Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk
Assessment of Defense Capabilities (01-OCT-02, GAO-03-137T).
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly
likely that an adversary of the United States will use chemical
or biological weapons against U.S. forces to degrade superior
U.S. conventional warfare capabilities, placing service members'
lives and effective military operations at risk. During the past
6 years, GAO has identified many problems with DOD's capabilities
to defend against chemical and biological weapons and sustain
operations in the midst of their use. Although GAO has found that
DOD has made some improvements--in equipment, training, and
reporting, and in the coordination of research and development
activities--it has continuing concerns in each of these areas.
One particular issue is the supply of chemical protective
clothing and the way associated risk is assessed. Due to the
upcoming expiration of existing protective suits, the slower rate
at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD's method
of assessing risk for individual items rather than complete
protective ensembles, GAO believes that the risk for protective
clothing shortages may increase dramatically from now through
2007. GAO is also concerned that certain management weaknesses,
such as program organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies
in key leadership positions, may have sent a message throughout
the department about the relative priority and importance of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-137T
ACCNO: A05208
TITLE: Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's
Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities
DATE: 10/01/2002
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Equipment inventories
Inventory control
Military forces
Military inventories
Weapons
DOD Chemical and Biological Defense
Program
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
JCS Status of Resources and Training
System
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated
Suit Technology Program
Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk
Assessment of Defense Capabilities (01-OCT-02, GAO-03-137T).
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly
likely that an adversary of the United States will use chemical
or biological weapons against U.S. forces to degrade superior
U.S. conventional warfare capabilities, placing service members'
lives and effective military operations at risk. During the past
6 years, GAO has identified many problems with DOD's capabilities
to defend against chemical and biological weapons and sustain
operations in the midst of their use. Although GAO has found that
DOD has made some improvements--in equipment, training, and
reporting, and in the coordination of research and development
activities--it has continuing concerns in each of these areas.
One particular issue is the supply of chemical protective
clothing and the way associated risk is assessed. Due to the
upcoming expiration of existing protective suits, the slower rate
at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD's method
of assessing risk for individual items rather than complete
protective ensembles, GAO believes that the risk for protective
clothing shortages may increase dramatically from now through
2007. GAO is also concerned that certain management weaknesses,
such as program organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies
in key leadership positions, may have sent a message throughout
the department about the relative priority and importance of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-137T
ACCNO: A05208
TITLE: Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's
Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities
DATE: 10/01/2002
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Defense capabilities
Defense procurement
Equipment inventories
Inventory control
Military forces
Military inventories
Weapons
DOD Chemical and Biological Defense
Program
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
JCS Status of Resources and Training
System
Joint Service Lightweight Integrated
Suit Technology Program
******************************************************************
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GAO-03-137T
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m., Tuesday, October 1,
2002 CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE Observations on DOD*s Risk Assessment of Defense
Capabilities
Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management
GAO- 03- 137T
Page 1 GAO- 03- 137T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here
today to discuss the Department of Defense*s (DOD) continuing efforts to
protect U. S. military forces against chemical and biological attack. DOD
believes it is increasingly likely that an adversary will use chemical or
biological weapons against U. S. forces to degrade superior U. S.
conventional warfare capabilities, placing service members* lives and
effective military operations at risk. Currently, more than 20 states or
non- state groups either have, or have an interest in acquiring, chemical
weapons. Also, about 12 countries are believed to have biological warfare
programs, and terrorist groups are known to be interested in these
weapons.
Potential adversaries, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia,
have chemical and biological weapons stocks and the means to deliver them.
U. S. forces therefore need to be properly trained and equipped to operate
in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. As we have
reported, when the threat of chemical and biological weapons use occurred
during the Gulf War, deploying U. S. forces encountered a wide array of
problems, including unsuitable and inadequate supplies of protective
equipment, inadequate training in its use, and unsatisfactory chemical and
biological detectors.
