    Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance
    Security Efforts (09-SEP-03, GAO-03-1154T).

    The economic well being of the United States is dependent on the
    expeditious flow of people and goods through the transportation
    system. The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats
    to and vulnerabilities of the transportation system. Prior to
    September 11, the Department of Transportation (DOT) had primary
    responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
    the wake of September 11, Congress created the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it primary
    responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
    TSA was recently transferred to the new Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS). GAO was asked to examine the challenges in
    securing the transportation system and the federal role and
    actions in transportation security.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1154T
        ACCNO:   A08380
      TITLE:     Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance
    Security Efforts
         DATE:   09/09/2003
      SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism
    	     Mass transit operations
    	     Safety regulation
    	     Safety standards
    	     Transportation safety

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    GAO-03-1154T

    Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
    United States Senate

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. EDT Tuesday, September
    9, 2003 TRANSPORTATION

    SECURITY Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts

    Statement of Peter Guerrero, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues

    GAO- 03- 1154T

    Securing the nation*s transportation system is fraught with challenges.
    The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our
    borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The
    extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and
    freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure.
    Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further
    complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved
    in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal,
    state, and local levels and thousands of private sector companies. Further

    exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
    transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
    weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
    ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
    funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
    outstripped the additional amounts made available. It will take the
    collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and
    future transportation challenges.

    Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance
    security. At the federal level, TSA primarily focused on meeting aviation
    security deadlines during its first year of existence and DOT launched a
    variety of security initiatives to enhance the other modes of
    transportation. For example, the Federal Transit Administration provided
    grants for emergency drills and conducted security assessments at the
    largest transit agencies, among other things. TSA has recently focused
    more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is
    planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. DOT
    is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and
    responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have
    not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap,
    duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their
    security efforts. The economic well being of the

    United States is dependent on the expeditious flow of people and goods
    through the transportation system. The attacks on September

    11, 2001, illustrate the threats to and vulnerabilities of the
    transportation system. Prior to September 11, the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) had primary responsibility for the security of

    the transportation system. In the wake of September 11, Congress created
    the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT and gave it
    primary responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation.
    TSA was recently

    transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO was
    asked to examine the challenges in securing the transportation system and
    the federal role and actions in

    transportation security. In a June 2003 report, GAO recommended that TSA
    and DOT use a mechanism, such as a memorandum of agreement, to

    define and clarify each entity*s role and responsibilities in
    transportation security matters. DHS and DOT disagreed with the
    recommendation. Based on the

    uncertainty in the entities* roles and responsibilities that
    transportation stakeholders surfaced to us, we continue to

    believe our recommendation is valid and would help address transportation
    security challenges.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1154T. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Peter Guerrero at (202) 512- 2834 or guerrerop@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1154T, testimony

    before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

    September 9, 2003

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

    Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 1154T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We
    appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the security of our
    nation*s transportation system. Almost 2 years have passed since the

    attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the vulnerabilities of the
    nation*s transportation system to the terrorist threat. Although most of
    the early attention following the September 11 attacks focused on aviation
    security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown

    as concerns are voiced about possible vulnerabilities, such as attempts to
    introduce weapons of mass destruction into this country through ports or
    launch chemical attacks on mass transit systems. The entire transportation
    industry has remained on a heightened state of alert since the attacks.

    My testimony today examines (1) challenges in securing the nation*s
    transportation system; (2) actions transportation operators, 1 as well as
    state and local governments, have taken since September 11 to enhance
    security; (3) the federal role in securing the transportation system and
    actions the federal government has taken to enhance transportation
    security since September 11; and (4) future actions that are needed to
    further enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. My
    comments are based on our recent report 2 on the security of the
    transportation system that we prepared for several Members of this

    1 Transportation operators may be private, public, or quasi- public
    entities that provide transportation services. 2 U. S. General Accounting
    Office, Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
    Security Challenges, GAO- 03- 843 (Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003). For
    this report, we analyzed the Federal Bureau of Investigation*s threat
    assessment and the administration*s security strategies, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) security- related documents and reports, and relevant
    statutes and regulations. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOT,
    the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), and TSA as well as
    representatives

    from numerous transportation industry associations and transportation
    security experts. We selected transportation industry and state and local
    government associations that represent the different modes of
    transportation and levels of government. We selected transportation
    security experts on the basis of their knowledge and expertise and
    reputation as being experts in the transportation security arena. We also
    consulted with the National Academy of Sciences in identifying appropriate
    transportation security experts. Finally, we reviewed our past reports on
    homeland, port, transit, and aviation security and

    other research on terrorism and transportation security. We conducted our
    work from February 2003 through May 2003, in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards.

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 1154T Committee as well as a body of our work undertaken
    since September 11 on homeland security and combating terrorism. 3
    Transportation stakeholders face numerous challenges in securing the

    nation*s transportation system. Some of these challenges are common to all
    modes of transportation; other challenges are specific to aviation,
    maritime, or land transportation modes. Common security challenges include
    the extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of
    the system, funding limitations, and the number of stakeholders involved
    in transportation security. For example, the transportation system
    includes about 3.9 million miles of roads, over 100,000 miles of rail,
    almost 600,000 bridges, over 300 ports, 2.2 million miles of pipelines,
    500 train stations, and over 5,000 public- use airports. The size of the
    system simultaneously provides a substantial number of potential targets
    for terrorists and makes it difficult to secure. Additionally, the number
    of stakeholders* including over 20 federal entities, state and local
    governments, and hundreds of thousands of private businesses* can lead to
    coordination, communication, and consensus- building challenges. Further
    exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting
    transportation stakeholders. For example, the sluggish economy has
    weakened the transportation industry*s financial condition by decreasing
    ridership and revenues. The federal government has provided additional
    funding for transportation security since September 11, but demand has far
    outstripped the additional amounts made available. The aviation, maritime,
    and land transportation modes also face particular challenges in enhancing
    security. For instance, maritime and land transportation systems generally
    have open access designs so that users can enter the systems at multiple

    points; however, this openness leaves them vulnerable because
    transportation operators cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves
    the systems. Despite these challenges, transportation operators and state
    and local

    governments have implemented numerous actions to enhance security since
    September 11. Although security was always a priority, the terrorist
    attacks elevated the importance and urgency of security. According to
    representatives from a number of industry associations we interviewed,
    transportation operators have implemented new security measures or

    3 See Related GAO Products at the end of this testimony. Summary

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 1154T increased the frequency or intensity of existing
    activities. For example, many transportation operators conducted risk or
    security assessments,

    undertook emergency drills, and developed security plans. State and local
    governments, which play a critical role in securing the system because
    they own a large portion of the transportation system as well as serve as
    first responders to incidents involving transportation assets, have also
    acted to improve the security of the transportation system. Some examples
    of their actions since September 11 include deploying additional law
    enforcement personnel and participating in emergency drills with the
    transportation industry.

    The roles of federal government agencies in securing the nation*s
    transportation system are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had
    primary responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In
    the wake of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility
    for the security of all modes of transportation. During TSA*s first year
    of existence, its primary focus was on aviation security. While TSA was
    focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations 4 launched
    various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and land
    transportation modes. For example, the Federal Transit Administration
    (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative to enhance transit
    security, which included grants for emergency drills, security
    assessments, and training. TSA has started to assert a greater role in
    securing the maritime and land transportation modes and is launching a
    number of new security

    initiatives. For example, TSA is planning to issue security standards for
    all modes of transportation. However, a number of representatives from
    transportation industry and state and local government associations that
    we contacted expressed concerns about not being adequately involved in

    TSA*s decision- making, such as the development of security standards. DOT
    modal administrations are also continuing their transportation security
    efforts. For example, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) is
    coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
    preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
    The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in transportation security
    have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for
    duplicating and/ or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with
    their security efforts.

    4 DOT*s modal administrations are the departmental units responsible for
    the different modes of transportation, such as the Federal Railroad
    Administration or the Federal Highway Administration.

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation security experts and representatives
    from transportation industry and state and local government associations
    that we spoke with

    identified a number of actions that they said should be implemented to
    enhance the security of the nation*s transportation system. In general,
    they believe that the transportation system is generally more secure today
    than it was prior to September 11; however, all noted that more work is
    needed to improve the security of the system. Transportation security
    experts and

    representatives from transportation industry and state and local
    government associations identified a number of future actions needed and
    stated that the identified actions are primarily the responsibility of the
    federal government. For instance, representatives from industry and state
    and local government associations told us that clarifying federal roles
    and coordinating federal efforts are important because association members
    are not clear about which agency to contact for their various security
    concerns and which agency has oversight for certain issues. Some
    representatives from the transportation industry and state and local
    government associations also noted that they have received conflicting
    messages from the different federal entities.

