Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services'		 
Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations (01-NOV-02, GAO-03-14).	 
                                                                 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic	 
military installations increased their antiterrorism measures to 
their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks	 
following the attacks, but because of the persistent nature of	 
the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic installations  
remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year later. The
Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year 2003
includes more than $10 billion for combating terrorism		 
activities, which includes a substantial increase in funding for 
antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic	 
issues. The service headquarters GAO reviewed did not use a	 
comprehensive results-oriented management framework to guide	 
their antiterrorism efforts. According to service officials, a	 
comprehensive results-oriented management framework for 	 
antiterrorism efforts is not consistently used across all	 
services and commands because DOD does not require it, and	 
service officials indicated that they were reluctant to develop  
such an approach before the forthcoming DOD-wide antiterrorism	 
strategy was issued. Although the Department has recently	 
restarted its efforts toward developing this strategy, it has not
set a specific time frame for its completion. The services and	 
commands are following prescribed guidance and regulations to	 
conduct risk management analyses to support their antiterrorism  
requirements, but significant weaknesses exist with the current  
approach. The commands do not always require documentation of the
assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment
methodology used at each installation to determine the		 
thoroughness of the analyses or the consistency with required	 
assessment methodology. DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has  
been allocated or requested for combating terrorism activities	 
from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003; however, these	 
reported amounts may not present a clear picture of total	 
combating terrorism costs. GAO's analysis indicates that $19.4	 
billion of this amount is for military and civilian personnel and
personnel-related operating costs associated with individuals in 
designated specialties that have combating terrorism-related	 
missions, such as military police, civilian police, and security 
guard.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-14						        
    ACCNO:   A05418						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services'   
Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations				 
     DATE:   11/01/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Funds management					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     National preparedness				 

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GAO-03-14

Report to the Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2002 COMBATING TERRORISM

Actions Needed to Guide Services* Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations

GAO- 03- 14

Page i GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 Background 5 Services* Antiterrorism Efforts Lack a
Results- Oriented

Management Framework 7 Services Are Implementing Risk Management but
Provide

Inadequate Oversight 10 DOD*s Combating Terrorism Funding Reports Do Not
Clearly

Reflect Costs 12 Conclusions 15 Recommendations for Executive Action 17
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 26

Related GAO Products 27

Table

Table 1: Results- Oriented Management Framework Principles 7

Figures

Figure 1: DOD*s Combating Terrorism Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003
14 Figure 2: Estimated Personnel Costs as Part of Combating

Terrorism Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003 15 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office

Page 1 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

November 1, 2002 The Honorable Jim Saxton Chairman, Special Oversight
Panel on Terrorism Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
domestic military installations increased their antiterrorism measures 1
to their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks
following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, but because of the
persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic
installations remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year
later. The Department of Defense*s (DOD) budget request for fiscal year
2003 includes over $10 billion for combating terrorism activities, 2 which
includes a substantial increase in funding for antiterrorism measures to
safeguard personnel and strategic assets.

We previously examined the implementation of DOD*s antiterrorism
initiatives, and focused on the measures taken by domestic military
installations to reduce vulnerabilities last year. We reported that at the
departmental level, the antiterrorism efforts lacked critical management
elements, such as a strategic plan containing long- term goals and a
performance plan to measure results, assess progress, and identify
corrective actions. 3 To strengthen the management of the antiterrorism

1 Antiterrorism represents defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. Examples of
defensive measures include reducing the number of access points onto an
installation, verifying the identity of personnel entering installations,
increasing security patrol activity at high- risk targets, and issuing
weapons to all security and law enforcement personnel.

2 Antiterrorism constitutes only one of four combating terrorism
categories. The other three categories are counterterrorism (offensive
measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), consequence
management (preparation for and response to a terrorist attack), and
intelligence support (collection, analysis, and dissemination of
terrorism- related information).

3 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed
to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management, GAO-
01- 909 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 19, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

program, we recommended that DOD establish a management framework
containing these elements, which could then provide a vehicle to guide
resource allocations and measure the results of DOD*s improvement efforts.
DOD agreed with this recommendation and initiated steps to develop the
framework but temporarily suspended these efforts after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. The Department has recently restarted these
efforts.

If consistent with our previous recommendation, this forthcoming
Department- wide framework should represent a significant and important
shift in management focus* from measuring program activities and processes
to measuring program results. To supplement and support this results-
oriented approach, a comprehensive risk management process can be an
effective foundation for allocating antiterrorism resources. Risk
management is a systematic, analytical process to determine the likelihood
that a threat will harm individuals or physical assets and to identify
actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist
attack. (More detailed information on risk management appears in the
background section of this report.)

