    Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways
    and Actions to Address Them (30-JAN-03, GAO-03-164).

    Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to
    address airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can
    affect the entire U.S. economy, but runway projects are often
    controversial and time-consuming. GAO was asked to examine how
    much time airports spend completing runways, what challenges
    airports and other stakeholders experience during this process,
    and what airports and other stakeholders have done to address
    challenges related to runway projects. GAO analyzed the results
    of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects and visited 5
    airports in order to interview numerous runway project
    stakeholders. The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO's
    characterization of the challenges associated with building
    runways and some of the initiatives taken to address these
    challenges. They did express some concerns related to GAO's
    analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in
    developing runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional
    FAA efforts to improve the runway process. We believe that our
    approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken
    to build runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the
    length of time. We also added information regarding initiatives
    undertaken by FAA.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-164
        ACCNO:   A05981
      TITLE:     Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building
    Runways and Actions to Address Them
         DATE:   01/30/2003
      SUBJECT:   Airports
    	     Aviation
    	     Construction (process)
    	     Construction costs
    	     Environmental monitoring
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning

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    GAO-03-164

                                           A

    Report to the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation
    and Infrastructure

    January 2003 AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE Challenges Related to Building
    Runways and Actions to Address Them

    GAO- 03- 164

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Some Airports Have Spent Many
    Years Building Runways and Have Faced a Variety of Challenges 10

    A Number of Initiatives Are Underway to Address Challenges Related to
    Building Runways 16 Agency Comments 22

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 24

    Appendix II: Airport Site Visits 26 General Edward Lawrence Logan
    International Airport * East Boston, MA 27

    Current Status of the Runway Project 30 Stakeholders Cite Community
    Opposition as a Major Challenge and Say Efforts to Address This Issue Were
    Unsuccessful 30

    Stakeholders Say Meeting Extensive Environmental Requirements Has Been
    Challenging Because of Community Opposition 31 Litigation Added Time to
    Process 34

    Appendix III: Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX 36
    Current Status of the Two Runway Projects 38 Airport Officials Described
    Extensive Environmental Review

    Process as Challenging 38 The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport
    Used Some Unique

    Approaches to Mitigate Runway Impacts 38 Stakeholder Experiences, from
    Start to Finish, Were Many and

    Varied 39 Litigation Delayed Process 40

    Appendix IV: Memphis International Airport 43 Status of the Runway project
    45 Airport Officials Stated That They Faced Challenges Reaching

    Consensus among Stakeholders on Project Funding Issues and Decisionmaking
    45 Extensive Requirements Raised Challenges Regarding Wetlands

    Mitigation and Land Acquisition during Construction of Runway 46 Site-
    Specific Challenges Involved Relocating Other

    Infrastructure 47

    Appendix V: Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport 49 Current Status
    of the Runway Project 51 Stakeholders Agree That Comprehensive Mitigation
    Plans Are

    Essential but Difficult to Develop 51 Stakeholders Believe That Mitigation
    Funding Should Be More

    Flexible to Include More Communities 52 A Nationwide Low Frequency Noise
    Policy Is Not in Place 52 Some Communities Question Justification of State
    Zoning Laws 53

    Appendix VI: Seattle- Tacoma International Airport 56 Status of the Runway
    project 58 Simplifying Purpose and Need May Help Reduce the Circuitous

    Nature of the Review Process 58 A Compatible Land Use Program May Help to
    Reduce

    Opposition 59 New Mitigation Approaches and Increased Community
    Interaction

    Could Help Foster Community Support 60 Extensive Regulatory and Legal
    Requirements Posed Resource Challenges 62

    Site- Specific Issues Involve Safety and Environmental Challenges 63

    Appendix VII: Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada 65
    Status of Runway Projects 67 Airport Development Process in Canada Differs
    from U. S.

    Process 67 Canadian Airports Face Many of the Same Challenges as U. S.

    Airports 68

    Appendix VIII: Survey of Airports 70

    Appendix IX: Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects 72
    Tables Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633, and the

    Challenges Each Seeks to Address 18 Table 2: Airports Selected for Site
    Visit and their Runway

    Projects 27 Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project 35 Table
    4: History of Dallas* Fort Worth Runway Project 41 Table 5: History of
    Memphis Runway Project 48 Table 6: History of Minneapolis- St. Paul
    International Airport

    Runway Project 54 Table 7: History of Sea- Tac Runway Project 64

    Table 8: Airports Surveyed 71 Figures Figure 1: Runway Development Process
    8

    Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on Runway
    Projects Varied 11 Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall
    and on Each Phase 12

    Figure 4: Airport Diagram* Boston*s Logan International Airport 29 Figure
    5: Airport Diagram* Dallas- Fort Worth International

    Airport 37 Figure 6: Airport Diagram* Memphis International Airport 44
    Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Sea- Tac International Airport 57 Figure 8:
    Airport Diagram* Lester B. Pearson International

    Airport 66

    Letter

    January 30, 2003 The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman The Honorable William
    O. Lipinski Ranking Democratic Member Subcommittee on Aviation Committee
    on Transportation and Infrastructure House of Representatives

    Although the events of September 11, 2001, diverted the aviation
    industry*s attention from airport flight capacity to security issues,
    aviation experts believe that addressing capacity issues must be brought
    back to the forefront to prevent costly flight delays and their negative
    effect on the U. S. economy. According to a recent report on the impact on
    civil aviation, 1 the

    flight congestion and delay problems that were experienced in 2000 had a
    significant effect on the entire U. S. economy and were felt not only in
    the commercial aviation industry but also in the tourism and related
    supplier industries. The report found that in 2000, commercial aviation
    delays resulted in over $9 billion in negative economic effects on the
    entire U. S. economy and cost commercial airlines over $3 billion. In
    addition, the report stated that if there were no new investments in
    airport construction (including new runways) or in the air traffic system
    beyond 2000, delays could potentially cost the U. S. economy $13.5 billion
    in 2007 and $17.2 billion in 2012.

    Building runways can involve years of planning, an extensive environmental
    review phase, and the design and construction of the actual runway.
    Airport authorities who want to build a runway must also coordinate with
    numerous stakeholders, including airlines, federal and

    state officials, and community groups. In addition, they may face legal
    challenges from opponents of the runway that can take years to resolve.
    Nonetheless, according to FAA, despite these challenges, building new
    runways is widely regarded as the most effective way to increase capacity

    1 The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation, DRI- WEFA, Inc., July
    2002.

    in the national airspace system and is critical to the entire U. S.
    economy. 2 This report provides information on the process for building
    runways, taking into consideration the needs of the system and the
    concerns of the various stakeholders. Specifically, as agreed with your
    offices, we address the following questions:

    1. How much time do airports spend building their runway projects, and
    what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience during this
    process?

    2. What have airports and other stakeholders done or proposed to do to
    address the challenges they experienced in building runways? To determine
    the amount of time that airports spent to complete runway projects, along
    with challenges that airports and other stakeholders faced during this
    process and initiatives to address these challenges, we surveyed 30
    airports that had built or planned to build a total of 32 runways between
    1991 and 2010. Based on survey responses, we selected 5 airports that were
    diverse in size, location, and challenges at which we conducted in- depth
    site visits in order to understand the perspectives of numerous

    stakeholders. At these locations, we interviewed airport, airline, federal
    and state, and community officials about their experiences. We also
    visited the Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to
    gain a perspective on the Canadian runway development process. A more
    detailed explanation of the scope and methodology can be found in appendix
    I.

    Results in Brief The amount of time that airports spend planning and
    building their runways can vary because of a number of factors. For
    example, although it

    is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending of the
    environmental and the design and construction phases of the runway
    development process, there is no consensus among stakeholders about what
    constitutes the beginning of the planning phase of the process.
    Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities considered
    by

    some airports to be part of the planning phase vary. In light of these
    circumstances, we decided to use a median time rather than the average
    time because it would minimize the impact of outlying airports that may
    have taken a very long or very short time. For the airports we surveyed,
    the

    2 Some in the aviation industry believe that demand management and peak
    pricing are also feasible alternatives to reducing congestion and delays.

    median time spent from planning to completion of their runway projects was
    about 10 years, and the median time that airports estimated they would
    spend on projects not yet completed was about 14 years. Several of the
    airports with unfinished runway projects stated that significant
    challenges had delayed their projects* completion. Although the level of
    challenges

    faced by airports varied depending on such factors as proximity of the
    airport to a major city, amount of community opposition to the runway, and
    specific environmental issues, some common themes emerged. For example,
    several airports described challenges related to reaching stakeholder
    agreement on the purpose and need for the new runway. Another theme was
    the challenge of completing required environmental

    reviews; specifically, airports described challenges related to complying
    with extensive and duplicative federal and state requirements and
    obtaining the necessary permits. Some airports also described challenges
    related to reaching agreement on how to mitigate the impact of noise and
    other issues. Several airports commented that they faced challenges during

    the design and construction of their runways such as dealing with weather
    and site preparation issues. Although there may be no single solution that
    addresses all the issues

    involved in planning and building runways, the federal government and
    airport authorities have undertaken a number of initiatives in this area.
    Most recently, the President issued an Executive Order that is directed at
    streamlining the environmental review of transportation infrastructure
    projects by requiring federal agencies that conduct environmental reviews
    to develop procedures that will allow the reviews to be completed in a
    timely and responsible manner. In addition, to address challenges
    associated with the many regulatory requirements of the runway development
    process, two legislative initiatives designed to streamline the runway
    development process have been under consideration at the federal

    level. FAA has also undertaken several initiatives directed at increasing
    communication and coordination, and at streamlining the planning and
    environmental review of runway projects. FAA officials expect these
    initiatives to produce measurable improvements in the runway development
    process. Although some airports stated that the federal initiatives held
    promise for helping airports to resolve challenges more quickly, it is too
    early to assess their impact on the runway development process. Airports
    have also undertaken initiatives to address challenges related to building
    runways, including getting local stakeholders such as community groups
    involved at the very beginning of the process and

    reaching early agreement on how to mitigate the impacts of the runway.
    Airports described these initiatives as helpful to facilitating the
    completion

    of their runway projects, and their efforts may be useful for other
    airports involved in runway projects to consider, but the variety of
    situations that airports described and the different levels of challenges
    they faced make it difficult to generalize from one airport*s experience
    to another.

    We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report
    for their review and comment. FAA officials agreed with our
    characterization of the challenges associated with building runways and
    our identification of some of the initiatives to address these challenges.
    However, they did express some concerns related to our analysis of the
    time that airports spent developing their runways, and suggested that GAO
    include more acknowledgment of FAA*s efforts to improve the process. In
    response to FAA*s comments, we believe our approach was a reasonable
    assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to build runways;
    however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We also

    added information regarding several initiatives that FAA has undertaken to
    streamline the runway development process, and we made technical changes
    where appropriate. Background The decision to build runways has
    traditionally elicited strong and often

    emotional reactions among stakeholders, both negative and positive.
    Generally, these reactions are directed at the decision to build a runway*
    usually in response to the perceived environmental or economic impacts
    that the proposed project will have on the surrounding communities. Often,
    opponents to a runway project base their opposition on the belief that the
    negative impact of the runway on their quality of life will outweigh the
    projected benefits of the project. At other times, opponents contend that
    alternatives such as high- speed rail, regional airports, or demand
    management are better alternatives to resolving delay issues than building
    new runways. In contrast, proponents of new runway projects generally

    contend that building new runways can increase the level of service and
    reduce delay at the airport, can result in a positive economic impact to
    the region served by the airport, and in some cases can reduce noise
    pollution by distributing flights over a larger geographical area.

    Airports that plan to build runways must comply with what can become a
    complex process involving three general phases that often overlap:
    planning, environmental review, and design and construction. In addition,
    airports can be involved in legal actions that can occur in any or all of
    the

    three phases.

    The first phase in the runway development process is planning. According
    to FAA guidance, airports should begin planning for a new runway when the
    airport has reached 60 to 75 percent of total annual flight capacity.
    During the planning phase, airport authorities and local officials begin
    by identifying the type of development needed at a specific airport and
    the proposed project*s estimated cost and benefits, in both political and
    economic terms. Some of the planning tasks include establishing the
    purpose and need for the runway (for example, assessing the capability of
    current facilities, reviewing and refining aviation demand forecasts, and
    evaluating options to accommodate forecast demands), coordinating land use
    issues with community planning boards, and preparing capacity

    enhancement plans, master plans, airspace reviews, cost benefit analyses,
    and airport layout plans. 3 Further, most airports consider numerous
    alternatives for increasing capacity or reducing delay before deciding on
    a project to pursue. During this phase, airports will begin addressing how
    to fund the proposed project.

    The environmental review phase, which often overlaps with planning, is the
    second phase in the runway development process. This phase typically
    begins with a determination by FAA of the extent to which a proposed
    project will affect the quality of the environment. 4 To make this
    determination, FAA examines the proposed project and its possible
    environmental impacts on air and water quality, on noise, and on
    historical lands. FAA will make one of three determinations. If the agency
    determines that the scope of the project is such that it will not directly
    affect the environment, it will issue a categorical exclusion. 5 If FAA
    determines that a project will have a measurable effect on the
    environment, but that its impact will not exceed guidelines established in
    the agency*s Environmental Handbook, it will issue a Finding of No
    Significant Impact

    (FONSI). After issuance of a FONSI, runway projects can begin applying for
    necessary permits, such as those that may be required under the Clean 3
    Airports and other stakeholders develop these plans to help them identify
    potential ways to increase airfield capacity at major airports and to
    coordinate major infrastructure projects at the airports.

    4 Some states have environmental review requirements in addition to
    federal requirements. 5 Under the National Environmental Policy Act of
    1969, a categorical exclusion exempts the project from the requirements of
    the federal environmental review process. However, according to FAA,
    categorical exclusions are not an option for a new runway or major runway
    extension. A categorical exclusion does not necessarily relieve the
    project from state and local environmental review requirements.

    Air Act or the Clean Water Act. Where potentially significant impacts are
    obvious, FAA will proceed directly to the preparation of an environmental
    impact statement (EIS) rather than start with the airport sponsors*
    environmental assessment. 6

    If FAA determines that a proposed project will have significant
    environmental effects, it will issue a notice of intent to prepare an EIS.
    An EIS includes an analysis of the potential environmental effects of a
    proposed project and how to mitigate significant impacts. Council on

    Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations do not require that all impacts be
    mitigated; agencies are required to disclose impacts that will not be
    mitigated, and the reason. After the draft EIS is completed, FAA provides
    it to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which publishes a notice
    of its availability in the Federal Register, where it is made available
    for review and comment to federal, state, and local agencies and the
    public for at least

    45 days. Public hearings, if necessary, usually occur during the review
    and comment period. At the end of the public comment period, FAA responds
    to comments received on the draft and prepares the final EIS. Once FAA
    approves the final EIS, the document is printed, distributed, and once
    again filed with EPA. EPA subsequently publishes notice of the
    availability of the final EIS in the Federal Register. According to CEQ
    regulations, FAA can not issue a Record of Decision (ROD) for at least 30
    days after the publication of the final EIS. Once the final EIS has been
    issued, it takes FAA an average of about 3 months to issue a ROD. The ROD,
    which is the final step of the environmental review process, summarizes
    the administrative record of the agency*s proposals, alternatives,
    analysis, findings/

    determinations, decisions, actions, and mitigation measures that were made
    a condition of approval of the EIS. If, however, FAA finds that the
    revised draft differs significantly from the initial draft, the agency may
    issue a supplemental draft EIS and release this document for further
    review

    and comment. In addition, other factors that may lead to a supplemental
    EIS include a change in the proposed action, a change in the agency*s

    6 An EIS is a document required of federal agencies by the National
    Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing regulations as
    formulated by the Council on Environmental Quality for major projects or
    legislative proposals that significantly affect the environment. It
    describes the environmental effects of the undertaking and lists
    alternative actions. In principle, it is a basis for deciding whether to
    approve the project. FAA is responsible for preparing an EIS for a major
    airport project or selecting a contractor (that is, consultant) to assist
    FAA in preparing the EIS. Typically, FAA coordinates with the airport
    authority when it selects an EIS consultant.

    decision, or new reasonable alternatives not previously evaluated. A
    supplemental draft EIS can occur anywhere in the environmental process.

    In addition to the requirements above, airport sponsors may be required to
    obtain environmental permits/ approvals from other state, local, and
    federal agencies before they can begin construction of the proposed
    project. These permits/ approvals cover various federal and state
    requirements related to wetlands, water and air quality, coastal zone
    management, and endangered

    species, among others. These requirements arise from various regulations,
    including the federal Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act. For example, the
    Army Corp of Engineers requires permits when proposed projects have an
    impact on wetlands under the Clean Water Act. State and local agencies may
    also be responsible for requiring permits dealing with air and water
    quality. Similar to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process,
    the permitting process may include a public review and comment period.
    Project opponents may initiate litigation once the final EIS has been
    approved and the FAA has issued a favorable ROD. However, a lawsuit can

    be filed at any time during the planning, environmental, and design and
    construction phases. Following the completion of the permit process,
    project sponsors generally

    begin the final phase of the runway development process* the design and
    construction phase. This phase includes a myriad of tasks, such as project
    engineering, financing, contracting, land acquisition, site preparation,
    and actual project construction. This phase also includes construction
    tasks related to mitigating noise, wetland, and other environmental
    impacts. According to FAA, it is common for airport sponsors to begin
    runway design while the environmental process is underway in the interest
    of saving time by undertaking these actions concurrently. Once
    construction

    of the runway has been completed, FAA certifies the runway for operation
    and commissions it for service. Figure 1 illustrates the main steps
    involved in the runway development process.

    Figure 1: Runway Development Process

    Note: GAO analysis of FAA and other documents.

