Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning
and Operating Expense Accounting (23-SEP-03, GAO-03-1171T).	 
                                                                 
USAID oversees humanitarian and economic assistance--an integral 
part of the U.S. global security strategy--to more than 160	 
countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID develop a 	 
comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management  
continues to be a high-risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to
testify on how changes in USAID's workforce over the past 10	 
years have affected its ability to deliver foreign aid, the	 
agency's progress in implementing a strategic workforce planning 
system, and whether its reported operating expenses reflect the  
full costs of delivering foreign aid.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1171T					        
    ACCNO:   A08541						        
  TITLE:     Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce 
Planning and Operating Expense Accounting			 
     DATE:   09/23/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Internal controls					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Labor force					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 

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GAO-03-1171T

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Tuesday,
September 23, 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operating Expense
Accounting

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

GAO- 03- 1171T

USAID has evolved from an agency in which U. S. direct- hire staff
directly implemented development projects to one in which U. S. direct-
hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992,
the number of USAID U. S. direct- hire staff declined by 37 percent, but
the number of countries with USAID programs doubled and, over the last 2
years, program funding increased more than 78 percent. As a result of
these and other changes in its workforce and its

mostly ad- hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human
capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign
service officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led
to the

deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency
also lacks a *surge capacity* to respond to evolving foreign policy
priorities and emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff
managing more

programs in more countries, USAID*s ability to oversee the delivery of
foreign assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken
steps toward developing a workforce planning and human capital management
system that should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve
its mission, but it needs to do more, such as conducting a comprehensive
skills assessment and including its civil service and contracted employees
in its workforce planning efforts.

USAID*s reported that operating expenses do not always reflect the full
costs of administering foreign assistance because the agency pays for some
support and oversight activities done by contractors with program funds.
As a result, the amount of program funds directly benefiting foreign
recipients is likely overstated.

USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 USAID U. S.
direct hires

Fiscal year 1992

Fiscal year 2002

Percentage change

Total number 3,163 1,985 (37) Number assigned overseas 1,082 631 (42)
Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with U. S. direct- hire
presence 66 71 7 Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with no U.
S. direct- hire presence 16 88 450

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.

USAID oversees humanitarian and economic assistance* an integral part of
the U. S. global security

strategy* to more than 160 countries. GAO recommended in 1993 that USAID
develop a comprehensive workforce plan; however, human capital management
continues to be a

high- risk area for the agency. GAO was asked to testify on how changes in
USAID*s workforce over the past 10 years have affected its ability to
deliver foreign aid, the agency*s progress in implementing a strategic
workforce planning

system, and whether its reported operating expenses reflect the full costs
of delivering foreign aid.

To help USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations in
an uncertain environment, we recommended that the USAID Administrator
institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management system that
takes advantage of strategic workforce planning principles. USAID agreed
with our findings

and recommendation and noted it has recently undertaken some efforts to
improve management of its workforce. www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO-
03- 1171T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512- 4268
or fordj@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1171T, a report to Subcommittee
on National Security,

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform

September 23, 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

USAID Needs to Improve ITS Workforce Planning and Operating Expense
Accounting

Page 1 GAO- 03- 1171T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
pleased to be here today to discuss our report on USAID*s workforce

planning 1 and highlight the preliminary findings from our ongoing review
of USAID*s operating expense account. The workforce report is being
released today. Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an
integral part of U. S. global security strategy, particularly as the
United States seeks to diminish the underlying conditions of poverty and
corruption that may be linked to instability and terrorism. In fiscal year
2003, USAID expects to obligate about $13 billion and manage programs in
about 160 countries. Agency staff often work in difficult environments and
under evolving program demands. More will be demanded of USAID*s staff as
they implement large- scale relief and reconstruction programs in
Afghanistan and Iraq while continuing traditional long- term development
assistance programs.

As a result, it is essential that USAID develop a strategic approach to
its workforce planning so that it can identify and attain the essentials
skills it needs to accomplish its goals. It is also important that USAID
identify and report accurate costs on administering its foreign aid
programs. My statement today will cover these two broad areas.

I will focus most of my statement on our review of USAID*s workforce
planning. I will discuss some of USAID*s human capital challenges,
including its recent efforts to staff missions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and the status of its efforts to develop a strategic workforce planning
system.

Regarding USAID*s operating expense account, I will focus on how the
agency*s reporting of operating expenses does not always capture the full
cost of administering foreign assistance.

