Justice Outcome Evaluations: Design and Implementation of Studies
Require More NIJ Attention (24-SEP-03, GAO-03-1091).
Policy makers need valid, reliable, and timely information on the
outcomes of criminal justice programs to help them decide how to
set criminal justice funding priorities. In view of previously
reported problems with selected outcome evaluations managed by
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), GAO assessed the
methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ
outcome evaluation grants.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1091
ACCNO: A08581
TITLE: Justice Outcome Evaluations: Design and Implementation of
Studies Require More NIJ Attention
DATE: 09/24/2003
SUBJECT: Crime prevention
Crimes or offenses
Evaluation methods
Federal aid for criminal justice
Program evaluation
Strategic planning
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GAO-03-1091
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Honorable Lamar Smith
House of Representatives
September 2003
JUSTICE OUTCOME EVALUATIONS
Design and Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention
GAO-03-1091
Highlights of GAO-03-1091, a report to The Honorable Lamar Smith, House of
Representatives
Policy makers need valid, reliable, and timely information on the outcomes
of criminal justice programs to help them decide how to set criminal
justice funding priorities. In view of previously reported problems with
selected outcome evaluations managed by the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ), GAO assessed the methodological quality of a sample of completed
and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants.
GAO recommends that NIJ
o review its ongoing outcome evaluation grants and develop appropriate
strategies and corrective measures to ensure that methodological design
and implementation problems are overcome so the evaluations can produce
more conclusive results;
o continue efforts to respond to GAO's 2002 recommendation that NIJ
assess its evaluation process with the purpose of developing approaches to
ensure that future outcome evaluations are funded only when they are
effectively designed and implemented.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOJ agreed with GAO's
recommendations, and cited several current and planned activities intended
to improve NIJ's evaluation program. DOJ also made two substantive
comments related to the presentation of information that GAO responded to
in the report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1091.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie E. Ekstrand (202)
512-8777 or [email protected].
September 2003
JUSTICE OUTCOME EVALUATIONS
Design and Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ managed 96 evaluation studies that sought to
measure the outcomes of criminal justice programs. Spending on these
evaluations totaled about $37 million. Our methodological review of 15 of
the 96 studies, totaling about $15 million and covering a broad range of
criminal justice issues, showed that sufficiently sound information about
program effects could not be obtained from 10 of the 15. Five studies,
totaling about $7.5 million (or 48 percent of the funds spent on the
studies we reviewed), appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both
design and implementation, enabling meaningful conclusions to be drawn
about program effects. Six studies, totaling about $3.3 million (or 21
percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), began with sound
designs but encountered implementation problems that would render their
results inconclusive. An additional 4 studies, totaling about $4.7 million
(or 30 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), had serious
methodological limitations that from the start limited their ability to
produce reliable and valid results. Although results from 5 completed
studies were inconclusive, DOJ program administrators said that they found
some of the process and implementation findings from them to be useful.
We recognize that optimal conditions for the scientific study of complex
social programs almost never exist, making it difficult to design and
execute outcome evaluations that produce definitive results. However, the
methodological adequacy of NIJ studies can be improved, and NIJ has taken
several steps-including the formation of an evaluation division and
funding feasibility studies--in this direction. It is too soon to tell
whether these changes will lead to evaluations that will better inform
policy makers about the effectiveness of criminal justice programs.
Characteristics of NIJ Outcome Evaluations (1992-2002)
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
aPercentages may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
Contents
Letter
Results in Brief
Background
Overview of the Evaluations We Reviewed
Most of the Reviewed NIJ Outcome Evaluations Could Not
Produce Sufficiently Sound Information on Program Outcomes
Completed Outcome Evaluations Produced Useful Information on Processes but
Not on Outcomes for DOJ Program Administrators
NIJ's Current and Planned Activities to Improve Its Evaluation
Program Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments
and our Evaluation 1
3 5 8
9
23
24 26 27 28
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix II Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed 37
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 56
GAO Contacts 56 Staff Acknowledgments 56
Tables
Table 1: NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed by GAO 9 Table 2:
Characteristics of 5 NIJ Outcome Evaluations with Sufficiently Sound
Designs and Implementation Plans 11 Table 3: Problems Encountered during
Implementation of 6 Well-
Designed NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies 15 Table 4: Design Limitations in
4 NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies 18 Table 5: Number and Size of Outcome
Evaluation Awards Made by
NIJ from 1992 through 2002, and Reviewed by GAO 32
Table 6: Size and Completion Status of the 15 Evaluations Selected
for Methodological Review 33 Table 7: Programs Evaluated and Funding
Sources for Completed
NIJ Outcome Evaluations 36
Abbreviations
BTC Breaking the Cycle
COPS Community Oriented Policing Services
DOJ Department of Justice
GREAT Gang Resistance Education and Training
NIJ National Institute of Justice
OJP Office of Justice Programs
OVW Office on Violence Against Women
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
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separately.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
September 24, 2003
The Honorable Lamar Smith House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Smith:
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) spent almost $4 billion in fiscal
year 2002 on assistance to states and local communities to combat crime.
These funds were used to reduce drug abuse and trafficking, address the
problems of gang violence and juvenile delinquency, expand community
policing, and meet the needs of crime victims, among other things. In
addition, state and local governments spend billions of their dollars
annually on law enforcement and criminal justice programs. Given these
expenditures, it is important to know which programs are effective in
controlling and preventing crime so that limited federal, state, and local
funds not be wasted on programs that are ineffective. As the principal
research, development, and evaluation agency of DOJ, the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) is responsible for evaluating existing programs
and policies that respond to crime. It spends millions of dollars annually
to support studies intended to evaluate various DOJ funded programs as
well as selected local programs. To the extent that NIJ evaluations
produce credible, valid, reliable, and timely information on the efficacy
of these programs in combating crime, they can serve an important role in
helping policymakers make decisions about how to set criminal justice
funding priorities.
Pursuant to our previous reports in which we reported problems with
selected NIJ-managed outcome evaluations,1 in your former position as
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary Committee, you
asked us to undertake a more extensive review of the outcome evaluation
work performed under the direction of NIJ during the last 10 years.
Outcome evaluations are defined as those efforts designed to determine
whether a program, project, or intervention produced its intended effects.
1U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Impact Evaluations: One Byrne
Evaluation Was Rigorous; All Reviewed Violence Against Women Office
Evaluations Were Problematic, GAO-02-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002);
and Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed
to Measure Impact of Drug Court Program, GAO-02-434 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 2002).
As agreed with your office, we are reporting on the methodological quality
of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants, and
the usefulness of the evaluations in producing information on outcomes.
Because we learned of changes NIJ has underway to improve its
administration of outcome evaluation studies, we are also providing
information in this report about these changes.
To meet our objectives, we reviewed outcome evaluation grants managed by
NIJ from 1992 through 2002. During this time period NIJ managed 96 outcome
evaluation grants. Of these 96 grants, we judgmentally selected and
reviewed 15 outcome evaluations chosen so that they varied in grant size,
completion status, and program focus. The selected studies accounted for
about $15.4 million, or about 42 percent, of the approximately $36.6
million spent on outcome evaluation studies during the 10-year period.
Although our sample is not representative of all NIJ outcome evaluations
conducted during the last 10 years, it includes those that have received a
large proportion of total funding for this type of research, and tends to
be drawn from the most recent work. Our review assessed the methodological
quality of these evaluations using generally accepted social science
standards,2 including such elements as whether evaluation data were
collected before and after program implementation; how program effects
were isolated (i.e., the use of nonprogram participant comparison groups
or statistical controls); and the appropriateness of sampling, outcome
measures, statistical analyses, and any reported results. We grouped the
studies into 3 categories based on our judgment of their methodological
soundness. Although we recognize that the stronger studies may have had
some weaknesses, and that the weaker studies may have had some strengths,
our categorization of the studies was a summary judgment based on the
totality of the information provided to us by NIJ. We also interviewed NIJ
officials regarding the selection and oversight of these evaluation
studies. To assess the usefulness of NIJ's outcome evaluations in
producing information about program outcomes, we reviewed the findings
from all 5 of the completed NIJ outcome evaluations
2Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T. Campbell and
Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and Donald T. Campbell,
Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research:
Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman, Evaluation Research:
Principles and Practice in Public Service and Social Action Programs (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-10.1.4 (Washington, D.C.: May 1991).
Results in Brief
in our sample that were funded in part by DOJ program offices, and
interviewed program officials at NIJ and program administrators at DOJ's
Office on Violence Against Women and Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services. Further details on our methodology are provided in appendix I.
Our methodological review of 15 selected NIJ outcome evaluation studies
undertaken since 1992 showed that although most studies began with
sufficiently sound designs, most could not produce sufficiently sound
information on program outcomes. Specifically, the studies could be
characterized in the following ways:
o Studies that began with sufficiently sound evaluation designs: Eleven
of the 15 studies began with sufficiently sound designs. Some of these
well-designed studies were also implemented well, while others were not.
Specifically,
o Five of the 11 studies were sufficiently well designed and
implemented-including having appropriate comparison groups or random
assignment to treatment and control groups, baseline measures, and
follow-up data-so that meaningful conclusions could be drawn about program
effects. Funding for these methodologically sound studies totaled about
$7.5 million, or nearly 50 percent of the approximately $15.4 million
spent on the studies we reviewed.
o Six of the 11 studies began with sufficiently sound designs, but
encountered implementation problems that limited the extent to which the
study objectives could be achieved. For example, some evaluators were
unable to carry out a proposed evaluation plan because the program to be
evaluated was not implemented as planned, or they could not obtain
complete or reliable data on outcomes. In some cases, implementation
problems were beyond the evaluators' control, and resulted from decisions
made by agencies providing program services after the study was underway.
These studies were limited in their ability to conclude that it was the
program or intervention that caused the intended outcome results. Funding
for these studies with implementation problems totaled about $3.3 million,
or about 21 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the
studies we reviewed.
o Studies that did not begin with sufficiently sound designs. Four of
the 15 studies had serious methodological problems from the beginning that
limited their ability to produce results that could be attributable to the
programs that were being evaluated. Methodological shortcomings in these
studies included the absence of comparison groups or appropriate
statistical controls, outcome measures with doubtful reliability and
validity, and lack of baseline data. Funding for these studies that began
with serious methodological problems totaled about $4.7 million, or about
30 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we
reviewed.
Outcome evaluations are difficult to design and execute because optimal
conditions for the scientific study of complex social programs almost
never exist. Attributing results to a particular intervention can be
difficult when such programs are evaluated in real world settings that
pose numerous methodological challenges. All 5 of the completed NIJ
outcome evaluations that focused on issues of interest to DOJ program
offices had encountered some design and implementation problems.
Nonetheless, DOJ program administrators told us that these evaluations
produced information that prompted them to make a number of changes to
DOJ-funded programs. The majority of the changes enumerated by DOJ program
administrators occurred as a result of findings from the process or
implementation components3 of the completed outcome evaluations, and not
from findings regarding program results. For example, as a result of NIJ's
evaluation of a DOJ program for domestic and child abuse victims in rural
areas, DOJ developed a training program to assist grantees in creating
collaborative programs based on the finding from the process evaluation
that such information was not readily available.
Although outcome evaluations are difficult to design and execute, steps
can be taken to improve their methodological adequacy and, in turn, the
likelihood that they will produce meaningful information on program
effects. NIJ officials told us that they have begun to take several steps
to try to increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will produce
more definitive results, including the establishment of an Evaluation
Division responsible for ensuring the quality and utility of NIJ
evaluations, the funding of selected feasibility studies prior to
soliciting outcome evaluations, and greater emphasis on applicants' prior
performance in awarding evaluation grants.
3Outcome evaluations can be distinguished from process or implementation
evaluations, which are designed to assess the extent to which a program is
operating as intended.
Background
We are making recommendations to the Attorney General to improve the
quality of NIJ's outcome evaluations. We recommend that NIJ review the
methodological adequacy of its ongoing grants and take action to improve,
refocus, or limit them, as appropriate; and that NIJ develop approaches to
ensure that future outcome evaluations are effectively designed and
implemented. In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOJ's Office of
Justice Programs' (OJP) Assistant Attorney General agreed with our
recommendations. She also provided technical comments, which we evaluated
and incorporated, as appropriate. The Assistant Attorney General made two
substantive comments on our draft report-one relating to the fact that
even rigorous study design and careful monitoring of program
implementation do not ensure that evaluation results will be conclusive;
the other relating to our purported focus on experimental and
quasi-experimental methods to the exclusion of other high quality
evaluation methods. We respond to these points in the Agency Comments and
Evaluation section of the report.
NIJ is the principal research development, and evaluation agency within
OJP. It was created under the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act,4 and is authorized to enter into grants, cooperative agreements, or
contracts with public or private agencies to carry out evaluations of the
effectiveness of criminal justice programs and identify promising new
programs. NIJ's Office of Research and Evaluation oversees evaluations by
outside researchers of a wide range of criminal justice programs,
including ones addressing violence against women, drugs and crime,
policing and law enforcement, sentencing, and corrections.
According to NIJ officials, the agency initiates a specific criminal
justice program evaluation in one of three ways. First, congressional
legislation may mandate evaluation of specific programs. For example, the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002,5 requires DOJ to conduct independent
evaluations of selected programs funded by OJP's Bureau of Justice
Assistance and selected projects funded by OJP's Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. DOJ determined that NIJ would be
442 U.S.C. 3721-3723. NIJ was formerly called the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
5P.L. 107-77. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-278, at 88, 108, and 112 (2001).
responsible for overseeing these evaluations. Second, NIJ may enter into
an evaluation partnership with another OJP or DOJ office, or another
federal agency, to evaluate specific programs or issues of interest to
both organizations. In these cases, NIJ, in partnership with the program
offices, develops a solicitation for proposals and oversees the resulting
evaluation. Third, NIJ periodically solicits proposals for evaluation of
criminal justice programs directly from the research community, through an
open competition for grants. These solicitations ask evaluators to propose
research of many kinds in any area of criminal justice, or in broad
conceptual areas such as violence against women, policing research and
evaluation, research and evaluation on corrections and sentencing, or
building safer public housing communities through research partnerships.
