U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict
Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress (26-SEP-03,
GAO-03-1071).
The United Nations responded to the failure of some past
peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help
peacekeeping operations move a country from conflict to
sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this strategy to the
large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a
contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U.N. operations,
the United States has a stake in the successful application of
this strategy. The strategy also has implications for the conduct
of international peace operations in other post-conflict
countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U.N.
transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the United
Nations has applied the strategy to operations; and (3) assess
the challenges to implementing the strategy in these three
countries.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1071
ACCNO: A08598
TITLE: U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for
Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of
Progress
DATE: 09/26/2003
SUBJECT: International agreements
International cooperation
International organizations
International relations
Military operations
Strategic planning
Foreign governments
Democratic Republic of the Congo
East Timor
Sierra Leone
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GAO-03-1071
Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
September 2003 U. N. PEACEKEEPING Transition Strategies for Post- Conflict
Countries Lack Results- Oriented Measures of Progress
GAO- 03- 1071
The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its
peacekeeping operations that takes a comprehensive and long- term view and
focuses on the causes of the conflict. The U. N. strategy for making
effective peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing
conditions for sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the
United Nations and other international organizations to establish these
conditions and sustain assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3)
developing objectives and results- oriented measures of progress to help
manage and decide when a country*s conditions warrant the withdrawal of
peacekeepers. U. N. Troops and Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East
Timorese Police The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of
this strategy to
help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous
challenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more
expensive than originally planned in countries where rival factions may
continue to fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult
in countries with little experience of accountable government.
Coordinating with independent international organizations and donor
nations with different priorities is also a challenge. The United Nations
has not yet developed results- oriented measures of progress for the three
peacekeeping operations.
Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal
of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results- oriented measures to
assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and
subsequent events in each country showed that the situation was not as
secure as
available measures indicated. The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to
measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining
sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these
indicators. The United Nations responded to the failure of some past
peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help peacekeeping
operations move a
country from conflict to sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this
strategy to the large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone,
East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a
contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U. N. operations, the United
States has a stake in the successful application of this strategy. The
strategy also has implications for the conduct of international peace
operations in other post- conflict countries. GAO
was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U. N. transition strategy;
(2) assess the extent to which the United Nations has applied the strategy
to operations; and (3) assess the challenges to implementing the strategy
in these three countries.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1071. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512- 8979 or christoffj@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1071, a report to the
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
September 2003
U. N. PEACEKEEPING
Transition Strategies for Post- Conflict Countries Lack Results- Oriented
Measures of Progress
Page i GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
Background 4 U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three
Elements 7 United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy 11
United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing
Transition Strategy 22 Conclusions 35 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
35 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37
Appendix II U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission 39
Appendix III Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 44
Sierra Leone 44 East Timor 48 Democratic Republic of the Congo 51 Appendix
IV Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations 56
Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58 GAO Contacts 58 Staff
Acknowledgments 58 Tables
Table 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives 12 Table 2: U. N.
Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of Progress in
Sierra Leone 30 Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for
Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training 33 Table 4: U. N.
Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone 39 Table 5: U. N.
Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor 41 Table 6: U. N.
Objectives and Measures of Progress in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo 42 Figures
Figure 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of June 30, 2003 6 Figure 2: U.
N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East Timorese
Police 14 Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U. N. Peacekeepers
in Sierra Leone 20 Figure 4: Revisions in U. N. Peacekeeping Troops and
Police Drawdown Schedule in East Timor 21 Figure 5: French Soldier in
Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 24 Figure 6: Sierra Leone
Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with Liberia 25 Figure 7: Map
of Sierra Leone 45 Figure 8: Map of East Timor 49 Figure 9: Location of
Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila
Government in 1998, and the Location of Major Antigovernment Groups and
Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003 53
Page iii GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping Abbreviations
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of the
Congo ETPS East Timor Police Service RUF Revolutionary United Front U. N.
United Nations
This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
Page 1 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
September 26, 2003 The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman, Committee on
International Relations House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman: The United Nations, in partnership with other
international organizations, has undertaken peace operations to establish
security and the rule of law in war- torn countries such as Somalia,
Cambodia, and Bosnia. However, years after these operations began, some of
these countries do not have a sustainable peace or fully abide by the rule
of law. 1 The U. N. Security Council has since authorized other peace
operations that have challenges comparable to previous efforts. By June
2003, U. N. costs for operations in
East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
exceeded $6 billion, with the United States contributing over 25 percent
of these funds. To ensure greater success in such peace operations, the U.
N.
Secretary General developed a strategy for effective peacekeeping
transitions* the process peace operations use to move a country from
immediate conflict toward long- term sustainable peace. This strategy was
to apply to countries with complex emergencies* countries confronting
civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a breakdown of civil order.
You asked us to assess the U. N. strategy for peacekeeping transitions in
countries with complex emergencies. In this report, we (1) identify the
elements of the U. N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which
the United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone,
East Timor, 2 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (3) assess the
challenges to implementing the strategy in these countries.
1 For example, see U. S. General Accounting Office, Cambodia: Governance
Reform Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging, GAO- 02- 569 (Washington,
D. C.: June 13, 2001); and Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten
Successful Implementation of Dayton Peace Agreement, GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00-
219 (Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000).
2 East Timor officially became the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste
upon attaining independence in May 2002.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
To identify the elements of the peacekeeping transition strategy, we
reviewed U. N., GAO, and other organizations* reports about peacekeeping.
We met with officials at the United Nations, the World Bank, and other
international organizations to discuss their peacekeeping and assistance
strategies in countries with complex emergencies. We performed fieldwork
at U. N. operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone, which are in the
initial drawdown phase. We conducted limited work at the U. N.
operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is expanding
operations. We selected these peace operations because they are the only
U. N. operations begun in countries with complex emergencies since the
United Nations developed a new peacekeeping strategy. Appendix I details
our scope and methodology.
The U. N. Secretary General*s strategy for making effective peacekeeping
transitions focuses on achieving tangible results within a country and
consists of three elements that U. N. peacekeeping operations and other
international stakeholders are to carry out, including
establishing conditions for sustainable peace in the country, including
adequate security, rule of law and participatory governance, and economic
and social reform;
coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international
organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after
peacekeepers withdraw; and
specifying objectives (linked to the country conditions sought) and
developing results- oriented measures of progress toward achieving these
conditions to help manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers. 3 The U. N.
Security Council has noted its support for the strategy but
decides on a case- by- case basis whether to authorize the peacekeepers
and resources required to implement it.
3 We define results- oriented or outcome measures as the results of
programs and activities compared with their intended purpose. See U. S.
General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: EPA Faces Challenges in
Developing Results- Oriented Performance Goals and Measures, GAO/ RCED-
00- 77 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 28, 2000), and Performance Measurement and
Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, GAO/ GGD- 98- 26 (Washington,
D. C.: April 1998). Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The United Nations Secretariat is attempting to apply the elements of this
strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo transition to sustainable peace. First, to establish the
conditions for sustainable peace, the United Nations and other
stakeholders have deployed thousands of peacekeepers, police, and
international administrators in Sierra Leone and East Timor to establish
security, reform government institutions, and undertake economic reforms.
