    U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict
    Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress (26-SEP-03,
    GAO-03-1071).

    The United Nations responded to the failure of some past
    peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help
    peacekeeping operations move a country from conflict to
    sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this strategy to the
    large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a
    contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U.N. operations,
    the United States has a stake in the successful application of
    this strategy. The strategy also has implications for the conduct
    of international peace operations in other post-conflict
    countries. GAO was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U.N.
    transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the United
    Nations has applied the strategy to operations; and (3) assess
    the challenges to implementing the strategy in these three
    countries.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1071
        ACCNO:   A08598
      TITLE:     U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for
    Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of
    Progress
         DATE:   09/26/2003
      SUBJECT:   International agreements
    	     International cooperation
    	     International organizations
    	     International relations
    	     Military operations
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Democratic Republic of the Congo
    	     East Timor
    	     Sierra Leone

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    GAO-03-1071

    Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
    Representatives

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    September 2003 U. N. PEACEKEEPING Transition Strategies for Post- Conflict
    Countries Lack Results- Oriented Measures of Progress

    GAO- 03- 1071

    The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its
    peacekeeping operations that takes a comprehensive and long- term view and
    focuses on the causes of the conflict. The U. N. strategy for making
    effective peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing
    conditions for sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the
    United Nations and other international organizations to establish these
    conditions and sustain assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3)
    developing objectives and results- oriented measures of progress to help
    manage and decide when a country*s conditions warrant the withdrawal of
    peacekeepers. U. N. Troops and Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East
    Timorese Police The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of
    this strategy to

    help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous
    challenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more
    expensive than originally planned in countries where rival factions may
    continue to fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult
    in countries with little experience of accountable government.
    Coordinating with independent international organizations and donor
    nations with different priorities is also a challenge. The United Nations
    has not yet developed results- oriented measures of progress for the three
    peacekeeping operations.

    Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal
    of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results- oriented measures to
    assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and
    subsequent events in each country showed that the situation was not as
    secure as

    available measures indicated. The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
    Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to
    measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining
    sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these
    indicators. The United Nations responded to the failure of some past
    peacekeeping operations by developing a strategy to help peacekeeping
    operations move a

    country from conflict to sustainable peace. It has attempted to apply this
    strategy to the large and costly peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone,
    East

    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. As a
    contributor of over 25 percent of the cost of U. N. operations, the United
    States has a stake in the successful application of this strategy. The
    strategy also has implications for the conduct of international peace
    operations in other post- conflict countries. GAO

    was asked to (1) identify the elements of the U. N. transition strategy;
    (2) assess the extent to which the United Nations has applied the strategy
    to operations; and (3) assess the challenges to implementing the strategy
    in these three countries.

    www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1071. To view the full product,
    including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
    information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512- 8979 or christoffj@
    gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1071, a report to the

    Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives

    September 2003

    U. N. PEACEKEEPING

    Transition Strategies for Post- Conflict Countries Lack Results- Oriented
    Measures of Progress

    Page i GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping Letter 1 Results in Brief 2
    Background 4 U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three
    Elements 7 United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy 11
    United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing

    Transition Strategy 22 Conclusions 35 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    35 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37

    Appendix II U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission 39

    Appendix III Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 44

    Sierra Leone 44 East Timor 48 Democratic Republic of the Congo 51 Appendix
    IV Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations 56

    Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58 GAO Contacts 58 Staff
    Acknowledgments 58 Tables

    Table 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives 12 Table 2: U. N.
    Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of Progress in
    Sierra Leone 30 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for
    Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training 33 Table 4: U. N.
    Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone 39 Table 5: U. N.
    Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor 41 Table 6: U. N.
    Objectives and Measures of Progress in the

    Democratic Republic of the Congo 42 Figures

    Figure 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of June 30, 2003 6 Figure 2: U.
    N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East Timorese
    Police 14 Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U. N. Peacekeepers
    in Sierra Leone 20 Figure 4: Revisions in U. N. Peacekeeping Troops and
    Police Drawdown Schedule in East Timor 21 Figure 5: French Soldier in
    Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 24 Figure 6: Sierra Leone
    Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with Liberia 25 Figure 7: Map
    of Sierra Leone 45 Figure 8: Map of East Timor 49 Figure 9: Location of
    Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila

    Government in 1998, and the Location of Major Antigovernment Groups and
    Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003 53

    Page iii GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping Abbreviations

    DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of the
    Congo ETPS East Timor Police Service RUF Revolutionary United Front U. N.
    United Nations

    This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
    its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
    work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
    separately.

    Page 1 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    September 26, 2003 The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman, Committee on
    International Relations House of Representatives

    Dear Mr. Chairman: The United Nations, in partnership with other
    international organizations, has undertaken peace operations to establish
    security and the rule of law in war- torn countries such as Somalia,
    Cambodia, and Bosnia. However, years after these operations began, some of
    these countries do not have a sustainable peace or fully abide by the rule
    of law. 1 The U. N. Security Council has since authorized other peace
    operations that have challenges comparable to previous efforts. By June
    2003, U. N. costs for operations in

    East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    exceeded $6 billion, with the United States contributing over 25 percent
    of these funds. To ensure greater success in such peace operations, the U.
    N.

    Secretary General developed a strategy for effective peacekeeping
    transitions* the process peace operations use to move a country from
    immediate conflict toward long- term sustainable peace. This strategy was

    to apply to countries with complex emergencies* countries confronting
    civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a breakdown of civil order.

    You asked us to assess the U. N. strategy for peacekeeping transitions in
    countries with complex emergencies. In this report, we (1) identify the
    elements of the U. N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which
    the United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone,
    East Timor, 2 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (3) assess the
    challenges to implementing the strategy in these countries.

    1 For example, see U. S. General Accounting Office, Cambodia: Governance
    Reform Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging, GAO- 02- 569 (Washington,
    D. C.: June 13, 2001); and Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten
    Successful Implementation of Dayton Peace Agreement, GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00-
    219 (Washington, D. C.: July 19, 2000).

    2 East Timor officially became the Democratic Republic of Timor- Leste
    upon attaining independence in May 2002.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    To identify the elements of the peacekeeping transition strategy, we
    reviewed U. N., GAO, and other organizations* reports about peacekeeping.
    We met with officials at the United Nations, the World Bank, and other
    international organizations to discuss their peacekeeping and assistance
    strategies in countries with complex emergencies. We performed fieldwork
    at U. N. operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone, which are in the
    initial drawdown phase. We conducted limited work at the U. N.

    operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is expanding
    operations. We selected these peace operations because they are the only
    U. N. operations begun in countries with complex emergencies since the
    United Nations developed a new peacekeeping strategy. Appendix I details
    our scope and methodology.

    The U. N. Secretary General*s strategy for making effective peacekeeping
    transitions focuses on achieving tangible results within a country and
    consists of three elements that U. N. peacekeeping operations and other
    international stakeholders are to carry out, including

     establishing conditions for sustainable peace in the country, including
    adequate security, rule of law and participatory governance, and economic
    and social reform;

     coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international
    organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after
    peacekeepers withdraw; and

     specifying objectives (linked to the country conditions sought) and
    developing results- oriented measures of progress toward achieving these
    conditions to help manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers. 3 The U. N.
    Security Council has noted its support for the strategy but

    decides on a case- by- case basis whether to authorize the peacekeepers
    and resources required to implement it.

    3 We define results- oriented or outcome measures as the results of
    programs and activities compared with their intended purpose. See U. S.
    General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: EPA Faces Challenges in
    Developing Results- Oriented Performance Goals and Measures, GAO/ RCED-
    00- 77 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 28, 2000), and Performance Measurement and
    Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, GAO/ GGD- 98- 26 (Washington,
    D. C.: April 1998). Results in Brief

    Page 3 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The United Nations Secretariat is attempting to apply the elements of this
    strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo transition to sustainable peace. First, to establish the
    conditions for sustainable peace, the United Nations and other
    stakeholders have deployed thousands of peacekeepers, police, and
    international administrators in Sierra Leone and East Timor to establish
    security, reform government institutions, and undertake economic reforms.
    In the Congo, efforts are less extensive, but in July 2003 the Security
    Council began expanding U. N. activities. Second, the United Nations,
    World Bank, and donor countries are trying to coordinate their work
    through joint planning and other mechanisms. Third, U. N. peacekeeping
    operations have developed objectives and results- oriented measures to a
    limited extent to plan drawdowns of peacekeepers. The Security Council,
    however, makes the final decisions on the drawdown or termination of
    peacekeeping operations based on factors such as political and budgetary
    considerations.