According to NIJ officials, once the decision has been made to evaluate a
particular program, or to conduct other research in a specific area of
criminal justice, the process of awarding an evaluation grant involves the
following steps. First, NIJ issues a solicitation and receives proposals
from potential evaluators. Next, proposals are reviewed by an external
peer review panel, as well as by NIJ professional staff. The external
review panels are comprised of members of the research and practitioner
communities,6 and reviewers are asked to identify, among other things, the
strengths and weaknesses of the competing proposals. External peer review
panels are to consider the quality and technical merit of the proposal;
the likelihood that grant objectives will be met; the capabilities,
demonstrated productivity, and experience of the evaluators; and budget
constraints. Reviews are to include constructive comments about the
proposal, useful recommendations for change and improvement, and
recommendations as to whether the proposal merits further consideration by
NIJ. NIJ professional staff are to review all proposals and all written
external peer reviews, considering the same factors as the peer review
panels. NIJ professional staff are also to consider the performance of
potential grantees on any other previous research grants with NIJ. Next,
the results of the peer and NIJ staff reviews are discussed in a meeting
of NIJ managers, led by NIJ's Director of the Office of Research and
Evaluation. Then, NIJ's Office of Research and Evaluation staff meet with
the NIJ Director to present their recommendations. Finally, the NIJ
Director makes the funding decision based on peer reviews, staff
recommendations, other internal NIJ discussions that may have taken
6In 2002, the NIJ Director specified that there be an equal number of
researchers and practitioners on the review panels.
place, and consideration of what proposals may have the greatest impact
and contribute the most knowledge.
NIJ generally funds outcome evaluations through grants, rather than with
contracts. NIJ officials told us that there are several reasons for
awarding grants as opposed to contracts. Contracts can give NIJ greater
control over the work of funded researchers, and hold them more
accountable for results. However, NIJ officials said that NIJ most often
uses grants for research and evaluation because they believe that grants
better ensure the independence of the evaluators and the integrity of the
study results. Under a grant, NIJ allows the principal investigator a
great deal of freedom to propose the most appropriate methodology and
carry out the data collection and analysis, without undue influence from
NIJ or the agency funding the program. Grants also require fewer
bureaucratic steps than do contracts, resulting in a process whereby a
researcher can be selected in a shorter amount of time.
NIJ officials told us that NIJ tends to make use of contracts for smaller
and more time-limited tasks-such as literature reviews or assessments of
whether specific programs have sufficient data to allow for more extensive
process or outcome evaluations-rather than for conducting outcome
evaluations. NIJ also occasionally makes use of cooperative agreements,
which entail a greater level of interaction between NIJ and the evaluators
during the course of the evaluation. According to NIJ officials,
cooperative agreements between NIJ and its evaluators tend to be slight
variations of grants, with the addition of a few more specific
requirements for grantees. NIJ officials told us that they might use a
cooperative agreement when NIJ wants to play a significant role in the
selection of an advisory panel, in setting specific milestones, or aiding
in the design of specific data collection instruments.
NIJ is to monitor outcome evaluation grantees in accordance with policies
and procedures outlined in the OJP Grant Management Policies and
Procedures Manual. In general, this includes monitoring grantee progress
through regular contact with grantees (site visits, cluster conferences,
other meetings); required interim reports (semiannual progress and
quarterly financial reports); and a review of final substantive evaluation
reports. In some cases, NIJ will require specific milestone reports,
especially on larger studies. Grant monitoring for all types of studies is
carried out by approximately 20 full-time NIJ grant managers, each
responsible for approximately 17 ongoing grants at any one time.
Overview of the Evaluations We Reviewed
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ awarded about $36.6 million for 96 evaluations
that NIJ identified as focusing on measuring the outcomes of programs,
policies, and interventions, among other things.7 The 15 outcome
evaluations that we selected for review varied in terms of completion
status (8 were completed, 7 were ongoing) and the size of the award
(ranging between about $150,000 and about $2.8 million), and covered a
wide range of criminal justice programs and issues (see table 1). All
evaluations were funded by NIJ through grants or cooperative agreements.8
Seven of the 15 evaluations focused on programs designed to reduce
domestic violence and child maltreatment, 4 focused on programs addressing
the behavior of law enforcement officers (including community policing), 2
focused on programs addressing drug abuse, and 2 focused on programs to
deal with juvenile justice issues.
7A number of these grants included both process and outcome components.
8Three of the 15 evaluations were funded as cooperative agreements.
Table 1: NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed by GAO
Status Grant Award Completed Ongoing Domestic violence and child maltreatment
National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization
Enforcement Grant Program
$719,949 X
National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims' Civil Legal Assistance
Program $800,154 X
Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address Domestic Violence
and Child
Maltreatment $2,498,638 X
Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial Oversight
of Domestic
Violence Cases $2,839,954 X
An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach $153,491 X
Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-American $356,321 X
Men
Testing the Impact of Court Monitoring and Batterer
Intervention Programs at the
Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court $294,129 X
Law enforcement
An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community Policing $2,157,859 X
Program
Corrections and Law Enforcement Family Support: Law $649,990 X
Enforcement Field Test
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of Four
Approaches to
Handling Citizen Calls for Service $399,919 X
Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of X
Early Warning Systems $174,643
Drug abuse
Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle $2,419,344 X
Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public
Housing $187,412 X
Juvenile justice issues
National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and Training Program
$1,568,323 X
Evaluation of a Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative with Randomized
Design $200,000 X
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
Most of the Reviewed Overall, we found that 10 of the 15 evaluations that
we reviewed could not produce sufficiently sound information about program
outcomes. Six
NIJ Outcome Evaluations Could Not Produce Sufficiently Sound Information on
Program Outcomes
evaluations began with sufficiently sound designs, but encountered
implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive. An
additional 4 studies had serious methodological problems that from the
start limited their ability to produce reliable and valid results. Five
studies appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both their design and
implementation. (Appendix II provides additional information on the
funding, objectives, and methodology of the 15 outcome evaluation
studies.)
Most of the Reviewed Studies Were Well Designed, but Many Later Encountered
Implementation Problems
Five Evaluations Were Sufficiently Well Designed and Implemented
Studies Measured Change in Outcomes Over Time
Our review found that 5 evaluations had both sufficiently sound designs
and implementation plans or procedures, thereby maximizing the likelihood
that the study could meaningfully measure program effects. Funding for
these methodologically sound studies totaled about $7.5 million, or nearly
50 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we
reviewed. Six evaluations were well designed, but they encountered
problems implementing the design as planned during the data collection
phase of the study. Funding for these studies with implementation problems
totaled about $3.3 million, or about 21 percent of the approximately $15.4
million spent on the studies we reviewed.
Five of the evaluations we reviewed were well designed and their
implementation was sufficiently sound at the time of our review. Two of
these evaluations had been completed and 3 were ongoing. All 5 evaluations
met generally accepted social science standards for sound design,
including measurement of key outcomes after a follow-up period to measure
change over time, use of comparison groups or appropriate statistical
controls to account for the influence of external factors on the results,9
random sampling of participants and/or sites or other purposeful sampling
methods to ensure generalizable samples and procedures to ensure
sufficient sample sizes, and appropriate data collection and analytic
procedures to ensure the reliability and validity of measures (see table
2).
All 5 evaluations measured, or included plans to measure, specified
outcomes after a sufficient follow-up period. Some designs provided for
collecting baseline data at or before program entry, and outcome data
several months or years following completion of the program. Such designs
allowed evaluators to compare outcome data against a baseline measurement
to facilitate drawing conclusions about the program's effects, and to
gauge whether the effects persisted or were transitory. For example, the
National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and Training Program
examined the effectiveness of a 9-week, school-based education program
that sought to prevent youth crime and violence by reducing student
involvement in gangs. Students were surveyed regarding attitudes toward
gangs, crime, and police, self-reported gang activity, and
9Statistically controlling for external factors that may be related to
program outcomes and on which the treatment and comparison groups differ
is usually not necessary when there is random assignment of participants
to treatment and comparison conditions.
risk-seeking behaviors 2 weeks before the program began, and then again at
yearly intervals for 4 years following the program's completion.
Table 2: Characteristics of 5 NIJ Outcome Evaluations with Sufficiently
Sound Designs and Implementation Plans
Appropriate
sampling Appropriate
data
Use of procedures collection
comparison and and
Sufficient groups to reasonable analysis
control sample
Evaluation study follow-up for external sizes procedures
factors
National Evaluation of the X X X X
Gang Resistance
Education and Training
Program
Evaluation of Breaking the X X X X
Cycle
Evaluation of a Multi-Site Planned X Planned Planned
Demonstration for
Enhanced Judicial
Oversight of Domestic
Violence Cases
Culturally Focused Planned X Planned Planned
Batterer Counseling for
African-American Men
Testing the Impact of Planned X Planned Planned
Court Monitoring and
Batterer Intervention
Programs at the Bronx
Misdemeanor Domestic
Violence Courta
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
aAlthough we have categorized this evaluation as having a sufficiently
sound design and implementation plan, the grantee's proposal did not
discuss how differential attrition from the four treatment groups would be
handled if it occurred. Therefore, we do not know if the grantee has made
sufficient plans to address this potential circumstance.
Measuring change in specific outcome variables at both baseline and after
a follow-up period may not always be feasible. When the outcome of
interest is "recidivism," such as whether drug-involved criminal
defendants continue to commit criminal offenses after participating in a
drug treatment program, the outcome can only be measured after the program
is delivered. In this case, it is important that the follow-up period be
long enough to enable the program's effects to be discerned. For example,
the ongoing evaluation of the Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for
African-American Men seeks to test the relative effectiveness of
counseling that recognizes and responds to cultural issues versus
conventional batterer counseling in reducing batterer recidivism. All
participants in the study had been referred by the court system to
counseling after committing domestic violence violations. The evaluators
planned to measure re-arrests and re-assaults 1 year after program intake,
approximately 8 months after the end of counseling. The study cited prior
research literature noting that two-thirds of first-time re-assaults were
found to occur within 6 months of program intake, and over 80 percent of
Comparison Groups Were Used to Isolate Program Effects
first-time re-assaults over a 2-1/2 year period occur within 12 months of
program intake.
All 5 evaluations used or planned to use comparison groups to isolate and
minimize external factors that could influence the results of the study.
Use of comparison groups is a practice employed by evaluators to help
determine whether differences between baseline and follow-up results are
due to the program under consideration or to other programs or external
factors. In 3 of the 5 studies, research participants were randomly
assigned to a group that received services from the program or to a
comparison group that did not receive services. In constructing comparison
groups, random assignment is an effective technique for minimizing
differences between participants who receive the program and those who do
not on variables that might affect the outcomes of the study. For example,
in the previously mentioned ongoing evaluation of Culturally Focused
Batterer Counseling for African-American Men participants who were
referred to counseling by a domestic violence court are randomly assigned
to one of three groups: (1) a culturally focused group composed of only
African-Americans, (2) a conventional counseling group composed of only
African-Americans, or (3) a mixed race conventional counseling group. The
randomized design allows the investigators to determine the effect of the
culturally focused counseling over and above the effect of participating
in a same race group situation.
In the remaining two evaluation studies, a randomized design was not used
and the comparison group was chosen to match the program group as closely
as possible on a number of characteristics, in an attempt to ensure that
the comparison and program groups would be similar in virtually all
respects aside from the intervention. For example, the ongoing Evaluation
of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial Oversight of Domestic
Violence Cases seeks to examine the effects of a coordinated community
response to domestic violence (including advocacy, provision of victim
services, and enhanced judicial oversight) on victim safety and offender
accountability. To ensure that the comparison and program groups were
similar, comparison sites were selected based on having court caseload and
population demographic characteristics similar to the demonstration sites.
Only the program group is to receive the intervention; and neither
comparison site has a specialized court docket; enhanced judicial
oversight; or a county-wide, coordinated system for handling domestic
violence cases.
Sufficiently Sound Sampling Procedures and Adequate Response Rates Helped
Ensure Representativeness
Careful Data Collection and Analysis Procedures Were Used or Planned
All 5 evaluations employed or planned to employ sufficiently sound
sampling procedures for selecting program and comparison participants.
This was intended to ensure that study participants were representative of
the population being examined so that conclusions about program effects
could be generalized to that population. For example, in the previously
mentioned Judicial Oversight Demonstration evaluation, offenders in
program and comparison sites are being chosen from court records. In each
site, equal numbers of eligible participants are being chosen
consecutively over a 12-month period until a monthly quota is reached.
Although this technique falls short of random sampling, the optimal method
for ensuring comparability across groups, use of the 12-month sampling
period takes into consideration and controls for possible seasonal
variation in domestic violence cases.
The 5 evaluations also had adequate plans to achieve, or succeeded in
achieving, reasonable response rates from participants in their samples.
Failure to achieve adequate response rates threatens the validity of
conclusions about program effects, as it is possible that selected
individuals who do not respond or participate are substantially different
on the outcome variable of interest from those who do respond or
participate. The previously mentioned National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training Program sought to survey students
annually for up to 4 years after program participation ended. The grantee
made considerable efforts in years 2, 3, and 4 to follow up with students
who had moved from middle school to high school and were later enrolled in
a large number of different schools; in some cases, in different school
districts. The grantee achieved a completion rate on the student surveys
of 76 percent after 2 years,10 69 percent after 3 years, and 67 percent
after 4 years. The grantee also presented analyses that statistically
controlled for differential attrition among the treatment and comparison
groups, and across sites, and showed that the program effects that were
found persisted in these specialized analyses.
All 5 well-designed evaluations employed or had adequate plans to employ
careful data collection and analysis procedures. These included procedures
to ensure that the comparison group does not receive services or treatment
received by the program group, response rates are
10The grantee notes that a 1990 analysis of 85 longitudinal studies
reported an average questionnaire completion rate of 72 percent for 19
studies that had a 24-month follow-up period. This is slightly lower than
the 76 percent response rate achieved after 2 years in the Gang Resistance
Education and Training evaluation.