During the past 6 years, we have identified many problems in DOD*s
capabilities to defend against chemical and biological weapons and sustain
operations in the midst of their use. While we have found that DOD has
made some improvements * in equipment, training, and reporting, and in the
coordination of research and development activities * we have continuing
concerns in each of these areas. One particular issue is the supply of
chemical protective clothing and the way associated risk is assessed. Due
to the upcoming expiration of existing protective suits, the slower rate
at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD*s method of
assessing risk for individual items rather than complete protective
ensembles, we believe that the risk for protective clothing shortages may
increase dramatically from now through at least 2007. We also are
concerned that certain management weaknesses, such as program
organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies in key leadership
positions, may have sent a message throughout the department about the
relative priority and importance of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program. Summary
Page 2 GAO- 03- 137T
Today, as requested, we will: (1) briefly discuss the shortcomings we
identified in previous work with regard to DOD*s protection of its forces
against chemical and biological warfare and the steps DOD has taken to
date to address them; (2) discuss the status of DOD*s current and
projected inventory of chemical and biological protective suits, and (3)
present our observations on the management of DOD*s Chemical and
Biological Defense Program. We will furnish an additional statement for
the closed session this afternoon.
Since 1995, GAO has focused on the chemical and biological defense area,
which has resulted in a series of reports and testimonies before Congress
on DOD*s efforts to prepare troops to survive and operate in a chemically
and biologically contaminated environment. Major problem areas have
included shortfalls in equipment, training, and reporting and weaknesses
in coordinating program research and development activities. Although DOD
has taken significant actions to improve the program and has increased its
funding, serious problems still persist.
Our first major report, issued in March 1996, discussed the overall
capability of U. S. forces to fight and survive chemical and biological
warfare and is the centerpiece for much of the work we have performed
since then. 1 We reported that DOD was slow in responding to the lessons
learned during the Gulf War. Specifically,
early deploying units lacked required equipment such as chemical
detector paper, decontamination kits, and sufficient quantities of
protective clothing;
Army and Marine forces remained inadequately trained for effective
chemical and biological defense;
joint exercises included little chemical or biological defense training;
Army medical units often lacked chemical and biological defense
equipment and training;
1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems, GAO/ NSIAD-
96- 103 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 29, 1996). Chemical and
Biological Defense Has Improved, but Problems Persist
Shortfalls in Equipment, Training, and Reporting
Page 3 GAO- 03- 137T
biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans remained
inadequate; and
research and development progress was slower than planned. We also
reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff*s Status of Resources and Training
System (SORTS) * DOD*s system for reporting the overall readiness of units
* was of limited value in determining the readiness of units to operate in
a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. The system was
established to provide the current status of specific elements considered
essential to readiness assessments, such as personnel and equipment on
hand, equipment condition, and training. However, we found that this
system allowed commanders to report their unit*s overall readiness
subjectively regardless of the unit*s actual readiness to operate in a
chemically or biologically contaminated environment.
We concluded that chemical and biological defense equipment, training, and
medical problems were persisting and, if not addressed, were likely to
result in needless casualties and a degradation of U. S. war fighting
capability. We noted that despite DOD*s increased emphasis on chemical and
biological defense, it continued to receive a lower priority than
traditional mission tasks at all levels of command. Many field commanders
accepted a level of chemical and biological defense unpreparedness and
told us that the resources devoted to that area were appropriate, given
other threat concerns and budgetary constraints.
When we looked again in 2000 at the readiness of early deploying U. S.
forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment, we found the situation generally improved. 2 Units we
reviewed included three Army divisions, two Air Force fighter wings, and
one Marine Corps expeditionary force. Military units are generally
expected to have at least 70 percent of their equipment requirements on
hand.
The units we visited had all their required individual protective
equipment (such as suits, boots, and gloves) and most chemical and
biological
2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense: Units
Better Equipped, but Training and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain,
GAO- 01- 27 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 14, 2000). Unit Equipment Levels
Have Improved, but Shortages Remain in Key Areas
Page 4 GAO- 03- 137T
medical supplies and detection and decontamination equipment needed to
operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. In the
medical arena, the Army divisions had all their needed medical supplies.
