Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions (12-NOV-02, GAO-03-155).
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of
many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland
security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast
Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains
responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the
flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing
grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to
review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for
balancing resource levels among its many missions.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-155
ACCNO: A05499
TITLE: Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring
Levels of Effort for All Missions
DATE: 11/12/2002
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
Military forces
National defense operations
Terrorism
Agency missions
National preparedness
Strategic planning
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-155
A
Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate
November 2002 COAST GUARD Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring
Levels of Effort for All Missions
GAO- 03- 155
Lett er
November 12, 2002 The Honorable John F. Kerry Chairman The Honorable
Olympia J. Snowe Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Oceans,
Atmosphere, and Fisheries Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation United States Senate
The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks affected the scope
of activities for many federal agencies. This is especially true of the
United States Coast Guard. The attacks prompted the nation to evaluate its
vulnerabilities to terrorism, and this evaluation has focused considerable
attention on the nation*s vast and sprawling network of ports and
waterways. Ports and waterways are particularly vulnerable because they
are both a potential target for a terrorist attack and an avenue for tools
of destruction to make their way into the country. While homeland security
has long been one of the Coast Guard*s missions, the agency has spent the
past decade focusing on other major national objectives, such as the
nation*s attempts to reduce the flow of drugs, monitor and protect
important fishing grounds, and respond effectively to marine pollution. 1
September 11th drastically changed the nation*s priorities, but it did so
by adding to the Coast Guard*s many responsibilities rather than by
replacing
responsibilities that were already in place. The impact of these changes
on the Coast Guard, and consideration of how to manage them, have been a
matter of intense congressional attention. For example, proposals to move
the Coast Guard from its current
organizational home within the Department of Transportation (DOT) to a new
Department of Homeland Security have generated questions about the Coast
Guard*s ability to meet its new security responsibilities while still
dealing with its other more traditional roles. You asked us to examine how
the Coast Guard*s various missions have fared since September 11th. As
agreed with your staff, we focused our work on the following four
questions:
1 Throughout this report, we define *nonsecurity* missions as those that
fall outside of the Coast Guard*s defense readiness and homeland security
responsibilities. These mission areas include law enforcement (including
drug and illegal migrant interdiction), search and
rescue, aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, marine
safety, and ice operations.
What nonsecurity missions were most affected by the September 11th
terrorist attacks, and what are the most recent levels of effort for these
missions?
To what extent would proposed funding for new initiatives in the
President*s fiscal year 2003 budget request allow the Coast Guard to
increase levels of effort for nonsecurity missions, while addressing
increased security responsibilities?
Are there operational efficiencies that the Coast Guard can consider as
a way to help accomplish all of its missions in 2003 and beyond? What
framework would help the Congress monitor levels of effort and
results attained for all Coast Guard missions? To answer these questions,
we conducted such activities as reviewing Coast Guard documents and
records and visiting Coast Guard installations to determine how activities
were being affected. We conducted our work at Coast Guard headquarters and
at five of the Coast Guard*s nine districts. The districts we visited
spanned three coasts* East, West, and Gulf. Our
work, which was conducted from December 2001 through October 2002, was
done in accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing
standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
Results in Brief The September 11th attacks primarily affected levels of
effort in two nonsecurity missions: law enforcement (such as drug and
migrant interdiction and fisheries enforcement) and marine safety (such as
pollution- related exercises, inspections of certain types of vessels and
facilities, and boating safety). For law enforcement activities, which are
carried out extensively with multiple- mission resources such as cutters,
patrol boats, aircraft, and small boats, the effect can be partly seen in
shifting usage patterns for these resources. Coast Guard data show that
the number of hours spent on law enforcement by cutters and patrol boats,
aircraft, and smaller boats dropped from about 67, 000 hours for the
quarter ending June 30, 2001, to about 39,000 hours for the quarter ending
December 31, 2001. By the quarter ending September 30, 2002, total hours
spent for law enforcement by these resources had risen to about 62, 500,
near the pre- September 11th level. Such aggregate data provide a useful
indication of overall effort, but they do not tell the entire story,
particularly for individual Coast Guard locations. Our visits to Coast
Guard sites turned
up examples in which law enforcement activities remained below
preSeptember 11th levels. For example, in the Northeast, some patrol boats
formerly used for fisheries patrols were conducting security patrols, and
as a result, fisheries patrols were 40* 50 percent lower than in previous
years. The Coast Guard does not have data that provide a similar overview
of how marine safety activities were affected, but our visits to
individual sites
identified instances in which the level of these activities was reduced
after September 11th and remained reduced as of mid- 2002. At local marine
safety offices, for example, officials said they had reduced planning and
outreach functions, pollution and planning exercises, and selected safety
inspections of fishing and other vessels. Proposed funding increases for
new mission- related initiatives in the Coast Guard*s fiscal year 2003
request submitted as part of the President*s budget would likely not have
a major effect on the level of effort for nonsecurity missions, according
to Coast Guard officials. The administration*s fiscal year 2003 budget
request for the Coast Guard proposes $213 million for new initiatives,
$188 million of which would be directed at security missions; the
remaining $25 million is for search and rescue initiatives and
enhancements to the vessel traffic information system. The proposed
security initiatives would add 1,330 new staff, many of whom would replace
reserve personnel activated after September 11th, and acquire more than 80
small patrol boats for security patrols. The Coast Guard is still working
out plans for using new staff, but Coast Guard field personnel
said that because the positions are largely expected to be replacements
for reservists who would return to civilian status, opportunities to
increase security staffing levels and thereby free up other staff for
nonsecurity missions would be limited. Moreover, the Coast Guard*s
preliminary allocation of cutter, patrol boat, and aircraft hours for
fiscal year 2003
largely mirrors the allocation for fiscal year 2002* a further indication
that the Coast Guard does not plan major changes in the level of effort
for nonsecurity missions in the short term. The Coast Guard, which so far
has been understandably focused on developing and implementing its
expanded homeland security missions, has not yet devised a plan for how
much of its resources will be devoted to security- related and
nonsecurityrelated missions in the long term.
A number of opportunities to improve operational efficiency are
potentially available for helping the Coast Guard with the challenges it
faces in accomplishing all its missions and tasks in 2003 and beyond. In
the past, we and others have made recommendations for improving the Coast
Guard*s operational efficiency. Many of them* such as examining whether
dockside monitoring by other federal or state agencies can substitute for
part of the Coast Guard*s at- sea boardings of commercial fishing vessels*
still have relevance in the Coast Guard*s new environment. In particular,
opportunities may exist for enhanced partnering with federal, state, and
local agencies, as well as private entities, helping all parties to
leverage limited resources and achieve efficiencies. For example, the
Coast Guard is successfully partnering with the State of California and
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to operate the area*s vessel
traffic* monitoring
system. Such partnering may be possible in other locations where the Coast
Guard operates such systems. Although some mechanisms are in place to help
ports share information about the various kinds of successful partnering
projects, these mechanisms are not working effectively.
Although the Coast Guard generates considerable information about its
mission activities, this information in its current form does not provide
a framework the Congress and the Coast Guard can use to monitor the
agency*s levels of effort and results attained for security and
nonsecurity missions. As part of the proposed legislation creating the
Department of
Homeland Security, the Congress is currently considering a requirement for
periodic reports about the levels of effort being directed at nonsecurity
missions. Our current review, along with past reviews of other agencies,
indicates that a useful framework for monitoring these levels involves two
main components. The first is a strategy that identifies, at least in
general terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its
various missions in future years, along with a time frame for achieving
these planned levels.
This strategy is not yet in place, and as a result the Congress does not
know what the Coast Guard believes the appropriate levels of effort should
be to achieve these missions over the longer term in this new operating
environment. The second component is having adequate information for
assessing progress in achieving these levels of effort and the desired
results. Several kinds of quantitative measures are needed: inputs (such
as budget allocation by mission); outputs (such as the utilization of
Coast
Guard cutters, or the number of fisheries patrols that are conducted); and
outcomes (such as the percentage of distress calls that result in a
successful rescue). To help interpret these measures correctly, it is also
important for the Coast Guard to provide explanations of changes in its
strategy and other pertinent developments. For example, a reduction in
expenditures might occur for different reasons, such as a reduced effort
or discovery of a way to accomplish the same task with fewer resources. We
are recommending that the Coast Guard develop (1) a longer- term strategy
that outlines how the Coast Guard sees its resources* cutters,
boats, aircraft, and personnel* being distributed across its various
missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this desired balance among
missions; (2) a useful reporting format allowing the Congress to
understand and assess the Coast Guard*s progress in implementing this
strategy; and (3) a systematic approach for reviewing past recommendations
for operational efficiencies and sharing information
about successful partnering projects. The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of
this report, but did not take a formal position on GAO*s recommendations.