Six Studies Were Well-Designed but Encountered Problems During
Implementation
documented, and statistical analyses are used to adjust for the effects of
selection bias or differential attrition on the measured results.11 For
example, the Breaking the Cycle evaluation examined the effectiveness of a
comprehensive effort to reduce substance abuse and criminal activity among
arrestees with a history of drug involvement. The program group consisted
of felons who tested positive for drug use, reported drug use in the past,
or were charged specifically with drug-related felonies. The comparison
group consisted of persons arrested a year before the implementation of
the Breaking the Cycle intervention who tested positive for at least one
drug. Both groups agreed to participate in the study. Although groups
selected at different times and using different criteria may differ in
systematic ways, the evaluators made efforts to control for differences in
the samples at baseline. Where selection bias was found, a correction
factor was used in the analyses, and corrected results were presented in
the report.
Six of the 11 studies that were well-designed encountered problems in
implementation during the data collection phase, and thus were unable to
or are unlikely to produce definitive results about the outcomes of the
programs being evaluated. Such problems included the use of program and
comparison groups that differed on outcome-related characteristics at the
beginning of the program or became different due to differential
attrition, failure of the program sponsors to implement the program as
originally planned, and low response rates among program participants (see
table 3). Five of the studies had been completed and 1 was ongoing.
11Selection bias refers to biases introduced by selecting different types
of people into the program and comparison groups; differences in measured
outcomes for each group may be a function of preexisting differences
between the groups, rather than the intervention. Differential attrition
refers to unequal loss of participants from the program and comparison
groups during the course of a study, resulting in groups that are no
longer comparable. Both may be a threat to the validity of conclusions.
Table 3: Problems Encountered during Implementation of 6 Well-Designed NIJ
Outcome Evaluation Studies
Program and Program not
comparison implemented as Response rates
Evaluation study groups differed planned were low
An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing X X
Program
Evaluation of a
Comprehensive Service-Based X X
Intervention
Strategy in Public Housing
An Evaluation of Victim
Advocacy with a Team X X
Approach
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls
to 911: An Assessment of X X
Four
Approaches to Handling
Citizen Calls for Service
Responding to the Problem
Police Officer: An X
Evaluation of Early
Warning Systems
Evaluation of the Juvenile
Justice Mental Health X
Initiative with
Randomized Design
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
Differences between Program and Comparison Group Characteristics Make it
Difficult to Attribute Outcomes to the Program
Three of the 6 studies used a comparison group that differed from the
program group in terms of characteristics likely to be related to program
outcomes-either due to preexisting differences or to differential
attrition-even though the investigators may have made efforts to minimize
the occurrence of these problems.12 As a result, a finding that program
and comparison group participants differed in outcomes could not be
attributed solely to the program. For example, the Comprehensive
Service-Based Intervention Strategy in Public Housing evaluation sought to
reduce drug activity and promote family self-sufficiency among tenants of
a public housing complex in one city through on-site comprehensive
services and high profile police involvement. The intervention site was a
housing project in one section of the city; the comparison site was
another public housing complex on the opposite side of town, chosen for
its similarities to the intervention site in terms of race, family
composition, crime statistics, and the number of women who were welfare
recipients. However, when baseline data from the two sites were examined,
important preexisting differences between the two sites became apparent.
These differences included a higher proportion of residents at the
comparison site who were employed, which could have differentially
12Preexisting differences between the program and comparison groups can be
viewed as a design problem. We treat this as an implementation problem in
this section because the proposed design for these particular studies
appeared to us to be reasonable at the time the funding decision was made.
Problems with the comparability of the groups became apparent only after
the studies were well underway, and often it was too late to control for
the effects of such differences on program outcomes with statistical
adjustments.
Program Results Not Measurable Because Program Not Implemented as Planned
affected intervention and comparison residents' propensity to utilize and
benefit from available services. Additionally, since there was
considerable attrition at both the intervention and comparison sites, it
is possible that the intervention and comparison group respondents who
remained differed on some factors related to the program outcomes.
Although it may have been possible to statistically control for these
differences when analyzing program outcomes, the evaluator did not do so
in the analyses presented in the final report.
In 5 of the 6 studies, evaluators ran into methodological problems because
the program under evaluation was not implemented as planned, and the
investigators could not test the hypotheses that they had outlined in
their grant proposals. For the most part, this particular implementation
problem was beyond the evaluators' control. It resulted from decisions
made by agencies providing program services that had agreed to cooperate
with the evaluators but, for a number of reasons, made changes in the
programs or did not cooperate as fully as expected after the studies were
underway. This occurred in the evaluation of the Juvenile Justice Mental
Health Initiative with Randomized Design, a study that is ongoing and
expected to be completed in September 2003. The investigators had proposed
to test whether two interventions provided within an interagency
collaborative setting were effective in treating youths with serious
emotional disturbances referred to the juvenile justice system for
delinquency. Juveniles were to be randomly assigned to one of two
treatment programs, depending on age and offense history (one for youth
under the age of 14 without serious, violent, or chronic offense history,
and one for youth ages 14 and older with serious, violent, or chronic
delinquencies) or to a comparison group that received preexisting court
affiliated service programs. The evaluators themselves had no power to
develop or modify programs. The funding agencies13 contracted with a local
parent support agency and with a nonprofit community-based agency to
implement the programs, but the program for youth under the age of 14 was
never implemented.14 In addition, partway through the study, the funding
agencies decided to terminate random assignment of juveniles, and shortly
thereafter ended the program. As a result, the evaluators had complete
data on 45 juveniles who had been in the treatment program, rather than
13The treatment programs were to be developed under the funding and
oversight of the St. Louis Mental Health Board and the Missouri Department
of Mental Health.
14As a result, juveniles under 14 were randomly assigned to either the
program for juveniles 14 and over, or to the comparison group.
Low Response Rates May Reduce the Reliability and Validity of Findings
on the 100 juveniles they had proposed to study. Although the study
continued to collect data on juveniles eligible for the study (who were
then assigned to the comparison group, since a treatment option was no
longer available), the evaluators proposed to analyze the data from the
random experiment separately, examining only those treatment and
comparison youths assigned when program slots were available. Because of
the smaller number of participants than anticipated, detailed analyses of
certain variables (such as the type, or amount of service received, or the
effects of race and gender) are likely to be unreliable.
Low response rates were a problem in 2 of the 6 studies, potentially
reducing the reliability and validity of the findings. In a third study,
response rates were not reported, making it impossible for us to determine
whether this was a problem or not.15 In one study where the response rate
was a problem, the evaluators attempted to survey victims of domestic
abuse, a population that NIJ officials acknowledged was difficult to
reach. In An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy With a Team Approach, the
evaluators attempted to contact by telephone women who were victims of
domestic violence, to inquire about victims' experiences with subsequent
violence and their perceptions of safety. Response rates were only about
23 percent, and the victims who were interviewed differed from those who
were not interviewed in terms of the nature and seriousness of the abuse
to which they had been subjected. NIJ's program manager told us that when
she became aware of low response rates on the telephone survey, she and
the principal investigator discussed a variety of strategies to increase
response rates. She said the grantee expended additional time and effort
to increase the response rate, but had limited success. In the other study
with low response rates-Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment
of Four Approaches to Handling Citizen Calls for Service-investigators
attempted to survey police officers in one city regarding their attitudes
about the city's new non-emergency phone system. Only 20 percent of the
police officers completed the survey.
15The Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public Housing reported response rates for both the intervention and
comparison sites on a survey at baseline, but did not report response
rates for follow-up surveys conducted 12 and 18 months after the
intervention began.
Some Evaluation Studies Had Serious Design Limitations from the Beginning
Four of the evaluation studies began with serious design problems that
diminished their ability to produce reliable or valid findings about
program outcomes. One of the studies was completed, and 3 were ongoing.
The studies' design problems included the lack of comparison groups,
failure to measure the intended outcomes of the program, and failure to
collect preprogram data as a baseline for the outcomes of interest (see
table 4). Funding for these studies that began with serious methodological
problems totaled about $4.7 million, or about 30 percent of the
approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
Table 4: Design Limitations in 4 NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies
No Intended Limited comparison outcomes not pre-program Evaluation study
group measured data
National Evaluation of the Rural X X X
Domestic Violence and Child
Victimization Enforcement Grant
Program
National Evaluation of the Domestic X X
Violence Victims' Civil Legal Assistance
Program
Multi-Site Demonstration of X X
Collaborations to Address Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment
Corrections and Law Enforcement X
Family Support: Law Enforcement Field
Test
Lack of Comparison Groups
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
None of the 4 outcome evaluation studies had a comparison group built into
the design-a factor that hindered the evaluator's ability to isolate and
minimize external factors that could influence the results of the study.
The completed National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child
Victimization Enforcement Grant Program did not make use of comparison
groups to study the effectiveness of the federal grant program that
supports projects designed to prevent and respond to domestic violence,
dating violence, and child victimization in rural communities. Instead,
evaluators collected case study data from multiday site visits to 9
selected sites.
The other three funded grant proposals submitted to NIJ indicated that
they anticipated difficulty in locating and forming appropriate comparison
groups. However, they proposed to explore the feasibility of using
comparison groups in the design phase following funding of the grant. At
Intended Outcomes of Program Were Not Measured
the time of our review, when each of these studies was well into
implementation, none was found to be using a comparison group. For
example, the Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to
Address Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment proposed to examine
whether steps taken to improve collaboration between dependency courts,
child protective services, and domestic violence service providers in
addressing the problems faced by families with cooccurring instances of
domestic violence and child maltreatment resulted in improvements in how
service providers dealt with domestic violence and child maltreatment
cases. Although NIJ stated that the evaluators planned to collect
individual case record data from similar communities, at the time of our
review these sites had not yet been identified, nor had a methodology for
identifying the sites been proposed. Our review was conducted during the
evaluation's third year of funding.
Although they were funded as outcome evaluations, 2 of the 4 studies were
not designed to provide information on intended outcomes for individuals
served by the programs. Both the Rural Domestic Violence and the
Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations programs had as their
objectives the enhanced safety of victims, among other goals. However,
neither of the evaluations of these programs collected data on individual
women victims and their families in order to examine whether the programs
achieved this objective. Most of the data collected in the Rural Domestic
Violence evaluation were indicators of intermediary results, such as
increases in the knowledge and training of various rural service
providers. While such intermediary results may be necessary precursors to
achieving the program's objectives of victim safety, they are not
themselves indicators of victim safety. The Multi-Site Demonstration of
Collaborations evaluation originally proposed to collect data on the
safety of women and children as well as perpetrator recidivism, but in the
second year of the evaluation project, the evaluators filed a request to
change the scope of the study. Specifically, they noted that the original
outcome indicators proposed for victim safety were not appropriate given
the time frame of the evaluation compared to the progress of the
demonstration project itself. The modified scope, which was approved by
NIJ, focused on system rather than individual level outcomes. The new
`effectiveness' indicators included such things as changes in policies and
procedures of agencies participating in the collaboration, and how agency
personnel identify, process, and manage families with co-occurring
domestic violence and child maltreatment. Such a design precludes
conclusions about whether the programs improved the lives of victims of
domestic violence or their children.
Lack of Pre-Program Data Hinders Ability to Show That Program Produced
Change
As discussed in our March 2002 report, the Rural Domestic Violence
evaluation team did not collect baseline data prior to the start of the
program, making it difficult to identify change resulting from the
program. In addition, at the time of our review, in the third year of the
multi-year National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims' Civil
Legal Assistance Program evaluation, the evaluator did not know whether
baseline data would be available to examine changes resulting from the
program. This evaluation, of the federal Civil Legal Assistance program,16
proposed to measure whether there had been a decrease in pro se
representation (or self-representation) in domestic violence protective
order cases. A decrease in pro se representation would indicate successful
assistance to clients by Civil Legal Assistance grantees. In May 2003, NIJ
reported that the evaluator was still in the process of contacting the
court systems at the study sites to see which ones had available data on
pro se cases. The evaluator also proposed to ask a sample of domestic
violence victims whether they had access to civil legal assistance
services prior to the program, the outcomes of their cases, and
satisfaction with services. Respondents were to be selected from a list of
domestic violence clients served by Civil Legal Assistance grantees within
a specified time period, possibly 3 to 9 months prior to the start of the
outcome portion of the study. Such retrospective data on experiences that
may have occurred more than 9 months ago must be interpreted with caution,
given the possibility of recall errors or respondents' lack of knowledge
about services that were available in the past.
NIJ Has Funded Outcome Evaluations Despite Major Gaps in Knowledge about the
Availability of Data and Comparison Groups
Outcome evaluations are inherently difficult to conduct because in
real-world settings program results can be affected by factors other than
the intervention being studied. In addition, grantees' ability to conduct
such evaluations can depend on the extent to which information is
available up front about what data are available to answer the research
questions, where such data can be obtained, and how the data can be
collected for both the intervention and comparison groups. We found that
in 3 of the 15 NIJ evaluations we reviewed, NIJ lacked sufficient
information about these issues to assure itself that the proposals it
funded were feasible to carry out. These 3 studies totaled about $3.7
million.
16Civil Legal Assistance provides grants to nonprofit, nongovernmental
organizations that provide legal services to victims of domestic violence
or that work with victims of domestic violence who have civil legal needs.
For the Evaluation of Non-Emergency Calls to 911, NIJ and DOJ's Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services jointly solicited grant proposals to
evaluate strategies taken by 4 cities to decrease non-emergency calls to
the emergency 911 system. NIJ officials told us that they had conducted
3-day site visits of the 4 sites, and that discussions with local
officials included questions about availability of data in each
jurisdiction. The NIJ solicitation for proposals contained descriptions of
how non-emergency calls were processed at all 4 sites, but no information
on the availability of outcome data to assess changes in the volume, type,
and nature of emergency and non-emergency calls before and after the
advent of the non-emergency systems. Evaluators were asked to conduct both
a process analysis and an assessment analysis. The assessment analysis was
to include "compiling and/or developing data" on a number of outcome
questions. Once the study was funded, however, the grantee learned that
only 1 of the 4 cities had both a system designed specifically to reduce
non-emergency calls to 911, as well as reliable data for evaluation
purposes.
