Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection
for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports (22-OCT-02,
GAO-03-15).
The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S.
Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional
threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11, 2001,
attacks further heightened the need for a significant change in
conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly regarding
threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm assumes
that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable
to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally
considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial
seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly
recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. Of
the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments
of Defense (DOD) and Transportation have designated 17 as
"strategic," because in the event of a large-scale military
deployment, DOD would need to transport more than 95 percent of
all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea.
If the strategic ports were attacked, not only could massive
civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose
precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its
overburdened airlift capabilities. The security environment at
strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive
assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port
infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no
effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat
information at the seaports. GAO identified two significant
weaknesses in DOD's force protection process for deployments
through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority
responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD
organizations that move forces from domestic installations
through U.S. seaports. Second, during some phases of a
deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to
non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by
non-U.S. citizens.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-15
ACCNO: A05379
TITLE: Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports
DATE: 10/22/2002
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
Harbors
Military forces
Military operations
Terrorism
Ships
National preparedness
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-15
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
October 2002 COMBATING TERRORISM Actions Needed to Improve Force
Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports
GAO- 03- 15
Page i GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Current Risk Management Approach Creates
Uncertainties about
the Security Environment at Strategic Seaports 6 Weaknesses in DOD Force
Protection Process Increase Risks for
Deployments through Domestic Seaports 13 Conclusions 20 Recommendations
for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments and Our Review 22
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 26
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 29
Related GAO Products 30
Tables
Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in Deployments GAO
Reviewed from Three Installations in 2001 18 Table 2: Examples of
Equipment Carried on Foreign- Owned and
Foreign- Crewed Ships 18
Figures
Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport 5 Figure
2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related
Infrastructure at a Seaport 7 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Demonstrating
Enforcement of a Security Zone at a Commercial Port 12 Figure 4: The
Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and
Responsible Organizations 15
Page 1 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
October 22, 2002 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer
U. S. S. Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional
threats to U. S. ships in seaports. The September 11 attacks further
heightened the need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist
thinking, particularly regarding threats to the U. S. homeland. The new
security paradigm assumes that all U. S. forces, be they abroad or at
home, are vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures
traditionally considered of little interest to terrorists, such as
commercial seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly
recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. The
Department of Defense (DOD) and all agencies associated with seaport
security recognize this new paradigm and are taking steps to reduce
vulnerabilities and increase security.
Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of
Defense and Transportation have designated 17 as *strategic,* because in
the event of a large- scale military deployment, DOD would transport more
than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military
operations by sea. These ports are therefore vital to national security.
If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were
attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD
could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on
its overburdened airlift capabilities.
Military commanders are responsible for the protection of personnel,
equipment, and other assets. To achieve this objective, commanders apply a
*risk management* approach, which is a systematic, analytical process to
determine the likelihood that a threat will negatively impact physical
assets, individuals, or operations and identify actions to reduce risk and
mitigate the consequences of an attack. The principles of risk management
acknowledge that although risk generally cannot be eliminated, it can be
significantly reduced by enhancing protection from known or potential
threats.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
You asked us to examine how DOD protects its forces and assets as it
deploys them through strategic commercial seaports. This report focuses on
domestic seaports and analyzes (1) the security environment at domestic
strategic seaports used by DOD for military deployments and (2) DOD*s
process for securing military deployments through those ports. Overseas
seaports will be the focus of a subsequent review.
As part of our evaluation, we examined seaport force protection efforts at
six strategic seaports in the United States. Although the information we
obtained at these locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD*s
overall seaport force protection, it provides insight into how force
protection efforts at strategic seaports were implemented at selected
locations. For security reasons, we do not discuss location- specific
information in this report. Further information on our scope and
methodology appears in appendix I.
The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because
comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port
infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective
mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the
seaports. These conditions compound the already difficult task of
protecting deploying forces and increase the risk that threats* both
traditional and nontraditional 1 ones* may not be recognized or that
threat information may not be communicated in a timely manner to all
relevant organizations. Recent efforts by the Coast Guard, the
Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies at the ports
have begun to address many of these weaknesses. The Coast Guard initiated
vulnerability assessments of port infrastructure and is deploying
additional teams dedicated to seaport security. Further, if enacted,
legislation currently before the Congress proposes steps that may assist
these efforts and provides additional measures that could improve the
coordination and dissemination of threat information.
We identified two significant weaknesses in DOD*s force protection process
for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central
authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD
organizations that move forces from domestic installations through
1 Nontraditional threats can include natural or man- made disasters, such
as hurricanes, industrial accidents, and cyber attacks. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
U. S. seaports. As a result, potential force protection gaps and
weaknesses requiring attention and action might be overlooked. DOD has
such an authority for the overseas portions of deployments and is
therefore better able to identify and mitigate force protection gaps
there. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody
of its military equipment to non- DOD entities, including foreign- owned
ships crewed by non- U. S. citizens. Although consistent with current DOD
policies and procedures, this practice limits DOD*s ability to provide
security oversight. As a result, equipment could fall into the hands of
individuals or groups whose interests are counter to those of the United
States.