Because of the increased emphasis on and funding for DOD*s antiterrorism
efforts, you asked us to examine the management framework each military
Department has established to implement antiterrorism initiatives.
Accordingly, this report specifically focuses on the extent to which the
military services and selected commands (1) use a results- oriented
management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts at domestic
installations 4 and (2) have established an effective risk management
approach to develop specific antiterrorism requirements. Because you also
asked us to examine how DOD reports combating terrorism funding, we also
reviewed funding trends and determined whether DOD*s annual budget reports
to Congress completely and accurately portray funding for combating
terrorism.

To accomplish this work, we obtained and reviewed documents, examined the
operations of the four services* headquarters, examined the operations of
eight major service commands and reserve components, and interviewed
cognizant officials. Collectively, these eight commands have

4 *Domestic* refers to the continental United States and excludes Alaska,
Hawaii, and the U. S. territories.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

antiterrorism responsibilities for approximately 444 installations. 5
Although the information we obtained at these commands cannot be
generalized to describe the Department*s overall antiterrorism efforts, it
provides insights into the antiterrorism programs within these commands.
Further information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.

For the most part, the service headquarters and commands we reviewed did
not use a comprehensive results- oriented management framework to guide
their antiterrorism efforts. For example, resource decisions generally
were not made with reference to specific, long- term goals, and short-
term measurable performance goals had not been set. However, 3 of the 12
organizations included in our review* Air Force headquarters, Army Forces
Command, and the Navy*s Atlantic Fleet* did have some, but not all,
elements of a results- oriented management framework in place. The Army
Forces Command*s management framework appeared to be the most complete,
containing elements such as long- term and annual goals, clear performance
measures, quarterly reviews, and the identification of resource
requirements. The Forces Command*s framework also appeared to have strong
support from senior command officials, without which it might not have
been as fully implemented. According to service officials, a comprehensive
results- oriented management framework for antiterrorism efforts is not
consistently used across all services and commands because DOD does not
require it, and service officials indicated that they were reluctant to
develop such an approach before the forthcoming DOD- wide antiterrorism
strategy was issued. Although the Department has recently restarted its
efforts toward developing this strategy, it has not set a specific time
frame for its completion. Without a results- oriented management framework
at both DOD and the service levels to prioritize, integrate, and evaluate
antiterrorism initiatives, the services and commands may not be
efficiently allocating the significant resources currently applied to
antiterrorism efforts or effectively assessing progress in safeguarding
military personnel and assets.

The services and commands we reviewed are generally following prescribed
guidance and regulations to conduct risk management analyses (i. e.,
terrorist threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality assessments) to
support their antiterrorism requirements, but significant weaknesses exist

5 The number of installations is based on information provided by the
respective commands. Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

with the current approach. Each service has established requirements for
installations to use a risk management approach in developing funding
requirements and generally provided implementing guidance on preparing the
assessments; in addition, each command verified that assessments have been
completed. However, weaknesses exist in the services* oversight of this
process. Specifically, the commands do not always require documentation of
the assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment
methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of the
analyses or the consistency with required assessment methodology. If the
services and commands do not evaluate installation assessments and do not
require the documentation of all assessments, then they have no assurance
that installations* antiterrorism requirements are based on a rigorous
application of risk management principles or that these assessments
produce comparable results across a service. Consequently, when the
services consolidate their antiterrorism requirements, the result may not
accurately reflect the most pressing needs.

DOD has reported that $32. 1 billion has been allocated or requested for
combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year
2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear picture of
total combating terrorism costs. Our analysis indicates that $19.4 billion
(60 percent) of this amount is for military and civilian personnel and
personnel- related operating costs associated with individuals in
designated specialties that have combating terrorism- related missions,
such as military police, civilian police, and security guards. This
allocation may overstate actual combating terrorism costs, however,
because the military services accounting systems do not track the actual
time that these individuals spend on activities related to combating
terrorism. Consequently, the total funding allocated to these personnel
specialties are included in the report, even if the individuals spend only
a portion of their time performing combating terrorism activities.

We are recommending that DOD accelerate its efforts to develop a
Department- wide strategy, set a target date for its completion, and work
with the military services to concurrently initiate steps to adopt a
results- based management framework for their antiterrorism efforts that
is consistent with this Department- wide approach. We also are
recommending that the services take steps to improve their risk management
approaches that underpin antiterrorism requirements. Additionally, we are
recommending that steps be taken to clarify DOD*s combating terrorism
budget report provided to Congress. In written comments on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with all of our

Page 5 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

recommendations and it identified actions that are under way at the
Department to address these recommendations.