    In our June report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
    and the Secretary of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a
    memorandum of agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities
    of TSA and DOT in transportation security matters. 5 DOT

    and DHS generally agreed with the report*s findings; however, they
    disagreed with the conclusions and recommendation that their roles and
    responsibilities in transportation security matters need to be clarified.
    On the basis of our discussions with transportation security stakeholders,
    we

    continue to believe our recommendation would help address transportation
    security challenges. For example, representatives from several
    associations stated that their members were unclear as to which

    agency to contact for their various security concerns and which agency has
    oversight for certain issues. Furthermore, both DOT and TSA are moving
    forward with their security efforts, and both entities have statutory
    responsibilities for transportation security. Therefore, we retained our
    recommendation that DOT and DHS clarify and delineate their roles and
    responsibilities in security matters and communicate this information to

    stakeholders. 5 GAO- 03- 843.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 1154T The nation*s transportation system is a vast,
    interconnected network of diverse modes. Key modes of transportation
    include aviation; highways;

    motor carrier (i. e., trucking); motor coach (i. e., intercity bus);
    maritime; pipeline; rail (passenger and freight); and transit (e. g.,
    buses, subways, ferry boats, and light rail). The transportation modes
    work in harmony to facilitate mobility through an extensive network of
    infrastructure and operators, as well as through the vehicles and vessels
    that permit passengers and freight to move within the system. For example,
    the nation*s transportation system moves over 30 million tons of freight
    and provides approximately 1.1 billion passenger trips each day. The
    diversity and size of the transportation system make it vital to our
    economy and national security, including military mobilization and
    deployment.

    Private industry, state and local governments, and the federal government
    all have roles and responsibilities in securing the transportation system.
    Private industry owns and operates a large share of the transportation
    system. For example, almost 2,000 pipeline companies and 571 railroad
    companies own and operate the pipeline and freight railroad systems,
    respectively. Additionally, 83 passenger air carriers and 640, 000
    interstate motor coach and motor carrier companies operate in the United
    States. State and local governments also own significant portions of the
    highways, transit systems, and airports in the country. For example, state
    and local governments own over 90 percent of the total mileage of
    highways. State and local governments also administer and implement
    regulations for different sectors of the transportation system and provide
    protective and emergency response services through various agencies.
    Although the federal government owns a limited share of the transportation
    system, it issues regulations, establishes policies, provides funding,
    and/ or sets standards for the different modes of transportation. The
    federal government uses a variety of policy tools, including grants, loan
    guarantees, tax incentives, regulations, and partnerships, to motivate or
    mandate state and local governments or the private sector to help address
    security concerns.

    Prior to September 11, DOT was the primary federal entity involved in
    transportation security matters. However, in response to the attacks on
    September 11, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
    (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its primary
    responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of transportation. 6 The
    act

    6 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). Background

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 1154T also gives TSA regulatory authority over all
    transportation modes. Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has focused
    primarily on meeting the

    aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. With the passage of the
    Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002, TSA, along with over 20 other
    agencies, was transferred to the new Department of Homeland

    Security (DHS). 7 The United States maintains the world*s largest and most
    complex national transportation system. Improving the security of such a
    system is fraught with challenges for both public and private entities. To
    provide safe transportation for the nation, these entities must overcome
    issues common to all modes of transportation as well as issues specific to
    the individual modes of transportation.

    Although each mode of transportation is unique, they all face some common
    challenges in trying to enhance security. Common challenges stem from the
    extensiveness of the transportation system, the interconnectivity of the
    system, funding security improvements, and the number of stakeholders
    involved in transportation security.

    The size of the transportation system makes it difficult to adequately
    secure. The transportation system*s extensive infrastructure crisscrosses
    the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers
    and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the infrastructure as
    well as the sheer volume of freight and passengers moved through the
    system creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists. Furthermore,
    as industry representatives and transportation security experts repeatedly
    noted, the extensiveness of the infrastructure makes equal protection for

    all assets impossible. Protecting transportation assets from attack is
    made more difficult because of the tremendous variety of transportation
    operators. Some are multibillion- dollar enterprises, and others have very
    limited facilities and very little traffic. Some are public agencies, such
    as state departments of

    transportation, and some are private businesses. Some transportation
    operators carry passengers, and others haul freight. Additionally, the
    type of freight moved through the different modes is similarly varied. For

    7 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). The Transportation

    System as a Whole Faces Numerous Challenges

    All Modes of Transportation Face Common Challenges

    Size and Diversity of Transportation Modes Create Security Challenges

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 1154T example, the maritime, motor carrier, and rail
    operators haul freight as diverse as dry bulk (grain) and hazardous
    materials.

    Additional challenges are created by the interconnectivity and
    interdependency among the transportation modes and between the
    transportation sector and nearly every other sector of the economy. The
    transportation system is interconnected or intermodal because passengers
    and freight can use multiple modes of transportation to reach a
    destination. For example, from its point of origin to its destination, a
    piece of freight, such as a shipping container, can move from ship to
    train to truck. (See fig. 1.) The interconnective nature of the
    transportation system creates several security challenges. First, the
    effects of events directed at one mode of transportation can ripple
    throughout the entire system. For

    example, when the port workers in California, Oregon, and Washington went
    on strike in 2002, the railroads saw their intermodal traffic decline by
    almost 30 percent during the first week of the strike, compared with the

    year before. Second, the interconnecting modes can contaminate each other*
    that is, if a particular mode experiences a security breach, the breach
    could affect other modes. 8 An example of this would be if a shipping
    container that held a weapon of mass destruction arrived at a U. S. port
    where it was placed on a truck or train. In this case, although the
    original security breach occurred in the port, the rail or trucking
    industry would be affected as well. Thus, even if operators within one
    mode established high levels of security they could be affected because of
    the security efforts, or lack thereof, of the other modes. Third,
    intermodal facilities where a number of modes connect and interact* such
    as ports* are potential targets for attack because of the presence of
    passengers, freight, employees, and equipment at these facilities.

    8 Similarly, there are opportunities for cross contamination within the
    same mode. For example, a bag containing an explosive device could be
    placed on one airline and then transferred to another airline where it
    explodes. Interconnectivity and

    Interdependency Also Present Challenges

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 1: Illustration of Possible Freight Movements
    within the Transportation System Interdependencies also exist between
    transportation and nearly every

    other sector of the economy. Consequently, an event that affects the
    transportation sector can have serious impacts on other industries. For
    example, when the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the rail
    industry restricted the movement of many hazardous materials, including
    chlorine, because of a heightened threat of a terrorist attack. However,

    within days, many major water treatment facilities reported that they were
    running out of chlorine, which they use to treat drinking water, and would
    have to shut down operations if chlorine deliveries were not immediately
    resumed.

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 1154T Securing the transportation system is made more
    difficult because of the number of stakeholders involved. As illustrated
    in figure 2, numerous

    entities at the federal, state, and local levels, including over 20
    federal entities and thousands of private sector businesses, play a key
    role in transportation security. For example, the Departments of Energy,
    Transportation, and Homeland Security; state governments; and about 2,000
    pipeline operators are all responsible for securing the pipeline system.
    The number of stakeholders involved in transportation security can lead to
    communication challenges, duplication, and conflicting guidance.
    Representatives from several state and local government and industry
    associations told us that their members are receiving different messages
    from the various federal agencies involved in transportation security. For
    instance, one industry representative noted that both TSA and DOT asked
    the industry to implement additional security measures when the nation*s
    threat condition was elevated to orange at the beginning of the Iraq War;
    9 however, TSA and DOT were not consistent in what they wanted done* that
    is, they were asking for different security measures. Moreover, many
    representatives commented that the federal government needs to better
    coordinate its security efforts. These representatives noted that dealing
    with multiple agencies on the same issues and topics is

    frustrating and time consuming for the transportation sector. 9 DHS
    created the Homeland Security Advisory System. The system has five threat
    conditions* ranging from low to severe* representing different levels of
    risk for terrorist attacks. The Number of Stakeholders

    Creates Challenges

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 2: Key Stakeholders in Transportation
    Security

    a *Other* includes private, public, or quasi- public entities.

    The number of stakeholders also makes it difficult to achieve the needed
    cooperation and consensus to move forward with security efforts. As we
    have noted in past reports, coordination and consensus- building are
    critical to successful implementation of security efforts. Transportation
    stakeholders can have inconsistent goals or interests, which can make
    consensus- building challenging. For example, from a safety perspective,
    vehicles that carry hazardous materials should be required to have
    placards that identify the contents of a vehicle so that emergency
    personnel know how best to respond to an incident. However, from a
    security perspective, identifying placards on vehicles that carry
    hazardous materials make them a potential target for attack.

    According to transportation security experts and state and local
    government and industry representatives we contacted, funding is the
    Funding Is Key Challenge

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 1154T most pressing challenge to securing the nation*s
    transportation system. Although some security improvements are
    inexpensive, such as removing

    trash cans from subway platforms, most require substantial funding.
    Additionally, given the large number of assets to protect, the sum of even
    relatively less expensive investments can be cost prohibitive. For
    example, reinforcing shipping containers to make them more blast resistant
    is one way to improve security, which would cost about $15,000 per
    container. With several million shipping containers in use, however, this
    tactic would cost billions of dollars if all of them were reinforced. The
    total cost of enhancing the security of the entire transportation system
    is unknown; however, given the size of the system, it could amount to tens
    of billions of dollars.