In the Congo, efforts are less extensive, but in July 2003 the Security
Council began expanding U. N. activities. Second, the United Nations,
World Bank, and donor countries are trying to coordinate their work
through joint planning and other mechanisms. Third, U. N. peacekeeping
operations have developed objectives and results- oriented measures to a
limited extent to plan drawdowns of peacekeepers. The Security Council,
however, makes the final decisions on the drawdown or termination of
peacekeeping operations based on factors such as political and budgetary
considerations.
The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each
element of the new strategy. First, establishing the conditions for
sustainable peace has taken longer and been more costly than expected.
Achieving adequate security in Sierra Leone and East Timor took more time
than expected because rival factions opposed the peace operation and
continued fighting. Continued fighting remains a problem in the Congo. And
developing rule of law and participatory governance has proved difficult
because the countries had limited experience with democratic governance,
traditions, and institutions. Second, the United Nations must effectively
coordinate efforts with other international organizations working in
complex emergencies, but each has its own priorities. Third, the United
Nations has not developed meaningful resultsoriented measures of progress
for most objectives. For example, a primary measure for East Timor*s
capacity to provide internal security has focused on the number of police
to be trained, rather than how well they control
crime and violence. U. N. mission staff in the field stated that they had
not been directed to develop or use results- oriented measures. Moreover,
they stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to gather the needed
data and report it to U. N. headquarters.
This report contains no recommendations. We provided a draft of this
report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the U. S. Agency
for International Development; and the United Nations. We received verbal
comments from the State Department and written comments from the U. N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The remaining agencies did not
provide comments. The State Department generally agreed with our
Page 4 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
findings and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations further
commented that the report (1) did not fully discuss its efforts to apply
results- oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not
acknowledge numerical measures of progress in mission reporting, and (3)
did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the
Congo or progress made. In response, we added information to the report
about recent and ongoing U. N. efforts to develop results- oriented
performance measures. We state in the report that the peacekeeping
operations use numerical measures of progress but note that most of these
are measures of output or tasks rather than measures of results. We
discuss the broader security and economic objectives of the U. N. mandate
in the Congo in several locations in the report, including table 2. We
report on progress made in the Congo, particularly in appendix III,
however,
much of the progress is very recent. The U. N. Security Council authorizes
all peacekeeping operations as a means to further international peace and
security. 4 The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is
responsible for the planning, management, and logistical support of U. N.
peacekeeping operations worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the
Security Council authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these
operations were ongoing as of August 2003.
Most current U. N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow mandates
that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease- fires and peace
agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing operations*
those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo* have broader, multidimensional mandates that
address complex emergencies.
4 The 15- member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a
peacekeeping operation and determines its mandate. Such decisions require
at least nine votes in favor and are subject to a veto by the negative
vote of any of the council*s 5 permanent members* China, France, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U. N.
Secretary General makes recommendations on how the operation is to be
launched and carried out and reports on its progress. The U. N. Department
of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for providing political and
executive direction to operations in the field. Background
Page 5 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and
Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian
affairs, but they initially lacked long- term transition strategies. For
example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with
efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to
provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years
later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives
for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for
effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation
left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations
and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
sustainable peace.
In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as
the Security Council mandated new U. N. operations to address complex
emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these
countries faced and the United Nations* response.) The council debated the
need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding
multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex
emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past
failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000,
the council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations
about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U. N.
peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each country
and the U. N. operation there.
Page 6 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Figure 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of June 30, 2003 Note: U. N.
fiscal years begin July 1 and end June 30 of the following calendar year.
Sierra
Leone Democratic
Republic of the Congo
East Timor
Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web
sites; MapArt. Baucau
Makeni Bo Kenema
Koindu KoiduSefadu
Freetown
Population (July 2003 estimate): 5,732,681 Area: 71,740 sq. km. Total
peacekeepers: 13,219 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004: $2.6
billion
Population (July 2003 estimate): 56,625,039 Area: 2,345,410 sq. km. Total
peacekeepers: 6,886 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004 $1.9 billion
Kinshasa
Population (July 2003 estimate): 997,853 Area: 15,007 sq. km. Total
peacekeepers: 4,014 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004 $1.8 billion
U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone U. N. Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo U. N. Missions in East Timor
West Timor (Indonesia)
Dili
Kisangani Goma
Mbuji- Mayi Bunia
500 miles 0 0 50 miles 0 20 miles
Page 7 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy
for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U. N.
strategy consists of three elements: establishing the conditions for
sustainable peace, including security, rule
of law, and economic and social reform; coordinating and sustaining the
efforts of international organizations and
donor states; and developing objectives and results- oriented measures
of progress to
manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions. The
Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but
also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources
needed to carry it out on a case- by- case basis. The U. N. Secretariat,
particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help
implement this strategy. In 2001, the U. N. Secretary General stated that
the ultimate purpose of
peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this,
the U. N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the
United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to
(1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide
rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for
economic and social recovery and reform.
Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U. N.
peacekeeping operations. However, when armed interventions have been
necessary, the United Nations generally has authorized alliances* such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* or coalitions of nations to
undertake military operations to restore security. U. N. peacekeepers then
have responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other
aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move
forward. In the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing
and reintegrating ex- combatants into society, training a fair and
impartial police force, and building a professional army that is
accountable to the national government.
The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely
if the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To
support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners U. N.
Peacekeeping
Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements
Strategy Focuses on Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic Reform
Page 8 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
undertake programs to reform a country*s justice system so that it is
fair, transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening
or building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access,
and accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the
Security Council, may include supporting broad- based political parties,
overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting
efforts to combat corruption.
Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is
also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these
conditions include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and
activities to promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as
supporting war crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other
efforts in this area include support for resettlement of refugees and
displaced persons.
Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not
focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace. For
example, a Department of Defense- sponsored study determined that past
failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to
restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with
the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a
tool for U. S. policy makers reached similar conclusions. 5 The guide
noted that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and
political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency
situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the
police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The
guide concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in
the country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming
excombatants or holding elections) and/ or transforming conditions on the
ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and
increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons
learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping operations
in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for
comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations. 6 The
Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and
5 See Len Hawley, Generic Political- Military Plan for a Multilateral
Complex Contingency Operation (Washington, D. C.: July 18, 2002). 6 See U.
S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International Peace
Operations, GAO- 02- 707R (Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002).
Page 9 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
sustainable peace.
In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for
effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable
peace requires a comprehensive approach that includes political,
humanitarian, and human rights programs to foster sustainable development,
eradication of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and
rule of law. 7 However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting
that it decides
on a case- by- case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops,
funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities.
The transition strategy recognizes that U. N. peacekeeping operations
cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must
be closely coordinated among U. N. peacekeeping offices; U. N.
development, humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international
financial institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and
nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that
peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these
other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation*s
earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged
cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated
response to the specific conditions in each country.
As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and
individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example,
the host government; international financial institutions, such as the
World Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for
economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace
operation ends.