The Air Force wings had most of their medical supplies, but we noted
shortages of some critical items. For example, one wing had only 25
percent of the protective masks required to treat contaminated patients
and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits. The units we
visited had shortages in detection and decontamination equipment, but
these shortages varied both across and within the services. For example,
one Marine Corps unit and one Air Force unit had 31 percent and 50
percent, respectively, of their chemical agent monitors, whereas the other
Air Force unit had 100 percent of its monitors. The three Army units we
reviewed had between 88 and 103 percent of their requirements for the same
item. Officials at the units with shortages of equipment said that when
the units deploy, the shortages would be filled from stocks held by later
deployers or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined
whether this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what
impact this action might have on the later deploying units* capabilities
or on war reserves. The medical readiness of some units to conduct
operations in a contaminated environment therefore remained questionable.
Chemical and biological defense training continues to be a problem area.
We reported in 1996 that commanders were not integrating chemical and
biological defense into unit exercises and that the training was not
always realistic in terms of how units would operate in wartime. For
example, Marine Corps commanders did not fully integrate chemical and
biological defense into unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps
policies, because operating in protective equipment is difficult and time
consuming and this (1) decreases the number of combat essential tasks that
can be performed during an exercise and (2) limits offensive combat
operations. Officials stated that chemical and biological defense training
is still being adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of chemical and
biological defense specialists and (2) the fact that these specialists are
often assigned multiple responsibilities unrelated to their specialties.
For example, Army units we reviewed had from 76 to 102 percent of their
authorized enlisted chemical personnel and from 75 to 88 percent of their
chemical officers. The Marine Corps unit we visited had 84 percent of its
authorized enlisted chemical specialists and 80 percent of its chemical
officers. Training Deficiencies
Persist
Page 5 GAO- 03- 137T
We also reported that DOD*s monitoring of chemical and biological defense
readiness has improved since our 1996 report. In April 2000, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff directed changes to the Status of Resources and Training
System that would require units to report more clearly on the quantity of
chemical and biological equipment on hand and on training readiness.
However, we noted the changes do not require that units report on the
condition of their chemical and biological defense equipment. Thus, these
reports could indicate that a unit had its chemical and biological
equipment, but they would not show whether this equipment was serviceable.
We have issued a series of reports that address DOD*s coordination of
chemical and biological defense research and development programs. For
example, in September 1998 we reported on DOD*s approach to addressing U.
S. troop exposures to low levels of chemical warfare agents. 3 Low- level
exposure is a concern because it may potentially cause or contribute to
health problems that may not become evident for years after exposure.
Specifically, we reported that:
DOD did not have an integrated strategy to address exposure to low
levels of chemical warfare agents.
Past research by DOD and others indicated that single and repeated low-
level exposures to some chemical warfare agents could result in adverse
psychological, physiological, behavioral, and performance effects that may
have military implications. We also highlighted limitations of the current
research.
DOD had allocated nearly $10 million (about 1. 5 percent) of its
chemical and biological defense research, development, testing, and
evaluation program to fund projects on low- level chemical warfare agent
exposures.
In August 1999 we reported on the coordination of federal research and
development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to chemical
and biological defense, an issue that DOD has not addressed
3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a
Strategy to Address Low- Level Exposures GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 228 (Washington,
D. C.: Sept. 23, 1998). Reporting Has Improved,
but Changes are Incomplete
Continuing Problems Confront DOD*s Coordination of Research and
Development Programs
Page 6 GAO- 03- 137T
until recently. 4 We identified four programs engaged in activities
ranging from applied research to prototype development: two of these
programs developed technologies primarily for military war fighting
applications, and two others developed technologies primarily to assist
civilians responding to terrorist incidents. We concluded that the formal
and informal program coordination mechanisms may not ensure that potential
overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration would be addressed. We
highlighted that agency officials were aware of the deficiencies in the
existing coordination mechanisms and that some had initiated additional
informal contacts.
