    Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
    Challenges Ahead (09-SEP-03, GAO-03-1150T).

    In the 2 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
    the security of our nation's civil aviation system has assumed
    renewed urgency, and efforts to strengthen aviation security have
    received a great deal of congressional attention. On November 19,
    2001, the Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation
    Security Act (ATSA), which created the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation
    (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security
    in aviation as well as in other modes of transportation. The
    Homeland Security Act, passed on November 25, 2002, transferred
    TSA to the new Department of Homeland Security, which assumed
    overall responsibility for aviation security. GAO was asked to
    describe the progress that has been made since September 11 to
    strengthen aviation security, the potential vulnerabilities that
    remain, and the longer-term management and organizational
    challenges to sustaining enhanced aviation security.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1150T
        ACCNO:   A08395
      TITLE:     Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and
    the Challenges Ahead
         DATE:   09/09/2003
      SUBJECT:   Air transportation operations
    	     Airport security
    	     Baggage (personal effects)
    	     Commercial aviation
    	     Counterterrorism
    	     Facility security
    	     Internal controls
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Transportation safety

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    GAO-03-1150T

    Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.
    S. Senate

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. EDT Tuesday September
    9, 2003 AVIATION SECURITY

    Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead

    Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Civil Aviation Issues

    GAO- 03- 1150T

    Since September 11, 2001, TSA has made considerable progress in meeting
    congressional mandates designed to increase aviation security. By the end
    of 2002, the agency had hired and deployed about 65,000 passenger and
    baggage screeners, federal air marshals, and others, and it was using
    explosives detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked
    baggage. TSA is also initiating or developing efforts that focus on the
    use of technology and information to advance security. One effort under
    development, the next- generation Computer- Assisted Passenger
    Prescreening System (CAPPS II), would use national security and commercial
    databases to identify passengers who could pose risks for additional
    screening. Concerns about privacy rights will need to be addressed as this
    system moves toward implementation.

    Although TSA has focused on ensuring that bombs and other threat items are
    not carried onto planes by passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities
    remain in air cargo, general aviation, and airport perimeter security.
    Each year, an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo are transported on all-
    cargo and passenger planes, yet very little air cargo is screened for
    explosives. We have previously recommended, and the industry has
    suggested, that TSA use a

    risk- management approach to set priorities as it works with the industry
    to determine the next steps in strengthening aviation security.

    TSA faces longer- term management and organizational challenges to
    sustaining enhanced aviation security that include (1) developing and
    implementing a comprehensive risk management approach, (2) paying for
    increased aviation security needs and controlling costs, (3) establishing
    effective coordination among the many entities involved in aviation
    security, (4) strategically managing its workforce, and (5) building a
    results- oriented culture within the new Department of Homeland Security.
    TSA has begun to respond to recommendations we have made addressing many
    of these challenges, and we have other studies in progress.

    Air Cargo Remains Vulnerable to Terrorist Threats

    In the 2 years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
    security of our nation*s civil aviation system has assumed renewed
    urgency, and efforts to strengthen aviation security have received a great
    deal of

    congressional attention. On November 19, 2001, the Congress enacted the
    Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the

    Department of Transportation (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility
    as ensuring security in aviation as well as in other

    modes of transportation. The Homeland Security Act, passed on November 25,
    2002, transferred TSA to the new Department of Homeland Security, which
    assumed overall responsibility for aviation

    security. GAO was asked to describe the progress that has been made since
    September 11 to strengthen aviation security, the potential
    vulnerabilities that remain, and the longer- term management and
    organizational challenges to sustaining enhanced aviation security. In
    prior reports and testimonies, listed at the end of this statement, GAO
    has made numerous recommendations to strengthen

    aviation security and to improve the management of federal aviation
    security organizations and functions.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1150T. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph. D., at (202) 512- 2834 or
    dillinghamg@ gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1150T, a testimony

    before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U. S. Senate

    September 9, 2003

    AVIATION SECURITY Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges
    Ahead

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: In the 2 years since the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the security of our nation*s
    civil aviation system has assumed renewed urgency, and efforts to
    strengthen aviation security have received a great deal of congressional
    attention. On November 19, 2001, the Congress enacted the Aviation and
    Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which created the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation
    (DOT) and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring security in
    aviation as well as in other modes of transportation. The act set forth
    specific improvements to aviation security for TSA to implement and
    established deadlines for completing many of them. The Homeland Security
    Act, passed on November 25, 2002, transferred TSA to the new Department of
    Homeland Security, which

    assumed overall responsibility for aviation security. My testimony today
    addresses the (1) progress that has been made since September 11 to
    strengthen aviation security, (2) potential vulnerabilities that remain,
    and (3) longer- term management and organizational challenges to
    sustaining enhanced aviation security. The testimony is based on our prior
    work, our review of recent literature, and discussions with aviation
    industry representatives and TSA.

    In summary: Since September 2001, TSA has made considerable progress in
    meeting congressional mandates related to aviation security, thereby
    increasing aviation security. For example, by the end of December 2002,
    the agency had hired and deployed a workforce of about 65,000, including
    passenger and baggage screeners and federal air marshals, and it was using
    explosives detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked
    baggage. In addition, TSA has initiated several programs and research and
    development efforts that focus on the use of technology and information to
    advance security. For example, the agency is developing the Transportation
    Workers Identification Card program to provide a nationwide standard
    credential for airport workers that is issued after a background check has
    been completed and biometric indicators have been incorporated so that
    each worker can be positively matched to his or her credential. TSA is
    also developing the next- generation Computer Assisted Passenger
    Prescreening System (CAPPS II), which would use national security and
    commercial databases to assess the risk posed by passengers and identify
    some passengers for additional screening before they board

    their flights. These uses of technology and information* particularly

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    CAPPS II* have raised some concerns about privacy rights that will need to
    be addressed as these programs move toward implementation.

    Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs
    and other threat items are not carried onto planes by passengers or in
    their luggage, vulnerabilities remain in areas such as air cargo security,
    general aviation security, and airport perimeter security. For example,
    air cargo is vulnerable because very little of the estimated 12.5 million
    tons

    transported each year on all- cargo and passenger planes is physically
    screened for explosives. As a result, a potential security risk is the
    introduction of explosive and incendiary devices in cargo placed aboard
    aircraft. We have recommended in prior work that TSA use a risk management
    approach to prioritize actions and funding as it works with industry to
    determine the next steps in strengthening air cargo security, and industry
    stakeholders have suggested the application of such an approach to general
    aviation security.

    TSA faces longer- term management and organizational challenges to
    sustaining enhanced aviation security that include (1) developing and
    implementing a comprehensive risk management approach, (2) paying for
    increased aviation security needs and controlling costs, (3) establishing
    effective coordination among the many public and private entities involved
    in aviation security, (4) strategically managing its workforce and
    ensuring appropriate staffing levels, and (5) building a results- oriented
    culture as it shifts its aviation security and other functions to the
    Department of Homeland Security. We have issued reports and made
    recommendations that address many of these challenges, and some actions
    are under way. In addition, we have studies in progress on some of these
    issues.

    Before September 2001, we and others had demonstrated significant,
    longstanding vulnerabilities in aviation security, some of which are
    depicted in figure 1. These included weaknesses in screening passengers
    and baggage,

    controlling access to secure areas at airports, and protecting air traffic
    control computer systems and facilities. To address these and other
    weaknesses, ATSA created the Transportation Security Administration and
    established security requirements for the new agency with mandated
    deadlines. Background

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    This page intentially left blank

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Figure 1: Aviation Security Focus Areas

    Source: GAO.

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Before September 2001, screeners, who were then hired by the airlines,
    often failed to detect threat objects located on passengers or in their
    carryon luggage. Principal causes of screeners* performance problems were
    rapid turnover and insufficient training. As we previously reported,
    turnover rates exceeded 100 percent a year at most large airports, leaving
    few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because of low wages,

    limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous work. 1 In addition, before
    September 2001, controls for limiting access to secure areas of airports,
    including aircraft, did not always work as intended. As we reported in May
    2000, our special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and
    credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at
    two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. 2 The
    agents, who had been issued tickets and boarding passes, could have
    carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft.
    DOT*s Inspector General also documented numerous problems with airport
    access controls, and in one series of tests, nearly 7 out of every 10
    attempts by the Inspector General*s staff to gain access to secure areas
    were successful. Upon entering the secure areas, the Inspector General*s
    staff boarded aircraft 117 times. The Inspector General further reported
    that the majority of the aircraft boardings would not have occurred if
    employees had taken the prescribed steps, such as making sure doors closed
    behind them.

    Our reviews also found that the security of the air traffic control
    computer systems and of the facilities that house them had not been
    ensured. 3 The vulnerabilities we identified, such as not ensuring that
    contractors who

    1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long- Standing
    Problems Impair Airport Screeners* Performance, GAO/ RCED- 00- 75
    (Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2000) and U. S. General Accounting Office,
    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
    Security, GAO- 01- 1166T (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2001).