    Some Airports Have The amount of time that airports spend planning and
    building their

    Spent Many Years runways can vary because of a number of factors. For
    example, although it

    is relatively straightforward to determine the beginning and ending of the
    Building Runways and

    environmental and the design and construction phases of the process, Have
    Faced a Variety of

    there is no consensus about what constitutes the beginning of the planning
    Challenges

    phase. Consequently, the length of time and the number of activities
    considered by some airports to be part of the planning phase vary.
    Airports also described a variety of challenges that they said delayed
    their projects. Many of these challenges related to reaching stakeholder
    agreement, completing the environmental review phase, mitigating the
    impact of noise, or designing and constructing the actual runway.

    Completed Runways Took a As shown in figure 2, airports we surveyed
    reported spending a wide range

    Median of 10 Years to Build, of time in completing runway projects. In
    general, airports reported

    and Unfinished Runways spending less time on completed projects than they
    estimate they will

    May Take Even Longer spend on those projects not yet completed; for
    example, airports reported

    that about half of the completed runways took 10 years or less but
    estimated that almost all the projects that were not yet completed (16 out
    of 17) would take 10 years or more. According to the airports with
    uncompleted projects, a number of factors contributed to the time spent,
    such as community opposition and difficulties in dealing with
    environmental requirements.

    Figure 2: Amount of Time Airports Have Spent or Planned to Spend on Runway
    Projects Varied

    Note: GAO analysis of airport survey data.

    Figure 3 shows that the median time spent on completed runway projects was
    about 10 years, while the median time airports estimated they would spend
    on runway projects not yet completed was about 14 years. Similarly, the
    median time spent on the planning and environmental phases for

    airports that had completed these phases was significantly shorter than
    the median time airports estimated would be spent on those phases for
    projects that they had not yet completed. This may have been because the
    three projects in the planning phase and the five projects in the
    environmental phase were experiencing challenges that the airports
    believed would delay the completion of the respective phases. Moreover,
    the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects that had
    completed their environmental requirements under a FONSI was about 2.7
    years, while the median time spent on the environmental phase of projects
    that had completed their environmental requirements with an EIS was about
    3.7 years. This difference is likely attributable to the greater number of
    requirements that accompany an EIS as compared with a FONSI.

    Figure 3: Median Time Spent on Runway Projects Overall and on Each Phase
    Varied

    Note 1: GAO analysis of airport survey data. Note 2: Airports used
    different milestones to indicate the start and end dates for each phase.
    Given this difference, we used median time rather than average time.

    Note 3: Although we received 32 responses regarding the amount of time
    taken or estimated to complete the overall process, the number of
    responses regarding the amount of time taken or estimated to complete each
    phase varied.

    In May 2001, the Department of Transportation issued a report to the
    Congress on an environmental review of airport improvement projects that
    reported results similar to our analysis. 7 As a part of its analysis, FAA
    measured the average time that elapsed between the start of planning and
    the start of construction for 10 airports that received approval for a new
    runway between 1996 and 2000. FAA found that the average time from

    7 Report to the U. S. Congress on Environmental Review of Airport
    Improvement Projects, U. S. Department of Transportation, May 2001.

    thestart of planning until the start of construction was about 10 years. 8
    The report also stated that the average time to complete an EIS for a new
    runway was 3.25 years from the beginning of the EIS process to the
    issuance of the Record of Decision* or about one- third of the 10- year
    time. According to FAA, there can be a considerable lag from the inception
    of the runway process until the runway is completed and in operation. FAA
    added

    that these delays occur as part of the process that airports sometimes go
    through in seeking to achieve consensus and the political will to move
    forward while contending with local public and political opposition to
    runway development. According to FAA, numerous examples can be found where
    runway development has been delayed 5, 10, or more years while plans are
    revised, discarded, or shelved until political and/ or economic factors
    can be satisfied. FAA stated that these actions make it difficult to
    determine how long it takes to build a runway.

    Several Themes Emerged Most airports that we surveyed and visited
    described significant factors

    among the Challenges That that delayed their runway projects. In many
    cases, the challenges they Airports Described

    described were interrelated. For example, several airports said they faced
    significant community opposition, which affected their ability to reach
    stakeholder agreement and to complete the environmental review phase.
    Although many of the airports we surveyed experienced similar types of
    challenges, some airports, such as those in Boston, Atlanta, and Seattle,
    faced a heightened level of challenges because of their locations in urban
    areas with a large number of residences very close by. Some of the
    specific challenges identified by airports and other stakeholders we
    visited include the following:

    Reaching stakeholder agreement. Reaching consensus on the purpose and need
    for a runway was described by several airports as being particularly
    challenging. In order to reach this consensus, airports generally must
    meet numerous times with stakeholders who may have differing opinions
    about the runway project or uses of land surrounding the airport. For
    example, airport officials in Los Angeles and Boston described challenges
    related to working with community interest groups and local metropolitan
    planning organizations that opposed the runway projects and advocated
    using means other than building a new runway to address

    8 FAA officials said that if they added 3 to 5 years for design and
    construction, then FAA*s determination of average time to complete a
    runway would become about the same as that reported by GAO for projects
    not yet completed.

    capacity issues, such as developing regional airports, building new
    airports, or pursuing alternative transportation modes like high- speed
    rail. Some airports described challenges related to reaching agreement
    with stakeholders other than community groups. For example, stakeholders
    in Seattle said that reaching agreement was challenging on issues such as
    where the runway should be located or the coordination of sometimes

    inconsistent land use plans among various planning groups. Officials at
    Boston*s Logan Airport said they could not reach agreement with FAA, a key
    stakeholder on all runway projects, regarding what was needed to satisfy
    the environmental review process. Specifically, Logan Airport officials
    disagreed with FAA*s decision to extend its environmental process by
    requiring a supplemental EIS because they believed that environmental
    issues had been settled during the initial analysis. They believed that
    FAA*s decision to require the supplemental draft stemmed from significant
    public and political pressure from those opposed to the project.

    Completing the environmental review phase. Of the 30 airports we surveyed,
    13 stated that one of their most significant challenges in planning and
    building their runways was complying with environmental requirements.
    Under the current process, airports must comply with over 40 federal laws,
    executive orders, and regulations that often overlap with the
    environmental requirements mandated by some states. For example, federal
    law requires the governor of each state to certify that federally funded
    runways conform to local air quality standards, a requirement known as the
    Governor*s certification. In addition, the Clean Air Act requires FAA to
    determine whether emissions from each airport project conform to its
    state*s plan for implementing national air quality standards. According to
    officials from the American Association of Airport Executives and Airports
    Council International, many state air quality plans contain

    unrealistically low airport emissions budgets, and few realistically
    anticipate reasonable airport growth. They believe that coordinating
    airport development activity with the state air quality plans causes a
    major source of delay and risk to airport projects. The officials also
    noted that the

    Governor*s Certificate requirement duplicates requirements found in the
    Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.

    Moreover, several airports, including those in Boston, Atlanta, Houston,
    and Minneapolis- St. Paul, commented that obtaining the permits necessary
    to complete the environmental review was a challenge that delayed their
    projects, because permitting agencies often took much longer than
    expected. Boston Logan officials stated that they experienced delays

    because the permitting agencies did not agree on the order in which the
    permits should be issued. For example, the coastal zone management agency
    was unwilling to issue its permit until FAA issued the ROD; however, FAA
    was unwilling to issue the ROD until the coastal permit was issued.
    According to FAA officials, the agency was able to obtain a satisfactory
    assurance from the state permitting agency that allowed FAA

    to move forward with the issuance of the ROD. As a result, according to
    FAA officials, they were able to avoid a significant delay. Mitigating the
    impact of noise and other issues. As we reported in

    October 2000, 9 mitigating the potential impact of aircraft noise on the
    surrounding community continues to be a significant challenge for airports
    that are building new runways. One of the reasons is that community
    concerns with aircraft noise are generally already high around many
    airports, and adding new runways adds to the already heightened concern.
    Another reason, according to some stakeholders, why mitigating noise is
    particularly challenging for several of the airports is because they do
    not participate in FAA*s voluntary Part 150 Noise Compatibility Program,
    which provides funding to airports to help mitigate the impact of noise on
    the communities. Several other airports also told us that their noise
    problems are the result of incompatible land uses (existing or planned)
    around the airports.

    In addition to mitigating the impact of noise on the surrounding
    community, officials at Sea- Tac Airport said that they were equally
    challenged to mitigate the impact of the project on wetlands, particularly
    because two key stakeholders had conflicting views on how this should be
    done. According to Sea- Tac officials, the state of Washington has a
    strong preference that mitigation measures for wetland and stream impacts
    be located in the same water basin where the impacts occur. However,
    because of concerns about attracting wildlife, and the danger to aircraft
    of

    bird strikes, FAA strongly advises that airports avoid locating wetlands
    within 10,000 feet of runways.

    Design and construction of the runway. Several airports commented that
    they also faced some challenges during the design and construction phase
    of their runways. For example, Dallas- Fort Worth officials stated that

    adverse weather conditions created construction problems for them, as the
    9 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges
    Associated with Building and Maintaining Runways, GAO- 01- 90T
    (Washington, D. C., Oct. 5, 2000).

    region*s high temperatures made it difficult to ensure that concrete
    poured for the runway would cure properly. Airport officials at Sea- Tac
    also described challenges related to the design and construction phase.
    For

    example, before Sea- Tac can build its runway it has to import 17 million
    cubic yards of dirt to the airport to extend a plateau for a foundation.
    Thus, the airport authority has to find suitable, nonpolluted fill dirt to
    use for the

    foundation. Once the dirt is located, it must be transported to the
    airport over an indirect route using trucks that the airport is required
    to clean before they leave the airport. Finally, the airport authority is
    to use extensive mitigation measures to ensure that moving the dirt will
    not adversely affect the surrounding communities and wetlands.

    Appendixes II through VI provide a detailed description of how various
    challenges have affected runway projects at the Boston, Dallas, Memphis,
    Minneapolis- St. Paul, and Seattle airports, according to airport
    authorities

    and other stakeholders. A Number of Initiatives

    While there may be no single solution to all the challenges associated
    with Are Underway to

    planning and building runways, the federal government and airports have
    undertaken a number of initiatives to address the challenges related to
    Address Challenges

    such issues as duplicative environmental requirements, stakeholder Related
    to Building

    differences, and noise mitigation. Primarily, these initiatives focused on
    Runways streamlining the environmental review process and improving
    cooperation, communication, and coordination among major stakeholders.

    Federal Initiatives Focus on One initiative designed to address a
    significant issue identified by airports

    Streamlining the and other stakeholders* the extensive and often
    duplicative environmental

    Environmental Review review requirements* is Executive Order 13274,
    entitled Environmental

    Stewardship and Transportation Infrastructure Project Reviews, which was
    Process to Reduce

    signed by the President on September 18, 2002. 10 The order directs
    agencies Duplication

    that conduct required environmental reviews with respect to transportation
    infrastructure projects, including runways, to formulate and implement
    administrative, policy, and procedural mechanisms that enable the agencies
    to ensure completion of such reviews in a timely and

    10 The order does not supersede the requirements of the National
    Environmental Policy Act or other environmental laws.

    environmentally responsible manner. The order also states that the
    Secretary of Transportation shall

     designate a list of high- priority transportation infrastructure
    projects to receive expedited agency reviews; 11

     chair an inter- agency task force to monitor and expedite environmental
    reviews of high- priority transportation infrastructure projects, and
    identify and promote policies that can effectively streamline the
    environmental review process; and

     prepare an annual report to the President describing the results of the
    expedited reviews, and provide recommendations.

    Executive departments and agencies shall take appropriate actions, to the
    extent consistent with applicable law and available resources, to promote
    environmental stewardship in the nation*s transportation system and to
    expedite environmental reviews of high- priority transportation
    infrastructure projects. The Secretary has stated that the Department of

    Transportation will work with federal and state agencies to reduce
    duplicative and overlapping requirements and promote effective strategies
    for enhancing the timeliness of the decisionmaking process.

    Proposed legislation was introduced in the 107th Congress to address
    several of the concerns raised by a number of airports and other
    stakeholders we surveyed and visited* H. R. 4481, the Airport Streamlining
    Approval Process Act of 2002, and S. 633, the Aviation Delay Prevention
    Act. H. R. 4481, the House bill, focused on capacity- enhancement projects

    and was generally directed at streamlining the runway development process,
    while the Senate bill was directed at reducing aviation delays. Table 1
    summarizes some of the key provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633 that sought
    to address the challenges the airports identified.

    11 On October 31, 2002, the Secretary of Transportation selected seven
    high- priority transportation projects. One airport project was selected*
    a runway construction project at the Philadelphia International Airport.
    The Secretary is currently considering additional transportation projects,
    including airport projects, to add to the initial list.

    Table 1: Summary of Provisions in H. R. 4481 and S. 633, and the
    Challenges Each Seeks to Address H. R. 4481, Airport Streamlining Approval
    Process Act of 2002 S. 633, Aviation Delay Prevention Act Challenge
    addressed

    Directs FAA to take action to encourage the Requires DOT to designate
    certain airport projects

    Reaching stakeholder construction of airport capacity- enhancement

    as national capacity projects. The airports where agreement.

    projects at congested airports. these national capacity projects are
    designated would be required to complete the planning and environmental
    review process within 5 years, or else lose access to certain federal
    funds.

    Authorizes DOT to develop interagency cooperative Requires DOT to
    implement an expedited Completing the

    agreements with other federal and state coordinated environmental review
    process for environmental review stakeholders in the environmental review
    process.

    national capacity projects that provides for better phase.

    coordination among federal, regional, state, and local agencies.

    Allows airports to reimburse FAA for the additional Authorizes DOT to
    develop a 5- year pilot program Completing the

    staff necessary to review and approve project funded by airport sponsors
    to hire additional FAA

    environmental review construction requests. environmental specialists and
    attorneys.

    phase. Makes DOT the lead agency for all capacity Requires DOT to
    implement an expedited Completing the

    enhancement project environmental reviews, with environmental review
    process that provides a *date

    environmental review responsibility for setting time frames for all
    relevant certain* process deadline for environmental reviews.

    phase. agency reviews. All federal agency reviews would be required to
    occur concurrently.

    Allows DOT to define the purpose and need for any Not addressed. Reaching
    stakeholder

    airport capacity- enhancement project for any federal agreement.

    or state review that requires the establishment of a purpose and need.
    Eliminates the required Governor's certification,

    Eliminates the required Governor's certification, Completing the which
    states that an airport will meet state and local which states that an
    airport will meet state and local

    environmental review environmental standards. environmental standards.

    phase. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.

    In responding to our survey, seven airports stated that eliminating the
    governor*s certificate requirement would reduce duplicative environmental
    requirements. In an August 2000 report to the Congress on aviation and the
    environment, we suggested that Congress may wish to consider eliminating
    the state air quality certification requirements in airport legislation

    becauseit is duplicative of protections offered under the Clean Air Act.
    12 FAA officials stated that they agreed with our suggestion and believed
    that a parallel situation exists with respect to state water quality
    certification,

    12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation and the Environment: Airport
    Operations and Future Growth Present Environmental Challenges, GAO/ RCED
    00- 153 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30, 2000).

    which is largely duplicative of protections under the Clean Water Act.
    Both the House and the Senate bills would have eliminated the Governor*s
    Certificate requirement.

    FAA Initiatives Focus on FAA has identified and undertaken several
    initiatives directed at

    Streamlining the Planning streamlining the planning and environmental
    review processes and

    and Environmental Review improving cooperation, communication, and
    coordination among major

    Processes stakeholders. Some of the initiatives have been implemented, and
    others

    are currently underway. FAA officials believe that the initiatives, if
    successful, will provide measurable improvements in the amount of time and
    resources spent in the planning and environmental review phases of the
    process. FAA has undertaken several initiatives to improve the planning
    and environmental processes that the agency believes will help ensure that

    runway projects are completed in a timely manner. With respect to
    planning, FAA prepared an internal Memorandum of Agreement in September
    2002 to standardize the procedures for establishing

    multidisciplinary teams to participate in major airport planning studies.
    The agency has plans to update its guidance on airport master plans and to
    upgrade an airspace and ground capacity simulation model in fiscal year
    2003, and to update its guidance on airport terminal planning and design
    by the end of fiscal year 2004. With respect to streamlining the
    environmental review process, FAA began implementing several initiatives
    in January 2001 that are designed to produce measurable improvements. FAA
    began establishing multidisciplinary EIS teams for new EISs at large hub
    primary airports, reallocating staff resources and seeking airport
    reimbursable agreements to support environmental work, and increasing the
    use of consultants to assist FAA with coordination and administration of
    EISs.

    To increase coordination and assign accountability for runway development
    tasks to key stakeholders, FAA began another initiative in August 2001 as
    a part of its Operational Evolution Plan* a 10- year plan to expand and
    modernize the nation*s airport system. FAA developed detailed plans called
    Runway Template Action Plans to provide a standard set of tasks that must
    be considered when developing new runways. FAA has completed Runway
    Template Action Plans for 12 airports that are expected to complete new
    runways by 2008. According to FAA officials, the agency has met the
    deadlines for its commitments at all of the airports, and no runway
    completion date has changed as a result of FAA actions since the

    program began.

    While the Executive Order and the proposed legislation were designed to
    address challenges some of the airports experienced, it is too early to
    assess their impact; the Executive Order was only recently signed, and the
    legislation did not pass in the 107th session of Congress. Nonetheless,
    several stakeholders, including airports we surveyed and visited,
    supported

    efforts consistent with these initiatives. Further, FAA officials believe
    that the initiatives FAA has taken and proposed will yield measurable
    improvements in the runway development process* particularly with respect
    to the planning and environmental review phases of the process.