In the case of the Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address
Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment, NIJ funded the proposal without
knowing whether the grantee would be able to form comparison groups. NIJ
officials stated that one of the reasons for uncertainty about the study
design was that at the time the evaluator was selected, the 6
demonstration sites had not yet been selected. The proposal stated that
the grantee would explore the "potential for incorporating comparison
communities or comparison groups at the site level, and assess the
feasibility, costs, and contributions and limitations of a design that
incorporates comparison groups or communities." NIJ continued to fund the
grantee for 3 additional years, although the second year proposal for
supplemental funding made no mention of comparison groups and the third
year proposal stated that the grantee would search for comparison sites,
but did not describe how such sites would be located. In response to our
questions about whether comparison groups would be used in the study, NIJ
officials said that the plan was for the grantee to compare a random
sample of case records from before program implementation to those after
implementation at each of the demonstration sites. Designs utilizing
pre-post treatment comparisons within the same group are not considered to
be as rigorous as pre-post-treatment comparison group designs because they
do not allow evaluators to determine whether the results are due to the
program under consideration or to some other programs or external factors.
NIJ also approved the Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations proposal
without knowing whether data on individual victims of domestic violence
and child maltreatment would be available during the time frame of the
evaluation. The first year proposal stated that the grantee would examine
outcomes for individuals and families, although it also noted that there
are challenges to assessing such outcomes and that system outcomes should
be examined first. Our review found that in the third year of the
evaluation, data collection was focused solely on "system" outcomes, such
as changes in policies and procedures and how agency personnel identify,
process, and manage families with co-occurring domestic violence and child
maltreatment. Thus, although the original design called for answering
questions about the outcomes of the program for individuals and families,
NIJ could not expect answers to such questions.17
In the case of the Civil Legal Assistance study, NIJ officials told us
that they have held discussions with the grantee about the feasibility of
adding comparison groups to the design. According to these officials, the
grantee said that a comparison group design would force it to reduce the
process sites to be studied from 20 to somewhere between 6 and 8. NIJ
advised the grantee that so large a reduction in sites would be too high a
price to pay to obtain comparison groups, and advised the grantee to stay
with the design as originally proposed. Consequently, NIJ cannot expect a
rigorous assessment of outcomes from this evaluation.
17NIJ officials told us in August 2003 that the evaluation had been funded
for a fourth year, and that the federal agencies funding this evaluation
(DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services) were also
considering a fifth year of funding. Four years of funding allows the
evaluation to collect data covering about the first 3 years of
implementation in the sites. However, data collected from stakeholders at
the sites early in the evaluation showed that the sites expected that it
would take 3.5 to 4 years to achieve change in key individual level
outcomes. At the time of our review, there was no information on whether
individual level outcome data would be collected.
Completed Outcome Evaluations Produced Useful Information on Processes but Not
on Outcomes for DOJ Program Administrators
Of the 5 completed NIJ studies that focused on issues of interest to DOJ
program offices, findings related to program effectiveness were not
sufficiently reliable or conclusive. However, DOJ program administrators
told us that they found some of the process and implementation findings
from the completed studies to be useful.18
Program administrators from DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women said
that although they did not obtain useful outcome results from the Rural
Domestic Violence evaluation, they identified two "lessons learned" from
the process and implementation components of the study. First, the
evaluation found that very little information was available to grantees
regarding how to create collaborative programs. Thus, DOJ engaged a
technical assistance organization to develop a training program on how to
create collaborative projects based on the experiences of some of the
grantees examined by the Rural evaluation. Second, program administrators
told us that the evaluation found that because Rural grants were funded on
an 18-month schedule, programs did not have adequate time to structure
program services and also collect useful program information. As a result,
Rural programs are now funded for at least 24 months.19
While shortcomings in NIJ's outcome evaluations of law enforcement
programs leave questions about whether the programs are effective and
whether they should continue to be funded, program administrators in DOJ's
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services said that the studies
helped identify implementation problems that assisted them in developing
and disseminating information in ways useful to the law enforcement
community. These included curriculum development, leadership conferences,
and fact sheets and other research publications. For example, as a result
of the NIJ-managed study, Responding to the
18Because of our interest in the effectiveness of criminal justice
programs, we limited our review of the usefulness of NIJ outcome
evaluations to evaluations of DOJ programs, or evaluations funded by DOJ-a
total of 5 evaluations. We did not examine 3 other completed NIJ outcome
evaluations focusing on programs funded by agencies other than DOJ.
19Officials with DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women were not familiar
with the findings from the other completed NIJ study focusing on violence
against women, the Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach evaluation. This
evaluation was funded by a transfer of funds to NIJ for NIJ research and
evaluations in the area of violence against women. NIJ officials stated
that Office on Violence Against Women officials were consulted in the
development of the solicitation.
Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early Warning Systems,20 DOJ
officials developed a draft command level guidebook that focuses on the
factors to be considered in developing an early warning system, developed
an early warning intervention training curriculum that is being taught by
the 31 Regional Community Policing Institutes21 located across the
country, and convened a "state-of-art" conference for five top law
enforcement agencies that were developing early warning systems. DOJ
officials also said the studies showed that the various systems evaluated
had been well received by citizens and law enforcement officials. For
example, they said that citizens like the 311 non-emergency number that
was established in several cities to serve as an alternative to calling
the 911 emergency number. The system allows law enforcement officers to
identify hot spots or trouble areas in the city by looking at various
patterns in the citizen call data. Officials may also be able to monitor
the overall state of affairs in the city, such as the presence of
potholes, for example. Similarly, Chicago's City-Wide Community Policing
program resulted in the development of a crime mapping system, enabling
officers to track crime in particular areas of the city. Like the
non-emergency telephone systems, DOJ officials believe that crime mapping
helps inform citizens, police, and policy makers about potential problem
areas.
NIJ's Current and NIJ officials told us that they have begun to take
several steps to try to
increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will produce morePlanned
Activities to definitive results. We recommended in our March 2002 report
on selected Improve Its NIJ-managed outcome evaluations22 that NIJ assess
its evaluation process
to help ensure that future outcome evaluations produce definitive results.
Evaluation Program In November 2002, Congress amended the relevant
statute to include cost-effectiveness evaluation where practical as part
of NIJ's charge to conduct evaluations.23 Since that time NIJ has
established an Evaluation Division
20An early warning system is a data based police management tool designed
to identify officers whose behavior is problematic, as indicated by high
rates of citizen complaints, use of force incidents, or other evidence of
behavior problems, and to provide some form of intervention, such as
counseling or training to correct that performance. The NIJ-managed study
consisted of a process and outcome evaluation of early warning systems in
3 large urban police departments, as well as a national survey.
21Through the Regional Community Policing Institute network, DOJ's Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services assists local law enforcement
agencies with meeting their community policing training needs.
22GAO-02-309.
23Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 sec. 237.
within NIJ's Office of Research and Evaluation. NIJ officials told us that
they have also placed greater emphasis on funding cost-benefit studies,
funded feasibility studies prior to soliciting outcome evaluations, and
placed greater emphasis on applicants' prior performance in awarding
grants.
In January 2003, NIJ established an Evaluation Division within NIJ's
Office of Research and Evaluation, as part of a broader reorganization of
NIJ programs. According to NIJ, the Division will "oversee NIJ's
evaluations of other agency's [sic] programs and...develop policies and
procedures that establish standards for assuring quality and utility of
evaluations."24 NIJ officials told us that among other things, the
Division will be responsible for recommending to the NIJ Director which
evaluations should be undertaken, assigning NIJ staff to evaluation grants
and overseeing their work, and maintaining oversight responsibility for
ongoing evaluation grants. In addition, NIJ officials told us that one of
the NIJ Director's priorities is to put greater emphasis on evaluations
that examine the costs and benefits of programs or interventions. To
support this priority, NIJ officials told us that the Evaluation Division
had recently developed training for NIJ staff on cost-benefit and
cost-effectiveness analysis.25
NIJ recently undertook 37 "evaluability assessments" to assess the
feasibility of conducting outcome evaluations of congressionally earmarked
programs prior to soliciting proposals for evaluation.26 In 2002 and 2003,
these assessments were conducted to examine each project's
24NIJ Web site (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/about.htm).
25These analyses compare a program's outputs or outcomes with the costs
(resources expended) to produce them. Cost-effectiveness analysis assesses
the costs of meeting a single goal or objective, and can be used to
identify the least costly alternative to meet that goal. Cost-benefit
analysis aidms to identify all the relevant costs and benefits, usually
expressed in dollar terms.
26Earmarked refers to dedicating an appropriation for a particular
purpose. Legislative language may designate any portion of a lump-sum
amount for particular purposes. In fiscal year 2002, congressional
guidance for the use of these funds was provided in conference report H.R.
107-278. The report specified that up to 10 percent of the funds for the
Bureau of Justice Assistance's Edward Byrne Discretionary Grant Program be
made available for an independent evaluation of the program (at 88); and
up to 10 percent of the funds for the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention's Discretionary Grants for National Programs and
Special Emphasis Programs (at 108) and Safe Schools Initiative be made
available for an independent evaluation of the program (at 112).
scope, activities, and potential for rigorous evaluation.27 The effort
included telephone interviews and site visits to gather information
regarding such things as what outcomes could be measured, what kinds of
data were being collected by program staff, and the probability of using a
comparison group or random assignment in the evaluation. Based on the
review, NIJ solicited proposals from the research community to evaluate a
subset of the earmarked programs that NIJ believed were ready for outcome
evaluation.28
NIJ officials also stated that in an effort to improve the performance of
its grantees, it has begun to pay greater attention to the quality and
timeliness of their performance on previous NIJ grants when reviewing
funding proposals. As part of NIJ's internal review of grant applications,
NIJ staff check that applicants' reports are complete and accurate and
evaluate past work conducted by the applicant using performance related
measures. Although this is not a new activity, NIJ officials told us that
NIJ was now placing more emphasis on reviewing applicants' prior
performance than it had in the past.29 NIJ officials told us that NIJ
staff may also contact staff in other OJP offices, where the applicant may
have received grant funding, to assess applicant performance on those
grants.
Conclusions Our in-depth review of 15 outcome evaluations managed by NIJ
during the past 10 years indicated that the majority was beset with
methodological and/or implementation problems that limited the ability to
draw meaningful conclusions about the programs' effectiveness. Although
our sample is not representative of all NIJ outcome evaluations conducted
during the last 10 years, it includes those that have received a large
proportion of the total funding for this type of research, and tends to be
drawn from the most recent work. The findings from this review, coupled
with similar findings we reported in other reviews of NIJ outcome
27Prior to conducting the evaluability assessments, NIJ conducted an
initial review of the earmarked programs, and eliminated from
consideration those programs that were appearing in legislation for the
first time, in order to focus on those programs that were receiving
continuation funding.
28The solicitation deadlines were April 11, 2003, for the Bureau of
Justice Assistance programs and July 15, 2003, for the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention programs.
29A new requirement of the solicitation for proposals is that applicants
report what prior funding they have received from NIJ.
evaluations, raise concerns about the level of attention NIJ is focusing
on ensuring that funded outcome evaluations produce credible results.
We recognize that it is very difficult to design and execute outcome
evaluations that produce meaningful and definitive results. Real world
evaluations of complex social programs inevitably pose methodological
challenges that can be difficult to control and overcome. Nonetheless, we
believe it is possible to conduct outcome evaluations in real world
settings that produce meaningful results. Indeed, 5 of NIJ's outcome
evaluations can be characterized in this way, and these 5 accounted for
about 48 percent of the $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed. We
also believe that NIJ could do more to help ensure that the millions of
dollars it spends annually to evaluate criminal justice programs is money
well spent. Indeed, poor evaluations can have substantial costs if they
result in continued funding for ineffective programs or the curtailing of
funding for effective programs.
NIJ officials told us that they recognize the need to improve their
evaluation efforts and have begun to take several steps in an effort to
increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will produce more
conclusive results. These steps include determining whether a program is
ready for evaluation and monitoring evaluators' work more closely. We
support NIJ's efforts to improve the rigor of its evaluations. However, it
is too soon to tell whether and to what extent these efforts will lead to
NIJ funding more rigorous effectiveness evaluations, and result in NIJ
obtaining evaluative information that can better assist policy makers in
making decisions about criminal justice funding priorities. In addition to
the steps that NIJ is taking, we believe that NIJ can benefit from
reviewing problematic studies it has already funded in order to determine
the underlying causes for the problems and determine ways to avoid them in
the future.
Recommendations for We recommend that the Attorney General instruct the
Director of NIJ to:
Executive Action
o Conduct a review of its ongoing outcome evaluation grants-including
those discussed in this report-and develop appropriate strategies and
corrective measures to ensure that methodological design and
implementation problems are overcome so the evaluations can produce more
conclusive results. Such a review should consider the design and
implementation issues we identified in our assessment in order to decide
whether and what type of intervention may be appropriate. If, based on
NIJ's review, it appears that the methodological problems cannot be
overcome, NIJ should consider refocusing the studies' objectives and/or
limiting funding.
o Continue efforts to respond to our March 2002 recommendation that NIJ
Agency Comments
and our Evaluation
assess its evaluation process with the purpose of developing approaches to
ensure that future outcome evaluation studies are funded only when they
are effectively designed and implemented. The assessment could consider
the feasibility of such steps as:
o obtain more information about the availability of outcome data prior to
developing a solicitation for research; o require that outcome
evaluation proposals contain more detailed design specifications before
funding decisions are made regarding these proposals; and
o more carefully calibrate NIJ monitoring procedures to the cost of the
grant, the risks inherent in the proposed methodology, and the extent of
knowledge in the area under investigation.