    2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies
    and Airports,

    GAO- OSI- 0010 (Washington, D. C.: May 25, 2000). 3 U. S. General
    Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices
    Jeopardize Flight Safety, GAO/ AIMD- 98- 155 (Washington, D. C.: May 18,
    1998); Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls over Use of
    Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review Software, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 55
    (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 23, 1999); Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing
    Personnel Weaknesses, but Further Action Is Required,

    GAO/ AIMD- 00- 169 (Washington, D. C.: May 31, 2000); FAA Computer
    Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other Continuing
    Weaknesses, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 252 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 16, 2000); and FAA
    Computer Security: Recommendations to

    Address Continuing Weaknesses, GAO- 01- 171 (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 6,
    2000). Civil Aviation Was

    Vulnerable before September 11, 2001

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    had access to the air traffic control computer systems had undergone
    background checks, made the air traffic control system susceptible to
    intrusion and malicious attacks. The air traffic control computer systems
    provide information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews
    to help ensure the safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to
    protect these systems and their facilities could cause a nationwide
    disruption of air traffic or even collisions and loss of life.

    Over the years, we made numerous recommendations to the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), which, until ATSA*s enactment, was responsible for
    aviation security. These recommendations were designed to improve
    screeners* performance, strengthen airport access controls,

    and better protect air traffic control computer systems and facilities. As
    of September 2001, FAA had implemented some of these recommendations and
    was addressing others, but its progress was often slow. In addition, many
    initiatives were not linked to specific deadlines, making it difficult to
    monitor and oversee their implementation.

    ATSA defined TSA*s primary responsibility as ensuring security in all
    modes of transportation. The act also shifted security- screening
    responsibilities from the airlines to TSA and established a series of
    requirements to strengthen aviation security, many of them with mandated
    implementation deadlines. For example, the act required the deployment

    of federal screeners at 429 commercial airports across the nation by
    November 19, 2002, and the use of explosives detection technology at these
    airports to screen every piece of checked baggage for explosives not

    later than December 31, 2002. However, the Homeland Security Act
    subsequently allowed TSA to grant waivers of up to 1 year to airports that
    would not be able to meet the December deadline.

    Some aviation security responsibilities remained with FAA. For example,
    FAA is responsible for the security of its air traffic control and other
    computer systems and of its air traffic control facilities. FAA also
    administers the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) trust fund, which is
    used to fund capital improvements to airports, including some security
    enhancements, such as terminal modifications to accommodate explosives
    detection equipment. Legislation Transferred

    Most Aviation Security Responsibilities to TSA

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Over the past 2 years, TSA and FAA have taken major steps to increase
    aviation security. TSA has implemented congressional mandates and explored
    options for increasing the use of technology and information to control
    access to secure areas of airports and to improve passenger screening. FAA
    has focused its efforts on enhancing the security of the nation*s air
    traffic control systems and facilities. In ongoing work, we are examining
    some of these efforts in more detail (see app. IV). In its first year, TSA
    worked to establish its organization and focused

    primarily on meeting the aviation security deadlines set forth in ATSA,
    accomplishing a large number of tasks under a very ambitious schedule. In
    January 2002, TSA had 13 employees* 1 year later, the agency had about

    65,000 employees. TSA reported that it met over 30 deadlines during 2002
    to improve aviation security. (See app. I for the status of mandates in
    ATSA.) For example, according to TSA, it  met the November 2002 deadline
    to deploy federal passenger screeners at airports across the nation by
    hiring, training, and deploying over 40,000

    individuals to screen passengers at 429 commercial airports (see fig. 2);
     hired and deployed more than 20,000 individuals to screen all checked

    baggage;  has been using explosives detection systems or explosives trace
    detection

    equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage as of December
    31, 2002; 4  has been using alternative means such as canine teams, hand
    searches,

    and passenger- bag matching to screen the remaining checked baggage;
    confiscated more than 4.8 million prohibited items (including firearms,

    knives, and incendiary or flammable objects) from passengers; and  has
    made substantial progress in expanding the Federal Air Marshal

    Service. 4 Explosives detection machines are used to screen baggage for
    explosives and work by using CAT scan X- ray technology to take
    fundamental measurements of materials in bags to recognize characteristic
    signatures of threat explosives. Explosives trace detection systems (trace
    detection machines) are used to screen baggage for explosives, and work by
    detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Since September

    2001, Multiple Initiatives Have Increased Aviation Security

    TSA Met Many Aviation Security Mandates but Encountered Some Difficulties

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    In addition, according to FAA, U. S. and foreign airlines met the April
    2003 deadline to harden cockpit doors on aircraft flying in the United
    States.

    Figure 2: Screening Passengers at a U. S. Commercial Airport

    Not unexpectedly, TSA experienced some difficulties in meeting these
    deadlines and achieving these goals. For example, operational and
    management control problems, cited later in this testimony, emerged with
    the rapid expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service, and TSA*s
    deployment of some explosives detection systems was delayed. As a

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    result, TSA had to grant waivers of up to a year (until Dec. 31, 2003) to
    a few airports, authorizing them to use alternative means to screen all
    checked baggage. Recently, airport representatives with whom we spoke
    expressed concern that not all of these airports would meet the new
    December 2003 deadline established in their waivers because, according to
    the airport representatives, there has not been enough time to produce,

    install, and integrate all of the systems required to meet the deadline.
    To strengthen control over access to secure areas of airports and other
    transportation facilities, TSA is pursuing initiatives that make greater
    use of technology and information. For example, the agency is
    investigating the establishment of a Transportation Workers Identification
    Card (TWIC) program. TWIC is intended to establish a uniform, nationwide
    standard for the secure identification of 12 million workers who require
    unescorted physical or cyber access to secure areas at airports and other
    transportation facilities. Specifically, TWIC will combine standard
    background checks and biometrics so that a worker can be positively
    matched to his or her credential. Once the program is fully operational,
    the TWIC card will be the standard credential for airport workers and will
    be accepted by all modes of transportation. According to TSA, developing a
    uniform, nationwide standard for identification will minimize redundant
    credentialing and background checks. Currently, each airport is required,
    as part of its security program, to issue credentials to workers who need
    access to secure, nonpublic areas, such as baggage loading areas. 5
    Airport representatives have told us that they think a number of
    operational issues need to be resolved for the TWIC card to be feasible.
    For example, the TWIC card would have to be compatible with the many types
    of card readers used at airports around the country, or new card readers
    would have to be installed. At large airports, this could entail replacing
    hundreds of card readers, and airport representatives have expressed
    concerns about how this effort would be funded. In April 2003, TSA awarded
    a contract to test and evaluate various technologies at three pilot sites.

    In addition, TSA has continued to develop the next- generation Computer
    Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II)* an automated passenger
    screening system that takes personal information, such as a

    5 Under 49 C. F. R. sec. 1542.101, all qualified airports are required to
    have a TSA- approved security program that includes procedures to control
    movement within the secured area, including identification media required
    under sec. 1542.201( b)( 3). TSA Is Making Greater Use

    of Technology and Information to Enhance Aviation Security

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    passenger*s name, date of birth, home address, and home telephone number,
    to confirm the passenger*s identity and assess a risk level. The
    identifying information will be run against national security information

    and commercial databases, and a *risk* score will be assigned to the
    passenger. The risk score will determine any further screening that the
    passenger will undergo before boarding. TSA expects to implement CAPPS II
    throughout the United States by the fall of 2004. However, TSA*s plans
    have raised concerns about travelers* privacy rights. It has been
    suggested, for example, that TSA is violating privacy laws by not
    explaining how the risk assessment data will be scored and used and how a
    TSA decision can be appealed. These concerns about the system will need to
    be addressed as it moves toward implementation. In ongoing work, we are
    examining CAPPS II, including how it will function, what safeguards will
    be put in place to protect the traveling public*s privacy, and how the
    system will affect the traveling public in terms of costs, delays, and
    risks.

    Additionally, TSA has begun to develop initiatives that could enable it to
    use its passenger screening resources more efficiently. For example, TSA
    has requested funding for fiscal year 2004 to begin developing a
    registered traveler program that would prescreen low- risk travelers.
    Under a registered traveler program, those who voluntarily apply to
    participate in the program and successfully pass background checks would
    receive a

    unique identifier or card that would enable them to be screened more
    quickly and would promote greater focus on those passengers who require
    more extensive screening at airport security checkpoints. In prior work,
    we identified key policy and implementation issues that would need to be
    resolved before a registered traveler program could be implemented. Such
    issues include the (1) criteria that should be established to determine
    eligibility to apply for the program, (2) kinds of background checks that
    should be used to certify applicants* eligibility to enroll in the program
    and the entity who should perform these checks, (3) security- screening
    procedures that registered travelers should undergo and the differences
    between these procedures and those for unregistered travelers, and (4)
    concerns that the traveling public or others may have about equity,
    privacy, and liability. 6 6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation
    Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues,
    GAO- 03- 253 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 22, 2002).

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Since September 2001, FAA has continued to strengthen the security of the
    nation*s air traffic control computer systems and facilities in response
    to 39 recommendations we made between May 1998 and December 2000. For
    example, FAA has established an information systems security management
    structure under its Chief Information Officer, whose office has developed
    an information systems security strategy, security architecture (that is,
    an overall blueprint), security policies and directives, and a security
    awareness training campaign. This office has also managed FAA*s incident
    response center and implemented a certification and accreditation process
    to ensure that vulnerabilities in current and future air traffic control
    systems are identified and weaknesses addressed. Nevertheless, the office
    faces continued challenges in increasing its intrusion detection
    capabilities, obtaining accreditation for systems that are already
    operational, and managing information systems security throughout the
    agency. In addition, according to senior security officials, FAA has
    completed assessments of the physical security of its staffed facilities,
    but it has not yet accredited all of these air traffic control facilities
    as secure in compliance with its own policy. Finally, FAA has worked
    aggressively over the past 2 years to complete background investigations
    of numerous contractor employees. However, ensuring that all new
    contractors are assessed to determine which employees require

    background checks, and that those checks are completed in a timely manner,
    will be a continuing challenge for the agency.