    Airports Have Undertaken Airports we visited and surveyed described a
    number of actions they have

    Some Initiatives to Address taken to address the challenges they faced in
    building their runways. These

    Challenges actions included proactive approaches to working with
    stakeholders to

    plan for and mitigate various impacts of the runway projects on
    neighboring communities. For example, the Louisville airport used an
    unusual approach to deal with the needs of neighboring homeowners who
    would be required to move in order to be outside the noise parameter
    levels posed by the new runway. After reaching agreement on the market
    value that the airport would pay for each home, the airport offered these
    residents a choice: residents either could move to a new home of equal
    value in a new community development being built by the airport, or they
    could participate in the traditional relocation program, where the airport
    purchases the home and the family relocates to a home and location of its
    choosing. Airport officials stated that this approach worked well for both
    the airport and the displaced residents. According to airport officials,
    the residents benefited because those who wished to stay together as a
    community (which was the preference of many) were able to do so, and the
    airport saved approximately $17,000 per home on those homes built in the
    new community development.

    A Washington State Department of Transportation official stated that
    minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed for expanding runway
    capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The
    department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,
    implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management
    Act* the state*s land- use planning law. The law requires cities and
    counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities
    (including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching
    development. In other words, when developing local land- use plans, cities

    and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these
    facilities. As part of the land- use compatibility program, certain state

    transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation,
    between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal or
    county planning staff) to balance the state*s dual interest of promoting
    aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.
    The approach to facilitating airports* future expansion includes several
    steps, including the development of planning- based solutions and the
    integration of those solutions into a legally enforceable document, such
    as a comprehensive development plan* rather than the Airport Master Plan,
    which is not binding on land- use authority* in order to increase the

    probability that the solutions will succeed. In Minneapolis, the airport
    attempted to build consensus throughout the project by considering
    mitigation agreements that were more liberal than those required by FAA.
    For example, the airport has been pursuing a liberal noise- mitigation
    strategy in order to better address community concerns about noise
    impacts. The airport chose to keep residential blocks together for noise-
    mitigation measures, whether or not the entire block fell within the same
    noise contour. In other words, if one residence in a block lay within the
    65- decibel Day Night Average Sound Level (DNL) noise contour, every
    residence on the block received similar mediation measures. 13 Another
    challenge for which the airport had to develop a solution was

    mitigating the noise impacts on a National Wildlife Refuge located within
    the flight path of the new runway. The refuge contains an educational
    center and is a popular location for bird watching. The refuge contended
    that the usefulness of the center and bird watching activities would be
    severely impacted by noise from the runway. The airport and the refuge
    were ultimately able to negotiate an agreement whereby the airport
    authority would pay the organization $26 million for the right to conduct
    flight operations over the refuge.

    In Dallas- Fort Worth, the airport chose to implement a four- stage
    approach to mitigating the noise impacts of the runway project: 1) direct
    land acquisition for properties located in the runway protection zone, 2)
    direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise mitigation, 3)
    sound proofing structures for noise mitigation, and 4) acquisition of
    aviation easements. Airport officials noted that the first three stages of
    the mitigation plan are standard among most runway projects and, in the
    case of acquiring properties in the runway protection zone, required of
    all

    13 The Day Night Average Sound Level is a measurement of the average noise
    impacts of the airport on the surrounding community.

    airports. However, with respect to aviation easements, the airport
    undertook an approach that it considered to be extraordinary at the time.
    The airport offered residents 25 percent of the fair market value of their
    property to acquire easements for noise impacts. The easements are
    attached to the property deed, affecting the current property owner and
    all future owners of that property.

    Overall, the airports that described these initiatives believed they had a
    positive impact on their runway projects. Other airports described similar
    initiatives that they believed were helpful in facilitating the completion
    of the various phases of their projects. It may be helpful for other
    airports to consider these initiatives when faced with similar challenges;
    however, the wide variety of situations faced by airports and the
    differing levels of community opposition or environmental issues each
    airport faces make it difficult to determine whether an effort undertaken
    successfully by one airport will have the same positive results at another
    airport.

    Agency Comments We provided the Secretary of Transportation with a copy of
    a draft of this report. FAA officials agreed with our characterization of
    the challenges

    associated with building runways and our identification of some of the
    initiatives to address these challenges. However, they did express some
    concerns related to our analysis of the amount of time airports spent or
    estimated spending in developing their runways, as compared with the

    results of FAA*s 2001 study. They also suggested that GAO include more
    acknowledgment of their efforts in trying to improve the runway
    development process. Regarding FAA*s concerns, we believe our approach was
    a reasonable assessment of the amount of time it takes airports to

    build runways. However, we clarified our discussion on the length of time
    by focusing on the median time rather than the average time because this
    approach minimizes the impact of outlying airports that may have taken a
    very long or a very short time to build their runways. We also compared
    our analysis of the time taken by airports to build runways with FAA*s
    study. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of the comparative
    analysis.

    Finally, we included information regarding several initiatives that FAA
    has undertaken to streamline and improve the planning and environmental
    processes. We also made technical changes throughout the report as

    appropriate. We performed our work from April 2001 through December 2002
    in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    As agreed with your office, unless you release its contents earlier, we
    plan no further distribution of this report until 10 days after the date
    of its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
    congressional committees with responsibilities for the activities
    discussed in this report; to the Secretary of Transportation; and to the
    Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. We will make copies
    available to others upon request. This report is also available at no
    charge on GAO*s Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions regarding the contents of this
    report, please call me or Tammy Conquest at (202) 512- 2834. Other key
    contributors to this report were Ruthann Balciunas, William Chatlos, David

    Hooper, Gary Lawson, David Lehrer, and Alwynne Wilbur. Gerald L.
    Dillingham, Ph. D Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Scope and Methodology Our primary methods for addressing our two research
    questions* first, how much time do airports spend building their runway
    projects and what challenges do airports and other stakeholders experience
    during this process, and second, what have airports and other stakeholders
    done or

    proposed to do to address the challenges they experienced in building
    runways*- were to conduct a nationwide survey of airports that built new
    runways between 1991 and 2000 or planned to build new runways by 2010, and
    to perform site visits at five airports. The survey population included 30
    airports, 16 of which had built their airports between 1991 and 2000, and
    14 of which had planned to build new runways by 2010. The survey,
    conducted in February 2002, provided data on the amount of time that 30
    airports spent in planning and building 32 runway projects; on key factors
    that accelerated or delayed the projects; and on initiatives that airports
    have taken to address the challenges they faced during the process. 14
    Based on our analysis of the survey responses, we judgmentally selected

    five airports at which to conduct site visits, to develop a more in- depth
    understanding of the experiences and challenges they faced. We
    subsequently visited Boston Logan, Dallas- Fort Worth, Memphis Shelby

    County, Minneapolis- St. Paul, and Seattle- Tacoma Airports, where we
    interviewed the airport authority, FAA, hub airlines, state agencies,
    metropolitan planning organizations, and local community and environmental
    groups about their experiences with the runway projects. In addition, we
    also interviewed officials from Lester B. Pearson International Airport in
    Toronto, Canada, and Transport Canada to gain an understanding of the
    Canadian runway development process.

    We also compared our analysis with FAA*s May 2001 report. While the
    results of the two studies are similar, there are some methodological
    differences between the two studies. First, our measurement begins at the
    start of planning and ends with the completion of the runway. In contrast,
    FAA*s measurement begins with planning but ends with the beginning of the
    design and construction phase. Second, GAO*s analysis is based on the
    median time, which minimizes the impact of runways that take a very long
    or a very short time to complete; FAA*s estimate, however, is based on the
    average time, which does not account for the impact of outliers. Based on
    our survey responses, when considering the average time, we found that
    airports that had completed their projects took 12.25 years and airports

    14 Information on the time airports spent in various parts of the process
    is based, in part, on estimates provided by some airports that have not
    yet completed their projects.

    that had not yet completed their projects estimated that their projects
    would take about 16 years. Third, our survey allowed the airports to
    determine the beginning and end of each of the process phases, whereas FAA
    selected specific events for analysis. For example, FAA*s analysis based
    the end of the environmental review phase on the issuance of the ROD.
    Certain airports responding to GAO*s survey included federal and state
    permits as part of the environmental process. FAA*s May 2001 report found
    that federal and state permits can take 6 to 12 months or more to complete
    after the ROD. Finally, each of the two analyses examined a different
    universe of airports. FAA analyzed data on 10 airports that had projects
    approved between 1996 and 2000. GAO analyzed data on over 30

    runway projects that were completed, or expected to be completed, between
    1991 and 2010. GAO*s analysis included 6 of the 10 airports that FAA
    analyzed.

    We also interviewed officials from FAA, Airports Council International,
    the Airline Transport Association, and the National Association of State
    Aviation Officials to obtain information on the process for building
    runways and to identify what actions have been taken to address challenges
    related to planning and building runways.

    We conducted our work from April 2001 through December 2002 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendi x II

    Airport Site Visits To gain additional perspective on the runway
    development process, we visited five airports that had significant
    positive or negative experiences in going through the runway development
    process; some of the airports identified initiatives to overcome these
    challenges. 15 We also included airports that were in various stages of
    completing their runway projects,

    and in various parts of the country. We asked the airports to share their
    experiences in the process of building new runways, as well as those
    events that either significantly delayed or accelerated the completion of
    the runway projects. We identified several key factors* the amount of time
    that transpired, how this time compared with the airports* expectations of
    the process timeline, how key stakeholders* timeliness compared with the
    airports* expectations, and the significant events that either delayed or
    accelerated the completion of the runways. In addition, we considered the
    airports* responses to other questions, as warranted. We also visited the
    Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto, Canada, to gain an
    understanding of the Canadian runway development process and of the
    airport*s experiences in building runways. The overarching factor leading
    to selection was the airports* experiences that appeared appropriate for
    other airports to draw upon. These experiences, both positive and
    negative, are intended to yield lessons that other airports can emulate or
    avoid. Table 2 shows the airports we selected and the phase of each
    project as of December 2002.

    15 See appendix I for the methodology we used to select the airports we
    visited.

    Table 2: Airports Selected for Site Visit and their Runway Projects
    Airport Location Size Phase a

    Gen. Edward Lawrence Logan East Boston, MA Large Environmental

    International Dallas- Fort Worth International DFW, TX Large Completed
    Dallas- Fort Worth International DFW, TX Large Suspended b Memphis
    International Memphis, TN Medium Completed Minneapolis- St. Paul
    International Minneapolis, MN Large Construction Seattle- Tacoma
    International Seattle, WA Large Environmental Lester B. Pearson
    International Toronto, Ontario Large Completed Lester B. Pearson
    International Toronto, Ontario Large Completed Lester B. Pearson
    International Toronto, Ontario Large Planning Source: U. S. General
    Accounting Office. a Runway development phases often overlap. The phase
    shown is the phase with the predominant

    activity as of December 2002. b The airport suspended development of this
    runway to explore implications of recent economic and

    industry events.

    Appendixes II through VII contain a summary of the results of our visit to
    each airport, including background information and status of the runway
    project. The summaries also highlight significant events and experiences
    for each specific location, based on our discussions with the airport
    authorities and key stakeholders. While each of the airports we visited
    experienced challenges within several broad themes noted earlier

    (resolving stakeholder differences, completing extensive environmental
    requirements, and addressing issues related to runway design and
    construction), those broad themes were not necessarily the most important
    at that specific site. Consequently, we highlight different experiences at
    each site. For example, the Boston airport*s legal challenges were much
    more extensive than were those at the Minneapolis- St. Paul airport. We
    discuss Boston*s legal challenges at length, while we mention those at

    Minneapolis- St. Paul as they applied to other experiences. General Edward

    Boston*s Logan International Airport is operated by the Massachusetts Port
    Lawrence Logan Authority (Massport). According to FAA, airport, state, and
    airline officials, Logan plays a critical role in the New England economy,
    and it serves as the International Airport *

    region*s long- haul and international gateway airport. According to East
    Boston, MA

    Massport officials, in 2000, the airport handled 27.4 million passengers
    and

    contributed about $6.6 billion to the regional economy, supporting about
    100,000 jobs. It was North America*s nineteenth- busiest in terms of
    passenger traffic. Logan is consistently ranked as one of the nation*s
    most delayed airports. In 2000, Logan was the sixth- most delayed airport
    overall and second- most delayed for arrivals. Logan is served by all the
    major U. S. carriers. The top carriers are U. S. Airways, American, and
    Delta, with roughly equal shares of passenger traffic. The airport is
    primarily an origin and destination point, with about 90 percent of the
    passengers beginning or ending their trips at Logan.

    In good weather, Logan generally operates on a north- south, three- runway
    configuration with a capacity of about 120 flight operations per hour.
    However, during adverse weather conditions (such as northwest or southeast
    winds in excess of 10 knots per hour, which occur about onethird of the
    year), the airport can be reduced to as few as 60 to 90 operations per
    hour on an east- west, one- or two- runway operation. Massport believes
    that its proposed 5,000- foot, unidirectional runway will avoid the
    significant reduction in efficiency during adverse weather conditions and
    help mitigate weather- related delays. 16 Massport views the runway as a
    capacity- neutral airfield enhancement, which means that the proposed
    runway will decrease delays without increasing the airport*s top capacity
    of about 120 flights per hour. The Massachusetts Executive Office of
    Environmental Affairs administers the Massachusetts Environmental Policy
    Act, the state*s environmental protection act. In its Final

    Environmental Impact Report certificate, the Secretary, Massachusetts
    Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, stated that the central
    environmental question is not whether the project is accommodating or
    generating demand per se, but rather whether Massport is operating the
    airport in a manner that avoids, minimizes, or mitigates environmental
    impacts in light of its obligations under MEPA. An official from the
    environmental office stated that the project might increase airfield
    capacity, but that an airport capacity determination was beyond the scope
    of its review. Figure 4 shows the existing Logan runway configuration,
    including the proposed runway project.

    16 All flights using this runway would arrive from the southeast or depart
    from the northwest, over Boston Harbor.

    Figure 4: Airport Diagram* Boston*s Logan International Airport

    We selected Logan Airport as a site- visit location, in part, because its
    runway project has been in the planning phase since 1969. 17 Further, a
    state court injunction against building new runways at the airport has
    been in place since the mid- 1970s (FAA approved an EIS for a runway in
    the same

    general location on the airfield in the late 1960s). Further, because of
    the injunction, Massport decided not to actively pursue the project until
    the project was reinstituted in 1995, based on an FAA Capacity Enhancement

    17 Logan Airport was not the only airport that spent a long time in the
    planning phase. Of the 30 airports we surveyed, two others* Phoenix and
    Indianapolis* also reported spending a long time (about 20 years or more)
    in the planning phase.

    Study. Logan is an example of an airport that has spent a long time in the
    process, and it has gone through several iterations of the EIS review
    process.

    We interviewed officials at Massport, who were the main sponsors of the
    new, sixth runway at Logan. We also interviewed officials at FAA*s New
    England Region, American Eagle Airlines, Massachusetts Executive Office of
    Environmental Affairs, and the Massachusetts High Technology Council. We
    also gathered information from Communities Against Runway Expansion, the
    primary community interest group. 18

    Current Status of the FAA issued its ROD indicating that the project had
    satisfied all federal

    Runway Project environmental requirements on August 2, 2002. However, the
    airport can not yet begin constructing the runway because of an existing
    state court

    injunction. Moreover, opposition groups appealed the ROD in August 2002 in
    the U. S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D. C., arguing, among other
    things, that FAA did not adequately analyze the noise and air quality
    impacts on neighboring communities.

    Stakeholders Cite Massport and other stakeholders we interviewed (American
    Eagle Airlines,

    Community Opposition Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental
    Affairs, FAA, and the

    High Technology Council) said that the lack of agreement among as a Major
    Challenge

    stakeholders* particularly with regard to responding to the strong ongoing
    and Say Efforts to

    community opposition to the runway project* has presented a major Address
    This Issue

    challenge. Communities Against Runway Expansion and other local community
    groups surrounding the airport opposed the project because of Were
    Unsuccessful

    a number of issues, including the impact of the runway on noise,
    emissions, economic growth, and endangered species. Opponents to the
    project also question the intended use of the runway (for example, delay
    reduction versus capacity enhancement). According to FAA, Massachusetts
    Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, American Eagle Airlines, the
    High Technology Council, and Massport officials themselves, the public
    appears to distrust Massport. These stakeholders added that much of the
    opposition stems from the fact that the airport is located in downtown
    Boston rather than from plans for a new runway, and that community

    18 The Communities Against Runway Expansion Vice President is also the
    Chair of the Community Advisory Council, a group representing various
    communities around Logan.

    groups opposed to the project are not likely to change their position.
    According to an American Eagle Airlines official, FAA should help
    community groups understand the economic benefits of the project on their
    communities.

    Massport said it has attempted to address this challenge through extensive
    public participation and review efforts, but that these have not been
    successful. FAA, Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs,
    and the airlines have agreed that Massport involved the public throughout
    most of the lengthy process, and that the public was able to express its
    concerns to Massport through the public meetings and the required public
    comment periods on FAA*s decisions. According to Massport, in response to
    public pressure, FAA created a special review panel and required Massport
    to undertake a supplemental Draft EIS as a means to further expand public
    participation. As part of the public outreach process, Massport provided
    $350,000 for technical assistance to the Community Advisory Council.
    Communities Against Runway Expansion, on the other

    hand, stated that Massport*s efforts toward communication were for
    appearance only* that the airport authority spoke to them but did not
    listen to their concerns. All agreed that extensive communication did not
    lead to cooperation and consensus.