We provided a copy of a draft of this report to the Attorney General for
review and comment. In a September 4, 2003, letter, DOJ's Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs commented on the
draft. Her comments are summarized below and presented in their entirety
in appendix III.
The Assistant Attorney General stated that NIJ agreed with our
recommendations. She also highlighted NIJ's current and planned activities
to improve its evaluation program. For example, as we note in the report,
NIJ has established an Evaluation Division and initiated a new strategy of
evaluability assessments. Evaluability assessments are intended to be
quick, low cost initial assessments of criminal or juvenile justice
programs to help NIJ determine if the necessary conditions exist to
warrant sponsoring a full-scale outcome evaluation. To improve its
grantmaking process, the Assistant Attorney General stated that NIJ is
developing a new grant "special conditions" that will require grantees to
document all changes in the scope and components of evaluation designs. In
response to our concerns, NIJ also plans, in fiscal year 2004, to review
its grant monitoring procedures for evaluation grants in order to more
intensively monitor the larger or more complex grants. NIJ also plans to
conduct periodic reviews of its evaluation research portfolio to assess
the progress of ongoing grants. This procedure is to include documenting
any changes in evaluation design that may have occurred and reassessing
the expected benefits of ongoing projects.
In her letter, the Assistant Attorney General made two substantive
comments-both concerning our underlying assumptions in conducting the
review-with which we disagree. In her first comment, the Assistant
Attorney General noted that our report implies that conclusive evaluation
results can always be achieved if studies are rigorously designed and
carefully monitored. We disagree with this characterization of the
implication of our report. While sound research design and careful
monitoring of program implementation are factors that can significantly
affect the extent to which outcome evaluation results are conclusive, they
are not the only factors. We believe that difficulties associated with
conducting outcome evaluations in real world settings can give rise to
situations in which programs are not implemented as planned or requisite
data turn out not to be available. In such instances, even a well-designed
and carefully monitored evaluation will not produce conclusive findings
about program effectiveness. Our view is that when such problems occur,
NIJ should respond and take appropriate action. NIJ could (1) take steps
to improve the methodological adequacy of the studies if it is feasible to
do so, (2) reconsider the purpose and scope of evaluation if there is
interest in aspects of the program other than its effectiveness, or (3)
decide to end the evaluation project if it is not likely to produce useful
information on program outcomes.
In her second comment, the Assistant Attorney General expressed the view
that our work excluded consideration of valid, high quality evaluation
methods other than experimental and quasi-experimental design. We believe
that our assessment of NIJ's outcome evaluations was both appropriate and
comprehensive. We examined a variety of methodological attributes of NIJ's
studies in trying to assess whether they would produce sufficiently sound
information on program outcomes. Among other things, we systematically
examined such factors as the type of evaluation design used; how program
effects were isolated (that is, whether comparison groups or statistical
controls were utilized); the size of study samples and appropriateness of
sampling procedures; the reliability, validity, and appropriateness of
outcome measures; the length of follow-up periods on program participants;
the extent to which program attrition or program participant nonresponse
may have been an issue; the appropriateness of analytic techniques that
were employed; and the reported results. Therefore, we made determinations
about the cause and effect linkages between programs and outcomes using a
myriad of methodological information. In discussing the methodological
strengths of experimental and quasi-experimental designs, we did not
intend to be dismissive of other potential approaches to isolating the
effects of program interventions. For example, if statistical controls can
be employed to
adequately compensate for a methodological weakness such as the existence
of a comparison group that is not comparable on characteristics that could
affect the study's outcome, then we endorse the use of such a technique.
However, in those instances where our review found that NIJ's studies
could not produce sufficiently sound information about program outcomes,
we saw no evidence that program effects had been isolated using
alternative, compensatory, or supplemental methods.
In addition to these comments, the Assistant Attorney General also
provided us with a number of technical comments, which we incorporated in
the report as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days from
the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to the Attorney
General, appropriate congressional committees and other interested
parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's
Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
Laurie E. Ekstrand Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to your request, we undertook a review of the outcome
evaluation work performed under the direction of the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) during the last 10 years. We are reporting on (1) the
methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome
evaluation grants and (2) the usefulness of the evaluations in producing
information on program outcomes.
Our review covered outcome evaluation grants managed by NIJ from 1992
through 2002. Outcome evaluations are defined as those efforts designed to
determine whether a program, project, or intervention produced its
intended effects. These kinds of studies can be distinguished from process
evaluations, which are designed to assess the extent to which a program is
operating as intended.
To determine the methodological quality of a sample of NIJ-managed outcome
evaluations, we asked NIJ, in June 2002, to identify and give us a list of
all outcome evaluations managed by NIJ that were initiated during the last
10 years, or initiated at an earlier date but completed during the last 5
years. NIJ identified 96 evaluation studies that contained outcome
evaluation components that had been awarded during this period. A number
of these studies included both process and outcome components. We did not
independently verify the accuracy or completeness of the data NIJ
provided.
These 96 evaluations were funded for a total of about $36.6 million.
Individual grant awards ranged in size from $22,374 to about $2.8 million.
Twenty grants were awarded for $500,000 or more, for a total of about
$22.8 million (accounting for about 62 percent of all funding for NIJ
outcome evaluations during the 10-year review period); 51 grants for less
than $500,000, but more than $100,000, for a total of about $11.7 million
(accounting for about 32 percent of all NIJ outcome evaluation funding);
and 25 grants for $100,000 or less, for a total of about $2.1 million
(accounting for about 6 percent of all NIJ outcome evaluation funding).
Fifty-one of the 96 evaluations had been completed at the time of our
review; 45 were ongoing.
From the list of 96 outcome evaluation grants, we selected a judgmental
sample of 16 grants for an in-depth methodological review. Our sample
selection criteria were constructed so as to sample both large and
medium-sized grants (in terms of award size), and both completed and
ongoing studies. We selected 8 large evaluations-funded at $500,000 or
above-and 8 medium-sized evaluations-funded at between $101,000 and
$499,000. Within each group of 8 we selected the 4 most recently
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
completed evaluations, and the 4 most recently initiated evaluations that
were still ongoing, in an effort to ensure that the majority of the grants
reviewed were subject to the most recent NIJ grant management policies and
procedures. One of the medium-sized ongoing evaluations was dropped from
our review when we determined that the evaluation was in the formative
stage of development; that is, the application had been awarded but the
methodological design had not yet been fully developed. As a result, our
in-depth methodological review covered 15 NIJ-managed outcome evaluations
accounting for about 42 percent of the total spent on outcome evaluation
grants between 1992 and 2002 (see tables 5 and 6). These studies are not
necessarily representative of all outcome evaluations managed by NIJ
during this period.
Table 5: Number and Size of Outcome Evaluation Awards Made by NIJ from 1992
through 2002, and Reviewed by GAO
All NIJ outcome evaluations NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by GAO
Size of grant
Number of grants
Total funding
Number of grants (percent Total funding (percent reviewed in category) reviewed
in category)
Large ($500,000 or more) 20 $22,801,186 8 (40%) $13,654,211 (60%)
Medium ($101,000-$499,000) 51 11,687,679 7 (14%) 1,765,915 (15%)
Small ($100,000 or less) 25 2,110,737 N/A N/A
Total 96 $36,599,602 15 (16%) $15,420,126 (42%)
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Table 6: Size and Completion Status of the 15 Evaluations Selected for
Methodological Review Size of award Status
Grant title Award Large Medium Completed Ongoing
National Evaluation of Gang
Resistance Education and
Training Program $1,568,323 X X
Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing
Program $2,157,859 X X
National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and
Child Victimization Enforcement $719,949 X X
Grant Program
Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle $2,419,344 X X
National Evaluation of the
Domestic Violence Victims' Civil
Legal Assistance Program $800,154 X X
Evaluation of a Multi-Site
Demonstration of Collaborations
to Address Domestic Violence and $2,498,638 X X
Child Maltreatment
Corrections and Law Enforcement
Family Support: Law
Enforcement Field Test $649,990 X X
Evaluation of a Multi-Site
Demonstration for Enhanced
Judicial Oversight of Domestic $2,839,954 X X
Violence Cases
Evaluation of a Comprehensive
Service-Based
Intervention Strategy in Public $187,412 X X
Housing
An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy $153,491 X X
with a Team Approach
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to
911: An Assessment of
Four Approaches to Handling $399,919 X X
Citizen Calls for Service
Responding to the Problem Police
Officer: An Evaluation
of Early Warning Systems $174,643 X X
Evaluation of a Juvenile Justice
Mental Health Initiative
with Randomized Design $200,000 X X
Culturally Focused Batterer
Counseling for African-
American Men $356,321 X X
Testing the Impact of Court
Monitoring and Batterer
Intervention Programs at the
Bronx Misdemeanor
Domestic Violence Court $294,129 X X
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
The evaluations we selected comprised a broad representation of issues in
the criminal justice field and of program delivery methods. In terms of
criminal justice issues, 7 of the 15 evaluations focused on programs
designed to reduce domestic violence, 4 focused on programs addressing the
behavior of law enforcement officers, 2 focused on programs addressing
drug abuse, and 2 focused on programs to deal with juvenile justice
issues. In terms of program delivery methods, 3 evaluations examined
national discretionary grant programs or nationwide cooperative
agreements, 4 examined multisite demonstration programs, and 8 examined
local programs or innovations.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For the 15 outcome evaluations we reviewed, we asked NIJ to provide any
documentation relevant to the design and implementation of the outcome
evaluation methodologies, such as the application solicitation, the
grantee's initial and supplemental applications, progress notes, interim
reports, requested methodological changes, and any final reports that may
have become available. We used a data collection instrument to obtain
information systematically about each program being evaluated and about
the features of the evaluation methodology. We based our data collection
and assessments on generally accepted social science standards.1 We
examined such factors as whether evaluation data were collected before and
after program implementation; how program effects were isolated (i.e., the
use of nonprogram participant comparison groups or statistical controls);
and the appropriateness of sampling, outcome measures, statistical
analyses, and any reported results.2 A senior social scientist with
training and experience in evaluation research and methodology read and
coded the documentation for each evaluation. A second senior social
scientist reviewed each completed data collection instrument and the
relevant documentation for the outcome evaluation to verify the accuracy
of every coded item. We relied on documents NIJ provided to us between
October 2002 and May 2003 in assessing the evaluation methodologies and
reporting on each evaluation's status. We grouped the studies into 3
categories based on our judgment of their methodological soundness.
Although we recognize that the stronger studies may have had some
weaknesses, and that the weaker studies may have had some strengths, our
categorization of the studies was a summary judgment based on the totality
of the information provided to us by NIJ. Following our review, we
interviewed NIJ officials regarding NIJ's role in soliciting, selecting,
and monitoring these grants, and spoke to NIJ grant managers regarding
issues raised about each of the grants during the course of our
methodological review.
1These standards are well defined in scientific literature. See, for
example, Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,
1963); Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research: Methods for Assessing Program
Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward A.
Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service &
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and
GAO/PEMD-10.1.4.
2The evaluations varied in the methodologies that were used to examine
program effects. Of the 15 evaluations, 14 did not explicitly discuss
cost/benefit considerations. The evaluation of Breaking the Cycle
estimated cost/benefit ratios at each of the 3 demonstration sites
examined.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In the course of our discussions with NIJ officials, we learned of changes
NIJ has underway to improve its administration of outcome evaluation
studies. To document these changes, we interviewed responsible NIJ
officials, and requested and reviewed relevant documents. We are providing
information in this report about these changes.
To identify the usefulness of the evaluations in producing information on
program outcomes, we reviewed reported findings from completed NIJ-managed
outcome evaluations that either evaluated programs administered or funded
by the Department of Justice (DOJ), or had been conducted with funding
contributed by DOJ program offices (see table 7). Of the 8 completed
evaluations that we reviewed for methodological adequacy, 5 had been
conducted with funding contributed in part by DOJ program offices,
including 2 evaluations funded in part by DOJ's Office on Violence Against
Women (OVW) and 3 evaluations funded in part by DOJ's Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Of the 2 evaluations funded by OVW, 1
was a review of a national program administered by DOJ, and the other was
a review of a locally administered program funded partially by an OVW
grant. Of the 3 evaluations funded by COPS, 2 were evaluations of programs
funded at least in part with COPS funding, and the other was an evaluation
of a program operating at several local law enforcement agencies,
supported with local funding. Because of our interest in the effectiveness
of criminal justice programs, we limited our review of the usefulness of
NIJ outcome evaluations to evaluations of DOJ programs, or evaluations
funded by DOJ program offices, and did not examine the 3 other completed
NIJ outcome evaluations that focused on programs funded by agencies other
than DOJ.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Table 7: Programs Evaluated and Funding Sources for Completed NIJ Outcome
Evaluations
Evaluation funded DOJ-funded by DOJ program Completed NIJ evaluations
program offices
OVW Evaluations
National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization
Enforcement Yes Yes Grant Program
An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach Yes Yes
COPS Evaluations Other evaluations
Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community Policing Program Yes Yes
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of Four Yes Yes
Approaches to
Handling Citizen Calls for Service
Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early No Yes
Warning Systems
National Evaluation of Gang Resistance Education and Training Program No
No
Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle No No
Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public Housing No No
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
We interviewed NIJ officials and relevant DOJ program administrators
regarding whether these findings were used to implement improvements in
the evaluated programs. At OVW and COPS, we asked officials the extent to
which they (1) were involved in soliciting and developing the evaluation
grant, and monitoring the evaluation; (2) were aware of the evaluation
results; and (3) had made any changes to the programs they administered
based on evaluation findings about the effectiveness of the evaluated
programs.