    The current economic environment makes this a difficult time for private
    industry or state and local governments to make security investments.
    According to industry representatives and experts we contacted, most of
    the transportation industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making
    it difficult for the industry to pay for additional security measures. The
    sluggish economy has further weakened the transportation industry*s
    financial condition by decreasing ridership and revenues. For example,
    airlines are in the worst fiscal crisis in their history, and several have
    filed for bankruptcy. Similarly, the motor coach and motor carrier
    industries and Amtrak report decreased revenues because of the slow
    economy. In addition, nearly every state and local government is facing a
    large budget deficit for fiscal year 2004. For example, the National
    Governors Association estimates that states are facing a total budget
    shortfall of $80 billion for fiscal year 2004. Given the tight budget
    environment, state and

    local governments and transportation operators must make difficult
    tradeoffs between transportation security investments and other needs,
    such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. According to the
    National

    Association of Counties, many local governments are planning to defer some
    maintenance of their transportation infrastructure to pay for some
    security enhancements.

    Further exacerbating the problem of funding security improvements is the
    additional costs the transportation sector incurs when the federal
    government elevates the national threat condition. Industry
    representatives stated that operators tighten security, such as increasing
    security patrols, when the national threat condition is raised or
    intelligence information suggests an increased threat against their mode.
    However, these representatives stated that these additional measures drain
    resources and are not sustainable. For example, Amtrak estimates that it
    spends an additional $500,000 per month for police overtime when

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 1154T the national threat condition is increased.
    Transportation industry representatives also noted that employees are
    diverted from their regular duties to implement additional security
    measures, such as guarding

    entranceways, in times of increased security, which hurts productivity.
    The federal government has provided additional funding for transportation
    security since September 11, but demand has far outstripped the additional
    amounts made available. For example, Congress appropriated a total of $241
    million for grants for ports, motor carriers, and Operation Safe Commerce
    in 2002. 10 However, as table 1 shows, the grant applications TSA has
    received for these security grants totaled $1.8 billion* nearly 8 times
    more than the amount available. Due to the costs of

    security enhancements and the transportation industries* and state and
    local governments* tight budget environments, the federal government is
    likely to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these
    enhancements. However, given the constraints on the federal budget as well
    as competing claims for federal assistance, requests for federal funding
    for transportation security enhancements will likely continue to exceed
    available resources.

    10 Operation Safe Commerce focuses on using new technology, such as
    container seals, to help shippers ensure the integrity of the cargo
    included in containers being sent to the United States.

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 1154T Table 1: Comparison of Selected Transportation
    Security Grant Requests with Federal Funding Available, 2002 to 2003

    (Dollars in millions) Type of grant Amount appropriated Total amount
    requested in all grant applications

    Port security grants a $93.3 $697 Port security grants b 105 996 Intercity
    bus grants b 15 45.6 Operation Safe Commerce grants b 28 97.9

    Total $241.3 $1,836.5

    Source: TSA. Note: Both the Department of Defense and Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 117) and the Supplemental
    Appropriations Act (P. L. No. 107- 206) provided funding for port security
    grants. a P. L. No. 107- 117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).

    b P. L. No. 107- 206, 116 Stat. 820 (2002).

    Another challenge is balancing the potential economic impacts of security
    enhancements with the benefits of such measures. Although there is broad
    support for greater security, this task is a difficult one because the
    nation relies heavily on a free and expeditious flow of goods.
    Particularly with

    *just- in- time* deliveries, which require a smooth and expeditious flow
    through the transportation system, delays or disruptions in the supply
    chain could have serious economic impacts. As the Coast Guard Commandant
    stated about the flow of goods through ports, *even slowing the flow long
    enough to inspect either all or a statistically significant random
    selection of imports would be economically intolerable.* 11 Furthermore,
    security measures may have economic and competitive

    ramifications for individual modes of transportation. For instance, if the
    federal government imposed a particular security requirement on the rail
    industry and not on the motor carrier industry, the rail industry might

    incur additional costs and/ or lose customers to the motor carrier
    industry. Striking the right balance between increasing security and
    protecting the

    11 Meeting the Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a
    Balanced and Practical Response (September 2001); and Global Trade:
    America*s Achilles* Heel (February 2002) by Admiral James M. Loy and
    Captain Robert G. Ross, U. S. Coast Guard. Balancing Potential Economic

    Impacts and Security Enhancements Is Also Challenging

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 1154T economic vitality of the national economy and
    individual modes will remain an important and difficult task.

    In addition to the overarching challenges that transportation stakeholders
    will face in attempting to improve transportation security, they also face
    a number of challenges specific to the aviation, maritime, and land
    transportation modes. Although aviation security has received a
    significant amount of attention and funding since September 11, more work
    is needed. In general, transportation security experts believe that the
    aviation system is more secure today than it was prior to September 11.
    However, aviation experts and TSA officials noted that significant
    vulnerabilities remain. For example:

     Perimeter security: Terrorists could launch attacks, such as launching
    shoulder- fired missiles, from a location just outside an airport*s
    perimeter. Since September 11, airport operators have increased their
    patrols of airport perimeter areas, but industry officials state that they
    do not have enough resources to completely protect against these attacks.

     Air cargo security: Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on
    ensuring that bombs and other threat items are not carried onto planes by
    passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities exist in securing the

    cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all- cargo aircraft. For
    example, employees of shippers and freight forwarders are not universally
    subject to background checks. Theft is also a major problem in air cargo
    shipping, signifying that unauthorized personnel may still be gaining
    access to air cargo shipments. Air cargo shipments pass through several
    hands in going from sender to recipient, making it challenging to

    implement a system that provides adequate security for air cargo.
    According to TSA officials, TSA is developing a strategic plan to address
    air cargo security and has undertaken a comprehensive outreach process to
    strengthen security programs across the industry.

     General aviation security: Although TSA has taken several actions
    related to general aviation 12 since September 11, this segment of the
    industry remains potentially more vulnerable than commercial aviation. For
    example, general aviation pilots are not screened prior to taking off, and
    the contents of a plane are not examined at any point. According to

    12 General aviation includes more than 200,000 corporate and privately
    owned aircraft at over 19, 000 airports. Individual Transportation

    Modes Also Confront Unique Challenges

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 1154T TSA, solutions that can be implemented relatively
    easily at the nation*s commercial airports are not practical at the 19,
    000 general aviation

    airports. It would be very difficult to prevent a general aviation pilot
    intent on committing a terrorist attack with his or her aircraft from
    doing so. The vulnerability of the system was illustrated in January 2002,
    when a teenage flight student from Florida crashed his single- engine
    airplane into a Tampa skyscraper. TSA is working with the appropriate
    stakeholders to close potential security gaps and to raise the security
    standards across this diverse segment of the aviation industry.

    Maritime and land transportation systems have their own unique security
    vulnerabilities. For example, maritime and land transportation systems
    generally have an open design, meaning the users can access the system at
    multiple points. The systems are open by design so that they are
    accessible and convenient for users. In contrast, the aviation system is
    housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The
    openness of the maritime and land transportation systems can leave them
    vulnerable because transportation operators cannot monitor or control who
    enters or leaves the systems. However, adding security measures that
    restrict the flow of passengers or freight through the systems could have
    serious consequences for commerce and the public.

    Individual maritime and land transportation modes also have unique
    challenges and vulnerabilities. For example, representatives from the
    motor carrier industry noted that the high turnover rate (about 40 to 60
    percent) of drivers means that motor carrier operators must be continually
    conducting background checks on new drivers, which is expensive and time
    consuming. Additionally, as we noted in our report on rail safety and

    security, 13 the temporary storage of hazardous materials in unsecured or
    unmonitored rail cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate
    destinations is a potential vulnerability. Specifically, unmonitored
    chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could threaten the
    nearby population and environment. In addition, representatives from the
    motor coach industry commented that the number of used motor coaches on
    the market, coupled with the lack of guidance or requirements on buying or
    selling these vehicles, is a serious vulnerability. In particular, there
    are approximately 5,000 used motor coaches on the market; however, there
    is very little information on who is selling and buying them, nor is there
    any

    13 U. S. General Accounting Office, Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions
    Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed, GAO-
    03- 435 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 30, 2003).

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 1154T consistency among motor coach operators in whether
    they remove their logos from the vehicles before they are sold. These
    vehicles could be used as weapons or to transport weapons. Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety

    Administration officials told us they have not issued guidance to the
    industry on this potential vulnerability because TSA is responsible for
    security and therefore would be responsible for issuing such guidance.