We are making recommendations to improve (1) threat information
coordination at strategic seaports, (2) DOD*s oversight and coordination
of force protection for deployments through seaports, and (3) DOD*s
control over the in- transit phases of a movement of equipment. In
comments on a draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and
Transportation generally agreed with the contents of this report and its
recommendations.
DOD defines force protection as *actions taken to prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family
members), resources, facilities, and critical information.* 2 Our review
concentrated mostly on the physical security and related aspects of force
protection that include measures to protect personnel and property and
encompass consequence management, intelligence, and critical
infrastructure protection.
We have identified a risk management approach used by DOD to defend
against terrorism that also has relevance for the organizations
responsible for security at commercial seaports. This approach can provide
a process to enhance preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks or other
emergencies, whether natural or man- made (intentional or unintentional).
The approach is based on assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and
criticalities (the importance of critical infrastructure and functions).
Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis of
factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. These
assessments represent a systematic approach to identifying potential
2 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1- 02, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Apr. 12, 2001, as amended
through May 7, 2002). Background
Page 4 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
threats before they materialize. However, even if updated frequently,
threat assessments may not adequately capture all emerging threats. The
risk management approach therefore uses vulnerability and criticality
assessments as additional input to the decision- making process.
Vulnerability assessments identify weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggest options that address those weaknesses. For
example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in a seaport*s
security systems, police force, computer networks, or unprotected key
infrastructure such as water supplies, bridges, and tunnels. In general,
teams of experts skilled in areas such as structural engineering, physical
security, and other disciplines conduct these assessments.
Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize important assets and
functions in terms of factors such as mission and significance as a
target. For example, certain power plants, bridges, computer networks, or
population centers might be identified as important to the operation of a
seaport. Criticality assessments provide a basis for identifying which
assets and structures are more important to protect from attack. These
assessments also help determine mission- essential requirements to better
prioritize limited force protection resources while reducing the potential
for expending resources on lower priority assets.
In the event of a major military mobilization and overseas deployment,
such as Operation Desert Shield, a large percentage of U. S. forces
(equipment and other materiel) would be sent by sea through a number of
commercial seaports in the United States to their respective areas of
operations. 3 To accomplish this, DOD would use several shipping methods,
including government- owned and maintained reserve sealift ships 4 and
ships operated or chartered by the Military Sealift Command. Figure 1
shows two reserve sealift ships berthed at a commercial seaport.
3 Most personnel would be transported by air. 4 These reserve ships are
part of the Maritime Administration*s Ready Reserve Force.
Page 5 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Figure 1: Reserve Sealift Ships Berthed at a Commercial Seaport
Source: GAO.
The military also uses commercial seaports for deployments such as those
to operations in the Balkans. The Departments of Defense and
Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and
Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1 military port, and 3 military
ammunition ports) as *strategic,* meaning that they are necessary for use
by DOD in the event of a large scale military deployment.
Because the security activities that DOD may conduct outside its
installations are limited, it must work closely with a broad range of
federal, state, and local agencies to ensure that adequate force
protection measures exist and are executed during deployments through
strategic seaports. Force protection responsibilities for DOD deployments
through commercial seaports are divided among a number of DOD
organizations including the U. S. Transportation Command and its
components (particularly the Military Traffic Management Command and the
Military Sealift Command), the U. S. Army Forces Command, and individual
deploying units.
Page 6 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Port Readiness Committees 5 at each strategic port provide a common
coordination structure for DOD, the Coast Guard, and other federal, state,
and local agencies at the port level and are the principal interface
between DOD and other officials at the ports during the movement of
military equipment. The Port Readiness Committees are focused largely on
preparing for potential military movements through a port and not on
dayto- day security concerns at the port.
The issue of security at the nation*s seaports has been the subject of a
recent major study, as has the broader issue of homeland security. In fall
2000, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S. Seaports
reported that security at seaports needed to be improved in a number of
areas, including
assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure at
ports;
coordination and cooperation among agencies; and
establishment of guidelines for commercial facilities handling military
cargo.
In February 2001, the Commission on National Security/ 21st Century
(commonly referred to as the Hart- Rudman Commission) reported that
threats such as international terrorism would place the U. S. homeland in
great danger. In addition to recommending national action, the commission
urged DOD to pay closer attention to operations within the United States.
The security environment at strategic seaports is uncertain because
comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and port
infrastructure and functions have not been completed. Recent efforts by
the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, and other
agencies at the ports have begun to address several important security
issues, and maritime security legislation before the Congress may assist
these efforts. Further, proposed legislation may provide a framework for
seaport organizations to improve the coordination and dissemination of
threat information.
5 The Port Readiness Committees are part of the National Port Readiness
Network chaired by the Maritime Administration. Current Risk
Management Approach Creates Uncertainties about the Security Environment
at Strategic Seaports
Page 7 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
There is a wide range of vulnerabilities at strategic seaports, including
critical infrastructure such as bridges and refineries in close proximity
to open shoreline, shipping containers with unknown contents, and an
enormous volume of foreign and domestic shipping traffic. Figure 2
illustrates typical commercial port infrastructure and operations.
