Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in
the Inspections Process (18-AUG-03, GAO-03-1084R).
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 mandates that we track, monitor, and evaluate the
Attorney General's strategy to deter illegal entry and report our
findings to Congress. In response, we have evaluated
immigration-related inspections at land border Ports of Entry
(POE) and made recommendations regarding (1) the integrity of the
inspections process; (2) the efficiency and effectiveness of
inspections-related port operations; and (3) the collection,
analysis, and use of intelligence information. Due to concern
that the public release of our detailed findings could compromise
law enforcement operations, our report is restricted to Limited
Official Use. This letter is intended to summarize our overall
findings and confirm agreement to take action to address
vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in the inspections process.
Most of our work was conducted before the Department of Justice's
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department
of the Treasury's Customs Service were merged into the newly
created Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, the issues we
address remain relevant as DHS merges the functions previously
performed by the two agencies and implements major changes to its
border inspections process.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1084R
ACCNO: A08164
TITLE: Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and
Inefficiencies in the Inspections Process
DATE: 08/18/2003
SUBJECT: Identity verification
Immigration and naturalization law
Immigration or emigration
Inspection
National preparedness
Counterterrorism
Data collection
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GAO-03-1084R
GAO- 03- 1084R Land Border Ports of Entry United States General Accounting
Office Washington, DC 20548
August 18, 2003 The Honorable Robert C. Bonner Commissioner, Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection Department of Homeland Security
Subject: Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in
the Inspections Process
Dear Mr. Bonner: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 mandates that we track, monitor, and evaluate
the Attorney General*s strategy to deter illegal entry and report our
findings to Congress. 1 In response, we have evaluated immigration-
related inspections at land border POEs and made recommendations regarding
(1) the integrity of the inspections process; (2) the efficiency and
effectiveness of inspections- related port operations; and (3) the
collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information. Due to your
Bureau*s concern that the public release of our detailed findings could
compromise law enforcement operations, our report is restricted to Limited
Official Use.
This letter is intended to summarize our overall findings and confirm your
agreement to take action to address vulnerabilities and inefficiencies in
the inspections process. Most of our work was conducted before the
Department of Justice*s Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
the Department of the Treasury*s Customs Service were merged into the
newly created Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, the issues we address
remain relevant as DHS merges the functions previously performed by the
two agencies and implements major changes to its border inspections
process.
In performing our review, we visited 15 land border POEs* 6 along the
southern border and 9 along the northern border. At these ports we met
with INS and Customs Port Directors, INS intelligence officers, and INS
training officers. We interviewed INS inspectors in groups, involving a
total of 82 inspectors. We also observed more than 100 INS and Customs
inspectors conduct inspections. In addition, we met with INS District
Office and Customs Management Center officials. At headquarters, we met
with INS officials responsible for the inspections program, field
operations, and intelligence; Customs officials responsible for passenger
programs; and DHS officials when making contacts after March 1, 2003. We
also spoke with officials from CBP, the Immigration Officer Academy, and
the Forensic Document Laboratory about issues related to immigration
inspector training. We reviewed INS and Customs
1 P. L. 104- 208, div. C, S: 110, 8 U. S. C. 1103 note.
GAO- 03- 1084R Land Border Ports of Entry Page 2 Inspections Program
policies and procedures, and memoranda issued after
September 11, 2001; related studies and reports; and relevant laws and
regulations. We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
Our observations and interviews at 15 land border POEs identified several
vulnerabilities in the integrity of the inspections process, which raise
the risk of unlawful entry. For example, inspectors can experience
difficulties in verifying the
identity of travelers, traveler inspections were not always done
consistently and according to policy, and inspectors did not always
receive the training they needed.
Inspections- related port operations were hampered by inefficiencies
related to technology and equipment. Inspectors faced cumbersome
procedures in order to access data systems, and the lack of automation for
routine data collection cost time and resources. Furthermore, inspectors
lacked a standard issue of equipment, which could create operational
inefficiencies. On a positive note, planned expansion of dedicated
commuter lanes for travelers determined to be low risk will increase
efficiency and give inspectors more time to focus on travelers whose risk
is unknown.
Regarding the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information,
lack of time and training impedes intelligence development and use. In
addition, there was no structure in place to support the analysis and use
of intelligence information in the field, despite the fact that INS and
others have long recognized this as a need. Given the threat of terrorism
confronting the country, having and using intelligence information
effectively at land border POEs has never been more important.
We recommended actions to improve inspector training and equipment and
develop a program to facilitate the collection, analysis, and use of
intelligence information in the field. CBP officials generally concurred
with our findings and described actions that it planned to take to address
both our findings and recommendations.