    Although TSA has focused much effort and funding on ensuring that bombs
    and other threat items are not carried onto commercial aircraft by
    passengers or in their luggage, vulnerabilities remain, according to
    aviation experts, TSA officials, and others. In particular, these
    vulnerabilities affect air cargo, general aviation, and airport perimeter
    security. For information on legislative proposals that would address
    these potential vulnerabilities and other aviation security issues, see
    appendix II.

    As we and DOT*s Inspector General have reported, vulnerabilities exist in
    securing the cargo carried aboard commercial passenger and all- cargo
    aircraft. TSA has reported that an estimated 12.5 million tons of cargo
    are transported each year* 9. 7 million tons on all- cargo planes and 2.8
    million tons on passenger planes. Some potential security risks associated
    with air cargo include the introduction of undetected explosive and
    incendiary FAA Is Strengthening Air

    Traffic Control Security Potential Vulnerabilities Remain in Several
    Aviation Sectors

    Air Cargo Security

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    devices in cargo placed aboard aircraft; the shipment of undeclared or
    undetected hazardous materials aboard aircraft; and aircraft hijackings
    and sabotage by individuals with access to cargo aircraft. 7 To address
    some of the risks associated with air cargo, ATSA requires that all cargo
    carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft be screened and that TSA

    have a system in place as soon as practicable to screen, inspect, or
    otherwise ensure the security of cargo on all- cargo aircraft. In August
    2003, the Congressional Research Service reported that less than 5 percent
    of cargo placed on passenger airplanes is physically screened. TSA*s
    primary approach to ensuring air cargo security and safety and to
    complying with the cargo- screening requirement in the act is the *known
    shipper* program* which allows shippers that have established business
    histories with air carriers or freight forwarders 8 to ship cargo on
    planes. However, we and DOT*s Inspector General have identified weaknesses
    in the known shipper program and in TSA*s procedures for approving freight
    forwarders. 9 Since September 2001, TSA has taken a number of actions to
    enhance

    cargo security, such as implementing a database of known shippers in
    October 2002. The database is the first phase in developing a
    cargoprofiling system similar to the Computer- Assisted Passenger
    Prescreening System. However, in December 2002, we reported that
    additional operational and technological measures, such as checking the
    identity of individuals making cargo deliveries, have the potential to
    improve air

    cargo security in the near term. 10 We further reported that TSA lacks a
    comprehensive plan with long- term goals and performance targets for cargo
    security, time frames for completing security improvements, and risk-
    based criteria for prioritizing actions to achieve those goals.
    Accordingly, we recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive plan for

    7 For example, on November 15, 1979, an explosive device contained in a
    parcel shipped by U. S. mail exploded aboard an American Airlines flight;
    on April 7, 1994, a Federal Express employee attempted to hijack a company
    plane and crash it into the company*s headquarters. We reported on the
    security risks associated with dangerous goods in

    Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by
    Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods, GAO- 03- 30C (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 3,
    2002).

    8 Freight forwarders consolidate shipments and deliver them to air
    carriers and cargo facilities of passenger and all- cargo air carriers. 9
    U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and
    Potential

    Improvements for the Air Cargo System, GAO- 03- 344 (Washington, D. C.:
    Dec. 20, 2002). 10 GAO- 03- 344.

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, includes
    a list of security priorities, and sets deadlines for completing actions.
    TSA agreed with this recommendation and expects to develop such a plan by

    the fall of 2003. It will be important that this plan include a timetable
    for implementation and that TSA expeditiously reduce the vulnerabilities
    in this area.

    Since September 2001, TSA has taken limited action to improve general
    aviation security, leaving it far more open and potentially vulnerable
    than commercial aviation. 11 General aviation is vulnerable because
    general aviation pilots are not screened before takeoff and the contents
    of general aviation planes are not screened at any point. General aviation
    includes more than 200,000 privately owned airplanes, which are located in
    every state at more than 19, 000 airports. Over 550 of these airports also
    provide commercial service. In the last 5 years, about 70 aircraft have
    been stolen

    from general aviation airports, indicating a potential weakness that could
    be exploited by terrorists. Moreover, it was reported that the September
    11 hijackers researched the use of crop dusters to spread biological or
    chemical agents. General aviation*s vulnerability was revealed in January
    2002, when a Florida teenage flight student crashed a single- engine
    Cessna airplane into a Tampa skyscraper.

    FAA has since issued a notice with voluntary guidance for flight schools
    and businesses that provide services for aircraft and pilots at general
    aviation airports. The suggestions include using different keys to gain
    access to an aircraft and start the ignition, not giving students access
    to aircraft keys, ensuring positive identification of flight students, and
    training employees and pilots to report suspicious activities. However,
    because the guidance is voluntary, it is unknown how many general aviation
    airports have implemented these measures.

    We reported in June 2003 that TSA was working with industry stakeholders
    as part of TSA*s Aviation Security Advisory Council to close potential
    security gaps in general aviation. 12 According to our recent

    11 For example, TSA issued a rule requiring that certain aircraft
    operators using aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 12, 500 pounds
    or more carry out security measures, including conducting criminal history
    records checks on their flight crew members and restricting access to the
    flight deck. This rule went into effect in April 2003.

    12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal
    Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO- 03- 843
    (Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003). General Aviation Security

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    discussions with industry representatives, however, the stakeholders have
    not been able to reach a consensus on the actions needed to improve
    security in general aviation. General aviation industry representatives,
    such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and General Aviation
    Manufacturers Association, have opposed any restrictions on operating
    general aviation aircraft and believe that small planes do not pose a
    significant risk to the country. Nonetheless, some industry
    representatives indicated that the application of a risk management
    approach would be helpful in determining the next steps in improving
    general aviation security. (We discuss risk management in more detail
    later in this testimony.) To identify these next steps, TSA chartered a
    working group on general aviation within the existing Aviation Security
    Advisory Committee, and this working group is scheduled to report to the
    full committee in the fall of 2003. We have ongoing work that is examining
    general aviation security in further detail.

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Figure 3: General Aviation Aircraft and Airport

    Airport perimeters present a potential vulnerability by providing a route
    for individuals to gain unauthorized access to aircraft and secure areas
    of airports (see fig. 4). For example, in August 2003, the national media

    reported that three boaters wandered the tarmac at Kennedy International
    Airport after their boat became beached near a runway. In addition,
    terrorists could launch an attack using a shoulder- fired missile from the
    perimeter of an airport, as well as from locations just outside the
    perimeter. For example, in separate incidents in the late 1970s,
    guerrillas with shoulder- fired missiles shot down two Air Rhodesia
    planes. More recently, the national media have reported that since
    September 2001, al Airport Perimeter Security

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Qaeda has twice tried to down planes outside the United States with
    shoulder- fired missiles. 13 We reported in June 2003 that airport
    operators have increased their

    patrols of airport perimeters since September 2001, but industry officials
    stated that they do not have enough resources to completely protect
    against missile attacks. 14 A number of technologies could be used to
    secure and monitor airport perimeters, including barriers, motion sensors,
    and closed- circuit television. Airport representatives have cautioned
    that as security enhancements are made to airport perimeters, it will be
    important for TSA to coordinate with FAA and the airport operators to
    ensure that any enhancements do not pose safety risks for aircraft. We
    have separate ongoing work examining the status of efforts to improve
    airport perimeter

    security and assessing the nature and extent of the threat from
    shoulderfired missiles.

    13 The Department of Homeland Security is assessing proposals from eight
    contractors for technology to protect commercial aircraft from shoulder-
    fired missile attack. 14 GAO- 03- 843.

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Figure 4: Airport Perimeter

    TSA*s efforts to strengthen and sustain aviation security face several
    longer- term challenges in the areas of risk management, funding,
    coordination, strategic human capital management, and building a
    resultsoriented organization. Aviation Security

    Poses Longer- Term Management and Organizational Challenges

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    As aviation security is viewed in the larger context of transportation and
    homeland security, it will be important to set strategic priorities so
    that national resources can be directed to the greatest needs. Although
    TSA initially focused on increasing aviation security, it has more
    recently begun to address security in the other transportation modes.
    However, the size and diversity of the national transportation system make
    it difficult to adequately secure, and TSA and the Congress are faced with
    demands for additional federal funding for transportation security that
    far exceed the additional amounts made available. We have advocated the
    use of a risk management approach to guide federal programs and responses
    to better prepare for and withstand terrorist threats, and we have
    recommended that TSA use this approach to strengthen security in aviation
    as well as in other transportation modes. 15 A risk management approach is
    a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the
    criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key
    decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results.
    Comprehensive risk- based assessments support effective planning and
    resource allocation. Figure 5 describes this approach.

