Transportation Programs: Opportunities for Oversight and Improved
Use of Taxpayer Funds (22-JUL-03, GAO-03-1040T).
It is important to ensure that longterm spending on
transportation programs meets the goals of increasing mobility
and improving transportation safety. In this testimony, GAO
discusses what recently completed work on four transportation
programs suggests about challenges and strategies for improving
the oversight and use of taxpayer funds. These four programs are
(1) the federal-aid highway program, administered by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA); (2) highway safety programs,
administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA); (3) the New Starts program, administered
by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA); and (4) the
Essential Air Service (EAS) program, administered out of the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation. Differences in the
structure of these programs have contributed to the challenges
they illustrate. The federal-aid highway program uses formulas to
apportion funds to the states, the highway safety programs use
formulas and grants, the New Starts program uses competitive
grants, and the EAS program provides subsidies. For each program,
GAO describes in general how the program illustrates a particular
challenge in managing or overseeing long-term spending and in
particular what challenges and strategies for addressing the
challenges GAO and others have identified.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1040T
ACCNO: A07653
TITLE: Transportation Programs: Opportunities for Oversight and
Improved Use of Taxpayer Funds
DATE: 07/22/2003
SUBJECT: Air transportation operations
Cost control
Cost effectiveness analysis
Federal aid for highways
Federal aid for transportation
Federal aid to localities
Federal/state relations
Ground transportation operations
Highway safety
Program evaluation
State-administered programs
Strategic planning
DOT Essential Air Service Subsidy
Program
FHWA Federal-Aid Highway Program
FTA New Starts Program
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-03-1040T
Untitled
Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House
of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 11: 00 a. m. EDT Tuesday July 22,
2003 TRANSPORTATION
PROGRAMS Opportunities for Oversight and Improved Use of Taxpayer Funds
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAO- 03- 1040T
The federal- aid highway program illustrates the challenge of ensuring
that federal funds (nearly $30 billion annually) are spent efficiently
when projects are managed by the states. GAO has raised concerns about
cost growth on and FHWA*s oversight of major highway and bridge projects.
Recent proposals to strengthen FHWA*s oversight are responsive to issues
and options GAO has raised. Options identified in previous GAO work
provide the Congress with opportunities to build on recent proposals by,
among other things, clarifying uncertainties about FHWA*s role and
authority.
NHTSA*s highway safety programs illustrate the challenge of evaluating how
well federally funded state programs are meeting their goals. Over 5
years, the Congress provided about $2 billion to the states for programs
to reduce traffic fatalities, which numbered over 42,000 in 2002. GAO
found that NHTSA was making limited use of oversight tools that could help
states better implement their programs and recommended strategies for
improving the tools* use that NHTSA has begun to implement. The
administration recently proposed performance- based grants in this area.
FTA*s New Starts program illustrates the challenge of developing effective
processes for evaluating grant proposals. Under the New Starts program,
which provided about $10 billion in mass transit funding in the past 6
years, local transit agencies compete for project funds through grant
proposals. FTA has developed a systematic process for evaluating these
proposals. GAO believes that FTA has made substantial progress by
implementing this process, but our work has raised some concerns,
including the extent to which the process is able to adequately prioritize
the projects. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program illustrates the
challenge of
considering modifications to statutorily defined programs in response to
changing conditions. Under the EAS program, many small communities are
guaranteed to continue receiving air service through subsidies to
carriers. However, the program has faced increasing costs and decreasing
average
passenger levels. The Congress, the administration, and GAO have all
proposed strategies to improve the program*s efficiency by better
targeting available resources and offering alternatives for sustainable
services.
Key Challenges and Strategies for Managing Four Federal Transportation
Programs Program
Highway construction Highway
safety New Starts transit Essential Air
Service
Challenges Managing cost growth on major highway and bridge projects
Enhancing
effectiveness of state safety programs
Selecting best projects for limited funds
Adjusting program to changing conditions
Strategies Improve oversight and reporting Improve use of monitoring tools
Establish sound
selection process Restructure program to improve viability It is important
to ensure that longterm spending on transportation
programs meets the goals of increasing mobility and improving
transportation safety. In this testimony, GAO discusses what recently
completed work on four transportation programs suggests about challenges
and strategies for improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds.
These four programs are (1) the federal- aid
highway program, administered by the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA); (2) highway safety programs, administered by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); (3) the
New Starts program, administered by the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA); and (4) the Essential Air Service (EAS) program, administered out
of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation.