We conducted our work at NIJ headquarters in Washington, D.C., between May
2002 and August 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluations with Sound Designs and Sound Implementation Plans Evaluation The
National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT)
Program
Principal investigator University of Nebraska at Omaha
Program evaluated The GREAT program began in 1991 with the goal of using
federal, state, and local law enforcement agents to educate elementary
school students in areas prone to gang activity about the destructive
consequences of gang membership. The program seeks to prevent youth crime
and violence by reducing involvement in gangs. According to the
evaluator's proposal, as of April 1994, 507 officers in 37 states (150
sites) had completed GREAT training. GREAT targets middle school students
(with an optional curriculum for third and fourth graders) and consists of
8 lessons taught over a 9-week period.
Evaluation components Process and outcome evaluations began in 1994 and
were completed in 2001. Total evaluation funding was $1,568,323. The
outcome evaluation involved a cross-sectional and longitudinal design. For
the cross-sectional component, 5,935 eighth grade students in 11 different
cities were surveyed to assess the effectiveness of GREAT. Schools that
had offered GREAT within the last 2 years were selected, and
questionnaires were administered to all eighth graders in attendance on a
single day. This sample constituted a 1-year follow-up of 2 ex-post facto
groups: students who had been through GREAT and those who had not. A
5-year longitudinal, quasi-experimental component was conducted in 6
different cities. Schools in the 6 cities were selected purposively, to
allow for random assignment where possible. Classrooms in 15 of 22 schools
were randomly assigned to receive GREAT or not, whereas assignment in the
remaining schools was purposive. A total of more than 3,500 students
initially participated, and active consent was obtained for 2,045
participants. Students were surveyed 2 weeks before the program, 2 weeks
after completion, and at 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year intervals after
completion. Significant follow-up efforts were employed to maintain
reasonable response rates. Concepts measured included attitudinal measures
regarding crime, gangs and police; delinquency; drug sales and use; and
involvement in gangs, gang activities, and risk-seeking behaviors. In
addition, surveys were conducted with parents of the students
participating in the longitudinal component, administrative and teaching
staff at the schools in the longitudinal design, and officers who had
completed GREAT training prior to July 1999.
Assessment of evaluation Although conclusions from the cross-sectional
component may be limited because of possible pre-existing differences
between students who had been exposed to GREAT and students who had not
and lack of detail about statistical controls employed, the design and
analyses for the longitudinal component are generally sound, including
random assignment of classrooms to the intervention in 15 of the 22
schools, collection of baseline and extensive follow-up data; and
statistical controls for differential attrition rates of participant and
comparison groups.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle
Principal investigator Urban Institute
Program evaluated A consortium of federal agencies, led by the Office of
National Drug Control Policy and NIJ, developed the Breaking the Cycle
(BTC) demonstration program in 3 sites to test the effectiveness of a
comprehensive, coordinated endeavor to reduce substance abuse and criminal
activity, and improve the health and social functioning of drug-involved
offenders. The first site, Birmingham, Ala., received funding in 1997, and
the next 2 sites, Tacoma, Wash., and Jacksonville, Fla. received funding
in 1998. Participants were adult arrestees (for any type of crime) who
tested positive for drug use and had a history of drug involvement. The
program was based on the recognition that there was a link between drug
use and crime, and it had the support of many criminal justice system
officials who were willing to use the authority of the criminal justice
system to reduce drug use among offenders. BTC intended to expand the
scope of earlier programs such as drug courts and Treatment Alternatives
to Street Crime by incorporating drug reduction activities as part of
handling felony cases. BTC included early intervention; a continuum of
treatment options tailored to participants' needs, including treatment
readiness programs in jails; regular judicial monitoring and graduated
sanctions; and collaboration among justice and treatment agencies.
Evaluation components Begun in 1997, and the final report completed in
2003, the evaluation was funded for $2,419,344, and included both outcome
and process components. Comparison groups were selected in each of the 3
sites, and were composed of defendants similar to the BTC participants who
were arrested in the year before BTC was implemented. The evaluation
examined program success in (1) reducing drug use and criminal activity,
as measured by self-reported drug use in the 6 months prior to follow-up
interviews and officially recorded arrests in the 12 months after
baseline; (2) improving the physical and mental health and family/social
well-being of participants, as measured by self-reported interview data on
problems experienced in these 3 areas during the 30 days before follow-up;
and (3) improving labor market outcomes for participating offenders, as
measured by self-reported interview data on employment and social
difficulties in the 30 days before follow-up. Survey data were collected
at baseline and again at two intervals between 9 and 15 months after
baseline. At baseline the sample sizes for the treatment and comparison
groups were, respectively, 374 and 192 in Birmingham, 335 and 444 in
Jacksonville, and 382 and 351 in Tacoma. Response rates for the follow-up
interviews varied across the 3 sites from 65 to 75 percent for the
treatment groups, and from 71 to 73 percent for the comparison groups.
Method of assessment varied across sites and across samples, with some
participants in both the comparison and treatment groups interviewed in
person while others were interviewed by telephone. Multiple statistical
analyses, including logistic regression, with controls for differences in
demographics, offense history, substance abuse history, and work history
between treatment and comparison groups were used. BTC's effect on the
larger judicial environment was also assessed, using official records on
the number of hearings, case closure rates, and other factors.
Cost-benefit analyses of the BTC interventions were conducted at the three
locations. The costs attributable to the BTC program were derived from
budgetary information provided by program staff. The BTC program benefits
were conceptualized as "costs avoided" arising from the social and
economic costs associated with crime. The estimates of cost avoided in the
study were based on (1) the costs (to society) associated with the
commission of particular crimes and (2) the costs (to the criminal justice
system) associated with arrests. Estimates of these components from the
economic and criminal justice literature were applied to self-reported
arrest data from the program and comparison group subjects. The derived
estimates of benefits were compared to program costs to form cost-benefit
ratios for the interventions. An earlier effort to incorporate estimates
of savings in service utilization from BTC (as a program benefit) was not
included in the final report analysis due to inconclusive results.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Assessment of evaluation The evaluation was well designed and
implemented. The study used comparison groups to isolate and minimize
external factors that could have influenced the results. While the
comparison groups were selected and baseline data collected 1 year before
the treatment groups were selected, the study corrected for selection bias
and attrition, using multivariate models that incorporated control
variables to measure observed sample differences. The study appears to
have handled successfully other potential threats to the reliability and
validity of results, by using appropriate statistical analyses to make
adjustments. For example, the study relied on both self-reported measures
of drug use and arrest histories as well as official records of arrests,
to assess the effects of the program. Self-report measures are subject to
errors in memory or self-presentational biases, while official records can
be inaccurate and/or incomplete. The evaluators made use of both the
self-report and official measures to attempt to control for these biases.
The methodological approach used in the cost benefit analysis was
generally sound. The report specified the assumptions underlying the cost
and benefit estimates, and appropriately discussed the limitations of the
analysis for policymaking.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial Oversight
of Domestic Violence Evaluation Cases
Principal investigator The Urban Institute
Program evaluated The Judicial Oversight Demonstration (JOD) initiative
is a multiyear program being implemented at 3 sites (City of
Boston/Dorchester District Court, Mass.; Washtenaw County, Ann Arbor,
Mich.; and Milwaukee County, Wis.) to address the problem of domestic
violence. JOD tests the idea that a coordinated community, focused
judicial, and systemic criminal justice response can improve victim safety
and service provision, as well as offender accountability. JOD emphasizes
uniform and consistent responses to domestic violence offenses, including
coordinated victim advocacy and services; strong offender accountability
and oversight; rigorous research and evaluation components; and
centralized technical assistance. Demonstration sites have developed
partnerships with a variety of public and private entities, including
victim advocacy organizations, local law enforcement agencies, courts, and
other social service providers. The program began in fiscal year 2000, and
demonstration sites are expected to receive funding for 5 years.
Evaluation components A process evaluation began in January 2000. The
outcome component of the evaluation began in October 2002 and is to be
completed by October 2005. At the time of our review, the evaluation grant
amount was $2,839,954. Plans call for a full outcome assessment to be
conducted in 2 sites and, because no appropriate comparison site could be
identified, a partial assessment in the third site. The 2 sites with a
full assessment were matched with comparison sites having similar court
caseloads and population demographics; neither comparison site had a
specialized court docket, enhanced judicial oversight, or a countywide
coordinated system for handling domestic violence cases. Over 12 months,
all domestic violence cases in each site, up to monthly size quotas, will
be selected into the following groups: cases where the offender was found
guilty and sentenced to jail for 6 months or less and probation or
probation only, cases that were dismissed or diverted from prosecution,
and cases where the offender received more than 6 months incarceration.
Victims and offenders in the first group will be interviewed, and in the
second group, victims only will be interviewed. Offender recidivism in
both groups will be tracked for 1 year following the intervention using
police and court records. For the third group, only offender recidivism
will be tracked. In the partial assessment site, subject to data
availability, the plan is to compare a sample of domestic violence cases
in which the offender was placed on probation in the period before JOD
implementation with a sample of cases in which the offender was placed on
probation and scheduled for judicial review in the period after JOD
implementation. Data about incidents, victims, and offenders are to be
obtained from official records, and offender recidivism will be tracked
using police and court records. Overall, short-term outcomes for the study
are planned to include various measures of offender compliance and victim
and offender perceptions of JOD, and long-term outcomes are planned to
include various measures of offender recidivism, victim well-being, and
case processing changes. In addition, to discern any system level changes
due to JOD, aggregate, annual data on all domestic violence cases for the
2 years prior to and 3 years after JOD implementation in all sites will be
collected and analyzed.
Assessment of evaluation The evaluation plan appears to be ambitious and
well designed. A quasi-experimental design is planned, and data will be
collected from multiple sources, including victims, offenders, and
agencies. While lack of sustained cooperation, uneven response rates, and
missing data could become problems, detailed plans seem to have been made
to minimize these occurrences. The planned approach of selecting cases
(choosing equal numbers of cases consecutively until a monthly quota is
reached, over a 12-month period) may be nearly as good as random sampling
and takes into consideration seasonal variation. However, it could
introduce biases, should there be variation as to the time each month when
case selection begins.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-American Men
Principal investigator Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Program evaluated The purpose of this study is to test the relative
effectiveness of culturally focused versus conventional batterer
counseling for African-American men. It is based on research indicating
that conventional counseling dropout and partner re-assault rates are
higher for African-American men than they are for white men, and clinical
literature in related fields that recommends culturally focused counseling
to improve the effectiveness of counseling with African-American men.
Culturally focused counseling refers to the counselor recognizing and
responding to cultural issues that emerge in group sessions (including
such topics as African-American men's perceptions of the police,
relationships with women, sense of African-American manhood, past and
recent experiences of violence, and reactions to discrimination and
prejudice), and a curriculum that includes the major cultural issues
facing a particular group of participants. The setting for the evaluation
is a counseling center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in September 2001, and the
expected completion date is February 2005. At the time of our review, the
grant amount was $356,321. A clinical trial will be conducted to test the
effect of culturally focused counseling on the extent to which
African-American men drop out of counseling, are accused of re-assaults,
and are re-arrested for domestic violence. Plans are for 600
African-American men referred by the Pittsburgh Domestic Violence Court
over a 12-month period to batterer counseling at the counseling center to
be randomly assigned to either (1) a culturally focused counseling group
of only African-Americans, (2) conventional batterer counseling in an
African-American only group, and (3) conventional counseling in a racially
mixed group. Before assignment, however, the counseling center must
recommend the men for participation in the study. Men included in the
study will be administered a background questionnaire and two tests of
culturally specific attitudes (i.e., racial acculturation and identity) at
program intake. The men's female partners will be interviewed by phone 3
months, 6 months, and 12 months after program intake. These structured
interviews will collect information on the woman's relationship with the
man, the man's behavior, and the woman's help-seeking. Clinical records of
program attendance and police records of re-arrests will be obtained for
each man. Planned analyses are to include (1) verification of equivalent
culturally focused and conventional counseling sub-samples at intake and
during the follow-up; (2) comparison of the program dropouts, re-assaults,
and re-arrests for the three counseling options at each follow-up interval
and cumulatively; and (3) a predictive model of the re-assault outcome
based on characteristics, cultural attitudes, and situational factors.
Additionally, interviews with a sub-sample of 100 men about their
counseling experience are to be conducted.
Assessment of evaluation This is a well-designed experiment to test the
effect of a new approach to provide counseling to perpetrators of domestic
violence. The researchers have plans to (1) adjust for any selection bias
in group assignment and participant attrition through statistical
analysis; (2) prevent "contamination" from counselors introducing
intervention characteristics to control groups, or the reverse; and (3)
monitor the response rates on the interviews with female partners. The
evaluation is on-going. The most recent progress report we reviewed
indicated that the evaluation is proceeding as planned, with the
recruitment of batterers behind schedule by 1 month, the series of female
partner interviews on schedule and very close to expected response rates,
and the interviews with the sub-sample of batterers about three-quarters
complete. One potential concern we have is that because all men referred
by the domestic violence court to the counseling center may not be
recommended to participate in the study, any bias in recommending study
participants will determine the population to which the study's results
can be generalized.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Testing the Impact of Court Monitoring and Batterer Intervention Programs
at the Bronx Evaluation Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court
Principal investigator Fund for the City of New York
Program evaluated Operating since 1998, the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic
Violence Court handles spousal abuse misdemeanor cases. The court has the
power to prescribe various conditions of discharge for batterers,
including participation in group counseling and/or court monitoring. Given
concerns about the effectiveness of these options, it was decided to test
the efficacy of batterer counseling programs and court monitoring, alone
and in combination with each other. Furthermore, court monitoring was
tested based on the frequency of its administration-either monthly or on a
graduated basis (less monitoring for fewer incidences of abuse). This was
to ascertain whether graduated monitoring might give batterers more
incentive to change.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in September 2001 and is
expected to be completed in August 2003. At the time of our review, this
evaluation was funded for $294,129. The proposed study is an outcome
evaluation of 4 different treatment alternatives for conditional discharge
defendants in domestic violence cases. The treatment options are (1)
counseling program and monthly court monitoring, (2) counseling program
and graduated court monitoring, (3) monthly court monitoring program only,
and (4) graduated court monitoring only. Participants in the evaluation
(800 total) are to be assigned randomly to 1 of the 4 treatments at the
time of sentencing, and incidents of new crimes are to be measured 6 and
12 months after sentencing. Official crime records at both intervals, and
interviews with victims at the 12-month interval are the sources of data.