Background The Coast Guard, a Department of Transportation agency, is
involved in seven main mission or program areas: (1) enforcement of
maritime laws and treaties; (2) search and rescue; (3) aids to navigation;
(4) marine
environmental protection; (5) marine safety and security (including
homeland security); 2 (6) defense readiness; and (7) ice operations. The
Coast Guard has two major commands that are responsible for the overall
mission performance in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. These commands are
further organized into a total of nine districts, which in turn are
organized into a number of groups, marine safety offices, and air
stations.
Groups provide more localized command and control of field units, such as
small boat stations, and patrol boats. Marine safety offices are located
at coastal ports and on inland waterways, and they are responsible for the
overall safety and security of maritime activities and for environmental
protection in their geographic areas. To accomplish these varying missions
and responsibilities, the Coast Guard operates a variety of equipment (see
table 1), including high- and medium- endurance cutters, 3 patrol boats,
and aircraft.
2 Since the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard has created a
separate program area, called Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, for
homeland security activities. 3 *Cutter* is defined as any Coast Guard
vessel 65 feet in length or greater with adequate accommodations for the
crew to live on board. Besides high- and medium- endurance cutters, this
definition includes icebreakers, buoy tenders, and patrol boats. In
addition, the Coast Guard operates a variety of types of smaller boats.
All vessels under 65 feet in length are classified as boats and usually
operate near shore or on inland waterways. Examples include motor
lifeboats, rigid- hull inflatable boats, and utility boats.
Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft Type of
asset Number Description Ships
378- foot high- endurance 12 This is the largest multipurpose cutter in
the fleet. It has a planned crew size of 167, a cutter speed of 29 knots,
and a cruising range of 14,000 nautical miles. The Coast Guard
operates it for about 185 days a year, and it can support helicopter
operations. 270- foot medium- endurance
13 This cutter has a planned crew size of 100, a speed of 19. 5 knots, and
a cruising cutter range of 10,250 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates
it for about 185 days a
year, and it can support helicopter operations. 210- foot medium-
endurance
14 This cutter has a planned crew size of 75, a speed of 18 knots, and a
cruising range cutter of 6,100 nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates it
for about 185 days a year, and it
can support operations of short- range recovery helicopters. 110- foot
patrol boat 49 This patrol boat has a planned crew size of 16, a speed of
29 knots, and a cruising range of 3, 928 nautical miles. The Coast Guard
operates most of these craft for about
1, 800 hours a year. 87- foot patrol boats 50 This patrol boat has a
planned crew size of 10, a speed of 29 knots, and a cruising range of 900
nautical miles. The Coast Guard operates most of these craft for about
1, 800 hours a year.
Tot al 141 a Aircraft
HC- 130 long- range 27 This is the largest aircraft in the Coast Guard*s
fleet. It has a planned crew size of surveillance airplane seven, a speed
of 290 knots, and an operating range of about 2,600 nautical miles. The
Coast Guard operates most of these aircraft for about 800 hours every
year.
HU- 25 medium- range 25 This is the fastest aircraft in the Coast Guard*s
fleet. It has a planned crew size of five, surveillance airplane a speed
of 410 knots, and an operating range of 2, 045 nautical miles. The Coast
Guard generally operates these aircraft for about 800 hours a year.
HH- 60J medium- range 42 This helicopter is capable of flying 300 miles
off shore, remaining on scene for 45 recovery helicopter minutes, hoisting
six people on board, and returning to its point of origin. The Coast
Guard operates most for about 700 hours a year. It has a planned crew size
of four, a maximum speed of 160 knots, and a maximum range of 700 nautical
miles. HH- 65 short- range recovery 95 This helicopter is capable of
flying 150 miles off shore. It has a crew allowance of helicopter three, a
maximum speed of 165 knots, a maximum range of 400 nautical miles, and a
maximum endurance of 3.5 hours. The Coast Guard operates most for about
645 hours a year.
Total 200 b
a Total does not include icebreakers or buoy tenders but does include a
213- foot medium- endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1944, a 230-
foot medium- endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1942, and a 282-
foot medium- endurance cutter that was commissioned in 1999, following 26
years in service with the U. S. Navy. b Total does not include three
support aircraft (VC- 4, C- 20, and C- 37) and eight leased MH- 68A
helicopters used in support of the counter- drug mission.
Source: Developed by GAO from data supplied by the Coast Guard.
A federal agency that is also part of the armed services, the Coast Guard
has both military and civilian positions. At the end of fiscal year 2001,
the agency had over 41, 000 total full- time positions* about 36,100
military and
about 5, 700 civilians. The Coast Guard also has about 8,000 reservists
who support the national military strategy and provide additional
operational support and surge capacity during emergencies, such as natural
disasters. Also, about 35, 000 volunteer auxiliary personnel assist in a
wide range of activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety
education.
Added homeland security requirements pose a challenge to the Coast Guard
as it works to balance all of its missions. While maritime homeland
security is not necessarily a new mission, the Coast Guard*s level of
effort in this mission prior to September 11th had been minimal when
compared with most of its other missions. 4 The events of September 11th
caused the Coast Guard to direct efforts increasingly into this area,
highlighted by the
Coast Guard*s establishing a new program area: Ports, Waterways, and
Coastal Security. Additionally, legislation now under consideration by
both houses of Congress would mandate that the Coast Guard take on even
greater homeland security responsibilities. 5 For example, some of the
additional responsibilities the Coast Guard would be required to perform
if the legislation passes include conducting port vulnerability
assessments,
establishing local port security committees, assessing antiterrorism
measures at foreign ports, conducting antiterrorism drills, and
maintaining harbor patrols. 4 Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, the Coast Guard included maritime security activities under its
marine safety program area.
5 Pending legislation (S. 1214 and H. R. 3983) proposes a number of
security measures for U. S. seaports. Major provisions of these bills
would require heavy involvement by the Coast Guard in conducting
vulnerability assessments at U. S. ports, reviewing port security plans,
developing seaport security standards, making loan guarantees and
authorizing grants for port security improvements, and evaluating security
at foreign ports that are points of origin for ships calling on U. S.
ports.
Expanded Security Taken together, the available data and additional
information provided by
Activities Primarily Coast Guard field personnel about levels of effort
indicate that activities in
two nonsecurity missions* law enforcement and marine safety* were the
Affected Law most affected by the Coast Guard*s shift of resources to
security functions
Enforcement and after September 11th. For law enforcement, data show that
the Coast Marine Safety Missions Guard shifted the use of multiple-
mission resources like cutters and patrol
boats to security efforts immediately after September 11th. Specifically,
the data show a sharp decline in the number of hours these resources spent
in law enforcement after September 11th, followed by a return to more
traditional levels, though the results vary by type of resource and
continue
to be affected when the Coast Guard must respond to heightened security
levels. For marine safety, which is largely carried out without using
these resources, there are no similar data for making comparisons in the
levels of effort. However, during our visits at individual Coast Guard
sites, we were provided many examples showing that as of mid- 2002,
expanded security responsibilities were still affecting levels of effort
for both missions.
Resource levels in two other nonsecurity missions* aids to navigation and
search and rescue* were also temporarily affected by September 11th, but
according to Coast Guard personnel, overall effects on mission performance
from these changes were minimal. Initial Effect of September
For the Coast Guard, the events of September 11th produced a dramatic 11th
on Resource shift in resources used for certain missions. The Coast Guard
responded
Deployment Was quickly to the attacks with a number of significant steps
to ensure that the
Substantial nation*s ports remained open and operating. The Coast Guard
relocated vessels, aircraft, and personnel* especially those associated
with law
enforcement* to enhance security activities. For example, nearly all
cutters that were conducting offshore patrols for drug, immigration, and
fisheries law enforcement were recalled and repositioned at entrances to
such ports as Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and San Francisco.
Smaller patrol boats and motor lifeboats, which had been used for search
and rescue, fisheries patrols, and other nonsecurity functions, were used
to conduct security patrols within port facilities, becoming the port*s
*cop on the beat,* according to Coast Guard officials.