Differences in the structure of these programs have contributed to the
challenges they illustrate. The
federal- aid highway program uses formulas to apportion funds to the
states, the highway safety programs use formulas and grants,
the New Starts program uses competitive grants, and the EAS program
provides subsidies. For each program, GAO describes in general how the
program illustrates a particular challenge in managing or overseeing long-
term spending and in particular what challenges and strategies for
addressing the
challenges GAO and others have identified.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1040T. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512- 2834 or heckerj@ gao.
gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1040T, a testimony before the Committee on
Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
July 22, 2003
TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS
Opportunities for Oversight and Improved Use of Taxpayer Funds
Page 1 GAO- 03- 1040T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: It is an
honor to be here today to participate in your hearing on strategies to
reduce or prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in transportation programs.
As requested, I will be discussing what our recently completed work on
four transportation programs suggests about challenges and strategies for
improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds to ensure that long-
term spending on transportation programs meets the goals of increasing
mobility and improving transportation safety. As you know, many
transportation programs rely on dedicated long- term funding to achieve
specified program objectives. Such funding, which generally comes from a
trust fund financed by user fees, is designed to match the long life,
ongoing maintenance needs, and replacement and rehabilitation expenditures
of large transportation projects. However, long- term funding creates
certain challenges related to the effective oversight and management of
the programs, particularly because in some cases, funds flow automatically
to states, which use the funds to
implement their own projects. Without effective oversight, investments of
scarce federal funds in these transportation programs may not achieve
maximum mobility and safety benefits.
Transportation legislation has sought to balance the federal interest in
effective management and oversight with state and local interest in
flexibility to tailor decisions to local priorities. Transportation
legislation has also sought to promote multimodal systemwide decision-
making while continuing distinct modal trust funds. Recently, the
Comptroller General testified before the House Budget Committee on
opportunities for improving the oversight and use of taxpayer funds for
such spending programs. 1 He described three tiers of review, one of
which* improving
1 Federal Budget: Opportunities for Oversight and Improved Use of Taxpayer
Funds,
(GAO- 03- 952T, June 2003)
Page 2 GAO- 03- 1040T economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in mandated
federal spending programs* is especially pertinent to the programs we will
be discussing. 2 As agreed with your office, my remarks today will focus
on four federal
transportation programs: (1) the federal- aid highway program, (2) highway
safety programs, (3) the New Starts transit program, and (4) the Essential
Air Service program. The size and structure of these programs vary
considerably. For each program, I will discuss in general how the program
illustrates a particular challenge in managing or overseeing long- term
spending programs and in particular what challenges and strategies for
addressing these challenges we and others have found in evaluating these
programs.
Before I discuss each individual program, I*d like to point out how
structural differences in these programs have contributed to different
oversight challenges for each. For example, the federal- aid highway
program uses formulas to apportion federal funds to the states in several
distinct categories for the purpose of constructing and improving highway
facilities. Ensuring efficient expenditures of federal funds for what can
be large, long- term construction projects is an important challenge that
has grown as the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has increasingly
devolved its oversight responsibilities to the states in recent years. The
highway safety programs, administered by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), also use formulas and other criteria to
apportion funds for state programs designed primarily to improve safety
through changes in drivers* behavior. Determining the effectiveness of the
states* efforts is a key challenge for these programs, together with
assessing the efficiency of their expenditures. In contrast, the New
Starts transit program relies on financial and project justification
criteria to evaluate and select grant proposals for transit projects
through a competition for federal funds administered by the Federal
Transit
2 The three levels of review the Comptroller General discussed also
included addressing vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, particularly in high- risk federal programs; and a
fundamental re- examination of programs, policies, activities, and
processes. Because the programs we are discussing today are not on our
high- risk list and
our work in these areas has not focused on fraud or abuse, we are
discussing them in the context of the longer- term goals of efficiency and
effectiveness, which are key to appropriately targeting scarce federal
resources. Our scope today does not encompass a fundamental re-
examination of programs, which is also critical to ensuring the effective
use of federal funds.
Page 3 GAO- 03- 1040T Administration (FTA). 3 While oversight of funded
projects is important for this program, a key challenge that our work has
addressed is how grant
proposals should be evaluated to identify the best projects for funding.
Finally, the Essential Air Service (EAS) program is statutorily based in
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Administered out of the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation, it subsidizes air carriers* operations to
guarantee that certain isolated small communities served by air carriers
before deregulation continue to receive some scheduled air service. As the
aviation industry has changed over the years, questions have arisen about
the program*s sustainability and efficiency. My statement is based on a
body of GAO reviews of these and other transportation programs, many
completed at the request of your Committee or legislatively mandated. A
complete list of related reports appears in appendix I.
In summary: The federal- aid highway program illustrates the challenge
of ensuring that
federal funds are spent efficiently through formula- based programs that
finance projects that are then largely managed and overseen by the states.