    Stakeholders Say Massport and FAA prepared a joint Draft Environmental
    Impact Report and

    Meeting Extensive Draft EIS to meet state and federal requirements.
    According to Massport, this joint effort is a common approach for
    streamlining the environmental

    Environmental review process. The joint state and federal permit process
    lasted over 7

    Requirements Has years. Stakeholders said this is partly attributable to
    community opposition

    Been Challenging and to the effect of this opposition on the process.

    Because of Community In 1995, in what it described as an effort to conduct
    the environmental

    Opposition analysis with input from all concerned parties, Massport
    established the

    Airside Review Committee, which included representatives from the 24
    communities surrounding the airport and from 11 business and industry
    organizations. However, according to both FAA and Massport, this effort
    was suspended for about 18 months between 1996 and 1998, when the entire
    runway project stalled because of a change in Massport leadership and
    priorities. In 1998, according to Massport officials, the airport
    attempted to pick up the environmental review process where it had been
    suspended. Community groups complained that they had not been part of

    the recent process and appealed to FAA that the Draft EIS was no longer

    accurate, complete, or up- to- date. Massport believes it did try numerous
    times to meet with the Airside Review Committee, but to no avail. The
    state approved the Draft Environmental Impact Review in May 1999 and the
    final Environmental Impact Review in June 2001. However, FAA requested a
    Supplemental Draft EIS rather than approving the Draft EIS. FAA officials
    stated that the agency did so because it needed to address several issues,
    including changing technology and the high level of concerns expressed by
    project opponents in public comments to the Draft

    EIS. Massport, the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and American
    Eagle Airlines all believe that FAA*s decision was unreasonable. Massport
    officials contended that the project had already undergone 5 years of
    public process, that continuation was unlikely to help achieve local
    consensus, and that they believed it had not. FAA officials, however,
    believe that it did result in a better, more informative EIS document.

    Individuals, communities, action groups, and business groups submitted
    comments during public information meetings and hearings and in response
    to the Draft EIS and Final EIR documents that were extensive. For example,
    about 800 people attended the two April 2001 public hearings

    for the Supplemental Draft EIS document and about 850 comment letters were
    received during the 75- day comment period.

    The Supplemental Draft EIS took about 1 year to complete, and it delayed
    the filing of the Final EIS by about 1.5 years, according to Massport.
    During this time, in another attempt to develop agreement among
    stakeholders, FAA chaired a city and commonwealth Task Force to request
    further comments to the Draft EIS for incorporation into the Supplemental
    Draft EIS. Although this group met, analyzed, and discussed many runway
    issues, not all stakeholders were pleased with its outcome. For example,
    Communities Against Runway Expansion stated that the products of the

    panel*s work, the Supplemental Draft EIS and the Final Environmental
    Impact Review, were inaccurate and inconclusive, and they justified the
    runway without proposing a viable alternative.

    In late June 2002, FAA issued the Final EIS for public comment, as
    required by the NEPA process. FAA received approximately 100 comment
    letters raising 42 main issues, ranging from general opposition to a
    concern about the adequacy of technical analyses. FAA said that it
    responded to the comments as required and issued its final approval, the
    ROD, in August 2002. In both the Final EIS and the ROD, FAA included a
    restriction (which Massport officials said was unprecedented) that the
    proposed runway be

    used only when winds create conditions in which the usefulness of other
    current runways is limited. 19 FAA considers this wind restriction a
    mitigation measure, as it would ensure that the runway was not used to
    increase capacity during good weather. Many stakeholders* including
    proponents and opponents* view this restriction as a compromise designed
    to achieve consensus, but others, such as community groups, maintain that
    the wind restriction does not go far enough to mitigate the environmental
    effects of this project. Communities Against Runway Expansion continued to
    contest FAA*s approval in the press and in federal court and, through an
    urgent message on its Web page, urged others to respond to the Final EIS.
    Moreover, Massport and Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental
    Affairs officials said that, by issuing the ROD with wind restrictions,
    FAA could reactivate the state environmental review process because the
    approved project differs significantly from what

    Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs approved in 2001.
    Subsequently, the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs chose not to
    reexamine the environmental document because it did not believe that the
    wind restriction significantly changed the environmental impacts of the
    runway.

    FAA, Massport, and American Eagle Airlines said that, during the length of
    time spent attempting to get all of the environmental approvals needed,
    some assumptions made early on in the process have been called into
    question. For example, concerns have been raised that traffic forecasts

    may not materialize, that the increasing use of Regional Jets may change
    the equipment mix more than planned, and that the 5,000 foot runway may
    not be long enough to be as useful as hoped. They believe that these
    issues played a part in triggering FAA*s Supplemental Draft EIS process.
    However, a Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
    official stated that it is not possible to *freeze* the process to figure
    out all the answers

    before making a decision. According to many stakeholders, the
    environmental review process is a continuous cycle in which comments
    require additional study, which leads to revisions, which lead to more
    comments, which lead to additional study. They contend that the circuitous
    nature of the process is the primary source of delay. The Massachusetts
    environmental permit process has important time triggers that allow for
    the

    19 The ROD limits the use of the proposed 14/ 32 runway to those times
    when wind conditions equal or exceed 10 knots, either northwest or
    southeast. FAA Air Traffic Control is responsible for runway assignments
    and will base its use of 14/ 32 on forecasted wind conditions. The Record
    of Decision also includes a 2- hour window to adjust to changing
    conditions.

    process to come to an end. Massport believes that if similar triggers were
    in place at the federal level, many of the delays encountered during the
    EIS process could have been avoided. Litigation Added Time

    Massport first suggested, and actually began construction on, a new 3,830
    to Process

    foot runway in the same general location on the airfield almost 30 years
    ago (May 1974). Massport took the position that the 1974 runway project
    did not require a state environmental review because 1) both the Massport
    Board and the Commonwealth Office of Transportation and Construction
    determined it had no environmental impact and 2) the project commenced
    before July 1, 1973, the effective date of the Massachusetts Environmental

    Policy Act. The City of Boston and the Massachusetts Secretary of
    Environmental Affairs both disagreed and sued Massport. The Suffolk
    Superior Court enjoined Massport from proceeding with the 1974 Runways
    Project, pending the preparation, filing, and review of a final EIR as
    directed by the Secretary of Environmental Affairs.

    On June 15, 2001, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs determined that
    Massport*s Final EIR submitted in March 2001 adequately and properly
    complied with the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs.
    Massport went to court to get the injunction lifted. The court began
    considering this injunction in late January 2003. Groups opposing the
    project declared victory because the motion to lift the injunction went to
    trial. A second lawsuit, regarding runway development in Plymouth County,
    located southeast of the airport, resulted in a summary judgment in favor
    of Massport. This matter is now under appeal. Plymouth County includes the
    cities of Hull, Hingham, and Cohasset, all in the flight path of the over-
    thewater operations. These local municipalities alleged that the state
    environmental permit was invalid because Massport misled the Massachusetts
    Executive Office of Environmental Affairs about the project*s impact by
    providing incomplete and inaccurate technical data. Table 3 summarizes the
    history of the Boston Logan runway project.

    Table 3: History of the Boston Logan Runway Project Date Event

    Late 1960s FAA approves new runway. August 1974 State court injunction
    against building new runways at airport. June 1976 State court injunction
    against building new runways at airport

    amended. November 1995 Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs
    defines Draft

    EIR scope. November 1995 Massport establishes Airside Review Committee.
    January 1996 FAA defines Draft EIS scope. February 1999 Massport files
    Draft EIS/ Draft EIR with state and FAA.

    April 1999 FAA and Massport hold public meetings on Draft EIS/ Draft EIR.
    May 1999 State approves Draft EIR. January 2000 FAA orders supplemental
    Draft EIS. March 2001 Massport submits supplemental Draft EIS/ Final EIR
    to state and

    FAA. April 2001 FAA and Massport hold public hearings on supplemental
    Draft

    EIS/ Final EIR. June 2001 State approves Final EIR. June 2002 FAA
    publishes Final EIS for public comment. August 2002 FAA issues ROD. August
    2002 FAA approves Airport Layout Plan. August 2002 Community groups appeal
    ROD in U. S. Court of Appeals. September 2002 Massachusetts MEPA decides
    not to reopen state process. October 2002 Community challenge of state
    environmental approval trial

    dismissed. January 2003 Massport challenge of injunction trial date
    (Suffolk Superior

    Court). Spring 2006 Projected completion date. Source: U. S. General
    Accounting Office.

    Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport *

    Appendi x III

    DFW, TX In 2001, the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport was the
    fourth- busiest North American airport in terms of passengers. Both
    American Airlines and Delta Airlines run hub operations at the airport,
    with about 70 percent and 19 percent of the airport*s annual operations,
    respectively. According to the

    airport*s Chief Executive Officer, the airport provides $12 billion in
    annual economic activity for North Texas.

    The Dallas- Fort Worth Airport Board (the Board) governs the airport. The
    Board is composed of 12 members, 11 of whom are appointed by the councils
    of the airport*s owner cities in accordance with each city*s ownership
    interest in the airport; 7 represent the city of Dallas, and 4

    represent the city of Fort Worth. The 12th member is a nonvoting member
    representing the neighboring host cities of Coppell, Euless, Grapevine,
    and Irving on a rotating annual basis (the member is from a particular
    city every fourth year). The Board may enter into contracts without
    approval of the City Councils, but its annual operating budget requires
    City Council approval of the owner cities.

    The airport lies within the city limits of the four host cities. It
    obtained the freedom to pursue independent development through state
    legislation known as the Texas Municipal Airports Act. It covers over 29
    square miles, and its real property consists of over 18, 000 acres. The
    current configuration is seven runways* five north- south parallel, two
    diagonal. Four of these runways are over 11, 000 feet in length. This
    configuration

    allows the airport to land four planes simultaneously. In good weather,
    the airport generally operates with a capacity of about 260 to 270
    operations per hour. Airport revenue is shared with the surrounding cities
    based upon the location of the enterprise. For example, the rental car
    franchises are located in Euless, so that city receives a portion of the
    car rental tax

    revenues. The seventh runway was designed to reduce delays as well as to
    increase overall aircraft operations capacity. Airport officials developed
    the 1991 DFW Airport Development Plan, which included two new runways in
    response to market demand, to maintain the highest level of service for

    their customers. Figure 5 shows the existing Dallas- Fort Worth
    International Airport configuration, including the proposed eighth runway
    and several proposed extensions.

    Figure 5: Airport Diagram* Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport

    We selected the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport for a site visit
    because the airport, which was completed in February 1974, is one of the
    most recently constructed airports in the United States (only Denver is a
    more recently constructed large hub airport). The airport completed its
    seventh runway in 1996, and had planned to complete an additional eighth
    runway before more sophisticated demand- delay studies were completed.
    Furthermore, the airport reported in our survey that many elements of the
    runway development process took less time than expected.

    We interviewed officials at the following: Dallas- Fort Worth
    International Airport, the sponsor of the new runway projects; the four
    host cities surrounding the airport* Coppell, Euless, Grapevine, and
    Irving; FAA Southwest Regional Office and Airports District Office; North
    Central Texas Council of Governments; and the Texas Commission on
    Environmental Quality. We attempted to contact American Airlines, but

    airline officials said that too much time had passed since the early
    phases of the project for its response to be meaningful.

    Current Status of the The seventh runway was commissioned in October 1996.
    All activities for

    Two Runway Projects the proposed eighth runway have been temporarily
    suspended while

    airport officials explore the implications that recent economic and
    industry events will have for runway need.

    Airport Officials According to the airport Chief Executive Officer, the
    environmental review

    Described Extensive process for the seventh runway required the airport to
    coordinate the

    activities of 19 federal agencies and 15 state agencies, and this process
    was Environmental Review

    further complicated by the lack of prime contacts and personnel changes at
    Process as Challenging

    reviewing agencies. Public controversy and public demands for information
    exceeded the airport*s expectations and necessitated a highly detailed
    environmental review. According to airport officials, this review included
    an analysis of 12 project alternatives, although many were not

    equally viable or would not survive the review process. According to these
    officials, the airport will probably include two alternatives in future
    reviews* build/ no build* and then add specific alternatives for study if
    reviewers request that additional alternatives be examined. Officials felt
    that preparing an analysis of alternatives in this way will likely be less
    costly and time- consuming than would preparing alternatives that, in
    their opinion, clearly have no relevance.

    The Dallas- Fort Worth The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport chose
    to implement a fourstage

    International Airport approach to mitigating the off- airport noise
    impacts of the runway

    project: 1) direct land acquisition for properties located in the runway
    Used Some Unique

    safety area; 2) direct land acquisition of certain properties for noise
    Approaches to Mitigate

    mitigation; 3) sound- proofing structures for noise mitigation; and 4)
    acquisition of aviation easements. 20 The airport offered 25 percent of
    the Runway Impacts

    fair market value of the property to acquire aviation easements. According
    to airport officials, the easements were written so that residents who
    accepted them still have legal standing to take the airport to court over
    noise impacts. Airport officials estimated that final mitigation costs
    would be about $176 million. The last of the real estate settlements were
    paid out in 2002. The final cost of the mitigation program exceeded the
    runway cost by a wide margin.

    20 Aviation Easements (also referred to as Avigation Easements) are rights
    given to the airport to fly aircraft over property; they indicate that
    property owners acknowledge and accept the noise impacts of the aircraft.

    The airport created an independent agency, the Action Desk, before
    beginning the mitigation plan implementation. The Action Desk was the main
    point of contact for property owners to provide and obtain information and
    to file concerns and complaints. This office developed a database of
    property- owner information and disseminated a newsletter. According to
    airport officials, this approach was highly effective in

    providing property- specific information to property owners that countered
    misinformation about the project and allayed fears. The airport also hired
    a consultant to manage the mitigation process, and it established an
    appeals process by which property owners could contest the acquisition
    process. The appeals council was composed of airline employees, local
    residents, a local clergy member, and airport board members. The airport
    Chief Executive Officer had final approval of any appeals.

    Stakeholder The Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport still maintains
    its Capacity

    Experiences, from Enhancement Team, first established in the 1970s,
    composed of officials

    from FAA, the airport, and the airlines. The airport refers to the team as
    a Start to Finish, Were

    *three- legged stool.* Each of the groups is equally important to
    supporting Many and Varied

    this stool. If one of the *legs* doesn*t provide support, the stool falls
    over. Airport officials, FAA, and even local governments made reference to
    this team during our visit. The team*s responsibility is to recommend how
    the airport should address increases in airfield efficiency, safety, and
    capacity. According to airport officials, one of the biggest factors
    contributing to the

    successful completion of the seventh runway project was the staff
    dedicated to the project from FAA, the Department of Justice, and various
    consultant teams. These stakeholders were assigned to the project. The
    dedicated team provided the airport with single points of contact and
    reduced the potential for misinterpretation or ambiguity, as well as
    continually reeducated the participants. This experience was in contrast
    to the difficulties the airport experienced in coordinating the input from
    over 30 agencies in the environmental review process. Airport officials
    wished that they had kept the Environmental Protection Agency involved

    throughout the process, rather than only at the beginning and at the end.
    They also suggested that FAA limit the time frame for agency comments, and
    thereby eliminate lengthy comment periods. The Environmental Protection
    Agency took 260 days to review the EIS, which is considerably longer than
    the 60 to 90 days that the airport expected.

    FAA officials thought that holding many more public information meetings
    than required also contributed to the success of the project, especially

    during the environmental review process. This way, FAA and others answered
    questions or comments and addressed concerns before the official comment
    period began. FAA also repeated the airport*s suggestion that FAA should
    adhere to the comment deadlines.

    The four communities surrounding the airport had both positive and
    negative experiences while working with the airport. Three cities
    challenged the ROD on the basis that its noise analysis and mitigation
    plan

    were insufficient. (The ROD was upheld 23 months later.) Grapevine felt
    that the airport broke long- standing promises. According to Grapevine
    representatives, the plan that the airport originally presented would have
    placed the area subsequently developed by Grapevine outside projected
    flight patterns. Currently, if the airport continues with its plan for the
    eighth

    runway, flights will go directly over the city of Grapevine. Irving
    realized that asking for no airport expansion was probably unreasonable,
    and *you really have to cut the best deal you can.* The best possible
    runway

    development process should make the city whole. Euless will be more
    affected by the eighth runway. While Euless initially joined forces with
    two cities to contest the ROD, it withdrew its challenge. The Euless City
    Manager stated that he appreciated the positive economic impact of the
    airport on the North Central Texas economy and believed the airport needs
    additional capacity to support that economic impact. If the eighth runway
    does become a reality, the City Manager expects the same mitigation plan
    that Irving received for the seventh runway, which he considered fair. The
    fourth community, Coppell, did not challenge the ROD. According to the
    Coppell City Manager, Coppell realized that it had to do its part to
    approve the runway somehow, because the airport is seen as vital to the
    economies of Coppell as well as to the region. The manager felt that
    airport staff were professional, knowledgeable, and helpful and never held
    things out to be different from reality. For example, the airport put
    together a task force to work with the communities affected by
    overflights.

    Litigation Delayed The surrounding communities of Irving, Grapevine,
    Euless, and Coppell

    Process challenged the airport, asserting that the cities had the rights
    to control

    zoning on the airport property that fell within their municipal
    boundaries. The municipalities wanted to zone the land for *government
    use.* Such zoning would require that the airport obtain the approval of
    the city boards

    prior to doing any construction on airport property. The airport objected,
    and took the cities to court. The cities won the case, and also won the
    subsequent appeal. The Texas State Legislature ultimately passed the Texas
    Municipal Airports Act, which stated that the airport sponsors and not the

    municipalities control zoning on airport property. According to the Chief
    Executive Officer, while the act can apply to any Texas municipal airport,
    the wording of the act leaves little doubt that it applies specifically to
    the Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport. The Chief Executive Officer
    also felt that the support of the local business community was crucial in
    the development and implementation of the project. For example, the
    business community provided support to the airport in the state
    legislature. This

    case resulted in nearly 7 years of litigation in state courts and ended
    when the Texas Supreme Court denied hearing the complaint. In addition to
    the zoning suit, the surrounding municipalities filed suit contending that
    the FAA ROD was based on an inadequate environmental impact study.
    According to the airport*s General Counsel, the cities surrounding the
    airport alleged that FAA and airport officials did not properly follow the
    environmental review process, primarily because the airport did not use a
    proper methodology in determining single- event noise impacts. The U. S.
    Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia upheld the ROD after 23
    months of argument, and the U. S. Supreme Court denied hearing the case.
    The runway construction was delayed 23 months pending the resolution of
    the case.