    The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each
    element of the new strategy. First, establishing the conditions for
    sustainable peace has taken longer and been more costly than expected.
    Achieving adequate security in Sierra Leone and East Timor took more time
    than expected because rival factions opposed the peace operation and
    continued fighting. Continued fighting remains a problem in the Congo. And
    developing rule of law and participatory governance has proved difficult
    because the countries had limited experience with democratic governance,
    traditions, and institutions. Second, the United Nations must effectively
    coordinate efforts with other international organizations working in
    complex emergencies, but each has its own priorities. Third, the United
    Nations has not developed meaningful resultsoriented measures of progress
    for most objectives. For example, a primary measure for East Timor*s
    capacity to provide internal security has focused on the number of police
    to be trained, rather than how well they control

    crime and violence. U. N. mission staff in the field stated that they had
    not been directed to develop or use results- oriented measures. Moreover,
    they stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to gather the needed
    data and report it to U. N. headquarters.

    This report contains no recommendations. We provided a draft of this
    report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the U. S. Agency
    for International Development; and the United Nations. We received verbal
    comments from the State Department and written comments from the U. N.
    Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The remaining agencies did not
    provide comments. The State Department generally agreed with our

    Page 4 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    findings and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we
    incorporated where appropriate.

    The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
    issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations further
    commented that the report (1) did not fully discuss its efforts to apply
    results- oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not
    acknowledge numerical measures of progress in mission reporting, and (3)
    did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the
    Congo or progress made. In response, we added information to the report
    about recent and ongoing U. N. efforts to develop results- oriented

    performance measures. We state in the report that the peacekeeping
    operations use numerical measures of progress but note that most of these
    are measures of output or tasks rather than measures of results. We
    discuss the broader security and economic objectives of the U. N. mandate
    in the Congo in several locations in the report, including table 2. We
    report on progress made in the Congo, particularly in appendix III,
    however,

    much of the progress is very recent. The U. N. Security Council authorizes
    all peacekeeping operations as a means to further international peace and
    security. 4 The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is
    responsible for the planning, management, and logistical support of U. N.
    peacekeeping operations worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the
    Security Council authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these
    operations were ongoing as of August 2003.

    Most current U. N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow mandates
    that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease- fires and peace
    agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing operations*
    those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic

    Republic of the Congo* have broader, multidimensional mandates that
    address complex emergencies.

    4 The 15- member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a
    peacekeeping operation and determines its mandate. Such decisions require
    at least nine votes in favor and are subject to a veto by the negative
    vote of any of the council*s 5 permanent members* China, France, the
    Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U. N.

    Secretary General makes recommendations on how the operation is to be
    launched and carried out and reports on its progress. The U. N. Department
    of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for providing political and
    executive direction to operations in the field. Background

    Page 5 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and
    Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian
    affairs, but they initially lacked long- term transition strategies. For
    example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with
    efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to
    provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years
    later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives
    for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for
    effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation

    left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations
    and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
    sustainable peace.

    In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as
    the Security Council mandated new U. N. operations to address complex
    emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these
    countries faced and the United Nations* response.) The council debated the
    need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding
    multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex
    emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past
    failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000,
    the council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations

    about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U. N.
    peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each country
    and the U. N. operation there.

    Page 6 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Figure 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of June 30, 2003 Note: U. N.
    fiscal years begin July 1 and end June 30 of the following calendar year.
    Sierra

    Leone Democratic

    Republic of the Congo

    East Timor

    Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web
    sites; MapArt. Baucau

    Makeni Bo Kenema

    Koindu KoiduSefadu

    Freetown

    Population (July 2003 estimate): 5,732,681 Area: 71,740 sq. km. Total
    peacekeepers: 13,219 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004: $2.6
    billion

    Population (July 2003 estimate): 56,625,039 Area: 2,345,410 sq. km. Total
    peacekeepers: 6,886 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004 $1.9 billion

    Kinshasa

    Population (July 2003 estimate): 997,853 Area: 15,007 sq. km. Total
    peacekeepers: 4,014 Total estimated mission costs, 1999- 2004 $1.8 billion

    U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone U. N. Mission in the

    Democratic Republic of the Congo U. N. Missions in East Timor

    West Timor (Indonesia)

    Dili

    Kisangani Goma

    Mbuji- Mayi Bunia

    500 miles 0 0 50 miles 0 20 miles

    Page 7 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy
    for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U. N.
    strategy consists of three elements:  establishing the conditions for
    sustainable peace, including security, rule

    of law, and economic and social reform;  coordinating and sustaining the
    efforts of international organizations and

    donor states; and  developing objectives and results- oriented measures
    of progress to

    manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions. The
    Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but
    also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources
    needed to carry it out on a case- by- case basis. The U. N. Secretariat,
    particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help
    implement this strategy. In 2001, the U. N. Secretary General stated that
    the ultimate purpose of

    peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this,
    the U. N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the
    United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to
    (1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide

    rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for
    economic and social recovery and reform.

    Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U. N.
    peacekeeping operations. However, when armed interventions have been
    necessary, the United Nations generally has authorized alliances* such as
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* or coalitions of nations to
    undertake military operations to restore security. U. N. peacekeepers then
    have responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other
    aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move
    forward. In the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing
    and reintegrating ex- combatants into society, training a fair and
    impartial police force, and building a professional army that is
    accountable to the national government.

    The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely
    if the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To
    support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners U. N.
    Peacekeeping

    Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements

    Strategy Focuses on Achieving Security, Rule of Law, and Economic Reform

    Page 8 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    undertake programs to reform a country*s justice system so that it is
    fair, transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening
    or building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access,
    and accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the

    Security Council, may include supporting broad- based political parties,
    overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting
    efforts to combat corruption.

    Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is
    also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these
    conditions include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and
    activities to promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as
    supporting war crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other
    efforts in this area include support for resettlement of refugees and
    displaced persons.

    Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not
    focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace. For
    example, a Department of Defense- sponsored study determined that past
    failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to
    restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with
    the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a
    tool for U. S. policy makers reached similar conclusions. 5 The guide
    noted that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and
    political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency
    situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the

    police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The
    guide concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in
    the country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming
    excombatants or holding elections) and/ or transforming conditions on the
    ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and
    increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons
    learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping operations
    in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for
    comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations. 6 The
    Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and

    5 See Len Hawley, Generic Political- Military Plan for a Multilateral
    Complex Contingency Operation (Washington, D. C.: July 18, 2002). 6 See U.
    S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International Peace
    Operations, GAO- 02- 707R (Washington, D. C.: May 24, 2002).

    Page 9 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
    sustainable peace.

    In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for
    effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable
    peace requires a comprehensive approach that includes political,
    humanitarian, and human rights programs to foster sustainable development,
    eradication of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and
    rule of law. 7 However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting
    that it decides

    on a case- by- case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops,
    funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities.

    The transition strategy recognizes that U. N. peacekeeping operations
    cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must
    be closely coordinated among U. N. peacekeeping offices; U. N.
    development, humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international
    financial institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and
    nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that
    peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these

    other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation*s
    earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged
    cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated
    response to the specific conditions in each country.

    As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and
    individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example,
    the host government; international financial institutions, such as the
    World Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for
    economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace
    operation ends.