    Figure 5: Elements of a Risk Management Approach

    15 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management
    Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO- 02- 208T (Washington, D. C.:
    Oct. 31, 2001); and GAO- 03- 344. Risk Management

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    TSA agreed with our recommendation and has adopted a risk management
    approach in attempting to enhance security across all transportation
    modes. TSA*s Office of Threat Assessment and Risk Management is developing
    two assessment tools that will help assess criticality, threats, and
    vulnerabilities. The first tool, which assesses criticality, will arrive
    at a criticality score for a facility or transportation asset by
    incorporating factors such as the number of fatalities that could occur
    during an attack and the economic and sociopolitical importance of the
    facility or asset.

    This score will enable TSA, in conjunction with transportation
    stakeholders, to rank facilities and assets within each mode and thus
    focus resources on those that are deemed most important. TSA is working
    with another Department of Homeland Security office* the Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate* to ensure that the
    criticality tool will be consistent with the Department*s overall approach

    for managing critical infrastructure. The second tool* the Transportation
    Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Evaluation tool (TRAVEL)* will assess
    threats and analyze vulnerabilities for all transportation modes. The tool
    produces a relative risk score for potential attacks against a
    transportation asset or facility. In addition, TRAVEL will include a cost-
    benefit component that compares the cost of implementing a given
    countermeasure with the reduction in relative risk due to that
    countermeasure. We reported in June 2003 that TSA plans to use this tool
    to gather comparable threat and vulnerability information across all
    transportation modes. It is important for TSA to complete the development
    of the two tools and use them to prepare action plans for specific modes,
    such as aviation, and for transportation security generally.

    Two key funding and accountability challenges will be (1) paying for
    increased aviation security and (2) ensuring that these costs are
    controlled. The costs associated with the equipment and personnel needed
    to screen passengers and their baggage alone are huge. The administration
    requested $4.2 billion for aviation security for fiscal year 2004, which
    included about $1.8 billion for passenger screening and $944 million for
    baggage screening. 16 ATSA created a passenger security fee to pay for the
    costs of aviation security, but the fee has not generated enough money to

    16 The House agreed to $3.7 billion in funding for TSA and the Senate
    approved $4.5 billion. Funding

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    do so. DOT*s Inspector General reported that the security fees are
    estimated to generate only about $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2004. 17 A
    major funding issue is paying for the purchase and installation of the

    remaining explosives detection systems for the airports that received
    waivers, as well as for the reinstallation of the systems that were placed
    in airport lobbies last year and now need to be integrated into airport
    baggage- handling systems. Integrating the equipment with the
    baggagehandling systems is expected to be costly because it will require
    major facility modifications. For example, modifications needed to
    integrate the equipment at Boston*s Logan International Airport are
    estimated to cost $146 million. Estimates for Dallas/ Fort Worth
    International Airport are $193 million. DOT*s Inspector General has
    reported that the cost of integrating the equipment nationwide could be as
    high as $3 billion.

    A key question is how to pay for these installation costs. Funds from
    FAA*s AIP grants and passenger facility charges are eligible sources for
    funding this work. 18 In fiscal year 2002, AIP grant funds totaling $561
    million were used for terminal modifications to enhance security. However,
    using these funds for security reduced the funding available for other
    airport development projects, such as projects to bring airports up to
    federal design standards and reconstruction projects. In February 2003, we
    identified letters of intent 19 as a funding option that has been
    successfully used to leverage private sources of funding. 20 TSA has since
    signed letters of intent with three airports* Boston Logan, Dallas- Fort
    Worth, and Seattle- Tacoma International Airports. Under the agreements,
    TSA will pay 75 percent of the cost of integrating the explosives
    detection equipment into the baggage- handling systems. The payments will
    stretch out over 3 to 4 years. Airport representatives said that about 30
    more airports have

    17 TSA suspended the security fees from June 1 to September 30, 2003, as
    mandated by the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003.
    18 With FAA*s approval, commercial airports may charge boarding passengers
    a fee of up to $4.50 per trip segment to raise funds for airport capital
    development. 19 A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from
    an agency to provide

    multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current authorization period.
    Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed with a project without
    waiting for future federal funds because the airport and investors know
    that allowable costs are likely to be reimbursed.

    20 U. S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels
    May Not Be Sufficient to Cover Airports* Planned Capital Development, GAO-
    03- 497T (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 25, 2003).

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    requested similar agreements. The slow pace of TSA*s approval process has
    raised concerns about delays in reinstalling and integrating explosives
    detection equipment with baggage- handling systems* delays that will
    require more labor- intensive and less efficient baggage screening by
    other approved means.

    To provide financial assistance to airports for security- related capital
    investments, such as the installation of explosives detection equipment,
    proposed aviation reauthorization legislation 21 would establish an
    aviation security capital fund that would authorize $2 billion over the
    next 4 years. The funding would be made available to airports in letters
    of intent, and

    large- and medium- hub airports would be expected to provide a match of 10
    percent of a project*s costs. A 5 percent match would be required for all
    other airports. This legislation would provide a dedicated source of
    funding for security- related capital investments and could minimize the
    need to use AIP funds for security.

    An additional funding issue is how to ensure continued investment in
    transportation research and development. For fiscal year 2003, TSA was
    appropriated about $110 million for research and development, of which $75
    million was designated for the next- generation explosives detection
    systems. However, TSA has proposed to reprogram $61.2 million of these
    funds to be used for other purposes, leaving about $12.7 million to be
    spent on research and development this year. This proposed reprogramming
    could limit TSA*s ability to sustain and strengthen aviation security by
    continuing to invest in research and development for more effective
    equipment to screen passengers, their carry- on and checked baggage, and
    cargo. In ongoing work, we are examining the nature and

    scope of research and development work by TSA and the Department of
    Homeland Security, including their strategy for accelerating the
    development of transportation security technologies.

    By reprogramming funds and making acknowledged use of certain funds for
    purposes other than those intended, TSA has raised congressional concerns
    about accountability. According to TSA, it has proposed to reprogram a
    total of $849.3 million during fiscal year 2003, including the $61.2
    million that would be cut from research and development and $104 million
    that would be taken from the federal air marshal program and used for
    unintended purposes. Because of these congressional concerns, we

    21 The proposed Vision 100* Century of Aviation Reauthorization* Act, H.
    R. 2115.

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    were asked to investigate TSA*s process for reprogramming funds for the
    air marshal program and to assess the implications of the proposed funding
    reductions in areas such as the numbers of hours flown and flights taken.
    We have ongoing work to address these issues. To ensure appropriate
    oversight and accountability, it is important that TSA maintain clear and
    transparent communication with the Congress and industry stakeholders
    about the use of its funds.

    In July 2002, we reported that long- term attention to cost and
    accountability controls for acquisition and related business processes
    will be critical for TSA, both to ensure its success and to maintain its
    integrity and accountability. 22 According to DOT*s Inspector General,
    although TSA has made progress in addressing certain cost- related issues,
    it has not established an infrastructure that provides effective controls
    to monitor contractors* costs and performance. 23 For example, in February
    2003, the Inspector General reported that TSA*s $1 billion hiring effort
    cost more than most people expected and that TSA*s contract with NCS
    Pearson to recruit, assess, and hire the screener workforce contained no
    safeguards

    to prevent cost increases. The Inspector General found that TSA provided
    limited oversight for the management of the contract expenses and, in one
    case, between $6 million and $9 million of the $18 million paid to a
    subcontractor appeared to be a result of wasteful and abusive spending
    practices. 24 As the Inspector General recommended, TSA has since hired
    the Defense Contract Audit Agency to audit its major contracts. To ensure
    control over TSA contracts, the Inspector General has further recommended
    that the Congress set aside a specific amount of TSA*s contracting budget
    for overseeing contractors* performance with respect to cost, schedule,
    and quality. 25 22 U. S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security:
    Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long- Term
    Challenges, GAO- 02- 971T (Washington,

    D. C.: July 25, 2002). 23 Aviation Security Costs, Transportation Security
    Administration, statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector
    General, U. S. Department of Transportation, before the Committee on
    Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, U. S.

    Senate, Feb. 5, 2003 (CC- 2003- 066). 24 DOT Inspector General, CC- 2003-
    066.

    25 Office of Inspector General, DOT, Report on Oversight of Security
    Screener Contracts, TSA, FI- 2003- 025 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 28, 2003).

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Sustaining the aviation security advancements of the past 2 years also
    depends on TSA*s ability to form effective partnerships with federal,
    state, and local agencies and with the aviation community. Effective,
    wellcoordinated partnerships at the local level require identifying roles
    and responsibilities; developing effective, collaborative relationships
    with local and regional airports and emergency management and law
    enforcement agencies; agreeing on performance- based standards that
    describe desired outcomes; and sharing intelligence information. The
    lynchpin in TSA*s efforts to coordinate with airports and local law
    enforcement and emergency response agencies is, according to the agency,
    the 158 federal security directors and staff that TSA has deployed
    nationwide. The

    security directors* responsibilities include ensuring that standardized
    security procedures are implemented at the nation*s airports; working with
    state and local law enforcement personnel, when appropriate, to ensure
    airport and passenger security; and communicating threat information to
    airport operators and others. Airport representatives, however, have
    indicated that the relationships between federal security directors and
    airport operators are still evolving and that better communication is
    needed at some airports.

    Key to improving the coordination between TSA and local partners is
    establishing clearly defined roles. In some cases, concerns have arisen
    about conflicts between the roles of TSA, as the manager of security
    functions at airports, and of airport officials, as the managers of other
    airport operations. Industry representatives viewed such conflicts as
    leading to confusion in areas such as communicating with local entities.
    According to airport representatives, for example, TSA has developed
    guidance or rules for airports without involving them, and time- consuming
    changes have then had to be made to accommodate operational factors. The
    representatives maintain that it would be more efficient and effective

    to consider such operational factors earlier in the process. Ultimately,
    inadequate coordination and unclear roles result in inefficient uses of
    limited resources.

