Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance
Security Efforts (09-SEP-03, GAO-03-1154T).
The economic well being of the United States is dependent on the
expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation
system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats
to and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary
responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in
securing the transportation system and the federal role and
actions in transportation security.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1154T
ACCNO: A08380
TITLE: Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance
Security Efforts
DATE: 09/09/2003
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism
Mass transit operations
Safety regulation
Safety standards
Transportation safety
******************************************************************
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** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
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GAO-03-1154T
Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. EDT Tuesday, September
9, 2003 TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts
Statement of Peter Guerrero, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO- 03- 1154T
Securing the nation*s transportation system is fraught with challenges.
The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our
borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The
extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and
freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure.
Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further
complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved
in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal,
state, and local levels and thousands of private sector companies. Further
exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take the
collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and
future transportation challenges.
Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance
security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation
security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a
variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of
transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided
grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the
largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused
more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is
planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. DOT
is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and
responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have
not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap,
duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their
security efforts. The economic well being of the
United States is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods
through the transportation system. The attacks on September
11, 2001, illustrate the threats to and vulnerabilities of the
transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of
the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it
primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
TSA was recently
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was
asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and
the federal role and actions in
transportation security. In a June 2003 report, GAO recommended that TSA
and DOT use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to
define and clarify each entity*s role and responsibilities in
transportation security matters. DHS and DOT disagreed with the
recommendation. Based on the
uncertainty in the entities* roles and responsibilities that
transportation stakeholders surfaced to us, we continue to
believe our recommendation is valid and would help address transportation
security challenges.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1154T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Peter Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1154T, testimony
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
September 9, 2003
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts
Page 1 GAO- 03- 1154T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We
appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security of our
nation*s transportation system. Almost 2 years have passed since the
attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the
nation*s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Although most of
the early attention following the September 11 attacks focused on aviation
security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown
as concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as attempts to
introduce weapons of mass destruction into this country through ports or
launch chemical attacks on mass transit systems. The entire transportation
industry has remained on a heightened state of alert since the attacks.
My testimony today examines (1) challenges in securing the nation*s
transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, 1 as well as
state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance
security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and
actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation
security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to
further enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. My
comments are based on our recent report 2 on the security of the
transportation system that we prepared for several Members of this
1 Transportation operators may be private, public, or quasi- public
entities that provide transportation services. 2 U. S. General Accounting
Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges, GAO- 03- 843 (Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003). For
this report, we analyzed the Federal Bureau of Investigation*s threat
assessment and the administration*s security strategies, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) security- related documents and reports, and relevant
statutes and regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT,
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as
representatives
from numerous transportation industry associations and transportation
security experts. We selected transportation industry and state and local
government associations that represent the different modes of
transportation and levels of government. We selected transportation
security experts on the basis of their knowledge and expertise and
reputation as being experts in the transportation security arena. We also
consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on
homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and
other research on terrorism and transportation security. We conducted our
work from February 2003 through May 2003, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Page 2 GAO- 03- 1154T Committee as well as a body of our work undertaken
since September 11 on homeland security and combating terrorism. 3
Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in securing the
nation*s transportation system. Some of these challenges are common to all
modes of transportation; other challenges are specific to aviation,
maritime, or land transportation modes. Common security challenges include
the extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of
the system, funding limitations, and the number of stakeholders involved
in transportation security. For example, the transportation system
includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail,
almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipelines,
500 train stations, and over 5,000 public- use airports. The size of the
system simultaneously provides a substantial number of potential targets
for terrorists and makes it difficult to secure. Additionally, the number
of stakeholders* including over 20 federal entities, state and local
governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses* can lead to
coordination, communication, and consensus- building challenges. Further
exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
outstripped the additional amounts made available. The aviation, maritime,
and land transportation modes also face particular challenges in enhancing
security. For instance, maritime and land transportation systems generally
have open access designs so that users can enter the systems at multiple
points; however, this openness leaves them vulnerable because
transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves
the systems. Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state
and local
governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since
September 11. Although security was always a priority, the terrorist
attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to
representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed,
transportation operators have implemented new security measures or
3 See Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony. Summary
Page 3 GAO- 03- 1154T increased the frequency or intensity of existing
activities. For example, many transportation operators conducted risk or
security assessments,
undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans. State and local
governments, which play a critical role in securing the system because
they own a large portion of the transportation system as well as serve as
first responders to incidents involving transportation assets, have also
acted to improve the security of the transportation system. Some examples
of their actions since September 11 include deploying additional law
enforcement personnel and participating in emergency drills with the
transportation industry.
The roles of federal government agencies in securing the nation*s
transportation system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had
primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
for the security of all modes of transportation. During TSA*s first year
of existence, its primary focus was on aviation security. While TSA was
focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations 4 launched
various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land
transportation modes. For example, the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) launched a multipart security initiative to enhance transit
security, which included grants for emergency drills, security
assessments, and training. TSA has started to assert a greater role in
securing the maritime and land transportation modes and is launching a
number of new security
initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security standards for
all modes of transportation. However, a number of representatives from
transportation industry and state and local government associations that
we contacted expressed concerns about not being adequately involved in
TSA*s decision- making, such as the development of security standards. DOT
modal administrations are also continuing their transportation security
efforts. For example, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is
coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security
have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for
duplicating and/ or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with
their security efforts.
4 DOT*s modal administrations are the departmental units responsible for
the different modes of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad
Administration or the Federal Highway Administration.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation security experts and representatives
from transportation industry and state and local government associations
that we spoke with
identified a number of actions that they said should be implemented to
enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. In general,
they believe that the transportation system is generally more secure today
than it was prior to September 11; however, all noted that more work is
needed to improve the security of the system. Transportation security
experts and
representatives from transportation industry and state and local
government associations identified a number of future actions needed and
stated that the identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the
federal government. For instance, representatives from industry and state
and local government associations told us that clarifying federal roles
and coordinating federal efforts are important because association members
are not clear about which agency to contact for their various security
concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Some
representatives from the transportation industry and state and local
government associations also noted that they have received conflicting
messages from the different federal entities.
In our June report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a
memorandum of agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities
of TSA and DOT in transportation security matters. 5 DOT
and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings; however, they
disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that their roles and
responsibilities in transportation security matters need to be clarified.