    Table 4: History of Dallas* Fort Worth Runway Project Date Event

    February 1974 Airport opens. September 1986 FAA Task Force forms to
    explore means of expanding air space

    capacity. January 1987 FAA Task Force initiates Metroplex Air Traffic
    System Plan Studies. September 1987 DFW begins runway planning. February
    1989 DFW begins EIS Scoping. April 1990 Neighboring cities challenge DFW
    on zoning issues. August 1990 FAA releases Draft EIS. March 1991 DFW
    completes runway planning, publishes Airport Development

    Plan. December 1991 FAA issues Final EIS. April 1992 FAA issues ROD. April
    1992 Three cities challenge ROD. 1993 DFW seeks legislative solution to
    zoning issues from the 73rd Texas

    Legislature. May 1993 Texas Municipal Airports Act, reaffirming DFW as
    exempt from local zoning ordinances, takes effect.

    March 1994 U. S. Court of Appeals for D. C. Circuit upholds ROD. April
    1996 Texas Supreme Court denies hearing appeal on zoning case from

    Fort Worth Court of Appeals. October 1996 DFW completes construction of
    7th runway. February 1998 Texas Supreme Court denies appeal on zoning case
    from Dallas

    Court of Appeals. May 1998 DFW publishes 1997 Airport Development Plan
    Update. October 2001 DFW suspends activities for 8th runway, while DFW
    Capacity Design

    Team explores implications of recent economic and industry events for
    runway need.

    Spring 2002 DFW pays final real estate settlements. Source: U. S. General
    Accounting Office.

    Appendi x IV

    Memphis International Airport The Memphis International Airport is a
    medium- size hub airport that has significant levels of both commercial
    passenger traffic and cargo traffic. According to FAA data, this airport
    was among the 31 busiest U. S. airports in 2001. Memphis is one of three
    major hubs operated by Northwest

    Airlines. Federal Express is based in Memphis, and along with other cargo
    airlines operating there, Memphis has served as the busiest cargo airport
    in the world for the past several years. Additionally, Memphis has claimed
    the

    distinction of being the number one hub airport in the United States for
    ontime flights. The Memphis- Shelby County Airport Authority operates the
    Memphis and two general aviation airports. The authority is managed by a
    seven- member county board composed of commissioners who must be qualified
    community leaders in the fields of aviation, engineering, or finance. Of
    the airlines operating at Memphis, three account for about 60 percent of
    the operations. Northwest and Federal Express each accounts for slightly
    more than 20 percent of the operations, while Northwest Airlink* a
    commuter airline* accounts for slightly less than 20 percent.

    Memphis currently has four runways, three of which are parallel and run
    north and south, including the new runway on the east side of the airport,
    developed between 1984 and 1997, which was the focus of our study. The

    fourth runway runs east and west and is located north of the other
    runways. The addition in 1997 of the new 9,000 foot runway (18L/ 36R)
    raised the airport*s maximum capacity in good weather from 131 to 145
    operations per hour (about 11 percent) and in bad weather from 84 to 99
    operations per hour (about 18 percent). However, the runway was
    constructed mainly to counteract the capacity reduction incurred by the
    reconstruction and extension of an existing runway, and to help the
    combination of commercial and cargo air service work at the airport.
    Figure 6 shows the existing Memphis airport configuration.

    Figure 6: Airport Diagram * Memphis International Airport

    Note: According to Memphis airport officials, the center runway has been
    completed, and changes to the remaining runways are no longer planned.

    We selected the Memphis Airport for study because it had quite recently
    experienced all phases of the runway development process* planning,
    environmental, and design and construction. In addition, unlike most other

    airports in our study, it had a significant proportion of its operations
    devoted to cargo, and it was the only medium- size hub airport we visited.

    We interviewed airport officials from the Memphis- Shelby County Airport
    Authority who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also interviewed
    officials at FAA Memphis Airport District Office; Federal

    Express Airlines, which accounted for about 20 percent of the airport*s
    operation but about 50 percent of its landed weight; Northwest Airlines,
    Memphis*s leading commercial airline; neighboring business community and
    residential representatives; Tennessee Department of Transportation,
    Aeronautics Division and Highway Division; and Tennessee Department of
    Environment and Conservation.

    Status of the Runway FAA commissioned the runway in 1997.

    Project

    Airport Officials Stated A Memphis Shelby County Airport Authority
    official stated that the airport

    That They Faced faced challenges reaching agreement among airlines
    regarding project

    funding during the development of their runway project. Specifically,
    Challenges Reaching

    during the planning phase, a funding disagreement arose between the two
    Consensus among

    airlines that were the biggest airport users* one a passenger airline and
    Stakeholders on

    one a cargo airline. The passenger airline objected to the airport*s
    initial proposal to fund a major portion of the project using passenger
    facility

    Project Funding Issues charges, which are collected only by commercial
    passenger airlines and not

    and Decisionmaking by cargo airlines, as it believed that this approach
    would disproportionately

    benefit the cargo airlines. Ultimately, the airport authority was able to
    negotiate an agreement with the airlines in which project funding was
    based on landing fees, which are proportionate to the gross landed weight
    at the airport and therefore apply to both passenger and cargo aircraft.

    The disagreement among airlines regarding project funding highlighted a
    broader issue regarding the establishment of the overall decisionmaking
    process at the airport, according to an airport official. The Memphis
    airport uses a Majority- in- Interest Agreement that stipulates how the
    airlines (and other airport tenants) are involved in the airport*s
    decisionmaking process.

    As some airline fees are based on landed weight, some airports* agreements
    base each airline*s vote on its proportion of landed weight, giving more
    power to those airlines with the greatest landed weight and highest fees.
    However, the Memphis airport chose to structure its voting process to
    prevent any one airline from dominating the decisionmaking process.
    According to its Majority- in- Interest Agreement, a vote to approve or
    reject a proposal, such as any that addressed the runway completed in
    1997, must

    have represented more than 51 percent of signatory airlines* landed weight
    and more than 51 percent of the number of signatory airlines serving the
    airport. This approach allowed all airlines to participate in runway
    project decisions affecting them. Additionally, after 1996, the airport
    started using an *inverted* Majority- in- Interest Agreement, whereby the
    airport may proceed with projects unless an airline requests a formal vote
    and the majority of airlines vote to disapprove the project. This
    approach*

    supported by the two hub airlines at the airport* gives the airport more
    flexibility in project development than would an approach requiring
    airlines to affirmatively approve every significant project step.

    Extensive Airport officials said that extensive environmental and land
    acquisition

    Requirements Raised requirements presented challenges during the
    construction of the runway

    project. The airport was required to mitigate a wetland area called
    Challenges Regarding

    Hurricane Creek and a series of small, adjacent marshy areas on its
    Wetlands Mitigation

    property that needed to be relocated because of impacts associated with
    the construction of the runway and adjacent developable land. 21 Airport
    and Land Acquisition

    officials said wetlands attract birds that must be *harvested* through
    during Construction of

    periodic hunting because of the danger that birds represent to jet
    airplanes, Runway

    and that airport workers do not like being exposed to the poisonous snakes
    in the creek as they work to maintain the relocated wetlands. According to
    airport officials, it was necessary to relocate a portion of the existing
    creek

    to construct the new runway, and to straighten the remainder of the creek
    to maximize the use of remaining developable airport property. The airport
    proposed a concrete- lined channel for the relocated creek based on a City
    of Memphis standard. However, state governmental authorities required the
    airport to obtain an aquatic alteration permit from the state and
    requested that it relocate the creek in its natural state so that animals
    such as frogs and poisonous snakes in the creek bed would still have their

    21 According to FAA officials, the EIS addressed all major development in
    the Memphis Airport Master Plan, including the new runway. FAA officials
    contend that if the EIS had included only the new runway, no appreciable
    wetland impacts would have occurred.

    habitat. According to an official from the Tennessee Department of
    Environment and Conservation, this type of requirement is fairly typical
    for airports that are expanding into areas containing water. Another state
    environmental official said that the airport*s concrete lined- channel
    approach had no habitat for living species and would be a direct conduit
    for pollutants. Ultimately, large wire baskets filled with medium- sized
    rocks were used along the new stream alignment, and four artificially
    constructed habitat structures were added in the channel bottom to

    support fish that had been in the stream before it was altered. Airport
    officials stated that acquiring land for the runway project took longer
    than they expected because of litigation and requirements associated with
    acquiring the land. According to airport officials, for the new runway,
    the airport acquired a road and adjacent property next to the airport that
    previously contained gas stations and industrial property. Some of the
    acquired properties contained underground tanks that had previously leaked
    chemicals into the ground. The state environmental

    agency required the airport to clean up the polluted properties prior to
    constructing the project, although the airport did not cause the residue
    problems.

    Site- Specific During the construction phase, the Memphis airport faced a
    challenge in

    Challenges Involved attempting to relocate a road that lay adjacent to the
    airport and in the path

    of the new runway. According to airport officials, the City of Memphis
    Relocating Other

    preferred that the airport be responsible for relocating the road to
    ensure Infrastructure

    that the work was done in a timely manner. After the new runway project
    was completed in 1997, the airport had a subsequent project to reconstruct
    and extend an existing runway by 2,700 feet to permit use by larger planes
    used for international flights. An airport boundary road had to be lowered
    to allow for the proper clearance of the flight path for the extended
    runway over the boundary road. According to airport officials, the City of
    Memphis owned the road and had widened it about 15 years earlier; the road
    could have been lowered for an additional $250,000. However, the city
    refused to fund the additional project cost at that time. When the airport
    asked for

    funding from the Federal Highway Administration to assist in lowering the
    highway, the agency determined that no funds were available to meet the
    airport*s required time schedule, and it could not fulfill the request.
    Ultimately, the airport accomplished the project with FAA and bond funds.

    On another roadway project through the center of the airfield, the airport
    worked with the Tennessee Department of Transportation to widen and

    lower a portion of an existing road passing under an existing taxiway, the
    original center runway, and two additional taxiways. The state
    transportation agency chose to be responsible for the design and

    construction of a new roadway to match the city*s current road plan. The
    airport notified the city that the taxiway and runway would be closed to
    air traffic because of airport reconstruction, and it offered the
    opportunity to accomplish the needed street improvements at the least
    cost. The airport funded and constructed two taxiway crossings over the
    existing road in the same general time period, and it contributed funds
    toward the cost of a replacement tunnel and a portion of the lowered and
    widened roadway needed to accommodate the eastern taxiway. According to
    airport officials, the airport was responsible for these improvements at a
    cost of $17 million.

    They said that the airport complied with state requests at a cost and time
    greater than was planned for by the airport because of the state
    transportation agency*s jurisdiction and power over factors that can slow
    down or stop an airport*s project.

    Table 5: History of Memphis Runway Project Date Event

    June 1984 Airport initiates Master Plan for new runway. March 1987 Airport
    initiated Environmental Assessment and noise study. June 1989 Airport*s
    noise study report issued. Litigation began. June 1991 First Majority in
    Interest Agreement between airport and airlines to build a new runway is
    reached.

    December 1991 Airport completes Environmental Assessment. December 1991
    FAA begins EIS process. April 1992 Airport initiates first of eight runway
    design projects. May 1992 FAA publishes Draft EIS. November 1992 FAA
    issues Supplemental Draft EIS to address EPA noise comments.

    April 1993 FAA issues Final EIS. May 1993 FAA issues ROD. July 1996
    Airlines* disagreement about prorated funding for runway project

    resolved. September 1997 Airport opens runway. October 2000 Litigation
    ended. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.

    Appendi x V

    Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport The Minneapolis- St. Paul
    International Airport (Minneapolis- St. Paul) ranked as North America*s
    tenth- busiest airport in terms of passenger traffic during 2001. The
    Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission) broke ground in May 1999 for
    the new north- south runway. This runway, the airport*s fourth, is
    expected to add about 25 percent additional capacity. According to the
    Commission Chairman at the groundbreaking, the new runway is vital to the
    economic growth of Minnesota and the region.

    The Commission owns and operates the Minneapolis- St. Paul International
    Airport and six reliever airports. The Commission reports directly to the
    Minnesota legislature and governor. Northwest Airlines, the major hub
    carrier serving Minneapolis, accounts for nearly 80 percent of annual
    operations. Several other airlines account for the remaining traffic.
    Northwest is headquartered in the neighboring community of Eagan, Minn.

    The configuration is two parallel northwest- southeast runways, one
    crosswind runway, and the new north- south runway. In good weather, the
    airport operates with a capacity of 115 to 120 operations per hour. The
    runway was originally scheduled for completion in December 2003, but the
    terrorist events of September 11, 2001, forced the airport to delay

    completion until November 2004* an 11 month delay. Airport officials cited
    reduced cash flow as the primary reason for this delay. They also said
    that the new runway would accommodate future demand, increase runway
    capacity, relieve congestion, and reduce delays. Figure 7 shows the
    existing

    airport configuration, including the new runway.

    Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    We selected Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport as a site- visit
    location because it is one of the nation*s busiest airports with an active
    runway project; its project was in the construction phase; it had detailed
    and comprehensive planning and environmental phases; and its Executive

    Director has been a prominent speaker regarding airport issues. We
    interviewed Commission officials who were the main sponsors of a new
    fourth runway at the airport. We also interviewed officials at FAA*s
    Minneapolis Airport District Office; Northwest Airlines, which had a
    majority of the air operations at the airport; Minnesota Department of
    Transportation Office of Aeronautics, which is responsible for promoting
    safety zones around the airport; and the Metropolitan Council, which had a

    key role in the planning process. Additionally, we interviewed
    representatives of the cities of Eagan, Richfield, and Bloomington, which
    surround the airport and are impacted by the runway project.

    Current Status of the The Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport is
    in the construction phase

    Runway Project for its fourth runway (Runway 17/ 35).

    Stakeholders Agree According to both FAA District Office and airport
    officials, the Commission

    That Comprehensive worked hard at building consensus throughout the
    project and entered into

    numerous mitigation agreements to resolve issues. The prevailing
    Mitigation Plans Are

    philosophy was to do whatever was necessary to make the project Essential
    but Difficult

    successful. Commission officials, communities, airlines, and other to
    Develop

    stakeholders worked together to achieve this. For example, when developing
    noise contour maps, the Commission chose to include an entire city block
    if the noise contour intersected any part of the block. If one residence
    received sound insulation measures because it lay within the Day Night
    Noise Level (DNL) 65 contour, every house on the block received identical
    remediation measures. According to Minneapolis* St. Paul airport
    officials, the effort represented good comprehensive community
    involvement. The Commission spent considerable resources trying to keep
    all stakeholders satisfied. According to airport officials, the Commission

    and FAA also tried to avoid having the project go into litigation, viewed
    as an unproductive use of time and resources and the worst scenario in the
    process. In the long run, the FAA District Office, the state Department of

    Transportation, and Commission officials agreed that consensus building,
    while taking longer than expected in the project*s early stages, saved
    time in the long run.

    However, often what was good for one community was bad for another
    community. At least one community accused the Commission of buying
    communities off, neighborhood by neighborhood. For example, Minneapolis
    was *made happy* by eliminating the north parallel runway from
    consideration. A National Wildlife Refuge located near the airport was
    *made whole* through the payment of over $26 million; 22 however, the

    22 According to an airport official, the amount was determined by an
    independent professional appraiser and includes costs to relocate
    significant educational activities.

    noise will continue over the refuge. According to FAA officials, this cost
    was required to mitigate the impact on refuge property protected under 49
    U. S. C. 303( c), formerly known as section 4( F) of the DOT Act. The
    opposition viewed the process as achieving *traveling* consensus* just
    moving the problem around. Opposition groups described the process as one
    seeking cooperation for appearances only* a *divide and conquer* approach.

    Stakeholders Believe Stakeholders impacted by the runway said that they
    would be more

    That Mitigation supportive of the project if the airport authority would
    increase the level of

    noise mitigation on the surrounding community. The FAA concluded, as
    Funding Should Be

    indicated in its Minneapolis- St. Paul ROD, that federal- funds
    eligibility for More Flexible to

    future residential sound insulation measures is generally limited to the
    DNL Include More 65+ contour. However, it said that FAA might extend
    federal- funds eligibility for the residential insulation program to
    include the area out to

    Communities the DNL 60 contour if there are applicable local standards.
    For the

    Minneapolis airport, FAA plans to evaluate this extension through a future
    Commission- initiated Federal Aviation Regulations Part 150 Noise
    Compatibility Plan. The Commission submitted an updated noise
    compatibility plan to FAA in November 2001 and withdrew it in May 2002,
    prior to an FAA decision. Mitigation efforts continue in the DNL 65+
    contour area; time frames released to the public called for the extended

    (DNL 60- 64) program to be completed in phases between 2005 and 2012. A
    major factor in Northwest Airlines* objection to paying for the additional
    mitigation measures was that the future had changed significantly enough
    since September 11, 2001, to reevaluate these additional measures. 23

    A Nationwide Low The impact of low frequency noise on the surrounding
    community is an

    Frequency Noise issue for the Minneapolis- St. Paul airport, which is
    close to neighborhoods, according to the Federal Interagency Committee on
    Aviation Noise

    Policy Is Not in Place 23 MAC intends to update the noise contours to
    reflect a 2002 base year and the 2007 forecast, incorporating the 2007
    fleet mix plans. As a result, noise contours could shrink because of
    quieter aircraft. MAC adopted a noise- mitigation plan for single- family
    homes in the DNL 60* 64 contours in April 2002. Implementation of this
    plan is contingent upon resubmission

    of the Part 150 Update and its FAA approval.