    TSA also has to ensure that the terrorist and threat information gathered
    and maintained by law enforcement and other agencies* including the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State* is
    quickly and efficiently communicated among federal agencies and to state
    and local authorities, as needed. Disseminating such information is
    important to allow those who are involved in protecting the nation*s
    aviation system to address potential threats rather than simply react to
    known threats. Coordination

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    In aviation security, timely information sharing among agencies has been
    hampered by the agencies* reluctance to share sensitive information and by
    outdated, incompatible computer systems. As we found in reviewing 12 watch
    lists maintained by nine federal agencies, information was being shared
    among some of them but not among others. Moreover, even when sharing was
    occurring, costly and overly complex measures had to be taken to
    facilitate it. 26 To promote better integration and sharing of terrorist
    and criminal watch lists, we have recommended that the Department of
    Homeland Security, in collaboration with the other departments and
    agencies that have and use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and
    standardize the federal government*s watch list structures and policies.
    27 In addition, as we found earlier this year, representatives of numerous

    state and local governments and transportation industry associations
    indicated that the general threat warnings received by government agencies
    are not helpful. Rather, they said, transportation operators, including
    airport operators, want more specific intelligence information so that
    they can understand the true nature of a potential threat and implement
    appropriate security measures. 28 As it organizes itself to protect the
    nation*s transportation system, TSA

    faces the challenge of strategically managing its workforce of more than
    60,000 people, most of whom are deployed at airports or on aircraft to
    detect weapons and explosives and to prevent them from being taken aboard
    and used on aircraft. Additionally, over the next several years, TSA

    faces the challenge of *right- sizing* this workforce as efficiency is
    improved with new security- enhancing technologies, processes, and
    procedures. For example, as explosives detection systems are integrated
    with baggage- handling systems, the use of more labor- intensive screening
    methods, such as trace detection techniques and manual searches of

    baggage, can be reduced. Other planned security enhancements, such as
    CAPPS II and the registered traveler program, also have the potential to
    make screening more efficient.

    26 GAO- 03- 322. 27 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information
    Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better
    Integration and Sharing, GAO- 03- 322 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 15, 2003).

    28 GAO- 03- 843. Strategic Human Capital

    Management

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    To assist agencies in managing their human capital more strategically, we
    have developed a model that identifies cornerstones and related critical
    success factors that agencies should apply and steps they can take. 29 Our
    model is designed to help agency leaders effectively lead and manage their
    people and integrate human capital considerations into daily
    decisionmaking and the program results they seek to achieve.

    In January 2003, we reported that TSA was addressing some critical human
    capital success factors by hiring personnel, using a wide range of tools
    available for hiring, and beginning to link individual performance to
    organizational goals. 30 However, concerns remain about the size and
    training of that workforce, the adequacy of the initial background checks
    for screeners, and TSA*s progress in setting up a performance management
    system. As noted earlier in this testimony, TSA now plans to reduce its
    screener workforce by 6,000 by September 30, 2003, and it has proposed
    cutting the workforce by an additional 3,000 in fiscal year 2004. This
    planned reduction has raised concerns about passenger delays at airports
    and has led TSA to begin hiring part- time screeners to make more

    flexible and efficient use of its workforce. In addition, TSA used an
    abbreviated background check process to hire and deploy enough screeners
    to meet ATSA*s screening deadlines in 2002. After obtaining additional
    background information, TSA terminated the employment of some of these
    screeners. TSA reported 1,208 terminations as of May 31, 2003, that it
    ascribed to a variety of reasons, including criminal offenses and failures
    to pass alcohol and drug tests. Furthermore, the national media have
    reported allegations of operational and management control problems that
    emerged with the expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service, including
    inadequate background checks and training, uneven scheduling, and
    inadequate policies and procedures. In ongoing work, we are examining the
    effectiveness of TSA*s efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger
    screeners, and we are assessing the effects of expansion on the Federal
    Air Marshal Service. In addition, we reported in January 2003 that TSA had
    taken the initial steps in establishing a performance management system
    linked to organizational goals. Such a system will be critical for TSA to
    motivate and manage staff, ensure the

    29 U. S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital
    Management,

    GAO- 02- 373SP (Washington, D. C.: March 2002). 30 U. S. General
    Accounting Office, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and
    Plans to Build a Results- Oriented Culture, GAO- 03- 190 (Washington, D.
    C.: Jan. 13, 2003).

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    quality of screeners* performance, and, ultimately, restore public
    confidence in air travel.

    For TSA to sustain enhanced aviation security over the long term, it will
    be important for the agency to continue to build a results- oriented
    culture within the new Department of Homeland Security. To help federal
    agencies successfully transform their cultures, as well as the new
    Department of Homeland Security merge its various components into a
    unified department, we identified key practices that have consistently
    been found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and
    transformations. 31 These key practices, together with implementation
    strategies such as establishing a coherent mission and integrated
    strategic goals to guide the transformation, can help agencies become more
    results oriented, customer focused, and collaborative. (See app. III.)
    These practices are particularly important for the Department of Homeland
    Security, whose implementation and transformation we have designated as
    high risk. 32 The Congress required TSA to adopt a results- oriented
    strategic planning

    and reporting framework and, specifically, to provide an action plan with
    goals and milestones to outline how acceptable levels of performance for
    aviation security would be achieved. In prior work, we reported that TSA
    has taken the first steps in performance planning and reporting by
    defining its mission, vision, and values and that this practice would
    continue to be

    important when TSA moved into the Department of Homeland Security. 33
    Therefore, we recommended that TSA take the next steps to implement
    results- oriented practices. These steps included establishing performance
    goals and measures for all modes of transportation as part of a strategic
    planning process that involves stakeholders, defining more clearly the
    roles and responsibilities of its various offices in collaborating and
    communicating with stakeholders; and formalizing the roles and
    responsibilities of governmental entities for transportation security.
    Table

    31 U. S. General Accounting Office, Results- Oriented Cultures:
    Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations,
    GAO- 03- 669 (Washington, D. C.: July 2, 2003).

    32 U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
    Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO- 03- 102 (Washington,
    D. C.: Jan. 1, 2003). 33 GAO- 03- 190. Building a ResultsOriented

    Organization

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    1 shows selected ATSA requirements, TSA*s actions and plans, and the next
    steps we recommended. TSA agreed with our recommendations.

    Table 1: Requirements, Actions and Plans, and Recommended Next Steps for
    Results- Oriented Practices ATSA requirements TSA actions and plans Next
    steps

    Leadership commitment to creating a high- performing organization

     Requires performance agreement between the Secretary of DOT and the
    Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and between the Under
    Secretary and TSA executives.

     Stated leadership commitment to creating a results- oriented culture in
    its 180- day action plan.

     Expressed plans to use the Baldrige performance excellence criteria as a
    management tool to promote quality and performance.

     Established standardized performance agreements for TSA executives.

     Establish a performance agreement for the Under Secretary of
    Transportation for Security that articulates how bonuses will be tied to
    performance.

     Add expectations in performance agreements for top leadership to foster
    the culture of a high- performing organization.

    Strategic planning to establish results- oriented goals and measures

     Requires a 5- year performance plan and annual performance report
    consistent with the principles of the Government Performance and Results
    Act.

     Articulated vision, mission, values, strategic goal, and performance
    goals and measures.

     Developed automated system to collect performance data to demonstrate
    progress in meeting goals.

     Aligned aviation security performance goals and measures with DOT goals.

     Reported it submitted first annual performance report.

     Establish security performance goals and measures for all modes of
    transportation as part of a strategic planning process that involves
    stakeholders.

     Apply practices that have been shown to provide useful information in
    agency

    performance plans.

    Performance management to promote accountability for results

     Requires a performance management system.

     Requires performance agreements for all employees that include
    organizational and individual goals.

     Established an interim performance management system.

     Created standardized performance agreements for groups of employees that
    include organizational and individual goals and standards of performance.
     Build on the current

    performance agreements to achieve additional benefits.

     Ensure the permanent performance management system makes meaningful
    distinctions in performance.

     Involve employees in developing its permanent performance management
    system.

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    ATSA requirements TSA actions and plans Next steps Collaboration and
    communication to achieve national outcomes

     Requires TSA to work within and outside the government to accomplish its
    mission.

     Establishes a Transportation Security Oversight Board to facilitate
    collaboration and communication.  Established Offices of Security
    Regulation

    and Policy, Communications and Public Information, Law Enforcement and
    Security Liaison, and Legislative Affairs to collaborate and communicate
    with stakeholders.

     Convened the Oversight Board, which has met twice.

     Stated plans to use memorandums of understanding and memorandums of
    agreement to formalize roles and responsibilities of TSA and other
    agencies in transportation security.

     Define more clearly the collaboration and communication roles and
    responsibilities of TSA*s various offices.

     Formalize roles and responsibilities among governmental entities for
    transportation security.

    Public reporting and customer service to build citizen confidence

     Requires a 180- day action plan and two progress reports within 6 months
    of enactment.

     Submitted 180- day action plan and both progress reports within
    established time frames.

