    Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation
    Security Program Need to Be Addressed (19-SEP-03, GAO-03-1083).

    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to establish a
    program to strengthen management of the pre-entry, entry, status,
    and exit of foreign nationals who travel to the United States.
    The goals of the program, known as the United States Visitor and
    Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), are to
    facilitate legitimate trade and travel, enhance national
    security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies. By
    congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval
    an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain
    conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO was asked to
    determine, among other things, whether the plan satisfies these
    conditions and to provide observations about the plan and DHS's
    management of the program.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1083
        ACCNO:   A08497
      TITLE:     Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
    Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed
         DATE:   09/19/2003
      SUBJECT:   Accountability
    	     Administrative costs
    	     Agency missions
    	     Budget outlays
    	     Immigrants
    	     Immigration information systems
    	     Internal controls
    	     Noncompliance
    	     Planning programming budgeting
    	     Program management
    	     Reporting requirements
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Homeland security
    	     DHS Visitor and Immigrant Status
    	     Indicator Technology Program

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-03-1083

                                           A

    Report to Congressional Committees

    September 2003 HOMELAND SECURITY Risks Facing Key Border and
    Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed

    GAO- 03- 1083

    Contents Letter 1

    Recommendations for Executive Action 6 Agency Comments 7

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations 9

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 97

    Abbreviations

    ADIS Arrival Departure Information System APIS Advance Passenger
    Information System CCD Consular Consolidated Database

    CLAIMS 3 Computer Linked Application Information Management System 3 CLASS
    Consular Lookout and Support System DHS Department of Homeland Security EA
    enterprise architecture IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System IDENT
    Automated Biometric Identification System INS Immigration and
    Naturalization Service IRB Investment Review Board IT information
    technology NIIS Non- Immigrant Information System NSEERS National Security
    Entry- Exit Registration System OMB Office of Management and Budget POE
    port of entry SA- CMM (R) Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model
    (R) SEI Software Engineering Institute SEVIS Student Exchange Visitor
    Information System US- VISIT U. S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
    Technology

    This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    Letter

    September 19, 2003 The Honorable Thad Cochran Chairman The Honorable
    Robert C. Byrd Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Homeland Security
    Committee on Appropriations United States Senate The Honorable Harold
    Rogers Chairman The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations House of
    Representatives Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
    2003, 1 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted to Congress in
    June 2003 its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan for the United States
    Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US- VISIT) program. US-
    VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to improve the nation*s
    capacity for collecting information on foreign nationals who travel to the
    United States, as well as control the pre- entry, entry, status, and exit
    of these travelers. The goals for US- VISIT are to facilitate legitimate
    travel and trade, enhance national security, and adhere to U. S. privacy
    laws and policies. As also required by the Consolidated Appropriations
    Resolution, 2003, we reviewed the expenditure plan. Our objectives were to
    (1) determine whether the US- VISIT fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan
    satisfies certain legislative conditions specified in the Consolidated
    Appropriations Resolution, 2003; (2) determine the status of our US- VISIT
    open recommendations; and (3) provide any other observations about the
    expenditure plan and DHS*s management of US- VISIT. The specified
    legislative conditions are that the plan meet the capital planning and
    investment control review requirements established by the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB), including OMB Circular A- 11, part 3; that it
    comply with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems

    1 P. L. 108- 7 (Feb. 20, 2003).

    acquisition management practices of the federal government; and that it be
    reviewed by GAO.

    On July 18, 2003, we provided your offices a written briefing detailing
    the results of our review. This report summarizes and transmits this
    briefing. The full briefing, including our scope and methodology, is
    reprinted as appendix I.

    Concerning our first objective, DHS partially satisfied those legislative
    conditions specified in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,
    that are applicable to it. That is, the plan, including related program
    documentation and program officials* statements, satisfied or provided for
    satisfying many, but not all of the key aspects of (1) OMB*s capital
    planning and investment control review requirements; and (2) federal
    acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition
    management practices. For example, DHS fulfilled the OMB requirement that
    agencies state whether projects are approved by investment review boards
    and

    reviewed by Chief Financial and Procurement Officers; the plan was
    conditionally approved by DHS*s review board, which includes DHS*s Chief
    Financial and Procurement Officers. On the other hand, OMB guidance
    requires that agency plans summarize life cycle costs and include a cost/
    benefit analysis that covers return on investment. DHS has not yet

    established a date and plan for developing a current life cycle cost and a
    cost/ benefit analysis for US- VISIT, although program officials stated
    that they intend to do so.

    Concerning our second objective, DHS has initiated action to implement or
    has partially implemented most, but not all of the recommendations
    contained in our report on the fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan. 2 Each
    recommendation, along with the status of each, is summarized below.

     We recommended that DHS develop a system security plan and privacy
    impact assessment. The department has action under way to address this
    recommendation. Specifically, DHS reported that it has defined security
    and privacy requirements and has drafted a security plan and a privacy
    impact assessment.

    2 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland
    Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO- 03-
    563 (Washington, D. C.: June 9, 2003).

     We recommended that DHS ensure that controls in the area of acquisition
    planning, solicitation, requirements management, program management,
    contract tracking and oversight, and evaluation are implemented in
    accordance with the Software Engineering Institute*s (SEI) guidance. 3 The
    department plans to implement this recommendation. Specifically, DHS has
    recently approved a program management structure that includes functions
    consistent with these

    controls; however, it has not yet developed explicit plans or time frames
    for defining and implementing them.

     We recommended that DHS ensure that future expenditure plans are
    provided to the department*s House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees
    in advance of US- VISIT funds being obligated. With respect to the fiscal
    year 2003 expenditure plan, DHS partially satisfied

    this recommendation. Specifically, it provided this plan to the Senate and
    House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in June 2003.
    However, following DHS*s request for use of $5 to $7 million

    in March 2003, the April 2003 House Conference Report 4 recommended that
    DHS use $5 million for US- VISIT. DHS subsequently allocated the $5
    million to the US- VISIT program.

     We recommended that DHS ensure that future expenditure plans fully
    disclose US- VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits. With
    respect to the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan, DHS has partially
    satisfied this recommendation. Specifically, this plan describes highlevel
    capabilities by increment, high- level schedule estimates, and categories
    of expenditures. However, the plan does not associate these categories of
    expenditure to incremental capabilities, time frames, and benefits.
    Moreover, the plan does not identify expected benefits in tangible,
    measurable, and meaningful terms, nor does it associate benefits with
    increments.

    Finally, we identified 10 factors that make US- VISIT a risky endeavor.
    Some of these risk factors are inherent to the program, and others are a
    product of the program*s relatively immature state of governance and
    management. The specific risk factors that we identified are as follows:

    3 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition
    Capability Maturity Model , Version 1. 03 (March 2002) defines acquisition
    process management controls for planning, managing, and controlling
    software- intensive system acquisitions.

    4 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 76, at 80 (2003).

     US- VISIT is critical to the department*s mission in preventing the
    entry of persons who pose a threat to our nation into the United States.
    The missed entry of just one of these persons could have severe
    consequences.

     US- VISIT is large in scope and complex. For example, the program is to
    (1) support a large governmentwide process involving multiple departments
    and agencies, (2) modify and expand facilities at over 150 land ports of
    entry, and (3) interconnect about 20 existing systems.

     To meet US- VISIT*s daunting milestones, 5 DHS has chosen to implement
    temporary solutions, largely because over the last 7 years, limited
    progress has been made in addressing key legislative requirements. For

    example, to meet deadlines at land ports of entry, DHS plans to develop
    and implement interim, or temporary, system and facility solutions.  The
    program will be a costly undertaking. In February 2003, DHS

    estimated that the program would cost about $7.2 billion through fiscal
    year 2014. However, this estimate is outdated and does not include, for
    example, the State Department*s cost to implement visas with biometrics,
    which we previously estimated could add as much as $15 billion to the
    program*s cost through 2014. 6  The performance of initial increments of
    the US- VISIT system depends

    on the performance of existing systems that are to be interfaced. Some of
    these systems, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
    7 and the Computer Linked Application Information Management System 3, 8
    have known system availability problems that could limit USVISIT system
    performance.

    5 For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
    Improvement Act of 2000 (P. L. 106- 215, June 15, 2000) requires that US-
    VISIT be implemented at all air and sea ports of entry by December 31,
    2003; at the 50 highest volume land ports of entry by December 31, 2004;
    and at all remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005.

    6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics
    for Border Security, GAO- 03- 174 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 15, 2002). 7
    The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System contains information
    on foreign students. 8 The Computer Linked Application Information
    Management System 3 contains information on foreign nationals who request
    benefits, such as change of status or extension of stay.

     US- VISIT is not currently directed and overseen by an accountable
    governance structure that reflects the program*s governmentwide scope and
    that includes the appropriate leaders from each stakeholder

    organization, that is, those who can make and enforce decisions and commit
    resources.

     The US- VISIT program office does not have the capabilities (people,
    processes, and tools) to effectively manage the program. For example, this
    office has not yet been adequately staffed, specific roles and
    responsibilities have not been defined, and acquisition management process
    controls have not been developed and implemented. Moreover, DHS has not
    defined specific plans and time frames for doing so.  Key information
    about the operational context surrounding US- VISIT

    that is necessary to effectively define, establish, and implement the
    program is not yet available. As a result, DHS is making certain
    assumptions and decisions in order to meet near- term deadlines, such as
    the use of a two- fingerprint biometric; these assumptions and decisions

    would require system rework if they prove inconsistent with subsequent
    operational context policy or standards decisions.  Construction of US-
    VISIT facility solutions, both interim and permanent,

    pose serious challenges for a number of reasons. For example, existing
    facilities do not support existing entry and exit processes at a number of
    land ports of entry, border crossing wait times are very sensitive to very
    small increases in processing times at certain high- volume land ports of

    entry, and interim facility solutions must satisfy yet- to- be defined
    program requirements.