On the basis of our discussions with transportation security stakeholders,
we
continue to believe our recommendation would help address transportation
security challenges. For example, representatives from several
associations stated that their members were unclear as to which
agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, both DOT and TSA are moving
forward with their security efforts, and both entities have statutory
responsibilities for transportation security. Therefore, we retained our
recommendation that DOT and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and
responsibilities in security matters and communicate this information to
stakeholders. 5 GAO- 03- 843.
Page 5 GAO- 03- 1154T The nation*s transportation system is a vast,
interconnected network of diverse modes. Key modes of transportation
include aviation; highways;
motor carrier (i. e., trucking); motor coach (i. e., intercity bus);
maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e. g.,
buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes
work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network of
infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels
that permit passengers and freight to move within the system. For example,
the nation*s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight
and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The
diversity and size of the transportation system make it vital to our
economy and national security, including military mobilization and
deployment.
Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government
all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.
Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation
system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad
companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,
respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640, 000
interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United
States. State and local governments also own significant portions of the
highways, transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state
and local governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of
highways. State and local governments also administer and implement
regulations for different sectors of the transportation system and provide
protective and emergency response services through various agencies.
Although the federal government owns a limited share of the transportation
system, it issues regulations, establishes policies, provides funding,
and/ or sets standards for the different modes of transportation. The
federal government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan
guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or
mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address
security concerns.
Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on
September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. 6 The
act
6 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). Background
Page 6 GAO- 03- 1154T also gives TSA regulatory authority over all
transportation modes. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused
primarily on meeting the
aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the
Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other
agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). 7 The United States maintains the world*s largest and most
complex national transportation system. Improving the security of such a
system is fraught with challenges for both public and private entities. To
provide safe transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome
issues common to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to
the individual modes of transportation.
Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some common
challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges stem from the
extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of the
system, funding security improvements, and the number of stakeholders
involved in transportation security.
The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately
secure. The transportation system*s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses
the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers
and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the infrastructure as
well as the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the
system creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore,
as industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly
noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes equal protection for
all assets impossible. Protecting transportation assets from attack is
made more difficult because of the tremendous variety of transportation
operators. Some are multibillion- dollar enterprises, and others have very
limited facilities and very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such
as state departments of
transportation, and some are private businesses. Some transportation
operators carry passengers, and others haul freight. Additionally, the
type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied. For
7 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). The Transportation
System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges
All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges
Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges
Page 7 GAO- 03- 1154T example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail
operators haul freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous
materials.
Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and
interdependency among the transportation modes and between the
transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers
and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a
destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a
piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to
train to truck. (See fig. 1.) The interconnective nature of the
transportation system creates several security challenges. First, the
effects of events directed at one mode of transportation can ripple
throughout the entire system. For
example, when the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went
on strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by
almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the
year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other*
that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach
could affect other modes. 8 An example of this would be if a shipping
container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U. S. port
where it was placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the
original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking
industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one
mode established high levels of security they could be affected because of
the security efforts, or lack thereof, of the other modes. Third,
intermodal facilities where a number of modes connect and interact* such
as ports* are potential targets for attack because of the presence of
passengers, freight, employees, and equipment at these facilities.
8 Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within the
same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could be
placed on one airline and then transferred to another airline where it
explodes. Interconnectivity and
Interdependency Also Present Challenges
Page 8 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 1: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements
within the Transportation System Interdependencies also exist between
transportation and nearly every
other sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the
transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For
example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail
industry restricted the movement of many hazardous materials, including
chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a terrorist attack. However,
within days, many major water treatment facilities reported that they were
running out of chlorine, which they use to treat drinking water, and would
have to shut down operations if chlorine deliveries were not immediately
resumed.
Page 9 GAO- 03- 1154T Securing the transportation system is made more
difficult because of the number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated
in figure 2, numerous
entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20
federal entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key
role in transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,
Transportation, and Homeland Security; state governments; and about 2,000
pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline system.
The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead to
communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting guidance.
Representatives from several state and local government and industry
associations told us that their members are receiving different messages
from the various federal agencies involved in transportation security. For
instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA and DOT asked
the industry to implement additional security measures when the nation*s
threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of the Iraq War;
9 however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they wanted done* that
is, they were asking for different security measures. Moreover, many
representatives commented that the federal government needs to better
coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted that dealing
with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is
frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector. 9 DHS
created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has five threat
conditions* ranging from low to severe* representing different levels of
risk for terrorist attacks. The Number of Stakeholders
Creates Challenges
Page 10 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 2: Key Stakeholders in Transportation
Security
a *Other* includes private, public, or quasi- public entities.
The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed
cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we
have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus- building are
critical to successful implementation of security efforts. Transportation
stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests, which can make
consensus- building challenging. For example, from a safety perspective,
vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to have
placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency
personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However, from a
security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that carry
hazardous materials make them a potential target for attack.
According to transportation security experts and state and local
government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the
Funding Is Key Challenge
Page 11 GAO- 03- 1154T most pressing challenge to securing the nation*s
transportation system. Although some security improvements are
inexpensive, such as removing
trash cans from subway platforms, most require substantial funding.
Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even
relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For
example, reinforcing shipping containers to make them more blast resistant
is one way to improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per
container. With several million shipping containers in use, however, this
tactic would cost billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The
total cost of enhancing the security of the entire transportation system
is unknown; however, given the size of the system, it could amount to tens
of billions of dollars.
The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for private
industry or state and local governments to make security investments.
According to industry representatives and experts we contacted, most of
the transportation industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making
it difficult for the industry to pay for additional security measures. The
sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry*s
financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,
airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history, and several have
filed for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier
industries and Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow
economy. In addition, nearly every state and local government is facing a
large budget deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National
Governors Association estimates that states are facing a total budget
shortfall of $80 billion for fiscal year 2004. Given the tight budget
environment, state and
local governments and transportation operators must make difficult
tradeoffs between transportation security investments and other needs,
such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the
National
Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer some
maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for some
security enhancements.
Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the
additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal
government elevates the national threat condition. Industry
representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing
security patrols, when the national threat condition is raised or
intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode.