    Since September 11, transportation operators and state and local
    governments have been working to strengthen security, according to
    associations we contacted. Although security was a priority before
    September 11, the terrorist attacks elevated the importance and urgency of
    transportation security for transportation operators and state and local
    governments. According to representatives from a number of industry
    associations we interviewed, transportation operators have implemented new
    security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of existing
    activities. Some of the most common measures cited include conducting

    vulnerability or risk assessments, tightening access control, intensifying
    security presence, increasing emergency drills, developing or revising
    security plans, and providing additional training. (Figure 3 is a
    photograph from an annual emergency drill conducted by the Washington
    Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.) Transportation

    Operators and State and Local Governments Have Taken Steps to Improve
    Security

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 1154T Figure 3: Emergency Drill in Progress

    As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical
    stakeholders in the nation*s homeland security efforts. This is equally
    true in securing the nation*s transportation system. State and local
    governments play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant

    portion of the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit
    systems, highways, and ports. For example, state and local governments own
    over 90 percent of the total mileage of the highway system. Even when
    state and local governments are not the owners or operators, they
    nonetheless are directly affected by the transportation modes that run
    through their jurisdictions. Consequently, the responsibility for
    protecting this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the
    transportation infrastructure often falls on state and local governments.

    Security efforts of local and state governments have included developing
    counter terrorist plans, participating in training and security- related
    research, participating in transportation operators* emergency drills and
    table- top exercises, conducting vulnerability assessments of
    transportation assets, and participating in emergency planning sessions
    with transportation operators. Some state and local governments have also
    hired additional law enforcement personnel to patrol transportation

    assets. Much of the funding for these efforts has been covered by the
    state and local governments, with a bulk of the expenses going to
    personnel costs, such as for additional law enforcement officers and
    overtime.

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 1154T Congress, DOT, TSA, and other federal agencies have
    taken numerous steps to enhance transportation security since September
    11. The roles of the federal agencies in securing the nation*s
    transportation system,

    however, are in transition. Prior to September 11, DOT had primary
    responsibility for the security of the transportation system. In the wake
    of September 11, Congress created TSA and gave it responsibility for the
    security of all modes of transportation. However, DOT and TSA have not yet
    formally defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of
    transportation. Furthermore, TSA is moving forward with plans to enhance
    transportation security. For example, TSA plans to issue security
    standards for all modes. DOT modal administrations are also continuing
    their security efforts for different modes of transportation.

    Congress has acted to enhance the security of the nation*s transportation
    system since September 11. In addition to passing the Aviation and
    Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 14 Congress passed a number of other
    key pieces of legislation aimed at improving transportation security. For
    example, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 15 which mandates
    federal background checks of individuals operating vehicles carrying
    hazardous materials; and the Homeland Security Act, 16 which created DHS
    and moved TSA to the new department. 17 Congress also provided funding for
    transportation security enhancements through various appropriations acts.
    For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act, in part, provided
    (1) $738 million for the installation of explosives detection systems in
    commercial service airports, (2) $125 million for port security
    activities, and (3) $15 million to enhance the security of intercity bus
    operations.

    14 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 15 P. L. No. 107- 56, 115
    Stat. 272 (2001). 16 P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 17 The U.
    S. Coast Guard was also transferred to DHS. In the Terms of Reference
    Regarding the Respective Roles of the U. S. Coast Guard and the
    Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard is designated as
    the lead DHS agency for maritime

    security and is directed to coordinate as appropriate with other agencies.
    The document further notes that a supporting memorandum of agreement
    between the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of the
    Transportation Security Administration is being developed. Congress and
    Federal

    Agencies Have Taken Numerous Actions to Enhance Security, but Roles Remain
    Unclear

    Congress and Federal Agencies Have Acted to Enhance Transportation
    Security

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 1154T Federal agencies, notably TSA and DOT, have also
    taken steps to enhance transportation security since September 11. In its
    first year of existence, TSA worked to establish its organization and
    focused primarily on meeting

    the aviation security deadlines contained in ATSA. In January 2002, TSA
    had 13 employees to tackle securing the nation*s transportation system; 1
    year later, TSA had about 65,000 employees. TSA reports that it met over
    30 deadlines during 2002 to improve aviation security, including two of
    its most significant deadlines* to deploy federal passenger screeners at
    airports across the nation by November 19, 2002; and to screen every piece
    of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002. 18 According to
    TSA, other completed TSA activities included recruiting, hiring, training,
    and deploying about 56,000 federal screeners; awarding grants for port
    security; and implementing performance management system and strategic
    planning activities to create a results- oriented culture.

    As TSA worked to establish itself and improve the security of the aviation
    system, DOT modal administrations acted to enhance the security of air,
    land, and maritime transportation. (See app. I for a table listing the
    actions taken by DOT modal administrations since September 11.) The
    actions taken by the DOT modal administrations have varied. For example,
    FTA launched a multipart initiative for mass transit agencies that
    provided grants for emergency drills, offered free security training,
    conducted security assessments at 36 transit agencies, provided technical
    assistance, and invested in research and development. The Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration developed three courses for motor coach
    drivers. The responses of the various DOT modal agencies have varied due
    to differences in authority and resource limitations.

    In addition to TSA and DOT modal administrations, other federal agencies
    have also taken actions to improve security. For example, the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP), previously known as the U. S. Customs
    Service, has launched a number of initiatives aimed at

    18 The Homeland Security Act, P. L. 107- 296 (November 25, 2002) the
    legislation that created DHS, amended this deadline to allow some airports
    up to an extra year (December 31, 2003) to deploy all of the necessary
    explosive detection equipment to enable TSA to screen all checked baggage.
    TSA reported that as of December 31, 2002, about 90 percent of all

    checked baggage were screened with an explosive detection system or
    explosives trace detection equipment and the remaining checked baggage was
    screened using alternative means as is allowed under the law.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 1154T strengthening the security of the U. S. border. 19
    Some of the specific security initiatives that CBP has implemented include
    establishing the

    Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), which is a joint
    government business initiative aimed at securing the supply chain of
    global trade against terrorist exploitation; and launching the Container
    Security Initiative (CSI), which is designed specifically to secure
    oceangoing sea containers. In addition, CBP has developed and/ or deployed
    tools to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo containers and
    vehicles, such as the new mobile gamma ray imaging devices pictured in
    figure 4.

    Figure 4: Photograph of Inspection Equipment in Use

    TSA is moving forward with efforts to secure the entire transportation
    system. TSA has adopted a systems approach* that is, a holistic rather
    than a modal approach* to securing the transportation system. In addition,
    TSA is using risk management principles to guide its decision

    19 The U. S. Customs Service was transferred from the Department of
    Treasury to DHS in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296,
    116 Stat. 2135 (2002)) and renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection. TSA Moves Forward as its

    Role in Transportation Security Evolves

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 1154T making. TSA is also planning to establish security
    standards for all modes of transportation and is launching a number of new
    security efforts for the

    maritime and land transportation modes. Using the systems approach, TSA
    plans to address the security of the entire transportation system as a
    whole, rather than focusing on individual modes of transportation.
    According to TSA officials, using a systems approach to security is
    appropriate for several reasons. First, the transportation system is
    intermodal, interdependent, and international. Given the intermodalism of
    the system, incidents in one mode of transportation could affect other
    modes. Second, it is important not to drive terrorism from one mode of
    transportation to another mode because of perceived lesser security* that
    is, make a mode of transportation a more attractive target because another
    mode is *hardened* with additional security measures. Third, it is
    important that security measures for one mode of transportation are not
    overly stringent or too economically challenging compared with the
    measures used for other modes. Fourth, it is important that the attention
    on one aspect of transportation security (e. g., cargo, infrastructure, or
    passengers) does not leave the other aspects vulnerable.

    TSA has also adopted a risk management approach for its efforts to enhance
    the security of the nation*s transportation system. A risk management
    approach is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and
    the criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
    decisions in order to link resources with prioritized efforts. (See app.
    II for a description of the key elements of a risk management approach.)
    The highest priorities emerge where the three elements of risk management
    overlap. For example, transportation

    infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to
    attack, and a likely target would be most at risk and therefore would be a
    higher priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only
    vulnerable to attack. According to TSA officials, risk management
    principles will drive all decisions* from standard- setting to funding
    priorities to staffing.

    Using risk management principles to guide decision- making is a good
    strategy, given the difficult trade- offs TSA will likely have to make as
    it moves forward with its security efforts. We have advocated using a risk
    management approach to guide federal programs and responses to better
    prepare against terrorism and other threats and to better direct finite
    national resources to areas of highest priority. As representatives from
    local government and industry associations and transportation security
    experts repeatedly noted, the size of the transportation system precludes
    TSA Adopts a Systems

    Approach and Risk Management Principles

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 1154T equal protection for all assets; moreover, the
    risks vary by transportation assets within modes and by modes. In
    addition, requests for funding for

    transportation security enhancements will likely exceed available
    resources. Risk management principles can help TSA determine security
    priorities and identify appropriate solutions.