     The mission value to be gained from the initial US- VISIT operational
    capability planned for December 31, 2003, is not currently known. In
    particular, DHS has not defined specific, measurable benefits expected
    from this initial operating capability, in large part because it has yet
    to define the processes that will govern how entry and exit activities
    will be performed. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that this
    initial operating capability is to be constrained by existing facilities
    and personnel and it is not to result in increases in border crossing wait
    times.

    In conclusion, US- VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to support a
    critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding
    implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. Generally,

    these risk factors are inherent to the program and cannot be easily
    changed. However, compounding these inherent risk factors are a number of
    others that are attributable to the program*s current state of governance
    and management and its acquisition approach, as described above. Further,
    DHS did not fully satisfy the legislative conditions imposed by the
    Congress

    and has yet to fully implement our previous recommendations, both of which
    were aimed at reducing risk. Because of all these risk factors, it is
    uncertain that US- VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably
    achieve DHS*s stated goals of facilitating legitimate travel and trade,
    enhancing national security, and adhering to U. S. privacy laws and
    policies. Moreover, DHS*s near- term investment in the program is at risk
    of not delivering promised capabilities on time and within budget, and not
    producing mission value commensurate with investment costs. Thus, it is
    imperative that the factors that contribute to this level of risk be
    addressed thoroughly and expeditiously.

    Recommendations for To address US- VISIT as a governmentwide program and
    to minimize the

    Executive Action risks facing the program, we recommend that the Secretary
    of Homeland

    Security, in collaboration with cabinet officials from US- VISIT
    stakeholder departments and agencies,  establish and charter an executive
    body, chaired by the Secretary*s

    designee, potentially co- chaired by the leadership from key stakeholder
    departments and agencies, and composed of appropriate senior- level
    representatives from DHS and each stakeholder organization, to guide and
    direct the US- VISIT program; and  direct this executive body to
    immediately take steps to (1) ensure that

    the human capital and financial resources are expeditiously provided to
    establish a fully functional and effective US- VISIT program office and
    associated management capability, (2) clarify the operational context
    within which US- VISIT must operate, and (3) decide whether proposed US-
    VISIT increments will produce mission value commensurate with costs and
    risks and disclose to the Congress planned actions based on this body*s
    decisions.

    Further, we recommend that the Secretary, through the Under Secretary for
    Border and Transportation Security, direct the US- VISIT Program Director
    to expeditiously establish an effective program management capability,
    including immediately

     defining program office positional roles, responsibilities, and
    relationships;

     developing and implementing a human capital strategy that provides for
    staffing these positions with individuals who have the requisite core
    competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities);

     developing and implementing a plan for satisfying key SEI acquisition
    management controls, to include acquisition planning, solicitation,
    requirements development and management, project management, contractor
    tracking and oversight, evaluation, and transition to support;

     developing and implementing a risk management plan and ensuring that all
    high risks and their status are reported regularly to the executive body;

     defining performance standards for each US- VISIT system increment that
    are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing
    systems for these system increments; and

     developing an analysis of incremental program costs, benefits, and
    risks, and providing this analysis to the executive body, to assist it in
    the body*s deliberations and decision making.

    Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report signed by
    the Director, USVISIT, DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated
    that it has

    recently made progress toward addressing them. In particular, DHS stated
    that it has approved the proposed US- VISIT organizational structure and
    identified necessary staff positions, and that it is working with the
    Office of Personnel Management to draft position descriptions and prepare
    for recruitment. Also, it stated that the US- VISIT program office is
    staffed with 51 detailees from various DHS components and agencies. Last,
    it stated that it has in place an Investment Review Board that has twice
    reviewed US- VISIT, has established a DHS framework for addressing policy

    questions, and has plans to establish a US- VISIT Advisory Council. DHS*s
    comments are reprinted in appendix II.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
    Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that

    have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland security.
    We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State and the Director of
    OMB. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http:// www. gao. gov.

    Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
    report, please contact me at (202) 512- 3439. I can also be reached by E-
    mail at Hiter@ gao. gov. Key contributors to this report were Seto
    Bagdoyan, Barbara Collier, Deborah Davis, Neil Doherty, Rebecca Gambler,
    Tamra Goldstein, James Houtz, Richard Hung, Tammi Nguyen, and Mark Tremba.

    Randolph C. Hite Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems
    Issues

    Appendi xes Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House

    Appendi x I

    Committees on Appropriations Information Technology: Risks Facing Key
    Homeland Security Program Need to Be Addressed

    Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland Security Senate
    and House Committee on Appropriations

    July 18, 2003 1

    Briefing Overview * Introduction  Objectives  Results in Brief
    Background  Results

     Legislative Conditions  Status of Recommendations  Observations
    Conclusions  Recommendations  Agency Comments  Attachment I.
    Legislative History  Attachment II. Scope and Methodology

    2

    Introduction Seven years ago, the Congress passed legislation that
    directed the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
    develop an entry exit system. Pursuant to this and related legislative
    direction, 1 INS established the entry exit program about 16 months ago.
    Subsequently, INS was merged into the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS), and the entry exit program was renamed the United States Visitor
    and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US- VISIT). US- VISIT is a
    governmentwide program that is to improve the processes, policies, and
    systems used to collect information on foreign nationals who travel to the
    United States, and to track entries, exits, and stays of travelers.

    DHS*s stated goals for US- VISIT are to  facilitate legitimate travel and
    trade,  enhance national security, and  adhere to U. S. privacy laws and
    policies.

    1 See attachment I for a listing of relevant legislation. 3

    Introduction The US- VISIT program involves the interdependent application
    of people, processes, technology, and facilities.

    Note: GAO analysis based on DHS data. 4

    Introduction The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, 1 prohibits
    DHS from obligating any funds appropriated in the act for the entry exit
    system (now US- VISIT), until it submits a plan for expenditure that
    satisfies the following legislative conditions.

     It meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements
    established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including OMB
    Circular A- 11, part 3. 2

     It complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and
    systems acquisition management practices of the federal government.

     It is reviewed by GAO. 1 P. L. 108- 7 (Feb. 20, 2003). 2 OMB Circular A-
    11 establishes policy for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management
    of federal capital assets.

    5

    Introduction In fiscal year 2003, Justice requested $380 million for the
    entry exit program (now US- VISIT)*$ 362 million in new funding and $18
    million in fiscal year 2003 base resources.

     In conjunction with the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,
    the conference report 1 recommended $362 million for the entry exit system
    (now US- VISIT) and related information technology (IT) infrastructure
    upgrades.

     According to DHS officials, the $18 million in base resources was to
    come from a user fee account. However, according to these officials, given
    the decrease in user fee receipts since September 11, 2001, it is unclear
    whether the $18 million will be available for the US VISIT program.

    DHS submitted its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan for $375 million 2 on
    June 5, 2003, to its House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on
    Homeland Security.

    1 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 10, at 623 (2003). 2 In April 2003, H. R.
    Conf. Rep. No. 108- 76 at 80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million
    for USVISIT. The $5 million was not included in the expenditure plan
    submitted to the Appropriations Subcommittees in June 2003.

    6

    Objectives As agreed, our objectives were to

    1. determine whether the US- VISIT fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan
    satisfies the legislative conditions,

    2. determine the status of our US- VISIT open recommendations, and 3.
    provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and DHS*s

    management of US- VISIT. We conducted our work at DHS headquarters in
    Washington, D. C., from April through July 2003 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards. Details of our scope and
    methodology are given in attachment II.

    7

    Results in Brief: Objective 1

    Legislative Conditions

    DHS*s expenditure plan partially satisfies the legislative conditions.

    Legislative conditions Fully satisfies 1 Partially satisfies 2 Does not
    satisfy 3

    1. Meets the capital planning and investment control review

    requirements established by OMB, including OMB Circular A- 11, part 3.

    2. Complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and

    systems acquisition management practices of the federal government.

    3. Is reviewed by GAO.

    1 Satisfies or provides for satisfying every aspect of the condition that
    we reviewed. 2 Satisfies or provides for satisfying many, but not all, key
    aspects of the condition that we reviewed. 3 Satisfies or provides for
    satisfying few, if any, of the key aspects of the condition that we
    reviewed.

    8

    Results in Brief: Objective 2

    Open Recommendations

    Status of DHS actions to implement our open recommendations.

    Status GAO open recommendations Complete Partially complete In progress
    Planned

    1. Develop a system security plan and

    privacy impact assessment. 2. Ensure that controls in the area of

    acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements management, project
    management, contract tracking and

    oversight, and evaluation are implemented in accordance with SEI 1
    guidance.

    ( continued next slide)

    1 The Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (R) developed by
    Carnegie Mellon University*s Software Engineering Institute (SEI) defines
    acquisition process management controls for planning, managing, and
    controlling software- intensive system acquisitions.

    9

    Results in Brief: Objective 2

    Open Recommendations Status GAO open recommendations

    Complete Partially complete In progress Planned

    3. Ensure that future expenditure plans are provided to DHS*s House and

    1

    Senate Appropriations Subcommittees in advance of USVISIT funds being
    obligated.

    4. Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose what US- VISIT
    system

    1

    capabilities and benefits are to be delivered, by when, and at what cost.

    1 With respect to the fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan. 10

    Results in Brief: Objective 3

    Observations: Risk Factors

    US- VISIT is a high risk endeavor. We have identified 10 risk factors
    affecting USVISIT:  Mission is critical. The missed entry of one person
    who poses a threat to the

    United States could have severe consequences.  Scope is large and
    complex. Controlling the pre- entry, entry, status, and exit

    of millions of travelers is a large and complex process.  Milestones are
    challenging. Progress and current status of the program

    makes satisfying legislatively mandated milestones difficult.  Potential
    cost is significant. DHS has estimated that the program will cost

    $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, and this estimate does not include
    all costs and may underestimate some others.

     Existing systems have known problems. The program is to initially rely
    on existing systems with known problems that could limit US- VISIT
    performance.