We are currently reviewing the effectiveness of DOD*s research and testing
activities in providing the scientific information needed to address
doctrinal, policy, and procedural shortcomings affecting DOD*s ability to
operate in a chemically contaminated environment, as well as DOD*s
approach to ensure the survivability of mission- essential systems in the
case of a chemical or biological attack. DOD*s work in this area is
crucial for developing the means to assure the restoration of operations
in the event of chemical and biological attacks on U. S. forces at
critical overseas depots, ports, and airfields.
Individual protection is a critically important component of the overall
chemical and biological defense program. DOD has recognized that military
service members may not be able to avoid exposure to chemical and
biological agents and has consequently provided U. S. forces with
individual protective equipment, including clothing ensembles. We have
conducted several recent reviews on this subject and are continuing to
focus on DOD*s acquisition and management of this equipment because of the
potential for increased risks in this area. Specifically, our primary
concerns involve DOD*s (1) process for assessing the risk of wartime
protective equipment shortages, (2) plans for addressing projected suit
shortages due to the expiration by 2007 of most of the existing inventory,
and (3) related inventory management and business practices. After
updating equipment status and trends, we will discuss our recent reports
and ongoing work in this area.
4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R& D Programs GAO/
NSIAD- 99- 160 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 16, 1999). Concerns Remain
Regarding DOD*s Inventory of Protective Clothing
Page 7 GAO- 03- 137T
Until recently, DOD calculated its chemical and biological defense
equipment needs in one of two ways: by assessing either how much would be
needed to prevail in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars (often
referred to as the *2- MTW* requirement), or how much would be needed to
fight two MTWs as well as maintaining supplies for peacetime and training
use, the *total service requirement.* In its most recent Annual Report to
Congress, for example, DOD reported both inventory and these requirements
for each item as of the end of fiscal year 2001. The report shows that
several items, particularly in Navy stocks, qualify as *high- risk;* that
is, less than 70 percent of needed equipment is on hand. Other items, such
as masks, are *low- risk;* that is, the services have more than 85 percent
of the needed equipment on hand. (We have been able to update some of the
data, in which we generally found only modest changes from the data we
show here.) Figure 1 shows these inventory levels, by service, for key
components of the protective clothing ensemble. Current Inventory Status
and Trends
Page 8 GAO- 03- 137T
Figure 1: Individual Protective Clothing Inventory, End of Fiscal Year
2001
Source: Chemical and Biological Defense Program Report to Congress, April
2002.
We found, though, that the raw data may understate the real risk because
the method that DOD has used to calculate risk may be flawed. In September
2001, we reported that DOD*s criteria for assessing the risk of wartime
shortages for protective clothing are unreliable. At that time we found
that DOD had inaccurately reported the risk in most cases as *low.*
We reported that the process for determining risk is fundamentally flawed
because (1) DOD determines requirements by individual pieces of protective
equipment * suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods *
rather than by the number of complete protective ensembles that can be
provided to deploying service members, and (2) the process for determining
risk combines individual service requirements and reported inventory data
into general categories, masking specific critical shortages that affect
individual service readiness. Had DOD assessed the risk on the Process for
Assessing Risk
is Flawed
Page 9 GAO- 03- 137T
basis of the number of complete ensembles it had available, by service,
the risk would have risen to *high* for all of the services.