    7 Several U. S. government studies support this approach. For example, see
    DFI International, Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to
    Sustainable Peace (Washington, D. C.: September 1997). Moreover, the
    Special Coordinator of the Stability

    Pact for Southeastern Europe noted that the pact, a multinational effort
    to implement a comprehensive, long- term regional conflict prevention
    strategy, was also based on this approach. Strategy Emphasizes

    Coordination with Other Organizations and Donor States

    Page 10 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The U. N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked
    to the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward
    achieving those conditions. The objectives and results- oriented measures
    are intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions
    about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective data.
    The emphasis on using objectives and results- oriented measures is part of
    the U. N. decision to implement results- based budgeting. Approved by the
    General Assembly in 2000, results- based budgeting links program
    objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client
    or users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended
    purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program*s
    objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended
    to ensure that U. N. programs are designed to achieve results and to
    ensure that the United Nations can measure performance.

    The U. N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management
    capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and
    transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations made
    by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts
    convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of
    the existing system for managing peace operations. 8 Some key initiatives
    included the following:

     In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping
    responsibilities into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political
    Affairs was responsible for developing and proposing the mandates of
    potential peace operations, and DPKO was responsible for planning and
    logistical support.

     In 2001, the U. N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in
    staff for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By
    January 2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For
    example, it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and
    increased the civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it
    to provide useful input in planning individual operations.

     DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace
    operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long- term

    8 The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly
    referred to as the *Brahimi Report,* made recommendations to the Secretary
    General in November 2000 to improve the strategic direction, planning,
    organization, and conduct of peace operations. Strategy Focuses on
    Developing Objectives and

    Results- Oriented Measures U. N. Reforms Support Implementation of
    Strategy

    Page 11 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to
    be undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for
    measuring success.

     As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO has
    begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task
    force membership varies but should include core military and police

    planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U. N. humanitarian
    and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the
    International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as
    appropriate.  In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create
    a best

    practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for
    Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit*s mission is to analyze past
    experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The
    unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for
    the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials
    stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the
    implementation of the United Nations* revised approach to transition
    planning.

    The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition
    strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First,
    the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of
    peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and
    maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help
    develop rule of law. U. N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the

    World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address human
    rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U. N. efforts are
    more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more
    peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and
    international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts
    with each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third,
    each U. N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and
    resultsoriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these
    to manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes
    the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation.
    United Nations Is

    Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy

    Page 12 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    In countries with complex emergencies, U. N. peacekeeping operations and
    other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable
    peace by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing
    institutions that provide rule of law and participatory governance, and
    (3) creating conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1
    illustrates the transition objectives associated with U. N. and other
    stakeholder efforts to achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

    Table 1: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives Results needed for
    sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Establish and maintain security  Ensure security, freedom of movement

     Strengthen police capacity, accountability, and loyalty

     Strengthen Sierra Leone armed forces

     Support reintegration of ex- combatants  Restore control over

    diamond mining  Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)

     Establish secure environment

     Provide executive policing authority

     Develop local police capacity

     Support strengthening of external security capability

     Assist in development of border control

     Support the cease- fire agreement

     Support border security and national sovereignty

     Assist with the disarmament, repatriation, or reintegration of foreign-
    and Congolese- armed groups  Strengthen local police training capacity

     Support reform of security forces Develop institutions that ensure rule
    of law and participatory governance

     Consolidate state authority

     Restore local governance

     Strengthen rule of law

     Create and support national government and rule of law  Supervise and

    support elections

     Support development of public administrative

    capacity

     Develop local governance

     Assist in the creation of a unified national government

     Support establishment of an interim government

     Foster political reconciliation

    U. N. Peacekeeping Operations Seek to Establish Conditions for Sustainable
    Peace

    Page 13 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Results needed for sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic
    Republic of the Congo

    Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform

     Facilitate reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons

     Reduce poverty, encourage economic growth

     Encourage national reconciliation

     Promote human rights and justice

     Help institute national development plan

     Support international poverty reduction efforts

     Assist in investigations of and proceedings for serious crimes
    Facilitate provision

    of humanitarian assistance

     Support reopening of internal waterways for free movement of goods and
    people

     Facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring

    Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.

    The Security Council mandates for the U. N. peace operations in Sierra
    Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining
    security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as
    reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying
    out provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.
    N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel
    to provide security at key locations, government buildings, and
    disarmament sites. 9 The mission also facilitated the free flow of people,
    goods, and humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council
    expanded the U. N. mission*s mandate in response to renewed violence and
    by March 2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According
    to the force commander, the operation*s priorities since the election of a
    new government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to
    improving the capacity of the local police and government officials. 10
    The British government has also played a major role in achieving these
    objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the
    government and U. N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone*s
    armed forces and police. 9 The July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement between the
    parties stipulated that the primary rebel group would maintain a cease-
    fire, disarm and demobilize, transform itself into a

    political party, and participate in a government of national unity. 10
    Another key task is to complete the reintegration of about 57, 000 ex-
    combatants into society by the end of 2003. U. N. Peacekeeping Operations

    Make Establishing and Maintaining Security a Priority

    Page 14 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In September
    1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an international force led
    by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread

    violence perpetrated by pro- Indonesian militias. According to members of
    the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had
    a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security
    Council subsequently authorized (1) the U. N. Transitional Administration
    in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150

    troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U. N. Mission of
    Support in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus
    1,250 police. According to the deputy force commander and other U. N.
    officials, these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have
    continued to patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun
    training a

    local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small
    East Timor military force (see fig. 2).

    Figure 2: U. N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with
    East Timorese Police

    Page 15 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U. N. force had
    about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease- fire
    and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May
    2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate
    1,500- strong force on a limited mission to protect U. N. peacekeeping

    troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around
    the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the
    council increased the strength of the U. N. force to 10,800 and for the
    first time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in
    selected locations.

    U. N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have
    undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory
    governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the U.
    N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked with the
    Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild
    courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges
    and prosecutors. In 2002, the U. N. operation provided transportation,
    supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections
    that observers characterized as *free and fair.* Mission officials also
    plan to provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local
    government elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U. N. plans and
    reports, the

    priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures
    throughout the country.

    In East Timor, U. N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory
    governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security Council
    empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative and
    executive authority for the country, including the administration of
    justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national
    consultative council to help make decisions about the future government
    and set up a transitional judicial commission. According to U. N.
    officials, international staff and advisors also provided on- the- job
    training to allow the East

    Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the
    government. The U. N. mission also supervised East Timor*s first popular
    election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the
    presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence and
    the end of the U. N. transitional administration in May 2002, the followon
    peace operation has focused on advising and training government officials
    and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts. U. N.
    Efforts to Develop Rule of

    Law and Participatory Governance

    Page 16 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U. N. peacekeeping
    operation*s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting
    the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to
    establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and
    Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council
    expanded the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to help the government
    restore stability, including support for security sector reform,
    elections, and rule of law, in coordination with other international
    actors.

    U. N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward
    conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East
    Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U. N. peacekeeping
    operation, and the U. N. Development Program helped the government develop
    a 20- year national development plan. The plan described short- and
    medium- term strategies for the country*s economic recovery and growth,
    and was used by the international community to determine their economic
    support programs. Although the U. N. peacekeeping operation provided
    funding for some projects, other donors provided major funding for
    programs to reduce poverty, increase power generation, and support private
    sector development.

    U. N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social
    reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the
    government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of
    rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In
    Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and fund
    an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those
    bearing *greatest responsibility* for violations of international
    humanitarian law during that country*s civil war. 11 The U. N. operation
    assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies.
    In East Timor, the U. N. operation established a unit to assist in the
    investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United
    Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to
    commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and
    fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U. N. High Commissioner for
    Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra
    Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these
    efforts by providing security and logistical support.

    11 The court*s draft budget for the fiscal year beginning in July 2003 was
    approximately $35.3 million. U. N. Peacekeeping Operations Support
    Economic and Social

    Recovery Efforts

    Page 17 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The U. N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try
    to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations.
    These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and
    the establishment of a high- level position in the mission to coordinate
    security and economic recovery efforts.