However, these representatives stated that these additional measures drain
resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it
spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when
Page 12 GAO- 03- 1154T the national threat condition is increased.
Transportation industry representatives also noted that employees are
diverted from their regular duties to implement additional security
measures, such as guarding
entranceways, in times of increased security, which hurts productivity.
The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation
security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional
amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of $241
million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce
in 2002. 10 However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications TSA has
received for these security grants totaled $1.8 billion* nearly 8 times
more than the amount available. Due to the costs of
security enhancements and the transportation industries* and state and
local governments* tight budget environments, the federal government is
likely to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these
enhancements. However, given the constraints on the federal budget as well
as competing claims for federal assistance, requests for federal funding
for transportation security enhancements will likely continue to exceed
available resources.
10 Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as
container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo
included in containers being sent to the United States.
Page 13 GAO- 03- 1154T Table 1: Comparison of Selected Transportation
Security Grant Requests with Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003
(Dollars in millions) Type of grant Amount appropriated Total amount
requested in all grant applications
Port security grants a $93.3 $697 Port security grants b 105 996 Intercity
bus grants b 15 45.6 Operation Safe Commerce grants b 28 97.9
Total $241.3 $1,836.5
Source: TSA. Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 117) and the Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 206) provided funding for port security
grants. a P. L. No. 107- 117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).
b P. L. No. 107- 206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002).
Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of security
enhancements with the benefits of such measures. Although there is broad
support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the
nation relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods.
Particularly with
*just- in- time* deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow
through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply
chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard Commandant
stated about the flow of goods through ports, *even slowing the flow long
enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random
selection of imports would be economically intolerable.* 11 Furthermore,
security measures may have economic and competitive
ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the
federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail
industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might
incur additional costs and/ or lose customers to the motor carrier
industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security and
protecting the
11 Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a
Balanced and Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade:
America*s Achilles* Heel (February 2002) by Admiral James M. Loy and
Captain Robert G. Ross, U. S. Coast Guard. Balancing Potential Economic
Impacts and Security Enhancements Is Also Challenging
Page 14 GAO- 03- 1154T economic vitality of the national economy and
individual modes will remain an important and difficult task.
In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation stakeholders
will face in attempting to improve transportation security, they also face
a number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime, and land
transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a
significant amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work
is needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the
aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11.
However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted that significant
vulnerabilities remain. For example:
Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as launching
shoulder- fired missiles, from a location just outside an airport*s
perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased their
patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state that they
do not have enough resources to completely protect against these attacks.
Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on
ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes by
passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the
cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all- cargo aircraft. For
example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not universally
subject to background checks. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo
shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining
access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through several
hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to
implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.
According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address
air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process to
strengthen security programs across the industry.
General aviation security: Although TSA has taken several actions
related to general aviation 12 since September 11, this segment of the
industry remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation. For
example, general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off, and
the contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to
12 General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate and privately
owned aircraft at over 19, 000 airports. Individual Transportation
Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges
Page 15 GAO- 03- 1154T TSA, solutions that can be implemented relatively
easily at the nation*s commercial airports are not practical at the 19,
000 general aviation
airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot
intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft from
doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January 2002,
when a teenage flight student from Florida crashed his single- engine
airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. TSA is working with the appropriate
stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security
standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry.
Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security
vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems
generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at
multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are
accessible and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is
housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
openness of the maritime and land transportation systems can leave them
vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control who
enters or leaves the systems. However, adding security measures that
restrict the flow of passengers or freight through the systems could have
serious consequences for commerce and the public.
Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique
challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the
motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60
percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually
conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and time
consuming. Additionally, as we noted in our report on rail safety and
security, 13 the temporary storage of hazardous materials in unsecured or
unmonitored rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate
destinations is a potential vulnerability. Specifically, unmonitored
chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could threaten the
nearby population and environment. In addition, representatives from the
motor coach industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on
the market, coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or
selling these vehicles, is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there
are approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there
is very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there
any
13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions
Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed, GAO-
03- 435 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 2003).
Page 16 GAO- 03- 1154T consistency among motor coach operators in whether
they remove their logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These
vehicles could be used as weapons or to transport weapons. Federal Motor
Carrier Safety
Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the
industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for
security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.
Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local
governments have been working to strengthen security, according to
associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before
September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of
transportation security for transportation operators and state and local
governments. According to representatives from a number of industry
associations we interviewed, transportation operators have implemented new
security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing
activities. Some of the most common measures cited include conducting
vulnerability or risk assessments, tightening access control, intensifying
security presence, increasing emergency drills, developing or revising
security plans, and providing additional training. (Figure 3 is a
photograph from an annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.) Transportation
Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken Steps to Improve
Security
Page 17 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 3: Emergency Drill in Progress
As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical
stakeholders in the nation*s homeland security efforts. This is equally
true in securing the nation*s transportation system. State and local
governments play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant
portion of the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit
systems, highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments own
over 90 percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when
state and local governments are not the owners or operators, they
nonetheless are directly affected by the transportation modes that run
through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the responsibility for
protecting this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the
transportation infrastructure often falls on state and local governments.
Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing
counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security- related
research, participating in transportation operators* emergency drills and
table- top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of
transportation assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions
with transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also
hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation
assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the
state and local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to
personnel costs, such as for additional law enforcement officers and
overtime.
Page 18 GAO- 03- 1154T Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies have
taken numerous steps to enhance transportation security since September
11. The roles of the federal agencies in securing the nation*s
transportation system,
however, are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary
responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake
of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the
security of all modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not yet
formally defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance
transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security
standards for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing
their security efforts for different modes of transportation.
Congress has acted to enhance the security of the nation*s transportation
system since September 11. In addition to passing the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 14 Congress passed a number of other
key pieces of legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For
example, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 15 which mandates
federal background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying
hazardous materials; and the Homeland Security Act, 16 which created DHS
and moved TSA to the new department. 17 Congress also provided funding for
transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts.
For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided
(1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in
commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security
activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of intercity bus
operations.
14 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 15 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001). 16 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 17 The U.
S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of Reference
Regarding the Respective Roles of the U. S. Coast Guard and the
Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard is designated as
the lead DHS agency for maritime
security and is directed to coordinate as appropriate with other agencies.