This change can be seen in the mission hours logged by multiple- mission
resources. The Coast Guard does not have an agencywide measure, such as a
mission- by- mission breakdown of how all employees spend their time,
that would provide a comprehensive picture of how nonsecurity missions
were affected throughout the entire organization. The best quantitative
picture of how missions were affected can be obtained from data about how
the Coast Guard*s multi- mission resources, such as cutters, boats, and
aircraft, were used before and after September 11th. These resources are
used in a variety of nonsecurity missions, and they figured heavily in the
Coast Guard*s homeland security response. 6
The resource- hour data show a large rise in homeland security activity
and a drop in several other missions, especially law enforcement. Overall,
the data for all types of resources (cutters and patrol boats, other
boats, and
aircraft) showed that homeland security activities accounted for 2 percent
of total hours during the quarter prior to September 11th (April* June
2001). For the quarter in which September 11th occurred (July* September),
the figure for homeland security rose to nearly 16 percent, and in the
subsequent quarter it more than doubled, to 37 percent. Law enforcement
was the nonsecurity mission most affected as a consequence of this rapid
rise in homeland security activities, according to Coast Guard personnel.
Law enforcement accounted for 28 percent of all mission hours from April
through June 2001, 26 percent from July through September, and 15 percent
from October through December. Total law enforcement resource hours for
the various types of resources declined from about 67,000 from April
through June 2001 to about 39, 000 from October through December. Here are
resource- by- resource breakdowns:
For Coast Guard high- and medium- endurance cutters, the months
immediately before and after September 11th showed a dramatic shift toward
security- related activities and away from law enforcement. Typically, 73
to 88 percent of these cutters* resource hours have been
spent on law enforcement activities, compared with less than 3 percent on
homeland security. In the second quarter of fiscal year 2001 (January*
March 2001), for example, they logged about 25,700 resource hours in law
enforcement activities, compared with less than 1,000 hours in security-
related activities and about 4,600 hours in all other missions, including
such activities as search and rescue and marine
6 The Coast Guard maintains information, on a mission- by- mission basis,
about how these resources were used. Each hour that these resources are
used in a mission is called a *resource hour.* These resource hours are
logged into employment categories that fall under such missions as search
and rescue, aids to navigation, defense readiness, enforcement of laws and
treaties, ice operations, marine environmental protection, ports and
waterways security, and marine safety. Resource hours do not include such
things as the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent
in maintaining it. Coast Guard officials told us they estimate that the
resource hours we use here would represent the employment in which
approximately 77 percent of Coast Guard personnel spend their time.
environmental protection. In the quarter immediately after September 11th
(October* December 2001), law enforcement activities dropped to about 13,
400 hours, or about 47 percent of their total resources hours;
efforts devoted to security- related activities increased to more than 11,
000 hours, and other missions were at about 3,800 hours. For the Coast
Guard*s 82-, 87-, and 110- foot patrol boats, the shift was
even greater. Prior to September 11th, these boats were used mainly for
law enforcement and search and rescue activities in offshore waters, with
law enforcement activities generally accounting for 68 percent or more of
their resource hours and homeland security missions for less than 5
percent. In the quarter immediately after September 11th
(October* December 2001), security- related hours increased to the point
that they greatly exceeded the number of hours spent on law enforcement
activities (about 20, 500 hours for security versus about
12, 000 hours for law enforcement). 7 These and other changes put a strain
on some resources. Local commanders reported that to meet new security
requirements while still being able to meet other essential missions, such
as search and rescue activities, they have had to operate small boats at
20 to 50 percent above normal levels. They reported that hours for patrol
boats also increased, and
that some personnel were working 60 to 100 hours a week. 8 Although Coast
Guard officials indicated that marine safety activities were also heavily
affected by the need to shift personnel to security activities, the Coast
Guard does not have data capturing the extent of this shift. To a much
greater extent than for law enforcement, marine safety activities are
carried out in ways other than using multiple- mission resources. For
example, personnel at marine safety offices are extensively involved in
conducting inspections of ships in port, examining facilities, and
carrying out a variety of other shoreside activities. The Coast Guard*s
current information systems do not capture the time devoted to these
activities. Officials at Coast Guard districts and local offices told us
that they had to curtail marine safety activities related to recreational
boating safety, fishing 7 Small boats and aircraft resource hours also saw
a shift away from law enforcement missions and toward homeland security.
8 Coast Guard officials said that there were no significant increases in
the resource hours for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft because of
maintenance requirements and orders to stay within budget.
boat safety, pollution drills, and other activities. However, since these
activities are not captured in terms of the level of resources expended on
them, we were unable to quantify the overall extent to which these
reductions occurred or the impact they had. Nonsecurity Activities Have
Since the initial response immediately following September 11th, levels of
Increased, but Missions Are effort for nonsecurity missions in general*
and for law enforcement in
Still Affected particular* have risen. During the first 6 months of 2002,
the level of resource hours provided for law enforcement activities rose
to the point that by July* September 2002, total resource hours were above
62, 000* or
within about 5,000 of the level of April* June 2001. The degree to which
this occurred varied from resource to resource. For medium- and
highendurance cutters, for example, the amount of time spent on
securityrelated activities dropped substantially in the January* March
2002 and April* June 2002 quarters, while the amount of time spent on law
enforcement activities began to approach levels that existed in January*
March 2001, and before. (See fig. 1.) During the April* June 2002 quarter,
high- and medium- endurance cutters logged over 27,000 hours for law
enforcement missions, compared with about 1,100 hours for security
missions. This is in marked contrast to the quarter immediately following
September 11th, when hours for the two types of missions were about the
same. However, security hours rose sharply again in the July* September
2002 quarter. According to Coast Guard officials, this increase came in
response to the Office of Homeland Security*s raising the national threat
level from *elevated* to *high* risk. During this period, which lasted
from September 10 until September 24, the Coast Guard reassigned its
resources to respond to the increased threat condition. Such shifts show
that even
relatively short periods of increased security activity can affect other
missions.
Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High- and Medium-
Endurance Cutters before and after September 11th
The pattern was similar, but not as pronounced, for 82-, 87-, and 110-
foot patrol boats. (See fig 2.) Compared with hours for high- and medium-
endurance cutters, patrol boat hours continue to show a more
lasting effect for expanded security requirements. 9 Immediately after
September 11th, hours logged by these boats on security activities
outstripped law enforcement hours. By the April* June 2002 quarter, the
number of hours devoted to law enforcement activities had once again
increased so that it was more than twice the number spent on security
activities. However, for the July* September 2002 quarter, patrol boat
hours for security purposes nearly doubled in response to the heightened
threat condition, and hours spent on other missions declined as a result.
9 Small boats saw shifts similar to patrol boats* that is, additional
hours were spent on law enforcement in the most recent quarters* but the
return to earlier levels was not as complete as it was for cutters.
Figure 2: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and 110-
Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 11th
Changes in resource hours provide a useful indicator of the overall level
of effort for most missions, but these data alone do not tell the entire
story. There are limitations in using the data, and these limitations make
quarterto- quarter comparisons difficult and potentially misleading. For
example, as we pointed out earlier, the data do not include the activities
of about one- fourth of the Coast Guard, particularly the personnel
assigned to the
Coast Guard*s 43 marine safety offices spread throughout the country. Many
of these personnel were and continue to be assigned to security functions,
according to Coast Guard officials. In addition, the resource hour data do
not reflect a working environment in which all fluctuations in
hours over time can be readily attributed to the events of September 11th.
For example, mission hours can be affected by seasonal fluctuations, such
as the need for more fisheries patrols during the fishing season and the
need for more buoy servicing because of weather damage, especially during
hurricane season. Similarly, fluctuations can result from changes in
budget levels, as they were in the months immediately preceding September
11th. During this period, in response to pending budget cuts, the Coast
Guard pulled a number of cutters and aircraft out of service, some
temporarily and others permanently. Finally, the Coast Guard*s operating
tempo increased sharply after September 11th, and the higher levels of
resource activity, while feasible temporarily, may not be sustainable in
the longer term because resources are being used far beyond their normal
limits.
To determine whether the situation at specific locations was different
from the trends shown in the overall data, we visited a number of Coast
Guard facilities on the East, West, and Gulf coasts. Officials at
individual Coast Guard districts and offices identified many examples of
law enforcement and marine safety activities that, as of mid- 2002, were
still less than existed
before September 11th. The type and extent of these examples varied from
location to location, depending on the particular Coast Guard
responsibilities in that location. For example, districts with large
industrial ports receiving additional security attention after September
11th reported having to shift the most resources to security missions. The
following are
examples, from the five Coast Guard districts we visited, of how the
districts said they were faring in returning resources to nonsecurity
missions by June 2002:
In the First District, 10 officials said that they reassigned patrol
boats from security to nonsecurity missions because the number of security
10 The First District is headquartered in Boston and is responsible for
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and parts of New York and New Jersey.
patrols 11 was reduced from 48 from October through December 2001 to 18
from April through June 2002. These reassignments allowed the district to
increase such activities as fishing boat boardings, which had been reduced
to 38 during the October* December 2001 period, compared with 300 in the
same quarter the year before. Still, they said the capacity to conduct
dockside safety inspections of commercial fishing boats had been cut in
half from pre- September 11th levels.