DOD issued a directive 6 signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense that
provides DOD*s antiterrorism policy and assigns responsibilities to DOD
organizations for implementing antiterrorism initiatives. This directive
places responsibility for developing antiterrorism policy and guidance
with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict. 7 In this capacity, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense issued an instruction that established 31
antiterrorism standards that DOD organizations, including the services,
are required to implement. 8 , 9 These standards address antiterrorism
planning, training requirements, physical security measures, and related
issues. The office also issued a handbook containing additional detailed
guidance on antiterrorism policies and practices, including guidance on
assessment methodology. 10 The Joint Staff has also issued an
installationplanning template to help installations prepare their
antiterrorism plans. 11 Additionally, each of the services has issued
regulations, orders and instructions to implement the DOD guidance and
establish its own specific policies and standards. DOD and the services
have recently revised some of these key guidance documents, and others are
now under revision.

6 DOD Directive 2000. 12, DOD Antiterrorism/ Force Protection Program,
Apr. 13, 1999. 7 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict performs these duties under the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. 8 DOD Instruction 2000. 16, DOD Antiterrorism
Standards, June 14, 2001.

9 The 31 antiterrorism standards in DOD Instruction 2000. 16 also apply to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense, defense agencies, and field activities.

10 DOD Handbook O- 2000. 12- H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities
Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, Feb. 19, 1993. 11
Joint Staff Antiterrorism Force Protection Installation Planning Template,
July 1, 1998. Background

DOD*s Antiterrorism Policy and Guidance

Page 6 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

The services assign responsibility for protecting installations from
terrorist attacks to installation commanders, who identify and prioritize
antiterrorism requirements. Installation commanders are to compose a
prioritized list of antiterrorism requirements from annual assessments of
threat, vulnerability, and the criticality of assets, which they submit to
their respective major commands. The major commands merge the
antiterrorism requirements from all of their installations, prioritize
them, and forward their integrated list to the service*s headquarters.
Similarly, the services merge and prioritize the antiterrorism
requirements of their major commands, and the consolidated list is then
used as a basis for funding decisions.

The required assessments of threat, vulnerability, and criticality of
assets form the foundation of each installation*s antiterrorism plan and
support a risk management approach to resource allocation. These three
assessments are designed to assess (1) the threats to the installation,
(2) the installation*s vulnerabilities, and (3) the installation*s
critical assets.

The threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of such factors as the threats* capabilities, intentions, and past
activities. This assessment represents a systematic approach to identify
potential threats before they materialize. However, this assessment might
not adequately capture some emerging threats, even in cases where the
assessment is frequently updated. The risk management approach therefore
uses vulnerability and asset criticality assessments as additional inputs
to the risk management decision- making process.

A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggests options that address those weaknesses. For
example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in an
installation*s access control system, its antiterrorism awareness
training, or how mission- critical assets such as fuel storage sites and
communications centers are protected. Teams of multidisciplinary experts
skilled in such areas as structural engineering, physical security, and
installation preparedness conduct these assessments.

A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions to
identify which assets and missions are relatively more important to
protect from attack. For example, important communications facilities,
utilities, or major weapons systems might be identified as critical to the
execution of U. S. military war plans, and therefore receive additional
protection. Process for Developing

Services* Antiterrorism Requirements

DOD*s Risk Management Approach

Page 7 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Criticality assessments provide information in order to prioritize
resources while at the same time, reducing the potential application of
resources on lower- priority assets.

The critical elements of a results- oriented management framework are not
being used by the services to guide their antiterrorism efforts. In
results- based management, program effectiveness is measured in terms of
outcomes or impact rather than outputs (i. e., activities and processes).
Results- oriented principles and elements, which we have derived from the
Government Performance and Results Act, 12 are presented in table 1.
Benefits from a results- based management approach depend upon the
combined use of all eight of the critical elements that appear in the
table. These elements, when combined with effective leadership can provide
a management framework to guide major programs and activities.

Table 1: Results- Oriented Management Framework Principles Principle
Critical elements

Long- term goals* typically general in nature that lay out what the agency
wants to accomplish in the next 5 years. Strategies to be used* general
methods the agency plans to use to accomplish long- term goals. Strategic
plan* defines the program*s

overall purpose, mission, and intent. External factors* factors that may
significantly affect the agency*s ability to accomplish goals. Performance
goals* stated in objective measurable form. Resources* a description of
the resources needed to meet the performance goals. Performance
indicators* mechanisms to measure outcomes of the program. Evaluation
plan* means to compare and report on program results vs. performance
goals. Performance plan* describes detailed

implementation actions as well as measurements and indicators of
performance.

Corrective actions* a list of actions needed to address or revise any
unmet goals.

Source: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.