7 Several U. S. government studies support this approach. For example, see
DFI International, Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to
Sustainable Peace (Washington, D. C.: September 1997). Moreover, the
Special Coordinator of the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe noted that the pact, a multinational effort
to implement a comprehensive, long- term regional conflict prevention
strategy, was also based on this approach. Strategy Emphasizes
Coordination with Other Organizations and Donor States
Page 10 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The U. N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked
to the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward
achieving those conditions. The objectives and results- oriented measures
are intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions
about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective data.
The emphasis on using objectives and results- oriented measures is part of
the U. N. decision to implement results- based budgeting. Approved by the
General Assembly in 2000, results- based budgeting links program
objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client
or users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended
purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program*s
objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended
to ensure that U. N. programs are designed to achieve results and to
ensure that the United Nations can measure performance.
The U. N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management
capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and
transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations made
by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts
convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of
the existing system for managing peace operations. 8 Some key initiatives
included the following:
In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping
responsibilities into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political
Affairs was responsible for developing and proposing the mandates of
potential peace operations, and DPKO was responsible for planning and
logistical support.
In 2001, the U. N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in
staff for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By
January 2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For
example, it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and
increased the civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it
to provide useful input in planning individual operations.
DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace
operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long- term
8 The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly
referred to as the *Brahimi Report,* made recommendations to the Secretary
General in November 2000 to improve the strategic direction, planning,
organization, and conduct of peace operations. Strategy Focuses on
Developing Objectives and
Results- Oriented Measures U. N. Reforms Support Implementation of
Strategy
Page 11 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to
be undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for
measuring success.
As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO has
begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task
force membership varies but should include core military and police
planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U. N. humanitarian
and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as
appropriate. In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create
a best
practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit*s mission is to analyze past
experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The
unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for
the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials
stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the
implementation of the United Nations* revised approach to transition
planning.
The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition
strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First,
the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of
peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and
maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help
develop rule of law. U. N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the
World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address human
rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U. N. efforts are
more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more
peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and
international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts
with each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third,
each U. N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and
resultsoriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these
to manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes
the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation.
United Nations Is
Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy
Page 12 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
In countries with complex emergencies, U. N. peacekeeping operations and
other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable
peace by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing
institutions that provide rule of law and participatory governance, and
(3) creating conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1
illustrates the transition objectives associated with U. N. and other
stakeholder efforts to achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Table 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives Results needed for
sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic Republic of the Congo
Establish and maintain security Ensure security, freedom of movement
Strengthen police capacity, accountability, and loyalty
Strengthen Sierra Leone armed forces
Support reintegration of ex- combatants Restore control over
diamond mining Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)
Establish secure environment
Provide executive policing authority
Develop local police capacity
Support strengthening of external security capability
Assist in development of border control
Support the cease- fire agreement
Support border security and national sovereignty
Assist with the disarmament, repatriation, or reintegration of foreign-
and Congolese- armed groups Strengthen local police training capacity
Support reform of security forces Develop institutions that ensure rule
of law and participatory governance
Consolidate state authority
Restore local governance
Strengthen rule of law
Create and support national government and rule of law Supervise and
support elections
Support development of public administrative
capacity
Develop local governance
Assist in the creation of a unified national government
Support establishment of an interim government
Foster political reconciliation
U. N. Peacekeeping Operations Seek to Establish Conditions for Sustainable
Peace
Page 13 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Results needed for sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform
Facilitate reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons
Reduce poverty, encourage economic growth
Encourage national reconciliation
Promote human rights and justice
Help institute national development plan
Support international poverty reduction efforts
Assist in investigations of and proceedings for serious crimes
Facilitate provision
of humanitarian assistance
Support reopening of internal waterways for free movement of goods and
people
Facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring
Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.
The Security Council mandates for the U. N. peace operations in Sierra
Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining
security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as
reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying
out provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.
N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel
to provide security at key locations, government buildings, and
disarmament sites. 9 The mission also facilitated the free flow of people,
goods, and humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council
expanded the U. N. mission*s mandate in response to renewed violence and
by March 2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According
to the force commander, the operation*s priorities since the election of a
new government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to
improving the capacity of the local police and government officials. 10
The British government has also played a major role in achieving these
objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the
government and U. N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone*s
armed forces and police. 9 The July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement between the
parties stipulated that the primary rebel group would maintain a cease-
fire, disarm and demobilize, transform itself into a
political party, and participate in a government of national unity. 10
Another key task is to complete the reintegration of about 57, 000 ex-
combatants into society by the end of 2003. U. N. Peacekeeping Operations
Make Establishing and Maintaining Security a Priority
Page 14 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In September
1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an international force led
by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread
violence perpetrated by pro- Indonesian militias. According to members of
the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had
a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security
Council subsequently authorized (1) the U. N. Transitional Administration
in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150
troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U. N. Mission of
Support in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus
1,250 police. According to the deputy force commander and other U. N.
officials, these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have
continued to patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun
training a
local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small
East Timor military force (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: U. N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with
East Timorese Police
Page 15 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U. N. force had
about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease- fire
and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May
2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate
1,500- strong force on a limited mission to protect U. N. peacekeeping
troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around
the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the
council increased the strength of the U. N. force to 10,800 and for the
first time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in
selected locations.
U. N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have
undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory
governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the U.
N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked with the
Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild
courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges
and prosecutors. In 2002, the U. N. operation provided transportation,
supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections
that observers characterized as *free and fair.* Mission officials also
plan to provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local
government elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U. N. plans and
reports, the
priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures
throughout the country.
In East Timor, U. N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory
governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security Council
empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative and
executive authority for the country, including the administration of
justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national
consultative council to help make decisions about the future government
and set up a transitional judicial commission. According to U. N.
officials, international staff and advisors also provided on- the- job
training to allow the East
Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the
government. The U. N. mission also supervised East Timor*s first popular
election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the
presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence and
the end of the U. N. transitional administration in May 2002, the followon
peace operation has focused on advising and training government officials
and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts. U. N.
Efforts to Develop Rule of
Law and Participatory Governance
Page 16 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U. N. peacekeeping
operation*s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting
the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to
establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and
Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council
expanded the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to help the government
restore stability, including support for security sector reform,
elections, and rule of law, in coordination with other international
actors.
U. N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward
conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East
Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U. N. peacekeeping
operation, and the U. N. Development Program helped the government develop
a 20- year national development plan. The plan described short- and
medium- term strategies for the country*s economic recovery and growth,
and was used by the international community to determine their economic
support programs. Although the U. N. peacekeeping operation provided
funding for some projects, other donors provided major funding for
programs to reduce poverty, increase power generation, and support private
sector development.
U. N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social
reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the
government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of
rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In
Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and fund
an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those
bearing *greatest responsibility* for violations of international
humanitarian law during that country*s civil war. 11 The U. N. operation
assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies.
In East Timor, the U. N. operation established a unit to assist in the
investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United
Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to
commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and
fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U. N. High Commissioner for
Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra
Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these
efforts by providing security and logistical support.
11 The court*s draft budget for the fiscal year beginning in July 2003 was
approximately $35.3 million. U. N. Peacekeeping Operations Support
Economic and Social
Recovery Efforts
Page 17 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The U. N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try
to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations.