As a result of the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD has
begun to reexamine its requirements. At present, there are several
requirements levels against which inventory is measured. Official reports
have commonly used the *2 Major Theater War* and the *Total Service
Requirement* standards. New interim guidance indicates that DOD should be
able to fully meet conflict equipment needs in one theater, while meeting
only partial requirements in another. This requirement, which is expected
to be finalized when DOD publishes the Illustrative Planning Scenario
annex to its Defense Planning Guidance, is referred to as the *150
percent of an MTW* option. Whatever the official requirement, the risk to
U. S. forces may be increasing for two reasons. First, DOD has not yet
revised its risk assessment process to consider ensemble needs and service
imbalances. Second, suit shortages are projected to escalate in the next
few years because (1) the majority of suits in the current inventory will
reach the end of their useful life and expire by 2007, and (2) new Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) suits, along with
other new generation protective ensemble components such as gloves and
boots, are not entering the inventory as quickly as originally planned.
Consequently, the old suits are expiring faster than they are being
replaced.
We are concerned that some ensemble components, particularly suits, may
not be available in adequate numbers to meet near- term minimum
requirements. As of August 30, 2002, DOD had procured about 1.5 million of
the new JSLIST suits, of which the majority were issued to the military
services. (Others are held in Defense Logistics Agency reserves, provided
to foreign governments under the Foreign Military Sales program, or
allocated to domestic uses.) Together with the existing inventory of
earlier- generation suits, we estimate that DOD has a total of 4. 5
million suits. This level is now barely sufficient to meet the new
requirement to supply 150 percent of an MTW. It is far below the Army-
chaired Joint Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Board requirement,
called the Joint Acquisition Objective, which combines elements of DOD and
service calculations. If new suit funding and production does not increase
sufficiently to replace the expiring suits, the inventory will even drop
below minimal needs for the 150 percent of an MTW requirement until at
Suit Inventory May be
Insufficient to Meet Requirements
Page 10 GAO- 03- 137T
least 2007. The risk for protective clothing shortages may therefore
increase dramatically during this period. Figure 2 illustrates this trend.
Figure 2. Trends in Suit Procurement and Requirements
Note: The Joint Acquisition Objective increased in 2002. This estimate
assumes that none of the suits counted as available in FY 2002 has already
expired or is defective.
Sources: DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Research, Development and
Acquisition Plan, April 2002; Program Strategy Guidance; GAO data
analysis.
Inadequate management of inventory is an additional risk factor because
readiness can be compromised by DOD*s inventory management practices,
which prevent an accurate accounting of availability or adequacy of DOD*s
protective equipment. The practices we identified regarding inventories of
chemical and biological equipment contribute to the development of
erroneous inventory data that in turn affect the accuracy of the risk
assessment. Specifically, we reported the following:
DOD could not monitor the status of the entire inventory of protective
equipment because the services and the Defense Logistics Agency use
Inventory Management
Practices Prevent Accurate Risk Assessment
Page 11 GAO- 03- 137T
at least nine different systems of inventory management with differing
data fields to manage suit inventories. The systems* records contain data
that cannot be easily linked.
DOD could not determine whether its older suits would adequately protect
service members because some of the systems* records omit essential data
on suit expiration.
DOD could not easily identify, track, and locate defective suits because
inventory records do not always include contract and lot numbers. In May
2000, DOD directed units and depots to locate 778, 924 defective suits
produced by a single manufacturer; as of July 2002, as many as 250,000 of
these suits remained unaccounted for.
DOD counted new suits as on hand before they had been delivered and
consequently overstated the actual inventory. In response to one of our
report recommendations, DOD now reports *on hand* and *due- in* suits
separately in its Annual Program Report to the Congress.
We have also testified before this Committee as part of our work on the
need for DOD to reform its business operations. 5 We noted that inventory
management procedures related to JSLIST suits, systems, and processes
result in DOD, the military services, and military units not knowing how
many items they have and where they are located.
DOD*s business processes for procuring, controlling, and paying for JSLIST
suits rely on manual data transmission and entry into nonintegrated data
systems. We identified 128 processing steps performed by 11 DOD
components, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Finance and
Accounting Service, and the military services. Of the 128 steps, 100
steps, or 78 percent, involved manual entry or re- entry of data into one
or more of the 13 nonintegrated data systems supporting the JSLIST
processes. However, the complex, nonintegrated, error- prone process
precludes DOD from being able to quickly and accurately identify the
suits* location and condition.