12 P. L. 103- 62. Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results
Act in 1993 to provide for, among other things, the establishment of
strategic planning and performance measurement in the federal government.
Services*

Antiterrorism Efforts Lack a ResultsOriented Management Framework

Page 8 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

The critical elements of a results- oriented management framework were
largely absent in the antiterrorism efforts of three services*
headquarters and at six of the eight commands we examined. Specifically,
the services have not published and disseminated unambiguous results-
based, strategic and performance goals for their antiterrorism efforts.
Some service antiterrorism officials did articulate broadly stated goals*
such as protecting personnel and material assets against terrorist attack,
and defeating terrorism* but these goals have not been endorsed and
disseminated by service headquarters as servicewide goals nor have the
services described how these goals will be achieved or how they intend to
evaluate results in terms of the goals. The Air Force, however, has taken
some steps toward a results- based management framework. For example, it
has published long- term goals and established service- level working
groups to evaluate the effectiveness of its antiterrorism program and
identify the actions needed to address or revise any unmet goals. Although
the Air Force has taken these positive steps, Air Force officials
acknowledge that the elements may not have been effectively articulated
servicewide so that installations can understand the *big picture* and how
all elements fit together. In fact, officials we contacted from Air Combat
Command and Air National Guard were not aware of the service- level goals
or performance- planning elements.

At the command level, a results- oriented management framework was largely
absent in the antiterrorism efforts of six of the eight major commands we
reviewed. For example, the Air Combat Command did not have overarching
antiterrorism goals for its 15 bases, although command officials said that
they planned to develop them. Also, the Army National Guard has not issued
antiterrorism goals for its 3,900 armories and 211 installations and has
no plan to do so.

Two of the commands* the Army*s Forces Command and the Navy*s Atlantic
Fleet* adopted aspects of a results- oriented framework, and officials
said that they did so on their own initiative and without direction from
their parent service. The Army Forces Command management framework
contained most of the critical management elements, such as quarterly
reviews, long- term and annual goals, clear performance measures, and
identification of resource requirements. Army Forces Command officials
said that the results- based management approach enables its senior
officers to monitor the command*s progress toward its short- and long-
term goals and make necessary adjustments to the strategy and resource
allocation to accomplish these goals. Forces Command officials attributed
their management approach*s success, in large part, to the involvement of
senior command officials and their endorsement of

Page 9 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

this management approach. According to Army headquarters antiterrorism
officials, the Forces Command management framework has been an effective
approach and may be useful as a model for other major commands.

The Navy*s Atlantic Fleet Command also articulated long- term goals and
strategies to accomplish its antiterrorism goals. For example, the fleet
developed a plan of action to address security deficiencies that were
identified through assessments by establishing a database to track
deficiencies and identify trends. The fleet also linked resource
requirements to accomplish these steps and developed metrics to measure
results. According to the Atlantic Fleet officials we spoke with, however,
these strategies are not currently being used by the fleet to shape its
antiterrorism efforts because they are waiting for the Navy to issue
servicewide antiterrorism goals. Atlantic Fleet officials stated they
wanted to avoid having separate and different strategic plans for each
command.

The services and their major commands cite two primary reasons for not
employing a results- based management framework to guide and implement
their antiterrorism efforts. First, the services do not want to adopt
goals and strategies that might prove inconsistent with DOD*s forthcoming,
Department- wide antiterrorism strategy. As discussed earlier, the
Department was in the process of developing an antiterrorism strategy, but
suspended its efforts after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon because of the pressing needs of the war on terrorism. DOD
officials have indicated that they have reinitiated their efforts to
develop a strategy but have not set a target date for their completion.
The second reason cited by service officials for not employing a results-
oriented management framework was that strategic planning and performance
planning called for by the Results Act applies to agencies and not to
specific efforts such as antiterrorism. We agree that the services and
major commands are not required by the Results Act to prepare strategic
plans and performance plans specific to their antiterrorism efforts.
Nonetheless, the Results Act offers a model for developing an effective
management framework to improve the likelihood of successfully
implementing initiatives and assessing results.

Without a results- based management approach to prioritize, integrate, and
evaluate their efforts, it will be difficult for the services and their
major commands to systematically plan and implement antiterrorism programs
or assess their progress in reducing the likelihood and impact of
terrorist attacks. It is crucial that the services identify and support
those efforts that are most likely to achieve long- term antiterrorism

Page 10 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

goals because funding is not sufficient to eliminate or mitigate all
identified vulnerabilities.

The services and commands we reviewed are generally following prescribed
guidance and regulations to use the DOD risk management approach in
developing their installation antiterrorism requirements, but a
significant weakness exists with the oversight of this process.
Specifically, the services are not required to evaluate the thoroughness
of all installations* annual risk management assessments or whether
installations used required methodologies to perform these assessments. As
previously discussed, under DOD*s antiterrorism approach, three
assessments (threat, vulnerability, and criticality) provide the
installation commanders with the information necessary to manage the risk
of a terrorist attack, and develop an antiterrorism program for the
installation. 13 It also provides guidance for completing these
assessments; 14 and it requires the military Departments, through the
services, to oversee the antiterrorism efforts at their installations. 15
In their oversight role, the military Departments, through the services,
are required to ensure that installation antiterrorism efforts adhere to
the antiterrorism standards established by DOD. 16