The document further notes that a supporting memorandum of agreement
between the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration is being developed. Congress and
Federal
Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance Security, but Roles Remain
Unclear
Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation
Security
Page 19 GAO- 03- 1154T Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also
taken steps to enhance transportation security since September 11. In its
first year of existence, TSA worked to establish its organization and
focused primarily on meeting
the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January 2002, TSA
had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation*s transportation system; 1
year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees. TSA reports that it met over
30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including two of
its most significant deadlines* to deploy federal passenger screeners at
airports across the nation by November 19, 2002; and to screen every piece
of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002. 18 According to
TSA, other completed TSA activities included recruiting, hiring, training,
and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners; awarding grants for port
security; and implementing performance management system and strategic
planning activities to create a results- oriented culture.
As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the aviation
system, DOT modal administrations acted to enhance the security of air,
land, and maritime transportation. (See app. I for a table listing the
actions taken by DOT modal administrations since September 11.) The
actions taken by the DOT modal administrations have varied. For example,
FTA launched a multipart initiative for mass transit agencies that
provided grants for emergency drills, offered free security training,
conducted security assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical
assistance, and invested in research and development. The Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration developed three courses for motor coach
drivers. The responses of the various DOT modal agencies have varied due
to differences in authority and resource limitations.
In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies
have also taken actions to improve security. For example, the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U. S. Customs
Service, has launched a number of initiatives aimed at
18 The Homeland Security Act, P. L. 107- 296 (November 25, 2002) the
legislation that created DHS, amended this deadline to allow some airports
up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) to deploy all of the necessary
explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all checked baggage.
TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent of all
checked baggage were screened with an explosive detection system or
explosives trace detection equipment and the remaining checked baggage was
screened using alternative means as is allowed under the law.
Page 20 GAO- 03- 1154T strengthening the security of the U. S. border. 19
Some of the specific security initiatives that CBP has implemented include
establishing the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), which is a joint
government business initiative aimed at securing the supply chain of
global trade against terrorist exploitation; and launching the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed specifically to secure
oceangoing sea containers. In addition, CBP has developed and/ or deployed
tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers and
vehicles, such as the new mobile gamma ray imaging devices pictured in
figure 4.
Figure 4: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use
TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation
system. TSA has adopted a systems approach* that is, a holistic rather
than a modal approach* to securing the transportation system. In addition,
TSA is using risk management principles to guide its decision
19 The U. S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of
Treasury to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection. TSA Moves Forward as its
Role in Transportation Security Evolves
Page 21 GAO- 03- 1154T making. TSA is also planning to establish security
standards for all modes of transportation and is launching a number of new
security efforts for the
maritime and land transportation modes. Using the systems approach, TSA
plans to address the security of the entire transportation system as a
whole, rather than focusing on individual modes of transportation.
According to TSA officials, using a systems approach to security is
appropriate for several reasons. First, the transportation system is
intermodal, interdependent, and international. Given the intermodalism of
the system, incidents in one mode of transportation could affect other
modes. Second, it is important not to drive terrorism from one mode of
transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security* that
is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another
mode is *hardened* with additional security measures. Third, it is
important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not
overly stringent or too economically challenging compared with the
measures used for other modes. Fourth, it is important that the attention
on one aspect of transportation security (e. g., cargo, infrastructure, or
passengers) does not leave the other aspects vulnerable.
TSA has also adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to enhance
the security of the nation*s transportation system. A risk management
approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and
the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
decisions in order to link resources with prioritized efforts. (See app.
II for a description of the key elements of a risk management approach.)
The highest priorities emerge where the three elements of risk management
overlap. For example, transportation
infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to
attack, and a likely target would be most at risk and therefore would be a
higher priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only
vulnerable to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management
principles will drive all decisions* from standard- setting to funding
priorities to staffing.
Using risk management principles to guide decision- making is a good
strategy, given the difficult trade- offs TSA will likely have to make as
it moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk
management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better
prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from
local government and industry associations and transportation security
experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes
TSA Adopts a Systems
Approach and Risk Management Principles
Page 22 GAO- 03- 1154T equal protection for all assets; moreover, the
risks vary by transportation assets within modes and by modes. In
addition, requests for funding for
transportation security enhancements will likely exceed available
resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine security
priorities and identify appropriate solutions.
TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of
transportation. The federal government has historically set security
standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of
ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow
in several areas including, screening equipment, screener qualifications,
and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11
attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure
the
security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to a
TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and land
transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack. For
example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are
subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no
screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne
passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels
and methods of screening and are largely free to set their own rules about
the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set
standards to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation
system and to reduce the transportation system*s vulnerability to attacks.
20 According to TSA officials and documents, TSA*s standards will be
performance-, risk-, and threat- based and may be mandatory. More
specifically: Standards will be performance- based. Rather than being
prescriptive
standards, TSA standards will be performance- based, which will allow 20
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within
DHS is working with TSA, the Coast Guard, and other federal agencies on
developing a set of national standards that would apply to all ports.
These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been developing a
set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct
vulnerability assessments for all U. S. ports. The standards will go into
effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was adopted by the International
Maritime Organization conference in December 2002. The Coast Guard
considers that the implementation of these standards is best done through
mandating compliance with the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
According to TSA, because of the Coast Guard*s significant role in
securing maritime transportation, TSA will
likely play a coordination role in the maritime arena. TSA Plans to Issue
National Security Standards
Page 23 GAO- 03- 1154T transportation operators to determine how best to
achieve the desired level of security. TSA officials believe that
performance- based standards
provide for operator flexibility, allow operators to use their
professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology
advancement. Standards will be risk- based. Standards will be set for
areas for which
assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that
an attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could be
considered in determining *national impact,* such as fatalities and
economic damage.
Standards will be threat- based. The standards will be tied to the
national threat condition and/ or local threats. As the threat condition
escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to
implement additional countermeasures.
Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the
risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these
cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In
addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put
securityconscious transportation operators that implement security
measures at a competitive disadvantage* that is, they have spent money
that their competitors may not have spent. This creates a disincentive for
transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA
officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In
determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the
results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
private sector and other government agencies.
Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by
the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using
risk-, threat-, and performance- based standards will increase the
acceptance of the standards. For example, performance- based standards
allow for more
operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,
prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited number
of standards* that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of
the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level of
risk is too high or unacceptable.
TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT modal
administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards, TSA
expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing
agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant
Page 24 GAO- 03- 1154T to assume this role because doing so could alter
their relationships with the industry. Historically, the missions of DOT
surface transportation
modal administrations have largely focused on maintaining operations and
improving service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the
authority to regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For
example, FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee security at
transit agencies. In contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail
security, and DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for
writing safety and security regulations for liquefied natural gas storage
facilities. In addition, DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to
administer and implement standards because of resource concerns. FHWA
officials commented that given the current uncertainty about the standards
and their impacts, FHWA is reluctant to commit, in advance, staff or
funding to enforce new security standards.
Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering,
implementing, and/ or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy- in is
critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on
the part of stakeholders are also necessary. However, achieving such
consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the conflicts between
some stakeholders* goals and interests.
Transportation stakeholders we contacted also expressed a number of
concerns about TSA*s plan to issue security standards for all modes of
transportation. For example, industry associations expressed concerns that
the standards would come in the form of unfunded mandates* that is, the
federal government would not provide funding to implement mandatory
standards. According to the industry and state and local government
associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial
burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing
financial difficulties. Industry representatives also expressed concern
that TSA has not adequately included the transportation industry in its
development of standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT
officials we met with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards,
what the standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing the
standards. The uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to
confusion and/ or inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they
are reluctant to spend money to implement certain security measures
because they are worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that
will require Amtrak to redo its efforts. Transportation stakeholders also
raised other concerns about TSA*s plans to issues standards, including
questioning whether TSA has the necessary expertise to develop Gaining
Stakeholder Buyin
is Critical for Standards to Work, but Stakeholders Express Concerns
Page 25 GAO- 03- 1154T appropriate standards and whether mandatory
standards, as opposed to voluntary standards, are prudent.
TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as
establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC)
program; developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger
Pre- Screening System; developing a national transportation system
security plan; and exploring methods to integrate operations and security,
among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve access control
for the 12 million transportation workers who require unescorted physical
or cyber access to secure areas of the nation*s transportation modes by
establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for secure identification of
transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard
background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively
matched to his/ her credential. Once the program is fully operational, the
TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation workers and would
be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a
uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant
credentialing and background checks.
As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal
administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some
cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is
coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
FTA also has a number of initiatives currently under way in the areas of
public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and
intelligence sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20
security actions
transit agencies should implement and is currently working with transit
agencies to assist them in implementing these measures.
FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the
aviation system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the
aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
protecting the nation*s air traffic control system* both the physical
security of its air traffic control facilities and computer systems. The
air traffic control system*s computers help the nation*s air traffic
controllers to safely direct and separate traffic* sabotaging this system
could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to
increase the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and
ensure that contractors who have access to the air traffic control system
undergo background checks. TSA Is Launching Other
Security Initiatives DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their
Security Efforts
Page 26 GAO- 03- 1154T The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates
the potential for
duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with
their security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily
responsible for the security of the transportation system prior to
September 11. In November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA
and gave it primary responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation. 21 However, during TSA*s first year of existence, TSA*s
main focus was on aviation security* more specifically, on meeting ATSA
deadlines. While TSA was
primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations
launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and
land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many
aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on
the security of all modes of transportation.
Legislation has not specifically defined TSA*s role and responsibilities
in securing all modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not
specify TSA*s role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
transportation modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For
instance, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain
transit security requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is
responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act
also did not eliminate the existing statutory responsibilities for DOT
modal administrations to secure the different transportation modes.
Moreover, recent legislation indicates that DOT still has security
responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
modes.
To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security,
DOT modal administrations and TSA planned to develop memorandums of
agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and
responsibilities of the different agencies for transportation security and
address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security
activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and establishing
funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations worked for
months to develop the memorandums of agreement and the draft agreements
were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review in early spring
of this year. According to DOT*s General Counsel,
21 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). TSA*s and DOT*s Roles and
Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined
Page 27 GAO- 03- 1154T with the exception of the memorandum of agreement
between FAA and TSA, the draft memorandums were very general and did not
provide much
clarification. Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to sign the
memorandums of agreement, except for the memorandum of agreement between
FAA and TSA, which was signed on February 28, 2003. 22 The General Counsel
suggested several reasons why the majority of the
draft memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA*s departure
date approached* that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS*
TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown concerned about
formally binding the organizations to specific roles and responsibilities.
Second, the working relationships between TSA and most of the DOT modal
administrations are still very new; as a result, all of the potential
issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified. Thus,
identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was more
difficult.
Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of
Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence that
commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on
security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator
also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a
framework for their interactions on security matters for all other modes.
TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of agreement
are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and said
that they would be open to using memorandums
of agreement in the future. 22 DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums
of agreement that are narrow in scope and address a specific issue. For
example, TSA and DOT signed a memorandum of agreement regarding the
processing of civil rights complaints.
Page 28 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation security experts and representatives
of state and local government and industry associations we contacted
generally believe that the transportation system is more secure today than
it was prior to
September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to strengthen
the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation experts, industry
representatives, and federal officials all recommend that more work be
done. Transportation experts and state and local government and industry
representatives identified a number of actions that, in their view, the
federal government should take to enhance security, including clarifying
federal roles and coordinating federal efforts, developing a
transportation security strategy, funding security enhancements, investing
in research and development, and providing better intelligence information
and related guidance. Specifically:
Clarify federal roles and responsibilities. The lack of clarity about
the roles and responsibilities of federal entities in transportation
security creates the potential for confusion, duplication, and conflicts.
Understanding roles, responsibilities, and whom to call is crucial in an
emergency. However, representatives from several industry associations
stated that their members were unclear about which agency to contact for
their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain
issues. Furthermore, they said that they do not have contacts within these
agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported
that their members are receiving different messages from various federal
agencies involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and
frustration within the industry. According to industry representatives and
transportation security experts, uncertainty about federal roles and the
lack of coordination are straining intergovernmental relationships,
draining resources, and raising the potential for problems in responding
to terrorism. One industry association told us, for instance, that it has
been asked by three different federal agencies to participate in three
separate studies of the same issue.