USAID*s workforce has undergone many changes over the years. For example,
the number of U. S. direct- hire staff, including foreign service
officers, has dropped 37 percent from 3,163 in 1992 to 1,985 in December
2002; and the agency has increasingly relied on personal services and
institutional contractors to implement its humanitarian and development
assistance projects and manage the day- to- day activities of overseas

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce
Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO- 03-
946 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 22, 2003). Summary

Page 2 GAO- 03- 1171T missions. At the same time, while the number of
countries with USAID activities has almost doubled, program funding levels
have remained

relatively level, with significant increases in 2003. However, as we
reported in 1993 and still find today, USAID has not developed a
comprehensive, strategic workforce planning system that would help it
manage these changes. As a result, the agency faces a number of human
capital challenges, such as difficulties in filling overseas positions, a
lack of mentoring and training opportunities for new staff, and

the lack of a *surge capacity* to quickly respond to post- emergency and
disaster situations. These vulnerabilities are reflected in the agency*s
difficulties in staffing the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of early
September, the Kabul mission had 61 vacancies, including 5 for direct-
hire foreign service officers, and the Baghdad mission had 13 vacancies
that will most likely be filled by contract staff.

Recently, and particularly in response to the President*s Management
Agenda, USAID has taken a number of preliminary steps to determine the
workforce it needs now and in the future and devise strategies for

achieving these goals. However, in comparing USAID*s efforts to proven
principles for strategic workforce planning, more work needs to be done.
Accordingly, we recommend that USAID develop and implement a

strategic workforce planning system to help it manage the changes in its
workforce and overseas environment.

USAID*s operating expenses are a separate line- item appropriation
intended to clearly identify the agency*s *cost of doing business.* In
fiscal year 2003, USAID expects to obligate about $668 million for
operating expenses. However, USAID*s reported operating expense
obligations do not always reflect all the costs associated with managing
its foreign aid program primarily because missions sometimes pay
contractors performing administrative or oversight duties with program
funds. Distinguishing between funds spent on operating expenses and funds
benefiting foreign recipients is not always clear; and, as a result, the
amount spent for program funds is likely overstated.

In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in its
overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a comprehensive
workforce planning system to better identify staffing needs Background

Page 3 GAO- 03- 1171T and requirements. 2 In the mid- 1990s, USAID
reorganized its activities around strategic objectives and began reporting
in a results- oriented

format but had made little progress in personnel reforms. 3 In July 2002,
we reported that USAID could not quickly relocate or hire the staff needed
to implement a large- scale reconstruction and recovery program in Latin
America, and we recommended actions to help improve USAID*s staffing
flexibility for future disaster recovery requirements. 4 Studies by
several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly successful
service organizations use strategic management approaches to

prepare their workforces to meet present and future mission requirements.
We define strategic workforce planning as focusing on long- term
strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization*s
workforce and aligning human capital approaches that are clearly linked to
achieving programmatic goals. Based on work with the Office of Personnel
Management and other entities, we identified strategic workforce planning
principles used by leading organizations. According to these principles, a
strategic workforce planning and management system should (1) involve

senior management, employees, and stakeholders in developing,
communicating, and implementing the workforce plan; (2) determine the
agency*s current critical skills and competencies and those needed to
achieve program results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in
critical skills and competencies; and (4) monitor and evaluate progress
and the

contribution of strategic workforce planning efforts in achieving program
goals.

Until the mid- 1970s, about two thirds of USAID*s operating expenses were
funded from appropriations to program accounts, and the rest were funded
from a separate administrative expenses account. 5 In 1976, Congress began
providing a line- item appropriation for operating expenses 2 GAO/ NSIAD-
93- 106.

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of USAID*s
Reforms, GAONSIAD- 241- BR (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 24, 1996); Foreign
Assistance: USAID*s Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/ NSIAD- 97-
194 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 12, 1997).

4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery
Program Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility
to Improve Its Response Capability, GAO- 02- 787 (Washington, D. C.: July
24, 2002).

5 The administration*s budget request for fiscal year 1975 identified 11
separate funding accounts from which administrative expenses would be
funded.