    11

    Results in Brief: Objective 3

    Observations: Risk Factors

     Governance structure is not established. The program is not currently
    governed by an accountable body that reflects its governmentwide scope and
    that can make and enforce decisions and commit resources for all program
    stakeholders.

     Program management capability is not implemented. The program office is
    not yet adequately staffed, roles and responsibilities are not yet clearly
    defined, and acquisition management processes are not yet established.

     Operational context is unsettled. Operational issues have not been
    decided, such as which rules and standards will govern implementation of
    biometrics technology.

     Near- term facilities solutions pose challenges. Interim facility
    planning for high- volume land ports of entry (POEs) must satisfy
    demanding as well as yetto- be defined requirements.

     Mission value of first increment is currently unknown. The benefits
    versus costs of the first increment are not yet known.

    12

    Results in Brief: Objective 3

    Observation Risk Factors Affecting US- VISIT

    Unless these risk factors are effectively addressed, US- VISIT is likely
    to fall short of envisioned expectations.

    13

    Results in Brief To address these risk factors, we are making
    recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

    We provided DHS a draft of this briefing. In its oral comments, DHS agreed
    with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

    14

    Background

    Border Inspection by POE

    All persons that legally enter the United States must pass through one of
    more than 300 land, sea, or air ports of entry (POEs), and must undergo a
    primary inspection. In fiscal year 2002, about 440 million primary
    inspections were conducted on foreign nationals and U. S. citizens.

    Number of Number of

    Percentage of Type of POEs

    POEs inspections inspections

    Land 165 358,373,569 81 Air 123 69,679,190 16 Sea

    42 12,369,035 3 Total 330 440,421,794 100 Source: DHS. Note: GAO analysis
    based on DHS data.

    15

    Background

    US- VISIT Overview

    US- VISIT is a governmentwide endeavor intended to facilitate legitimate
    travel and trade, enhance national security, and adhere to U. S. privacy
    laws and policies by

     collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on individuals who
    enter and exit the United States;

     identifying individuals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of
    their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status;
    and (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;

     detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and
    determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and

     facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border
    management community.

    16

    Background

    US- VISIT Organization

    Within DHS, 1 organizational responsibility for the US- VISIT program is
    within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.

    In June 2003, DHS established a US- VISIT program office with
    responsibility for managing the acquisition, deployment, operation, and
    sustainment of the US- VISIT system and supporting people (e. g.,
    inspectors), processes (e. g., entry exit policies and procedures), and
    facilities (e. g., inspection booths) associated with the program.

    The following graphic shows the organizational ownership for the US- VISIT
    program.

    1 In January 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of
    DHS as a high risk program for the following three reasons: (1) the size
    and complexity of the undertaking, (2) the wide array of existing
    challenges of the component agencies being merged within DHS, and (3) the
    potentially serious consequences of DHS*s failure to effectively carry out
    its mission. (U. S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges
    and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security , GAO- 03- 102
    (Washington, D. C.: January 2003)).

    17

    Background

    US- VISIT Organization Organizational Placement of US- VISIT Program (
    partial DHS organization chart)

    Note: GAO analysis based on DHS data As of May 2003, the US- VISIT program
    office reports directly to the Under Secretary for Border and
    Transportation Security.

    18

    Background

    Acquisition Strategy Acquisition Strategy

    DHS plans to deliver US- VISIT capability incrementally. Currently DHS has
    defined four increments, with Increments 1 through 3 being interim, or
    temporary, solutions, and increment 4 being the strategic solution and
    consisting of a series of increments. Increments 1 through 3 include the
    interfacing and enhancement of existing system capabilities and the
    deployment of these capabilities at air, sea, and land POEs; the design
    and construction of interim facilities 1 at land POEs; and the development
    and implementation of revised border inspection procedures.

    1 DHS is planning to construct interim, or temporary, facilities at land
    POEs to meet established milestones, while concurrently developing
    permanent solutions at these POEs.

    19

    Background

    Acquisition Strategy

    According to DHS, Increment 1 is to deliver an initial system operating
    capability to all air and sea POEs by December 31, 2003, that includes

     recording the arrival and departure of foreign nationals using passenger
    and crew manifest data,

     identifying travelers who have overstayed their visits or changed their
    visitor status, and

     interfacing seven existing systems that contain data about foreign
    nationals. Increment 1 is to also verify travelers* identities upon entry
    into the United States through the use of biometrics and checks against
    watch lists (e. g., the Interagency Border Inspection System* IBIS) at air
    POEs and 13 of 42 sea POEs, but only for those cruise lines that currently
    have inspections stations

    Increment 1 is also to include developing policies and procedures and
    providing the associated training for an interim inspection process.

    Increment 1 may include an exit capability beyond the capture of the
    manifest data. 20

    Background

    Acquisition Strategy

    Increment 1 is not intended to include the installation or acquisition of
    additional facilities at air and sea POEs, or employment of additional
    inspectors.

    Increment 2 is to deploy Increment 1 system capability and design and
    construct interim facilities (e. g., additional inspection booths) at the
    50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004. It is also to include

     the use of radio frequency technology 1 for vehicles and pedestrians
    that are pre- cleared, and

     the use of technology to read travel documents with biometrics. 2
    Increment 3 is to deploy Increment 2 system capability and design and
    construct interim facilities at all remaining land POEs by December 31,
    2005. Increment 4 is to deliver a new, yet- to- be- defined, integrated
    system solution to a yet- to- be- defined number of POEs by December 31,
    2006.

    1 DHS plans to issue radio frequency- enabled proximity cards. As the
    person or vehicle passes through the inspection lane, the data on the card
    are read by an antenna and displayed on the inspector*s screen. 2 By
    October 26, 2004.

    21

    Background

    Acquisition Strategy

    For the system, DHS plans are to award a single, indefinite- delivery/
    indefinitequantity (IDIQ) 1 type contract to a prime contractor capable of
    integrating existing and new business processes and technologies. DHS
    plans to issue a request for proposal for the prime contractor in November
    2003. The prime contractor is to be responsible for Increment 4 and is to
    assist in the deployment of Increments 2 and 3. DHS plans to use existing
    contractors to interface and enhance the existing systems for Increment 1.
    For facilities, the department plans to award contracts for the design and
    construction of interim facilities at each land POE through the General
    Services Administration (GSA). DHS is working with GSA to obligate $17
    million for the award of interim facilities design contracts beginning in
    August 2003. DHS plans to award interim facilities construction contracts
    for the 50 highest volume land POEs through GSA beginning in February 2004
    using anticipated fiscal year 2004 funds.

    1 An IDIQ contract is a flexible contract that provides for an indefinite
    quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed
    period of time. The government schedules deliveries or performance by
    placing orders with the contractor.

    22

    Background

    Acquisition Strategy

    For human capital, DHS has not yet defined its strategy. However, for
    Increment 1, it does not plan to acquire any additional inspection staff.
    According to program officials, the department is developing a training
    plan for inspectors for Increment 1, and it expects to complete training
    by the end of December 2003.

    DHS is currently developing the policies, procedures, and guidance for
    implementing Increment 1. It expects to complete development by the end of
    October 2003.

    23

    Background

    Component Systems Component Systems

    US- VISIT (Increments 1 through 4) is to include the interfacing and
    integration of over 20 existing systems. For example, Increment 1 includes
    the following existing systems:

     Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), a database that stores
    traveler arrival and departure data and can perform query functions;

     Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), a system that captures
    arrival and departure manifest information;

     Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a system that maintains
    lookout data and interfaces with other agencies databases, and is
    currently used by inspectors at POEs to verify traveler information and
    modify data;

     Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a system that
    collects and stores biometric data for foreign visitors;

    24

    Background

    Component Systems

     Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), a system that
    contains information on foreign students; and

     Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS 3), a
    system that contains information on foreign nationals who request
    benefits, such as change of status or extension of stay.

     Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a system that includes information
    on whether a visa applicant has previously applied for a visa or currently
    has a valid U. S. visa.

    25

    Background

    Review of Prior Expenditure Plan GAO s Review of Fiscal Year 2002
    Expenditure Plan

    In our report on the fiscal year 2002 expenditure plan, 1 we concluded
    that  the plan partially satisfied the legislative conditions;  INS
    intended to acquire and deploy a system with functional and performance

    capabilities consistent with the general scope of capabilities under
    various laws; and

     the plan did not provide sufficient information to allow Congress to
    oversee the program.

    1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland
    Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO- 03-
    563 (Washington, D. C.: June 9, 2003).

    26

    Background

    Review of Prior Expenditure Plan

    Accordingly, we made recommendations, including  developing a system
    security plan and privacy impact assessment;  ensuring that controls in
    the area of acquisition planning, solicitation,

    requirements development and management, project management, contract
    tracking and oversight, and evaluation be implemented in accordance with
    SEI guidance;

     ensuring that future expenditure plans be provided to the department*s
    House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees in advance of US- VISIT
    funds being obligated; and

     ensuring that future expenditure plans fully disclose US- VISIT system
    capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.

    27

    Background

    Review of Current Expenditure Plan Fiscal Year 2003 Expenditure Plan
    Summary (see next slides for descriptions)

    Areas of expenditure Amount

    Proof of Concept Demonstrations: NSEERS reimbursement $ 10,500,000

    NSEERS 9,500,000

    Facial Verification Test 1,500,000

    System Enhancement & Infrastructure Upgrades 155,000,000

    POE IT and Communication Upgrades 85,000,000

    Facilities Planning, Analysis, & Design 60,000,000

    Training 3,500,000

    Program Management Support 30,000,000

    Operations & Systems Sustainment 20,000,000

    Total $ 375,000,000 1

    Source: DHS. 1 In April 2003, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 76 at 80 (2003),
    recommended that DHS use $5 million for USVISIT.

    The $5 million was not included in the expenditure plan submitted to the
    Appropriations Subcommittees in June 2003.