To implement DOD*s required risk management approach, the services have
issued supplements to DOD*s guidance requiring installations to conduct
the three risk management assessments and indicating how these assessments
should be performed. The supplemental guidance of three of the services*
the Army, Air Force, and the Marine Corps* requires service- specific
methodologies to be used for the assessments. 17 The commands, to which
the services have delegated some oversight responsibility for
installations* antiterrorism efforts, generally verified that
installations completed annual threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments. Command officials indicated that they verify
whether

13 DOD Instruction 2000. 16, para. E3. 1. 1. 15 also calls for an
assessment of incident deterrence and response capabilities. 14 See DOD
Handbook O- 2000. 12- H, para. E3. 1. 1. 5, E3. 1. 1. 15, and E3. 1. 1.
15. 4.

15 See DOD Directive 2000. 12, para. 5. 9. 16 See DOD Directive 2000. 12,
para. 5. 9.12. 17 Toward the end of our review, the Marine Corps issued
instructions on how installations are to perform their assessments.
Services Are

Implementing Risk Management but Provide Inadequate Oversight

Page 11 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

installations* annual risk assessments have been completed in one of two
ways: (1) through the request for and receipt of copies of the written
assessments or (2) through verbal verification from the installation
commanders. The Navy, however, does not require that annual vulnerability
assessments be documented and does not verify that these assessments are
completed.

To provide oversight of the risk management process, DOD*s antiterrorism
standards require a higher headquarters review of subordinate
installations* antiterrorism programs once every 3 years for installations
that meet specific criteria. 18 These reviews are conducted by teams of
specialists skilled in various disciplines (such as engineering,
intelligence, and security) from the Joint Staff, service headquarters, or
major command. The reviews assess, among other things, an installation*s
antiterrorism plans, physical security, vulnerabilities and solutions for
enhanced protection, and incident response measures. These reviews,
however, do not routinely evaluate the methodology used to develop the
annual installation assessments. 19 Moreover, there is no requirement to
review the antiterrorism programs of installations that do not meet DOD*s
criteria for higher headquarters assessments.

Because the results of assessments form the foundation of installation
antiterrorism plans, which drive servicewide requirements, it is critical
that assessments be performed consistently across each service to ensure
that assessment results are comparable. According to DOD officials,
installations* risk assessments were not evaluated for two reasons. First,
DOD does not specifically require the services and their commands to
evaluate installation assessments. Second, several command officials
indicated that evaluating assessment methodologies would provide little or
no added value to the process.

The Air Force and the Navy have initiatives under way that will place a
greater emphasis and importance on the results of the installations* risk
management efforts. Both services are using to varying degrees an
automated risk management program that should improve visibility over

18 DOD Instruction 2000. 16 requires a service- level review of DOD
facilities with (1) at least 300 personnel, (2) an emergency response and
physical security mission, or (3) contact with local nonmilitary or
foreign agencies at least once every 3 years.

19 In technical comments provided by the Air Force, officials stated that
Air Force higher headquarters reviews also include a review of annual
installation assessments.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

installation assessments and the resulting antiterrorism requirements.
This program* the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program* will enable
service and command officials to track assessment results and prioritize
corrective actions servicewide. 20 The program will contain information
about installations* antiterrorism requirements and the threat,
vulnerability, and asset criticality assessments that support these
requirements. It is also designed to allow service officials to conduct
trend analyses, identify common vulnerabilities, and track corrective
actions. Service officials stated that this program will also enable them
to evaluate the risk assessment methodologies used at each installation,
but it is unclear how this will be accomplished.

If installations* risk assessments are not periodically evaluated to
ensure that assessments are complete and that a consistent or compatible
methodology has been applied, then commands have no assurance that their
installations* antiterrorism requirements are comparable or based on the
application of risk management principles. Consequently, when the services
and commands consolidate their antiterrorism requirements (through the
process of merging and reprioritizing the requirements of their multiple
installations), the result may not accurately reflect the services* most
pressing needs. For example, if a standard methodology is not consistently
applied, then vulnerabilities may not be identified and critical
facilities may be overlooked. Or in the case of the Navy, the lack of
assessment documentation further limits the command*s ability to perform
its oversight responsibility.

DOD has reported that $32. 1 billion has been allocated or requested for
combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year
2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear picture of
total combating terrorism costs. Each year, DOD is required to provide
Congress with a report on the funds allocated to combat terrorism
activities. 21 DOD*s reported annual combating terrorism allocations have
risen from $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1999 to $10 billion in the fiscal
year 2003 budget request. Significant uncertainty exists, however,
regarding the accuracy of these reported amounts because over half are
associated with

20 Both the Air Force and the Navy are requiring their installations to
submit antiterrorism requirements for fiscal year 2003 in the format
prescribed by the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program.