These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and
the establishment of a high- level position in the mission to coordinate
security and economic recovery efforts.
In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and
international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation
deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8 months
before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment mission
included members from five donor countries, four U. N. agencies, the
European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The
International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent mission to assess
East Timor*s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core plans for
reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its
planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in
other post- conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed
efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external
resources.
The U. N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also
coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor
meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of
Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U. N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised
strategic plans for that country. U. N. organizations working in Sierra
Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank) subsequently
collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their national recovery
and peace- building efforts. At an international donors conference in
November 2002, U. N. organizations and other donors agreed to work
together to support the government*s comprehensive national recovery
strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national
aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination meetings.
Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among U.
N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out
peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second highest
ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between security
and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy representative in
East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping operations and U.
N. development programs allow him to better manage U. N. Peacekeeping
Operations Attempt to Coordinate and Sustain Assistance
Page 18 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
the process of transitioning the mission*s emphasis from peacekeeping to
longer term peace building.
DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and
identified some results- oriented measures of progress. The operations in
Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to
plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council
makes the final transition decisions. The U. N. operations in Sierra
Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have specified
their objectives, based on mandates from the Security Council, and have
developed measures of progress, some of which are results oriented. (App.
II lists the objectives and measures for the three missions.) For example,
in Sierra Leone, one objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic
growth. Measures of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of
households with access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women
who are AIDS aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6
percent annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of
movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and
containing cease- fire violations and opening roads and removing
roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are
quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing
resultsoriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace
operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the
last section of this report.
The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as well
as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making the final
decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces. Nonetheless, the
United Nations has to a limited extent used some measures to plan the
withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East Timor. (The operation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a
stage to begin withdrawing.) U. N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and
modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of
progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating
excombatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining.
Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the security
risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each region to
ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower United Nations
Is
Beginning to Use Objectives and Results- Oriented Measures in Peacekeeping
Operations
Peace Operations Are Making Efforts to Specify Objectives and Measures
Peace Operations Use Measures of Progress to a Limited Extent in Planning
Drawdown
Page 19 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along
the Liberian border. U. N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the
force was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of
the council*s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping
mission and not because the mission*s measures pointed to a reduced threat
to the country*s security and stability. In March 2003, the council
requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for
the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra
Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal
security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for
withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in
September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by the
Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by the
council in July 2003.
Page 20 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U. N. Peacekeepers in Sierra
Leone
In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used
measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although the
United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and
international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack
of sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor
police
service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of
June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule
for the troops and police.) According to U. N., U. S., and Australian
officials,
0 2,000
4,000 6,000
8,000 10,000
12,000 14,000
16,000 18,000 Projected
U. N. troops
Original Modified Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified
Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.
2002 2003 2004 2005 Sept. Jan. May Nov. June Oct. Dec. July
Page 21 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the
United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the
peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as
having a judicial system in place by mid- 2003, will not change the
withdrawal date.
Figure 4: Revisions in U. N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police Drawdown
Schedule in East Timor U. N. police
May Nov. May Jan. June Projected
Original Modified Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified
Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.
U. N. troops 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 0
2,000 3,000
4,000 5,000
6,000 May Nov. May July Oct. Dec. June
Projected 0 400
800 1,200 1,000
Page 22 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help
manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council
decisions. According to U. N. officials, U. S. officials, and members of
the council, the following factors are involved in these decisions:
Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for
countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the
opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support.
The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the
country*s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their
country and fulfill their commitments.
Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security
Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it
devotes resources to ongoing operations. 12 The cost and resources
needed for peacekeeping operations are high.
Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support,
particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest. The
United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each
element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for
sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable
peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival
factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their
internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers* presence. Further,
establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in
countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and
democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken
longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the
United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities
with those of other independent international organizations and donor
states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third,
developing clear objectives and meaningful results- oriented measures of
progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by
which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in
12 The Security Council has addressed calls for initiating peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan, Cote d*Ivoire, Liberia, Iraq, and other
locations in the past 2 years. Security Council Bases Transition Decisions
on Several
Factors United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing
Transition Strategy
Page 23 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made
developing or using these measures a priority.
Establishing security in war- torn countries is difficult because of
uncertain and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements
among opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially
threatened by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted
their
movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to
commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British
troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49
peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in
East Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with
Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro- integration militia created
widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A
military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to
restore security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died.
Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven
extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease- fire agreements, the two
large rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the
country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned with
neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U. N. peace operation. The
operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease- fires
frequently have been violated. The government*s forces only have control
over half of the country*s territory. After violations of several cease-
fire agreements, France led a coalition force to help U. N. peacekeepers
control large- scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the
Ituri region (see fig. 5). Achieving Security, Rule of
Law, and Economic and Social Reform Is Difficult
Page 24 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Maintaining security in war- torn countries is also a problem. In East
Timor, pro- Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from
Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U. N.
military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to
East Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U. N. peacekeeping troops
should be maintained along the border. 13 In April 2003, Sierra Leone
peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state
that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra
Leone 13 The boundary between East and West Timor is known as the Tactical
Coordination Line, pending the outcome of negotiations between East Timor
and Indonesia in establishing an international border.
Page 25 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U. N. officials also noted
that large concentrations of ex- combatants, unemployed youths,
corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone*s diamond mining areas
continue to be ongoing threats to security.
Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with
Liberia
Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because
countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with
transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and
institutions. For example, the U. N. strategy for restoring local
government to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary
chieftaincies and elected district councils. According to a British
government analysis, however, Sierra Leone*s reliance on hereditary
chieftains has always compromised transparency and accountability and
provided a means for the central government to control local affairs.
Moreover, this reliance limits democratic participation because only
candidates meeting
hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections
to fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally,
local civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the
National Limited Progress in
Establishing Rule of Law
Page 26 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief.
A 2002 U. K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as
unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the AntiCorruption
Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate corrupt
practices among government officials, has been ineffective, according to
U. S. and U. K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies, the
World Bank and the U. K. government are planning a 5- year effort to
improve the justice system beginning in late 2003. In East Timor, U. N.
and other international officials told us that years of
mistrust of the Indonesian- imposed court system and the rural
population*s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and
informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women,
according to U. N. and other international officials. These issues present
a significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and
respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not
passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will
serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and
services beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government
services or representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have
almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U. S.
government and U. N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that
the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the
territory was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo
a difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the
peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance of
the U. N. peacekeeping operation.
U. N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have
noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than
those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that
developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty
will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U. N.
Children*s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population
is below the poverty level. The most recent U. N. health survey indicated
that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished.
Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra
Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in regaining
legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital sector in its
economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed Economic
Recovery Is a LongTerm Effort
Page 27 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41
million in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British
government estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise
to as much as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated
and effective
anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone
government, U. N., and other international officials agree that government
systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical.
Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,
overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more time
and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone,
international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the
early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally
planned. Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999)
anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair
election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit
until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a
limited operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine
whether the
nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or an
independent country. 14 The U. N. mission of 325 civilian police and
military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following
violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United
Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later
deployed thousands of U. N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition
to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U. N. observer and peace mission
has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease- fire violations have
occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim
government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July
14 Under the agreement governing the referendum (formally termed a
*popular
consultation*), the people of East Timor could choose to accept or reject
autonomy. However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the Indonesian
President*s promise to seek to have Indonesia*s Supreme People*s
Consultative Assembly reverse the territory*s annexation in the event of
such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The agreement
stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United
Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence.
Implementing Overall
Transition Takes Longer and Is More Costly than Originally Planned
Page 28 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new
government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops. 15
Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,
implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over $6
billion:
The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6
billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for
the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U. N.
fiscal year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security
Council*s decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in
response to continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for
the current fiscal year is about $544 million.
The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about $1.8
billion through June 2004. The initial U. N. observer mission sent to
organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected to
cost about $53 million. The current operation*s annual cost is $292
million for the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost
for the current fiscal year is $193 million.
The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have
risen from $55 million for the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an
estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter
estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council*s
recent decision to expand the operation*s mandate and authorize a larger
U. N. force.
There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that are
needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not
funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about $69
million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the
reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved
access to health, water, and education services. International donors
funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping
15 Experiences in the Balkans further demonstrate that transitions take
longer than expected. In 1995, U. S. and international leaders stated that
the NATO- led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina would require
a 1- year deployment and then withdraw. As of June 2003, 13,000
international peacekeeping troops remain in the country with some
remaining for the foreseeable future.
Page 29 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor
resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U. N. Development
Program identified the need for 228 donor- funded international advisers
to begin to help manage government and economic development programs once
the U. N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided 48
advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100
positions. Despite the numerous efforts at coordination* early planning,
donor conferences, and other field representation* the United Nations,
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor
nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground.
Part of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the
country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can
create a variety of problems on the ground.
In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that
efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and humanitarian
agencies were not effective. One donor agency official described donor
efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and Sierra Leone
government representatives stated that neither the government nor the
United Nations has an adequate system to track the amount and the impact
of external aid, especially aid provided through nongovernmental
organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall authority to
direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or
overlap in specific locations. In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate
U. N. peacekeeping operations with donors did not address critical needs
in the governance and security areas. According to World Bank officials
and assessments, U. N. officials planned activities to rebuild East
Timor*s governance and security sectors largely outside of the coordinated
needs assessments conducted by the international community in 1999. This
situation contributed to some conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For
example, one of the first World Bank projects was to help villagers in
outlying regions establish local governing councils using traditional law.
However, according to the Deputy Special Representative, this effort
complicated outreach efforts by the peace operation, as it began
establishing central government authority and providing consistent
regulations throughout East Timor. Coordination among
Multiple Organizations Is Sometimes Ineffective
Page 30 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results- oriented
measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping
transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO*s
Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for
peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable
resultsoriented measures of progress.
Although U. N. missions are using measures of progress for their
operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of
underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to
improve. For example, a U. K.- led coalition of donor nations in Sierra
Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of progress
in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of the armed
forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2 shows some
objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.)
Table 2: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of
Progress in Sierra Leone
Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Establish and maintain security Strengthen police capacity,
accountability, loyalty
Progress toward increasing force to pre- war level (from current 6,500
to 9,500 personnel)
Strengthen strategic management
Enhance training, expand police training school capacity
Provide essential transport and communication equipment
Rehabilitate key infrastructure Strengthen Sierra Leone armed forces
Accelerate training
Restructuring of armed forces and Ministry of Defense
Ensure sustainability of army deployments
Reduce combined government and rebel force to 10,500
Support reintegration of ex- combatants Offer reintegration
opportunities
to all registered ex- combatants (57,000)
Developing Meaningful Results- Oriented Measures Poses Difficulties
Measures of Progress Often Focus on Tasks Rather than Conditions
Page 31 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)
Accelerate training and restructuring of armed forces, and the Ministry
of Defense
Encourage regional political dialogue and collaboration
Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes
Develop regional arms collection and destruction program
Source: United Nations documents.
According to U. K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such
as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly
defined or taken into account. These military trainers also said that
measures for this area do not provide meaningful indications of the
capability of the Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military
trainers noted that while the U. N. operation focuses on such performance
measures as the speed at which units can deploy, it overlooks such
measures as troop discipline,
loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership.
Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and
effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the
armed forces were *much improved* and were effectively patrolling the
country*s border. He also stated that U. N. troops were supporting army
units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General
reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that
lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed shortcomings
in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army troops
retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70 Liberian
raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police investigation
into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory implicated
several active- duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the government and
prevent the operation of the international tribunal.
A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased capacity
of the national police force to provide internal security. However, these
missions use output- oriented measures. For example, in East Timor,
the peace operation originally intended to train 2, 830 police by 2004.
However, the operation established this target using a standard European
police- to- population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates.
Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their
training and whether they are improving security in the country. In
Page 32 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully
staffed police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the
riots, the United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units,
lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human
rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor
police officers by 500.
The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating
governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of
district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of
progress toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U. N. analysts
in Sierra Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas
was having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law.
However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the
operations of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or
criteria, such
as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of
their cases within a reasonable period of time.
In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions* objectives and measures to
develop results- based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so.
U. N. officials said that the missions* measures were process- oriented
and did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping
operations were working to improve. A U. N. report in late 2002
acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to
objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties
in developing results- oriented measures. 16 An example drawn from a
Department of Justice international assistance
program could be useful, however. Justice*s framework for overseas
prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of
strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as
decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval
for an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable
measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the
16 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Agencies Annual Performance Plans
Under the Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional
Decisionmaking,
GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 10.1.18 (Washington, D. C.: February 1998); Managing for
Results: Agencies* Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic
Planning Challenges, GAO/ GGD- 98- 44 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 1998);
and The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide
Implementation Will Be Uneven, GAO/ GGD- 97- 109 (Washington, D. C.: June
2, 1997).
Page 33 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results,
including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and
percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such
measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see table
3).
Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for
Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training
Sample strategic objective Objectives/ Results
sought a Sample measures of output a Sample measures of
outcome/ impact a Sample measures of impact on underlying
conditions a Strengthen judicial independence in a host country
Identify needs of the host country:
Decreased organized crime and corruption
More efficient case processing
Increased regard for human rights
Justice for victims of mass crimes
Facilitate development of anticorruption task force by:
Securing legislative approval
Assisting task force formation
Delivering joint courses on corruption and surveillance
Percentage increase in host country budget for anticorruption efforts
Percentage increase in corruption complaints filed, investigated, and
leading to convictions
Percentage increase in public confidence in government and judicial
honesty
Source: Excerpted from the Department of Justice Handbook for Overseas
Prosecutorial Development and Training.
a Definitions (under the terms of the Government Performance and Results
Act): Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity
or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner.
Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with
its objective.
Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving
program objectives.
U. N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in
past missions would be helpful in developing results- oriented measures
for future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition
strategy, his department needed to develop better measures by which to
assess the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining
sustainable peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of
results was an important task.