Establish a national transportation strategy. A national strategy is
crucial for helping stakeholders identify priorities, leveraging
resources, establishing stakeholder performance expectations, and creating
incentives for stakeholders to improve security. Currently, local
government associations view the absence of performance expectations*
coupled with limited threat information* as a major obstacle in focusing
their people and resources on high- priority threats, particularly at
elevated threat levels. The experts also noted that modal strategies* no
matter how Experts and
Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the Security of the
Transportation System
Page 29 GAO- 03- 1154T complete* cannot address the complete
transportation security problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As
mentioned earlier, TSA is in the
process of developing a national transportation system security plan, 23
which, according to the Deputy Administrator of TSA, will provide an
overarching framework for the security of all modes. Provide funding for
needed security improvements. Although an
overall security strategy is a prerequisite to investing wisely, providing
adequate funding also is essential, according to experts we contacted.
Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding diminishes
stakeholders* commitment and willingness to absorb initial security
investments and long- term operating costs, an expert emphasized. Industry
and state and local government associations also commented that federal
funding should accompany any federal security standards; otherwise,
mandatory standards will be considered unfunded mandates that the industry
and state and local governments will have to absorb.
Invest in research and development for transportation security.
According to most transportation security experts and associations we
contacted, investing in research and development is an appropriate role
for the federal government, because the products of research and
development endeavors would likely benefit the entire transportation
system, not just individual modes or operators. TSA is actively engaged in
research and development projects, such as the development of the next
generation explosive detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft
and cargo/ baggage containers, biometrics and other access control
methods, and human factors initiatives to identify methods to improve
screener performance, at its Transportation Security Laboratory in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. However, TSA noted that continued adequate
funding for research and development is paramount in order for TSA to be
able to meet security demands with up- to- date and reliable technology.
Provide timely intelligence information and related guidance.
Representatives from numerous associations commented that the federal
government needs to provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence
information. They said that general threat warnings are not helpful.
Rather, transportation operators want more specific intelligence
information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential
threat and implement appropriate security measures. Without more localized
and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they run the risk of
23 TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system
security plan prepared by the end of this year.
Page 30 GAO- 03- 1154T wasting resources on unneeded security measures or
not providing an adequate level of security. Moreover, local government
officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence
information because they do not have appropriate federal security
clearances. Also, there is little
federal guidance on how local authorities should respond to a specific
threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco police were
stationed at the Golden Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated national
threat condition. However, without information about the nature of the
threat to San Francisco*s large transportation infrastructure or clear
federal expectations for a response, it is difficult to judge whether
actions like this are the most effective use of police protection,
according to representatives from a local government association.
Securing the transportation system is fraught with challenges. Despite
these challenges, transportation stakeholders have worked to strengthen
security since September 11. However, more work is needed. It will take
the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet the
continuing challenges and enhance the security of the transportation
system. 24 During TSA*s first year of existence, it met a number of
challenges,
including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for aviation
security. With the immediate crisis of meeting these deadlines behind it,
TSA can now examine the security of the entire transportation system. As
TSA becomes more active in securing the maritime and land transportation
modes, it will become even more important that the roles of TSA and DOT
modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of clearly defined roles
among the federal entities could lead to duplication and
confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation sector*s
ability to prepare for and respond to attacks. Therefore, in our report,
we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of
agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT
in transportation security and communicate this information to
stakeholders.
24 See appendix III for a listing of active GAO engagements related to
transportation security. Observations
Page 31 GAO- 03- 1154T This concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee
may have.
For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512- 2834. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony included Cathleen Berrick,
Steven Calvo, Nikki Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Susan Fleming, Libby
Halperin, David Hooper, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Ray Sendejas.
Page 32 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
taken
All (transport of hazardous materials) Research and Special Programs
Administration (Office of Hazardous Materials Safety)
Established regulations for shippers and transporters of certain
hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans and to require
security awareness training for hazmat employees.
Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness training
for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community.
Published security advisory, which identifies measures that could
enhance the security of the transport of hazardous materials.
Investigated the security risks associated with placarding hazardous
materials, including whether removing placards from certain shipments
improve shipment security, and whether alternative methods for
communicating safety hazards could be deployed.
Aviation Federal Aviation Administration Established rule for
strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft.
Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional security
measures.
Assisted Department of Justice in increasing background check
requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot certificates. Increased
access restrictions at air traffic control facilities.
Developed computer security strategy. Highways Federal Highway
Administration Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency
preparedness
workshops.
Developed and prioritized list of highway security research and
development projects.
Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel vulnerabilities.
Appendix I: Key Transportation Security Efforts of DOT Modal
Administrations, September 2001 to May 2003
Page 33 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
taken
Maritime U. S. Coast Guarda Maritime Administration
Activated and deployed port security units to help support local port
security patrols in high threat areas.
Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and confirmed the
identity of those aboard.
Conducted initial assessments of the nation*s ports to identify vessel
types and facilities that pose a high risk of being involved in a
transportation security incident.
Established a new centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track
the movement of all foreign- flagged vessels entering U. S. ports of call.
Established new guidelines for developing security plans and
implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger
terminals.
Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the Coast
Guard*s National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.
Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port
Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises.
Provided port security training and developed standards and curriculum
to educate and train maritime security personnel.
Increased access restrictions and established new security procedures
for the Ready Reserve Force. Provided merchant mariner background checks
for Ready Reserve
Force and sealift vessels in support of Department of Defense and Coast
Guard requirements.
Provided merchant mariner force protection training. Motor carrier
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Conducted 31, 000 on- site security sensitivity visits for hazardous
materials carriers; made recommendations after visits.
Initiated a field operational test to evaluate different safety and
security technologies and procedures, and identify the most cost-
effective means for protecting different types of hazardous cargo for
security purposes.
Provided free training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement
officials and industry representatives.
Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials industry. Motor
coach Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Developed three courses for drivers on security- related information,
including different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to respond
in the case of an emergency.
Page 34 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
taken
Pipeline Research and Special Programs Administration (Office of Pipeline
Safety)
Developed contact list of operators who own critical systems. Convened
blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions to develop
a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate efforts of
the stakeholders.
Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to use for pipeline
operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA have
begun the inspection of major operators.