    In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and
    international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation
    deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8 months
    before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment mission
    included members from five donor countries, four U. N. agencies, the
    European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank. The
    International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent mission to assess
    East Timor*s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core plans for
    reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its

    planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in
    other post- conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed
    efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external
    resources.

    The U. N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also
    coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor
    meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of
    Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U. N. Office for the Coordination of
    Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised
    strategic plans for that country. U. N. organizations working in Sierra
    Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank) subsequently
    collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their national recovery
    and peace- building efforts. At an international donors conference in
    November 2002, U. N. organizations and other donors agreed to work
    together to support the government*s comprehensive national recovery
    strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national

    aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination meetings.

    Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among U.
    N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out
    peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of
    Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second highest
    ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between security
    and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy representative in
    East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping operations and U.
    N. development programs allow him to better manage U. N. Peacekeeping

    Operations Attempt to Coordinate and Sustain Assistance

    Page 18 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    the process of transitioning the mission*s emphasis from peacekeeping to
    longer term peace building.

    DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and
    identified some results- oriented measures of progress. The operations in
    Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to
    plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council

    makes the final transition decisions. The U. N. operations in Sierra
    Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have specified
    their objectives, based on mandates from the Security Council, and have
    developed measures of progress, some of which are results oriented. (App.
    II lists the objectives and measures for the three missions.) For example,
    in Sierra Leone, one objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic
    growth. Measures of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of
    households with access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women
    who are AIDS aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6
    percent annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of
    movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and
    containing cease- fire violations and opening roads and removing
    roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are
    quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing
    resultsoriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace
    operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the
    last section of this report.

    The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as well
    as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making the final
    decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces. Nonetheless, the
    United Nations has to a limited extent used some measures to plan the
    withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East Timor. (The operation
    in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a

    stage to begin withdrawing.) U. N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and
    modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of
    progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating
    excombatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining.
    Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the security
    risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each region to
    ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower United Nations
    Is

    Beginning to Use Objectives and Results- Oriented Measures in Peacekeeping
    Operations

    Peace Operations Are Making Efforts to Specify Objectives and Measures

    Peace Operations Use Measures of Progress to a Limited Extent in Planning
    Drawdown

    Page 19 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along
    the Liberian border. U. N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the
    force was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of
    the council*s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping
    mission and not because the mission*s measures pointed to a reduced threat
    to the country*s security and stability. In March 2003, the council
    requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for
    the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra
    Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal
    security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for
    withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in
    September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by the
    Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by the
    council in July 2003.

    Page 20 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U. N. Peacekeepers in Sierra
    Leone

    In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used
    measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although the
    United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and
    international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack
    of sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor
    police

    service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of
    June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule
    for the troops and police.) According to U. N., U. S., and Australian
    officials,

    0 2,000

    4,000 6,000

    8,000 10,000

    12,000 14,000

    16,000 18,000 Projected

    U. N. troops

    Original Modified Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified

    Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.

    2002 2003 2004 2005 Sept. Jan. May Nov. June Oct. Dec. July

    Page 21 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the
    United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the
    peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as
    having a judicial system in place by mid- 2003, will not change the
    withdrawal date.

    Figure 4: Revisions in U. N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police Drawdown
    Schedule in East Timor U. N. police

    May Nov. May Jan. June Projected

    Original Modified Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified

    Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.

    U. N. troops 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 0

    2,000 3,000

    4,000 5,000

    6,000 May Nov. May July Oct. Dec. June

    Projected 0 400

    800 1,200 1,000

    Page 22 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help
    manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council
    decisions. According to U. N. officials, U. S. officials, and members of
    the council, the following factors are involved in these decisions:
    Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for

    countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the
    opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support.

     The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the
    country*s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their
    country and fulfill their commitments.

     Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security
    Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it
    devotes resources to ongoing operations. 12  The cost and resources
    needed for peacekeeping operations are high.

    Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support,
    particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest. The
    United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each

    element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for
    sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable
    peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival
    factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their
    internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers* presence. Further,
    establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in
    countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and
    democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken
    longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the

    United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities
    with those of other independent international organizations and donor
    states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third,
    developing clear objectives and meaningful results- oriented measures of
    progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by
    which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in

    12 The Security Council has addressed calls for initiating peacekeeping
    operations in Afghanistan, Cote d*Ivoire, Liberia, Iraq, and other
    locations in the past 2 years. Security Council Bases Transition Decisions
    on Several

    Factors United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing
    Transition Strategy

    Page 23 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made
    developing or using these measures a priority.

    Establishing security in war- torn countries is difficult because of
    uncertain and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements
    among opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially
    threatened by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted
    their

    movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to
    commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British
    troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49
    peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in
    East Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with

    Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro- integration militia created
    widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A
    military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to
    restore security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died.

    Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven
    extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease- fire agreements, the two
    large rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the
    country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned with
    neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U. N. peace operation. The
    operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease- fires
    frequently have been violated. The government*s forces only have control

    over half of the country*s territory. After violations of several cease-
    fire agreements, France led a coalition force to help U. N. peacekeepers
    control large- scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the
    Ituri region (see fig. 5). Achieving Security, Rule of

    Law, and Economic and Social Reform Is Difficult

    Page 24 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Maintaining security in war- torn countries is also a problem. In East
    Timor, pro- Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from
    Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U. N.
    military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to
    East Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U. N. peacekeeping troops
    should be maintained along the border. 13 In April 2003, Sierra Leone
    peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state
    that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra
    Leone 13 The boundary between East and West Timor is known as the Tactical
    Coordination Line, pending the outcome of negotiations between East Timor
    and Indonesia in establishing an international border.

    Page 25 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U. N. officials also noted
    that large concentrations of ex- combatants, unemployed youths,
    corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone*s diamond mining areas
    continue to be ongoing threats to security.

    Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with
    Liberia

    Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because
    countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with
    transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and

    institutions. For example, the U. N. strategy for restoring local
    government to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary
    chieftaincies and elected district councils. According to a British
    government analysis, however, Sierra Leone*s reliance on hereditary
    chieftains has always compromised transparency and accountability and
    provided a means for the central government to control local affairs.
    Moreover, this reliance limits democratic participation because only
    candidates meeting

    hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections
    to fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally,
    local civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the
    National Limited Progress in

    Establishing Rule of Law

    Page 26 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief.
    A 2002 U. K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as
    unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the AntiCorruption
    Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate corrupt
    practices among government officials, has been ineffective, according to
    U. S. and U. K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies, the
    World Bank and the U. K. government are planning a 5- year effort to
    improve the justice system beginning in late 2003. In East Timor, U. N.
    and other international officials told us that years of

    mistrust of the Indonesian- imposed court system and the rural
    population*s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and
    informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women,
    according to U. N. and other international officials. These issues present
    a significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and
    respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not
    passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will
    serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and
    services beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government
    services or representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital.

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have
    almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U. S.
    government and U. N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that
    the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the
    territory was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo
    a difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the
    peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance of
    the U. N. peacekeeping operation.

    U. N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have
    noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than
    those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that
    developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty
    will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U. N.
    Children*s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population
    is below the poverty level. The most recent U. N. health survey indicated
    that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished.

    Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra
    Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in regaining
    legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital sector in its
    economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed Economic
    Recovery Is a LongTerm Effort

    Page 27 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41
    million in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British
    government estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise
    to as much as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated
    and effective

    anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone
    government, U. N., and other international officials agree that government
    systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical.
    Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,
    overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more time
    and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone,
    international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the
    early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally
    planned. Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999)
    anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair
    election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit
    until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a
    limited operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine
    whether the

    nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or an
    independent country. 14 The U. N. mission of 325 civilian police and
    military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following
    violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United
    Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later
    deployed thousands of U. N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition
    to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U. N. observer and peace mission
    has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease- fire violations have
    occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim
    government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July
    14 Under the agreement governing the referendum (formally termed a
    *popular

    consultation*), the people of East Timor could choose to accept or reject
    autonomy. However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the Indonesian
    President*s promise to seek to have Indonesia*s Supreme People*s
    Consultative Assembly reverse the territory*s annexation in the event of
    such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The agreement
    stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United
    Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence.
    Implementing Overall

    Transition Takes Longer and Is More Costly than Originally Planned

    Page 28 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new
    government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops. 15
    Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,

    implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over $6
    billion:

     The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6
    billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for
    the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U. N.
    fiscal year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security
    Council*s decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in
    response to continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for
    the current fiscal year is about $544 million.

     The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about $1.8
    billion through June 2004. The initial U. N. observer mission sent to
    organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected to
    cost about $53 million. The current operation*s annual cost is $292
    million for the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost
    for the current fiscal year is $193 million.

     The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have
    risen from $55 million for the U. N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an
    estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter
    estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council*s
    recent decision to expand the operation*s mandate and authorize a larger
    U. N. force.

    There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that are
    needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not
    funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about $69
    million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the
    reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved
    access to health, water, and education services. International donors
    funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping

    15 Experiences in the Balkans further demonstrate that transitions take
    longer than expected. In 1995, U. S. and international leaders stated that
    the NATO- led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina would require
    a 1- year deployment and then withdraw. As of June 2003, 13,000
    international peacekeeping troops remain in the country with some
    remaining for the foreseeable future.

    Page 29 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor
    resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U. N. Development
    Program identified the need for 228 donor- funded international advisers
    to begin to help manage government and economic development programs once
    the U. N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided 48
    advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100

    positions. Despite the numerous efforts at coordination* early planning,
    donor conferences, and other field representation* the United Nations,
    international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor
    nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground.
    Part of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the

    country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can
    create a variety of problems on the ground.

    In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that
    efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and humanitarian
    agencies were not effective. One donor agency official described donor
    efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and Sierra Leone
    government representatives stated that neither the government nor the
    United Nations has an adequate system to track the amount and the impact
    of external aid, especially aid provided through nongovernmental
    organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall authority to
    direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or

    overlap in specific locations. In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate
    U. N. peacekeeping operations with donors did not address critical needs
    in the governance and security areas. According to World Bank officials
    and assessments, U. N. officials planned activities to rebuild East
    Timor*s governance and security sectors largely outside of the coordinated
    needs assessments conducted by the international community in 1999. This
    situation contributed to some conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For
    example, one of the first World Bank projects was to help villagers in
    outlying regions establish local governing councils using traditional law.
    However, according to the Deputy Special Representative, this effort
    complicated outreach efforts by the peace operation, as it began
    establishing central government authority and providing consistent
    regulations throughout East Timor. Coordination among

    Multiple Organizations Is Sometimes Ineffective

    Page 30 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results- oriented
    measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping
    transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO*s
    Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for
    peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable
    resultsoriented measures of progress.

    Although U. N. missions are using measures of progress for their
    operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of
    underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to
    improve. For example, a U. K.- led coalition of donor nations in Sierra
    Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of progress
    in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of the armed
    forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2 shows some
    objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.)

    Table 2: U. N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of
    Progress in Sierra Leone

    Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Establish and maintain security Strengthen police capacity,
    accountability, loyalty

     Progress toward increasing force to pre- war level (from current 6,500
    to 9,500 personnel)

     Strengthen strategic management

     Enhance training, expand police training school capacity

     Provide essential transport and communication equipment

     Rehabilitate key infrastructure Strengthen Sierra Leone armed forces

     Accelerate training

     Restructuring of armed forces and Ministry of Defense

     Ensure sustainability of army deployments

     Reduce combined government and rebel force to 10,500

    Support reintegration of ex- combatants  Offer reintegration
    opportunities

    to all registered ex- combatants (57,000)

    Developing Meaningful Results- Oriented Measures Poses Difficulties

    Measures of Progress Often Focus on Tasks Rather than Conditions

    Page 31 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)

     Accelerate training and restructuring of armed forces, and the Ministry
    of Defense

     Encourage regional political dialogue and collaboration

     Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes

     Develop regional arms collection and destruction program

    Source: United Nations documents.

    According to U. K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such
    as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly
    defined or taken into account. These military trainers also said that
    measures for this area do not provide meaningful indications of the
    capability of the Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military
    trainers noted that while the U. N. operation focuses on such performance
    measures as the speed at which units can deploy, it overlooks such
    measures as troop discipline,

    loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership.
    Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and
    effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the

    armed forces were *much improved* and were effectively patrolling the
    country*s border. He also stated that U. N. troops were supporting army
    units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General
    reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that

    lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed shortcomings
    in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army troops
    retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70 Liberian
    raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police investigation
    into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory implicated
    several active- duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the government and
    prevent the operation of the international tribunal.

    A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased capacity
    of the national police force to provide internal security. However, these
    missions use output- oriented measures. For example, in East Timor,

    the peace operation originally intended to train 2, 830 police by 2004.
    However, the operation established this target using a standard European
    police- to- population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates.
    Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their
    training and whether they are improving security in the country. In

    Page 32 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully
    staffed police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the
    riots, the United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units,
    lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human
    rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor
    police officers by 500.

    The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating
    governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of
    district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of
    progress toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U. N. analysts
    in Sierra Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas
    was having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law.
    However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the
    operations of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or
    criteria, such

    as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of
    their cases within a reasonable period of time.

    In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions* objectives and measures to
    develop results- based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so.
    U. N. officials said that the missions* measures were process- oriented
    and did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping

    operations were working to improve. A U. N. report in late 2002
    acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to
    objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties
    in developing results- oriented measures. 16 An example drawn from a
    Department of Justice international assistance

    program could be useful, however. Justice*s framework for overseas
    prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of
    strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as
    decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval
    for an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable
    measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the

    16 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Agencies Annual Performance Plans
    Under the Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional
    Decisionmaking,

    GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 10.1.18 (Washington, D. C.: February 1998); Managing for
    Results: Agencies* Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic
    Planning Challenges, GAO/ GGD- 98- 44 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 30, 1998);
    and The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide
    Implementation Will Be Uneven, GAO/ GGD- 97- 109 (Washington, D. C.: June
    2, 1997).

    Page 33 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results,
    including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and
    percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such
    measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see table
    3).

    Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for
    Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training

    Sample strategic objective Objectives/ Results

    sought a Sample measures of output a Sample measures of

    outcome/ impact a Sample measures of impact on underlying

    conditions a Strengthen judicial independence in a host country

    Identify needs of the host country:

     Decreased organized crime and corruption

     More efficient case processing

     Increased regard for human rights

     Justice for victims of mass crimes

    Facilitate development of anticorruption task force by:

     Securing legislative approval

     Assisting task force formation

     Delivering joint courses on corruption and surveillance

     Percentage increase in host country budget for anticorruption efforts

     Percentage increase in corruption complaints filed, investigated, and
    leading to convictions

    Percentage increase in public confidence in government and judicial
    honesty

    Source: Excerpted from the Department of Justice Handbook for Overseas
    Prosecutorial Development and Training.

    a Definitions (under the terms of the Government Performance and Results
    Act): Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity
    or effort that can be expressed in a quantitative or qualitative manner.
    Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with
    its objective.

    Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving
    program objectives.

    U. N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in
    past missions would be helpful in developing results- oriented measures
    for future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for
    Peacekeeping Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition
    strategy, his department needed to develop better measures by which to
    assess the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining
    sustainable peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of
    results was an important task.