Despite the importance of developing results- based measures, the
peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the
Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these
measures. Although DPKO*s revised planning process for peace operations
would require mission planners to clarify long- term aims in the country
United Nations Has Not Yet
Developed Results- Oriented Measures of Progress
Page 34 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military
planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to
develop results- oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers
for each of the three operations noted that they have received only
general guidance on developing results- oriented measures. Moreover, they
stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures
and collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed
were largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use
results- oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff
attempted to implement results- based budgeting for peacekeeping
operations for fiscal year 2003- 04. According to one DPKO official,
however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations
staff had not made it a priority to develop results- oriented measures
linked to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U. N. officials noted
that DPKO and mission staff are working to develop results- oriented
measures in order to implement results- based budgets for most
peacekeeping operations by fiscal year 2004- 05. They also indicated that
the lessons learned and best practices from this planning and budget
preparation process will be reflected in the 2005- 06 budget.
Nevertheless, DPKO has only recently begun to provide the resources
necessary to develop these measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for
policy and analysis and peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best
practices unit to systematically review the results of past U. N.
peacekeeping operations and develop guidelines and general measures of
progress to better plan and conduct future operations. DPKO did not
provide a director for the unit
until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August
2003.
State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs and at the U. S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for
providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example,
they monitor the progress of the 14 U. N. peacekeeping missions and track
the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent.
They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions.
According to these State officials, they have not focused on U. N. efforts
to develop results- based measures. However, they follow the progress of
the missions through U. N. reports and U. S. intelligence. Nonetheless,
they said more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor
the
progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether
they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They cautioned,
however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the United
Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country and
helping it move toward sustainable peace.
Page 35 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous
challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in
internal conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of
accountable
government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general
transition strategy for U. N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step
in overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and
longterm view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The
strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify
results- oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations
and the withdrawal of peacekeepers. However, the United Nations has not
yet developed quantifiable resultsoriented
measures of progress to help the Security Council make peacekeeping
transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses output measures to
manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these measures did not provide useful
information about results, such as progress in improving security in
Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations has not yet developed resultsoriented measures. It created a
best practices unit to systematically review the results of past U. N.
peacekeeping operations and develop measures of
progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have
the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice,
and State; the U. S. Agency for International Development; and the United
Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the U.
S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from the U.
N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The remaining
agencies did not provide comments.
The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided
technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where
appropriate. The U. S. Agency for International Development provided
technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate.
The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations was concerned,
however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts to apply
results- oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not
acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine
peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain
the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not
Conclusions Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 36 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have
added information to the report about recent and proposed U. N. efforts to
develop results- oriented performance measures. We describe in the report
a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used
numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of
tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the
United Nations* results- based budgeting system. The report provides an
accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the
peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U. N. efforts to
develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report
fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and
appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council
voted to expand the operation's mandate. However, this operation's limited
focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations we
examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress
attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The
Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June
2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to
fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan
excombatants.
We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International
Development, and the U. N. Secretary General. We will also make copies
available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be
made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512- 8979, or at christoffj@ gao. gov. Other GAO
contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours, Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and
Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
To identify the elements of the U. N. transition strategy, we obtained and
examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on peacekeeping
policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to the council
from the United Nations* Secretary General. To obtain additional detail,
we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and operational
management from officials of the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, as well as officials in the Department of Political Affairs
who are responsible for contributing to planning peace operations. We also
interviewed and obtained documents from officials from other U. N. bodies,
such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the U.
N. Development Program, that contribute to overall U. N. efforts to
restore stability in complex emergency countries. To obtain other
perspectives on U. N. policies and initiatives and peacekeeping operations
in general, we interviewed and/ or obtained critical evaluations and
analyses from government and nongovernment analysts, including officials
from the U. S. mission to the United Nations; the Departments of State,
Justice, and Defense; the U. S. Agency for International Development; the
World Bank; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the
Henry L. Stimson Center; and others.
To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply
the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its
operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to
implement the United Nations* commitment to applying results- based
budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in
Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those
countries. These trips included visits to U. N. and national government
military and police posts, ex- combatant reintegration centers, justice
institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained
documentation from U. N. and host government officials, bilateral and
multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U. N.
peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing
internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we
visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and
Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in
Sierra Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries
allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of
initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have
completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to
withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U. N.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 38 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration programs
and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However, due to
unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United Nations*
activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it was in
Sierra Leone and East Timor. To assess challenges faced in applying the U.
N. strategy in these countries,
we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping operations
over the last decade (including reviews of U. N. operations in Cambodia
and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues in our
interviews with U. N. headquarters and field- level staff, U. S.
government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad,
as previously described. Our findings regarding U. N. efforts to develop
meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by
our prior work on U. S. government efforts to develop and apply similar
frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the
Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent and
quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined progress
reports sent from the U. N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations headquarters in New York between November 2002 and May 2003.
We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Page 39 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Table 4: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone Results
needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Establish and maintain security Ensure security and freedom of movement
Cease- fire violations minimized and contained
Roads opened, checkpoints removed Strengthen police capacity,
accountability, and loyalty
Progress toward increasing force to prewar level (9,500)
Strengthen strategic management
Enhance training
Provide essential equipment, rehabilitate key infrastructure Strengthen
Sierra Leone armed forces
Restructure and reduce combined government and rebel forces to 10,500
troops
Forces accept responsibility for security in areas vacated by U. N.