    28

    Background

    Current Expenditure Plan Descriptions Proof of Concept Demonstrations:
    This area includes reimbursement to DHS*s Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services for previously conducted registration activities
    associated with the National Security Entry- Exit Registration System
    (NSEERS). 1 Costs in this area also include those for software changes
    made to IDENT to accommodate NSEERS, for the purchase and deployment of
    additional IDENT/ ENFORCE workstations to POEs and district offices, and
    for training staff on these system changes. In addition, this area
    includes a pilot with the Australian government to test facial
    recognition, in which the Australian government will provide a select
    group of commercial pilots traveling between Australia and the United
    States with passports that have biometrics encoded on a chip; these
    passports will allow DHS to test the reading of the biometric information
    and to conduct facial verification matching tests.

    1 NSEERS consists of (1) a modified version of the Enforcement Case
    Tracking System (ENFORCE), (2) deployments of the Automated Biometric
    Identification System (IDENT), and (3) updated polices and procedures
    covering the registration of certain nonimmigrants. ENFORCE is a case
    management system that supports the apprehension and booking process for
    illegal aliens. IDENT is a database of more than 4.5 million foreign
    visitors* fingerprints (two prints) and photos.

    29

    Background

    Current Expenditure Plan System Enhancement & Infrastructure Upgrades:
    This area includes the enhancement of existing information systems,
    telecommunications upgrades between the Justice and Customs data centers,
    an additional server to accommodate increased workload, and wide- area
    network upgrades to support additional processing and bandwidth
    requirements relative to the transmission of biometrics data.

    POE IT and Communication Upgrades: This area includes upgrades to the
    hardware (e. g., desktop computers, scanners, biometric devices) and
    communications infrastructure at the POEs.

    30

    Background

    Current Expenditure Plan Facilities Planning, Analysis, & Design: This
    area includes modeling air, sea, and the 50 highest volume land POEs for
    interim facilities and planning for permanent facilities; conducting
    environmental assessments; acquiring space for US- VISIT enrollment
    centers at the 50 highest volume land POEs; developing site plans;
    awarding design contracts for interim facilities at the 50 highest volume
    land POEs; conducting feasibility studies and developing master plans to
    begin collecting data and coordinating existing activities and projects
    for future requirements; and providing facility- related program and
    project management support.

    Training: This area includes initial training for personnel to use the US-
    VISIT system.

    Program Management Support: This area includes establishing a program
    management office to manage the US- VISIT program and engaging program
    management support contractors.

    Operations & Systems Sustainment: This area includes increased maintenance
    and technical support to meet the system performance requirements.

    31

    Background

    Funding US- VISIT Available Appropriations, DHS Allocations, and
    Obligations for Fiscal Year 2002 and 2003

    Available DHS allocations

    2 Fiscal year appropriations ( millions) 1 ( millions) Obligated (
    millions) FY 2003

    $ 380.0 $ 52.5 3

    $ 4.2 FY 2002

    13.3 * 4

    3.2 4

    Total $ 393.3 $ 7.4

    Source DHS. 1 Of the $449.8 million lump sum appropriated for Enforcement
    and Border Affairs in the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the
    United States Act, 2002 (P. L. 107- 117), the conference report (H. R.
    Conf. Rep. No. 107- 350, at 416 (2001)) recommended that INS use $13.3
    million in appropriations for the entry exit system (now USVISIT). This
    amount is available until expended. Of the $2.8 billion lump sum
    appropriated for Immigration Enforcement and Border Affairs for fiscal
    year 2003, the conference report (H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 10, at 623
    (2003)) recommended that INS use $362 million for what is now US- VISIT.
    These funds expire at the end of fiscal year 2003. According to DHS
    officials, an additional $18 million in base resources was to be available
    from a user fee account. Given the decrease in user fee receipts since
    September 11, 2001, these officials stated that the $18 million may not be
    available for the US- VISIT program.

    32

    Background

    Funding Approvals

    2 As of June 12, 2003. 3 In April 2003, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 76, at
    80 (2003), recommended that DHS use $5 million for USVISIT. DHS allocated
    this $5 million to the US- VISIT program. After submitting the expenditure
    plan to its appropriations subcommittees in June, DHS allocated $47.5
    million to the US- VISIT program. 4 On August 2, 2002, the Congress
    enacted the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From
    and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P. L. 107- 206,
    Aug. 2, 2002), which prohibited INS from obligating funds for the entry
    exit system (from either of the two supplemental appropriations) until the
    agency submitted an expenditure plan to the appropriations committees that
    satisfied certain legislative conditions imposed by the act. Before August
    2, 2002, the former INS had obligated $3.2 million.

    33

    Background

    US- VISIT Timeline US- VISIT Timeline

    Note: GAO analysis of DHS data. 1 The Visa Waiver System electronically
    collects arrival and departure information for all passengers and crew
    members who are provided a waiver and who arrive and depart U. S. airports
    and seaports.

    34

    Objective 1 Results

    Legislative Conditions

    US- VISIT expenditure plan partially satisfies the legislative conditions.

    Condition 1 partially met. The plan, including related program
    documentation and program officials* statements, partially meets the
    capital planning and investment control review requirements established by
    OMB, including OMB Circular A- 11, part 3, which establishes policy for
    planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management of federal capital
    assets.

    Details of our analysis are shown on the table that follows. 35

    Objective 1 Results

    Legislative Conditions Examples of A- 11 conditions Results of our
    analysis

    Indicate whether the project was The plan was conditionally approved by
    DHS*s IRB, which is

    approved by Investment Review Board chaired by the Deputy Secretary and
    composed of department

    (IRB) and reviewed by Chief Financial executives, including DHS*s Chief
    Financial and Procurement

    and Procurement Officers. Officers.

    Provide justification and describe The plan provides a high- level
    justification and description of

    acquisition strategy. the acquisition strategy for Increment 1. DHS plans
    to use existing contracts to interface and enhance existing systems for
    Increment 1. Summarize life cycle costs and

    DHS does not have current life cycle costs nor a current cost/ benefit
    analysis, including the

    cost/ benefit analysis for US- VISIT, but plans to develop these. return
    on investment.

    However, a date and plan for doing so have not been established. 1 Address
    enterprise architecture. The plan states that US- VISIT is identified in
    DHS*s enterprise

    architecture (EA), but it does not explain how this project conforms to
    DHS*s EA, which is currently under development. Further, DHS officials
    could not provide evidence of USVISIT*s alignment with DHS*s EA
    activities. 1 Address security and privacy. According to programofficials,
    security and privacy

    requirements have been defined, and a draft security plan and privacy
    assessment is currently under review. 1 These areas are more fully
    discussed in the observation section of the briefing.

    36

    Objective 1 Results

    Legislative Conditions Condition 2 partially met. The plan, including
    related program documentation and program officials* statements, partially
    complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems
    acquisition management practices of the federal government. These provide
    a management framework based on the use of rigorous and disciplined
    processes for planning, managing, and controlling the acquisition of IT
    resources, including acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements
    development and management, project management, contract tracking and
    oversight, and evaluation.

    Details of our analysis are shown on the table that follows. 37

    Objective 1 Results

    Legislative Conditions Examples of practices Results of our analysis

    Acquisition planning. 1 For various reasons, including the recent
    transition to DHS, many of the

    Ensures that reasonable acquisition planning documents that had been
    prepared for the former entry exit

    planning for the system are outdated. For example, INS had developed an
    acquisition plan, as

    acquisition is conducted, required by INS acquisition policies and
    procedures that outlined its approach and

    including, among other strategy for acquiring the entry exit system.
    According to DHS officials, the plan is

    things, developing an no longer current.

    acquisition strategy and DHS officials stated that they have updated some
    of these acquisition planning

    plan, determining the cost documents, submitted them to the IRB on June
    30, 2003, and plan to meet with and schedule, identifying

    the IRB on July 17, 2003. DHS plans to update additional planning
    documents by risks, and defining

    August 7, 2003. For example, DHS plans to update its acquisition plan and
    requirements.

    develop a life cycle cost estimate and risk management plan for Increment
    1.

    Project management. 1 According to US- VISIT program officials,
    interfacing and enhancing existing

    Provides for the systems under Increment 1 are being managed according to
    the former INS*s

    management of activities SDLC. 2 However, they could not provide evidence
    to support this statement;

    within the project office because of time constraints, we did not verify
    whether these contractors and

    and supporting associated DHS acquisition entities were following the
    SDLC.

    contractors to ensure a These officials also stated that US- VISIT will
    transition to DHS*s SDLC when it is

    timely, efficient, and costeffective completed. However, they did not know
    when the DHS SDLC would be complete,

    acquisition. and therefore when US- VISIT will transition.

    1 These practices are addressed in our observations section. 2 An SDLC
    (Systems Development Life Cycle) is a management process that specifies,
    for a series of *cradle to grave* phases,

    the development activities to be performed, products to be generated, and
    the decision points to determine whether the project is ready for the next
    phase.

    38

    Objective 1 Results

    Legislative Conditions Condition 3 met. The plan satisfies the requirement
    that it be reviewed by GAO. Our review was completed on July 18, 2003.

    39

    Objective 2 Results

    Open Recommendations Open Recommendation 1: Develop a system security plan
    and privacy impact assessment.

    Status: In progress The expenditure plan states that adequate security and
    privacy related measures are to be built into the US- VISIT system and
    that these measures will comply with emerging DHS security policies,
    relevant security- related laws, OMB circulars, and privacy guidelines of
    the federal Chief Information Officer Council*s best practices.

    According to program officials, system security and privacy requirements
    have been defined, and a draft security plan and privacy assessment is
    currently under review.

    40

    Objective 2 Results

    Open Recommendations Open Recommendation 2: Ensure that controls in the
    area of acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements development and
    management, project management, contract tracking and oversight, and
    evaluation be implemented in accordance with SEI guidance.

    Status: Planned DHS has recently approved a program management structure
    that includes functions consistent with these acquisition management
    controls: acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements development and
    management, project management, contract tracking and oversight, and
    evaluation. According to the USVISIT Program Director, these functions
    will be performed consistent with SEI*s guidance. However, the department
    does not currently have explicit plans and associated time frames for
    developing and implementing these acquisition management controls.