Figure 2: A Commercial Container Vessel and Related Infrastructure at a
Seaport
Source: GAO.
Many of the organizations responsible for seaport security do not have the
resources (such as trained personnel, equipment, and funding) necessary to
mitigate all vulnerabilities. To determine how best to allocate available
resources and address security at seaports, it is vital that responsible
agencies involved follow a risk management approach that includes
assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical infrastructure and
functions. The results of these assessments should then be used to better
conduct risk- based decisions involving security planning and actions.
Since September 11, the organizations responsible for security at
strategic seaports have increased emphasis on security planning. They now
recognize that planning must include the protection of critical seaport
Weaknesses Exist in the
Process to Assess Risk at Seaports
Page 8 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
infrastructure and assets that have not generally been considered
vulnerable. Port authority officials stated that increased security
planning has led to improvements in physical security, such as higher
fences, more security personnel, and better coordination with local law
enforcement and other agencies. The Coast Guard has taken broad actions
forward and has redirected resources towards security planning
improvements.
However, in their planning efforts, the organizations at the ports we
visited applied the elements of risk management differently. At only one
of six ports we visited were the results of threat, vulnerability, and
criticality assessments incorporated into a seaport security plan that
included all relevant agencies. The Port Mobilization Master Plan
developed by the Port Readiness Committee at this port employs a risk-
based process and systematically identifies the mission, responsibilities,
and functional relationships of each activity or agency involved in
supporting a military deployment through the port. 6 Specific weaknesses
in the assessment process used at ports we studied include the following:
Individual organizations at the seaports conducted separate
vulnerability assessments that were not coordinated with those of other
agencies and were not based on standardized approaches. The Coast Guard
has taken the lead in developing a standard methodology for comprehensive
portwide vulnerability assessments (also called port security assessments)
that it plans to complete at 50 major ports, including all strategic
seaports.
Assessments of the criticality of seaport infrastructure were not done
at all the ports we visited prior to September 11. The Coast Guard has
since addressed this shortcoming by conducting assessments of high- risk
infrastructure at all major ports. It coordinated the assessments with
commercial facilities at the ports. Criticality of seaport assets and
functions will also be incorporated into the port security assessments.
In some cases, threat assessment information received by agencies at the
ports is based on higher- level regional assessments that do not focus on
the local port facility. These regional assessments, while helpful in
providing a broader view of the security environment, do not provide
sitespecific local threat information to the port.
Agencies involved with seaport security have different concepts of how
threat assessments should be developed and the degree to which threat
information should be shared and disseminated. Some agencies have not
traditionally shared threat information as widely as may be necessary for
6 The local Port Readiness Committee is currently revising the master
plan.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
comprehensive security measures at seaports. In addition to these specific
weaknesses, we found that there is no single mechanism (such as a working
group or committee) at the seaports we visited to analyze, coordinate, and
disseminate information on a routine basis on the broad range of threats
at each port. Most threat information at the ports was coordinated on an
informal basis, such as through personal contacts between law enforcement
individuals and those at other agencies. The lack of such a mechanism
compounds the already difficult task of protecting deploying military
forces and increases the risk that threats* both traditional and
nontraditional ones* may not be recognized or that threat information may
not be communicated in a timely manner to all relevant organizations.
Currently, interagency bodies at or near the ports, such as port readiness
committees, joint terrorism task forces, or the newly formed antiterrorism
task forces, do not routinely coordinate threat information focused solely
on the ports. The port readiness committees were designed to prepare
commercial ports to conduct military movements. The task forces were
designed to focus on threat information but on a regional rather than a
port level.
The need for efficient coordination of threat information has been amply
documented and recognized, and there are examples of improved coordination
efforts. The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S.
Seaports noted in 2000 the importance of interagency threat coordination.
The commission said that officials at seaports need a means to analyze,
coordinate, and disseminate information on the broad range of threats they
face. This includes information on ships, crews, and cargo and information
on criminal, terrorist, and other threats with foreign and domestic
origins. Although the commission did not recommend centralizing threat
information distribution into a single agency or regulating dissemination
procedures at seaports, it did recommend improvements in integrating
threat information systems and improved coordination mechanisms for law
enforcement agencies at the seaport level.
Furthermore, the Coast Guard recognizes that agencies involved with
seaport security are currently unable to adequately analyze, share, and
exploit available threat information, and it also recognizes that
Page 10 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
asymmetric 7 military and terrorist threats have a natural gateway into
America via its ports. In response, the Coast Guard has developed a
*maritime domain awareness* concept that emphasizes a risk management
approach for preventing or mitigating both traditional and nontraditional
threats through the analysis and dissemination of threat information. The
concept involves being knowledgeable of all activities and elements in the
maritime domain that could represent threats to the safety, security, or
environment of the United States or its citizens. Through the timely
delivery to the appropriate civilian or military authorities of processed
information, drawn from all available sources, effective actions involving
limited resources can be taken. Additionally, the maritime domain
awareness concept allows the Coast Guard and other relevant agencies to
incorporate nontraditional threat information, such as unintentional
biological hazards in empty cargo containers or impending weather hazards
into actionable intelligence. Both of these issues can constitute
potential threats to a port and its operation.