21 10 U. S. C. sec. 229. DOD*s Combating

Terrorism Funding Reports Do Not Clearly Reflect Costs

Page 13 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

personnel who may or may not be engaged in combating terrorism activities
full- time.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires DOD
to provide Congress with an annual consolidated budget justification
display that includes all of its combating terrorism activities and
programs and the associated funding. 22 In response, DOD has submitted a
separate budget report for fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003 that portrays
its allocation of funds within the four categories of combating terrorism:
antiterrorism/ force protection, counterterrorism, consequence management,
and intelligence support. The most recent budget report, submitted to
Congress in March 2002, includes the following: the combating terrorism
program descriptions and budget request estimates for fiscal year 2003,
the estimated budget for fiscal year 2002, and the actual obligations for
fiscal year 2001. It also reflects the funding provided by the Defense
Emergency Response Fund 23 for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. 24

If Congress passes the fiscal year 2003 budget request as submitted,
annual funding to combat terrorism will increase 122 percent from fiscal
year 1999 through fiscal year 2003 25 *rising from $4.5 billion (actual
obligations) to $10 billion (budget request), including the Defense
Emergency Response Fund request for fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 1.) In
total, DOD reports that $32.1 billion has been allocated for combating
terrorism activities during this 5- year period. The dollar amounts shown
in figure 1 do not include funding for the current global war on
terrorism, such as military operations in Afghanistan, because these
activities are not intended to be included.

22 P. L. 106- 65, sec. 932, Oct. 5, 1999; 10 U. S. C. sec. 229. 23 The
Defense Emergency Response Fund is DOD*s portion of the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations of September 2001, which was approved
immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.

24 The Defense Emergency Response Fund request for fiscal year 2003 was
provided to Congress in a separate budget justification book. 25 In terms
of fiscal year 2002 dollars, which adjusts for inflation, this increase
would be 105 percent. DOD Is Required to Report

Its Funding Requirements Annually

Funding for Combating Terrorism Activities More Than Double Over 5- Year
Period

Page 14 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: DOD*s Combating Terrorism Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003

Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD*s combating terrorism budget reports.

Although not clearly identified in DOD*s budget reports, our analysis
estimates that $19.4 billion (60 percent) of the $32.1 billion combating
terrorism funding is for military ($ 14.1 billion) and civilian personnel
and personnel- related operating costs ($ 5.3 billion); however, this
estimate may be overstated. (See fig. 2.) In accordance with DOD*s
Financial Management Regulation, 26 the Department*s combating terrorism
costs include funding for personnel in designated specialties that have
combating terrorism missions, such as military police, civilian police,
and security guards. The military services* accounting systems do not
track the time that individuals in these specialties spend on activities
related to combating terrorism; therefore, the total personnel costs are
reported even if the individuals spend only a portion of their time
performing combating terrorism activities. The actual proportion of time
these

26 DOD 7000. 14- R, Vol. 2B, Ch. 19, June 2000. Reported Combating

Terrorism Funding May Be Overstated

Page 15 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

personnel spend between combating terrorism and unrelated activities (such
as counter drug investigations) varies, although all of these personnel
are available to perform combating terrorism duties when needed.

Figure 2: Estimated Personnel Costs as Part of Combating Terrorism Funding
for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003

Source: GAO*s analysis of DOD*s combating terrorism budget reports.

The $19.4 billion of estimated combating terrorism personnel costs shown
in figure 2 consists of military personnel costs of $14.1 billion and
estimated operation and maintenance civilian personnel costs of $5.3
billion. Other components of the total $32 billion shown include $4.3
billion from the Defense Emergency Response Fund and $8.4 billion in other
appropriations, including procurement, research and development, and
military construction.

Officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict recognize that improvements could
be made in the budget report for next year and plan to consider ways to
restructure its contents to include more summary information.

Funding for antiterrorism requirements has increased since fiscal year
1999, but it is widely recognized that vulnerabilities at military
installations will continue to outpace available funding. It is therefore
essential that Conclusions

Page 16 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

funds be spent efficiently and effectively if the services are to achieve
the highest level of protection possible for military personnel,
equipment, and critical facilities and operations. Our analysis indicates
that the military services generally are not applying a results- oriented
management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts, in part,
because DOD does not yet have a Department- wide antiterrorism strategy.
Without a resultsoriented management framework to implement antiterrorism
efforts and monitor results, the services, military commanders, and
Congress will not be able to determine if past and future resources* which
have been significantly increased* are achieving their desired results in
the most efficient and effective manner.

The services and commands we reviewed are adhering to prescribed policies
and procedures and taking significant steps to improve their capability to
use a risk management approach. We identified a significant weakness in
the services* current risk management approach, however, which limits
their ability to ensure that these methodologies are consistently used. As
a result, there is limited assurance that assessment results* which
ultimately drive funding allocations* have been achieved through a
consistent assessment process prescribed by DOD guidance. This creates the
potential that limited resources could be misapplied and important
opportunities to improve an installation*s force protection posture could
be overlooked.