    Despite the importance of developing results- based measures, the
    peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these
    measures. Although DPKO*s revised planning process for peace operations
    would require mission planners to clarify long- term aims in the country
    United Nations Has Not Yet

    Developed Results- Oriented Measures of Progress

    Page 34 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military
    planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to
    develop results- oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers
    for each of the three operations noted that they have received only
    general guidance on developing results- oriented measures. Moreover, they
    stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures
    and collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed
    were largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use
    results- oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff
    attempted to implement results- based budgeting for peacekeeping
    operations for fiscal year 2003- 04. According to one DPKO official,
    however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations
    staff had not made it a priority to develop results- oriented measures
    linked to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U. N. officials noted
    that DPKO and mission staff are working to develop results- oriented
    measures in order to implement results- based budgets for most
    peacekeeping operations by fiscal year 2004- 05. They also indicated that
    the lessons learned and best practices from this planning and budget
    preparation process will be reflected in the 2005- 06 budget.
    Nevertheless, DPKO has only recently begun to provide the resources
    necessary to develop these measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for
    policy and analysis and peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best
    practices unit to systematically review the results of past U. N.
    peacekeeping operations and develop guidelines and general measures of
    progress to better plan and conduct future operations. DPKO did not
    provide a director for the unit

    until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August
    2003.

    State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization
    Affairs and at the U. S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for
    providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example,
    they monitor the progress of the 14 U. N. peacekeeping missions and track
    the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent.
    They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions.

    According to these State officials, they have not focused on U. N. efforts
    to develop results- based measures. However, they follow the progress of
    the missions through U. N. reports and U. S. intelligence. Nonetheless,
    they said more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor
    the

    progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether
    they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They cautioned,
    however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the United
    Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country and
    helping it move toward sustainable peace.

    Page 35 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous
    challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in
    internal conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of
    accountable

    government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general
    transition strategy for U. N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step
    in overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and
    longterm view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The
    strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify
    results- oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations
    and the withdrawal of peacekeepers. However, the United Nations has not
    yet developed quantifiable resultsoriented

    measures of progress to help the Security Council make peacekeeping
    transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses output measures to
    manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these measures did not provide useful
    information about results, such as progress in improving security in
    Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
    Operations has not yet developed resultsoriented measures. It created a
    best practices unit to systematically review the results of past U. N.
    peacekeeping operations and develop measures of

    progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have
    the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently.

    We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice,
    and State; the U. S. Agency for International Development; and the United
    Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the U.
    S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from the U.
    N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The remaining
    agencies did not provide comments.

    The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided
    technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where
    appropriate. The U. S. Agency for International Development provided
    technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate.

    The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
    issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations was concerned,
    however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts to apply
    results- oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not
    acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine
    peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain
    the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not
    Conclusions Agency Comments

    and Our Evaluation

    Page 36 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have
    added information to the report about recent and proposed U. N. efforts to
    develop results- oriented performance measures. We describe in the report
    a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used
    numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of
    tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the
    United Nations* results- based budgeting system. The report provides an
    accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the
    peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U. N. efforts to

    develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report
    fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and
    appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council
    voted to expand the operation's mandate. However, this operation's limited
    focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations we
    examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress
    attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The
    Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June
    2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to
    fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan
    excombatants.

    We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the
    Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International
    Development, and the U. N. Secretary General. We will also make copies
    available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be
    made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512- 8979, or at christoffj@ gao. gov. Other GAO
    contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

    Sincerely yours, Joseph A. Christoff Director, International Affairs and
    Trade

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 37 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    To identify the elements of the U. N. transition strategy, we obtained and
    examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on peacekeeping
    policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to the council
    from the United Nations* Secretary General. To obtain additional detail,
    we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and operational
    management from officials of the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping
    Operations, as well as officials in the Department of Political Affairs
    who are responsible for contributing to planning peace operations. We also
    interviewed and obtained documents from officials from other U. N. bodies,
    such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the U.
    N. Development Program, that contribute to overall U. N. efforts to
    restore stability in complex emergency countries. To obtain other
    perspectives on U. N. policies and initiatives and peacekeeping operations
    in general, we interviewed and/ or obtained critical evaluations and
    analyses from government and nongovernment analysts, including officials
    from the U. S. mission to the United Nations; the Departments of State,
    Justice, and Defense; the U. S. Agency for International Development; the
    World Bank; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the
    Henry L. Stimson Center; and others.

    To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply
    the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
    the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping
    Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its
    operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to
    implement the United Nations* commitment to applying results- based
    budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in
    Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those
    countries. These trips included visits to U. N. and national government
    military and police posts, ex- combatant reintegration centers, justice
    institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained
    documentation from U. N. and host government officials, bilateral and
    multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U. N.
    peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing
    internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we
    visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and
    Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in
    Sierra Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries
    allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of
    initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have
    completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to
    withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U. N.
    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 38 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration programs
    and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However, due to
    unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United Nations*
    activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it was in
    Sierra Leone and East Timor. To assess challenges faced in applying the U.
    N. strategy in these countries,

    we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping operations
    over the last decade (including reviews of U. N. operations in Cambodia
    and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues in our
    interviews with U. N. headquarters and field- level staff, U. S.
    government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad,
    as previously described. Our findings regarding U. N. efforts to develop

    meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by
    our prior work on U. S. government efforts to develop and apply similar
    frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the
    Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent and
    quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined progress
    reports sent from the U. N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of Peacekeeping
    Operations headquarters in New York between November 2002 and May 2003.

    We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Page 39 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Table 4: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone Results
    needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Establish and maintain security Ensure security and freedom of movement

     Cease- fire violations minimized and contained

     Roads opened, checkpoints removed Strengthen police capacity,
    accountability, and loyalty

     Progress toward increasing force to prewar level (9,500)

     Strengthen strategic management

     Enhance training

     Provide essential equipment, rehabilitate key infrastructure Strengthen
    Sierra Leone armed forces

     Restructure and reduce combined government and rebel forces to 10,500
    troops

     Forces accept responsibility for security in areas vacated by U. N.
    peacekeepers Support reintegration of excombatants

     Offer reintegration opportunities to all registered ex- combatants
    (57,000)

    Restore control over diamond mining

     Support for enforcement of mining regulations  Increase value of legal
    exports Address external security challenges (Liberia and Guinea)

     Accelerate training, restructuring of armed forces, Ministry of Defense

     Ensure sustainability of army deployments

     Encourage political dialogue, collaboration in the Mano River Union a
    Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes

     Develop regional arms collection and destruction program Develop
    institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance

    Consolidate state authority  Restore basic administrative capacity

     Increase number of District officials in office Restore local governance
     Enhance decentralization for improved public service delivery

     Enhance decentralization for community participation in decision making,
    oversight

     Build capacity

     Hold local chieftain and district council elections Strengthen rule of
    law  Support rebuilding of impartial, transparent, and independent

    judiciary

     Rehabilitate courts

     Train magistrates

     Judicial coverage, legal aid in all districts

     Rehabilitate essential elements of penal system

     Support anticorruption measures (accountability, transparency)

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Page 40 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform

    Facilitate reintegration of refugees, internally displaced persons

     Facilitate return of Sierra Leonean refugees  Support completion of
    assisted resettlement program for Internally Displaced Persons

     Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons returned home

     Support shelter programs

     Improve food security

     Strengthen child protection Reduce poverty and encourage economic growth

     Increase in percentage of households with access to safe drinking water
    to 63 percent

     Increase in percentage of children enrolled in primary school

     Stimulate economic revival* increase annual gross domestic product
    growth to 6 percent

     Malaria: Increase in treated bed net use by pregnant women and children

     Health care: Increase in percentage of health units rehabilitated and
    functional

     HIV: Increase in percentage of women who are AIDS aware to 20 percent
    aware Encourage national reconciliation  Land disputes mechanism
    functioning  Foster policy of inclusion at local level

     Promote reconciliation initiatives

     Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioning Promote human rights,
    justice  Reinforce national human rights institutions