5 U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Management: Examples of Inefficient
and Ineffective Business Processes, GAO- 02- 873T (Washington, D. C.: June
25, 2002). DOD*s Business Processes
Remain Inefficient
Page 12 GAO- 03- 137T
Further, at the military units that GAO visited, the methods used to
control and maintain visibility over JSLIST suits issued to them ranged
from automated information systems, to spreadsheet applications, to paper,
to dry eraser board, to none. The data maintained also varied. Some units
maintained specific data, including manufacturer, manufacture date, and
production lot number, while other units maintained little or no data. DOD
is now taking steps to correct this problem and improve asset visibility
at all levels. As recently as 2000 there was no single office that tracked
all JSLIST suit production and fielding DOD- wide, for example, and the
annual report to Congress was compiled by data calls to each individual
service and major command within the services. Now there is such an
office: the Marine Corps, in its role as commodity area manager for
individual protection, can report new production of JSLIST ensemble items
(suits, boots, and gloves) and the services to which they have been
fielded. Our work to date has found that the Marine Corps program office
has established an effective system for managing this information.
We are currently reviewing factors related to JSLIST production and the
implications of the removal of the expiring suits from the inventory. Our
work will (1) evaluate whether DOD*s requirements and activities for
acquiring and sustaining chemical protective equipment provide the
military with sufficient usable chemical and biological protective
clothing ensembles; (2) assess DOD*s current risk assessment, testing,
development, and production procedures; and (3) evaluate the effectiveness
of DOD*s actions to mitigate any shortfalls. We plan to report our results
early next year.
Our body of work over 7 years highlights a serious gap between the
priority given chemical and biological defense by DOD and the actual
implementation of the program. Both the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Reviews identified chemical and biological defense as key priorities of
the Department of Defense. Although the program overall is clearly
improved and better funded since 1995, many of the problems we previously
reported still have not been resolved. We are concerned that DOD*s efforts
to implement this program are not consistent with the emphasis given to it
in overall department guidance. Organization complexity, vacancies in key
positions, and priority conflicts are all factors that have contributed to
program difficulties and, if not resolved, will continue to weaken DOD*s
management of this program. Program Review
Underway Observations on Program Management
Page 13 GAO- 03- 137T
The management of the Chemical and Biological Defense program is diffuse,
with numerous offices and activities responsible for separate aspects,
notwithstanding the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994*s (P. L. 103- 160) attempt to bring oversight under one
organizational authority. Concurrence on program direction is therefore
sometimes difficult to achieve. This act required the Secretary of Defense
to assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of the
Chemical and Biological Defense program to a single office within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and to designate the Army as
executive agent to coordinate and integrate the chemical and biological
research, development, test and evaluation, and acquisition requirements
of the military departments. Although this office was established shortly
thereafter, many aspects of DOD*s management of chemical and biological
defense remain spread between this office, the military services, and
other DOD organizations. Furthermore, each individual service also has
numerous offices devoted to various aspects of chemical and biological
defense, including planning, logistics, and acquisition. The services
purchase their own consumable items such as protective suit replacements
under their role of managing their own operations and maintenance funds; a
process over which OSD has limited visibility. Figure 3 depicts the
current organization for DOD*s management of its Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP), as well as some of the changes now being
implemented or under consideration. Program Organizational
Complexity
Page 14 GAO- 03- 137T
Figure 3. Current CBDP Organization and Potential Changes
Source: DOD.
The OSD office at the Assistant Secretary level that is charged with
overall coordination of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program also
went through upheaval during the latter part of the 1990s. The position
was initially slated for elimination under the terms of the 1997 Defense
Reform Initiative (DRI). As a result of the DRI, OSD oversight functions
were
Page 15 GAO- 03- 137T
transferred to a different staff office within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (Director, Defense Research and Engineering), while management
and most staffing of the program were transferred to a directorate within
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). This directorate, in turn, has
had five directors in less than 4 years.