The Department*s annual combating terrorism report to Congress provides a
detailed description of DOD funds allocated for combating terrorism
activities, but that report should be viewed with caution because over
half of the reported amounts are estimates that do not reflect actual
activities dedicated to combating terrorism. Consequently, as Congress
considers DOD*s budget requests and oversees DOD*s combating terrorism
activities, it may not have a clear picture of total costs incurred by DOD
for this purpose.

Page 17 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Because of the magnitude of the funds being allocated for, and the
importance of antiterrorism efforts within, DOD, we recommend that
simultaneous steps be taken within the Department to improve the
management framework guiding these efforts. Accordingly, to establish a
foundation for the services* antiterrorism efforts, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense (1) direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict to accelerate and set a
target date to issue a Department- wide antiterrorism strategy that will
underpin each service*s efforts, and (2) work with each service to ensure
that its management framework is consistent with this Department- wide
strategy.

To improve the effectiveness of the services* antiterrorism efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force to adopt and effectively communicate a results-
oriented management framework, consistent with DOD*s overall antiterrorism
strategy, to guide each service*s antiterrorism efforts. This framework
should include the following:

A strategy that defines

 long- term antiterrorism goals,

 approaches to achieve the goals, and

 key factors that might significantly affect achieving the goals. An
implementation approach that provides

 performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable;

 resources to achieve the goals;

 performance indicators to measure outputs;

 an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals;
and

 actions needed to address any unmet goals. To improve their risk
management approach for identifying antiterrorism requirements, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force to require

 installation commanders to document all threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments and

 periodic higher headquarters evaluations of the methodologies used by
installations to conduct their threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments. Such an evaluation may be incorporated into the
existing Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 18 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

service- level review process; however, for those installations that are
not covered by this process, the services should develop an alternative
approach.

To clarify the annual consolidated budget justification display for
combating terrorism reported to Congress, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense highlight the military and civilian personnel funding included
in the report and clearly indicate that these total personnel funds are
reported even though the individuals may spend only a portion of their
time performing combating terrorism activities.

DOD agreed with all of our recommendations and stated that it is
accelerating the development of an antiterrorism strategy and working with
the military services to ensure that a consistent approach is followed
across the Department. In commenting on this report, DOD said that it
would publish an antiterrorism strategic plan by January 2003 that
articulates strategic goals, objectives, and an approach to achieve them.
Moreover, DOD will require each service to develop its own antiterrorism
strategic plan that complements and supports the Department*s plan. DOD
also agreed to improve its risk management process for establishing
antiterrorism requirements. In its comments, DOD said that it is revising
guidance to validate the methodologies their installations use to perform
threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality assessments and the
thoroughness of these three assessments as part of regularly scheduled
antiterrorism program reviews. DOD agreed with our recommendation to
clarify how personnel costs that appear in the Department*s annual
combating terrorism funding report to Congress were calculated. In its
fiscal year 2004 combating terrorism funding report to Congress, DOD plans
to highlight the personnel costs and the methodology used to determine
them.

DOD officials also provided technical comments that we have incorporated
as appropriate. DOD*s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 19 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512- 6020. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix III.

Sincerely yours, Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 20 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

The scope of our study was limited to the antiterrorism preparedness of
Department of Defense (DOD) installations in the continental United
States. To perform our review, we contacted the antiterrorism offices for
each of the four military services, as well as two commands within each
service. We selected an active- duty command from each service that was
responsible for a large number of installations and that had a key role in
providing personnel and weapons systems for military operations.
Additionally, we selected a reserve command from each service because they
typically have smaller- sized installations than do active- duty commands;
consequently, a large number of them do not receive servicelevel reviews
of their antiterrorism efforts. 1

To determine whether the services use a results- oriented management
framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts, we met with Office of the
Secretary of Defense and service headquarters and command antiterrorism
officials, and reviewed their strategic- planning documents for evidence
of the critical elements of a strategic plan and performance plan* as
embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. We also
reviewed service- and command- specific documents, such as campaign plans,
operating orders, and briefing slides, which describe and communicate the
management structure of the services and commands antiterrorism programs.
We interviewed officials and gathered relevant documentation for our
review primarily from the following DOD organizations located in the
Washington, D. C., area:

 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity
Conflict.

 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Force Protection and Law
Enforcement Division, Antiterrorism Branch.

 Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Interagency Support and
Antiterrorism/ Force Protection Division.

 Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Force Protection Branch,
Directorate of Security Forces.

 Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Homeland Defense Branch, Security
Division.