     Increase capacity of local human rights groups

     Harmonize domestic and international human rights instruments

     Promote culture of peace, tolerance, and human rights

     Special Court functioning

     Observed decrease in human rights violations Source: GAO analysis of
    United Nations documents and official interviews. a The Mano River Union
    is a customs and economic union between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Page 41 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Table 5: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor Results
    needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Establish and maintain security Establish secure environment  Reduction
    and containment of militia threat Continue to provide executive policing
    after independence

     Gradual handover of executive policing by district

     Hand over five districts, eight specialized units by the end of 2002
    from U. N. to Timorese authority, remaining districts by November 2003

     U. N. review and monitoring of handed over districts

     Hand over headquarters by January 2004

     Downsize U. N. police from 1,250 to 325 in January 2004

    Support the development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS)

     Train 3,330 police officers (including 230 border police) at Police
    College

     On- the- job mentoring by international experts  ETPS is able to
    provide all basic functions

     Specialized training for ETPS in human rights and management skills

    Support external security and territorial integrity

     East Timor defense force at full operational capability by June 2004

     June 2004 defense force assumes responsibility for external security

    Assist in the development of border security and control

     Border demarcated by June 2003; ETPS to assume patrolling and
    immigration responsibilities

     National government to normalize its customs service

    Develop institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance

    Supervise and support elections  Presidential elections conducted April
    2002 Support development of the postindependence public administration and
    rule of law

     Civilian Support Group to assist in 100 core functions of government
    administration  Civilian Support Group to complete essential

    services and legal systems activities by November 2003 and remaining
    functions by May 2004

     Ensure application of general public service standards and systems
    throughout the public administration

    Create local governance  Government established in all 13 districts
    Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform Facilitate
    provision of humanitarian

    assistance

     Refugees returned home and reintegrated Support international poverty
    reduction efforts

     U. N. Development Program coordinating 228 donor- funded international
    social and economic development advisers to the national government

    Help institute national development plan  10- year plan adopted in 2001;
    interim targets met

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Page 42 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Assist in the conduct of serious crimes investigations and proceedings

     Conclude investigations in 10 priority cases and 5 other investigations
    by the end of 2002

     Successful completion of trials throughout 2003 Source: GAO analysis of
    United Nations documents and official interviews.

    Table 6: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo Results needed for sustainable peace Objective
    Measures of progress

    Establish and maintain security Support cease- fire agreement  Parties to
    conflict participate in Joint Military Commission

     Cease- fire violations investigated Assist disarmament and repatriation
    or reintegration of foreign and Congolese armed groups

     Up to 90,000 Rwandan combatants and dependents voluntarily disarmed and
    repatriated

     Congolese combatants disarmed and reintegrated

     Establish ban on supply of weapons or any military assistance to armed
    groups in Ituri and Kivus areas in northeastern Congo

    Support border security and integrity and national sovereignty

     Verify withdrawal and monitor continued absence of Rwandan, Ugandan, and
    other foreign military forces from the Congo

     Establish functional joint Uganda- Congo Pacification Commission to halt
    hostilities, create administrative authority, and restore law and order in
    Ituri area

    Strengthen local police capacity  Complete national assessment of police
    capabilities and needs

     Provide limited police training and material support to Kisangani
    training program

    Foster political reconciliation  All major parties participate in U. N.
    sponsored Inter- Congolese dialogue

     All parties agree on power- sharing plan  Support the Ituri
    pacification commission a Assist in creation of unified national security
    forces

     Establish high command of unified national armed forces

     Form initial unified police unit in one city or area

    Appendix II: U. N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by Mission

    Page 43 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Results needed for sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress

    Develop institutions that ensure rule of law and participatory governance

    Assist in creation of unified national government  Transitional
    constitution approved by parties  Transitional government formed by
    parties

     Election plans for a democratic government finalized

     Peacekeeping operation coordinates activities of U. N. system and other
    actors in supporting the transitional government and rule of law

    Create conditions for economic recovery and social reform Support
    reopening of major riverways for free movement of goods and people

     Obtain agreements among parties to conflict permitting commercial and
    other traffic along the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani

    Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.
    a The commission, which includes the United Nations and all parties to the
    conflict in the Congo*s

    northeastern Ituri region, was created to develop and implement new
    structures to restore law and order and effective administration in this
    region along the Ugandan border.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 44 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of
    armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by
    decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption. The
    conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily
    from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to
    restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary
    rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a
    peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace.
    In 2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after
    rebels took about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened
    and

    ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U. K. and
    other nationals and to support the government and international
    peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001 had
    nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the
    rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or
    rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In
    May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted
    with U. N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The U.
    N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone in
    its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the

    country. Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated
    population in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for
    freed slaves by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an
    independent country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with
    substantial mineral resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern
    portion of the country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone*s prewar
    population lived in poverty. Appendix III: Crises and International

    Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the
    Congo

    Sierra Leone

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 45 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone

    The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small- scale
    revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary United
    Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later
    president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone*s
    diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive
    struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition.
    Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other,
    the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of
    conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing
    conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations*

    Makeni Bo Bonthe Lungi

    Kenema Koindu

    Kailahun KoiduSefadu

    Freetown

    0 50 miles

    LIBERIA GUINEA

    SIERRA LEONE

    North Atantic Ocean

    Source: MapArt.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 46 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much of
    the nation*s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the
    population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people
    fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone*s
    professionals.

    Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the
    international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end the
    conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African States, 1
    with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of African
    Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated agreements,
    sponsorship of democratic elections, and military intervention. These
    attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra Leone*s civilian and
    military institutions, continuing rebel resistance, limitations of the
    international military forces operating in the country, and competing
    international commitments to the region. The government was overthrown by
    a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished power to a new
    president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the RUF did not
    participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. In
    November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement
    (known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF. This
    agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in 1997 by
    another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling junta. The
    government was restored in 1998 after West African forces drove the junta
    from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the
    government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and destruction in
    Freetown and the surrounding area.

    In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known
    as the Lome Agreement because it was signed in Lome, Togo) negotiated with
    the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF agreed
    to maintain a cease- fire, transform itself into a political party, and
    join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted

    pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for
    actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security
    Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among

    other things, assist in the implementation of the Lome Agreement, assist
    in 1 The member states of the Economic Community of West African States
    are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d*Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana,
    Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
    Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 47 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and
    monitor the cease- fire. The council*s resolution authorized the
    deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed the
    Lome Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and engaged in a
    series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping forces and,
    subsequently, with U. N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took about 500 U. N.
    peacekeepers hostage. U. N. and other assessments concluded that
    insufficient military strength and other shortcomings contributed to the
    peacekeeping force*s inability to deter and repel RUF attacks and
    stabilize the country. 2 The hostage- taking and other incidents prompted
    a significant change in the United Nations* and the international
    community*s approach to the

    crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater
    military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF
    resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United
    Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U. K. and other nationals
    and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment
    boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to
    redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United Nations
    began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series of
    steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the

    mission*s mandate to clarify its right to self- defense and tasked it to
    help extend government authority throughout the country, including areas
    controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean armed
    forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United Nations
    imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country*s support for the RUF.
    The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in mid- 2000
    enhanced RUF cooperation.

    The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U. N. peacekeeping
    operation supported the extension of government authority throughout the
    country, the disarmament and reintegration of excombatants, and the
    conduct of free and fair national elections. According to U. N. reports,
    by December 2001, U. N. troops had been deployed to all districts of
    Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators

    and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the
    2 These shortcomings included a serious lack of cohesion within the
    mission; confusion about the mandate and rules of engagement; and problems
    in command and control, leadership, planning, information sharing, and
    logistics.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 48 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    U. N. forces, the U. N. Development Program, and international groups. In
    January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United
    Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the
    RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and
    parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U. N. operation played an
    important role in supporting these elections, which international and
    local observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of

    violence. In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic
    milestones, U. N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the
    size of the mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U. N.
    officials identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where
    progress would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its
    ability to maintain security and stability without substantial assistance
    from U. N. peacekeepers. 3 A former Portuguese colony, East Timor
    experienced years of intermittent

    conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low- level
    international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until
    1998, when Indonesian- Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement
    on a referendum to decide the territory*s political future. The ensuing
    vote for independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from
    militias favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community
    intervened to end the fighting and established a U. N. transitional
    administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international
    assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and
    independence declared in May 2002. A U. N. peacekeeping operation remains
    in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing international
    efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country.