Page 4 GAO- 03- 1171T separate from USAID*s humanitarian and economic
development assistance programs. 6 The accompanying Senate report noted
that USAID*s *cost of doing business* would be better managed if these
funds were

separately appropriated. 7 Congress authorized USAID*s separate operating
expense account the following year. 8 USAID*s criteria for determining the
expenses to be paid from operating expense funds are based on guidance it
has received from Congress as well as its assessment of who benefits from
a particular activity* the agency or the intended program recipient. For
example, congressional reports in the late 1970s directed USAID to fund
the costs of all full- time staff in permanent positions from the
operating expense account. 9 USAID faces a number of challenges in
developing and implementing a

strategic workforce plan. Its overseas missions operate in a changing
foreign policy environment often under very difficult conditions. USAID*s
workforce, particularly its U. S. direct- hire foreign service officers,
has decreased over the years; but in recent years program dollars and the
number of countries with USAID activities have increased. These factors
have combined to produce certain human capital vulnerabilities that have
implications for the agency*s ability to effectively carry out and oversee
foreign assistance. A strategic approach to workforce planning and
management can help USAID identify the workforce it needs and develop
strategies for attaining this workforce that will last throughout
successive administrations.

Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U. S.
direct- hire foreign service employees directly implemented development
projects to one with a declining number of direct- hire staff who oversee
the contractors and grantees carrying out most of its day- to- day
activities. As numbers of U. S. direct- hire staff declined, mission
directors began

relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign national personal
services contractors, to manage mission operations and oversee development
activities implemented by third parties. In December 2002,

6 P. L. 94- 330. 7 S. Rept. 94- 704. 8 P. L. 95- 88, Sec. 129, 22 U. S. C.
2427. 9 H. Rept. 95- 701 and S. Rept. 95- 1194. Strategic Workforce

Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges

USAID Faces Challenges in Workforce Planning

Page 5 GAO- 03- 1171T according to USAID*s staffing report, the agency*s
workforce totaled 7,741, including 1,985 U. S. direct- hires. 10 Personal
services contractors made up more than two- thirds of USAID*s total
workforce, including 4,653 foreign

national contractors. Of the 1,985 U. S. direct- hires, 974 were foreign
service officers, about 65 percent of whom were posted overseas. Other
individuals not directly employed by USAID also perform a wide range of
services in support of the agency*s programs. These individuals include
employees of institutional or services contractors, private voluntary
organizations, and grantees. 11 In addition to having reduced the number
of U. S. direct hires, USAID now

manages programs in more countries with no USAID direct- hire presence,
and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1 illustrates
the changes in USAID*s U. S. direct- hire overseas presence between fiscal
years 1992 and 2002. In fiscal year 2002, USAID managed activities in 88
countries with no U. S. direct- hire presence. According to USAID, in some
cases, activities in these countries are very small and require little
management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these countries USAID manages
programs of $1 million or more, representing a more significant burden on
the agency. USAID also increasingly provides administrative and program
support to countries from regional service platforms, which have increased
from 2 to 26 between fiscal years 1992 and 2002. 12 Program funding also
recently increased about 78 percent* from $7.3 billion in fiscal year 2001
to about $13 billion in fiscal year 2003.

10 All figures exclude the staff of USAID*s Office of the Inspector
General, which includes 95 foreign service officers (51 posted overseas)
and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D. C. 11 In 1990, USAID
estimated this extended workforce was approximately 10,000 individuals.

For this report, USAID was unable to provide an estimate. 12 Services
include legal, executive office, financial/ controller, procurement, and
program and project development support services. Services vary among the
26 platforms due to security, ease of travel, and other local concerns.
For example, the regional office in Kenya provides all services to up to
14 countries, while the Honduras mission simply shares a contracts officer
with Nicaragua.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 1171T Table 1: USAID U. S. Direct- Hire Presence, Fiscal
Years 1992 and 2002 USAID U. S. direct hires Fiscal year 1992 Fiscal year
2002 Percentage change

Total number 3,163 a 1,985 b (37) Number assigned overseas 1,082 a 631 b
(42) Number of countries receiving USAID assistance with U. S.

direct- hire presence 66 c 71 d 7 Number of countries receiving USAID
assistance with no

U. S. direct- hire presence 16 c 88 d 450 Sources: a USAID*s Monthly
Workforce Profile Report, data as of September 30, 1992.