The planned analysis involves looking at the groups as a whole, and
subgroups related to age, criminal history, and current charge. Outcome
measures are (1) completion of the conditional discharge or imposition of
the jail alternative, (2) new arrests for domestic violence, and (3) new
reports from victims of domestic violence incidents.
Assessment of evaluation This is a well-designed approach to measure the
comparative efficacy of combinations of program counseling and variations
in monitoring. However, at the time of our review, we had some concerns
about how well implementation will proceed. One concern is that if one or
more of the treatments is less effective, it could result in participants
spending time in jail, reducing the possibility of further incidents. This
difficulty can be addressed in the analysis, but neither the proposal nor
subsequent progress reports discuss this or other differential attrition
issues. Also, although the evaluators have a plan to try to ensure good
response rates for the victims' survey, it is uncertain how effective they
will be. Other surveys of similar populations have been problematic.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Well-designed Evaluations That Encountered Implementation Problems
Evaluation An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community Policing Program
Principal investigator Northwestern University
Program evaluated Chicago's community policing program, known as
Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), began in April 1993. The
program reorganizes policing around small geographical areas where
officers assigned to beat teams meet with community residents to identify
and address a broad range of neighborhood problems.
Evaluation components There were 2 evaluation efforts in this study, 1
examining the prototype project and the second examining citywide program
implementation. The combined evaluations were completed in August 2001, at
a total cost of $2,157,859.
The prototype evaluation, conducted between April 1993 and September 1994,
compared five areas that implemented CAPS with four areas that did not.
Data from the 1990 Census were used to select four sections of the city
that closely matched the demographics of the five prototype areas.
Residents of all areas were first surveyed in the spring of 1993 regarding
the quality of police service and its impact on neighborhood problems.
Follow-up interviews occurred in either June or September of 1994 (14 to
17 month time lags). Interviews were conducted by telephone in English and
Spanish. The re-interview rate was about 60 percent. A total of 1,506
people were interviewed both times, an average of 180 in each prototype
area and 150 in each comparison area.
The CAPS citywide evaluation began after the conclusion of the prototype
evaluation in July 1994. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess how
changing from a traditional policing approach to a community-centered
approach would affect citizens' perceptions of the police, neighborhood
problems and crime rates. The researchers administered annual citywide
public opinion surveys between 1993 and 2001 (excluding 2000). The surveys
covered topics such as police demeanor, responsiveness, and task
performance. Surveys were also administered to officers at CAPS
orientation sessions to obtain, among other things, aggregate indicators
of changes in officers' attitudes toward CAPS. Changes in levels of
recorded crimes were analyzed. Direct observations of police meetings,
surveys of residents, and interviews with community activists were used to
measure community involvement in problem solving and the capacity of
neighborhoods to help themselves.
Assessment of evaluation The 1992 crime rates were reported to be similar
between prototype districts and their matched comparison areas and the
baseline demographic measures used to match the two groups were basically
similar. The initial and follow-up response rates of about 60 percent seem
reasonable considering the likelihood of community mobility in these
areas; however, attrition rates differed for various demographic
characteristics, such as home ownership, race, age, and education, raising
some concerns about whether the results are generalizable to the intended
population. The follow-up time (14-17 months) was the maximum period
allowed by the planned citywide implementation of CAPS. A single follow-up
survey and the citywide implementation precluded drawing firm conclusions
about longer-term impacts of the prototype program.
Because CAPS was implemented throughout the city of Chicago in 1995, the
CAPS citywide evaluation was not able to include appropriate comparison
groups and could not obtain a measure of what would have happened without
the benefits of the program. The authors used a variety of methods to
examine the implementation and outcomes of the CAPS program, and stated
that there was no elaborate research design involved because their focus
was on organizational change. However, because the trends over time from
resident surveys and crime data were presented without controls or
comparison groups and some declines in crime began before the program was
implemented, changes cannot be attributed solely to the program.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public Housing
Principal investigator Yale University School of Medicine
Program evaluated The program was an intervention strategy designed to
reduce drug activity and foster family self-sufficiency in families living
in a public housing complex in the city of New Haven, Conn. The key
elements of the intervention were (1) an on-site comprehensive services
model that included both clinical (substance abuse treatment and family
support services) and nonclinical components (e.g., extensive outreach and
community organizing as well as job training and placement and GED high
school equivalency certification) and (2) high profile police involvement.
The goals of the program were (1) increases in the proportion of residents
entering and completing intervention services and (2) a reduction in
substance-related activities and crime.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in 1998 and was completed in
2000. The total evaluation funding was $187,412. The intervention site was
a public housing complex composed primarily of female heads of household
tenants and additional family members; the control site was another public
housing complex on the opposite side of town, chosen for its similarities
to the intervention site. The evaluation design was both process and
outcome oriented and involved the collection of both qualitative and
quantitative data. At baseline, a needs assessment survey was completed
(n=175 at the intervention site and n=80 at the control site), and
follow-up surveys with residents took place at 12 and 18 months
post-intervention (no response rates reported). All heads of household at
the sites were the target population for the surveys. The follow-up
surveys, while administered in the same two sites, did not track the same
respondents that were surveyed at baseline. Survey measures included
access to social services; knowledge and reported use of social services;
and residents' perceptions of the extent of drug and alcohol abuse, drug
selling, violence, safety, and unsupervised youth in the community. The
study also examined crime statistics obtained from the New Haven police
department, at baseline and during the intervention.
Assessment of evaluation The study had several limitations, the first of
which is potential selection bias due to pre-existing differences between
the sites, as well as considerable (and possibly differential) attrition
in both groups, with no statistical control for such differences. Second,
respondents may not have been representative of the populations at the
housing sites. No statistical comparisons of respondents to nonrespondents
on selected variables were presented. In addition, on the baseline survey,
the response rates of the intervention and control sites differed
substantially (70 vs. 44 percent, respectively). Overall response rates
were not reported for the follow-up surveys. Furthermore, implementation
did not work smoothly (e.g., the control site received additional
unanticipated attention from the police). Finally, the grantee proposed to
track data on individuals over time (e.g., completion of services), but
this goal was not achieved, in part because of the limited capability of
project staff in the areas of case monitoring, tracking, and data
management. Thus, although the intervention may have produced changes in
the intervention site "environment" over time (aggregate level changes),
it is not clear that the intervention successfully impacted the lives of
individuals and families at the site.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach
Principal investigator Wayne State University
Program evaluated The program provides assistance to domestic violence
victims in some police precincts in the city of Detroit. The domestic
violence teams studied included specially trained police officers, police
department advocates, legal advocates, and in one police precinct, an
on-site prosecutor. The advocates assisted victims by offering information
about the legal system, referrals, and safety planning.
Evaluation components The outcome evaluation began in January of 1998 and
the final report was completed in January of 2001. The grant amount was
$153,491. The objectives of the study were to address the relationships
between advocacy and victim safety and between advocacy and victims'
responses to the criminal justice system, using a quasi-experimental
design to compare domestic violence cases originating in police precincts
with and without special police domestic violence teams that included
advocates. The study focused on assistance provided in 3 police precincts.
Precincts not served by in-precinct domestic violence teams, but
resembling the precincts with such teams in terms of ethnic representation
and median income, were selected as comparisons. Data were collected using
police records, county prosecutor's office records, advocate contact
forms, and telephone interviews with victims. Cases that met Michigan's
legal definition of domestic violence, had adult female victims, and were
received in the selected precincts over a 4-month period in 1998 were
eligible for the study. The cases were first identified by the police
department through police reports and then reviewed for qualification by a
member of the research team. A weekly quota of cases was selected from
each precinct. If the number of qualified cases for a precinct exceeded
the quota, then cases were selected randomly using a random numbers table.
Outcomes included rates of completed prosecution of batterers, rate of
guilty findings against batterers, subsequent violence against victims,
victims' perceptions of safety, and victims' views of advocacy and the
criminal justice process.
Assessment of evaluation The study was severely affected by numerous
problems, many of which the researchers acknowledged. First, the sample
selection was based on incomplete or unreliable data, since police
officers in writing reports often did not fully describe incidents, and
precinct staff inconsistently provided complete case information about
incidents to the researchers. Second, evaluators were not able to secure
cooperation from domestic violence advocates and their supervisors at all
service levels in providing reliable reports on service recipients and the
type, number, and length of services. Additionally, most domestic violence
team members were moved out of the precincts and into a centralized
location during the period victims in the study were receiving services,
thereby potentially affecting the service(s) provided to them. Further,
the researchers were uncertain as to whether women from the comparison
precincts received any advocacy services, thereby potentially
contaminating the research results between the precincts with the domestic
violence teams and the comparison precincts. Finally, low response rates
and response bias for data collected from victims were problems. The
overall response rate for the initial round of telephone interviews was
only about 23 percent and the response rates for follow-up interviews were
lower. Response rates were not provided separately for victims from the
precincts with the domestic violence teams and the comparison precincts.
As a result of the low response rates, the interviewed victims were
identified as being less likely to have experienced severe physical abuse,
less likely to be living with the abuser, and more likely to have a child
in common with the abuser, compared to the victims in the sample who were
not interviewed.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of Four Approaches to
Handling Citizen Evaluation Calls for Service
Principal investigator University of Cincinnati
Program evaluated DOJ's COPS office has worked with police agencies, the
Federal Communications Commission, and the telecommunications industry to
find ways to relieve the substantial demand on the current 911 emergency
number. Many police chiefs and sheriffs have expressed concern that
non-emergency calls represent a large portion of the 911 overload problem.
Four cities have implemented strategies to decrease non-emergency 911
calls and have agreed to participate in the research. Those cities, each
implementing a different type of approach, were Baltimore, Md.; Dallas,
Tex.; Buffalo, N.Y.; and Phoenix, Ariz.
Evaluation components A process and outcome evaluation was conducted
between July of 1998 and June of 2000. The grant amount was $399,919. For
the outcome component, the grantee examined whether (1) the volume of 911
calls declined following the introduction of the non emergency call
system; (2) there was a corresponding decline in radio dispatches, thus
enhancing officer time; and (3) this additional time was directed to
community-oriented policing strategies. The bulk of the design and
analysis focused on Baltimore, with a limited amount of analysis of
outcomes in Dallas and no examination of outcomes in the other two sites.
The study compared rates of 911 calls before implementation of the new 311
system to rates of 911 and 311 calls after the system in both cities. In
Baltimore, time series analysis was used to analyze the call data; police
officers and sergeants were surveyed; the flow of 311 and 911 calls to
Neighborhood Service Centers was examined; researchers accompanied police
officers during randomly selected shifts in 3 sectors of Baltimore for 2
weeks; and citizens who made 311 calls during a certain 1-month time frame
were surveyed.
Assessment of evaluation The crux of the outcome analysis relies on the
study of pre- and post- 311 system comparisons, and the time series
analysis done in Baltimore is sound. The rigor of several other parts of
this study is questionable (e.g., poor response rates to surveys and short
time frames for data from accompanying police officers on randomly
selected shifts). In addition, the choice of sites that NIJ required the
grantee to examine, other than Baltimore, did not allow for a test of the
study's objectives. Although NIJ conducted pre-solicitation site visits to
all 4 sites, at the time of the solicitation it still did not clearly know
whether outcome data would be available at all the sites. As it turned
out, outcome data were not available in Phoenix and Buffalo. Further,
since the 311 system in Dallas was not implemented with the goal of
reducing or changing call volume, it does not appear to be a good case
with which to test the study's objectives.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early
Warning Systems
Principal investigator University of Nebraska - Omaha
Program evaluated An Early Warning (EW) system is a data based police
management tool designed to identify officers whose behavior is
problematic, as indicated by high rates of citizen complaints, use of
force incidents, or other evidence of behavior problems, and to provide
some form of intervention, such as counseling or training to correct that
performance. According to the current study's national survey of local law
enforcement agencies (LEA) serving populations of 50,000 or more, about
one-quarter of LEAs surveyed had an EW system, with another 12 percent
indicating that one was planned. One-half of existing EW systems have been
created since 1994.
Evaluation components Begun in 1998, the study was completed in 1999 and
included process and outcome components, as well as a national survey. The
total evaluation funding was $174,643. The outcome portion of the study
was composed of case studies of EW systems in 3 large urban police
departments (Miami-Dade, Fla.; Minneapolis, Minn.; and New Orleans, La.).
Sites were selected judgmentally; each had functioning EW systems in place
for a period of 4 or more years and had agreed to participate in the
study.
Both Miami-Dade and Minneapolis case studies examined official performance
records (including citizen complaints in both sites and use of force
reports in Miami-Dade) for officers identified by the department's EW
system, for 2 years prior to and after departmental intervention, compared
to records for officers not identified. The participant groups included
officers hired between 1990 and 1992 and later identified by the EW system
(n=28 in Miami-Dade; n=29 in Minneapolis); the comparison groups included
officers hired during the same period and not identified (n=267 in
Miami-Dade; n=78 in Minneapolis). In New Orleans, official records were
not organized in a way that permitted analysis of performance of officers
subject to EW and a comparison group. The New Orleans case study,
therefore, examined citizen complaint data for a group of officers
identified by the EW system 2 years or more prior to the study, and for
whom full performance data were available for 2 years prior to and 2 years
following intervention (n=27).
Assessment of evaluation The study had a number of limitations, many of
them acknowledged by the grantee. First, it is not possible to disentangle
the effect of EW systems per se from the general climate of rising
standards of accountability in all 3 sites. Second, use of nonequivalent
comparison groups (officers identified for intervention are likely to
differ from those not identified), without statistical adjustments for
differences between groups creates difficulties in presenting outcome
results. Only in Minneapolis did the evaluators explicitly compare changes
in performance of the EW group with changes in performance of the
comparison group, again without presenting tests of statistical
significance. Furthermore, the content of the intervention was not
specifically measured, raising questions about the nature of the
intervention that was actually delivered, and whether it was consistent
over time in the 3 sites, or across officers subject to the intervention.