peacekeepers Support reintegration of excombatants
Offer reintegration opportunities to all registered ex- combatants
(57,000)
Restore control over diamond mining
Support for enforcement of mining regulations Increase value of legal
exports Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)
Accelerate training, restructuring of armed forces, Ministry of Defense
Ensure sustainability of army deployments
Encourage political dialogue, collaboration in the Mano River Union a
Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes
Develop regional arms collection and destruction program Develop
institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance
Consolidate state authority Restore basic administrative capacity
Increase number of District officials in office Restore local governance
Enhance decentralization for improved public service delivery
Enhance decentralization for community participation in decision making,
oversight
Build capacity
Hold local chieftain and district council elections Strengthen rule of
law Support rebuilding of impartial, transparent, and independent
judiciary
Rehabilitate courts
Train magistrates
Judicial coverage, legal aid in all districts
Rehabilitate essential elements of penal system
Support anticorruption measures (accountability, transparency)
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Page 40 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform
Facilitate reintegration of refugees, internally displaced persons
Facilitate return of Sierra Leonean refugees Support completion of
assisted resettlement program for Internally Displaced Persons
Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons returned home
Support shelter programs
Improve food security
Strengthen child protection Reduce poverty and encourage economic growth
Increase in percentage of households with access to safe drinking water
to 63 percent
Increase in percentage of children enrolled in primary school
Stimulate economic revival* increase annual gross domestic product
growth to 6 percent
Malaria: Increase in treated bed net use by pregnant women and children
Health care: Increase in percentage of health units rehabilitated and
functional
HIV: Increase in percentage of women who are AIDS aware to 20 percent
aware Encourage national reconciliation Land disputes mechanism
functioning Foster policy of inclusion at local level
Promote reconciliation initiatives
Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioning Promote human rights,
justice Reinforce national human rights institutions
Increase capacity of local human rights groups
Harmonize domestic and international human rights instruments
Promote culture of peace, tolerance, and human rights
Special Court functioning
Observed decrease in human rights violations Source: GAO analysis of
United Nations documents and official interviews. a The Mano River Union
is a customs and economic union between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Page 41 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Table 5: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor Results
needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Establish and maintain security Establish secure environment Reduction
and containment of militia threat Continue to provide executive policing
after independence
Gradual handover of executive policing by district
Hand over five districts, eight specialized units by the end of 2002
from U. N. to Timorese authority, remaining districts by November 2003
U. N. review and monitoring of handed over districts
Hand over headquarters by January 2004
Downsize U. N. police from 1,250 to 325 in January 2004
Support the development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS)
Train 3,330 police officers (including 230 border police) at Police
College
On- the- job mentoring by international experts ETPS is able to
provide all basic functions
Specialized training for ETPS in human rights and management skills
Support external security and territorial integrity
East Timor defense force at full operational capability by June 2004
June 2004 defense force assumes responsibility for external security
Assist in the development of border security and control
Border demarcated by June 2003; ETPS to assume patrolling and
immigration responsibilities
National government to normalize its customs service
Develop institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance
Supervise and support elections Presidential elections conducted April
2002 Support development of the postindependence public administration and
rule of law
Civilian Support Group to assist in 100 core functions of government
administration Civilian Support Group to complete essential
services and legal systems activities by November 2003 and remaining
functions by May 2004
Ensure application of general public service standards and systems
throughout the public administration
Create local governance Government established in all 13 districts
Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform Facilitate
provision of humanitarian
assistance
Refugees returned home and reintegrated Support international poverty
reduction efforts
U. N. Development Program coordinating 228 donor- funded international
social and economic development advisers to the national government
Help institute national development plan 10- year plan adopted in 2001;
interim targets met
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Page 42 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Assist in the conduct of serious crimes investigations and proceedings
Conclude investigations in 10 priority cases and 5 other investigations
by the end of 2002
Successful completion of trials throughout 2003 Source: GAO analysis of
United Nations documents and official interviews.
Table 6: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo Results needed for sustainable peace Objective
Measures of progress
Establish and maintain security Support cease- fire agreement Parties to
conflict participate in Joint Military Commission
Cease- fire violations investigated Assist disarmament and repatriation
or reintegration of foreign and Congolese armed groups
Up to 90,000 Rwandan combatants and dependents voluntarily disarmed and
repatriated
Congolese combatants disarmed and reintegrated
Establish ban on supply of weapons or any military assistance to armed
groups in Ituri and Kivus areas in northeastern Congo
Support border security and integrity and national sovereignty
Verify withdrawal and monitor continued absence of Rwandan, Ugandan, and
other foreign military forces from the Congo
Establish functional joint Uganda- Congo Pacification Commission to halt
hostilities, create administrative authority, and restore law and order in
Ituri area
Strengthen local police capacity Complete national assessment of police
capabilities and needs
Provide limited police training and material support to Kisangani
training program
Foster political reconciliation All major parties participate in U. N.
sponsored Inter- Congolese dialogue
All parties agree on power- sharing plan Support the Ituri
pacification commission a Assist in creation of unified national security
forces
Establish high command of unified national armed forces
Form initial unified police unit in one city or area
Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission
Page 43 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress
Develop institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance
Assist in creation of unified national government Transitional
constitution approved by parties Transitional government formed by
parties
Election plans for a democratic government finalized
Peacekeeping operation coordinates activities of U. N. system and other
actors in supporting the transitional government and rule of law
Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform Support
reopening of major riverways for free movement of goods and people
Obtain agreements among parties to conflict permitting commercial and
other traffic along the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani
Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.
a The commission, which includes the United Nations and all parties to the
conflict in the Congo*s
northeastern Ituri region, was created to develop and implement new
structures to restore law and order and effective administration in this
region along the Ugandan border.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 44 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of
armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by
decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption. The
conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily
from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to
restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary
rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a
peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace.
In 2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after
rebels took about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened
and
ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U. K. and
other nationals and to support the government and international
peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001 had
nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the
rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or
rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In
May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted
with U. N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The U.
N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone in
its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the
country. Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated
population in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for
freed slaves by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an
independent country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with
substantial mineral resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern
portion of the country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone*s prewar
population lived in poverty. Appendix III: Crises and International
Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
Sierra Leone
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 45 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small- scale
revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later
president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone*s
diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive
struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition.
Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other,
the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of
conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing
conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations*
Makeni Bo Bonthe Lungi
Kenema Koindu
Kailahun KoiduSefadu
Freetown
0 50 miles
LIBERIA GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
North Atantic Ocean
Source: MapArt.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 46 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much of
the nation*s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the
population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people
fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone*s
professionals.
Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the
international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end the
conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African States, 1
with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of African
Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated agreements,
sponsorship of democratic elections, and military intervention. These
attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra Leone*s civilian and
military institutions, continuing rebel resistance, limitations of the
international military forces operating in the country, and competing
international commitments to the region. The government was overthrown by
a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished power to a new
president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the RUF did not
participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. In
November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement
(known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF. This
agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in 1997 by
another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling junta. The
government was restored in 1998 after West African forces drove the junta
from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the
government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and destruction in
Freetown and the surrounding area.
In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known
as the Lome Agreement because it was signed in Lome, Togo) negotiated with
the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF agreed
to maintain a cease- fire, transform itself into a political party, and
join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted
pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for
actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security
Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among
other things, assist in the implementation of the Lome Agreement, assist
in 1 The member states of the Economic Community of West African States
are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d*Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 47 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and
monitor the cease- fire. The council*s resolution authorized the
deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed the
Lome Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and engaged in a
series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping forces and,
subsequently, with U. N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took about 500 U. N.
peacekeepers hostage. U. N. and other assessments concluded that
insufficient military strength and other shortcomings contributed to the
peacekeeping force*s inability to deter and repel RUF attacks and
stabilize the country. 2 The hostage- taking and other incidents prompted
a significant change in the United Nations* and the international
community*s approach to the
crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater
military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF
resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United
Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U. K. and other nationals
and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment
boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to
redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United Nations
began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series of
steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the
mission*s mandate to clarify its right to self- defense and tasked it to
help extend government authority throughout the country, including areas
controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean armed
forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United Nations
imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country*s support for the RUF.
The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in mid- 2000
enhanced RUF cooperation.
The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U. N. peacekeeping
operation supported the extension of government authority throughout the
country, the disarmament and reintegration of excombatants, and the
conduct of free and fair national elections. According to U. N. reports,
by December 2001, U. N. troops had been deployed to all districts of
Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators
and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the
2 These shortcomings included a serious lack of cohesion within the
mission; confusion about the mandate and rules of engagement; and problems
in command and control, leadership, planning, information sharing, and
logistics.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 48 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
U. N. forces, the U. N. Development Program, and international groups. In
January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United
Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the
RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and
parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U. N. operation played an
important role in supporting these elections, which international and
local observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of
violence. In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic
milestones, U. N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the
size of the mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U. N.
officials identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where
progress would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its
ability to maintain security and stability without substantial assistance
from U. N. peacekeepers. 3 A former Portuguese colony, East Timor
experienced years of intermittent
conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low- level
international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until
1998, when Indonesian- Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement
on a referendum to decide the territory*s political future. The ensuing
vote for independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from
militias favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community
intervened to end the fighting and established a U. N. transitional
administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international
assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and
independence declared in May 2002. A U. N. peacekeeping operation remains
in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing international
efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country.