    TSA plans to issue national security standards for all modes of
    transportation. The federal government has historically set security
    standards for the aviation sector. For instance, prior to the passage of
    ATSA, FAA set security standards that the airlines were required to follow
    in several areas including, screening equipment, screener qualifications,
    and access control systems. In contrast, prior to the September 11
    attacks, limited statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure
    the

    security of the maritime and land transportation systems. According to a
    TSA report, the existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and land
    transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack. For
    example, the rail, transit, and motor coach transportation systems are
    subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no

    screening of passengers, baggage, or crew. Additionally, seaborne
    passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators have inconsistent levels
    and methods of screening and are largely free to set their own rules about
    the hiring and training of security personnel. Hence, TSA will set
    standards to ensure consistency among modes and across the transportation
    system and to reduce the transportation system*s vulnerability to attacks.
    20 According to TSA officials and documents, TSA*s standards will be

    performance-, risk-, and threat- based and may be mandatory. More
    specifically:  Standards will be performance- based. Rather than being
    prescriptive

    standards, TSA standards will be performance- based, which will allow 20
    The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within
    DHS is working with TSA, the Coast Guard, and other federal agencies on
    developing a set of national standards that would apply to all ports.
    These efforts are well under way. The Coast Guard has been developing a
    set of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct
    vulnerability assessments for all U. S. ports. The standards will go into
    effect on July 1, 2004, as part of the International Convention for the
    Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments and the International Ship and
    Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) that was adopted by the International
    Maritime Organization conference in December 2002. The Coast Guard
    considers that the implementation of these standards is best done through
    mandating compliance with the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code.
    According to TSA, because of the Coast Guard*s significant role in
    securing maritime transportation, TSA will

    likely play a coordination role in the maritime arena. TSA Plans to Issue
    National Security Standards

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 1154T transportation operators to determine how best to
    achieve the desired level of security. TSA officials believe that
    performance- based standards

    provide for operator flexibility, allow operators to use their
    professional judgment in enhancing security, and encourage technology
    advancement.  Standards will be risk- based. Standards will be set for
    areas for which

    assessments of the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that
    an attack would have a national impact. A number of factors could be
    considered in determining *national impact,* such as fatalities and
    economic damage.

     Standards will be threat- based. The standards will be tied to the
    national threat condition and/ or local threats. As the threat condition
    escalates, the standards will require transportation operators to
    implement additional countermeasures.

     Standards may be mandatory. The standards will be mandatory when the
    risk level is too high or unacceptable. TSA officials stated that in these
    cases, mandatory standards are needed to ensure accountability. In
    addition, according to TSA officials, voluntary requirements put
    securityconscious transportation operators that implement security
    measures at a competitive disadvantage* that is, they have spent money
    that their competitors may not have spent. This creates a disincentive for
    transportation operators to implement voluntary requirements. TSA
    officials believe that mandatory standards will reduce this problem. In
    determining whether mandatory standards are needed, TSA will review the
    results of criticality and vulnerability assessments, current best
    practices, and voluntary compliance opportunities in conjunction with the
    private sector and other government agencies.

    Although TSA officials expect some level of resistance to the standards by
    the transportation industry, they believe that their approach of using
    risk-, threat-, and performance- based standards will increase the
    acceptance of the standards. For example, performance- based standards
    allow for more

    operator flexibility in implementing the standards, compared with rigid,
    prescriptive standards. Moreover, TSA plans to issue only a limited number
    of standards* that is, standards will be issued only when assessments of
    the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality indicate that the level of
    risk is too high or unacceptable.

    TSA also expects some level of resistance to the standards from DOT modal
    administrations. Although TSA will establish the security standards, TSA
    expects that they will be administered and implemented by existing
    agencies and organizations. DOT modal administrations may be reluctant

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 1154T to assume this role because doing so could alter
    their relationships with the industry. Historically, the missions of DOT
    surface transportation

    modal administrations have largely focused on maintaining operations and
    improving service and safety, not regulating security. Moreover, the
    authority to regulate security varies by DOT modal administration. For
    example, FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee security at
    transit agencies. In contrast, FRA has regulatory authority for rail
    security, and DOT*s Office of Pipeline Safety has responsibility for
    writing safety and security regulations for liquefied natural gas storage
    facilities. In addition, DOT modal administrations may be reluctant to
    administer and implement standards because of resource concerns. FHWA
    officials commented that given the current uncertainty about the standards
    and their impacts, FHWA is reluctant to commit, in advance, staff or
    funding to enforce new security standards.

    Because transportation stakeholders will be involved in administering,
    implementing, and/ or enforcing TSA standards, stakeholder buy- in is
    critical to the success of this initiative. Compromise and consensus on
    the part of stakeholders are also necessary. However, achieving such
    consensus and compromise may be difficult, given the conflicts between
    some stakeholders* goals and interests.

    Transportation stakeholders we contacted also expressed a number of
    concerns about TSA*s plan to issue security standards for all modes of
    transportation. For example, industry associations expressed concerns that
    the standards would come in the form of unfunded mandates* that is, the
    federal government would not provide funding to implement mandatory
    standards. According to the industry and state and local government
    associations we spoke to, unfunded mandates create additional financial
    burdens for transportation operators, who are already experiencing
    financial difficulties. Industry representatives also expressed concern
    that TSA has not adequately included the transportation industry in its
    development of standards. Many industry representatives and some DOT
    officials we met with were unsure of whether TSA was issuing standards,
    what the standards would entail, or the time frames for issuing the
    standards. The uncertainty about the pending standards can lead to
    confusion and/ or inaction. For example, Amtrak officials noted that they
    are reluctant to spend money to implement certain security measures
    because they are worried that TSA will subsequently issue standards that
    will require Amtrak to redo its efforts. Transportation stakeholders also
    raised other concerns about TSA*s plans to issues standards, including
    questioning whether TSA has the necessary expertise to develop Gaining
    Stakeholder Buyin

    is Critical for Standards to Work, but Stakeholders Express Concerns

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 1154T appropriate standards and whether mandatory
    standards, as opposed to voluntary standards, are prudent.

    TSA is also working on a number of additional security efforts, such as
    establishing the Transportation Workers Identification Card (TWIC)
    program; developing the next generation of the Computer Assisted Passenger
    Pre- Screening System; developing a national transportation system
    security plan; and exploring methods to integrate operations and security,
    among other things. The TWIC program is intended to improve access control
    for the 12 million transportation workers who require unescorted physical
    or cyber access to secure areas of the nation*s transportation modes by
    establishing a uniform, nationwide standard for secure identification of
    transportation workers. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard
    background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively
    matched to his/ her credential. Once the program is fully operational, the
    TWIC would be the standard credential for transportation workers and would
    be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a
    uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant
    credentialing and background checks.

    As TSA moves forward with new security initiatives, DOT modal
    administrations are also continuing their security efforts and, in some
    cases, launching new security initiatives. For example, FHWA is
    coordinating a series of workshops this year on emergency response and
    preparedness for state departments of transportation and other agencies.
    FTA also has a number of initiatives currently under way in the areas of
    public awareness, research, training, technical assistance, and
    intelligence sharing. For example, FTA developed a list of the top 20
    security actions

    transit agencies should implement and is currently working with transit
    agencies to assist them in implementing these measures.

    FAA is also continuing its efforts to enhance cyber security in the
    aviation system. Although the primary responsibility for securing the
    aviation system was transferred to TSA, FAA remains responsible for
    protecting the nation*s air traffic control system* both the physical
    security of its air traffic control facilities and computer systems. The
    air traffic control system*s computers help the nation*s air traffic
    controllers to safely direct and separate traffic* sabotaging this system
    could have disastrous consequences. FAA is moving forward with efforts to
    increase the physical security of its air traffic control facilities and
    ensure that contractors who have access to the air traffic control system
    undergo background checks. TSA Is Launching Other

    Security Initiatives DOT Modal Agencies Are Continuing Forward with Their
    Security Efforts

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 1154T The roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in
    transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates
    the potential for

    duplicating or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with
    their security efforts. DOT modal administrations were primarily
    responsible for the security of the transportation system prior to
    September 11. In November 2001, Congress passed ATSA, which created TSA
    and gave it primary responsibility for securing all modes of
    transportation. 21 However, during TSA*s first year of existence, TSA*s
    main focus was on aviation security* more specifically, on meeting ATSA
    deadlines. While TSA was

    primarily focusing on aviation security, DOT modal administrations
    launched various initiatives to enhance the security of the maritime and
    land transportation modes. With the immediate crisis of meeting many
    aviation security deadlines behind it, TSA has been able to focus more on
    the security of all modes of transportation.

    Legislation has not specifically defined TSA*s role and responsibilities
    in securing all modes of transportation. In particular, ATSA does not
    specify TSA*s role and responsibilities in securing the maritime and land
    transportation modes in detail as it does for aviation security. For
    instance, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain
    transit security requirements. Instead, the act simply states that TSA is
    responsible for ensuring security in all modes of transportation. The act
    also did not eliminate the existing statutory responsibilities for DOT
    modal administrations to secure the different transportation modes.
    Moreover, recent legislation indicates that DOT still has security
    responsibilities. In particular, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 states
    that the Secretary of Transportation is responsible for the security as
    well as the safety of rail and the transport of hazardous materials by all
    modes.