    (FICAN). 24 According to the City of Richfield official, the Commission
    received $10 million in FAA Airport Improvement Program funds for noise
    mitigation activities for the west side of the new runway (the City of
    Richfield lies west of the new runway), pending FAA*s review of the noise
    impacts of the project. The $10 million was earmarked in the 2001
    Department of Transportation Appropriations Act conference report. 25 In
    December 1998, the City of Richfield and the Commission agreed to

    undertake a detailed study of existing and potential impacts of low
    frequency aircraft noise in communities around the airport. In order to
    develop a consistent low frequency noise policy, FAA turned to FICAN for
    input on the review of this study and technical aspects of the issue*
    particularly for an assessment of the problem and metrics to evaluate it.
    Low frequency noise was discussed at the committee meeting held in June
    2001. Commission and Richfield experts attended. The Committee released
    its findings in August 2002 and basically said that additional data are
    needed to determine whether any relationship exists between low frequency
    noise and human annoyance. 26 According to FAA officials, FAA is reluctant
    to fund low frequency noise mitigation until the alleged adverse impacts
    are conclusively validated and national standards established.

    Some Communities According to the Minnesota Department of Transportation,
    FAA, the

    Commission, and community officials, Minnesota has state safety zones
    Question Justification

    that go beyond the federal Runway Protection Zone limits. 27 Within these
    of State Zoning Laws

    safety zones, certain types of development are prohibited. The
    establishment of safety zones involves issues of safety, land use, and
    encroachment that can impact not only the development of an airport

    24 Low frequency noise is aircraft- generated noise that is likely to
    induce audible rattles in residences, most likely below 100 hertz. 25
    House Conference Report 106- 940, October 5, 2000.

    26 Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise on the Findings of the
    Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport Low Frequency Expert Panel,
    August 2002. 27 FAA requirements cover both the primary runway surface and
    runway protection zone limits. The length and width of the zones depend
    upon the aircraft operating on the particular runway and the visibility
    minimums. Minnesota state requirements include 1) Zone A* begins 200 feet
    from the runway end and extends for a distance two- thirds the runway
    length; 2) Zone B* begins at the end of Zone A and extends for a distance
    of onethird the runway length; and 3) Zone C* the required horizontal
    clearance.

    runway but also the development of land surrounding the airport. Some
    communities around the airport question whether the safety zones are
    beneficial for them. Although not all stakeholders oppose Minnesota*s
    strict zoning, The Commission authorized and funded a consultant study to
    research the need for the state safety zones as well as the approaches
    that

    the other 49 states have taken. The consultant*s April 2002 report, sent
    to the Joint Zoning Board, found no justification for the strict zoning.
    The application of a grandfather clause in the use of state- created
    safety zones presents an additional challenge to the communities
    surrounding the airport. Under the terms of the grandfather clause, if a
    residential area existed in the state zones in 1978 or earlier, it was
    allowed to remain in place and not be removed by the airport. However,
    business expansion in the general area around the airport is subjected to
    state safety zone restrictions. Communities are unhappy because it makes
    no sense to the community leaders to leave residences closer to the runway
    itself but not permit businesses to expand in an area further away from
    the airport. Businesses feel that, although their property was not
    acquired, the impact is the same, since expansion is forbidden.

    Table 6: History of Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport Runway
    Project Date Event

    October 1988 Metropolitan Airports Commission (Commission) and
    Metropolitan Council issue Airport Adequacy Study. May 1989 Minnesota
    legislature establishes Dual Track Airport Planning Process. April 1992
    Scoping meetings held. FAA, in cooperation with Commission,

    publishes Notice of Intent to prepare EIS. FAA and Commission issue First
    Phase Scoping Report. March 1993 FAA and MAC publish responses to First
    Phase Scoping Report. December 1993 Airport Capacity Team completes
    Capacity Enhancement Plan. December 1994 State Department of
    Transportation completes Terminal Airspace Study for relocated airport.

    May 1995 FAA issues Second Phase Scoping report, holds public meetings.
    July 1995 FAA issues EIS Scoping Decision. December 1995 FAA and
    Commission publish Draft EIS. March 1996 Commission and Metropolitan
    Council issue Dual Track Planning Study.

    April 1996 Minnesota legislature decides to expand existing airport.
    August 1996 FAA issues Airport Capacity Enhancement Terminal Airspace
    Study.

    (Continued From Previous Page)

    Date Event

    May 1998 FAA issues Final EIS. September 1998 FAA issues ROD. December
    1998 Richfield individual files suit against Commission and state
    Environmental Quality Board.

    May 1999 Commission commences runway construction. June 2000 State Court
    of Appeals upholds Summary judgment regarding

    Richfield individual*s lawsuit. October 2000 $10 million earmarked for
    noise mitigation activities for the west side of the new runway.

    June 2001 Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise begins
    discussing low frequency noise standards.

    November 2001 Commission submits Part 150 Noise Compatibility Plan. March
    2002 FAA clarifies airport zoning standards. April 2002 Study authorized
    by Commission results in consultant report that

    finds no need for state safety zones. May 2002 Commission withdraws Part
    150 Noise Compatibility Plan. November 2004 Planned runway completion.
    Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.

    Appendi x VI

    Seattle- Tacoma International Airport The Seattle- Tacoma International
    Airport (Sea- Tac) is the primary air transportation hub of Washington
    State and the northwestern United States. It is the 17th- busiest
    passenger airport, the 20th- busiest cargo airport, and among the 31
    busiest hub airports in the United States. Located

    12 miles south of downtown Seattle and 20 miles north of Tacoma, it is the
    primary provider of international and domestic air carrier service in the
    region surrounding the Seattle/ Tacoma area. Its primary service market is
    the Puget Sound region, composed of four counties and approximately 3.5
    million people. About three- fourths of the air travelers using Sea- Tac
    Airport are origin and destination passengers who begin or end their trip
    at the airport. The remaining flights are connecting flights. The airport
    is a

    significant employer in the region, with 20,000 airport employees. Sea-
    Tac currently has two parallel runways. Our primary focus was on a runway
    development project for a new third parallel runway first considered in
    Sea- Tac*s plans in 1989, and which the Port of Seattle approved in 1992.
    The project has proceeded through several steps of the environmental
    review process, and it is currently scheduled for completion in 2006. Sea-
    Tac*s sole purpose for adding this 8,500 foot parallel runway,

    which would be separated by 2,500 feet from the furthest parallel runway,
    is to address constraints attributable to Seattle*s poor weather, and
    although the new runway would increase capacity, airport officials do not

    consider the runway project to be a capacity- enhancing project. During
    periods of reduced weather conditions, which occur about 44 percent of the
    time, Sea- Tac can use only one of the two existing runways for arrivals
    because of the narrow spacing between them, thereby causing delays. The
    number of flights that can be accommodated drops from about 60 arrivals
    per hour in good weather to 48 or fewer in poor weather. The new runway,
    which is planned to have much greater separation from other runways, would
    allow independent landings on two runways at the same time, which

    reduces delays. Figure 8 shows the existing Sea- Tac airport
    configuration, including the proposed runway.

    Figure 7: Airport Diagram* Sea- Tac International Airport

    We selected Sea- Tac Airport for study because it was an airport with a
    significant amount of both passenger and cargo operations and it had

    experienced significant planning and environmental issues during the
    development of its runway project. Additionally, in constructing the
    planned runway, Sea- Tac is expanding the plateau where the airport is
    located* undertaking one of the most significant landfill and embankment
    projects in the United States (about 17 million cubic yards). According to
    Sea- Tac officials, this earth- moving project is producing several

    accompanying environmental considerations. We interviewed officials from
    Sea- Tac, who were the sponsors of the runway project. We also interviewed
    officials at the FAA Seattle Airports District Office; Alaska Airlines;
    Puget Sound Regional Council; Airport Community Coalition; Regional
    Commission on Airport Affairs; Washington State Department of
    Transportation Aviation Division; Washington State Department of Ecology;
    the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers; and the U. S. Environmental Protection
    Agency.

    Status of the Runway As indicated above, the runway project for the new
    third parallel runway at

    Project Sea- Tac has completed environmental review and has received state
    and

    Corps wetland fill permits. However, according to Sea- Tac officials, both
    permits are currently in litigation and under appeal. Sea- Tac has begun
    constructing the foundation that will be required to support the third

    runway. Simplifying Purpose

    Sea- Tac officials stated that continual review of the purpose of and need
    for and Need May Help

    their runway project, as well as alternatives to it, presented a
    significant challenge to moving forward in the process. They stated that
    reducing the Reduce the Circuitous

    number of reviews could reduce the amount of potential delay in the Nature
    of the Review

    process. The purpose and need was established and reviewed by the Process

    airport, FAA, consultants, and the local Metropolitan Planning
    Organization during the planning and environmental process; it was then
    re- reviewed by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) during the permitting
    process under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 28 FAA officials
    questioned the usefulness of the Corps* review of the project*s purpose
    and need, stating that the extra review created frustrations for other
    stakeholders and added time to the process when the purpose and need had
    already been 28 According to Sea- Tac and FAA, the Corps was involved as a
    cooperating agency during

    Master Plan updates and participated in an early EIS draft.

    established. Additionally, FAA officials said that aviation expertise is
    needed to analyze the alternatives, and the Corps has no such expertise.
    According to Corps officials, the Corps is required to ensure that
    alternatives have been adequately considered. 29 Corps officials said that
    their review of the alternatives was justified because it had been a
    considerable time since the EIS had been developed, and it wanted to
    determine if the events of September 11, 2001, had changed the relative
    benefits of the alternatives. Officials from the Puget Sound Regional

    Council, the metropolitan planning organization in the Seattle area,
    suggested that the Corps could have been included more in the early
    consideration of alternatives, but acknowledged that the Corps* limited
    resources made early participation difficult. FAA officials, however,
    believe that the Corps did participate in the development of alternatives
    in its role as a cooperating agency during the development of the EIS.

    Sea- Tac Airport, while not specifically citing purpose and need, said
    that a clear federal policy of encouraging runway development and moving
    projects through the regulatory process would help ensure that adequate
    airport capacity is in place to reduce growing air traffic delays. It
    suggested that such a commitment could be similar to the one the federal
    government took in developing the interstate highway system and national
    railroads. A task force could be created to identify runway projects that
    are critical to the national air transportation system. Such an approach
    could help

    expedite implementation of decisions already made at the local level.
    Additionally, they suggested that Congress could adopt a policy of
    directing all organizations to achieve a balance between environmental,
    economic, and social goals, coupled with statutory deadlines for
    decisionmaking.

    They contend that such an approach, now used by other countries, would
    help agencies make difficult decisions and get needed runways built.

    A Compatible Land Use A Washington State Department of Transportation
    official stated that

    Program May Help to minimizing controversy over the uses of land needed
    for expanding runway

    capacity could be important in avoiding lengthy project delays. The Reduce
    Opposition

    department developed an Airport Land Use Compatibility Program,
    implementing a 1996 amendment of the Washington State Growth Management
    Act* the state*s land use planning law. The law requires cities and
    counties to identify, site, and protect essential public facilities

    29 33 CFR part 323.

    (including airports) from incompatible land use, such as encroaching
    development. In other words, when developing local land use plans, cities
    and counties must ensure that their plans do not adversely affect these
    facilities.

    As part of the land use compatibility program, certain state
    transportation officials provide consultations, including mediation,
    between airport sponsors and community representatives (often municipal or
    county planning staff) to balance the state*s dual interest of promoting
    aviation and ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its residents.
    The approach to facilitating airports* future expansion includes several
    steps, including the development of planning- based solutions and the
    integration of those solutions into a legally enforceable document such as
    a comprehensive development plan (rather than the Airport Master Plan,
    which is not binding on a land use authority).

    New Mitigation In Seattle, the Airport Communities Coalition, representing
    several

    Approaches and communities near Sea- Tac Airport but not the city of
    SeaTac, said that

    expanding the scope of mitigation beyond direct environmental Increased
    Community applications would go far in building community support for
    runway

    Interaction Could Help projects. They said that the airport*s use of heavy
    trucks over local roads to

    Foster Community haul dirt for its landfill project for the runway caused
    significant

    deterioration of the community*s roads, for which it has not been Support

    reimbursed. 30 Similarly, when the airport acquires residence and business
    locations in order to mitigate noise or wetland impacts, these buyouts
    deplete the tax base in the community where the properties are based,
    resulting in negative economic impacts for which the community is not

    reimbursed. Therefore, the community has no reason to support the runway
    project. However, they said that the community would have reasons to
    support the project if some funding were provided to mitigate the economic
    damage to the community. An organization official said that the Department
    of Defense reimburses communities for economic loss when it acquires
    property within the community to build military bases. Officials at the
    Regional Commission on Airport Affairs, a citizens* group in the greater
    Seattle metropolitan area, stated that that the airport could do

    more to mitigate economic impacts. However, they also said that 30 An
    airport official stated that most of the impacts have been to roads in the
    city of SeaTac, and that mitigation costs pertaining to the impacts have
    been addressed.

    expanding the scope of mitigation would not diminish their opposition to
    the runway project.

    According to the Airport Communities Coalition, communities seek to
    contribute meaningful input into the airport expansion process; however,
    when they are not allowed to do so, they are forced to file lawsuits
    against airports and other stakeholders over decisions that have been
    made. Officials at both the Coalition and the Regional Commission believed
    that the planning process used by the airport and the Puget Sound Regional
    Council needed to include meaningful input from the communities near the
    airport. An official at the Regional Commission stated that there should
    be a citizen*s advisory committee with genuine input into the airport*s

    expansion projects early in the planning process. The official suggested
    that the federal government should provide the incentive for the
    establishment of such a committee by providing federal funds only when
    such a committee was established. In the official*s view, the success of
    such an approach would be contingent on the airport*s taking the
    committee*s views into account and substantively addressing them. These
    community organizations have filed several lawsuits against the airport,
    the Puget Sound Regional Council, and FAA, based on objections to their
    approach for addressing environmental issues. An Airport Communities
    Coalition official said that the community filed lawsuits in part, to get
    the airport to

    listen to the needs of the community and to negotiate solutions. The
    official noted that communities near other airports had successfully used
    such an approach. Sea- Tac and FAA officials stated that there was
    extensive community involvement beyond that required by law.

    An official at the Airport Communities Coalition said that the public
    hearing process on environmental matters gives stakeholders the ability to
    voice concerns but, because of the limited time allocated to each person,
    does not give those convening the hearing an ability to understand the
    concerns or allow citizens to have an impact on the project. The thrust of
    FAA*s 2001 best practices guide seems to agree with the coalition
    official;

    the guide states that periodic informal workshops during the planning and
    environmental processes tend to provide better forums for community
    consultation than do formal public hearings. Understandable information on
    the project and its environmental impacts should be made available at the
    workshop, and knowledgeable stakeholders such as the airport, FAA, and EIS
    consultants should be present to answer questions. In the guide, FAA notes
    that strong local opposition tends to slow down the environmental process
    and that a citizens* advisory committee in some locations has been useful
    in improving working relationships and

    communication between the airport and the community. FAA said that such a
    committee may be established on either a permanent basis or for the
    duration of a specific project*s planning and environmental review. FAA
    added that factors that help build local consensus and address opposition
    include, among others: 1) open and frank dialogue on the aviation need and
    the airport proprietor*s initial planning, including possible
    alternatives; 2) an effective forum for constructive exchanges on expected
    benefits, impacts, alternatives, and mitigation prospects; and 3) serious
    consideration of community concerns and views, including project
    adjustments that have merit and are possible, as well as responses to
    community proposals that cannot be accommodated, and the reasons why. A
    SeaTac official emphasized that the airport did include public outreach

    beyond that required by environmental regulations. For example, such
    efforts included public information sessions and community open houses,
    among others. Extensive Regulatory

    Stakeholders may have limited staff and resources to address the extensive
    and Legal

    regulatory and legal requirements of the process, leading to delays. For
    example, officials from FAA*s Seattle office said that when an endangered
    Requirements Posed

    species of fish was identified at Sea- Tac Airport, 20 months elapsed
    before Resource Challenges

    officials from the federal Fish and Wildlife Service and the state
    Department of Marine Fisheries approved actions to address the conditions
    of endangered species. Both agencies had limited staff to review and
    analyze the discovery and the approach for addressing it. FAA officials
    said that they understood that the Corps had only six staff members to
    review about 1,000 water quality permits, and according to state aviation
    department officials, the Corps had a significant backlog in processing

    permit applications. Additionally, an official from the state Department
    of Ecology said that the Sea- Tac runway project had been a significant
    drain on resources at the agency. The agency has had difficulty finding
    sufficient resources to complete environmental reviews and must redirect
    personnel from other functions. The official said that, because of the
    shortage of state funds, applicants wanting reviews to proceed quickly
    will have to bear the burden

    of funding water quality reviews. Sea- Tac officials noted that additional
    staff resources are needed in regulatory agencies in order to process
    environmental permits in a timely manner and, aside from adding federal
    funding, funding could be provided by project proponents. The airport
    acknowledged that agencies were reluctant to accept funding because of a

    concern with potential conflicts of interest. The airport suggested that

    Congress could make guidelines under which the agencies could remain
    impartial. The purpose of allowing such funding would not be to curry
    favor but to work efficiently with the federal government to get runways
    built. They asserted that these staff would work exclusively under FAA*s
    supervision and would be under no obligation to the airport. They
    contended that this proposal would provide a mechanism for airports to
    bear the financial cost of accelerated project reviews.