East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000
and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor
(see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided
between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side became
part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under
3 U. N. Security Council Resolutions 1436 and 1470, adopted in September
2002 and March 2003 respectively, instructed U. N. officials to base plans
for withdrawing the operation on an evaluation of the security situation
in Sierra Leone and the capacity of the country*s security sector to take
responsibility for internal and external security. East Timor
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 49 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor
declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions
provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter
century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate East
Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By
1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last
place among Asian countries on the United Nations* Human Development
Index.
Figure 8: Map of East Timor Although the United Nations refused to
recognize Indonesia*s annexation and called for self- determination for
East Timor, these calls did not achieve results until the government of
Indonesia changed hands in 1998 and the new administration decided to
enter U. N.- mediated discussions with Portugal about the territory*s
political future.
In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on
whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated
with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair
Liquica Baucau
WEST TIMOR
Timor Sea Banda Sea
Dili INDONESIA
INDONESIA EAST TIMOR
0 20 miles Source: MapArt.
Pante Makasar
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 50 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the U.
N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to oversee
the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility for
maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population voted
overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U. N.
administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response,
militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the
support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of
people, displacing 500,000 more* many of whom fled or were forcibly
removed to West Timor* and destroying much of the country*s already
damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the
country*s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in origin.
Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others,
Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security
forces in fact provided considerable support to pro- union militias. In
1999, the Secretary General noted that the potential for post- vote
discord was widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an
effective job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U. N. mission then
in the country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking
effective action to restore stability.
In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series
of interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence,
create a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that
would permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national
government and withdrawal of U. N. forces. In September 1999, the Security
Council authorized an Australian- led international force of approximately
8,000 military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and
facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force
quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East Timorese
were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced went to West
Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro- Indonesia
militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the U.
N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume
responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian- led force,
administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor*s
capacity for self- government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw
development of a national consultative council, began training a police
force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other
international organizations create the conditions for economic
development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 51 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent
assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president.
On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U. N.
transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to
Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the
Security Council created a U. N. Mission in Support of East Timor to
pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to establish
stability and security in the country. The mission has developed
implementation plans for its activities, identified security and
governance *milestones* to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable
for reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2- year period, with the
final withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid- 2004.
Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996-
97 and again in 1998- 99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has
been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic
armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support
or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring
peace, including a U. N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress
since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council
established a peacekeeping operation, the U. N. Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement
signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to
meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U. N.
mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign
troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a
transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded
the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to assist the new government*s
efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council
authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force.
The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in
size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country
shares borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55
million. The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial
deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and
enormous potential for hydroelectric power generation. 4 A colony of
Belgium until
4 Coltan, or colombite- tantalite, is a metallic ore used in laptop
computers and other common electronic devices. Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 52 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after
declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in
power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel
the country*s considerable wealth into economic and social development.
Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population
remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support
opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near- total
collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do
little to resist rebels and outside forces.
The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the
1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1
million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became refugees
in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese Tutsis,
the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading eventually to a
1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in deposing Mobutu
with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The successor government
under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged in 1998 by a new
coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan troops. With support
from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad, the Kabila government
pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before
losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective
rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country
(see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the
continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 53 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila
Government in 1998, and the Location of Major Antigovernment Groups and
Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003
MLC RCD- N RCD
Ituri Armed Groups
Government- controlled RCDK/
ML RWANDA SUDAN
TANZANIA ANGOLA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHAD
Congo River
UGANDA BURUNDI REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO GABON
A t l a n t i c O c e a n
ZAMBIA MALAWI ZAMBIA NIGERIA CHAD
CAMEROON Valuable Minerals
Area demilitarized by agreement Location of current ethnic clashes in the
Ituri region
GDRC: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo MLC: Movement for
the Liberation of the Congo RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy RCD- N:
Colgolese Rally for Democracy * National RCD- K/ ML: Congolese Rally for
Democracy * Kisangani/ Liberation Movement
Coltan Gold Diamonds Kinshasa
500 miles 0
Pro- GDRC countries
Anti- GDRC countries
DRC
500 miles Namibia
Pro- GDRC countries Anti- GDRC countries
Angola Chad Sudan
Zimbabwe Rwanda
Uganda 0
Kisangani Goma
Bunia Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and
other Web sites; MapArt.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 54 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a
ceasefire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a
transitional government and national elections. The Security Council
authorized a U. N. peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of
hostilities, oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks
sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union to create a new
national government that included the current government and foreign-
supported rebel groups in eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would
then support the new government*s efforts to restore peace, including a
timetable calling for agreement on the formation of a unified transitional
government within 3 months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6
months, and reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC
within 9 months, that is, by April 2000.
The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to
implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a
national government was also substantially delayed. The parties committed
numerous violations of the cease- fire, and it was not until December 2002
that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups from eastern Congo 5
signed a power- sharing agreement that would permit the creation of the
transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow to withdraw in part
because they want to retain control of mineral
resources. 6 Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda removed
the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has
continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other
northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting
after foreign troops vacated the area.
Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and
mandate of the U. N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace
process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for
the
5 The two major rebel groups participating in peace- building efforts are
the Rwandansupported Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Ugandan-
supported Movement for the Liberation of the Congo. Splinters of these two
groups and other rebel groups have also
been involved in the fighting and in recent negotiations to form a
transitional government. 6 A U. N. panel concluded in late 2002 that the
conflict in the DRC had evolved into a dispute about control over
minerals. The panel observed that disintegration of civil authority in the
DRC, combined with incursion by foreign armies, had fostered the formation
of criminal
networks linked to the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and to
the DRC government. These networks realized large profits from trade in
the country*s natural resources and had built up a *self- financing war
economy* that is likely to remain a
challenge to establishing an effective national government.
Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 55 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
eastern rebel- occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River
to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and
repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to
Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the
peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military
liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual
forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly
below the ceiling because the country*s unstable political environment,
great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy
troops. Consequently, the number of U. N. troops actually deployed to the
DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May
2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French- led
force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end
fighting and restore order in the city of Bunia.
The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity and
Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security Council
expanded the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to assist the government in
developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring stability, including
efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and the
establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other international
actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force to stabilize
Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force level to
10,800 troops. The U. N. operation will also assume control over
international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new
resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for
elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the
holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate
time to end the current peacekeeping operation.
Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Page 56 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Page 57 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 58 GAO- 03- 1071
U. N. Peacekeeping
Tetsuo Miyabara, (202) 512- 8974 B. Patrick Hickey, (202) 512- 3163
In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De
Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions
to this report. Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments
(320144)
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