    To clarify their roles and responsibilities in transportation security,
    DOT modal administrations and TSA planned to develop memorandums of
    agreement. The purpose of these documents was to define the roles and
    responsibilities of the different agencies for transportation security and

    address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security
    activities, interfacing with the transportation industry, and establishing
    funding priorities. TSA and the DOT modal administrations worked for
    months to develop the memorandums of agreement and the draft agreements
    were presented to senior DOT and TSA management for review in early spring
    of this year. According to DOT*s General Counsel,

    21 P. L. No. 107- 71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). TSA*s and DOT*s Roles and

    Responsibilities Have Not Been Clearly Defined

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 1154T with the exception of the memorandum of agreement
    between FAA and TSA, the draft memorandums were very general and did not
    provide much

    clarification. Consequently, DOT and TSA decided not to sign the
    memorandums of agreement, except for the memorandum of agreement between
    FAA and TSA, which was signed on February 28, 2003. 22 The General Counsel
    suggested several reasons why the majority of the

    draft memorandums of agreement were too general. First, as TSA*s departure
    date approached* that is, the date that TSA transferred from DOT to DHS*
    TSA and DOT modal administration officials may have grown concerned about
    formally binding the organizations to specific roles and responsibilities.
    Second, the working relationships between TSA and most of the DOT modal
    administrations are still very new; as a result, all of the potential
    issues, problem areas, or overlap have yet to be identified. Thus,
    identifying items to include in the memorandums of agreement was more
    difficult.

    Rather than execute memorandums of agreement, the Secretary of
    Transportation and the Administrator of TSA exchanged correspondence that
    commits each entity to continued coordination and collaboration on
    security measures. In the correspondence, the Secretary and Administrator
    also agreed to use the memorandum of agreement between TSA and FAA as a
    framework for their interactions on security matters for all other modes.
    TSA and DOT officials stated that they believe memorandums of agreement
    are a good strategy for delineating roles and responsibilities and said
    that they would be open to using memorandums

    of agreement in the future. 22 DOT and TSA have signed other memorandums
    of agreement that are narrow in scope and address a specific issue. For
    example, TSA and DOT signed a memorandum of agreement regarding the
    processing of civil rights complaints.

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation security experts and representatives
    of state and local government and industry associations we contacted
    generally believe that the transportation system is more secure today than
    it was prior to

    September 11. Transportation stakeholders have worked hard to strengthen
    the security of the system. Nevertheless, transportation experts, industry
    representatives, and federal officials all recommend that more work be
    done. Transportation experts and state and local government and industry
    representatives identified a number of actions that, in their view, the
    federal government should take to enhance security, including clarifying
    federal roles and coordinating federal efforts, developing a
    transportation security strategy, funding security enhancements, investing
    in research and development, and providing better intelligence information
    and related guidance. Specifically:

     Clarify federal roles and responsibilities. The lack of clarity about
    the roles and responsibilities of federal entities in transportation
    security creates the potential for confusion, duplication, and conflicts.
    Understanding roles, responsibilities, and whom to call is crucial in an
    emergency. However, representatives from several industry associations
    stated that their members were unclear about which agency to contact for
    their various security concerns and which agency has oversight for certain
    issues. Furthermore, they said that they do not have contacts within these
    agencies. As mentioned earlier, several industry representatives reported
    that their members are receiving different messages from various federal

    agencies involved in transportation security, which creates confusion and
    frustration within the industry. According to industry representatives and
    transportation security experts, uncertainty about federal roles and the
    lack of coordination are straining intergovernmental relationships,
    draining resources, and raising the potential for problems in responding
    to terrorism. One industry association told us, for instance, that it has
    been asked by three different federal agencies to participate in three
    separate studies of the same issue.

     Establish a national transportation strategy. A national strategy is
    crucial for helping stakeholders identify priorities, leveraging
    resources, establishing stakeholder performance expectations, and creating
    incentives for stakeholders to improve security. Currently, local
    government associations view the absence of performance expectations*
    coupled with limited threat information* as a major obstacle in focusing
    their people and resources on high- priority threats, particularly at
    elevated threat levels. The experts also noted that modal strategies* no
    matter how Experts and

    Associations Identified Future Actions to Advance the Security of the
    Transportation System

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 1154T complete* cannot address the complete
    transportation security problem and will leave gaps in preparedness. As
    mentioned earlier, TSA is in the

    process of developing a national transportation system security plan, 23
    which, according to the Deputy Administrator of TSA, will provide an
    overarching framework for the security of all modes.  Provide funding for
    needed security improvements. Although an

    overall security strategy is a prerequisite to investing wisely, providing
    adequate funding also is essential, according to experts we contacted.
    Setting security goals and strategies without adequate funding diminishes
    stakeholders* commitment and willingness to absorb initial security
    investments and long- term operating costs, an expert emphasized. Industry
    and state and local government associations also commented that federal
    funding should accompany any federal security standards; otherwise,
    mandatory standards will be considered unfunded mandates that the industry
    and state and local governments will have to absorb.

     Invest in research and development for transportation security.
    According to most transportation security experts and associations we
    contacted, investing in research and development is an appropriate role
    for the federal government, because the products of research and
    development endeavors would likely benefit the entire transportation
    system, not just individual modes or operators. TSA is actively engaged in
    research and development projects, such as the development of the next

    generation explosive detection systems for baggage, hardening of aircraft
    and cargo/ baggage containers, biometrics and other access control
    methods, and human factors initiatives to identify methods to improve
    screener performance, at its Transportation Security Laboratory in
    Atlantic City, New Jersey. However, TSA noted that continued adequate
    funding for research and development is paramount in order for TSA to be
    able to meet security demands with up- to- date and reliable technology.

     Provide timely intelligence information and related guidance.
    Representatives from numerous associations commented that the federal
    government needs to provide timely, localized, actionable intelligence
    information. They said that general threat warnings are not helpful.

    Rather, transportation operators want more specific intelligence
    information so that they can understand the true nature of a potential
    threat and implement appropriate security measures. Without more localized
    and actionable intelligence, stakeholders said they run the risk of

    23 TSA hopes to have a draft of the national transportation system
    security plan prepared by the end of this year.

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 1154T wasting resources on unneeded security measures or
    not providing an adequate level of security. Moreover, local government
    officials often are not allowed to receive specific intelligence
    information because they do not have appropriate federal security
    clearances. Also, there is little

    federal guidance on how local authorities should respond to a specific
    threat or general threat warnings. For example, San Francisco police were
    stationed at the Golden Gate Bridge to respond to the elevated national
    threat condition. However, without information about the nature of the
    threat to San Francisco*s large transportation infrastructure or clear
    federal expectations for a response, it is difficult to judge whether
    actions like this are the most effective use of police protection,
    according to representatives from a local government association.

    Securing the transportation system is fraught with challenges. Despite
    these challenges, transportation stakeholders have worked to strengthen
    security since September 11. However, more work is needed. It will take

    the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet the
    continuing challenges and enhance the security of the transportation
    system. 24 During TSA*s first year of existence, it met a number of
    challenges,

    including successfully meeting many congressional deadlines for aviation
    security. With the immediate crisis of meeting these deadlines behind it,
    TSA can now examine the security of the entire transportation system. As
    TSA becomes more active in securing the maritime and land transportation
    modes, it will become even more important that the roles of TSA and DOT
    modal administrations are clearly defined. Lack of clearly defined roles
    among the federal entities could lead to duplication and

    confusion. More importantly, it could hamper the transportation sector*s
    ability to prepare for and respond to attacks. Therefore, in our report,
    we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
    of Transportation develop mechanisms, such as a memorandum of

    agreement, to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT
    in transportation security and communicate this information to
    stakeholders.

    24 See appendix III for a listing of active GAO engagements related to
    transportation security. Observations

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 1154T This concludes my prepared statement. I would be
    pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee
    may have.

    For information about this testimony, please contact Peter Guerrero,
    Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, on (202) 512- 2834. Individuals
    making key contributions to this testimony included Cathleen Berrick,
    Steven Calvo, Nikki Clowers, Michelle Dresben, Susan Fleming, Libby
    Halperin, David Hooper, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Ray Sendejas.

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
    taken

    All (transport of hazardous materials) Research and Special Programs
    Administration (Office of Hazardous Materials Safety)

     Established regulations for shippers and transporters of certain
    hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans and to require
    security awareness training for hazmat employees.

     Developed hazardous materials transportation security awareness training
    for law enforcement, the industry, and the hazmat community.

     Published security advisory, which identifies measures that could
    enhance the security of the transport of hazardous materials.

     Investigated the security risks associated with placarding hazardous
    materials, including whether removing placards from certain shipments
    improve shipment security, and whether alternative methods for
    communicating safety hazards could be deployed.

    Aviation Federal Aviation Administration  Established rule for
    strengthening cockpit doors on commercial aircraft.

     Issued guidance to flight school operators for additional security
    measures.