We also believe that the emphasis DOD placed on the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program was adversely affected by the absence of
leadership at the Assistant Secretary level for nearly 4 years. In
accordance with P. L. 103- 160, the Secretary designated the Assistant to
the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense (ATSD) as the
principal officer responsible for oversight and coordination of the
program. However, this position was vacant from 1998 through late 2001.
The Deputy ATSD, who exercises day- to- day oversight over the program,
was also vacant for more than a year during that period. We believe these
OSD vacancies adversely affected the high- level attention received by the
program as well as its ability to compete for funding against other
defense needs, thereby sending a message throughout the Department about
the relative priority and importance attached to the program.
DOD has requested almost $1. 4 billion for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program in fiscal year 2003 * more than three times the fiscal
year 1994 amount. Nevertheless, the program has consistently had
difficulty competing against other service priorities, such as those
associated with traditional mission tasks. Despite the emphasis placed on
this program by the Quadrennial Defense Review, spending on chemical and
biological defense represents about a third of a percent of the entire
$369 billion DOD budget request.
DOD officials and field commanders alike have repeatedly stressed that
they must balance chemical and biological defense requirements against all
other defense needs, and do so within a constrained budget environment.
For example, as we reported in 1996, officers have cited other- than- war
deployments, quality of life considerations, and peacetime medical care as
higher priorities than chemical and biological defense. We have previously
recommended that chemical and biological defense needed direct
representation by a general officer on the Joint Staff in order to receive
the appropriate program emphasis and support. DOD has recently implemented
this change. It remains to be seen what the effect of this change will be.
Figure 4 shows the growth in Chemical and Biological Defense Program
funding since fiscal year 1994. Vacancies in Key OSD
Positions Competing Priorities
Page 16 GAO- 03- 137T
Figure 4. Funding for Chemical and Biological Defense Program
Note: FY 2002 includes $0. 7 million for military construction and FY 2003
includes $5. 0 million for military construction. The peak in FY 2003 is
caused by inclusion in the CBDP budget of $420 million to support Office
of Homeland Security biodefense projects and $56 million for installation
force protection.
Source: DOD.
There is also competition within the program between the main categories
of research and development and procurement. 6 At present, some components
of the clothing ensemble, such as the JSLIST glove and nextgeneration
mask, are in the developmental phase; others, like the JSLIST suit, are in
procurement. In deciding how much money to allocate to each of the various
categories and specific projects, DOD relies on the Joint Priority List,
which integrates and rank- orders the preferences of combatant commanders
for all chemical and biological equipment needs. On this year*s Joint
Priority List, for example, the JSLIST suit ranked 35 out of 72 items.
Biodetection capabilities occupied the first spaces on that list. In
fiscal year 2003, $96 million is earmarked for the procurement of JSLIST
suits. Conflicts over internal program priorities thus can also affect
issues such as shortages of JSLIST suits.
6 Small sums are also spent on military construction projects.
Page 17 GAO- 03- 137T
DOD has made improvements over the years to defend against and sustain
operations in the midst of chemical and biological weapons use. These
gains have been primarily in the areas of equipment, training, and
readiness reporting. During the past 6 years, DOD has concurred or
partially concurred with 36 of the 37 recommendations contained in the GAO
reports referred to in this testimony, and initiated or completed action
on many of these. DOD recognizes that the management and organization of
the program needs improvement and has recently proposed organizational and
other changes designed to address many of the shortcomings we identified
in prior reports. In particular, DOD recently approved the establishment
of a Joint Requirements office within the Joint Staff and named a general
officer as its director.
However, a real gap remains between the priority and emphasis given
chemical and biological defense by DOD and the actual implementation of
the program. Many needed improvements remain to be realized. Furthermore,
we are concerned that without the leadership and commitment of the
department to address the long term conditions we have identified, the
service members of our country may be at risk in a contaminated
environment. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you have.
Conclusion
(350271)
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