Moreover, it was not possible to determine which aspects of the
intervention were most effective overall (e.g., differences in EW
selection criteria, intervention services for officers, and
post-intervention monitoring), since the intervention was reportedly
effective in all 3 departments despite differences in the nature of their
EW systems. Also, no data were available to examine whether the EW systems
had a deterrent effect on desirable officer behavior (e.g., arrests or
other officer-initiated activity). Finally, generalizability of the
findings in Miami-Dade and Minneapolis may also be limited, since those
case studies examined cohorts of officers recruited in the early 1990s,
and it is not clear whether officers with greater or fewer years of police
experience in these departments would respond similarly to EW
intervention.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Evaluation of the Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative
with Randomized Design
Principal investigator University of Missouri - St. Louis.
Program evaluated The Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative (JJMI) is
a collaborative multi-agency demonstration project funded under an Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant, and administered by
the St. Louis Mental Health Board, the St. Louis Family Court, and the
Missouri Department of Health. The initiative provides mental health
services to families of youths referred to the juvenile justice system for
delinquency who have serious emotional disturbances (SED). The initiative
involves parents and families in juvenile justice interventions, providing
coordinated services and sanctions for youths who otherwise might shuttle
between criminal justice and mental health agencies. Two new mental health
programs were established under JJMI. The first, the Child Conduct and
Support Program, was designed for families in which youths under the age
of 14 do not have a history of serious, violent, or chronic offending. The
second, Multi-systemic Therapy (MST), was designed for families in which
youths aged 14 and above have prior serious, violent, or chronic
delinquency referrals.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in October 2001 and is
expected to be completed in September 2003. At the time of our review, the
evaluation was funded for $200,000. The study proposed to evaluate the two
mental health programs using a random experimental design. Youths referred
to the Juvenile Court are first screened for SED. Those who test positive
or have prior diagnoses of SED (anxiety, depressed mood, somatic
complaints, suicidal ideation, thought disturbance, or traumatic
experience) are eligible for the JJMI programs. Eligible youth are
randomly assigned to either one of the two treatment programs (depending
on age) or to a control group. The evaluation includes a comparison of
police contact data, court data, self-reported delinquency, and
standardized measures of psychological and parental functioning.
Potentially important demographic and social context variables, including
measures of school involvement and performance, will be obtained from
court records.
Assessment of evaluation This is an ongoing, well designed study.
However, as implementation has proceeded, several problems that may affect
the utility of the results have emerged. First, the researchers proposed
to sample a total of 200 youths, with random assignment expected to result
in approximately 100 juveniles in the treatment and comparison groups. The
treatment group turned out to be much smaller than anticipated, however,
because the randomization protocol and, subsequently, the MST program
itself, were discontinued by the St. Louis Mental Health Board. At the
time of termination, only 45 youths had been randomly assigned to the
treatment group. The small number of subjects limits the extent of the
analyses that can be conducted on this population.
The Child Conduct and Support Program designed to address the mental
health needs of youth under the age of 14 without a history of serious
offending was never implemented by the providers contracted to develop the
program. Eligible youth, of all ages, were instead assigned to the MST
program. Thus, the evaluation will not be able to compare the relative
effectiveness of programs specifically designed for younger and older
juvenile offenders with SED.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluations with Design Limitations
National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization
Enforcement Grant Evaluation Program
Principal investigator COSMOS Corporation
Program evaluated The National Rural Domestic Violence and Child
Victimization Enforcement Grant program, begun in fiscal year 1996, has
funded 92 grants through September 2001 to promote the early
identification, intervention, and prevention of woman battering and child
victimization; increase victim's safety and access to services; enhance
the investigation and prosecution of crimes of domestic violence and child
abuse; and develop innovative, comprehensive strategies for fostering
community awareness and prevention of domestic abuse. The program seeks to
maximize rural resources and capacity by encouraging greater collaboration
between Indian tribal governments, rural local governments, and public and
private rural service organizations.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in October 1998 and was
completed in July 2002. This evaluation was funded at $719,949, and
included both process and outcome components. Initially 10 grantees
(comprising 11 percent of the total number of program grantees) were
selected to participate in the outcome evaluation; 1 was unable to obtain
continuation funding and was dropped from the outcome portion of the
study. Two criteria were used in the selection of grant participants: the
"feasibility" of grantees visited in the process phase of the evaluation
(n=16) to conduct an outcome evaluation; and recommendations from OVW,
which were based on knowledge of grantee program activities and an
interest in representing the range of organizational structures,
activities, and targeted groups served by the grantees. Logic models were
developed, as part of the case study approach, to show the logical or
plausible links between a grantee's activities and desired outcomes. The
specified outcome data were collected from multiple sources, using a
variety of methodologies, during 2-3 day site visits (e.g., multi-year
criminal justice, medical, and shelter statistics were collected from
archival records where available; community stakeholders were interviewed;
and grantee and victim service agency staff participated in focus groups).
Assessment of evaluation This evaluation has several limitations. First,
the choice of the 10 outcome sites was skewed toward the technically
developed evaluation sites and was not representative of all Rural
Domestic Violence program grantees, particular project types, or delivery
styles. Second, the lack of comparison groups makes it difficult to
exclude the effect of external factors, such as victim safety and improved
access to services, on perceived change. Furthermore, several so-called
short-term outcome variables were in fact process variables (e.g., number
of clients served, number of services provided, number of workshops
conducted, and service capacity of community agencies). Moreover, it is
not clear how interview and focus group participants were selected.
Finally, pre-and post- survey data were not collected at multiple points
in time to assess change, except at 1 site, where pre- and post-tests were
used to assess increased knowledge of domestic violence among site staff
as a result of receiving training.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims' Civil Legal
Assistance Program
Principal investigator Institute for Law and Justice
Program evaluated The Civil Legal Assistance (CLA) program is one of
seven OJP grants (through OVW) dedicated to enhancing victim safety and
ensuring offender accountability. The CLA program awards grants to
nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations that provide legal services to
victims of domestic violence or that work with victims of domestic
violence who have civil legal needs. The CLA grant program was created by
Congress in 1998. In fiscal year 1998, 54 programs were funded, with an
additional 94 new grantees in fiscal year 1999. Approximately 85-100 new
and continuation grants were anticipated in fiscal year 2000.
Evaluation components The study began in November 2000 and was expected
to be completed in October 2003. The proposed evaluation consisted of
process and outcome components and the total evaluation funding at the
time of our review was $800,154. The objective of the outcome evaluation
was to determine the effectiveness of the programs in meeting the needs of
the women served. The researchers proposed to study 8 sites with CLA
programs. At each site at least 75 cases will be tracked to see if there
is an increase in pro se (self) representation in domestic violence
protective order cases, and a total of 240 victims receiving services will
be surveyed (about 30 at each site). Focus groups of service providers
will be used to identify potential program impacts on the justice system
and wider community. Outcomes to be assessed include change in pro se
representation in domestic violence protective order cases, satisfaction
with services, and legal outcomes resulting from civil assistance.
Assessment of evaluation The evaluation has several limitations. First,
NIJ and the grantee agreed in 2002 not to utilize a comparison group
approach whereby data would be collected from a set of comparison sites,
due to concerns that investment in that approach would limit the amount of
information that could be derived from the process component of the
evaluation and from within-site and cross-site analyses of the selected
outcome sites. Thus, the study will be limited in its ability to isolate
and minimize the potential effects of external factors that could
influence the results of the study, in part because it did not include
comparison groups in the study design. At the time of our review, it was
not yet clear whether sufficient data will be available from the court
systems at each outcome site in order to examine changes in pro se
representation. In addition, since victims would be selected for the
surveys partially on the basis of willingness to be interviewed, it is not
clear how representative the survey respondents at each site will be and
how the researchers will handle response bias. It also appears that the
victim interviews will rely to a great extent on measures that will
primarily consist of subjective, retrospective reports.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment
Principal investigator Caliber Associates
Program evaluated The Department of Health and Human Services and DOJ's
Office of Justice Programs are jointly funding 6 demonstration sites for
up to 3 years to improve how 3 systems (dependency courts, child
protective services, and domestic violence service providers) work with
their broader communities to address families with co-occurring domestic
violence (DV) and child maltreatment (CM). Funded sites must agree to
implement key recommendations of the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Courts Judges' publication, "Effective Interventions in Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment: Guidelines for Policy and Practice" (aka,
the "Greenbook"). At a minimum, the sites need to implement changes in
policies and procedures regarding screening and assessment;
confidentiality and information sharing; safety; service provision;
advocacy; cross-training; and case collaboration. The goals of the
demonstration are to generate more coordinated, comprehensive, and
consistent responses to families faced with DV and CM, resulting in
increased safety and well-being for women and their children.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in September 2000, and is
expected to be completed around September 2004. At the time of our review,
this evaluation was funded at $2,498,638, for both process and outcome
components. The original evaluation proposal focused on various process
elements as well as the effects of the intervention on perpetrator
recidivism and the safety of women and children. In the second year, the
evaluator realized that no site considered itself to be in the
implementation phase and many of the original outcome indicators for
children and families were not appropriate given the initiative time
frame. The revised design in the funded third year proposal is therefore a
systems-level evaluation. The analytic focus is now on how the 3 systems
identify, process, and manage families with co-occurrence of DV and CM.
A random sample of case records from before and after the introduction of
the intervention will be used to document trends in identification of
co-occurring cases of DV and CM over the course of the intervention.
Stakeholder interviews conducted during site visits in fall 2001 and later
during implementation, and analysis of agency documents, will be used to
measure changes in policies and procedures. "Network analysis" of
responses on the stakeholder interviews will be performed to measure
changes in how key stakeholders work with others within and across
systems. Supervisors and workers will also be asked, early in the
implementation period and at the end of the initiative, to respond to
vignettes describing hypothetical situations involving co-occurrence of DV
and CM to see how they might respond to clients.
Assessment of evaluation This evaluation has several limitations. First,
the study objectives changed substantially from year 1 to year 3. The
study is no longer examining outcomes for individuals, precluding
conclusions about whether the implementation improved the lives of victims
of domestic violence or their children. Second, it is not clear whether
the evaluator will locate appropriate comparison data at this late stage,
and without a comparison group, the study will not be able to determine
(a) whether collaboration between systems improved (or weakened) because
of the intervention or some extraneous factors and (b) whether
collaboration resulted in increased capacity in the 3 systems to identify
the co-occurrence of DV and CM, or whether these kinds of cases increased
for reasons other than collaboration (e.g., perhaps identification of
these cases is improving all over the country). Questions remain about the
extent of data available for examining co-occurrence of DV and CM at the 6
sites.
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed
Evaluation Corrections and Law Enforcement Family Support (CLEFS) Law
Enforcement Field Test
Program evaluated Since 1996 NIJ has funded, as part of the CLEFS
program, 32 grants totaling over $2.8 million to law enforcement agencies,
correctional agencies, and organizations representing officers (unions and
membership associations) to support the development of research,
demonstration, and evaluation projects on stress intervention methods. The
stress intervention methods developed and studied have included stress
debriefing and management techniques, peer support services, referral
networks, police chaplaincy services, stress management training methods,
spouse academies, and stress education programs. While NIJ purports to
have developed state-of-practice stress reduction methods through these
efforts, it acknowledges that very little outcome data have been
generated.
Evaluation components The evaluation began in June 2000 and is expected
to be completed in June 2004. At the time of our review, the grant amount
was $649,990. The study proposes to develop and field test a model to
allow for the systematic evaluation of selected program components. The
grantee worked with NIJ to identify the test sites and services to be
evaluated, based on grant application reviews, telephone interviews, and
site visits. Three police departments in Duluth, Minn.; North Miami Beach,
Fla.; and Knoxville, Tenn. were selected. Baseline stress correlate data
were collected during visits to the 3 sites between January 2002 and March
2002, and baseline officer and spouse/partner surveys were conducted
during the same visits. Outcome data were to be collected at baseline
(prior to actual program implementation), midway through the
implementation, and toward the end of the evaluation. While the original
proposal did not specify exactly what stress correlate or outcome data
were to be collected, the grantee was considering looking at rates of
absenteeism and tardiness, citizen complaints, rule and regulation
violations, disciplinary actions, and premature retirements and disability
pensions, as stress correlates. These were to be obtained from official
agency records. Surveys included questions about program impacts on
physical health, emotional health, job performance, job satisfaction,
job-related stress, and family related stress. The evaluation also
included baseline health screenings. It appears the evaluation plan has
been modified to add supervisor surveys (there were none at baseline), and
to incorporate group data collection efforts with officers, spouses,
supervisors, and administrators.
Assessment of evaluation The study has several limitations. First, the 3
study sites were chosen on the basis of merits in their proposal to
implement a stress reduction or wellness program for officers, from 4
sites that submitted applications. There was no attempt to make the chosen
sites representative of other sites with stress reduction programs and
police departments more generally. Second, the study will not make use of
comparison groups consisting of similar agencies that did not implement
stress reduction programs. It is unclear how effects of the interventions
in these 3 sites over time will be disentangled from the effects of other
factors that might occur concurrently. Third, the grantee will not collect
individually identified data, and thus will only be able to analyze and
compare aggregated data across time, limiting the extent of analysis of
program effects that can be accomplished. Fourth, response rates to the
first wave of officer surveys were quite low in 2 of the 3 sites (16
percent and 27 percent).
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Staff Acknowledgments
(440123)
Laurie E. Ekstrand (202) 512-8777 Evi L. Rezmovic (202) 512-2580
In addition to the above, Tom Jessor, Anthony Hill, Stacy Reinstein, David
Alexander, Michele Fejfar, Douglas Sloane, Shana Wallace, Judy Pagano,
Kenneth Bombara, Scott Farrow, Ann H. Finley, Katherine Davis, and Leo
Barbour made key contributions to this report.
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