Created e: mail network of pipeline operators and a call- in telephone
number that pipeline operators can use to obtain information.
Directed pipeline operators to identify critical facilities and develop
security plans for critical facilities that address deterrence,
preparedness, and rapid response and recovery from attacks.
Worked with industry to develop risk- based security guidance, which is
tied to national threat levels and includes voluntary, recommended
countermeasures.
Rail Federal Railroad Administration Shared threat information with
railroads and rail labor.
Reviewed Association of American Railroads* and Amtrak*s security plans.
Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans.
Provided funding for security assessments of three commuter railroads,
which were included in FTA*s assessment efforts.
Reached out to international community for lessons learned in rail
security.
Transit Federal Transit Administration Awarded $3.4 million in grants to
over 80 transit agencies for emergency response drills. Offered free
security training to transit agencies.
Conducted security assessments at the 36 largest transit agencies.
Provided technical assistance to 19, with a goal of 60, transit agencies
on security and emergency plans and emergency response drills.
Increased funding for security research and development efforts. Source:
GAO presentation of information provided by DOT modal administrations.
a The U. S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).
Page 35 GAO- 03- 1154T A risk management approach encompasses three key
elements* a threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality
assessment. In
particular, these three elements provide the following information: A
threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis
of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This
assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential
threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat
assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats. The risk
management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and critical
assessments as additional input to the decision- making process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited
by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in
terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and
the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which
structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from
attack. Thus, it helps managers determine operational requirements and
target resources
to the highest priorities while reducing the potential for targeting
resources to lower priorities. Appendix II: Elements of a Risk Management
Approach
Page 36 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What are the status and
associated costs of TSA efforts to acquire, install, and operate explosive
detection equipment (Electronic
Trace Detection Technology and Explosive Detection Systems) to screen all
checked baggage by December 31, 2003? 2) What are the benefit and
tradeoffs* to include costs, operations and performance* of using
alternative explosive detection technologies currently available for
baggage screening?
Key Questions: 1) How has security concerns and measures at changed at
general aviation airports since September 11, 2001? 2) What steps has the
Transportation Security Administration taken to improve general aviation
security?
Key Questions: What are procedures for conducting background and security
checks for pilots of small banner- towing aircraft requesting waivers to
perform stadium overflights? (2) To what extent were these procedures
followed in conducting required background and security checks since 9/
11? (3) How effective were these procedures in reducing risks to public
safety?
Key Questions: (1) What are the levels of effort for USCG*s various
missions? (2) What is USCG*s progress in developing a strategic plan for
setting goals for all of its various missions? (3) What is USCG*s mission
performance as compared to its performance and strategic plans?
Key Questions: 1) How will the CAPPS- II system function and what data
will be needed to make the system operationally effective? 2) What
safeguards will be put in place to protect the traveling public*s privacy?
3) What systems and measures are in place to determine whether CAPPS- II
will result in improved national security? 4) What impact will CAPPS- II
have on the traveling public and airline industry in terms of costs,
delays, risks, and hassle, etc.? Appendix III: GAO Active Engagements
Related to Transportation Security TSA Baggage Screening
General Aviation Security
Banner Pilot Waivers U. S. Coast Guard Budget And Mission Performance
Transportation Security Administration*s Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS- II)
Page 37 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What efforts have been taken or
planned to ensure passenger screeners comply with federal standards and
other criteria, to
include efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? 2)
What methods does TSA use to test screener performance, and what have been
the results of these tests? 3) How have the results of tests of TSA
passenger screeners compared to the results achieved by screeners prior to
9/ 11 and at the 5 pilot program airports? 4) What actions are TSA taking
to remedy performance concerns?
Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition
laws and policies, including ensuring adequate competition? (2) How well
does TSA*s organizational structure facilitate effective, efficient
procurement? (3) How does TSA ensure that its acquisition workforce is
equipped to award and oversee contracts? (4) How well do TSA*s policies
and processes ensure that it receives the supplies and services it needs
on time and at reasonable cost?
Key Questions: (1) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to implement
section 106 of the Act requiring improved airport perimeter access
security? (2) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to implement section 136
requiring assessment and deployment of commercially available security
practices and technologies? (3) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to
implement section 138 requiring background investigations for TSA and
other airport employees?
Key Questions: 1) How effectively is the port vulnerability assessment
process being implemented, and what actions are being taken to address
deficiencies identified? 2) What progress is being made to develop port,
vessel, and facility security plans? 3) Does the CG have sufficient
resources and an action plan to ensure the plans be completed, reviewed
and approved in time to meet statutory deadlines? 4) What will it cost
stakeholders to comply? Transportation
Security Administration Passengers Screening Program
TSA*s Use of Sole Source Contracts
TSA*s Efforts To Implement Section 106, 136, And 138 Of The Aviation And
Transportation Security Act
Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
Page 38 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What is the nature and extent of
the threat from MANPADs? 2) How effective are U. S. controls on the use of
exported
MANPADs? 3) How do multilateral efforts attempt to stem MANPAD
proliferation? 4) What types of countermeasures are available to minimize
this threat and at what cost?
Key Questions: (1) What is the nature, scope, and operational framework of
the designee program? (2) What are the identified strengths and weaknesses
of the program? (3) What is the potential for FAA*s ODA proposal and other
stakeholders* alternatives to address the identified program weaknesses?
Key Questions: (1) How has Customs developed the Automated Targeting
System (ATS) and the new anti- terrorism rules? (2) How does Customs use
ATS to identify containerized cargo as *high risk* for screening and
inspection to detect cargo that might contain weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)? (3) To what extent is ATS implemented at seaports, including impact
and challenges involved? (4) What is Customs* plan for assessing system
implementation and performance?
Key Questions: 1) What are the current and emerging national challenges to
freight mobility and what proposals have been put forth to address these
issues? 2) To what extent do these current and emerging challenges exist
at container ports and surrounding areas and to what extent do the
proposals appear to have applicability to these locations?
Key Questions: (1) What are states* policies and practices for verifying
the identity of driver*s license/ ID card applicants and how might they
more effectively use SSNs or other tools to verify identity? (2) How does
SSA assist states in verifying SSNs for driver*s license/ ID card
applicants and how can SSA improve the verification service it provides?