    East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000
    and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor
    (see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided
    between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side became
    part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under

    3 U. N. Security Council Resolutions 1436 and 1470, adopted in September
    2002 and March 2003 respectively, instructed U. N. officials to base plans
    for withdrawing the operation on an evaluation of the security situation
    in Sierra Leone and the capacity of the country*s security sector to take
    responsibility for internal and external security. East Timor

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 49 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor
    declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions
    provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter

    century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate East
    Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By
    1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last
    place among Asian countries on the United Nations* Human Development
    Index.

    Figure 8: Map of East Timor Although the United Nations refused to
    recognize Indonesia*s annexation and called for self- determination for
    East Timor, these calls did not achieve results until the government of
    Indonesia changed hands in 1998 and the new administration decided to
    enter U. N.- mediated discussions with Portugal about the territory*s
    political future.

    In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on
    whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated
    with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair

    Liquica Baucau

    WEST TIMOR

    Timor Sea Banda Sea

    Dili INDONESIA

    INDONESIA EAST TIMOR

    0 20 miles Source: MapArt.

    Pante Makasar

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 50 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the U.
    N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to oversee
    the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility for
    maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population voted
    overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U. N.
    administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response,
    militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the
    support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of
    people, displacing 500,000 more* many of whom fled or were forcibly
    removed to West Timor* and destroying much of the country*s already
    damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the
    country*s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in origin.

    Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others,
    Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security
    forces in fact provided considerable support to pro- union militias. In
    1999, the Secretary General noted that the potential for post- vote
    discord was widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an
    effective job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U. N. mission then
    in the country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking
    effective action to restore stability.

    In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series
    of interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence,
    create a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that
    would permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national
    government and withdrawal of U. N. forces. In September 1999, the Security
    Council authorized an Australian- led international force of approximately
    8,000 military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and
    facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force
    quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East Timorese
    were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced went to West
    Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro- Indonesia

    militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the U.
    N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume
    responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian- led force,
    administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor*s
    capacity for self- government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw
    development of a national consultative council, began training a police
    force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other
    international organizations create the conditions for economic
    development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 51 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent
    assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president.

    On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U. N.
    transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to
    Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the
    Security Council created a U. N. Mission in Support of East Timor to
    pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to establish
    stability and security in the country. The mission has developed
    implementation plans for its activities, identified security and
    governance *milestones* to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable
    for reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2- year period, with the
    final withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid- 2004.

    Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996-
    97 and again in 1998- 99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has
    been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic
    armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support
    or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring
    peace, including a U. N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress
    since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council
    established a peacekeeping operation, the U. N. Organization Mission in
    the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement
    signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to
    meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U. N.

    mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign
    troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a
    transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded
    the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to assist the new government*s
    efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council
    authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force.

    The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in
    size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country
    shares borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55
    million. The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial
    deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and
    enormous potential for hydroelectric power generation. 4 A colony of
    Belgium until

    4 Coltan, or colombite- tantalite, is a metallic ore used in laptop
    computers and other common electronic devices. Democratic Republic

    of the Congo

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 52 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after
    declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in
    power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel
    the country*s considerable wealth into economic and social development.
    Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population

    remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support
    opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near- total
    collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do
    little to resist rebels and outside forces.

    The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the
    1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1
    million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became refugees
    in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese Tutsis,
    the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading eventually to a
    1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in deposing Mobutu
    with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The successor government
    under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged in 1998 by a new
    coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan troops. With support
    from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad, the Kabila government
    pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before

    losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective
    rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country
    (see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the
    continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 53 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila
    Government in 1998, and the Location of Major Antigovernment Groups and
    Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003

    MLC RCD- N RCD

    Ituri Armed Groups

    Government- controlled RCDK/

    ML RWANDA SUDAN

    TANZANIA ANGOLA

    CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHAD

    Congo River

    UGANDA BURUNDI REPUBLIC

    OF THE CONGO GABON

    A t l a n t i c O c e a n

    ZAMBIA MALAWI ZAMBIA NIGERIA CHAD

    CAMEROON Valuable Minerals

    Area demilitarized by agreement Location of current ethnic clashes in the
    Ituri region

    GDRC: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo MLC: Movement for
    the Liberation of the Congo RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy RCD- N:
    Colgolese Rally for Democracy * National RCD- K/ ML: Congolese Rally for
    Democracy * Kisangani/ Liberation Movement

    Coltan Gold Diamonds Kinshasa

    500 miles 0

    Pro- GDRC countries

    Anti- GDRC countries

    DRC

    500 miles Namibia

    Pro- GDRC countries Anti- GDRC countries

    Angola Chad Sudan

    Zimbabwe Rwanda

    Uganda 0

    Kisangani Goma

    Bunia Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and
    other Web sites; MapArt.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 54 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a
    ceasefire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a
    transitional government and national elections. The Security Council
    authorized a U. N. peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of
    hostilities, oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks
    sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union to create a new
    national government that included the current government and foreign-
    supported rebel groups in eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would
    then support the new government*s efforts to restore peace, including a
    timetable calling for agreement on the formation of a unified transitional
    government within 3 months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6
    months, and reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC
    within 9 months, that is, by April 2000.

    The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to
    implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a
    national government was also substantially delayed. The parties committed
    numerous violations of the cease- fire, and it was not until December 2002
    that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups from eastern Congo 5
    signed a power- sharing agreement that would permit the creation of the
    transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow to withdraw in part
    because they want to retain control of mineral

    resources. 6 Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda removed
    the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has
    continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other
    northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting
    after foreign troops vacated the area.

    Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and
    mandate of the U. N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace
    process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for
    the

    5 The two major rebel groups participating in peace- building efforts are
    the Rwandansupported Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Ugandan-
    supported Movement for the Liberation of the Congo. Splinters of these two
    groups and other rebel groups have also

    been involved in the fighting and in recent negotiations to form a
    transitional government. 6 A U. N. panel concluded in late 2002 that the
    conflict in the DRC had evolved into a dispute about control over
    minerals. The panel observed that disintegration of civil authority in the
    DRC, combined with incursion by foreign armies, had fostered the formation
    of criminal

    networks linked to the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and to
    the DRC government. These networks realized large profits from trade in
    the country*s natural resources and had built up a *self- financing war
    economy* that is likely to remain a

    challenge to establishing an effective national government.

    Appendix III: Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, East
    Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Page 55 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    eastern rebel- occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River
    to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and
    repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to
    Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the
    peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military
    liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual
    forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly
    below the ceiling because the country*s unstable political environment,

    great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy
    troops. Consequently, the number of U. N. troops actually deployed to the
    DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May
    2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French- led
    force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end
    fighting and restore order in the city of Bunia.

    The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity and
    Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security Council
    expanded the peacekeeping operation*s mandate to assist the government in
    developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring stability, including
    efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and the
    establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other international
    actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force to stabilize
    Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force level to
    10,800 troops. The U. N. operation will also assume control over
    international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new
    resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for
    elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the
    holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate
    time to end the current peacekeeping operation.

    Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
    Page 56 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

    Appendix IV: Comments from the U. N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
    Page 57 GAO- 03- 1071 U. N. Peacekeeping

    Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments Page 58 GAO- 03- 1071
    U. N. Peacekeeping

    Tetsuo Miyabara, (202) 512- 8974 B. Patrick Hickey, (202) 512- 3163

    In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De
    Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions
    to this report. Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments

    (320144)

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    C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of

    GAO Reports and Testimony

    Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
    Programs Public Affairs
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