    Site- Specific Issues A major site- specific challenge involves the
    construction of a large plateau

    Involve Safety and to enable the airport to construct the new runway.
    According to Sea- Tac

    officials, in order to bring the new runway site up to the elevation of
    its Environmental

    other two runways, a 17* million cubic yard landfill and embankment is
    Challenges being built. The embankment will require three retaining walls
    to reduce impacts on a nearby creek and wetlands and to accommodate safety
    areas at the ends of the runway. The walls are mechanically stabilized,
    using concrete panels and layers of galvanized reinforced strips that bind
    to and reinforce the embankment material in a coherent way. According to
    the Port, this type of wall is highly earthquake resistant, and it has
    been used successfully elsewhere in the United States. In April 2002, Sea-
    Tac Airport officials said that the communities surrounding the airport
    were concerned that the wall will collapse or will be unable to withstand
    an earthquake. However, according to airport officials, the airport used
    the services of consulting engineers, geotechnical consultants, and
    earthquake engineers from companies and the University of Washington, and
    sought advice from a technical review board in developing the wall design
    to ensure that it is safe. The airport has also held public hearings in an
    attempt to enlighten the public about the durability and safety of the
    wall project.

    Table 7: History of Sea- Tac Runway Project Date Event

    June 1992 Puget Sound Regional Council completes 2. 5 year study of air
    capacity needs that included possible third runway at SeaTac.

    April 1993 Metropolitan Planning Organization approves Regional Airport
    System Plan.

    November 1993 Initial design contracts awarded. October 1994 Metropolitan
    Planning Organization concludes no sites suitable for

    new airport. February 1996 Final EIS completed. July 1996 Metropolitan
    Planning Organization amends metropolitan

    transportation plan to include new runway. August 1996 Airport authority
    adopts revised Master Plan that includes new runway.

    December 1996 Supplemental EIS begun. May 1997 Final Supplemental EIS
    issued. July 1997 ROD issued. August 1997 ROD challenged. December 1997
    Airport submits permit applications to state and Corps of Engineers. March
    1998 Construction begins on the first phase of the landfill project.
    September 1998 New wetlands discovered in project area. January 1999
    Circuit court affirms ROD. September 1999 Airport submits revised permit
    applications. November 1999 Public comment hearings held on permit
    applications. September 2000 Airport withdraws permit application before
    expiration deadline to address remaining issues and provide agency
    additional time to

    process application. October 2000 Airport resubmits permit applications.
    January 2001 Public comment hearings held on permit applications. August
    2001 State issues water quality certification. December 2001 State water
    quality certification suspended pending community

    appeal to Pollution Control Hearings Board. July 2002 FAA approves Part
    150 noise study. August 2002 Pollution Control Hearings Board upholds
    water quality certification,

    subject to additional conditions. September 2002 Airport appeals Pollution
    Control Hearings Board*s conditional

    approval of water quality certification. December 2002 Corps issues
    wetland permits; permits challenged. 2006 Planned completion of runway
    construction. Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.

    Lester B. Pearson International Airport,

    Appendi x VII

    Toronto, Canada The Lester B. Pearson International Airport (Pearson) is
    the primary commercial airport serving the Toronto area. The Greater
    Toronto Airports Authority manages the day- to- day operations of the
    Pearson airport, as well as managing its capital infrastructure projects.
    The Greater Toronto Airports Authority was established in March 1993 as a
    community initiative, was reconstituted in accordance with Canadian
    Airport Authority guidelines, and was recognized by the Minister of
    Transport in November 1994 as the airport authority responsible for
    Pearson airport. The airport authority is a private, not- for- profit
    corporation. Its 15- member Board of Directors is composed of nominees
    from the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, the Government of
    Canada, and four regional municipalities. The airport authority assumed
    control of the management, operation, and maintenance of Pearson on
    December 2, 1996.

    Pearson Airport is the busiest airport in Canada and the 16th- busiest in
    North America, having served 28 million passengers in 2001. With regard to
    international passengers, Pearson was ranked as the 2nd- busiest in North
    America and 17th- busiest in the world in 2001. To handle the projected
    demand for air travel through the airport, the airport authority developed
    a $4.4 billion (Canadian) development plan for the improvement of the
    airport*s infrastructure* the Airport Development Program (ADP), which
    includes new runway projects, among other infrastructure projects. Figure
    9 shows the existing Pearson airport configuration.

    Figure 8: Airport Diagram* Lester B. Pearson International Airport

    We chose Pearson Airport as a site visit to learn about the runway
    development process used in Canada, and because the airport had three
    runway projects that met the criteria we used to select airports in the
    United States* one runway completed in 1997, one completed in October
    2002, and one planned for future implementation. 31 The three additional
    runways were approved for development as warranted by demand in 1993 by
    Transport Canada after a lengthy Environmental Assessment Review process
    in 1990* 1992.

    31 When we visited the airport, the runway project completed in October
    2002 was still under construction.

    Status of Runway As noted above, Pearson Airport completed the
    construction of a new

    Projects runway in 1997, completed the construction of a second new runway
    in

    2002, and has a third runway in the planning stages, to be constructed
    when capacity demands warrant another runway.

    Airport Development The airport development process in Canada differs from
    the U. S. process in

    Process in Canada several distinct ways. Pearson Airport was one of the
    first airports in

    Canada to attempt to build additional runways since the airports were
    first Differs from U. S.

    constructed to serve the Canadian military during World War II. As a
    result, Process

    there was no established runway development process in place* Transport
    Canada officials had to learn about the process as they progressed through
    it. In the broadest sense, there are three pieces of legislation that
    affect the process* the Aeronautics Act, the Fisheries Act, and the
    Environmental Act.

    The environmental phase differs greatly from that employed in the United
    States. Prior to the development of the EIS, the airport authority begins
    the process with scoping. The scoping process is a public process.
    According to airport officials, every project goes through environmental
    screening (equivalent to an Environmental Assessment) as a part of the
    planning process. When the Pearson project went through the screening
    process, the airport authority was responsible for conducting
    environmental screening. However, current legislation requires that the
    screening results be available to the public.

    The Minister of Transport and the Minister of the Environment
    cooperatively choose an Environmental Review Panel consisting of
    government officials and knowledgeable local residents (that is,
    academics.) The panel begins by developing a list of issues that it
    believes the EIS must identify. The issues and, therefore, the
    requirements of the EIS will vary from airport to airport. Airport
    officials referred to the process as *organic** changing from airport to
    airport, project to project. The airport authority is responsible for
    preparing the EIS documents, and it

    submits them to the panel for review. The panel reviews the environmental
    impact documents and convenes hearings to hear testimony in order to
    formulate its opinions regarding the environmental impacts of the project
    and accompanying mitigation measures. The hearings are judicial in nature,
    and attendees have never resorted to shouting or histrionics. According to
    airport officials, the hearings were well balanced between opponents and
    proponents of the projects. With respect to the EIS, the focus of the

    environmental hearings was medium- term capacity enhancement projects* the
    three runways at Pearson. The issues that the panel considered depended
    greatly on their perception of the issues raised during the hearings. The
    members of the panel did not work on the EIS full- time, and did not have
    the requisite expertise to conduct their reviews* the panel either hires
    knowledgeable consultants or develops the necessary knowledge. This
    process takes a long time.

    Once the EIS is completed, the panel reviews the document, develops a
    series of recommendations, and submits them to the Minister of
    Environment. The Minister of Environment then makes a final determination
    and submits recommendations to the Minister of Transport. The Minister of
    Transport has sole discretion as to whether to implement the
    recommendations of the Minister of Environment. The Minister of Transport
    makes the final determination, and it is incumbent upon the

    airport authority to respond to the final recommendations. The design and
    construction process in Canada does not differ substantially from that in
    the United States. The airport must prepare preliminary engineering and
    final design, and then construct the runway infrastructure. Finally, in
    summary, airport officials believed that the

    process went very well and did not believe that they would proceed
    dramatically differently if they were to go through the process again.
    However, both airport and Transport Canada officials noted that the
    recently passed Canadian Environmental Assessment Act will result in
    changes to the existing process.

    Canadian Airports Airports in Canada seeking to add capacity by
    constructing new runways

    Face Many of the Same face many of the same challenges that airports in
    the United States face,

    including environmental issues, wetlands mitigation issues, and the
    Challenges as U. S.

    impacts of noise on the surrounding communities. These impacts generally
    Airports

    lead to some community opposition to the proposed project. Canadian
    airports are also subject to site- specific constraints attributable
    primarily to the northern climate.

    Because of the northern climate, airport operations in Toronto require
    extensive ice removal in the winter months, resulting in the use of a
    large quantity of Glycol that can cause an environmental impact on
    surrounding wetlands. The airport straddles both the Etobicoke and Mimico
    Creek

    watersheds, covering 1, 640 hectares of land. Most of the airport,
    including runways, cargo areas, Terminal Three, Terminal One aprons, and
    infield

    areas, drains to Etobicoke Creek. According to the Toronto and Region
    Conservation Authority, although runoff contamination from these sources
    is a concern, significant progress has recently been made to mitigate the
    airport's impact on water quality through the expanded use of wastewater
    and storm water recovery and containment systems. Airport officials cited
    their wastewater treatment facility as contributing greatly to allaying
    the concerns of residents over ground and surface water contamination, and
    they stated that the airport has never exceeded contaminant limits.

    The Council of Concerned Residents, a coalition of three residents*
    associations near the airport, opposed the expansion of the airport
    fundamentally on the premise that the projects would increase the noise
    impacts on their communities. In 1993, the group filed a lawsuit against
    the airport claiming that the proposed project was illegal for three
    reasons: 1) a

    1973 order precluded the Toronto airport from expanding beyond its
    borders; 2) a federally approved airport master plan and the local
    municipality*s land use plan stipulated that they were based on the
    assumption that the airport would have no more than three runways; and 3)
    the Environmental Review Panel stated that the project should not be
    pursued because the adverse social impacts of the project outweighed the
    capacity gains at the airport. According to Transport Canada officials,
    Canada*s noise mitigation standards are very similar to FAA*s Federal

    Aviation Regulations Part 150 programs in the United States. According to
    airport officials, neither Transport Canada nor the airport authorities
    are required to acquire noise- sensitive properties surrounding the
    airport. According to airport authority officials, airports in Canada face
    a shortened construction season because of the sometimes severe winter
    weather associated with the northern climate. Therefore, airports seeking
    to construct runways must take the climate into account when entering into
    the construction phase of the runway development process. Airports must

    schedule construction tasks such that weather- dependent tasks such as
    concrete construction are scheduled during the warmer months, and reserve
    climate- independent tasks for the winter months.

    Appendi x VIII

    Survey of Airports The following section provides a copy of the survey
    that we sent to airports that have built a runway between 1991 and 2000 or
    planned to do so by 2010. Where appropriate, we have summarized their
    responses to each question. In instances where summarized answers are not
    possible* such

    as dates* we have listed the number of airports that answered the
    question. In total, we sent 39 surveys to 34 airports* Dallas- Fort Worth,
    Detroit, Indianapolis, Louisville, and Washington Dulles received more
    than one survey, because each had more than one runway that met our
    criteria. We excluded five surveys because the airports reported that
    their projects did not meet our selection criteria. For our statistical
    analysis, we excluded responses from five airports* Kailua- Kona, Little
    Rock, Reno, Sacramento, and one of the two surveys sent to Washington
    Dulles* because their responses indicated that their projects did not meet
    our criteria. The primary reason why their responses were dropped from our
    statistical analysis was that they planned only runway extensions or no
    new runways during our time frame. We did, however, rely on their
    responses during the remainder of our review. In total, we received 32 out
    of a potential 34 responses from 30 airports* a response rate of 94
    percent. Table 8 lists the airports we surveyed.

    Tabl e 8: Ai rpor t s Sur veyed

    1. Atlanta Hartsfield 2. Baltimore 3. Boston Logan 4. Charlotte 5.
    Cincinnati 6. Colorado Springs 7. Dallas- Fort Worth (2) 8. Denver 9.
    Detroit Wayne County (2) 10. Grand Rapids 11. Houston 12. Indianapolis (2)
    13. Kansas City 14. Las Vegas 15. Los Angeles 16. Louisville (2) 17.
    Madison 18. Memphis Shelby County 19. Miami 20. Minneapolis 21. Nashville
    22. Orlando 23. Philadelphia 24. Phoenix 25. Salt Lake City 26. San
    Francisco 27. Seattle 28. St. Louis Lambert 29. Tampa 30. Washington-
    Dulles Source: U. S. General Accounting Office.

    Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned

    Appendi x IX

    Runway Projects United States General Accounting Office

    Survey of Airports With Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    ___ ___ ___ Introduction Survey ID

    The U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) is an agency of the legislative
    branch that reviews federal programs for the U. S. Congress. We have been
    asked by the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation,
    House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to review what long-
    term improvements can be made to enhance capacity in the National Airport
    System, particularly as it relates to building runways.

    As part of our study, we are asking a select group of 34 airports for
    information on their experiences with building runways and how the process
    could be improved. Your airport was selected because you built a runway
    between 1991 and 2000 or plan to build a runway before 2010. If you have
    more than one runway that meets these criteria, you have received one
    survey for each runway. Your responses will help us better understand the
    various phases of runway construction and the challenges you had or
    foresee in the future. We will present the results of this survey in our
    report.

    We have made every effort to minimize the amount of information we are
    requesting by using other data sources when available. Your participation
    is important and will enable us to report to the Congress on what works
    well and what can be improved to expedite the building of runways. Please
    have appropriate staff respond to these questions including consultants
    that may have assisted in this project. Please return your completed
    survey, within the next 15 working days or by January 11, 2002, in the
    enclosed pre- addressed, postage- paid envelope, or fax your response to
    David Lehrer at (312) 220- 7726. In the event that the envelope is
    misplaced, the return address is:

    Mr. David Lehrer U. S. General Accounting Office 200 W. Adams Street,
    Suite 700 Chicago, IL 60606- 5219 EMAIL: lehrerd@ gao. gov

    Your responses to this survey should pertain to the airport and runway
    stated below, unless the questions ask you to do otherwise. If you have
    any questions, please call either David Lehrer (312) 220- 7667 or Gary
    Lawson at (202) 512- 3649.

    Thank you very much for taking time to complete the survey.

    1. . Airport Name: ______________________________________ 2. . Runway of
    interest is: ____________________ ___________ 3. . Name and phone number
    of person( s) completing this survey:

    a. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ -
    ____________ b. Name: ______________________________ Telephone: (_____)
    _____ - ____________ 4. . Name of a person we may call if we have
    questions:

    a. Name: ___________________________________ Telephone: (_____) _____ -
    ____________ b. Best times of day to call:
    ________________________________________________________

    1

    EXPERIENCES WITH PLANNING AND BUILDING RUNWAYS

    5. . Please provide the start and completion dates for each of the
    following phases of your runway project and describe the event or task
    related to each date. (Note: The time frames associated with each of the
    phases listed below can overlap.)

    Phase Date Date started completed

    a. Planning _ [a] ___ _______ ______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______

    N= 32 (month/ year) (month/ year)

    _Begin Master Plan______ _Complete Master Plan_ _

    (event/ task) (event/ task) b. Environmental process _ [a] ___ _______
    ______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______

    N= 31 (month/ year) (month/ year)

    _Begin EIS_______ ______ _Record of Decision_ ____

    (event/ task) (event/ task) c. Litigation _ [a] ___ _______ ______ _ [a]
    ___ _______ ______

    N= 16 (month/ year) (month/ year)

    _ First Lawsuit Begun_ __ _ Last Lawsuit Settled ____

    (event/ task) (event/ task) d. Design and construction _ [a] ___ _______
    ______ _ [a] ___ _______ ______

    N= 27 (month/ year) (month/ year)

    _Begin Design____ _ _____ _Commission Runway______

    (event/ task) (event/ task)

    [a] Due to the differences in reporting, summarized responses are not
    possible. Event/ task listed is the most common response provided for each
    phase.

    If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:

    N= 18

    2

    6. . For each of the tasks listed below, please indicate to what extent it
    took more or less time than expected (i. e., as compared to your timeline
    and schedule at the beginning of the project). Please indicate *not
    applicable* for those tasks that have not yet taken place.