District officials also said that the increased hours of operation brought
on by the security operations created $400,000 in unforeseen maintenance
expenditures. Fifth District 12 officials said that they once again use
three 110- foot patrol boats for law enforcement patrols. However, because
the district*s 87- foot patrol boats are still involved with homeland
security activities, they said that law enforcement operations conducted
by
patrol boats will likely remain about 40 to 50 percent lower than they
were before September 11th. Officials said that this reduction in law
enforcement operations would likely continue for several years. At one of
the district*s local marine safety offices we visited (Hampton Roads,
Virginia), officials said that they eliminated or reduced activities in
such areas as planning and outreach, pollution planning exercises, and
selected safety inspections of foreign vessels.
Eighth District 13 officials said that all missions have seen
significant resource reductions except for homeland security, search and
rescue, and aids to navigation. For example, during fiscal year 2002, the
district boarded 1, 020 U. S. fishing vessels, compared with 2,701
boardings for fiscal year 2001. At one of the local offices we visited
(Houston/ Galveston), officials reported that the requirement for
providing cruise ship security had a major impact on personnel
11 The district defines security patrols as specific high- interest vessel
security escorts or nonroutine security patrols. 12 The Fifth District is
headquartered in Portsmouth, Virginia, and is responsible for North
Carolina, Virginia, the District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, and
parts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
13 The Eighth District is headquartered in New Orleans and is responsible
for Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, Kansas, Wyoming,
Louisiana, Arkansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri, Mississippi,
Iowa, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and parts of Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Florida.
allocations. Local marine safety unit officials said that they currently
assign at least six marine safety personnel for terminal security sweeps,
sea marshal operations, and tugboat and bunker barge security monitoring;
they also dedicate both an aircraft and patrol boats for cruise ship
escort duty. They said that an expected increase in cruise ship activity
would add to this workload.
In the Eleventh District, 14 officials said that they were not sending a
110- foot patrol boat to southern California and northern Mexico to
conduct counter- drug patrols. Prior to September 11th they had done so,
but since the terrorist attacks this boat has remained within the
district*s
area of responsibility to conduct security- related activities. Besides
reductions in counter- drug patrols, district staff indicated that other
missions were being affected by increased security requirements. For
example, in San Francisco, officials said that they used patrol and small
boats to conduct harbor patrols and enforce established security zones.
The group commander said that since the terrorist attacks he has had to
eliminate a number of nonsecurity missions for these boats, including
fishing vessel* safety inspections and fisheries- and other living marine
resources* enforcement operations.
In the Thirteenth District, 15 officials said that they had resumed some
ready cutter patrols, 16 which were suspended between September 2001 and
April 2002. Nonetheless, the district is continuing to use one of its
patrol boats for homeland security patrols on inshore waters and along the
border. This precludes using this boat for its former duty in fisheries
enforcement patrols, since these patrols are normally conducted on
offshore waters.
These examples of local officials* difficulties in returning nonsecurity
missions to earlier levels reflect a central issue that Coast Guard
officials have pointed out: a number of their activities are dependent on
cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft that are used to meet a variety of
missions. If a
14 The Eleventh District is headquartered in Alameda, California, and is
responsible for Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah. 15 The Thirteenth
District is headquartered in Seattle and is responsible for Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. 16 The district defines *ready cutter patrols*
as having at least one patrol boat assigned to conducting full- time law
enforcement operations.
cutter or patrol boat is assigned to conduct security patrols because this
mission is judged to be a higher priority, it is less available to perform
other types of missions. Coast Guard officials said that multiple- mission
resources may be involved in simultaneous missions, such as a cutter*s
engaging in both fisheries enforcement and marine environmental protection
tasks while at sea. However, particularly when these resources are engaged
in close- in security work, they said the resources are less available to
multitask in this way or less effective in doing so.
Effects on Other While other nonsecurity missions besides law enforcement
and marine Nonsecurity Missions Were safety were affected by the increased
emphasis on homeland security, the
Not as Great available data and our discussions with Coast Guard officials
indicate that
by comparison, other missions were affected to a much lesser degree than
law enforcement and marine safety. For example:
Although search and rescue resources were used to perform homeland
security functions, doing so did not materially affect the Coast Guard*s
ability to respond to search and rescue missions, according to Coast Guard
officials. Although search and rescue boats were initially
redeployed for harbor security patrols, they said that any potential
impact of doing so was tempered by normal changes in workload in the
season when the attacks occurred. Search and rescue hours normally tend to
follow a cyclical pattern, with heavier demand in the Aprilthrough-
September period, and lower demand in October through March. They said
that because the attacks occurred at the beginning of the low- demand
season, resources could be redeployed with little or no
effect on the mission. Coast Guard officials also emphasized that search
and rescue is a primary mission that will always receive priority.
Operational data we reviewed showed that the drop in search and rescue
hours after September 11th mirrored the normal annual cycle, and that
since that time, the quarterly fluctuations have continued as they have
done historically.
For aids to navigation, the data showed a drop in cutter resource hours
after September 11th, when, according to Coast Guard officials, some boats
that normally operate as buoy tenders were used for security purposes
instead. However, this drop was not as great as it had been for law
enforcement and was relatively short- lived. By the April* June 2002
quarter, the number of cutter resource hours spent on aids to navigation
had returned to traditional levels. Coast Guard officials said that
resources for aids to navigation were among the first to be returned to
their former missions. Funding Increases Most of the proposed funding
increase for new mission- related initiatives in Proposed in Fiscal Year
the Coast Guard*s fiscal year 2003 budget request is directed at security
activities and, according to Coast Guard officials, would likely have a
2003 Budget May Not
limited impact on nonsecurity missions. The $213 million proposed for new
Have a Major Effect on operational initiatives would be directed primarily
toward new, permanent, Nonsecurity Missions
security- related personnel positions and new security patrol boats. The
Coast Guard is still working out plans for how these additional personnel
would be used and where they would be assigned, but, according to Coast
Guard personnel in the units we visited, it is unlikely that the
additional personnel would allow units to shift substantial resources to
nonsecurity missions. Many of the proposed new positions would replace
reservists
activated on a temporary basis after September 11th. To the degree that
the proposed positions would replace temporarily activated reservists,
they would not result in a net addition of staff.
Proposed Spending for New The administration*s fiscal year 2003 budget
request for the Coast Guard
Initiatives Is Focused on includes a total of $213 million for new
mission- related initiatives. 17 Of this Expanded Security Role amount,
$188 million (88 percent) is proposed for security- related purposes, such
as increased patrols and vessel boardings; the remaining
$25 million is for enhanced staffing of search and rescue operations, and
for vessel traffic information system improvements. One of the main
objectives of the security- related initiatives is to provide permanent
staff
following the Coast Guard*s initial staffing buildup after September 11th,
which was accomplished largely by temporarily activating reservists. While
there is variation among the districts, many of the proposed positions
would be permanent slots that would replace the positions filled by 17 In
addition to requesting $213 million for new mission- related initiatives,
the Coast Guard is also requesting the following other increases: $172
million for pay increases and military personnel entitlements; $123
million in various technical adjustments; $49 million in other
expenditures, such as reserve training; and $14 million for capital
expenditures. The budget request also includes $1. 2 billion in
retirement- related costs for current and future retirees, according to
Coast Guard officials. These retirement- related costs were included in
response to proposed legislation (Managerial Flexibility Act of 2001 [S.
1612]) directing agencies to fully fund the future pension and health
benefits of their current workforces. Although this legislation has not
been enacted, the Coast Guard complied with the administration*s
requirement to include these costs in its fiscal year 2003 budget request.
reservists. In all, the Coast Guard plans to hire almost 2,200 new
personnel by the end of fiscal year 2003. Of these positions, 870 were
authorized in the supplemental appropriation approved for fiscal year
2002, and 1, 330 are proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. The
Coast Guard expects nearly 90 percent of these 2,200 new positions to be
assigned to securityrelated functions. (See table 2.) Coast Guard
officials expect that at least 80 percent of the personnel will be
assigned to field units (area commands, districts, marine safety offices,
marine safety units, air stations, or small boat stations).
Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area, Fiscal Year
2003 Budget Request Number of
additional Program area
personnel Security mission
Maritime domain awareness 316 High- interest vessel control 268 Presence
and response capabilities 1, 062 Critical infrastructure and force
protection 85 Domestic and international outreach 190 Homeland Security
Liaison Billets 43
Total for security mission 1, 964 Nonsecurity missions
Commissioning and operation of three seagoing buoy tenders 165 Maritime
search and rescue/ Personnel safety 193 47- foot motor life boat follow-
on 36 Commissioning and operation of three coastal patrol boats 35
Decommissioning of three seagoing buoy tenders -195
Total for nonsecurity missions 234 Grand total 2,198
Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data.