    41

    Objective 2 Results

    Open Recommendations Open Recommendation 3: Ensure that future expenditure
    plans be provided to the Department*s House and Senate Appropriations
    Subcommittees in advance of US- VISIT funds being obligated.

    Status: Partially complete In fiscal year 2003, Justice requested $380
    million for the entry exit program (now US- VISIT)*$ 362 million in new
    funding and $18 million in fiscal year 2003 base resources. 1 In
    conjunction with the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, the
    conference report 2 recommended $362 million for the entry exit system
    (now US- VISIT) and related IT infrastructure upgrades.

    In June 2003, DHS provided its fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan to the
    Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security. In
    April 2003, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 76, at 80 (2003), recommended that
    DHS use $5 million for US- VISIT. DHS allocated this $5 million to the US-
    VISIT program.

    1 According to DHS officials, the $18 million in base resources was to
    come from the user fee account. However, according to these officials,
    given the decrease in user fee receipts since September 11, 2001, it is
    unclear whether that $18 million will be available for the US- VISIT
    program. 2 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108- 10, at 623 (2003).

    42

    Objective 2 Results

    Open Recommendations Open Recommendation 4: Ensure that future expenditure
    plans fully disclose USVISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and
    benefits to be delivered.

    Status: Partially complete The expenditure plan identifies high- level
    capabilities by increment, such as

     recording the arrival and departure of foreign nationals using passenger
    and crew manifest data,

     implementing biometrics, and  being interoperable with other entities,
    including law enforcement and

    intelligence agencies. The plan also identifies a high- level schedule for
    implementing the system. For example, Increment 1 is to be implemented by
    December 31, 2003; Increment 2 by December 31, 2004; and Increment 3 by
    December 31, 2005.

    43

    Objective 2 Results

    Open Recommendations

    The plan also includes categories of expenditures, such as system
    enhancements and infrastructure upgrades, facilities planning, analysis
    and design, and POE IT and communications upgrades. However, the plan does
    not explicitly associate costs with incremental capabilities, time frames,
    and benefits. For example, the plan does not state how much of the $85
    million for POE IT and communications upgrades DHS plans to use for
    Increment 1 or for other increments.

    The plan identifies high- level goals for Increment 1 (i. e., positively
    impact national security and overall efforts in the war against
    terrorism). However, it does not identify expected benefits in tangible,
    measurable, and thus meaningful terms, nor does it associate benefits with
    increments. Therefore, it does not provide the basic data needed to
    measure return on investment. US- VISIT program officials stated that they
    intend to estimate program costs and benefits, but they did not have time
    frames for doing so.

    44

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations Observation: US- VISIT is a high risk endeavor. Ten separate
    factors collectively expose the US- VISIT program to a high level of risk.
    Some of these risk factors are inherent to the program, such as those
    associated with its mission criticality and complexity. Others are a
    product of the program*s relatively immature state of governance and
    management. Unless these risk factors are effectively addressed, US- VISIT
    is likely to fall short of envisioned expectations.

    45

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Criticality

    a. Mission is critical.  In fiscal year 2002, there were about 279
    million inspections of foreign

    nationals at U. S. POEs. The missed entry of just one person who poses a
    threat to the United States can have severe consequences. One of DHS*s
    critical missions is to prevent such an entry, and it intends to rely
    heavily on US- VISIT to help it do so.

     Additionally, the US- VISIT system is to assist law enforcement in
    identifying those visitors who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of
    their visas.

     Further, in announcing the US- VISIT system, the Under Secretary stated
    that the system would *give America a 21st Century *smart border** one
    that speeds through legitimate trade and travel, but stops terrorists in
    their tracks.*

    46

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity

    b. Scope is large and complex.  US- VISIT is to support and refine a
    large and complex governmentwide

    process involving multiple departments and agencies. This process is to
    control the pre- entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of
    foreign national travelers to and from the United States at over 300 air,
    sea, and land POEs. It also requires the modification and expansion of
    facilities at over 150 land POEs. The graphic below depicts the high-
    level border security processes. The following graphics depict the
    subprocesses.

    47

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity Simplified Diagram of Current Pre- entry Process

    1 The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is a name check system
    that contains records of people who may be ineligible to receive a
    passport or visa.

    48

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity Simplified Diagram of Current Entry Process

    1 The Non- Immigrant Information System (NIIS) collects arrival and
    departure Form I- 94 data and reports information on overstays.

    49

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity Simplified Diagram of the Current Status Process

    1 The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) provides information on
    wanted persons and criminal histories. 50

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity Simplified Diagram of the Current Exit Process

    51

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity

    As mentioned previously, US- VISIT (Increments 1 through 4) is to include
    the interfacing and integration of over 20 existing systems. Increment 1
    includes the following seven existing systems:

     Arrival Departure Information System,  Advance Passenger Information
    System,  Interagency Border Inspection System,  Automated Biometric
    Identification System,  Student Exchange Visitor Information System,
    Computer Linked Application Information Management System, and  Consular
    Consolidated Database. The following graphic shows the systems and their
    relationships.

    52

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Complexity Simplified Diagram of US- VISIT Increment 1
    Component Systems and Relationships

    1 Fingerprint Identification Number. 53

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Challenging Milestones

    c. Milestones are challenging. Key US- VISIT milestones are legislatively
    mandated. For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
    Management Improvement Act of 2000 1 requires that US- VISIT be
    implemented at all air and sea POEs by December 31, 2003; at the 50
    highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004; and at all remaining POEs
    by December 31, 2005.

    Because of limited progress over the last 7 years in addressing entry exit
    legislative requirements, including the above cited milestones, DHS
    acknowledges that it cannot complete permanent solutions in these time
    frames and thus now plans to implement interim, or temporary solutions.
    For example, as previously described, Increments 1 through 3 include the
    interfacing of existing systems and the design and construction of interim
    facilities at land POEs. Further, DHS officials have stated that it will
    be difficult to develop and implement even the interim solutions at some
    of the highest volume land POEs (such as San Ysidro, CA; Otay Mesa, CA;
    and Laredo, TX) by December 31, 2004, because even minor changes in the
    inspection time can greatly impact the average wait time at these high-
    volume POEs. 1 P. L. 106- 215 (June 15, 2000).

    54

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Cost

    d. Potential cost is significant. The potential governmentwide cost of US-
    VISIT over just a 10- year period will likely be in the tens of billions
    of dollars.

    In February 2003, DHS estimated the total overall cost of the US- VISIT
    program to be about $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014. This estimate
    includes system investment costs, such as IT hardware and communications
    infrastructure, software enhancements and interfaces, as well as the cost
    of facilities and additional inspectors. It also includes system and
    facilities operation and maintenance costs.

    55

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Cost

     The estimate does include the cost of planning, designing, and
    constructing permanent facilities, which according to DHS is about $2.9
    billion. 1 This estimate is based on the assumptions that (1) no
    additional traffic lanes will be required to support the entry processes
    and (2) exit facilities will mirror entry facilities (i. e., that a land
    POE with 10 entry traffic lanes will require 10 exit traffic lanes). The
    estimate includes the costs to design and construct building space to
    house additional computer equipment and inspectors, as well as the costs
    for highway reconfiguration at land POEs.

    The estimate does not include the costs to design and construct interim
    facilities at land POEs. DHS officials estimate that the cost of
    constructing the interim facilities at the 50 highest volume POEs is about
    $218 million.

    1 The $2.9 billion is a parametric cost estimate. Parametric cost
    estimating is a technique used in the planning, budgeting, and conceptual
    stages of projects. This technique expedites the development of order of
    magnitude benchmark estimates when discrete estimating techniques are not
    possible or would require inordinate amounts of time and resources to
    produce similar results. Estimates such as this can vary +- 30 to 50
    percent.

    56

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Cost

     The estimate does include the cost of implementing biometrics. However,
    these costs may be understated because it does not include, for example,
    State Department costs. Specifically, in November 2002, 1 we reported that
    a rough order of magnitude estimate of the cost to implement visas with
    biometrics would be between $1.3 billion and $2.9 billion initially and
    between $0.7 and $1.5 billion annually thereafter. This estimate is based
    on certain assumptions, including that all current visa- issuing embassies
    and consulates will be equipped to collect biometrics from visa
    applicants. Assuming that biometrics are implemented by December 2004,
    this means that the recurring cost of having biometric visas through DHS*s
    fiscal year 2014 life cycle period would be between $7 and $15 billion; in
    contrast, DHS has estimated a cost of about $7.2 billion for the entire
    program through fiscal year 2014.

    1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics
    for Border Security , GAO- 03- 174 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 15, 2002).

    57

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Existing Problems

    e. Existing systems have known problems. The system performance of US-
    VISIT Increments 1, 2, and 3 is largely dependent on the performance of
    the existing systems that are to be interfaced to form it. For example,
    US- VISIT system availability and associated downtime will be constrained
    by the availability of the interfaced systems. In this regard, some of the
    existing systems have known problems that could limit US- VISIT
    performance. For example:

     Recent reports have identified problems with the availability and
    reliability of SEVIS, which is the Internet- based system designed to
    manage and monitor foreign students in the United States. For example, in
    April 2003, the Justice Inspector General reported that many users had
    difficulty logging on to the system, and that as the volume of users grew,
    the system became increasingly sluggish. 1 Other reports indicated that
    university representatives complained that it was taking hours to log on
    to the system and to enter a single record, or worse, that the system
    accepted the record and later deleted it.

    1 Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U. S. Department of
    Justice, *Implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
    System (SEVIS)* (Apr. 2, 2003).

    58

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Existing Problems

     Similarly, we reported in May 2001 1 that CLAIMS 3 is unreliable; this
    system contains information on foreign nationals who request benefits and
    is used to process benefit applications other than naturalization.
    Specifically, we reported that INS officials stated that CLAIMS 3 was
    frequently unavailable and did not always update and store important case
    data when field offices transferred data from the local CLAIMS 3 system to
    the mainframe computer.