In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security
Administration officials agreed that the coordination and dissemination of
threat information at the port level is an issue that needs to be
addressed. They noted that the Transportation Security Administration is
overseeing studies (as part of *Operation Safe Commerce*) aimed at
identifying potential threats and risk mitigation techniques that will
contribute to meeting this goal.
Finally, as we have previously reported, DOD uses threat working groups at
its installations as a forum to involve installation force protection
personnel with local, state, and federal law enforcement officials to
identify potential threats to the installation and to improve
communication between these organizations. 8 These working groups help
coordinate as much information as possible on a broad range of potential
threats. Given the limited information available on threats posed by
terrorist groups or individuals, such a mechanism assists the installation
commander and local authorities in gaining a more complete picture of
internal and
7 Asymmetric threats include unconventional approaches (such as terrorism,
the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and information
warfare) that circumvent traditional U. S. military strengths. 8 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management, GAO- 01- 909
(Washington, D. C.: Sept. 19, 2001).
Page 11 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
external threats on a more continuous basis over and above what is
provided by an annual threat assessment.
Since the September 11 attacks, the Coast Guard and other agencies at
ports have made efforts to improve risk management and security measures.
The Coast Guard, traditionally a multimission organization, has made a
significant shift in operational focus toward seaport security. In so
doing, the Coast Guard, in the months immediately following September
2001, diverted resources from other missions such as drug interdiction but
has since restored some of its effort in those areas.
Examples of additional recent efforts by the Coast Guard and other
agencies include
formation of Coast Guard maritime safety and security teams based at
selected ports to assist in providing port security personnel and
equipment;
Coast Guard escorts or boarding of high- risk ships, including cruise
ships, in ports;
Coast Guard escorts for naval vessels;
establishment and enforcement of new security zones and increased harbor
security patrols (figure 3); and
port authority cost estimates for improving facility security and
interim security improvement measures.
In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation Security
Administration officials indicated that they are taking initial steps
toward accomplishing seaport security goals by awarding approximately $217
million in grants (funded through both regular and emergency
appropriations) to public and private entities at the ports for initial
security assessments, preliminary security improvements, and port incident
response training. Recent Efforts and
Proposed Legislation May Assist Port Security Improvements
Page 12 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Figure 3: Coast Guard Crew in a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Demonstrating
Enforcement of a Security Zone at a Commercial Port
Source: GAO.
Legislation on maritime security before the Congress (as of October 22,
2002) 9 may promote and enhance these seaport security efforts. Some of
the major provisions include
vulnerability assessments to be conducted at ports;
establishment of port security committees at each port, with broad
representation by relevant agencies, to plan and oversee security
measures;
development of standardized port security plans;
background checks and access control to sensitive areas for port
workers; and
federal grants for security improvements. 9 S. 1214 passed the Senate on
December 20, 2001. The House of Representatives passed an amendment to S.
1214 on June 4, 2002.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
On the basis of our discussions with agency officials at the ports we
visited, we believe that if enacted and properly implemented, these and
other provisions of the maritime security legislation should assist
officials in addressing many of the weaknesses we have identified. For
example, comprehensive vulnerability assessments and the proposed
standardized security plans could provide a more consistent approach to
identifying and mitigating security weaknesses. In providing for port
security committees and interagency coordination, the legislation would
also provide a framework for organizations at seaports to establish a
mechanism to coordinate, analyze, and disseminate threat information at
the port level. There may be challenges, however, to implementing the
maritime security legislation, including uncertainty about the amount and
sources of funds needed to address security needs at seaports. We recently
reported on these and other challenges to implementing the provisions of
this legislation and the establishment of a new Department of Homeland
Security. 10
In commenting on a draft of this report, Coast Guard officials reported
that notwithstanding the status of the proposed legislation, port security
committees have already been established at some major ports and that the
Coast Guard is preparing a nationwide policy to delineate the purpose and
composition of these committees. Coast Guard officials believe that in
addition to consideration of vulnerabilities and security planning, the
port security committees, as currently envisioned, may provide a more
effective mechanism for threat information coordination.
During our review, we identified two significant weaknesses in DOD*s force
protection process. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for
overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations while carrying
out the various domestic phases of military deployments to and through U.
S. seaports. As a result, potential force protection gaps and weaknesses
requiring attention and action might be overlooked. Second, there are
instances during some phases of these deployments when DOD transfers
custody of its military equipment to nongovernment entities. At these
times, the equipment could fall into the hands of individuals or groups
whose interests are counter to those of the United States.