In addition to the increased numbers of permanent positions, the Coast
Guard plans to buy 80 homeland security response boats and 4 87- foot
coastal patrol boats. 18 While both types of boats are multi- mission
capable, officials stated that these new boats are intended mainly for use
in homeland security missions.
Ability to Shift Resources to The additional personnel and assets included
in the fiscal year 2003 budget Nonsecurity Missions May
request may allow field units to free up some resources for nonsecurity Be
Limited missions, but for several reasons, the flexibility to do so
appears limited. One reason is that many of the new positions would
replace reservists activated at field locations since September 11th,
thereby providing these
units only the resources necessary to maintain operations at current
levels. The Coast Guard can use reservists for up to 2 years, but from a
practical standpoint, the agency typically uses them in large numbers only
for surge
capability during emergencies. Moreover, having permanent personnel is
more cost effective and provides long- term workforce stability, according
to Coast Guard officials. Our interviews with district staff indicated
that this would be the case to a greater degree in some locations than in
others. Coast Guard staff in some districts told us that new personnel
would largely replace currently activated reservists, and therefore would
do little more than allow them to maintain the status quo. Some districts
also reported that because of the large number of reservists called to
active duty, there would not be enough new active duty personnel to
replace reservists on a one- to- one basis. As a result, the new
authorized personnel strength would not match the current personnel
numbers at some locations, and the impact would actually be a reduction in
resources allocated to lower- priority missions.
The second reason why the flexibility to shift additional resources to
nonsecurity missions may be limited is that the Coast Guard plans to
assign a number of the new positions to security units that would provide
only limited replacement of any existing activity. Nearly 430 personnel,
or 20 percent of all new personnel, are expected to be assigned to six
maritime
18 These figures include boats funded through the fiscal year 2002
supplemental appropriations. The supplemental appropriations funded 42 of
the 80 homeland security response boats, and all 4 of the coastal patrol
boats.
safety and security teams. 19 Currently, the Coast Guard has four such
teams* in Seattle; San Pedro, California; Houston/ Galveston, Texas; and
Hampton Roads, Virginia* and there are plans for two additional teams in
Jacksonville, Florida, and New York City. Our conversations with Coast
Guard officials indicated that there are still many unresolved issues
concerning how these teams will be used. District and headquarters
officials believed that these teams help meet certain security
requirements,
but individual teams will have to learn how best to use these assets. The
third reason for limited flexibility is the time that will probably elapse
before many of the people in these new positions could be in place or
ready to make optimum contributions. Time lags normally occur from when a
position is authorized to when a person is assigned to fill it. Both
headquarters and district officials have reported that they do not expect
some personnel to start filling headquarters and field positions for at
least 6 months, or maybe even longer. In addition, once a number of these
positions are filled, the effectiveness of the persons in them could be
decreased by what some Coast Guard personnel refer to as *juniorocity**
that is, persons at a lower rank or pay grade (in the case of civilians)
filling positions that call for higher- level candidates. Coast Guard
officials said that this could potentially occur, and if it does, these
people may need
additional supervision from senior personnel. The Coast Guard*s fiscal
year 2003 allocation of cutter and patrol boat resource hours provides
further indication that nonsecurity missions would not be greatly
increased, because the resource hours allocation is relatively the same as
it was for fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard sets this allocation for all
law enforcement program areas in its annual operational
and maritime safety mission planning guidance. This guidance shows that
for fiscal year 2003, the overall number of cutter hours for those
activities is to rise by about 5,700, a 2 percent increase from the
previous year, with each of the law enforcement areas seeing small changes
from the prior year. The planning guidance data support the conclusion
that even with new security boats funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, the Coast Guard would not be able to redeploy cutters to
nonsecurity missions. According to the guidance, continued shifting of
small boats and 87- foot 19 The maritime safety and security teams are
each composed of 71 personnel. They are under the administrative and
operational control of the area commanders, but the tactical control of
the local unit.
patrol boats to port security activities will leave gaps in inshore
fisheries enforcement.
Opportunities for A number of opportunities for improving operational
efficiency are
Increased Operational potentially available to help the Coast Guard
accomplish its various
missions. In recent years, we and others have studied Coast Guard
Efficiency Could Help
operations and made recommendations for more efficient operations, and
Meet Mission a number of these recommendations have merit in this new
operating Responsibilities
environment. In addition, the Coast Guard has attempted, through local
port organizations, to develop ways to partner more effectively with
local, state, and federal agencies, as well as with public and private
entities. Individual ports have made notable* but isolated*
accomplishments in this regard. Although some mechanisms are in place to
help ports share
information about these projects, these mechanisms are not working
effectively. Previous Recommendations Over the past decade, we and other
outside organizations, along with the for Improving Operations Coast Guard
itself, have studied Coast Guard operations to determine Still Have Merit
where greater efficiencies might be found. We consolidated many of these
recommendations to improve Coast Guard operations in reports issued in
1997 and 1999. 20 As part of previous initiatives aimed at operating more
efficiently, the Coast Guard has used many such recommendations,
undertaking such steps as reducing administrative staff, consolidating
offices, and streamlining operations. However, a number of past
recommendations that were not adopted still have relevance. For example:
Dockside fisheries enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries Service.
Past studies found that the Coast Guard had opportunity to
replace some of its at- sea boardings for domestic fishing vessels with
dockside enforcement by the National Marine Fisheries Service (an agency
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and by state
agencies. Whether this same opportunity still exists in the current
environment is unknown, but it represents a possible way to leverage
resources and minimize any overlap that may be occurring. A
20 Coast Guard: Challenges for Addressing Budget Constraints (GAO/ RCED-
97- 110, May 14, 1997) and Coast Guard: Review of Administrative and
Support Functions (GAO/ RCED- 9962R, Mar. 10, 1999).
closer look at potential efficiencies seems particularly warranted given
the increasingly complex nature of the Coast Guard*s work in fisheries
enforcement. For example, fishing regulations in the New England fisheries
have evolved to include 18 fisheries management plans involving more than
40 marine species.
Privatizing vessel traffic service systems in more ports. Vessel traffic
service systems, which are responsible for controlling harbor traffic
operations in a number of the nation*s ports, are operated predominantly
by Coast Guard personnel. However, two systems*
Delaware Bay and Los Angeles/ Long Beach* are either privately operated or
operated jointly with the Coast Guard, and past studies have recommended
that the Coast Guard examine the possibility of privatizing at least some
additional systems. At Los Angeles/ Long Beach,
for example, the system uses Coast Guard and Marine Exchange personnel to
monitor traffic and provide mariners with information. 21 The state of
California reimburses the Coast Guard*s personnel costs, using fees paid
by vessel owners using the system.
Leveraging Resources One area that has come to the forefront since
September 11th, given the through Partnerships expanded duties that the
Coast Guard and other port stakeholders have
Provides Mission assumed, is the agency*s potential ability to partner
with other port Efficiencies to the Coast
stakeholders to help accomplish the varied security and nonsecurity goals
involved in port operations. These stakeholders include state and local
Guard
agencies as well as private- sector interests. As we visited Coast Guard
locations, we noted many examples in which cooperative arrangements had
been used to accomplish these varied goals successfully. Table 3 provides
examples of some of the partnerships we found.
21 The Marine Exchange of Los Angeles and Long Beach operates the vessel
traffic information system serving these two ports.
Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard Partnering in Individual Ports Port
Example of partnering
Boston Coast Watch. This program acts in a neighborhood- watch fashion and
allows fishermen and other port stakeholders to alert the Coast Guard to
irregularities that might indicate security threats. Liquid Natural Gas
(LNG) Escorts. In developing its plan for escorting LNG ships, the Coast
Guard cooperated with other agencies and entities to share the burden. As
a result, state and local agencies in the
Port of Boston assist in escorting LNG ships through the port, providing
on- shore security, and coordinating bridge closures. Spill Response. The
Coast Guard has turned over responsibility for responding to minor oil
spills to the state of Massachusetts. Hampton Roads Maritime Incident
Response Team (MIRT). Local municipalities have created a firefighting
cooperative to respond to marine fires. In the event of an incident, in
addition to deploying as first responder, the team acts under the command
and control of the captain of the port and liaises with affected
municipalities. The MIRT trains by conducting field exercises with the
Coast Guard. Through this program, the Coast Guard benefits
from the presence of a marine firefighting resource, while the
municipalities involved benefit from coordinated federal participation.