     Maintains a Web site to provide information to the public.

     Created ombudsman position to serve customers.

     Developed measures to track customer satisfaction.

     Reviewed and eliminated security procedures that do not enhance security
    or customer service.

     Stated plans to develop a customer satisfaction index to analyze
    customer opinions to improve performance.

     Fill the ombudsman position to facilitate responsiveness of TSA to the
    public.

     Continue to develop and implement mechanisms, such as the CSI, to gauge

    customer satisfaction and improve customer service.

    Source: GAO. After spending billions of dollars over the past 2 years on
    people, policies, and procedures to improve aviation security, we have
    much more security now than we had before September 2001, but it has not
    been determined how much more secure we are. The vast number of guns,
    knives, and other potential threat items that screeners have confiscated
    suggests that security is working, but it also suggests that improved
    public awareness of prohibited items could help focus resources where they
    are most needed and reduce delays and inconvenience to the public. Faced
    with vast and competing demands for security resources, TSA should
    continue its efforts to identify technologies, such as CAPPS II, that will
    leverage its resources and potentially improve its capabilities. Improving
    the efficiency and effectiveness of aviation security will also require
    risk assessments and plans that help maintain a balance between security
    and customer service. Concluding

    Observations

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
    any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

    For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald L.
    Dillingham at (202) 512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions to
    this testimony include Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Hooper, Jennifer Kim,
    Heather Krause, Maren McAvoy, John W. Shumann, and Teresa Spisak. Contact
    Information

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Deadline Provisions a Status

    Nov. 19, 2001 Require new background checks for those who have access to
    secure areas of the airport. Completed

    Institute a 45- day waiting period for aliens seeking flight training for
    planes of 12,500 pounds or more. Completed

    Dec. 19, 2001 Establish qualifications for federal screeners. Completed
    Report to the Congress on improving general aviation security. Completed
    Jan. 18, 2002 Screen all checked baggage in U. S. airports using
    explosives detection systems,

    passenger- bag matching, manual searches, canine units, or other approved
    means. Completed The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is to develop
    guidance for air carriers to use in developing programs to train flight
    and cabin crews to resist threats (within 60 days after FAA issues the
    guidance, each airline is to develop a training program and submit it to
    FAA; within 30 days of receiving a program, FAA is to approve it or
    require revisions; within 180 days of receiving FAA*s approval, the
    airline is to complete the training of all flight and cabin crews).

    Guidance issued Develop a plan to train federal screeners. Completed
    Foreign and domestic carriers are to provide electronic passenger and crew
    manifests to Customs for flights from foreign countries to the United
    States. Completed

    Begin collecting the passenger security fee. Completed Feb. 17, 2002 The
    Under Secretary is to assume civil aviation security functions from FAA.
    Completed

    Implement an aviation security program for charter carriers. Completed
    Begin awarding grants for security- related research and development.
    Completed The National Institute of Justice is to report to the Secretary
    on less- than- lethal weapons for flight crew members. Completed

    May 18, 2002 Report to the Congress on the deployment of baggage screening
    equipment. Report submitted

     Report to the Congress on progress in evaluating and taking the
    following optional actions: Report submitted

     Require 911 capability for onboard passenger telephones.  Completed

     Establish uniform IDs for law enforcement personnel carrying weapons on
    planes or in secure areas.

     Ongoing

     Establish requirements for trusted traveler programs.  Ongoing

     Develop alternative security procedures to avoid damage to medical
    products.  Completed

     Provide for the use of secure communications technologies to inform
    airport security forces about passengers who are identified on security
    databases.

     Ongoing

     Require pilot licenses to include a photograph and biometric
    identifiers.  Ongoing

     Use voice stress analysis, biometric, or other technologies to prevent
    high- risk passengers from boarding.

     Ongoing

     Provide for the use of instant communications technology between planes
    and ground.

     Ongoing

    Appendix I: Selected Deadlines in the Aviation and Transportation Security
    Act and Their Status

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Deadline Provisions a Status

    Nov. 19, 2002 Deploy federal screeners, security managers, and law
    enforcement officers to screen passengers and property. Completed

    Report to the Congress on screening for small aircraft with 60 or fewer
    seats. Report submitted Establish pilot program to contract with private
    screening companies (program to last until Nov. 19, 2004). Completed

    Dec. 31, 2002 Screen all checked baggage by explosives detection systems.
    Ongoing No deadline Carriers are to transfer screening property to TSA.
    Completed

    FAA is to issue an order prohibiting access to the flight deck, requiring
    strengthened cabin doors, requiring that cabin doors remain locked, and
    prohibiting possession of a key for all but the flight deck crew.

    Completed Improve perimeter screening of all individuals, goods, property,
    and vehicles. Ongoing Screen all cargo on passenger flights and cargo-
    only flights. Ongoing Establish procedures for notifying FAA, state and
    local law enforcement officers, and airport security of known threats.
    Completed

    Establish procedures for airlines to identify passengers who pose a
    potential security threat. Ongoing

    FAA is to develop and implement methods for using cabin video monitors,
    continuously operating transponders, and notifying flight deck crew of a
    hijacking. Ongoing

    Require flight training schools to conduct security awareness programs for
    employees. Completed Work with airport operators to strengthen access
    control points and consider deploying technology to improve security
    access. Ongoing

    Provide operational testing for screeners. Ongoing Assess dual- use items
    that seem harmless but could be dangerous and inform screening personnel.
    Ongoing

    Establish a system for measuring staff performance. Ongoing Establish
    management accountability for meeting performance goals. Ongoing
    Periodically review threats to civil aviation, including chemical and
    biological weapons. Ongoing Source: TSA.

    a Except where otherwise indicated, the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) is responsible for implementing the provisions.

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges H. R.
    2144 - Aviation Security Technical Corrections and

    Improvements Act - Many of the important provisions of this bill have been
    incorporated into the Conference Report version of the FAA Reauthorization
    Act, H. R. 2115.

    S. 1409 - Rebuild America Act of 2003 - Establishes a new grant program in
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for airport security
    improvements, including projects to replace baggage conveyer systems and
    projects to reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install
    explosives detection systems. The Under Secretary for Border and
    Transportation Security is authorized to issue letters of intent to
    airports for these types of projects. One billion dollars is authorized
    for this program.

    H. R. 2555 - House and Senate versions of the Department of Homeland
    Security Appropriations Act for 2004

    House version - Makes fiscal year 2004 appropriations of $3.679 billion
    for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to provide civil
    aviation security services (aviation security, federal air marshals,
    maritime and land security, intelligence, research and development, and
    administration):

     $1.673 billion for passenger screening activities,  $1.285 billion for
    baggage screening activities,  $721 million for airport support and
    enforcement presence,  $235 million for physical modifications of
    airports to provide for the

    installation of checked baggage explosives detection systems, and  $100
    million for the procurement of the explosives detection systems.

    Continues to cap the number of screeners at 45,000 full- time equivalent
    positions.

    Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this act to pursue or adopt
    regulations requiring airport sponsors to provide, without cost to TSA,
    building construction, maintenance, utilities and expenses, or space for
    services relating to aviation security (excluding space for necessary
    checkpoints).

    Senate Version of H. R. 2555 - Makes fiscal year 2004 appropriations of
    $4.524 billion for TSA to provide civil aviation security services:

     $3.185 billion for screening activities, Appendix II: Bills Related to
    Aviation

    Security

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

     $1.339 billion for airport support and enforcement presence,  $309
    million for physical modifications of airports to provide for the

    installation of checked baggage explosives detection systems, and  $151
    million for the procurement of the explosives detection systems.

    Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this act to pursue or adopt
    regulations requiring airport sponsors to provide, without cost to TSA,
    building construction, maintenance, utilities and expenses, or space for
    services relating to aviation security (excluding space for necessary
    checkpoints).

    Prohibits the use of funds authorized in this act for the Computer
    Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) until GAO has reported
    to the Committees on Appropriations that certain requirements have been
    met, including (1) the existence of a system of due process by which
    passengers considered to pose a threat may appeal their delay or
    prohibition from boarding a flight; (2) that the underlying error rate of
    databases will not produce a large number of false positives that will
    result in a significant number of passengers being treated mistakenly or
    security resources being diverted; (3) that TSA has stressed- tested and
    demonstrated the efficacy and predictive accuracy of all search tools in
    CAPPS II; and (4) that the Secretary has established an internal oversight
    board to monitor the manner in which CAPPS II is being developed and
    prepared.

    Requires a report from the Secretary of Homeland Security on actions taken
    to develop countermeasures for commercial aircraft against shoulder- fired
    missile systems and vulnerability assessments of this threat for larger
    airports.

    H. R. 2115 - Flight 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act -
    Conference Report version - Gives FAA the authority to take a certificate
    action if it is notified by DHS that the holder of the certificate
    presents a security threat.

    Gives the Secretary of Transportation the authority to make grants to
    general aviation entities (including airports, operators, and
    manufacturers) to reimburse them for security costs incurred and revenues
    lost because of restrictions imposed by the federal government in response
    to the events of September 11. The bill authorizes $100 million for these
    grants.

    Authorizes DHS to reimburse air carriers and airports for all security
    screening activities they are still performing, such as for providing
    catering

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    services and checking documents at security checkpoints and for providing
    the space and facilities used to perform screening functions to the extent
    funds are available.