10 U. S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable
Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T
(Washington, D. C.: Aug. 5, 2002). Weaknesses in DOD
Force Protection Process Increase Risks for Deployments through Domestic
Seaports
Page 14 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Deploying units traditionally focus their force protection efforts
primarily on their overseas operations. Before they arrive in an overseas
region, the units are required to submit force protection plans to the
unified combatant commanders, who are responsible for force protection of
all military units in their regions, with the exception of DOD personnel
assigned to the Department of State. The tactics, techniques, and
procedures in the units* plans must match the guidance developed by the
unified commander, who coordinates and approves the individual plans. This
allows the commander to ensure that a unit*s plan takes into account all
current threats that could affect the mission and to accept or mitigate
any security risks that arise.
The situation for the domestic phases of overseas deployments is
different: there is no designated commander with centralized force
protection responsibilities similar to those of the overseas unified
combatant commander. This creates gaps, during the domestic phases of a
deployment, in DOD*s ability to coordinate individual force protection
plans, identify gaps that may exist, and mitigate the identified risk. The
one coordination mechanism that is in place* the Port Readiness Committee*
is focused largely on port operations and at this time does not coordinate
all phases of a deployment from an installation through the port. Figure 4
illustrates the domestic phases of a deployment and key organizations
responsible for force protection. DOD Lacks a Central
Authority to Coordinate and Execute Domestic Force Protection Measures
Page 15 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Figure 4: The Domestic Phases of the Deployment Process and Responsible
Organizations
Source: GAO, based on DOD information.
In the deployments we reviewed, service guidance and DOD antiterrorism
standards, particularly those that emphasize the elements of risk
management (such as Army major command force protection operations
orders), were not always followed in all phases of a deployment from an
installation through a port. For example, the Military Traffic Management
Command*s transportation units recognized the vulnerability of seaport
operations and prepared security plans for deployment operations at the
ports that were based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and
Page 16 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
critical infrastructure. The transport of military equipment to the port
by commercial carrier was not always supported by such detailed plans and
assessments. In contrast, we found that when a military unit travels by
road to a seaport in its own convoy, it generally follows exhaustive
planning and risk management measures.
In discussing the absence of a focal point for coordinating and executing
force protection measures for the domestic phases of military deployments,
DOD officials indicated that the recently established U. S. Northern
Command may serve as such a coordinating mechanism. Additionally, in
commenting on a draft of this report, DOD officials noted that the
principal defense guidance on military transportation issues 11 is in the
process of being revised to incorporate force protection guidance.
During deployments from domestic installations through commercial
seaports, there are three phases in which DOD either transfers custody of
its equipment to nongovernment persons (in some cases foreign nationals)
or does not have adequate information about who is handling its equipment,
as follows:
Private trucking and railroad carriers transport equipment and cargo
from military installations to seaports.
Civilian port workers handle and load equipment onto ships.
Private shipping companies with civilian crews sometimes transport DOD
equipment overseas.
The four deployments we reviewed from three military installations in 2001
involved the use of road and rail contract carriers transporting equipment
from the installation to a port of embarkation. Contract carriers are
required to provide security for the equipment they transport, including
sensitive items. For example, contract carriers are required to provide
their own security at railroad switching yards, rest areas, overnight
stops, and along the entire route whenever they transport sensitive
equipment. Although we did not review the steps taken by DOD to evaluate
the contractors* security measures, the transfer of accountability to
these nongovernmental agents creates a gap in DOD*s oversight of its
assets between installations and ports.
11 DOD Directive 4500. 9, Transportation and Traffic Management, Jan. 26,
1989. Military Equipment and
Cargo Are Sometimes Not under DOD Control
Page 17 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Once equipment arrives at a commercial seaport, it comes under the control
of the military units responsible for managing the loading process.
However, civilian port workers, stevedores, and longshoremen* who undergo
limited screening and background checks by port authorities or terminal
operators* handle military equipment and cargo, as well as the loading and
unloading of ships used to transport the equipment overseas. This was the
case in all the deployments we reviewed. In all cases, the stevedores or
longshoremen were in the same labor pool as the one used for commercial
port operations. While DOD officials have not identified port workers as a
particular threat, they are concerned that lack of information on the
background of individuals handling military equipment increases potential
risk. Organizations at some of the ports we visited are now implementing
or reviewing efforts to increase screening of port workers. And the
maritime security legislation currently before the Congress includes
provisions for background checks and access control for port workers.
These measures, if approved and properly implemented, may help address
this issue. In commenting on a draft of this report, Transportation
Security Administration officials acknowledged the problems posed by the
lack of screening for port workers and indicated that they plan to study
and eventually issue nationwide standards for credentialing port workers.
DOD also transfers custody of its equipment when the equipment is placed
aboard a commercial ship for transport overseas. We reviewed four major
overseas deployments from three military installations during calendar
year 2001 that involved about 6, 550 tons of military equipment and
supplies. Although these four deployments are not representative of all
DOD deployments conducted in 2001, they do illustrate the use of
foreignowned commercial vessels by DOD. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD officials stated that about 43 percent of cargo shipped
overseas in 2001 as part of deployments involving major equipment in
support of overseas operations was carried on foreign- flagged ships. 12
As indicated in table 1, most of the ships for the deployments we reviewed
were both foreign- owned and foreign- crewed.