The program makes nearly $30 billion available to the states for their
transportation programs annually, including funding for major highway and
bridge projects. Over the years, we have documented cost growth and
management deficiencies on these major highway and bridge projects, as
have the Department of Transportation*s Inspector General and state audit
and evaluation agencies. Additionally, in 1997, we found that FHWA had
done little to ensure that containing costs was an integral part of
states* project management* in part because FHWA did not believe that
encouraging or requiring practices to control costs and better manage
projects was part of its oversight mandate. Since then, FHWA has developed
strategies to strengthen its oversight, including requirements for annual
finance plans and greater use of risk- based factors to focus its
oversight efforts. The administration*s reauthorization proposal also
includes strategies for strengthening FHWA*s oversight, and we believe
these are positive steps that are responsive to many of the issues we*ve
raised in the past. Should the Congress determine that enhancing federal
oversight of major highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate,
3 In contrast to the New Starts program, there are other transit programs
that are formula funded; however, we have not evaluated these programs and
therefore do not include them in our discussion today.
Page 4 GAO- 03- 1040T in previous work we have identified options that
provide the Congress opportunities to build on the administration*s
proposal during the
reauthorization process by, among other things, clarifying uncertainties
about FHWA*s role and authority.
The highway safety programs administered by NHTSA illustrate the
challenge of evaluating how well federally funded and assisted state
programs are meeting their goals, as well as how efficiently the federal
funds are being spent. During fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Congress
provided about $2 billion to the states for programs designed to reduce
the number of traffic fatalities, which totaled over 42,000 in 2002. NHTSA
has tools for overseeing these programs, including improvement plans to
help states meet their safety goals and management reviews to assess the
programs* performance and use of federal funds. However, evaluating how
well the state programs are meeting their highway safety goals is
difficult because NHTSA*s guidance does not establish a consistent means
of measuring progress. Moreover, NHTSA*s regional offices have made
limited and inconsistent use of improvement plans and management reviews,
in part because NHTSA*s guidance does not specify criteria for conducting
them. When NHTSA*s regional offices have conducted management reviews of
the state programs, they have sometimes found inefficient spending and
weak controls over federal funds. In April 2003, we recommended strategies
for improving NHTSA*s use of these tools,
including developing better guidance on when they should be used. NHTSA
has begun to implement these recommendations. The administration*s recent
proposal to reauthorize the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
(TEA- 21) calls for changes in the program that would provide even further
flexibility to states in using these funds. It would also create grant
programs based on state performance in two areas* reductions in fatalities
and safety belt laws and usage.
FTA*s New Starts transit program illustrates two management oversight
challenges: the challenge of developing effective federal processes for
evaluating grant proposals as well as the already described challenge of
overseeing projects* implementation. Under the New Starts program, which
provided about $10 billion in mass transit funding for fiscal years 1998-
2003 and was authorized by TEA- 21, local transit agencies apply and
compete for project funds on the basis of specific financial and project
justification criteria. FTA reviews the grant applications and then
notifies the Congress that it intends to commit New Starts funding to
certain
Page 5 GAO- 03- 1040T projects through full funding grant agreements. 4
Because many transit projects compete for New Starts funding, and FTA
awards relatively few full funding grant agreements each year, it is
crucial that the most
promising projects are selected. FTA is also responsible for overseeing
funded projects. FTA has implemented strategies to address the twin
challenges of evaluating projects and overseeing their implementation.
First, it developed a systematic process for evaluating potential New
Starts projects competing for federal funding that provides a framework
for evaluating and selecting projects. We believe that FTA has made
substantial progress by implementing this process, but our work in recent
years has raised some concerns, including the extent to which the process
is able to adequately prioritize the projects. Second, FTA has improved
the quality of its transit grants management oversight program by
upgrading its guidance and training of staff and grantees and by
strengthening
oversight procedures. However, oversight remains an area of concern, as
major transit projects continue to experience cost, schedule, and
performance problems. The administration*s fiscal year 2004 budget
proposal contains several initiatives that have both advantages and
disadvantages, with implications for the cost- effectiveness and
performance of proposed projects.
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program illustrates the challenge of
considering modifications to statutorily defined programs in response to
changing conditions. Under the EAS program, small communities that
received scheduled commercial air service prior to the deregulation of the
airline industry in 1978 and that meet certain additional criteria are
guaranteed to continue receiving air service. Although the program was
originally intended to end in 1988, the Congress later permanently
authorized it. As the airline industry has evolved over the past 25 years,
however, the EAS program has faced increasing challenges to remain viable.
Costs have tripled since 1995 because carriers* costs have increased and
revenues have declined as passenger ridership has fallen; passengers often
prefer to drive to other larger airports nearby for better air service. In
addition, the number of communities eligible for EAS
subsidies has increased and may continue to grow in the near term. Within
the past year, the Congress, the administration, and we have all proposed
various strategies to improve the EAS program*s overall efficiency and
effectiveness by better targeting available resources and offering
alternatives for sustainable services, such as allowing communities to
4 A full funding grant agreement is a multiyear contractual agreement
between FTA and project sponsors for a specified amount of funding. The
full amount of funding is committed to the projects over a set period.