Houston/ Galveston Mobility Program. The Coast Guard partnered with the
Houston/ Galveston Navigation Safety Advisory Committee on identifying
mobility issues associated with both recreational and commercial users of
the Houston Ship Channel, Galveston Bay, and connecting waters. As a
result, the Coast Guard derived lists of
local waterways needs and their relative importance to the users*
outcomes. Ship Rider Information Exchange Program. The Coast Guard entered
into agreements that allow vessel inspectors to ride on many of the
chemical and oil tank ships that frequent Houston, the nation*s largest
petro- chemical port. The inspectors get to see bridge resource
management, cargo operations, tank cleaning evolutions, and engine room
procedures first hand. The program exposes Coast Guard inspectors to the
unique aspects of the tank industry, while allowing the ships* crew to
develop insights into Coast Guard
enforcement and U. S. and international legal requirements. Los Angeles/
Long Beach Vessel Traffic Service. In cooperation with the state of
California and local interests, the Coast Guard jointly operates a VTS
system. State law requires all vessels over a certain size to participate,
and operating costs are paid from user fees on vessels using the system.
Developed under Coast Guard guidance, the system operates under many of
the same rules and procedures as Coast Guard VTS sites, provides the Coast
Guard valuable assistance during its search and rescue efforts and law
enforcement actions, and aids in the
dissemination of captain of the port orders. Puget Sound Harbor Safety
Plan. Through the efforts of the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee,
guidelines were
developed to cover issues such as emergency response, lightering, and
pilotage. By working through the harbor safety committee, the Coast Guard
was able to achieve buy- in from those affected by the plan, thereby
ensuring greater success. Guidance developed through this process has been
incorporated into the charts that mariners use when navigating the waters
of Puget Sound. Ballast Water. The Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee
developed voluntary standards of care for exchanging ballast water that
were eventually used as the basis for new state regulations. Standards of
Care to Prevent Drifting Ships. Through the work of the Puget Sound Harbor
Safety Committee, a mechanical problem was identified that caused seven to
eight groundings per year, on average. This cooperative effort resulted in
a new standard of care that requires ship operators to complete a check of
their
propulsion systems upon checking in with the Vessel Traffic System. The
change mitigates groundings that could result in spills or loss of life.
Source: Developed by GAO.
The Coast Guard has recognized possibilities for greater efficiencies
through partnering and is beginning to implement better guidance and
procedures in this area. In May 2002, the Commandant stated that the Coast
Guard intended to build strategic partnerships to enhance its mission
outcomes, bring clarity to mission planning and execution, and leverage
the capabilities of Coast Guard forces. Likewise, the Coast Guard*s
strategic plan declares partnering to be a guiding principle for
decisionmaking. To help local Coast Guard officials promote these efforts,
headquarters has
issued general guidance to aid in the development of harbor safety
committees. Although there are other cooperative arrangements in ports,
including area committees and port security committees, the Coast Guard
has focused on harbor safety committees or their equivalents 22 because it
believes that such committees, composed of facility operators and port
users, are often the only local bodies available to meet and discuss
mutual safety, mobility, and environmental protection issues.
Harbor safety committees, established largely on an ad hoc basis by the
Coast Guard or other entities over the years, differ widely in their
membership and structure. These differences, in part, reflect the
differences that exist from port to port. The Coast Guard guidance is
intended to increase harmonization between committees without imposing
a mandated structure for them. The guidance illustrates the attributes of
particularly successful committees and focuses on overall organizational
structure, committee membership, and areas for potential action. The
guidance also points out that tools are available to assist committees in
their work, particularly the Coast Guard*s National Harbor Safety
Committee Web site. Coast Guard officials told us that some recently
formed committees were established using the guidance, and that some
existing committees have made changes to come into closer alignment with
the guidance. Effectiveness of Some
Although the Coast Guard recognizes the potential offered by partnering
Partnerships Is Hampered
and has provided guidance toward this end, current efforts are limited by
by Limited Scope of Activity
two main problems. The first is related to the variations between harbor
and Lack of Information safety committees: some are much narrower in scope
and activity than others. The second is related to the lack of effective
sharing of information
Sharing among harbor safety committees. 22 The Coast Guard uses the term
*Harbor Safety Committee* to refer to any port Marine Transportation
System (MTS) coordinating body or committee in its guidance on the topic.
The makeup of harbor safety committees, which varies somewhat from port to
port, can sometimes affect their ability to tackle new projects. The
actions the Coast Guard can undertake often reflect the extent of the
individual committee*s interests. Some committees have broad
representation among various stakeholder groups. For example, the
committee in Puget Sound has included a broad mix of shipping industry
groups, labor organizations, port representatives, environmental agencies,
and state representatives. Consensus efforts of this committee resulted in
new state regulations about the dumping of ballast water, for example. By
contrast, in Philadelphia, when the Coast Guard attempted to carry out a
safety assessment with the cooperation of the local harbor safety
committee, the stakeholders perceived the assessment effort as threatening
the competitiveness of the port and decided not to cooperate. Coast Guard
officials attributed this lack of interest to the makeup of the committee,
which did not have representation beyond industry representatives.
More effective information- sharing is another way the Coast Guard could
better leverage its resources. There currently is no effective way for
stakeholder groups in the more than 100 locations where such committees
exist to share information with each other about successful projects or
about best practices that contribute to these successes. Our discussions
with Coast Guard and port officials indicated that information between
committees tends to be exchanged sporadically, by word of mouth or
happenstance. There currently is no national harbor safety association or
other umbrella group that can share information, although a few
committees have recently expressed interest in forming an association.
Likewise, no formal process exists for sharing best practices and
information within the Coast Guard. Numerous Coast Guard personnel noted
that personal relationships and the rotation of personnel currently are
the best tools available for information- sharing about the operation of
other ports.
In the absence of a mechanism or process for effectively sharing
information, communication within the Coast Guard and among its partners
could be facilitated by greater use of the Coast Guard*s National Harbor
Safety Committee Web site, which is currently underutilized. When we
checked in September 2002, it had just five examples of best practices*
three from Puget Sound, one from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and one from the Coast Guard. By contrast,
during our field visits we were told about examples of good partnerships
in each of the ports we visited.
Framework for The Congress has expressed great interest in monitoring the
Coast Guard*s
Monitoring Levels of mission resource levels, especially for nonsecurity
missions. In particular,
legislation currently under consideration for establishing a Department of
Effort and Results Has Homeland Security includes a requirement for the
Coast Guard to report
Two Main Components regularly on the status of its nonsecurity missions.
We think our experience
in reviewing such information may be helpful in establishing a meaningful
framework for keeping the Congress informed. In this instance, such a
framework would involve two main components. The first component is a
strategy that identifies, at least in general terms, the planned levels of
effort for these various missions in future years and a time frame for
achieving
these planned levels. The second component is adequate information for
assessing progress. This information has to capture not only how much the
Coast Guard is spending on these missions but also what these expenditures
produce, both in the level of service provided and the results achieved.
Much of the necessary information may already exist, but not in a report
that specifically responds to the Congress*s interest in nonsecurity
missions.
First Component: In the Coast Guard*s substantial transformation following
September 11th, Establishing Planned
it is understandable that the agency*s primary planning focus has been on
Resource Levels and a Time incorporating its expanded security mission.
The agency has not yet Frame for Achieving These developed a plan for how
it intends to balance these various missions over the longer term. For its
multiple- mission resources such as cutters and Levels
aircraft, the Coast Guard has established fiscal year 2003 resource levels
for its various missions, but there is no indication that these levels
represent planned levels for future years.
Specifying the proposed resource levels for these missions, as well as
establishing a strategy for achieving them, is an important first step in
the Coast Guard*s communication with the Congress and other decisionmakers
about what it intends to accomplish with its additional resources. This
information is critical; without it, neither the Coast Guard nor the
Congress knows what level of activities and services are to be expected.
Operating without such knowledge for an extended period of time places
decisionmakers in the position of being asked to decide on funding levels
without knowing what this funding is likely to produce.
Second Component: Once resource levels are set, it is important to be able
to assess progress in Adequate Information for
achieving those levels. An effective reporting mechanism needs a variety
of Assessing Progress measures and a way to set these measures in context.