12 DOD further stated that only 18 percent of all cargo (including
deployments and general cargo, such as household goods) shipped by the
Military Sealift Command was transported by foreign- flagged vessels.
Page 18 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Table 1: Ownership and Crew for Commercial Ships Used in Deployments GAO
Reviewed from Three Installations in 2001
Ship U. S. Owned Foreign Owned U. S. Crew Foreign Crew
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 N/ A N/ A 9 N/ A N/ A
N/ A: Crew information not available. Source: DOD.
In addition to transferring custody over its assets to non- DOD personnel,
DOD did not generally provide security forces aboard these vessels.
Several of the ships used in the deployments we reviewed did have DOD
maintenance personnel aboard, but the ship manifests did not indicate that
armed DOD personnel were aboard as a security force. The Military Sealift
Command reviews charter vessel crew lists to determine whether any
crewmembers are known security threats. Some of the materiel transported
by these vessels included sensitive and mission essential items. Table 2
provides examples of equipment carried aboard foreignowned and foreign-
crewed ships for the deployments we reviewed.
Table 2: Examples of Equipment Carried on Foreign- Owned and Foreign-
Crewed Ships
Equipment Category Example
Major weapon system Bradley fighting vehicles
155mm howitzers
Apache attack helicopters
Blackhawk helicopters
Stinger anti- aircraft launchers
Armored light vehicles Other weapons Antitank missile launchers
.50 caliber machineguns
40mm grenade launchers
9mm pistols
M- 16A2 rifles
Squad automatic weapons
Bayonets
Page 19 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Equipment Category Example
Individual equipment Night vision goggles
Minefield marking system
Chemical agent monitor
Body armor
Nuclear, biological, and chemical protective suits and masks
Mine detection sets
Global positioning system receivers Communications equipment Radio
sets
Antenna assemblies
Satellite communications terminals Source: DOD.
When DOD relinquishes control over its equipment, it relies on
nongovernment third parties to protect its assets. Placing military
equipment outside DOD*s control also complicates the steps needed to
mitigate the higher risk and could disrupt military units from performing
their intended missions. An example of the dangers of such loss of control
occurred in summer 2000. While in the North Atlantic, the captain of a
commercial vessel carrying Canadian military equipment and three Canadian
Forces personnel from the Balkans refused to proceed to the ship*s
destination port in Canada after a dispute over payment to the vessel*s
owner. The vessel, GTS Katie, was owned by a U. S. company but registered
in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and crewed by non- U. S. citizens.
Alarmed at the loss of control over its equipment, including sensitive
items, the Canadian government was compelled to board the
Katie with a contingent of Canadian Forces naval personnel from a nearby
warship. The vessel was then brought safely into a Canadian port. 13
The Canadian Defense Minister explained that the loss of control over
military equipment compromised Canada*s ongoing military operations and
the ability to undertake new ones. 14 Similarly, when the third parties to
whom DOD relinquishes control of its equipment include foreign nationals,
there may be an increased risk of the equipment being tampered with,
seized, or destroyed by individuals or groups whose interests run
13 The Department of Defense had also chartered the same vessel to
transport military equipment from operations in the Balkans. 14 Although
he recognized the danger of the Katie incident, the Canadian Defense
Minister
also acknowledged that it would still be necessary for Canada to charter
nongovernment vessels for future military movements.
Page 20 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
counter to those of the United States and an increased chance that those
weapons or equipment might be used against military or civilian targets.
During our review, officials from several military commands expressed
concern about placing military equipment aboard ships that are outside DOD
control. DOD officials told us that the reasons for the use of commercial
contract carriers include, among others, economy and efficiency over using
government- owned and -operated vessels and the adequacy and availability
of the U. S.- flagged merchant marine. In commenting on a draft of this
report, Maritime Administration officials agreed with our concerns related
to the use of foreign ships and crews to transport sensitive military
equipment and reiterated their interest in increasing the number of U. S.-
flag vessels appropriate for DOD use. They indicated that the shortage of
appropriate U. S.- flagged ships will be exacerbated by Military Sealift
Command plans to terminate existing charters for some U. S.- flag vessels.
The events of September 11 highlighted the vulnerability of the U. S.
homeland to unconventional attack, and the resulting new security
environment warrants that more attention be paid to the domestic phases of
military deployments. It is clearly evident that since September 11, DOD
and the organizations responsible for seaport security recognize the need
for increased vigilance at home during the domestic phases of a military
deployment, and this recognition provides an opportunity to improve
seaport security in a systematic and effective manner.
However, the inadequate assessment of threats and vulnerabilities and lack
of comprehensive security plans prevent organizations at seaports and DOD
from thoroughly analyzing the security environment at the ports. This
hampers the identification and prioritization of requirements for the
protection of critical assets. This situation compounds an already
difficult task of protecting deploying DOD forces. However, if enacted and
properly implemented, pending maritime security legislation would address
most of these issues. We are therefore making no recommendations in this
area.