    A. Planning Much longer

    Longer than Time

    Less than Much less than

    Not than expected

    expected expected

    expected expected

    applicable

    N= 32

    (25% longer (up to

    (up to (25% less

    or greater) 25% longer)

    25% less) or greater)

    Preparing future forecast 9% 25% 59% 0% 0% 6%

    Demand/ capacity analysis 9% 16% 66% 3% 0% 6%

    Alternatives analysis 16% 16% 56% 0% 0% 13%

    Justification of future development 19% 22% 50% 0% 3% 6%

    Development of Airport Layout Plan 3% 19% 69% 3% 0% 6%

    Confirmation of financial feasibility 6% 13% 63% 3% 0% 16%

    Other (Please specify) 22% 0% 0% 0% 0% 78%

    Other (Please specify) 9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91%

    B. Environmental process Much longer

    Longer than Time

    Less than Much less than

    Not than expected

    expected expected

    expected expected

    applicable

    N= 32

    (25% longer (up to

    (up to (25% less

    or greater) 25% longer)

    25% less) or greater)

    National Environmental Policy Act

    22% 19% 44% 0% 0% 16%

    (NEPA) requirements Environmental Assessment 6% 0% 38% 0% 0% 56%

    Finding of No Significant

    3% 0% 16% 0% 0% 81%

    Impact-- FONSI Noise study 9% 9% 50% 0% 0% 31%

    Noise compatibility program

    6% 9% 28% 0% 0% 56%

    -- Part 150 Noise and access restrictions

    0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 97%

    -- Part 161 Draft Environmental Impact

    22% 19% 28% 0% 0% 31%

    Statement* EIS Public comment on draft EIS 13% 13% 41% 0% 0% 34%

    General conformity 9% 16% 34% 0% 0% 41%

    Environmental Justice 9% 6% 19% 0% 0% 66%

    Governor*s certificate issuance 6% 9% 38% 6% 0% 41%

    Scope definition 6% 9% 50% 0% 0% 34%

    Final EIS 25% 19% 22% 0% 0% 34%

    Record of decision 16% 9% 38% 3% 0% 34%

    Other federal requirements 16% 6% 31% 0% 0% 47%

    State and local requirements 19% 13% 25% 0% 0% 44%

    Other (Please specify) 19% 6% 0% 0% 0% 75%

    Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 94%

    Other (Please specify) 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 94%

    Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97%

    Other (Please specify) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%

    3

    Question 6 (con*t.)

    C. Litigation Much longer

    Longer than Time

    Less than Much less than

    Not than expected

    expected expected expected

    expected applicable

    N= 32

    (25% longer (up to

    (up to (25% less

    or greater) 25% longer)

    25% less) or greater)

    Noise 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 91%

    NEPA litigation 3% 0% 6% 3% 0% 88%

    Air quality 3% 0% 6% 0% 0% 91%

    Land acquisition 6% 9% 22% 0% 0% 63%

    General conformity 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 94%

    Environmental justice 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%

    Wetlands 3% 9% 0% 0% 0% 88%

    Endangered species 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 94%

    Historical site 0% 3% 6% 0% 0% 91%

    State legislation 6% 0% 3% 0% 0% 91%

    Other (Please specify.) 6% 3% 3% 0% 0% 88%

    Other (Please specify.) 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94%

    D. Design and construction Much longer

    Longer than Time

    Less than Much less than

    Not than expected

    expected expected

    expected expected

    applicable

    N= 32

    (25% longer (up to

    (up to (25% less

    or greater) 25% longer)

    25% less) or greater)

    Project engineering 6% 6% 47% 9% 0% 31%

    Contracting 3% 6% 56% 3% 0% 31%

    Mobilization (facility relocation) 0% 6% 47% 6% 0% 41%

    Land acquisition 0% 19% 47% 0% 0% 34%

    Site preparation 0% 6% 47% 9% 0% 38%

    Noise mitigation construction 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 75%

    Project construction 6% 13% 34% 6% 3% 38%

    Other (Please specify) 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 94%

    Other (Please specify) 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97%

    If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:

    N= 18

    4

    7. . The following table lists stakeholders that may have been involved in
    your runway project. Please indicate the extent to which each
    stakeholder*s involvement took more or less time than you expected during
    each phase of your runway project. Please indicate *not applicable* for
    those stakeholders with which you have not yet interacted.

    Using the following scale (without regard to set percentages as used in
    question 6), select the one that best describes the impact of this
    stakeholder in each phase of the project. Please clearly indicate plus or
    minus, as appropriate, next to the number you select.

    -2= Much longer than expected -1= Longer than expected 0= Took the time
    expected +1= Less than expected +2= Much less than expected NA= Not
    Applicable

    Stakeholder Planning Environmental Litigation Design &

    process construction

    FAA Headquarters -. 012 -0. 48 0. 00 -0.43

    FAA Region -0. 18 -0.52 0.29 -0. 20

    FAA District Office -0. 04 0. 00 0. 00 0. 16

    FAA Air Traffic Control 0.00 -0. 14 0. 00 -0.10

    U. S. Environmental Protection Agency -0. 50 -0.80 -0. 67 -0.45

    U. S. Army Corps of Engineers -0. 25 -0.57 0.00 -0. 58

    Department of Justice 0. 00 -0. 17 0. 00 0. 00

    Airlines -0. 38 0. 05 -0. 25 -0. 09

    State Department of Transportation -0. 27 -0.20 0.00 -0. 25

    State Environmental Agency -0. 35 -0.52 -1. 00 -0.46

    Local agencies -0. 19 -0.42 0.00 -0. 32

    Community Interest Groups -0. 32 -0.50 -0. 43 -0.31

    Metropolitan planning

    -0. 04 -0.15 0.00 0.00

    Organization (MPO) Financial institutions 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0. 11

    Contractors -0. 22 -0. 10 -0. 25 0. 13

    Other (Please specify.) [a] [a] [a] [a]

    Other (Please specify.) [a] [a] [a] [a]

    [a] Insufficient number of similar answers to summarize.

    If necessary, provide clarifying information to your responses:

    N= 12

    5

    8. . Which of the following geographic characteristics surrounding your
    airport had/ will have an impact on the runway project? (Check one column
    for each row.)

    Some Moderate

    Great Characteristic None Impact Impact Impact

    a. Lack of open space within airport boundary N= 31 42% 19% 13% 26%

    b. Community proximity N= 32 13% 25% 19% 44%

    c. Hills, mountains, or other obstructions near airport

    50% 28% 6% 16%

    N= 32 d. Highways or railroads nearby N= 32 16% 44% 9% 31%

    e. Water surrounding area N= 32 56% 25% 12% 6%

    f. Wetlands considerations N= 32 25% 34% 9% 31%

    g. Other (Please describe) N= 6 17% 17% 17% 50%

    If necessary, provide clarifying information for your response:

    Responding airports provided additional information to this question. The
    airports cited factors not explicitly listed in the question, including
    endangered species, landfills, valleys and airspace conflicts and/ or
    described how the geographic characteristic affected their projects. (N=
    14)

    6

    9. . Please describe the most critical or significant events or factors
    that either delayed or accelerated the completion of your runway project
    and briefly describe why or how each one affected it.

    Events or factors that delayed the project:

    Responding airports generally stated that events or factors that delayed
    their projects identified challenges in three major areas* resolving
    differences among the stakeholders involved in the runway development
    process, completing extensive federal and state regulatory and legal
    environmental requirements, and handling site specific challenges related
    to the airport*s location. (N= 29)

    Events or factors that accelerated the project:

    Responding airports generally stated that events or factors that
    accelerated their projects focused primarily on improving communication
    and coordination with major stakeholders and streamlining the
    environmental process. Some stakeholders also identified innovative
    construction techniques that they believed accelerated the completion of
    their projects. (N= 20)

    7

    COSTS TO BUILD THE RUNWAY

    10. . What were your original cost estimates and actual costs incurred
    during each phase of your runway construction project? (Please state
    dollars in millions.) 1

    Project Phase or step Original estimate Actual costs

    Planning N= 32 N= 32

    Environmental N= 32 N= 32

    Environmental mitigation N= 32 N= 32

    Litigation N= 32 N= 32

    Land acquisition N= 32 N= 32

    Design and construction N= 32 N= 32

    Total N= 32 N= 32

    11. . What percentage of the funding for your runway project came from or
    will come from the following sources?

    Sources Percent Not applicable

    Airport Improvement Program* entitlement 19% N= 4

    Airport Improvement Program* discretionary 25% N= 7

    Passenger Facility Charges 18% N= 12

    Airport bonds 22% N= 9

    State grants 2% N= 25

    Landing fee revenue 1% N= 28

    Other airport revenue 0% N= 27

    Other: (Please specify) 0% N= 32

    [a] Figures represent the average of the responses given, and therefore,
    do not total 100 percent.

    12. . For each of the funding sources listed below, please indicate the
    extent to which your project was delayed because of delays in receiving
    the funds.

    Source Delayed Delayed

    No Not

    greatly somewhat delay applicable

    Airport Improvement Program* entitlement

    6% 9% 59% 25%

    N= 32 Airport Improvement Program* discretionary

    12% 12% 47% 28%

    N= 32 Passenger Facility Charges N= 32 0% 0% 50% 50%

    Airport bonds N= 32 0% 3% 69% 28%

    State grants N= 32 0% 3% 28% 69%

    Airport revenue N= 32 0% 3% 41% 57%

    Other: (Please specify) [a] [a] [a] [a]

    [a] Insufficient number of similar answers to summarize. 13. . Did you
    consider constructing this runway project without the use of federal AIP
    funds?

    Yes [ 9% ] NA= 6%

    No [ 84% ] N= 32

    Please explain.

    1 Due to the various methods used to account for project costs,
    summarization is not possible.

    8

    Responding airports generally stated that they were either required to use
    AIP funds, that non- use would present significant financial burden upon
    the airport, or that federal funds were necessary to establish the
    financial feasibility of the project. (N= 17)

    9

    IMPACT OF RUNWAY PROJECT

    14. . What impact do/ did you expect this runway to have on the maximum
    number of operations per hour at your airport?

    Maximum number of hourly Estimated maximum number of

    Type of weather operations before runway hourly operations after runway

    completion completion

    a. VFR conditions Range: 75 - 270 Range: 90 - 278

    b. IFR conditions Range: 50 - 185 Range: 59 - 216

    15. . How did you estimate the maximum number of additional operations per
    hour that could be accommodated from building your new runway? (Please
    include such information as the model used, which contractor was used to
    prepare the estimates, based on what study.)

    Responding airports briefly described the models used to construct the
    estimates: 25 used SIMMOD primarily or exclusively, and 7 did not expect
    capacity to change as a result of the project or did not specify the model
    used. Other models cited included TAAM, DELAYSIM, and ADSIM/ RDSIM. (N=
    30)

    16. . In 2000, what percentage of annual operations was attributed to the
    three largest carriers (passenger or cargo) at your airport?

    Name of carrier Percentage of total annual operations

    a. N= 32 Range: 8% - 78%

    b. N= 32 Range: 4% - 32%

    c. N= 32 Range: 3% - 22%

    10

    IMPROVING THE RUNWAY PROCESS

    17. . What changes, if any, would you recommend to expedite the overall
    process (from planning through construction) for building runways and
    which federal, state or local entity would be the most appropriate one to
    address each of the changes?

    Responding airports provided a number of potential initiatives directed at
    expediting the overall process for building runways directed primarily at
    improving communication and coordination between stakeholders and
    streamlining the environmental process. (N= 31)

    18. . Other than building new runways, what can be done to increase the
    capacity of the National Airport System?

    Responding airports provided a number of potential initiatives directed at
    increasing the capacity of the National Airport System including changes
    to airspace utilization, technology improvements and ATC modernization and
    the continuing construction of new infrastructure. (N= 29)

    11

    RUNWAY EXTENSION PROJECTS

    Answer questions 19 * 21 in this section only if your airport completed
    one or more runway extensions from 1991 through 2000 or has one or more
    runway extensions planned from 2001 through 2010. ( If you have received
    more than one survey, please respond to questions 19 - 21 once. )

    19. . Describe the runway extensions you have completed or planned to
    complete by 2010.

    Runway number Year extension Extension completion

    Length of original Length of

    completed time-- years/ months runway extension

    N= 16 Range: 1991 2010 Range: 00/ 04 * 05/ 00 Range:

    Range: 3,000 ft. - 12,636 ft.

    489 ft. - 5,500 ft.

    N= 6 Range: 1992 2004 Range: 00/ 07 * 05/ 09 Range:

    Range: 8,900 ft. - 11,388 ft.

    1,000 ft. - 2,012 ft.

    N= 3 Range: 1998 Range: 02/ 00 * 06/ 07 Range:

    Range: 2005

    5,001 ft. - 11,388 ft. 2,000 ft. - 4,769 ft.

    N= 0 Range: N/ A Range: N/ A Range: N/ A Range: N/ A

    20. . What were you seeking to accomplish by building this extension (e.
    g., changed runway from commuter runway to one for only large airplanes)?
    What impact did/ will the extension( s) have on the capacity of this
    airport?

    Responding airports provided information regarding the purpose of their
    runway extensions. The primary purpose for the extensions was to
    accommodate longer- range aircraft, heavier aircraft (i. e., cargo),
    increase safety, and/ or reduce noise impacts. (N= 19)

    21. . How is the process for planning and building an extended runway
    different from building a new runway at your airport? (Please explain.)

    Responding airports stated that the process for building an extended
    runway is virtually the same as that for building a new runway, with minor
    exceptions. Exceptions included such things as, reduced environmental
    impacts, less controversy, fewer legal challenges, and shorter
    construction time. (N= 19)

    12

    IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ATTACKS ON THE NATIONAL AIRPORT SYSTEM

    22. . How important is it to add capacity to a) your specific airport, and
    b) the National Airport System after the terrorist attacks on America on
    September 11, 2001? Have your airport*s priorities changed as a result of
    the terrorist attacks? If yes, please explain.

    Responding airports stated that their short- term focus would shift to
    safety and security, however, long- term plans remained largely unchanged.
    They also noted that capacity remains important to the nation*s airport
    system. (N= 32)

    23. . What impact, if any, have or will the terrorist attacks on September
    11, 2001, have on the completion of any runway or runway extension planned
    at your airport?

    Baltimore Washington International, Charlotte, Dallas, Minneapolis, and
    Phoenix experienced delays or deferred airside projects. Several airports
    noted that their projects were demand driven and that the extent to which
    demand returns to the airport would determine when the project would be
    started. (N= 29)

    24. . Given the current financial condition of the major airlines at your
    airport, what is the likelihood that these airlines will be able to
    contribute financially to funding your runway project or repayment of
    existing debt?

    Responding airports stated that in the short- term, airlines may have some
    difficulty in providing financial contributions to the airport. The
    airports anticipate that the long- term financial commitment of the
    airlines will not be impacted. (N= 32)

    Please feel free to include any additional documentation that you believe
    will help us better understand your runway project and your experiences
    with it.

    Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 13

    (390007)

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    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    The amount of time airports spend planning and building their runways can
    vary because of numerous factors. In light of this variation, for the 32
    runway projects we analyzed, we used median rather than average time. The
    median time was about 10 years for runways that had been completed and

    was estimated to be about 14 years for those not completed. Most airports
    and stakeholders we visited and surveyed said they faced a variety of
    challenges that had delayed their runway projects. While the level of
    challenges that airports faced varied in part depending on the proximity
    of the airport to a major city and the amount of community opposition to
    the runway, some common themes emerged, including challenges related to
    the following:

    * Reaching stakeholder agreement on purpose and need for the runway;
    Completing the environmental review process;  Reaching agreement on noise
    mitigation and other issues; and  Designing and constructing the runway.

    Although there may be no single solution to the challenges involved in
    developing runways, the federal government and airport authorities have
    undertaken a number of initiatives in this area. Recently, the President
    issued an Executive Order that is directed at streamlining the
    environmental review of transportation infrastructure projects, including
    runways. In addition, two federal legislative initiatives designed to
    streamline the runway process were considered in the 107th Congress. In
    addition, FAA has undertaken a number of initiatives directed at
    streamlining parts of the process. Airports have also undertaken
    initiatives in this area, including involving stakeholders such as
    community groups early in the process, and reaching early agreement on how
    best to mitigate noise and other runway impacts. These initiatives may be
    a step in the right direction, but it is too early to assess their impact
    on the runway process. Amount of Time Airports Spent or Estimated Spending
    to Complete Runways Varied

    AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE

    Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 164 To view the full report,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph. D., at (202) 512- 3650 or via

    E- mail at dillinghamg@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 164, a report to
    the Aviation Subcommittee, House Committee

    on Transportation and Infrastructure

    January 2003

    Aviation experts believe that building runways is one key way to address
    airport capacity issues and prevent delays that can affect the entire U.
    S. economy, but runway projects are often controversial and time-
    consuming. GAO was asked to examine how much time airports spend
    completing runways, what challenges airports and other

    stakeholders experience during this process, and what airports and other
    stakeholders have done to address challenges related to runway projects.
    GAO analyzed the results of surveys from 30 airports on 32 runway projects
    and visited 5 airports in order to interview numerous runway project
    stakeholders.

    The Department of Transportation agreed with GAO*s characterization of the
    challenges associated with building runways and some of the initiatives
    taken to address these challenges. They did express some concerns related
    to GAO*s analysis of the time airports spent or estimated spending in
    developing

    runways, and suggested that GAO acknowledge additional FAA efforts to
    improve the runway process. We believe that our

    approach was a reasonable assessment of the amount of time taken to build
    runways; however, we clarified our discussion about the length of time. We
    also added information regarding initiatives undertaken by FAA.

    Page i GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Contents

    Contents Page ii GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Contents Page iii GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure United States General
    Accounting Office

    Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    A

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Scope and Methodology

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix II Airport Site Visits

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix III Dallas- Fort Worth International Airport * DFW, TX

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Memphis International Airport

    Page 44 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IV Memphis International Airport

    Page 45 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IV Memphis International Airport

    Page 46 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IV Memphis International Airport

    Page 47 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IV Memphis International Airport

    Page 48 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 49 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 50 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 51 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 52 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 53 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 54 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix V Minneapolis- St. Paul International Airport

    Page 55 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 56 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 57 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 58 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 59 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 60 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 61 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 62 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 63 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VI Seattle- Tacoma International Airport

    Page 64 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 65 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VII

    Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada

    Page 66 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada

    Page 67 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada

    Page 68 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VII Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto, Canada

    Page 69 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Page 70 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix VIII

    Appendix VIII Survey of Airports

    Page 71 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

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    Appendix IX

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 73 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 74 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 75 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 76 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 77 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 78 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

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    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 80 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

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    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 82 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 83 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

    Appendix IX Survey of Airports with Recent or Planned Runway Projects

    Page 84 GAO- 03- 164 Aviation Infrastructure

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