Assessment of the
Portable Air Defense Missile Threat
Federal Aviation Administration Designee Program
Custom Cargo Inspections at Seaports
Enhancement Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation
Social Security Administration*s Role in Verifying Identities For State*s
Licensing of Drivers
Page 39 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: (1) What are the status, plans, and
technical and programmatic risks associated with the National Distress and
Response
System (NDRS) Modernization Project? (2) How is the Coast Guard addressing
concerns with the new NDRS, such as communication coverage gaps and the
inability to pinpoint distressed boaters? (3) How will Coast Guard*s new
homeland security role affect the NDRS project?
Key Questions: (1) What is the status of Customs* plan to install
radiation detection equipment at U. S. border crossings? (2) What is the
basis for the plan*s time frame? (3) What is Customs* technical capability
to implement the plan? (4) How well is Customs coordinating with other
agencies in the area of radiation detection? (5) What are the results of
Customs* evaluations of radiation detection equipment and how are the
evaluations being used? Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to
compensate major air
carriers for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist
attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in
insurance premiums resulting from the attacks? United States Coast
Guard*s National Distress and Response *Rescue 21* System Modernization
U. S. Border Radiation Detection
Airline Assistance Determination Of Whether The $5 Billion Provided by P.
L. 107- 42 Was Used To Compensat e The Nation*s Major Air
Carriers For Their Losses Stemming From The Events of Sept. 11, 2001
Page 40 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: (1) What is the budget profile for
the Federal Aviation Administration*s and the Transportation Security
Administration*s (TSA*s)
aviation security research and development (R& D) program? (2) How
effective is TSA*s strategy for determining which aviation security
technologies to research and develop? (3) To what extent do stakeholders
believe that TSA is researching and developing the most promising aviation
security technologies?
Key Questions: (1) How has the FAM program evolved, in terms of
recruiting, training, retention, and operations since the transfer of
program management to TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented the
necessary internal controls to meet the human capital and operational
challenges of the FAM program? (3) To what extent has TSA developed plans
and initiatives to accommodate future FAM program sustainability, growth
and maturation? Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration*s Research and
Development Program
Federal Air Marshals
Page 41 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to
Help Address Security Challenges, GAO- 03- 843 (Washington, D. C.: June
30, 2003).
Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and
Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments,
GAO- 03- 502 (Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2003).
Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail
Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed, GAO- 03- 435 (Washington, D. C.:
April 30, 2003). Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the
Department of
Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 594T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).
Transportation Security: Post- September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term
Challenges, GAO- 03- 616T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003). Aviation
Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
Certification Process, GAO- 03- 248NI (Washington, D. C.: February 3,
2003). (Not for Public Dissemination) Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of
Transportation, GAO- 03- 108 (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003).
High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation*s Critical Infrastructure, GAO- 03- 121
(Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003). Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air
Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
DOT*s Enforcement Approach, GAO- 03- 22 (Washington, D. C.: January 10,
2003).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
Cargo System, GAO- 03- 344 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).
Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
Issues, GAO- 03- 253 (Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002). Related GAO
Products
Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies
Page 42 GAO- 03- 1154T Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical
Federal Operations and Assets Remain at Risk, GAO- 03- 303T (Washington,
D. C.: November 19,
2002).
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO- 03- 297T (Washington, D. C.: November
18, 2002).
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
for All Missions, GAO- 03- 155 (Washington, D. C.: November 12, 2002).
Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO- 02- 1075T
(Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002).
Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and
Communication Needed, GAO- 02- 785 (Washington, D. C.: August 26, 2002).
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002).
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
and Long- Term Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25,
2002).
Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed, GAO- 02- 961T (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports,
GAO- 02- 955TNI (Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public
Dissemination) Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots,
GA0- 02- 822R
(Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2002). Aviation Security: Deployment and
Capabilities of Explosive Detection Equipment, GAO- 02- 713C (Washington,
D. C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified) Coast Guard: Budget and Management
Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO- 02- 538T (Washington, D. C.: March
19, 2002).
Page 43 GAO- 03- 1154T Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities
in the Nation*s Air Transportation System, GAO- 01- 1164T (Washington, D.
C.: September 26,
2001). (Not for Public Dissemination) Aviation Security: Information on
the Nation*s Air Transportation System Vulnerabilities, GAO- 01- 1174T
(Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations, GAO- 01- 1171T (Washington, D. C.:
September 25, 2001). Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and
Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO- 01- 1165T (Washington, D. C.:
September 21, 2001). Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe
Weaknesses in
Aviation Security, GAO- 01- 1166T (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation*s Airports, GAO- 01- 1162T (Washington, D. C.:
September 20, 2001).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and
Key Management Issues, GAO- 03- 715T (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003).
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
Results- Oriented Culture, GAO- 03- 190 (Washington, D. C.: January 17,
2003). Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership,
GAO- 03- 260 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated
Management Issues, GAO- 03- 250 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued
Management Challenges, GAO- 02- 1122T (Washington, D. C.: October 1,
2002). Terrorism and Risk Management
Page 44 GAO- 03- 1154T National Preparedness: Technology and Information
Sharing Challenges, GAO- 02- 1048R (Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002).
Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
Success, GAO- 02- 1013T (Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems,
GAO- 02- 474 (Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO- 02- 918T (Washington, D. C.: July 9,
2002).
Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
Critical to Success, GAO- 02- 901T (Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002).
Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
Complicate Priority Setting, GAO- 02- 893T (Washington, D. C.: June 28,
2002).
National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,
GAO- 02- 811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002). Homeland Security:
Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals, GAO- 02-
627T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).
National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
Security, GAO- 02- 621T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 550T
(Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002). Combating Terrorism: Enhancing
Partnerships Through a National
Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 548T (Washington, D. C.: March 25,
2002).
Page 45 GAO- 03- 1154T Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership
in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02-
547T (Washington, D. C.: March 22, 2002).
Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,
GAO- 02- 490T (Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002).
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 473T (Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002).
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long- Term National Needs, GAO- 02- 160T (Washington, D. C.: November 7,
2001).
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness, GAO- 02- 162T (Washington, D. C.: October 17,
2001).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection, GAO- 02- 24 (Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,
GAO- 02- 150T (Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
Management Are Needed, GAO- 01- 667 (Washington, D. C.: September 28,
2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding
Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer- Based Attacks,
GAO- 01- 1168T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Efforts,
GAO- 01- 1158T (Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-
01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).
(545040)
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