    Requires air carriers to carry out a training program for flight and cabin
    crews to prepare for possible threat conditions. TSA is required to
    establish minimum standards for this training within 1 year of the act*s
    passage.

    Requires DHS to report in 6 months on the effectiveness of aviation
    security, specifically including the air marshal program; hardening of
    cockpit doors; and security screening of passengers, checked baggage, and
    cargo.

    Establishes within DHS a grant program to airport sponsors for (1)
    projects to replace baggage conveyer systems related to aviation security;
    (2) projects to reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install

    explosives detection systems; and (3) projects to enable the Under
    Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to deploy explosives
    detection systems behind the ticket counter, in the baggage sorting area,
    or in line with the baggage handling system. Requires $250 million
    annually from the existing aviation security fee that is paid by airline
    passengers to be deposited in an Aviation Security Capital Fund and made
    available to finance this grant program. Requires TSA to certify that
    civil liberty and privacy issues have been

    addressed before implementing CAPPS II and requires GAO to assess TSA*s
    compliance 3 months after TSA makes the required certification.

    Allows cargo pilots to carry guns under the same program for pilots of
    passenger airlines. Permits an off- duty pilot to transport the gun in a
    lockbox in the passenger cabin rather than in the baggage hold. Also
    provides that both passenger and cargo pilots should be treated equitably
    in their access to training.

    Requires security audits of all foreign repair stations within 18 months
    after TSA issues rules governing the audits. The rules must be issued
    within 240 days of enactment.

    Requires background checks on aliens seeking flight training in aircraft
    regardless of the size of the aircraft. For all training on small
    aircraft, includes a notification requirement but no waiting period. For
    training on larger aircraft, adopts an expedited procedure if the
    applicant already has

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    training, a license, or a background check, and adopts a 30- day waiting
    period for first- time training on large aircraft. Makes TSA responsible
    for the background check. Requires TSA to issue an interim final rule in
    60 days to implement this section. This section takes effect when that
    rule becomes effective. S. 236 - Background Checks for Foreign Flight
    School Applicants -

    Amends federal aviation law to require a background check of alien flight
    school applicants without regard to the maximum certificated weight of the
    aircraft for which they seek training. (Currently, a background check is
    required for flight crews operating aircraft with a maximum certificated
    takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more.)

    S. 165 - Air Cargo Security Act - House companion bill (H. R. 1103) Amends
    federal aviation law to require the screening of cargo that is to be
    transported in passenger aircraft operated by domestic and foreign air

    carriers in interstate air transportation. Directs TSA to develop a
    strategic plan to carry out such screening. Requires the establishment of
    systems that (1) provide for the regular inspection of shipping facilities
    for cargo shipments; (2) provide an industrywide pilot program database of
    known shippers of cargo; (3) train persons that handle air cargo to ensure
    that such cargo is properly handled and safeguarded from security
    breaches; and (4) require air carriers operating all- cargo aircraft to
    have an approved plan for the security of their air operations area, the
    cargo placed aboard the aircraft, and persons having access to their
    aircraft on the ground or in flight.

    H. R. 1366 - Aviation Industry Stabilization Act - Requires the Under
    Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, after all cockpit doors
    are strengthened, to consider and report to the Congress on whether it is
    necessary to require federal air marshals to be seated in the first class
    cabin of an aircraft with strengthened cockpit doors.

    Requires the Under Secretary to (1) undertake action necessary to improve
    the screening of mail so that it can be carried on passenger flights and
    (2) reimburse air carriers for certain screening and related activities,
    as well as the cost of fortifying cockpit doors, and for any financial
    losses attributed to the loss of air traffic resulting from the use of
    force against Iraq in calendar year 2003.

    Establishes an air cargo security working group composed of various groups
    to develop recommendations on the enhancement of the current known shipper
    program.

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges H. R. 115
    - Aviation Biometric Badge Act - Amends federal aviation

    law to direct TSA to require by regulation that each security screener (or
    employee who has unescorted access, or may permit other individuals to
    have unescorted access, to an aircraft or a secured area of the airport)
    be issued a biometric security badge that identifies a person by
    fingerprint or retinal recognition.

    H. R. 1049 - Arming Cargo Pilots Against Terrorism Act - Senate companion
    bill (S. 516) - Expresses the sense of Congress that a flight deck crew
    member of a cargo aircraft should be armed with a firearm to

    defend such aircraft against attacks by terrorists that could use the
    aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction or for other terrorist purposes.
    Amends federal transportation law to authorize the training and arming of
    flight deck crew members (pilots) of all- cargo air transportation flights
    to prevent acts of criminal violence or air piracy.

    H. R. 765 - (No title) - Legislation to arm cargo pilots - Amends federal
    aviation law to allow cargo pilots (not just air passenger pilots) to
    participate in the federal flight deck officer program.

    H. R. 580 - Commercial Airline Missile Defense Act - Senate companion bill
    - S. 311 - Directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations
    that require all turbojet aircraft of air carriers to be equipped with a
    missile defense system. Requires the Secretary to purchase such defense
    systems and make them available to all air carriers. Sets forth certain
    interim security measures to be taken before the deployment of such
    defense systems.

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    Practice Implementation step

    Ensure top leadership drives the transformation.  Define and articulate a
    succinct and compelling reason for change.

     Balance continued delivery of services with merger and transformation
    activities.

    Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the
    transformation.

     Adopt leading practices for results- oriented strategic planning and
    reporting.

    Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the
    transformation.

     Embed core values in every aspect of the organization to reinforce the
    new culture.

    Set implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show
    progress from day one.

     Make public implementation goals and a time line.

     Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate follow- up
    actions.

     dentify cultural features of merging organizations to increase
    understanding of former work environments.

     Attract and retain key talent.

     Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills inventory to exchange
    knowledge among merging organizations.

    Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process.

     Establish networks to support the implementation team.

     Select high- performing team members. Use the performance management
    system to define responsibility and ensure accountability for change.

     Adopt leading practices to implement effective performance management
    systems with adequate safeguards.

    Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
    report related progress.

     Communicate early and often to build trust.

     Ensure consistency of message.

     Encourage two- way communication.

     Provide information to meet specific needs of employees. Involve
    employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the
    transformation.

     Use employee teams.

     Involve employees in planning and sharing performance information.

     Incorporate employee feedback into new policies and procedures.

     Delegate authority to appropriate organizational levels. Build a world-
    class organization.  Adopt leading practices to build a world- class
    organization. Source: GAO. Appendix III: Key Practices and Implementation
    Steps for Mergers and

    Organizational Transformations

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges
    Transportation Security Research and Development Programs at

    DHS and TSA

    Key Questions: (1) What were the strategy and organizational structure for
    transportation security research and development (R& D) prior to 9/ 11 and
    what is the current strategy and structure? (2) How do DHS and TSA select
    their transportation security R& D projects and what projects are in their
    portfolios? (3) What are DHS*s and TSA*s goals and strategies for

    accelerating the development of transportation security technologies? (4)
    What are the nature and scope of coordination of R& D efforts between DHS
    and TSA, as well as with other public and private sector research
    organizations?

    Federal Air Marshal Service

    Key Questions: (1) How has the federal air marshal program evolved, in
    terms of recruiting, training, retention, and operations since its
    management was transferred to TSA? (2) To what extent has TSA implemented
    the internal controls needed to meet the program*s operational and
    management control challenges? (3) To what extent has TSA developed plans
    and initiatives to sustain the program and accommodate its future growth
    and maturation?

    TSA Baggage Screening

    Key Questions: (1) What are the status and associated costs of TSA*s
    efforts to acquire, install, and operate explosives detection equipment
    (electronic trace detection technology and explosives detection systems)
    to screen all checked baggage by December 31, 2003? (2) What are the
    benefits and trade- offs* to include costs, operations, and performance*

    of using alternative explosives detection technologies currently available
    for baggage screening?

    Reprogramming of Air Marshal Program Funds

    Key Questions: (1) Describe the internal preparation, review, and approval
    process for DHS*s reprogrammings and, specifically, the process for the
    May 15 and July 25 reprogramming requests for the air marshal program. (2)
    Determine whether an impoundment or deferral notice should have

    been sent to the Congress and any other associated legal issues. (3)
    Identify the implications, for both the air marshal program and other
    programs, of the pending reprogramming request. Appendix IV: GAO Active
    Engagements

    Related to Aviation Security

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges General
    Aviation Security

    Key Questions: (1) How have security concerns and measures changed at
    general aviation airports since September 11, 2001? (2) What steps has TSA
    taken to improve general aviation security?

    Background Checks for Banner- Towing Aircraft

    Key Questions: (1) What are the procedures for conducting background and
    security checks for pilots of small banner- towing aircraft requesting
    waivers to perform stadium overflights? (2) To what extent have these
    procedures been followed in conducting required background and security
    checks since September 11, 2001? (3) How effective have these procedures
    been in reducing risks to public safety?

    TSA*s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II)

    Key Questions: (1) How will the CAPPS II system function and what data
    will be needed to make the system operationally effective? (2) What
    safeguards will be put in place to protect the traveling public*s privacy?
    (3) What systems and measures are in place to determine whether CAPPS II
    will result in improved national security? (4) What impact will CAPPS II
    have on the traveling public and on the airline industry in terms of
    costs, delays, risks, inconvenience, and other factors?