b USAID*s Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of December
31, 2002. c U. S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile
of the Agency for International Development, GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 148
(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 3, 1992). d USAID*s Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination data provided in May 2003. USAID staff cautioned that this
information was

gathered in 2002 and may not be up to date. As a result of the decreases
in U. S. direct- hire foreign service staff levels, increasing program
demands, and a mostly ad- hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID now
faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For example, the attrition of
its more experienced foreign service officers, its difficulties in filling
overseas positions, and limited opportunities for training and mentoring
have sometimes led to the deployment of directhire staff who do not have
essential skills and experience and the reliance on contractors to perform
many functions. In addition, USAID lacks a *surge capacity* to enable it
to respond quickly to emerging crises and changing strategic priorities.
As a result, according to USAID officials and a recent overseas staffing
assessment, the agency is finding it increasingly

difficult to manage the delivery of foreign assistance. In addition, USAID
works in an overseas environment that presents unique challenges to
workforce planning. Mission officials noted the difficulties in adhering
to a formal workforce plan linked to country strategies in an uncertain
foreign policy environment. For example, following the events of September
11, 2001, the Middle East and sub- Saharan African missions we visited*
Egypt, Mali, and Senegal* received additional work that was not
anticipated when they developed their country development strategies and
work plans. Also, the mission in Ecuador had been scheduled to close in
fiscal year 2003. However, this decision was reversed due to political and
economic events in Ecuador, including a coup in 2000, the collapse of the
financial system, and rampant inflation. Program funding for Ecuador

Page 7 GAO- 03- 1171T tripled from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2000,
while staffing was reduced from 110 to 30 personnel; and the budget for
the mission*s operating

expenses was reduced from $2.7 million to $1.37 million. During our field
work, we found that other factors unique to USAID*s overseas work
environment can affect its ability to conduct workforce planning and
attract and retain top staff. These factors vary from country to country
and among regions and include difficulties in attracting staff to hardship
posts, inadequate salaries and benefits for attracting the top host
country professionals, and lengthy clearance processes for locally
contracted staff. USAID*s workforce challenges are illustrated by its
difficulties in staffing

hardship posts like Afghanistan and Iraq. As of September 4, 2003,
according to USAID*s new personnel data system, the mission in Kabul had
42 full- time staff* 7 foreign service officers and 35 personal service
contractors, mostly local hires. However, the mission had 61 vacancies,
including 5 vacancies for foreign service officers. 13 In Iraq, as of
September 15, 2003, the mission had 13 USAID direct- hire staff; 3
additional U. S. government employees; and about 60 personal services and
institutional contractors. The mission had 13 vacancies that will most
likely be filled by contract staff.

USAID*s human resource office is in its annual bidding process for foreign
service positions. When that process is complete, the office expects to
have a better picture of replacements for current staff in Afghanistan and
Iraq as well as additional placements. According to USAID staff, the
agency is having trouble attracting foreign service officers to these
posts because in- country conditions are difficult and tours are
unaccompanied. USAID*s average staff age is in the late forties, and this
age group is generally attracted to posts that can accommodate families.
Both posts are responsible for huge amounts of foreign aid* in fiscal year
2003 alone, USAID*s assistance for Afghanistan and Iraq is expected to
total $817 million and $1.6 billion, respectively. USAID faces serious
accountability and quality of life issues as it attempts to manage and
oversee large- scale, expensive reconstruction programs in countries with
difficult conditions and inadequate numbers of both foreign service and
local hire staff.

13 The foreign service vacancies included a supervisory program officer, a
supervisory general development officer, two general development officers
in the rural sector development office, and an economic development
officer. The vacancies of contractor staff ranged from professionals with
technical program or financial management skills to numerous support
positions, such as secretaries, clerks, drivers, and maintenance workers.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 1171T In response to the President*s Management Agenda,
USAID has taken steps toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning
and human

capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its
challenges and achieve its mission, but progress so far is limited. In
evaluating USAID*s efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning
principles, USAID has more to do. For example:  The involvement of USAID
leadership, employees, and stakeholders in

developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been mixed.
USAID*s human resource office is drafting a human capital strategy, but at
the time of our review it had not yet been finalized or approved by such
stakeholders as OMB and the Office of Personnel Management. As a result,
we cannot comment on whether USAID employees and other stakeholders will
have an active role in developing and communicating the agency*s workforce
strategies.

 USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future workforce
will need, and a working group is conducting a comprehensive workforce
analysis and planning pilot at three headquarters units that will include
an analysis of current skills. However, it has not yet conducted a
comprehensive assessment of the critical skills and competencies of its
current workforce. USAID hopes to have a contractor in place by the end of
September, 2003, to assist the working group in identifying critical
competencies and devising strategies to close skill gaps. USAID is also in
the process of determining the appropriate information technology
instrument and methodology that will permit the assessment of its current
workforce skills and competencies.