Although the Coast Guard may already be collecting this information, it
currently does not
exist in a useful format. Measures That Address Both
Program measures are most useful when, taken together, they can provide
Efforts and Accomplishments
a picture of both the resources being applied to a mission (inputs) and
the results of applying these resources (outputs and outcomes). Input
measures include such things as the amount of money spent on a mission or
the number of persons assigned to the mission. (See table 4 for other
examples.) Output measures, such as the number of patrols or inspections
conducted, describe what is being provided with these resources. Outcome
measures go further than output measures, in that they address the extent
to which program goals are accomplished. Together, these different
measures allow decisionmakers to answer questions about how many resources
are being applied, how the application of these resources translates into
specific activities, and what these activities are producing. 23 23 In
addition to these three types of measures, there is a fourth main type*
one that relates efforts to accomplishments. Efficiency measures, which
provide information about the cost of providing a certain level of
service, are the most common form of effort measure. We have omitted this
category of measurement here because the category, while important, is not
as central as the other three for answering questions about returning to
previous levels of effort and program results.
Table 4: Types of Measures for Monitoring Agency Missions and Activities
Type (or subtype) of measure Explanation Measures of effort: inputs
Financial information These measures are based on information about
expenditures. This can include items such as salaries, employee benefits,
materials, supplies, and equipment. Nonfinancial information These
measures focus on the number of personnel used in a specific mission or
activity. Using nonfinancial information in effect removes wage, benefit,
and cost- of- living differences
from resource inputs, making it easier to compare levels of effort over
time. Other information These measures could include such things as the
amount of equipment or assets assigned to a specific mission or activity.
Measures of accomplishment: outputs and outcomes
Outputs These measures focus on the quantity of a service provided to
address a specific mission or activity, such as the number of inspections
conducted.
Outcomes These measures are used to determine whether the service provided
results in an actual accomplishment besides the activity itself. These
measures are useful in setting goals, targets, and standards. Source:
Developed by GAO based on information from the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board.
Having all three types of measures is important, because exclusive
dependence on any one type has built- in limitations. For example, a
rising level of expenditures (an input measure) does not necessarily
equate to
higher levels of effort (outputs). Instead, it may be a reflection only of
rising personnel costs or increased capital expenditures. Similarly,
although a rising level of outputs (such as increased numbers of patrols)
may appear desirable, they tell only a limited story on their own.
Increased
outputs may simply represent inefficiencies* more effort is expended, but
with little or no increase in the desired outcome. Including outcome
measures is particularly important because they provide a *so what* tool
to help assess whether the level of effort is justified and whether it
needs to be modified in some way. The Coast Guard currently has a variety
of all three types of measures. (See
table 5 for examples.) Many of these measures are already reported in some
context or another. In particular, the Coast Guard currently collects and
reports a variety of outcome data to comply with the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Under GPRA, DOT is required to
establish annual performance plans that contain annual goals and measures
to assess progress in reaching these goals, which are linked to their
long- term strategic goals. The Coast Guard*s current performance
plan also contains some discussion of how security- related priorities are
affecting performance targets for other missions in fiscal years 2002 and
2003. The plan notes five areas that have been negatively impacted by
increased security requirements* drug interdiction, foreign fishing vessel
interdiction, fisheries protection, military readiness, and support for
military operations. For example, the Coast Guard does not expect to reach
its fiscal year 2002 cocaine seizure rate goal, because drug interdiction
resources have been diverted to port security missions.
Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast Guard Type
of measure Example
Input Dollar expenditures by mission, both planned and actual Authorized
strength levels for specific units or offices Number of vessels or
aircraft assigned to specific program areas or missions Output Number of
hours that assets such as cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft were spent
on each mission
Number of fisheries patrols conducted Number of vessel- safety and
-security inspections conducted Outcome Percentage of mariners in distress
who were saved
Number of foreign fishing vessel incursions detected Percentage of time
that navigation aids were fully operational
Source: Compiled by GAO from Coast Guard reports and information systems.
Additional Information Providing To give context to these various types of
measures, it may be necessary to Context for Measurement Data
report other explanatory information. Such information might be needed to
explain changes in the way an agency is doing business, or special
circumstances that had an impact on the agency*s goals or missions. This
information is of two main types:
External factors, such as environmental or demographic characteristics,
that are outside of an organization*s control. Declines in fish stocks,
for example, can be affected by many things beyond the management of the
fishery, such as climate or actions by other nations.
Internal factors, such as staffing patterns, patrol routes, or any other
significant developments that the agency has control over. Such
information is important because data from the measures themselves*
particularly input and output measures* may, in isolation, tell only part
of the story. For example, the Coast Guard*s marine safety office in New
Orleans recently curtailed some of its safety- related foreign flag*
vessel
inspections because of reduced staff levels. Any measure related to the
number of inspections made by Coast Guard personnel would thus likely show
a decline and lead to a conclusion that the Coast Guard had
significantly curtailed its safety oversight. However, the Coast Guard
decided in this instance to rely on Coast Guard- approved maritime
classification societies for these safety inspections. This additional
information would be needed to put the data in proper context. No Current
Report Usefully Although much potentially useful information exists for
explaining and
Provides This Information analyzing the Coast Guard*s levels of effort in
nonsecurity missions, no current report assimilates this information and
sets it in the context of organizational or program developments related
to accomplishing nonsecurity missions. The Coast Guard*s annual
performance plan, while
acknowledging in several places that nonsecurity performance targets are
likely to be negatively affected by ongoing security efforts, has a
relatively limited amount of data, is not intended as a report on
increasing resource levels for nonsecurity missions, and does not have the
level of detail that may be desired on this issue. Assembling a meaningful
report calls for a mix of input, output, and
outcome measures and a complementary explanation of what difficulties the
Coast Guard is facing, what externalities have affected the outcome, and
what plans the Coast Guard is making either to bring more resources to
bear or to find ways to leverage resources or otherwise operate more
efficiently. A meaningful report could potentially use many different
measures. In concept, the best set of measures would be one that allowed
both the Coast Guard and the Congress, to the degree possible, to link
resources and activities with results* for example, linking the number and
types of fisheries patrols with the recovery of fish stocks, or the level
of drug enforcement patrols with the level of success in preventing drugs
from entering the country.
It is important for the Coast Guard to work with the Congress in defining
what information should be provided, because some information is readily
available while other information is not. For example, under current
information systems, it is much easier to determine, on a mission-
bymission basis, how personnel aboard ships and aircraft spend their time
than it is to create a similar mission- by- mission picture of how time is
spent
in headquarters and program offices. 24 The value of developing additional
measures that are not already in place needs to be weighed against the
possible cost. We did not undertake a detailed evaluation of the Coast
Guard*s information systems to determine the full range of information
these systems might be able to supply. It may be that, if the Congress
decides that certain additional measures are important for reporting
purposes, Coast Guard information specialists can assemble the data with
relative ease. However, if the systems do not already collect the
information, considerable work may be needed, and there may be little
historical information to provide a benchmark for current data.
Conclusions The Coast Guard*s adjustment to its new post* September 11th
environment is still largely in process. Sorting out how traditional
missions will be fully carried out alongside new security responsibilities
will likely take several years. The Congress has expressed strong interest
in monitoring the activity levels for these missions, particularly those
nonsecurity missions that saw a reduction in activities after September
11th. The Coast Guard acknowledges that for the foreseeable future,
absorbing new security activities will continue to affect activity levels
for some of these other missions. After September 11th, the Coast Guard*s
attention understandably turned to assimilating added security
responsibilities, and beyond its short- term plans for fiscal year 2003 it
has not indicated the levels of effort its various missions are likely to
receive. However, given the degree of congressional concern, it is
important for the
Coast Guard to develop a framework that will keep the Congress apprised of
what is happening. It is also important for the Coast Guard to develop and
share with the Congress a longer- term strategy that identifies, at least
in general terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its
various missions, along with a time frame for achieving these planned
levels. Because the Coast Guard must adjust to rapid changes in its multi-
mission environment, these levels are likely to remain fluid and therefore
in need of revision as necessary, but the direction they set is
nonetheless important. Without this sense of direction, decisionmakers are
less able to make 24 The Coast Guard collects and reports information
about the number of hours that each resource, such as a cutter, a patrol
boat, or a helicopter, is used for each type of mission.
However, this asset- based information does not include mission- related
time spent by other personnel. Coast Guard officials told us that new
information systems currently under development are expected to provide a
variety of information related to the tasks of these employees, such as
the number of inspections performed or the number of boardings conducted.
spending and other decisions with a clear understanding of how the Coast
Guard intends to balance its missions. It is also important for the Coast
Guard to provide decisionmakers with information about progress in
achieving the intended balance among missions. The Coast Guard currently
collects and disseminates a wide variety of information about its
nonsecurity missions and activities, but this information is in disparate
forms and documents. To make such
information more useful for the Congress, a better synthesis is needed. In
short, existing information must be analyzed in the context of the Coast
Guard*s efforts to address all of its missions as effectively and
efficiently as possible. In doing so, information regarding agreed- upon
performance measures also needs to be developed and provided to
congressional decisionmakers. The absence of such information limits their
ability to assess current efforts and decide if changes should be made.