1 DOD Instruction 2000. 16 requires facilities with (1) at least 300
personnel, (2) an emergency response and physical security mission, or (3)
contact with local nonmilitary or foreign agencies to receive a service-
level review at least once every 3 years. Appendix I: Scope and
Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 21 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

We also spoke with officials from the following commands, who provided
data on the number of domestic installations within their respective
commands.

 Army Forces Command, Atlanta, Georgia (number of installations = 11).

 Navy Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia (number of installations = 18).

 Air Combat Command, Hampton, Virginia (number of installations = 16).

 Marine Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia (number of installations = 7).

 Army National Guard, Arlington, Virginia (number of installations =
165).

 Naval Reserve Force, New Orleans, Louisiana (number of installations =
116).

 Air National Guard, Arlington, Virginia (number of installations = 69).

 Marine Force Reserve, New Orleans, Louisiana (number of installations =
42).

To determine the extent to which the military services use risk management
analysis to develop antiterrorism requirements, we obtained relevant
documents and interviewed antiterrorism officials from the organizations
and commands previously listed as well as the following organizations:

 Joint Staff Directorate for Combating Terrorism Programs and
Requirements, Washington, D. C.

 Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio,
Texas.

We reviewed DOD as well as Joint Staff-, service-, and command- specific
regulations, orders, pamphlets, manuals, and other antiterrorism guidance
to determine whether organizations were required to perform the three
assessments (of threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality) that
comprise risk management to identify and prioritize antiterrorism
requirements. We also reviewed these documents for procedures and
directions on how these assessments are to be performed. We spoke with
headquarters and command officials about their involvement in overseeing
how installations identify antiterrorism requirements and about their
process for merging, reprioritizing, and funding these installation
requirements. Additionally, we spoke with Air Force and Navy headquarters
officials as well as officials from the Air Force Security Forces Center
about the utility of the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program for
prioritizing and tracking installation antiterrorism requirements
servicewide.

To identify funding trends and determine if DOD accurately and completely
reports its combating terrorism funding to Congress, we

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 22 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

obtained and analyzed the three annual combating terrorism activities
budget reports that cover fiscal years 1999 through 2003. We did not
independently verify the information contained in the funding reports,
although we did examine the methodology and assumptions that were used to
develop the information. We discussed how the budget report is reviewed
and consolidated with officials from the DOD Comptroller*s Office, the
Office for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict, and the Program
Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. To determine if the military
services* funding information is accurate and complete, we interviewed
budget officials responsible for compiling the information for each
service.

To estimate the combating terrorism personnel funding that appears in
figure 2, we analyzed 5 fiscal years of funding from the previously
mentioned combating terrorism budget reports. The $14.1 billion of
military personnel presented in the figure represents appropriations for
military personnel for combating terrorism. We estimated civilian
personnel funding by combining the four antiterrorism activities that
contain most of the operation and maintenance funds for personnel:
physical security management and planning, security forces and
technicians, law enforcement, and security and investigative matters.
DOD*s budget report does not distinguish civilian personnel funds from the
other funds contained in these activities; therefore, our estimate of
civilian personnel funds includes the nonpersonnel funds as well. However,
we believe that the estimate is appropriate on the basis of our analysis
of DOD*s budget report and discussions with DOD officials. We could not
determine the civilian personnel funds embedded in other operation and
maintenance activities and in research and development activities and,
therefore, did not include them in our estimate of personnel funding.

We conducted our review from February through August 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 26 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Ray Decker, (202) 512- 6020 Bob Repasky, (202) 512- 9868

In addition to those named above, Alan Byroade, J. Paul Newton, Marc
Schwartz, Corinna Wengryn, R. K. Wild, Susan Woodward, and Richard Yeh
made key contributions to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contacts and
Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products Page 27 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. GAO- 02- 1021. Washington, D. C.: September 6, 2002.

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO- 02- 993T. Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports.

GAO- 02- 955TNI. Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 548T. Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs. GAO- 02- 160T. Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO- 02- 208T. Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO- 01- 162T. Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO- 02- 150T. Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Issues.

GAO- 01- 1158T. Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-
01- 822. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD*s Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management. GAO- 01- 909. Washington, D. C.: September
19, 2001. Related GAO Products

Related GAO Products Page 28 GAO- 03- 14 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO- 01- 556T. Washington, D. C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 00- 218. Washington, D. C.: July 26, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces
Overseas. GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 181. Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 180. Washington, D. C.:
May 24, 2000.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken to Protect
Military Forces. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 49. Washington, D. C.: October 20,
1999.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on
Year 2000 Experiences. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 1. Washington, D. C.: October 1,
1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163. Washington, D. C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3. Washington, D. C.:
November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74. Washington, D. C.: April
9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U. S. Forces in Turkey and the
Middle East. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 44. Washington, D. C.: October 28, 1997.

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas.
GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 207. Washington, D. C.: July 21, 1997.

(350084)

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