The absence of a mechanism at the strategic seaports for coordinating and
disseminating comprehensive threat information increases the risk that
threats* both traditional and nontraditional* will not be identified and
appropriately communicated to all relevant organizations. If established
at the port level such a mechanism could provide a formal, rather than
informal and ad- hoc, process for coordinating information, and it could
Conclusions
Page 21 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
focus on port- specific threats, rather than a regionwide perspective. A
central coordination mechanism could also provide a means to analyze
threats on a continuous basis.
Without a DOD authority or organization to coordinate force protection
planning and execution for the domestic phases of DOD deployments to and
through strategic seaports, potential gaps in force protection may go
unnoticed, increasing the risk to DOD operations and equipment. Having
such an authority would not only reduce such risks, but would also provide
oversight to ensure that risk management and antiterrorism standards are
consistently applied through all phases of a deployment from an
installation through a port.
When military equipment is entrusted to non- DOD personnel, with limited
DOD control over the equipment, there is a greater risk that it could be
tampered with, seized, or destroyed. While we recognize there are times
during a deployment when DOD will relinquish direct control of its
equipment, the new security environment warrants that DOD re- evaluate its
current policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate security
measures are applied during these times. Weaknesses in DOD*s force
protection approach along with uncertainties in the security environment
at strategic seaports result in increased risks that military operations
could be disrupted, successful terrorist attacks might occur, or
sophisticated military equipment might be seized by individuals or
organizations whose interests run counter to those of the United States.
To improve the information available to develop effective seaport security
measures, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation identify and
direct the appropriate transportation agency to develop a mechanism at the
port level to compile, coordinate, analyze, and disseminate threat
information on a real- time basis to all relevant organizations. Such a
mechanism might be similar to DOD*s threat working groups but with broader
membership or be part of an existing coordinating body (such as the
proposed port security committees or the joint terrorism task forces).
Whether established as a new entity or as a modification of an existing
coordinating body, this mechanism should include representatives from a
broad range of federal, state, and local agencies. It should also include
in its assessment process nontraditional threats such as natural
emergencies and information technology attacks. Recommendations for
Executive Action
Page 22 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
To improve DOD*s oversight and execution of force protection for
deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense
designate a single authority (such as the recently established U. S.
Northern Command) to coordinate and execute force protection planning for
deployments of units from installations in the United States through
seaports and until ships enter the destination areas of operation (this
responsibility would be similar to that of the overseas unified combatant
commands for their respective areas of operation) and
direct the single coordinating authority (once established), along with
the U. S. Transportation Command, to develop and implement measures to
maintain greater security over equipment transported by non- DOD carriers.
DOD agreed with the need for a single DOD authority to coordinate and
execute force protection planning for deployments from installations in
the United States through seaports and until ships enter the destination
areas of operation. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that the
recently established U. S. Northern Command will work closely with the U.
S. Transportation Command to examine security for deployments through
domestic seaports.
DOD also agreed with the need for measures to maintain greater security
over equipment transported by non- DOD carriers. In its comments, however,
DOD stated that it has for decades relied on the commercial sector to
provide a large portion of the nation*s strategic sealift capabilities in
both peacetime and during contingencies and that it is not cost effective
to use government- owned sealift vessels for routine cargo movements or
force rotations of the type included in GAO*s analysis. Nonetheless, DOD
stated that the U. S. Transportation Command and the new U. S. Northern
Command will continue to seek ways to improve the security of DOD cargo
transported via commercial carrier, including the use of satellite
tracking of cargo and vessels and placing security personnel aboard those
ships. On those occasions when DOD transfers custody of its equipment to
non- DOD carriers, the kinds of additional measures DOD discussed should
help improve the overall security of sensitive DOD cargoes.
DOD*s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. In
addition, DOD officials suggested a number of technical clarifications and
Agency Comments
and Our Review
Page 23 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
corrections, which we have incorporated into this report where
appropriate.
In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of Transportation
officials generally agreed with the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. They also provided additional information and suggested a
number of technical clarifications and corrections, which we have
incorporated into this report where appropriate. Transportation officials
discussed several new and ongoing efforts affecting seaport security by
the newly established Transportation Security Administration. Among other
initiatives, these include measures for seaport security grants, studies
on credentialing port workers, and a study on developing a threat
assessment center. These initiatives are funded through regular and
emergency appropriations for fiscal year 2002. Additionally, proposed
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 would provide further funding if
enacted into law. If properly implemented, these initiatives should
contribute to the goal of improved seaport security.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of
Defense and Transportation and interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http:// gao.
gov.
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, or wish to
discuss this matter further, please contact me at (202) 512- 6020. Key
contributors are acknowledged in appendix III.
Sincerely yours, Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 24 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
To analyze the security environment at strategic seaports we reviewed
security planning and procedures during the conduct of site visits at six
selected commercial seaports and two military- owned ammunition ports.