    1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors
    Impede Timeliness of Application Processing , GAO- 01- 488 (Washington, D.
    C.: May 4, 2001).

    59

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Governance

    f. Governance structure is not established. Our experience shows that one
    key to successfully implementing large and complex modernization programs
    that involve multiple organizations, such as USVISIT, is to have an
    executive body, composed of representatives from each stakeholder
    organization, to guide and direct the program. Among other things, this
    body should (1) be formally chartered, (2) include representatives that
    are empowered to make and enforce decisions and commit resources for their
    respective organizations, and (3) be responsible and accountable for the
    program progress and outcomes.

    The US- VISIT program is governmentwide in scope, involving multiple
    departments and agencies. However, it is not currently being guided and
    directed by a governance structure that reflects this program scope.
    Instead, the program relies on a combination of

     the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB), which is the department*s
    chartered investment decisionmaking body, made up of senior leadership
    from the department, and

    60

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Governance

     an integrated project team representing many US- VISIT stakeholder
    organizations (e. g., Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation
    Security Administration, and the State Department).

    However, the IRB*s chartered mission and authority governs only DHS
    activities, and does not govern non- DHS, stakeholder activities, such as
    issuing visas and passports, and the integrated project team does not
    include stakeholder representatives who can personally commit resources
    and make and enforce decisions for their respective organizations.
    Moreover, according to the US- VISIT Program Director, who heads the
    integrated project team, the integrated project team*s role is basically
    to advise the US- VISIT program office.

    The Under Secretary for Transportation and Border Security, who is a
    member of the department*s IRB, is assigned responsibility and
    accountability for program governance. However, the Program Director
    stated that a governance body with appropriate representation from all
    relevant program stakeholder organizations would benefit the program.
    Until such a body is established to address important crosscutting issues,
    such as operational decisions and resource needs, US- VISIT is at risk of
    not delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and
    within budget.

    61

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Program Management

    g. Program management capability is not implemented. Our experience with
    major modernization programs, like US- VISIT, shows that they should be
    managed as a formal program, which includes establishing a program office
    that is (1) adequately staffed (numbers and skill levels), (2) grounded in
    clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and (3) supported by rigorous
    and disciplined acquisition management processes.

    DHS established a US- VISIT program office in June 2003, 1 and recently
    determined this office*s staffing needs to be 115 government and 117
    contractor personnel (in all) to perform key acquisition management
    functions. The Software Engineering Institute*s Software Acquisition
    Capability Maturity Model (SA- CMM (R) ) 2 has defined a suite of key
    acquisition process areas that are necessary to manage the system
    acquisition program in a rigorous and disciplined fashion. These process
    areas include acquisition planning, requirements development and
    management, project management, solicitation, contract tracking and
    oversight, evaluation, and transition to support. 1 The predecessor
    program office for the entry exit program was established within the
    former INS in March 2002.

    2 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition
    Capability Maturity Model , Version 1.03 (March 2002).

    62

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Program Management

    As of July 10, 2003, the US- VISIT program*s staffing levels were far
    below DHS*s stated needs. Specifically, the US- VISIT program officials
    stated that the program office has 10 staff within the program office and
    another 6 staff that are working closely with them. Moreover, specific
    roles and responsibilities have not been defined beyond general
    statements. Further, plans and associated time frames for achieving needed
    staffing levels and defining roles, responsibilities, and relationships
    have not yet been defined. According to the Program Director, positions
    are to be filled with detailees from various DHS component organizations.
    Positions are also to be filled with full- time equivalent slots from
    other DHS components that are not currently filled.

    Additionally, while the approved program office structure (see slide 65)
    provides for positions to perform the SA- CMM (R) key process areas,
    including acquisition planning, requirements development and management,
    project management, and contract tracking and oversight, none of the
    process areas have been defined and implemented. In the interim, the
    program office is relying on the knowledge and skills of existing program
    office staff to execute these important acquisition functions.

    63

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Program Management

    According to the Program Director, needed program staffing and key process
    areas are not yet in place because the program is only now getting off the
    ground, and it will take time to establish a fully functioning and capable
    program management capability. Until the program office is adequately
    staffed, positional roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and
    understood, and rigorous and disciplined acquisition process controls are
    defined, understood, and followed, DHS*s ongoing efforts to acquire,
    deploy, operate, and maintain system capabilities will be at risk of not
    producing promised performance levels, functionality, and associated
    benefits on time and within budget.

    The graphic on the next page shows the US VISIT program management
    structure. 64

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Program Management Approved US- VISIT Program Management
    Structure

    1 A geographic information system (GIS) is a system of computer software,
    hardware, and data used to manipulate, analyze, and graphically present a
    potentially wide array of information associated with geographic
    locations.

    65

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Operational Context

    h. Operational context is unsettled. To effectively define, establish, and
    implement a program (particularly one that involves restructuring and
    reengineering the use of people, processes, technology, and facilities
    from physically and culturally divergent organizations), it is essential
    that the program be aligned with a common blueprint, or frame of
    reference, governing key aspects of program operations* e. g., what
    functions are to be performed by whom, when and where they are to be
    performed, what information is to be used to perform them, and what rules
    and standards will govern the application of technology to support them.
    Such a frame of reference is referred to as an enterprise architecture
    (EA). In brief, an EA defines the operations of an enterprise, such as
    DHS, in both business terms (e. g., policies, processes, information,
    locations) and technical terms (e. g., hardware and software standards).
    It also provides these operational definitions for both the *as is* state
    and the *to be* state, and it includes a transition plan for moving
    between the two.

    66

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Operational Context

    The operational context, or EA, within which US- VISIT is to exist has not
    been defined. Currently, DHS is developing an EA and reports that it is to
    be completed by October 2003. If developed effectively, the department*s
    EA should provide the operational context necessary to effectively define,
    establish, and make operational US VISIT.

    In the absence of an EA, certain policy and standards information that is
    necessary to effectively define, establish, and implement the US- VISIT
    program is not yet available. In particular, policy decisions have not
    been made governing (1) whether official travel documents will be required
    for all persons who enter and exit the country, including U. S. and
    Canadian citizens, and (2) whether biometrics will be captured and used
    for all persons entering and exiting the country, including U. S. and
    Canadian citizens. Some of these policy decisions may necessitate changes
    to existing laws and regulations.

    Similarly, certain technology standards, such as the number of
    fingerprints to be collected, are only now emerging, with a tentative
    agreement to use two fingerprints and plans to migrate to eight prints for
    enrollment. Also, the specific processes have yet to be defined (e. g.,
    entry and exit procedures and border personnel roles and responsibilities
    relative to implementation of the procedures).

    67

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Operational Context

    Because this operational context is unsettled and unclear, the program
    office is making certain assumptions and decisions necessary to meet near-
    term deadlines, such as the use of a two- fingerprint biometric, and
    adoption of border crossing processes that will implement planned system
    capabilities in whatever way needed to avoid (1) requiring additional
    facilities and personnel for Increment 1 and (2) increasing wait times for
    traffic crossings. If these assumptions and decisions are not aligned with
    DHS*s EA, then near- term investments in systems and associated process
    will need to be reworked or replaced. Moreover, the mission value of the
    planned system capabilities that are actually implemented (made
    operational) at the border could be minimal. For example, inspectors may
    have to limit their use of installed system capabilities (such as those
    for capturing biometrics) to prevent traffic delays.

    Unless DHS can coordinate its plans for developing its EA (and thus
    providing a clear operational context) with its near- term implementation
    plans for US VISIT, the department is increasing its near- term risk of
    defining, establishing, and implementing a program and supporting system
    that will not cost- effectively meet mission needs.

    68

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Near- Term Facilities

    I. Near- term facilities solutions pose challenges. According to DHS
    officials, DHS*s existing facilities do not adequately support the current
    entry exit process at land POEs. In particular, more than 100 land POEs
    have less than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current
    inspection processes and traffic levels. 1 As a result, as part of US
    VISIT (increment 2), DHS plans to construct interim facilities at about 40
    of the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004, and construct
    interim facilities at the remaining portion of the 50 by February 2005. To
    accomplish this, DHS plans to begin awarding design contracts in August
    2003, and construction contracts in February 2004.

    1 Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, First Annual Report to
    Congress (Washington, D. C.: December 2002).

    69

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Near- Term Facilities

    According to DHS officials, the department plans to design and construct
    interim facilities to (1) support the US- VISIT inspection process,
    technology, and staff requirements; and (2) meet current traffic wait time
    requirements at each land POE. To plan for the design and construction of
    interim facilities that meet these requirements, DHS is modeling various
    inspection process and facilities scenarios to define what inspection
    process to follow and what interim facilities to construct. DHS officials
    told us that preliminary modeling exercises show that 3-, 6-, and 9-
    second incremental increases in average inspection times at some high
    volume land POEs can significantly increase average wait times at these
    POEs. For example, peak wait time at the Blaine Peace Arch POE in
    Washington could increase by more than 11 hours if the average inspection
    increased by 9 seconds.

    The modeling exercise was based on two key assumptions: (1) the current
    staffing level and (2) the current number of inspection booths staffed for
    each POE. (see figure on next slide for modeling results at six POEs).

    70

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Near- Term Facilities High- Volume Ports Maximum Vehicle
    Wait Time as a Function of Added Inspection Time

    71

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Near- Term Facilities

    At this point, DHS officials told us that they are planning to satisfy
    interim facilities constraints and requirements by installing temporary
    booths on existing traffic lanes and employing additional inspectors at
    some of the highest volume land POEs. 1 However, they also stated that the
    high traffic volumes and urban locations of some land POEs will make
    meeting US- VISIT constraints and requirements challenging, even on an
    interim basis. Moreover, given existing facilities constraints, developing
    interim facilities plans without defined inspection process, staff, and
    technology requirements introduces considerable uncertainty and risk that
    resources invested in interim facilities may not fully satisfy constraints
    and requirements and may not be useful in the design and construction of
    permanent facilities.