In meeting the challenges involved with its various missions, it is also
important for the Coast Guard to carefully consider and implement, where
appropriate, ways of operating more efficiently and effectively. Many past
suggestions for more efficient operation still appear relevant. These
would include looking for ways to share monitoring duties with other
agencies, eliminating possible duplication of effort, and conducting joint
operations or projects with state and local partners. The Coast Guard*s
recent efforts
to expand partnerships with other maritime stakeholders at individual
ports offer promising examples of greater leveraging of existing
resources. However, the processes for sharing information between ports
are limited, diminishing the potential for replicating a port*s successes
in other locations. Recommendations To provide the Congress with a useful
framework for reviewing and
monitoring Coast Guard activities, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to:
Develop a longer- term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees
its resources* cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel* being distributed
across its various missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this
desired balance among missions.
Work with the Congress to develop and implement a useful reporting
format that provides a full range of input, output, and outcome
measures, as well as a means to keep the Congress apprised of ongoing
developments that have an effect on nonsecurity missions.
To improve operational efficiencies and help leverage resources, we also
recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant to
reexamine past recommendations for operational efficiencies and, in
particular, to develop an effective way to systematically share
information on successful partnership efforts. Agency Comments and
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation and
Our Evaluation
the Coast Guard for their review and comment. Coast Guard officials
provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we incorporated to
ensure the accuracy of our report. The Coast Guard did not respond in
writing to our recommendations, but, in oral comments, Coast Guard
officials expressed a concern that our recommendation about developing a
longer- term strategy would involve disclosing budgetary information well
in advance of approval by DOT and Office of Management and Budget
officials in the normal budget process. We have modified the wording of
the
recommendation to help clarify that it is meant to identify, in more
general terms, how the Coast Guard envisions distributing its resources to
meet its many missions.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the
Honorable Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, and Admiral
Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the Coast Guard. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at heckerj@
gao. gov or (202) 512- 2834, or Randall Williamson at willamsonr@ gao. gov
or (206) 287- 4860. GAO contacts and acknowledgments are listed in
appendix II.
JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology To determine the extent to which the
Coast Guard has restored its nonsecurity missions following the September
11th terrorist attacks, we reviewed the Coast Guard*s Abstract of
Operations. This data, reported by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft,
represents the hours that these resources spent in each of the Coast
Guard*s mission areas. We reviewed
this data to identify how resources were utilized across missions both
before and after September 11th. In addition, we also spoke with officials
at Coast Guard Headquarters and at the Atlantic Area and Pacific Area
commands in Portsmouth, Virginia, and Alameda, California, respectively,
regarding restoration of nonsecurity missions. To obtain information on
how the restoration varied around the country, we visited Coast Guard
district offices and operational units in Alameda, Boston, New Orleans,
Portsmouth, and Seattle, as well as personnel at operational commands
under these district commands.
To assess the impact of the fiscal year 2003 budget request on nonsecurity
operations, we reviewed the Coast Guard*s fiscal year 2002 budget and
supplemental appropriations, as well as their fiscal year 2003 budget
request. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials within the
Coast Guard*s Office of Programs, the Human Resource Directorate,
Operations
Directorate, and the Marine Safety Directorate to identify where budget
increases would be spent and the impact of the budget increase. To discuss
the impact of the increase in the budget request, we interviewed staff at
Coast Guard Headquarters, area commands, and district offices. In
addition, we also reviewed Coast Guard planning documents to determine the
extent of changes in planned resource allocations for fiscal year 2003.
To identify types of operational efficiencies the Coast Guard should
consider to help restore nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous GAO
and Department of Transportation Inspector General reports. In addition,
we discussed options for operational efficiencies and for the development
of partnerships at district offices we visited, as well as at local Coast
Guard
offices under these districts* commands. We also reviewed Coast Guard
guidance for Harbor Safety Committees and Marine Transportation System
issues.
To identify a framework that would help the Coast Guard report on progress
toward restoring nonsecurity missions, we reviewed previous GAO work on
performance management and developing performance measures. We reviewed
the Coast Guard*s current strategic documents and discussed these reports
with staff in the Coast Guard*s Office of Programs
to determine the extent to which existing data collection activities could
support a reporting framework.
Appendi x II
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts JayEtta Z. Hecker
(202) 512- 2834 Randall B. Williamson (206) 287- 4860 Acknowledgments In
addition to those named above, David Hooper, Christopher M. Jones,
Molly C. Laster, Sara Moessbauer, Tim Schindler, and Stan Stenersen made
key contributions to this report.
(544022)
GAO*s Mission The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to
help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions.
GAO*s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO
documents at no cost is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao.
gov) contains abstracts and fulltext GAO Reports and
files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older
Testimony
products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate
documents using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in
their entirety, including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov
and select *Subscribe to daily E- mail alert for newly released products*
under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out
to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:
U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D. C.
20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202)
512- 6061
To Report Fraud, Contact: Waste, and Abuse in
Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail: fraudnet@ gao.
gov
Federal Programs Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202) 512-
7470
Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202)
512- 4800 U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D. C. 20548
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post* September 11th environment, it
will likely take several years to determine how best to balance carrying
out nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities. In
recent months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in
nonsecurity activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols,
but some of these activities remain below earlier levels. For example,
patrol boats formerly used for drug interdiction are still being used for
harbor security patrols. Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities
are also unlikely in the near future, because the mission- related
initiatives proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget are directed primarily
at security missions. Most notably, most of the proposed 1,330 new staff
would replace reserve staff activated after September 11th.
The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing, even in
general terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions in
future years. Understandably, the Coast Guard*s attention has been focused
on assimilating added security responsibilities. However, developing a
more comprehensive strategy is now important, as a way to inform the
Congress about the extent to which the Coast Guard*s use of its resources*
cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel* will allow it to continue meeting
its many responsibilities. Also important is designing a way to keep the
Congress informed about its progress in achieving this balance. The Coast
Guard has considerable data from which to develop progress reports, but
this information is currently in disparate forms and documents.
.
Coast Guard patrol boats like this one, formerly used mainly in activities
such as intercepting drugs or illegal immigrants, were still being used
extensively for harbor security patrols in mid- 2002.
Source: U. S. Coast Guard. COAST GUARD
Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All
Missions
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 155. To view the full report,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512- 2834 or heckerj@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 155, a report to
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
November 2002
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many
federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-
standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard*s duties, took
center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other
missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration,
protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine pollution.
GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard*s current efforts and future plans
for balancing resource levels among its many missions.
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard:
Develop a longer- term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees its
resources being distributed across its various missions, and a time frame
for achieving this desired balance.
Develop and implement a useful reporting format that allows the Congress
to understand and assess the progress in implementing this strategy.
Reexamine recommendations from past studies of the agency*s operations as
a way to identify and improve operational efficiencies and help leverage
resources. The Coast Guard reviewed a draft of this report but did not
take a formal position on GAO*s recommendations.
Page i GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Contents Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 5 Expanded Security Activities Primarily
Affected Law Enforcement and Marine Safety Missions 8
Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not Have A Major
Effect on Nonsecurity Missions 19 Opportunities for Increased Operational
Efficiency Could Help Meet
Mission Responsibilities 23 Framework for Monitoring Levels of Effort and
Results Has Two
Main Components 28 Conclusions 33 Recommendations 34 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 35
Appendixes
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 39 GAO Contacts 39
Staff Acknowledgments 39
Tables Table 1: Description of Selected Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft 6
Table 2: Allocation of Proposed New Personnel by Program Area,
Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request 20 Table 3: Examples of Coast Guard
Partnering in Individual Ports 25 Table 4: Types of Measures for
Monitoring Agency Missions and Activities 30
Table 5: Examples of Measures Currently Developed by the Coast Guard 31
Figures Figure 1: Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard High- and
Medium- Endurance Cutters before and after September 11th 12 Figure 2:
Distribution of Resource Hours Spent Aboard 82-, 87-, and
110- Foot Patrol Boats before and after September 11th 14
Page 1 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions United States General Accounting
Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
A
Page 2 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 3 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 4 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 5 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 6 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 7 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 8 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 9 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 10 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 11 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 12 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 13 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 14 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 15 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 16 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 17 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 18 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 19 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 20 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 21 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 22 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 23 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 24 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 25 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 26 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 27 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 28 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 29 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 30 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 31 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 32 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 33 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 34 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 35 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 36 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 37 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Appendix I
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 38 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Page 39 GAO- 03- 155 Coast Guard Missions
Appendix II
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Service Requested Presorted Standard
Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***