These six commercial ports included ports that regularly support DOD
deployments as well as those that are used less frequently. We selected
ports on the West Coast, East Coast and on the Gulf of Mexico. We visited
two of the three dedicated ammunition ports identified by DOD, one on each
coast. For security reasons, we do not discuss location- specific
information in this report.
At these selected ports we reviewed documents, observed security measures,
and discussed port operations, security planning, coordination mechanisms,
specific vulnerabilities, mitigation plans, and resource issues with
government and nongovernment officials. Among the organizations we visited
during our seaport visits were the Coast Guard, the U. S. Maritime
Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U. S. Customs
Service, port authorities, and local law enforcement agencies. Although
the information we obtained at these locations could not be generalized to
describe the environment DOD could expect at all seaports, it provides
insight into what DOD could expect to encounter at domestic seaports. We
also discussed these issues with officials at Coast Guard headquarters and
the U. S. Maritime Administration, both in the Department of
Transportation in Washington, D. C.
To analyze DOD*s process for securing deployments of military equipment
through strategic seaports we examined force protection plans, procedures,
and coordination measures for four deployments conducted in 2001. We
selected these deployments based on information provided by the U. S. Army
Forces Command. The command provided a list of deployments involving units
moving from within the continental United States to an overseas location
during calendar year 2001 that required the use of sealift to transport
military equipment. We selected four deployments originating from three
installations in calendar year 2001 because they represented about 65
percent of the total tonnage of equipment for all deployments to major DOD
contingency operations during that period. An additional factor in our
selection was the geographic dispersion of the domestic seaports used for
the deployments.
Our review of force protection procedures included the guidance and
criteria for force protection for deployments, the extent to which these
are clearly defined and carried out, and the extent to which DOD works
with other federal, state, and local agencies to plan and carry out force
protection measures. We also reviewed information from the Military
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 25 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command on the ships used
to transport equipment for these deployments and the equipment they
carried. We interviewed officials from the following organizations:
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
LowIntensity Conflict in Washington, D. C.
U. S. Transportation Command at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.
Military Transportation Management Command in Fort Eustis, Va.
Military Sealift Command in Washington, D. C.
U. S. Central Command in Tampa, Fla.
U. S. Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Ga.
Army and Navy Force Protection Offices in Washington D. C.
Transportation and force protection officials at the installation and
unit levels for Army and Marine Corps units
To examine DOD force protection efforts, we conducted site visits at three
military installations that were the origins of the four 2001 deployments
in our review. During these site visits, we reviewed DOD force protection
plans, policies and standards used for the equipment involved in the
deployments and discussed with unit and installation personnel how DOD
addressed security weaknesses identified at the seaports. We also
discussed the experience of past deployments and recent deployments with
DOD officials at installations and the ports.
We also reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Interagency
Commission of Crime and Security in U. S. Seaports and the provisions of
maritime security legislation now before Congress to determine the
potential impact on current and future seaport security efforts. We
analyzed the provisions of both House and Senate versions of the
legislation and discussed key provisions with staff members of cognizant
Congressional committees.
We conducted our review from January through August 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 26 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 27 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 28 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 29 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Ray Decker (202) 512- 6020 Bob Repasky (202) 512- 9868
In addition to those names above, Willie J. Cheely, Jr., Brian G. Hackett,
Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Jean M. Orland, Stefano Petrucci, Elizabeth G. Ryan,
and Tracy M. Whitaker also made key contributions to this report. Appendix
III: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgements
Related GAO Products Page 30 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its Congressional
Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry Vulnerabilities. GAO-
03- 24R. Washington, D. C.: October 10, 2002.
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges. GAO- 02- 1122T. Washington, D. C.: October 1, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO- 02- 1021. Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.
National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges. GAO-
02- 1048R. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1013T. Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1012T. Washington, D. C.: August 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success. GAO- 02- 1011T. Washington, D. C.: August 20, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO- 02- 993T. Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports.
GAO- 02- 955TNI. Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002.
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO02- 957T.
Washington, D. C.: July 17, 2002.
Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO02-
927T. Washington, D. C.: July 9, 2002.
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships Will Be
Critical to Success. GAO- 02- 899T. Washington, D. C.: July 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting. GAO- 02- 893T. Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002. Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products Page 31 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But
Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success. GAO- 02- 886T. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2002.
Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
Uncertainty Remains. GAO- 02- 610. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.
GAO- 02- 811T. Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002.
Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability For Achieving
National Goals. GAO- 02- 627T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
Security. GAO- 02- 621T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 550T.
Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy. GAO- 02- 549T. Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 548T. Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002.
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy
to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 547T. Washington, D. C.:
March 22, 2002.
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought.
GAO- 02- 490T. Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs. GAO- 02- 160T. Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001.
Related GAO Products Page 32 GAO- 03- 15 Combating Terrorism
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO- 01- 162T. Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.
GAO- 02- 150T. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Issues.
GAO- 01- 1158T, September 21, 2001. Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO- 01- 822. Washington, D. C.:
September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD*s Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management. GAO- 01- 909. Washington, D. C.: September
19, 2001.
(350156)
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