    1 At this point, DHS is not planning to acquire additional land for
    interim facilities at land ports of entry. 72

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Value of First Increment

    j. Mission value of first increment is currently unknown. OMB Circular
    Number A- 11, part 3, requires that investments in major systems be
    implemented incrementally, with each increment delivering tangible and
    measurable benefits. Incremental investment involves justifying investment
    in each increment on the basis of benefits, costs, and risks.

    DHS is pursuing US- VISIT incrementally, but it has not defined the
    specific benefits to be provided by Increment 1.

     The expenditure plan states that Increment 1 will provide *immediate
    benefits,* but it does not describe them. Instead, it describes
    capabilities to be provided, such as the ability to determine whether a
    foreign national should be admitted and perform checks against watch
    lists. It does not describe in meaningful terms the benefits that are to
    result from implementation of these capabilities (e. g., X percent
    reduction in inspection times or Y percent reduction in false positive
    matches against watch lists).

    73

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Value of First Increment

     In fact, because DHS has not yet defined the processes that are to
    govern the extent to which planned Increment 1 system capabilities will be
    implemented (as discussed previously), and because these processes are to
    be constrained by existing facilities and personnel and are not to result
    in increases in wait times for traffic crossings, it is not possible at
    this point to reliably project tangible and measurable Increment 1 mission
    benefits.

    The expenditure plan also does not identify the estimated cost of
    Increment 1. The Program Director told us that the $375 million requested
    in the plan includes not only all the funding required for Increment 1,
    but also funding for later increments. However, the plan does not separate
    the funds by increment, and program officials did not provide this
    information.

    To DHS*s credit, the expenditure plan does identify certain program risks,
    such as not having established clear decision authorities for policy and
    other operational questions and schedule slippage due to the aggressive
    milestones. However, it has yet to address how these risks will be
    mitigated, and the extent to which the status of program risks that are
    deemed *high impact/ high probability of occurrence* will be disclosed to
    program executives.

    74

    Objective 3 Results

    Observations: Value of First Increment

    In February 2003, DHS developed a benefits and cost analysis for the
    former entry exit program. However, this analysis had limitations, such as
    an absence of meaningful benefit descriptions, and program officials
    acknowledged that it is out of date and is not reflective of current US-
    VISIT plans. According to these officials, an updated analysis will be
    prepared; however, a date and plan for doing so has not been set.

    Without a reliable understanding of whether Increment 1 will produce
    mission value commensurate with costs and whether known risks can be
    effectively mitigated, DHS is investing in and implementing a near- term
    solution that is not adequately justified.

    75

    Conclusions The fiscal year 2003 US- VISIT expenditure plan (with related
    program office documentation and representations) either partially
    satisfies or provides for satisfying the legislative conditions imposed by
    Congress.

    The US- VISIT program leadership has expressly committed to developing and
    implementing the program acquisition management capabilities and the
    expenditure plan content described in our open recommendations. However,
    much remains to be accomplished before these recommendations are fully
    implemented.

    By definition, US- VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to perform a
    critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding
    implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. Generally,
    these risk factors are inherent to the program and cannot be easily
    changed.

    76

    Conclusions However, compounding these inherent risk factors are a number
    of others that are attributable to the program*s current state of
    governance and management and its acquisition approach. These include
    relying on existing systems to provide the foundation for the first three
    program increments (and thus having to accept the performance limitations
    of these existing systems), not having a governance structure to guide and
    direct the program office, not having a mature program management
    capability, not having stabilized the operational context within which the
    program is to operate (and thus having to make assumptions about this
    context), not having fully defined near- term facilities solutions, and
    not knowing the mission value that is to be derived from the first US-
    VISIT increment.

    Because of all these risk factors, the ability of US- VISIT to measurably
    and appreciably achieve DHS*s stated goals of facilitate legitimate travel
    and trade, enhance national security, and adhere to U. S. privacy laws and
    policies is uncertain. Moreover, DHS*s near- term investment in the
    program is at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and
    within budget, and not producing mission value commensurate with
    investment costs. Thus, it is imperative that the factors that contribute
    to this level of risk are addressed thoroughly and expeditiously.

    77

    Recommendations for Executive Action To address US- VISIT as a
    governmentwide program and to minimize the risks facing the program, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with
    cabinet officials from US- VISIT stakeholder departments and agencies,

     establish and charter an executive body, chaired by the Secretary*s
    designee, potentially co- chaired by the leadership from key stakeholder
    departments and agencies, and composed of appropriate senior- level
    representatives from DHS and each stakeholder organization, to guide and
    direct the US- VISIT program; and

     direct this executive body to immediately take steps to (1) ensure that
    the human capital and financial resources are expeditiously provided to
    establish a fully functional and effective US- VISIT program office and
    associated management capability, (2) clarify the operational context
    within which USVISIT must operate, and (3) decide whether proposed US-
    VISIT increments will produce mission value commensurate with costs and
    risks and disclose to the Congress planned actions based on this body*s
    decisions.

    78

    Recommendations Further, we recommend that the Secretary, through the
    Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, direct the US-
    VISIT Program Director to expeditiously establish an effective program
    management capability, including immediately

     defining program office positional roles, responsibilities, and
    relationships;  developing and implementing a human capital strategy that
    provides for

    staffing these positions with individuals who have the requisite core
    competencies (knowledge, skills, and abilities);

     developing and implementing a plan for satisfying key SEI acquisition
    management controls, to include acquisition planning, solicitation,
    requirements development and management, project management, contractor
    tracking and oversight, evaluation, and transition to support;

     developing and implementing a risk management plan and ensuring that all
    high risks and their status are reported regularly to the executive body;

    79

    Recommendations  defining performance standards for each US- VISIT system
    increment that are

    measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing
    systems to form these system increments; and

     developing an analysis of incremental program cost, benefits, and risks,
    and providing this analysis to the executive body, to assist it in the
    body*s deliberations and decision- making.

    80

    Agency Comments We provided DHS a draft of this briefing and discussed its
    contents with the USVISIT Program Director and Deputy Director. In its
    oral comments, DHS agreed with our findings, conclusions, and
    recommendations. The department also provided some technical comments,
    which we have incorporated into the briefing, as appropriate. Further, the
    US- VISIT Program Director stated that our work was very helpful to him
    and to the program.

    81

    Attachment I

    Legislative History Legislation Key requirements

    Illegal Immigration By September 30, 1998, the Attorney General shall
    develop an automated entry exit control

    Reform and Immigrant system that*

    Responsibility Act of (1) collects a record of departure for every alien
    departing the United States and matches it with

    1996 the corresponding arrival record and

    P. L. 104- 208 (2) identifies, through on- line searching procedures,
    lawfully admitted aliens who overstay their

    September 30, 1996 visas.

    Overstay information identified through the system shall be integrated
    into appropriate databases of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
    (INS) and the Department of State, including those used at ports of entry
    and at consular offices. Notwithstanding any other provision of federal,
    state, or local law, a federal, state, or local government entity or
    official may not prohibit or in any way restrict any government entity or
    official from sending to or receiving from INS information regarding the
    citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.
    INS Data Management

    For the purposes of this section, the term *integrated entry and exit data
    system* means an Improvement Act of

    electronic system that* 2000

    (1) provides access to, and integrates, alien arrival and departure data
    that are (a) authorized or P. L. 106- 215

    required to be created or collected under law; (b) in an electronic
    format; and (c) in a database June 15, 2000

    of the Department of Justice or the Department of State, including those
    created or used at ports of entry and at consular offices; (2) uses
    available data described above to produce a report of arriving and
    departing aliens by country of nationality, classification as an immigrant
    or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in and departure from the United
    States; (3) matches an alien*s available arrival data with the alien*s
    available departure data; (4) identifies, through on- line searching
    procedures, lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who may have remained in the
    United States beyond the period authorized by the Attorney General; and

    82

    Attachment I

    Legislative History Legislation Key requirements

    INS Data Management (5) otherwise uses available alien arrival and
    departure data described in paragraph (1) above

    Improvement Act of to permit the Attorney General to make the reports
    required under 8 U. S. C. section 1365a( e):

    2000  Number of departure records collected, with an accounting by
    nationality.

    P. L. 106- 215  Number of departure records that were successfully
    matched to records of arrival, with an

    June 15, 2000 accounting by nationality and classification as an immigrant
    or nonimmigrant.

    (cont*d)  Number of aliens who arrived pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa,
    or the Visa Waiver Program,

    for whom no matching departure data have been obtained through the system
    or by other means as of the end of the alien*s authorized period of stay,
    with an accounting by nationality and arrival date in the United States.
    Number of lawfully admitted nonimmigrants identified as visa overstays,
    with an accounting by

    nationality. The Attorney General shall implement the integrated entry
    exit system at airports and seaports by December 31, 2003. System
    requirements:  include available arrival/ departure data,  ensure that
    the arrival/ departure data, when collected or created by an immigration
    officer, are

    entered into the system and can be accessed by other officers at other
    air/ seaports. The Attorney General must implement the system at the 50
    busiest land border ports of entry by December 31, 2004. System
    requirements:  Same as specified above  Arrival/ departure data on
    aliens shall be accessible at other high- traffic land border ports of

    entry. The system shall be fully implemented at all remaining ports of
    entry by December 31, 2005.