     Assisted Department of Justice in increasing background check
    requirements for foreign nationals seeking pilot certificates.  Increased
    access restrictions at air traffic control facilities.

     Developed computer security strategy. Highways Federal Highway
    Administration  Provided vulnerability assessment and emergency
    preparedness

    workshops.

     Developed and prioritized list of highway security research and
    development projects.

     Convened blue ribbon panel on bridge and tunnel vulnerabilities.

    Appendix I: Key Transportation Security Efforts of DOT Modal
    Administrations, September 2001 to May 2003

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
    taken

    Maritime U. S. Coast Guarda Maritime Administration

     Activated and deployed port security units to help support local port
    security patrols in high threat areas.

     Boarded and inspected ships to search for threats and confirmed the
    identity of those aboard.

     Conducted initial assessments of the nation*s ports to identify vessel
    types and facilities that pose a high risk of being involved in a
    transportation security incident.

     Established a new centralized National Vessel Movement Center to track
    the movement of all foreign- flagged vessels entering U. S. ports of call.

     Established new guidelines for developing security plans and
    implementing security measures for passenger vessels and passenger
    terminals.

     Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the Coast
    Guard*s National Strike Force to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism
    and weapons of mass destruction.

     Increased port security and terrorism emphasis at National Port
    Readiness Network Port Readiness Exercises.

     Provided port security training and developed standards and curriculum
    to educate and train maritime security personnel.

     Increased access restrictions and established new security procedures
    for the Ready Reserve Force. Provided merchant mariner background checks
    for Ready Reserve

    Force and sealift vessels in support of Department of Defense and Coast
    Guard requirements.

     Provided merchant mariner force protection training. Motor carrier
    Federal Motor Carrier Safety

    Administration

     Conducted 31, 000 on- site security sensitivity visits for hazardous
    materials carriers; made recommendations after visits.

     Initiated a field operational test to evaluate different safety and
    security technologies and procedures, and identify the most cost-
    effective means for protecting different types of hazardous cargo for
    security purposes.

     Provided free training on trucks and terrorism to law enforcement
    officials and industry representatives.

     Conducted threat assessment of the hazardous materials industry. Motor
    coach Federal Motor Carrier Safety

    Administration

     Developed three courses for drivers on security- related information,
    including different threats, how to deal with packages, and how to respond
    in the case of an emergency.

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 1154T Mode DOT modal administration Examples of actions
    taken

    Pipeline Research and Special Programs Administration (Office of Pipeline
    Safety)

     Developed contact list of operators who own critical systems.  Convened
    blue ribbon panel with operators, state regulators, and unions to develop
    a better understanding of the pipeline system and coordinate efforts of
    the stakeholders.

     Worked with TSA to develop inspection protocols to use for pipeline
    operator security inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety and TSA have
    begun the inspection of major operators.

     Created e: mail network of pipeline operators and a call- in telephone
    number that pipeline operators can use to obtain information.

     Directed pipeline operators to identify critical facilities and develop
    security plans for critical facilities that address deterrence,
    preparedness, and rapid response and recovery from attacks.

     Worked with industry to develop risk- based security guidance, which is
    tied to national threat levels and includes voluntary, recommended
    countermeasures.

    Rail Federal Railroad Administration  Shared threat information with
    railroads and rail labor.

     Reviewed Association of American Railroads* and Amtrak*s security plans.

     Assisted commuter railroads with their security plans.

     Provided funding for security assessments of three commuter railroads,
    which were included in FTA*s assessment efforts.

     Reached out to international community for lessons learned in rail
    security.

    Transit Federal Transit Administration  Awarded $3.4 million in grants to
    over 80 transit agencies for emergency response drills.  Offered free
    security training to transit agencies.

     Conducted security assessments at the 36 largest transit agencies.

     Provided technical assistance to 19, with a goal of 60, transit agencies
    on security and emergency plans and emergency response drills.

     Increased funding for security research and development efforts. Source:
    GAO presentation of information provided by DOT modal administrations.

    a The U. S. Coast Guard was transferred to DHS in the Homeland Security
    Act of 2002 (P. L. No. 107- 296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)).

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 1154T A risk management approach encompasses three key
    elements* a threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality
    assessment. In

    particular, these three elements provide the following information:  A
    threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the basis

    of such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. This
    assessment represents a systematic approach to identifying potential
    threats before they materialize. However, even if updated often, a threat
    assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats. The risk
    management approach, therefore, uses vulnerability and critical
    assessments as additional input to the decision- making process.

     A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited
    by identified threats and suggests options to address those weaknesses.
    A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions in

    terms of specific criteria, such as their importance to public safety and
    the economy. The assessment provides a basis for identifying which
    structures or processes are relatively more important to protect from
    attack. Thus, it helps managers determine operational requirements and
    target resources

    to the highest priorities while reducing the potential for targeting
    resources to lower priorities. Appendix II: Elements of a Risk Management

    Approach

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What are the status and
    associated costs of TSA efforts to acquire, install, and operate explosive
    detection equipment (Electronic

    Trace Detection Technology and Explosive Detection Systems) to screen all
    checked baggage by December 31, 2003? 2) What are the benefit and
    tradeoffs* to include costs, operations and performance* of using
    alternative explosive detection technologies currently available for
    baggage screening?

    Key Questions: 1) How has security concerns and measures at changed at
    general aviation airports since September 11, 2001? 2) What steps has the
    Transportation Security Administration taken to improve general aviation
    security?

    Key Questions: What are procedures for conducting background and security
    checks for pilots of small banner- towing aircraft requesting waivers to
    perform stadium overflights? (2) To what extent were these procedures
    followed in conducting required background and security checks since 9/
    11? (3) How effective were these procedures in reducing risks to public
    safety?

    Key Questions: (1) What are the levels of effort for USCG*s various
    missions? (2) What is USCG*s progress in developing a strategic plan for
    setting goals for all of its various missions? (3) What is USCG*s mission
    performance as compared to its performance and strategic plans?

    Key Questions: 1) How will the CAPPS- II system function and what data
    will be needed to make the system operationally effective? 2) What
    safeguards will be put in place to protect the traveling public*s privacy?
    3) What systems and measures are in place to determine whether CAPPS- II
    will result in improved national security? 4) What impact will CAPPS- II
    have on the traveling public and airline industry in terms of costs,
    delays, risks, and hassle, etc.? Appendix III: GAO Active Engagements

    Related to Transportation Security TSA Baggage Screening

    General Aviation Security

    Banner Pilot Waivers U. S. Coast Guard Budget And Mission Performance

    Transportation Security Administration*s Computer Assisted

    Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS- II)

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What efforts have been taken or
    planned to ensure passenger screeners comply with federal standards and
    other criteria, to

    include efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? 2)
    What methods does TSA use to test screener performance, and what have been
    the results of these tests? 3) How have the results of tests of TSA

    passenger screeners compared to the results achieved by screeners prior to
    9/ 11 and at the 5 pilot program airports? 4) What actions are TSA taking
    to remedy performance concerns?

    Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition
    laws and policies, including ensuring adequate competition? (2) How well
    does TSA*s organizational structure facilitate effective, efficient
    procurement? (3) How does TSA ensure that its acquisition workforce is
    equipped to award and oversee contracts? (4) How well do TSA*s policies
    and processes ensure that it receives the supplies and services it needs
    on time and at reasonable cost?

    Key Questions: (1) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to implement
    section 106 of the Act requiring improved airport perimeter access
    security? (2) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to implement section 136
    requiring assessment and deployment of commercially available security
    practices and technologies? (3) What is the status of TSA*s efforts to
    implement section 138 requiring background investigations for TSA and
    other airport employees?

    Key Questions: 1) How effectively is the port vulnerability assessment
    process being implemented, and what actions are being taken to address
    deficiencies identified? 2) What progress is being made to develop port,
    vessel, and facility security plans? 3) Does the CG have sufficient
    resources and an action plan to ensure the plans be completed, reviewed
    and approved in time to meet statutory deadlines? 4) What will it cost

    stakeholders to comply? Transportation

    Security Administration Passengers Screening Program

    TSA*s Use of Sole Source Contracts

    TSA*s Efforts To Implement Section 106, 136, And 138 Of The Aviation And
    Transportation Security Act

    Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: 1) What is the nature and extent of
    the threat from MANPADs? 2) How effective are U. S. controls on the use of
    exported

    MANPADs? 3) How do multilateral efforts attempt to stem MANPAD
    proliferation? 4) What types of countermeasures are available to minimize
    this threat and at what cost?

    Key Questions: (1) What is the nature, scope, and operational framework of
    the designee program? (2) What are the identified strengths and weaknesses
    of the program? (3) What is the potential for FAA*s ODA proposal and other
    stakeholders* alternatives to address the identified program weaknesses?

    Key Questions: (1) How has Customs developed the Automated Targeting
    System (ATS) and the new anti- terrorism rules? (2) How does Customs use
    ATS to identify containerized cargo as *high risk* for screening and
    inspection to detect cargo that might contain weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD)? (3) To what extent is ATS implemented at seaports, including impact
    and challenges involved? (4) What is Customs* plan for assessing system
    implementation and performance?