    TSA Passengers Screening Program

    Key Questions: (1) What efforts have been taken or planned to ensure that
    passenger screeners comply with federal standards and other criteria,
    including efforts to train, equip, and supervise passenger screeners? (2)
    What methods does TSA use to test screeners* performance, and what have
    been the results of these tests? (3) How have the results of tests of TSA
    passenger screeners compared with the results achieved by screeners before
    September 11, 2001, and at five pilot program airports? (4) What actions
    is TSA taking to remedy performance concerns?

    TSA*s Efforts to Implement Sections 106, 136, and 138 of the Aviation and
    Transportation Security Act

    Key Questions: What is the status of TSA*s efforts to implement (1)
    section 106 of the act requiring improved airport perimeter access
    security, (2) section 136 requiring the assessment and deployment of

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and Challenges

    commercially available security practices and technologies, and (3)
    section 138 requiring background investigations for TSA and other airport
    employees?

    Assessment of the Portable Air Defense Missile Threat

    Key Questions: (1) What are the nature and extent of the threat from
    manportable air defense systems (MANPAD)? (2) How effective are U. S.
    controls on the use of exported MANPADs? (3) How do multilateral efforts
    attempt to stem MANPAD proliferation? (4) What types of countermeasures
    are available to minimize this threat and at what cost?

    Airline Assistance Determination of Whether the $5 Billion Provided by P.
    L. 107- 42 Was Used to Compensate the Nation*s Major Air Carriers for
    Their Losses Stemming from the Events of Sept. 11, 2001

    Key Questions: (1) Was the $5 billion used only to compensate major air
    carriers for their uninsured losses incurred as a result of the terrorist
    attacks? (2) Were carriers reimbursed, per the act, only for increases in
    insurance premiums resulting from the attacks?

    TSA*s Use of Sole- Source Contracts

    Key Questions: (1) To what extent does TSA follow applicable acquisition
    laws and policies, including those for ensuring adequate competition? (2)
    How well does TSA*s organizational structure facilitate effective,
    efficient procurement? (3) How does TSA ensure that its acquisition
    workforce is equipped to award and oversee contracts? (4) How well do
    TSA*s policies and processes ensure that TSA receives the supplies and
    services it needs on time and at reasonable cost?

    Related GAO Products Page 42 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and
    Challenges

    Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security
    Challenges. GAO- 03- 843. Washington, D. C.: June 30, 2003.

    Transportation Security: Post- September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm
    Challenges. GAO- 03- 616T. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003.

    Aviation Security: Measures Needed to Improve Security of Pilot
    Certification Process. GAO- 03- 248NI. Washington, D. C.: February 3,
    2003. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
    Cargo System. GAO- 03- 286NI. Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002. (NOT
    FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air
    Cargo System. GAO- 03- 344. Washington, D. C.: December 20, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by
    Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO- 03- 30C. Washington, D. C.:
    December 3, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation
    Issues. GAO- 03- 253. Washington, D. C.: November 22, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate
    and Long- Term Challenges. GAO- 02- 971T. Washington, D. C.: July 25,
    2002.

    Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots.
    GA0- 02- 822R. Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2002.

    Aviation Security: Deployment and Capabilities of Explosive Detection
    Equipment. GAO- 02- 713C. Washington, D. C.: June 20, 2002. (CLASSIFIED)

    Aviation Security: Information on Vulnerabilities in the Nation*s Air
    Transportation System. GAO- 01- 1164T. Washington, D. C.: September 26,
    2001. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

    Aviation Security: Information on the Nation*s Air Transportation System
    Vulnerabilities. GAO- 01- 1174T. Washington, D. C.: September 26, 2001.
    (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) Related GAO Products

    Aviation Security

    Related GAO Products Page 43 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and
    Challenges

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
    Screening Security Operations. GAO- 01- 1171T. Washington, D. C.:
    September 25, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
    Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO- 01- 1165T. Washington, D. C.:
    September 21, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
    Security at the Nation*s Airports. GAO- 01- 1162T. Washington, D. C.:
    September 20, 2001.

    Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
    Security. GAO- 01- 1166T. Washington, D. C.: September 20, 2001.

    Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
    Security Improvements. GAO- 01- 1069R. Washington, D. C.: August 31, 2001.

    Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed about Access
    Security Improvements. GAO- 01- 1068R. Washington, D. C.: August 31, 2001.
    (RESTRICTED)

    FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses.
    GAO- 01- 171. Washington, D. C.: December 6, 2000.

    Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
    Carriage of Weapons Regulations. GAO/ RCED- 00- 181. Washington, D. C.:
    September 29, 2000.

    FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses That
    Jeopardize Aviation Operations. GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 330. Washington, D. C.:
    September 27, 2000.

    FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other
    Continuing Weaknesses. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 252. Washington, D. C.: August 16,
    2000.

    Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners*
    Performance. GAO/ RCED- 00- 75. Washington, D. C.: June 28, 2000.

    Related GAO Products Page 44 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and
    Challenges

    Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems Detecting
    Dangerous Objects. GAO/ RCED- 00- 159. Washington, D. C.: June 22, 2000.
    (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION) Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing
    Personnel Weaknesses, but

    Further Action Is Required. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 169. Washington, D. C.: May 31,
    2000.

    Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports. GAO- OSI- 00- 10.
    Washington, D. C.: May 25, 2000.

    Aviation Security: Screener Performance in Detecting Dangerous Objects
    during FAA Testing Is Not Adequate. GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 143. Washington, D.
    C.: April 6, 2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

    Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
    Terrorism. GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 85. Washington, D. C.: April 7, 2000.

    Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
    System. GAO/ T- RCED/ AIMD- 00- 142. Washington, D. C.: April 6, 2000.

    U. S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal
    Searches Could Produce Better Results. GAO/ GGD- 00- 38. Washington, D.
    C.: March 17, 2000.

    Aviation Security: Screeners Not Adequately Detecting Threat Objects
    during FAA Testing. GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 124. Washington, D. C.: March 16,
    2000. (NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION)

    Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long- Standing Screener
    Performance Problems. GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 125. Washington, D. C.: March 16,
    2000.

    Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign
    Nationals to Remediate and Review Software. GAO/ AIMD- 00- 55. Washington,
    D. C.: December 23, 1999.

    Aviation Security: FAA*s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for
    Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies. GAO/ RCED99- 53.
    Washington, D. C.: February 24, 1999.

    Aviation Security: FAA*s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of
    Explosives. GAO/ RCED- 99- 32R. Washington, D. C.: November 13, 1998.

    Related GAO Products Page 45 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and
    Challenges

    Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
    Safety. GAO/ AIMD- 98- 155. Washington, D. C.: May 18, 1998.

    Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long- Term Attention Is
    Needed. GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 190. Washington, D. C.: May 14, 1998.

    Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
    Safety. GAO/ AIMD- 98- 60. Washington, D. C.: April 29, 1998. (LIMITED
    OFFICIAL USE *DO NOT DISSEMINATE)

    Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
    Completion Will Take Several Years. GAO/ RCED- 98- 102. Washington, D. C.:
    April 24, 1998.

    Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. T- NSIAD- 98-
    164. Washington, D. C.: April 23, 1998. Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in
    Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to
    Risks. GAO/ RCED- 98- 6. Washington,

    D. C.: February 27, 1998.

    Aviation Security: FAA*s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices.

    GAO/ RCED- 97- 111R. Washington, D. C.: May 1, 1997.

    Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
    Devices. GAO/ RCED- 97- ll9R. Washington, D. C.: April 24, 1997.

    Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the
    Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
    Security. GAO/ T- RCED- 97- 90. Washington, D. C.: March 5, 1997.

    Aviation Security: Technology*s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities.

    GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 262. Washington, D. C.: September 19, 1996.

    Aviation Security: Oversight of Initiatives Will Be Needed. C- GAO/ TRCED/
    NSIAD- 96- 20. Washington, D. C.: September 17, 1996. (CLASSIFIED)

    Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. GAO/ TRCED/ NSIAD-
    96- 251. Washington, D. C.: September 11, 1996.

    Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. GAO/ T-
    RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 237. Washington, D. C.: August 1, 1996.

    Related GAO Products Page 46 GAO- 03- 1150T Aviation Security Progress and
    Challenges

    Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That Airports* Access Control
    Systems Are Cost Effective. GAO/ RCED- 95- 25. Washington, D. C.: March 1,
    1995.

    Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
    Expectations. GAO/ RCED- 94- 142. Washington, D. C.: May 19, 1994.

    Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
    International Challenges. GAO/ RCED- 94- 38. Washington, D. C.: January
    27, 1994.

    Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and
    Key Management Issues. GAO- 03- 715T. Washington, D. C.: May 3, 2003.

    Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to
    Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO- 03- 322. Washington, D. C.:
    April 15, 2003.

    Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
    Terrorism. GAO- 03- 519T. Washington, D. C.: March 3, 2003.

    Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a
    Results- Oriented Culture. GAO- 03- 190. Washington, D. C.: January 17,
    2003.

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
    Security. GAO- 03- 102. Washington, D. C.: January 1, 2003.

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
    Transportation. GAO- 03- 108. Washington, D. C.: January 2003. National
    Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private

    Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland
    Security. GAO- 02- 621T. Washington, D. C.: April 11, 2002.

    Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership Sought.
    GAO- 02- 490T. Washington, D. C.: March 12, 2002.

    A Model of Human Capital Management. GAO- 02- 373SP. Washington, D. C.:
    March 2002. Other

    (540070)

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