 USAID*s strategies to address critical skill gaps are not comprehensive
and have not been based on a critical analysis of current capabilities
matched with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring foreign service
officers and Presidential Management Interns to replace staff lost through
attrition. However, the agency has not completed its civil service
recruitment plan and has not yet included personal services contractors*
the largest segment of its workforce* in its agencywide workforce analysis
and planning efforts. According to USAID human resource staff, the civil
service recruitment plan will be completed after conducting the competency
analysis for civil service staff.  USAID has not created a system to
monitor and evaluate its progress

toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts
continue under the leadership of successive administrators. USAID*s
Workforce

Planning Efforts

Page 9 GAO- 03- 1171T  Because it does not have a comprehensive workforce
planning and management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the
essential

skills needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs. To help USAID
plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations in an uncertain
environment, our report recommends that the USAID Administrator develop
and institutionalize a strategic workforce planning and management system
that takes advantage of strategic workforce planning principles.

USAID*s operating expense account does not fully reflect the agency*s cost
of delivering foreign assistance, primarily because the agency pays for
some administrative activities done by contractors with program funds. As
we noted in our recent report, USAID*s overseas missions have increasingly
hired personal services contractors to manage USAID*s development
activities due to declining numbers of U. S. direct- hire staff. 14
According to USAID guidance, contractor salaries and related support can

be paid from program funds when the expenses are benefiting a particular
program or project. In some cases, however, the duties performed by
contractors, especially personal services contractors, are
indistinguishable from those done by U. S. direct- hire staff. One senior
level USAID program planning officer told us that 10 to 15 percent of
program funds may be a more realistic estimate of USAID*s cost of doing
business, as opposed to the 8.5 percent average since fiscal year 1995
that we calculated based on our analysis of USAID reported data.  A
recent USAID internal study identified about 160 personal services

contractors who were performing inherently governmental duties, 15 but
these costs are not always reported as operating expenses.

 Recent data collection efforts by USAID indicate that the agency will
likely obligate approximately $350 million in program funds for operating
expenses incurred during fiscal year 2003.

Because USAID*s cost of doing business is not always separated from its
humanitarian and development programs* the original intent behind

14 GAO- 03- 946. 15 U. S. Agency for International Development, Report of
the Overseas Working Group, May 2003. USAID guidance states that salaries
and support for nondirect- hire staff performing inherently governmental
functions should be funded from the operating expenses account (ADS 601.5.
7). USAID*s Operating

Expense Account Does Not Reflect the Full Cost of Delivering Foreign
Assistance

Page 10 GAO- 03- 1171T establishing the separate operating expense
account, the amount of program funds that directly benefits a foreign
recipient is likely overstated.

Overall, to accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data,
workforce planning documents, and obligations data reported by USAID in
its annual budget justification documents. We did not verify the accuracy
of USAID*s reported data. We also interviewed cognizant USAID officials
representing the agency*s regional, technical, and management bureaus in
Washington, D. C., and conducted fieldwork at seven overseas missions* the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the West
Africa Regional Program in Mali.

 To examine USAID*s progress in developing and implementing a strategic
workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency*s efforts in terms of
workforce planning principles used by leading organizations: ensuring the
involvement of agency leadership, employees, and stakeholders; determining
current skills and competencies and those needed; implementing strategies
to address critical staffing needs; and evaluating progress in achieving
human capital goals.

 To determine whether USAID*s operating expenses reflect its cost of
doing business, we reviewed USAID reports and obligations data and
discussed the matter with cognizant officials at USAID, the Department

of State, and the Office of Management and Budget. We also reviewed
mission staffing reports to determine whether staff were funded from the
operating expense account or program funds and discussed staff duties with
cognizant mission officials.

We obtained written comments on a draft of our report on USAID*s workforce
planning and discussed our preliminary findings from our review of USAID*s
operating expense account with cognizant USAID officials. Overall, USAID
agreed with our findings and concurred with our recommendation to
implement a strategic workforce planning system.

Our review was conducted between July 2002 and September 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Scope and

Methodology

Page 11 GAO- 03- 1171T For future contacts regarding this testimony,
please call Jess Ford at (202) 512- 4268 or Al Huntington at (202) 512-
4140. Individuals making key

contributions to this testimony included Kimberly Ebner, Jeanette
Espinola, Emily Gupta, Rhonda Horried, and Audrey Solis. Mark Dowling,
Reid Lowe, and Jose Pena provided technical assistance. Contacts and

Acknowledgments

(320225)

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