    Key Questions: 1) What are the current and emerging national challenges to
    freight mobility and what proposals have been put forth to address these
    issues? 2) To what extent do these current and emerging challenges exist
    at container ports and surrounding areas and to what extent do the
    proposals appear to have applicability to these locations?

    Key Questions: (1) What are states* policies and practices for verifying
    the identity of driver*s license/ ID card applicants and how might they
    more effectively use SSNs or other tools to verify identity? (2) How does
    SSA assist states in verifying SSNs for driver*s license/ ID card
    applicants and how can SSA improve the verification service it provides?
    Assessment of the

    Portable Air Defense Missile Threat

    Federal Aviation Administration Designee Program

    Custom Cargo Inspections at Seaports

    Enhancement Options for Intermodal Freight Transportation

    Social Security Administration*s Role in Verifying Identities For State*s
    Licensing of Drivers

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: (1) What are the status, plans, and
    technical and programmatic risks associated with the National Distress and
    Response

    System (NDRS) Modernization Project? (2) How is the Coast Guard addressing
    concerns with the new NDRS, such as communication coverage gaps and the
    inability to pinpoint distressed boaters? (3) How will Coast Guard*s new
    homeland security role affect the NDRS project?

    Key Questions: (1) What is the status of Customs* plan to install
    radiation detection equipment at U. S. border crossings? (2) What is the
    basis for the plan*s time frame? (3) What is Customs* technical capability
    to implement the plan? (4) How well is Customs coordinating with other
    agencies in the area of radiation detection? (5) What are the results of
    Customs* evaluations of radiation detection equipment and how are the
    evaluations being used? Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to
    compensate major air

    carriers for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist
    attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in
    insurance premiums resulting from the attacks? United States Coast

    Guard*s National Distress and Response *Rescue 21* System Modernization

    U. S. Border Radiation Detection

    Airline Assistance Determination Of Whether The $5 Billion Provided by P.
    L. 107- 42 Was Used To Compensat e The Nation*s Major Air

    Carriers For Their Losses Stemming From The Events of Sept. 11, 2001

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 1154T Key Questions: (1) What is the budget profile for
    the Federal Aviation Administration*s and the Transportation Security
    Administration*s (TSA*s)

    aviation security research and development (R& D) program? (2) How
    effective is TSA*s strategy for determining which aviation security
    technologies to research and develop? (3) To what extent do stakeholders
    believe that TSA is researching and developing the most promising aviation
    security technologies?

    Key Questions: (1) How has the FAM program evolved, in terms of
    recruiting, training, retention, and operations since the transfer of
    program management to TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented the
    necessary internal controls to meet the human capital and operational
    challenges of the FAM program? (3) To what extent has TSA developed plans
    and initiatives to accommodate future FAM program sustainability, growth
    and maturation? Effectiveness of the

    Transportation Security Administration*s Research and

    Development Program

    Federal Air Marshals

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 1154T Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to
    Help Address Security Challenges, GAO- 03- 843 (Washington, D. C.: June
    30, 2003).

    Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and
    Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments,

    GAO- 03- 502 (Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2003).

    Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail
    Security, but Risk- based Plan Needed, GAO- 03- 435 (Washington, D. C.:
    April 30, 2003). Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the
    Department of

    Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 594T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003).

    Transportation Security: Post- September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term
    Challenges, GAO- 03- 616T (Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003). Aviation
    Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot

    Certification Process, GAO- 03- 248NI (Washington, D. C.: February 3,
    2003). (Not for Public Dissemination) Major Management Challenges and
    Program Risks: Department of

    Transportation, GAO- 03- 108 (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003).

    High Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
    Government and the Nation*s Critical Infrastructure, GAO- 03- 121
    (Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003). Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air
    Shipments of Dangerous Goods and

    DOT*s Enforcement Approach, GAO- 03- 22 (Washington, D. C.: January 10,
    2003).

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
    Cargo System, GAO- 03- 344 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).

    Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
    Challenges, GAO- 03- 263 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).

    Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
    Issues, GAO- 03- 253 (Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002). Related GAO
    Products

    Transportation Security Reports and Testimonies

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 1154T Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical
    Federal Operations and Assets Remain at Risk, GAO- 03- 303T (Washington,
    D. C.: November 19,

    2002).

    Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New
    Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO- 03- 297T (Washington, D. C.: November
    18, 2002).

    Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort
    for All Missions, GAO- 03- 155 (Washington, D. C.: November 12, 2002).

    Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, GAO- 02- 1075T
    (Washington, D. C.: September 18, 2002).

    Pipeline Safety and Security: Improved Workforce Planning and
    Communication Needed, GAO- 02- 785 (Washington, D. C.: August 26, 2002).
    Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New

    Initiatives Successful, GAO- 02- 993T (Washington, D. C.: August 5, 2002).
    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
    and Long- Term Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington, D. C.: July 25,
    2002).

    Critical infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
    Addressed, GAO- 02- 961T (Washington, D. C.: July 24, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
    Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports,

    GAO- 02- 955TNI (Washington, D. C.: July 23, 2002). (Not for Public
    Dissemination) Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots,
    GA0- 02- 822R

    (Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2002). Aviation Security: Deployment and
    Capabilities of Explosive Detection Equipment, GAO- 02- 713C (Washington,
    D. C.: June 20, 2002). (Classified) Coast Guard: Budget and Management
    Challenges for 2003 and Beyond, GAO- 02- 538T (Washington, D. C.: March
    19, 2002).

    Page 43 GAO- 03- 1154T Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities
    in the Nation*s Air Transportation System, GAO- 01- 1164T (Washington, D.
    C.: September 26,

    2001). (Not for Public Dissemination) Aviation Security: Information on
    the Nation*s Air Transportation System Vulnerabilities, GAO- 01- 1174T
    (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001). (Not for Public Dissemination)
    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard

    Screening Security Operations, GAO- 01- 1171T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 25, 2001). Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and
    Options for

    Assigning Screening Responsibilities, GAO- 01- 1165T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 21, 2001). Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe
    Weaknesses in

    Aviation Security, GAO- 01- 1166T (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
    Security at the Nation*s Airports, GAO- 01- 1162T (Washington, D. C.:
    September 20, 2001).

    Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and
    Key Management Issues, GAO- 03- 715T (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003).

    Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
    Results- Oriented Culture, GAO- 03- 190 (Washington, D. C.: January 17,
    2003). Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership,
    GAO- 03- 260 (Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated
    Management Issues, GAO- 03- 250 (Washington, D. C.: December 13, 2002).
    Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued

    Management Challenges, GAO- 02- 1122T (Washington, D. C.: October 1,
    2002). Terrorism and Risk Management

    Page 44 GAO- 03- 1154T National Preparedness: Technology and Information
    Sharing Challenges, GAO- 02- 1048R (Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
    Success, GAO- 02- 1013T (Washington, D. C.: August 23, 2002).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More
    Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach for Protecting Information Systems,
    GAO- 02- 474 (Washington, D. C.: July 15, 2002).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security
    Challenges Need to Be Addressed, GAO- 02- 918T (Washington, D. C.: July 9,
    2002).

    Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be
    Critical to Success, GAO- 02- 901T (Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2002).

    Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May
    Complicate Priority Setting, GAO- 02- 893T (Washington, D. C.: June 28,
    2002).

    National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and
    Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy,

    GAO- 02- 811T (Washington, D. C.: June 7, 2002). Homeland Security:
    Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals, GAO- 02-
    627T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).

    National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private
    Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
    Security, GAO- 02- 621T (Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a
    National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 550T
    (Washington, D. C.: April 2, 2002). Combating Terrorism: Enhancing
    Partnerships Through a National

    Preparedness Strategy, GAO- 02- 549T (Washington, D. C.: March 28, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance
    State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 548T (Washington, D. C.: March 25,
    2002).

    Page 45 GAO- 03- 1154T Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership
    in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02-
    547T (Washington, D. C.: March 22, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought,
    GAO- 02- 490T (Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002).

    Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State
    and Local Preparedness, GAO- 02- 473T (Washington, D. C.: March 1, 2002).

    Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
    Long- Term National Needs, GAO- 02- 160T (Washington, D. C.: November 7,
    2001).

    Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
    Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.: October 31, 2001).

    Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
    and Biological Preparedness, GAO- 02- 162T (Washington, D. C.: October 17,
    2001).

    Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
    Protection, GAO- 02- 24 (Washington, D. C.: October 15, 2001).

    Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,

    GAO- 02- 150T (Washington, D. C.: October 12, 2001).

    Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory
    Management Are Needed, GAO- 01- 667 (Washington, D. C.: September 28,
    2001).

    Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding
    Government and Privately Controlled Systems from Computer- Based Attacks,
    GAO- 01- 1168T (Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001).

    Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation*s Efforts,

    GAO- 01- 1158T (Washington, D. C.: September 21, 2001).

    Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-
    01- 822 (Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001).

    (545040)

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