Background
Most travelers enter the United States through the nation*s 166 land
border POEs. According to INS data, of the estimated 453 million
inspections that occurred in 2002, about 363 million, or 80 percent,
occurred at land border POEs. 2 About two- thirds of these inspections
involved aliens and about one- third involved returning U. S. citizens.
The vast majority of travelers who cross at land POEs arrive by vehicle,
although a small percentage arrive on foot or by bus, mainly through
southern border ports.
The purpose of the immigration- related portion of the inspections process
is to determine if the person is a U. S. citizen or alien, and if an
alien, whether the alien is entitled to enter the United States. 3 The
great majority of persons arriving at land
2 INS Performance and Analysis System. We did not assess the reliability
of the data since the information is presented for background purposes. 3
While our work focused on how inspectors determined the admissibility of
persons, inspectors are
also responsible for determining whether travelers could be violating
criminal laws (such as the
GAO- 03- 1084R Land Border Ports of Entry Page 3 POEs are residents of the
border area who cross frequently and are familiar with U. S.
entry requirements. Consequently, a screening procedure called primary
inspection has been established to rapidly inspect travelers and identify
those who are readily admissible. In general, inspectors are to question
travelers about their nationality and purpose of their visit and review
any travel documents the traveler may be required to present. Typically,
primary inspections are conducted in less than 1 minute. Of the about 363
million persons inspected at land border POEs in 2002, about 354 million
(98 percent) were admitted after a primary inspection.
Travelers whose admissibility cannot be readily determined, about 9
million in 2002, are referred for a more intensive, or secondary,
inspection. A secondary inspection consists of a more detailed review of
travel documents and belongings; in- depth questioning by an inspector;
and multiple computer checks to verify specific corroborating information,
such as the traveler*s stated identity. Depending on the results of the
secondary inspection, the traveler could, among other outcomes, be
admitted for entry, denied admission, allowed to return to the country of
origin voluntarily, or detained while admissibility is determined in
formal proceedings.
Because of the large volume of traffic at POEs, INS established dedicated
commuter lanes to expedite the inspection of low- risk travelers. As of
February 2003, dedicated commuter lanes had a total enrollment of about
80,000 persons. Along the southern border, commuter lanes are at 3 POEs--
San Ysidro and Otay Mesa in California and Stanton Street Bridge in El
Paso, Texas. Along the northern border, commuter lanes are located at 7
POEs-- Pacific Highway, Point Roberts, and Peace Arch Crossing in
Washington; Blue Water Bridge, Detroit Tunnel, and the Ambassador Bridge
in Michigan; and Peace Bridge in New York. Travelers enrolled in these
commuter lane programs have been prescreened through background checks and
determined to pose a low risk to border security.
The inspections process at the nation*s land borders will likely undergo
significant changes in the near future. A series of laws enacted between
1996 and 2002 required the Attorney General to develop an automated entry
and exit system that would create a record for every alien arriving in the
United States and match it with a record when the alien departs. The
system is to be in place at all air and sea ports by December 31, 2003, at
the 50 busiest land border ports by the end of 2004, and at all land
border ports by the end of 2005. On April 29, 2003, the Secretary of
Homeland Security announced plans for the new U. S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US- VISIT) system. The system is to use
biometric identifiers, such as photographs, fingerprints, or iris scans,
to build an electronic check in/ check out system for people coming to the
United States to work, study, or visit. The US- VISIT system is intended
to address the congressional requirements of the automated entry and exit
system.
DHS Needs to Address Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Inspections
Process
Our visits to various ports, conducted in the months leading up to the
establishment of DHS, identified issues affecting the integrity of the
inspections process, deficiencies and inefficiencies in technology and
equipment, and deficiencies in field
smuggling of narcotics) and are in compliance with other laws related to
importing products and animals.
GAO- 03- 1084R Land Border Ports of Entry Page 4 level operations to
collect, analyze, and use intelligence information. Persons seeking
to illegally enter the United States may exploit weaknesses in any of
these areas. Given the threat of terrorism against the country, it is
particularly important that inspectors at land border POEs have the
support they need to collect, analyze, and use intelligence information.
Officials we interviewed and studies we reviewed offered various options
for addressing some of the vulnerabilities discussed in our report. DHS
has work groups in place to examine many of these vulnerabilities, but it
must take swift action to address them, given the threats to the nation.
As a newly established department, DHS is tasked with expeditiously
integrating multiple agencies and units into a cohesive and effective
organization. The challenges before it are many, but resolving
the issues we raised should help place DHS in a better position to protect
the nation from the entry of unlawful travelers at land border POEs.
- - - - -
In addition to the Department of Homeland Security, we are sending copies
of this report to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, the
House Select Committee on Homeland Security, the Department of State, and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO*s Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 8777 or Michael
P. Dino, Assistant Director, at (213) 830- 1150.
Sincerely yours, Richard M. Stana Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues
(440239)
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