    83

    Attachment I

    Legislative History Legislation Key requirements

    Visa Waiver Permanent Not later than October 1, 2001, the Attorney General
    shall develop and implement a fully automated

    Program Act entry exit control system that will collect a record of
    arrival and departure for every alien who arrives

    P. L. 106- 396 and departs by sea or air at a port of entry in the United
    States and is provided a waiver. Not later

    than October 1, 2002, the system shall enable immigration officers
    conducting inspections at ports October 30, 2000

    of entry to obtain from the system, with respect to aliens seeking a
    waiver, (1) any photograph of the alien that may be contained in the
    records of the State Department or INS; and (2) information on whether the
    alien has ever been determined to be ineligible to receive a visa or be
    admitted to the United States. The system shall maintain, for a minimum of
    10 years, information about each application for admission made by an
    alien seeking a waiver. On and after October 1, 2007, the alien at the
    time of application for admission must have a valid unexpired machine-
    readable passport that satisfies the internationally accepted standard for
    machine readability. Countries designated to participate before May 1,
    2000, shall issue machine- readable passports no later than October 1,
    2003. All Visa Waiver Program (VWP) applicants are to be checked against
    lookout systems. By October 1, 2002, no waiver may be provided to an alien
    arriving by air or sea at a port of entry on a carrier unless the carrier
    is electronically transmitting passenger data to the entry exit system.
    Not less than 1 hour before arrival at port of entry, signatory aircraft
    transporting VWP aliens must electronically furnish the passenger data
    required by the Attorney General in regulations. The system shall contain
    sufficient data to permit the Attorney General to calculate, for each
    program country and each fiscal year, the portion of nationals of that
    country who arrive under VWP at air and sea ports of entry but for whom no
    record of departure exists, expressed as a percentage of the total number
    of such VWP aliens for the particular country.

    84

    Attachment I

    Legislative History Legislation Key requirements

    USA PATRIOT ACT Focus of system development shall be on (a) utilization of
    biometric technology and (b) tamper

    P. L. 107- 56 resistant documents readable at ports of entry.

    October 26, 2001 The system must be accessible to (a) all consular
    officers responsible for visa issuance, (b) all

    federal inspection agents at all U. S. border inspection points, and (c)
    all law enforcement and intelligence officers responsible for
    investigation or identification of aliens. The entry exit system must be
    able to interface with law enforcement databases to be used by federal law
    enforcement to identify and detain individuals who pose a threat to the
    national security of the United States

    Aviation and (1) Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment, each
    air carrier and foreign air carrier

    Transportation Security operating a passenger flight in foreign air
    transportation to the United States shall provide to the

    Act Commissioner of Customs by electronic transmission a passenger and
    crew manifest containing

    P. L. 107- 71 the following information:

    November 19, 2001  The full name of each passenger and crew member.

     The date of birth and citizenship of each passenger and crew member.
    The sex of each passenger and crew member.  The passport number and
    country of issuance of each passenger and crew member if required

    for travel.  The U. S. visa number or resident alien card number of each
    passenger and crew member, as

    applicable.  Such other information as the Under Secretary of
    Transportation for Security, in consultation with

    the Commissioner of Customs, determines is reasonably necessary to ensure
    aviation safety. Carriers may use the advanced passenger information
    system established under section 431 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S.
    C. 1431) to provide the information required by the preceding sentence.

    85

    Attachment I

    Legislative History Legislation Key requirements

    Aviation and (2) Passenger name records* The carriers shall make passenger
    name record information

    Transportation Security available to the Customs Service upon request.

    Act (3) Transmission of manifest* a passenger and crew manifest required
    for a flight under paragraph

    P. L. 107- 71 (1) above shall be transmitted to the Customs Service in
    advance of the aircraft landing in the

    November 19, 2001 United States in such manner, time, and form as the
    Customs Service prescribes.

    (cont*d) (4) Transmission of manifests to other federal agencies* Upon
    request, information provided to the

    Under Secretary or the Customs Service under this subsection may be shared
    with other federal agencies for the purpose of protecting national
    security. Enhanced Border

    No later than October 26, 2004, the Secretary of State and the Attorney
    General shall issue to Security and Visa Entry

    aliens only machine- readable, tamper- resistant visas and other travel
    and entry documents that use Reform Act of 2002

    biometrics. In addition to the requirement for biometric identifiers,
    name- search capacity and P. L. 107- 173

    support must also be implemented between 18 months and 4.5 years after the
    date of enactment. May 14, 2002

    Not later than October 26, 2004, the Attorney General and Secretary of
    State shall install at all U. S. ports of entry equipment and software to
    allow biometric comparison and authentication of all U. S. visas and other
    travel and entry documents issued to aliens. Not later than January 1,
    2003, arrival and departure manifests must be electronically provided to
    appropriate immigration officers for each passenger (including crew
    members and any other occupants) of air and sea carriers at port of entry.
    The information to be provided with respect to each person listed on a
    manifest shall include (1) complete name; (2) date of birth; (3)
    citizenship; (4) sex; (5) passport number and country of issuance; (6)
    country of residence; (7) U. S. visa number, date, and place of issuance,
    where applicable; (8) alien registration number, where applicable; (9) U.
    S. address while in the United States; and (10) such other information
    that the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretaries of State
    and the Treasury, determines as being necessary for the identification of
    the persons transported and for the enforcement of the immigration laws
    and to protect safety and national security.

    86

    Attachment II

    Scope and Methodology

    To accomplish our objectives, we  analyzed the expenditure plan against
    legislative conditions and other relevant

    federal requirements, guidance, and best practices to determine the extent
    to which the conditions were met;

     analyzed supporting documentation and interviewed program officials to
    determine capabilities in key program management areas, such as
    acquisition planning, enterprise architecture, and project management;

     analyzed key acquisition management controls documentation and
    interviewed program officials to determine the status of our open
    recommendations;

     attended program working group meetings; and  assessed DHS*s plans and
    ongoing and completed actions to establish and

    implement the US- VISIT program (including acquiring the US- VISIT system,
    expanding and modifying existing port of entry facilities, and developing
    and implementing policies and procedures) and compared them to existing
    guidance to assess risks.

    87

    Attachment II

    Scope and Methodology

    We did not independently validate DHS*s provided information. We conducted
    our work at DHS headquarters in Washington, D. C., from April through July
    2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    88

    Comments from the Department of Homeland

    Appendi x II Security

    (310266)

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    DHS*s fiscal year 2003 US- VISIT expenditure plan and related
    documentation partially satisfied the conditions imposed by the Congress,
    which include meeting the capital planning and investment control review
    requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example,
    DHS fulfilled the OMB requirement that agencies state whether projects are
    approved by investment review boards and reviewed by Chief Financial and
    Procurement Officers; the plan was conditionally approved by DHS*s review
    board, which

    includes DHS*s Chief Financial and Procurement Officers. On the other
    hand, OMB guidance requires that agency plans summarize life cycle costs
    and include a cost/ benefit analysis that covers return on investment. DHS
    has not yet established a date and plan for developing these for US-
    VISIT, although program officials stated that they intend to do so. GAO
    also identified 10 factors (see figure) affecting US- VISIT and concluded

    that the program is a very risky endeavor. Some risk factors are inherent
    to the program, such as its mission criticality, its size and complexity,
    and its enormous potential costs. Others, however, arise from the
    program*s

    relatively immature state of governance and management. For example,
    although the program has governmentwide scope, an accountable governance
    structure to direct and oversee the program that reflects this scope is
    not yet established. In addition, a US- VISIT program management
    capability has yet to be established, important aspects defining the
    program*s operating environment are not decided, facility needs are
    unclear and challenging, and the mission value to be derived from the
    program*s

    initial operating capability is unknown. Because of the risk factors, GAO
    concluded that it is uncertain that US- VISIT will be able to measurably
    and appreciably achieve DHS*s stated goals for the program. Further, DHS*s
    near- term investment in the program is at risk of not delivering promised
    capabilities on time and within budget and not producing mission value
    commensurate with investment costs. Factors That Collectively Make US-
    VISIT a Risky Endeavor

    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to establish a program to
    strengthen management of the pre- entry, entry, status, and exit of
    foreign

    nationals who travel to the United States. The goals of the program, known
    as the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
    (US- VISIT), are to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, enhance
    national security, and adhere to U. S. privacy laws and policies. By
    congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an
    expenditure plan for US- VISIT that satisfies

    certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. GAO was asked to
    determine, among other things, whether the plan satisfies these

    conditions and to provide observations about the plan and DHS*s management
    of the program.

    GAO is making a number of recommendations to the Secretary of DHS aimed at
    minimizing the risks facing US- VISIT, including (1) establishing an
    executive body, composed of appropriate stakeholder representatives, to
    guide and direct the program, be held accountable for the program*s

    progress and outcomes, and address key program issues and make associated
    decisions and (2) taking steps to establish an

    effective program management capability. DHS concurred with our
    recommendations and stated that it has made progress toward addressing
    them.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1083 To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512- 3439 or hiter@ gao.
    gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1083, a report to

    Subcommittees on Homeland Security, Senate and House Committees on
    Appropriations

    September 2003

    HOMELAND SECURITY

    Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be
    Addressed

    Page i GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security United States General Accounting
    Office Washington, D. C. 20548

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    A

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 37 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 38 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 43 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 44 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 45 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 46 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 47 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 48 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 49 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 50 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 51 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 52 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 53 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 54 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 55 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 56 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 57 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 58 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 59 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 60 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 61 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 62 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 63 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 64 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 65 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 66 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 67 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 68 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 69 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 70 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 71 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 72 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 73 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 74 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 75 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 76 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 77 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 78 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 79 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 80 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 81 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 82 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 83 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 84 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 85 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 86 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 87 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 88 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 89 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 90 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 91 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 92 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 93 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 94 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 95 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix I Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland
    Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

    Page 96 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Page 97 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    Appendix II

    Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

    Page 98 GAO- 03- 1083 Homeland Security

    GAO*s Mission The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and
    investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
    constitutional responsibilities

    and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal
    government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
    evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
    recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
    oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to good
    government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity,
    and reliability.

    Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

    The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
    is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
    and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
    archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
    you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
    documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.

    Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
    correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
    Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
    To have GAO e- mail this

    list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select *Subscribe to
    e- mail alerts* under the *Order GAO Products* heading. Order by Mail or
    Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are
    $2 each. A check

    or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO
    also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to
    a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

    U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D. C.
    20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax:
    (202) 512- 6061

    To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

    Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
    fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
    512- 7470

    Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202)
    512- 4800 U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
    Washington, D. C. 20548

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
    Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Service Requested

    Presorted Standard Postage & Fees Paid

    GAO Permit No. GI00
    *** End of document. ***