Page 6 GAO- 03- 1040T spend subsidy funds on individually- tailored
transportation options that better meet their needs. The federal- aid
highway program provides nearly $30 billion annually to
the states, most of which are formula grant funds that FHWA distributes
through annual apportionments according to statutory formulas; once
apportioned, these funds are generally available to each state for
eligible projects. 5 The responsibility for choosing which projects to
fund generally rests with state departments of transportation and local
planning
organizations. The states have considerable discretion in selecting
specific highway projects and in determining how to allocate available
federal funds among the various projects they have selected. For example,
section 145 of title 23 of the United States Code describes the federal-
aid highway program as a federally assisted state program and provides
that the authorization of the appropriation of federal funds or their
availability for expenditure, *shall in no way infringe on the sovereign
rights of the States to determine which projects shall be federally
financed.*
A major highway or bridge construction or repair project usually has four
stages: (1) planning, (2) environmental review, (3) design and property
acquisition, and (4) construction. While FHWA approves state
transportation plans, environmental impact assessments, and the
acquisition of property for highway projects, its role in approving the 5
How formulas are designed to distribute federal funds can itself affect
the extent to which
federal funds encourage or leverage the Nation*s total level of highway
investment and promote the most efficient funding of transportation
projects. These issues are outside the scope of this testimony*s
discussion; however, our recent reports Trends in Federal and
State Capital Investment in Highways (GAO- 03- 744R) and Trends in State
Capital Investment in Highways (GAO- 03- 915SP) provide information on
federal, state, and local investment in highways, and variations in
states* levels of * investment and effort over time. Our follow- on work
to that report will more closely examine the interaction between levels of
federal and state investment, including how the design of formulas may
affect this interaction. Options Exist to
Address the FederalAid Highway Program*s Oversight Challenges
Page 7 GAO- 03- 1040T design and construction of projects varies. 6 The
state*s activities and FHWA*s corresponding approval actions are shown in
figure 1.
Figure 1: State and FHWA Actions on Highway Projects
6 FHWA exercises full oversight only of certain high- cost Interstate
system projects. On projects subject to *full* oversight, FHWA prescribes
design and construction standards, approves design plans and estimates,
approves contract awards, inspects construction progress, and renders
final acceptance on projects when they are completed. States either may
assume or are required to assume responsibilities for all other types of
projects. See
U. S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Cost and
Oversight Issues on Major Highway and Bridge Projects, GAO- 02- 702T
(Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2002) for a more complete description of FHWA*s
and the states* responsibilities.
Page 8 GAO- 03- 1040T Given the size and significance of the federal- aid
highway program*s funding and projects, a key challenge for this program
is overseeing states*
expenditure of public funds to ensure that state projects are well managed
and successfully financed. Our work* as well as work by the DOT Inspector
General and by state audit and evaluation agencies* has documented cost
growth on numerous major highway and bridge projects. Let me provide one
example. In January 2001, Virginia*s Joint Legislative
Audit and Review Commission found that final project costs on Virginia
Department of Transportation projects were well above their cost estimates
and estimated that the state*s 6- year, $9 billion transportation
development plan understated the costs of projects by up to $3.5 billion.
The commission attributed these problems to several factors, including,
among other things, not adjusting estimates for inflation and expanding
the scope of projects.
Our work has identified weaknesses in FHWA*s oversight of projects,
especially in controlling costs. In 1997, we reported that cost
containment was not an explicit statutory or regulatory goal of FHWA*s
oversight. 7 While FHWA influenced the cost- effectiveness of projects
when it
reviewed and approved plans for their design and construction, we found it
had done little to ensure that cost containment was an integral part of
the states* project management. According to FHWA officials, controlling
costs was not a goal of their oversight, and FHWA had no mandate in law to
encourage or require practices to contain the costs of major highway
projects. More recently, an FHWA task force concluded that changes in the
agency*s oversight role since 1991* when the states assumed greater
responsibility for overseeing federal- aid projects* had resulted in
conflicting interpretations of the agency*s role in overseeing projects,
and that some of the field offices were taking a *hands off* approach to
certain projects. In June 2001, FHWA issued a policy memorandum, in part
to clarify that FHWA is ultimately accountable for all projects financed
with federal funds. As recently as last month, a memorandum posted on
FHWA*s Web site discussed the laws establishing FHWA and the federalaid
highway program, along with congressional and public expectations that
FHWA *ensure the validity of project cost estimates and schedules.* The
memorandum concluded, *These expectations may not be in full agreement
with the role that has been established by these laws.*
7 U. S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing
the Costs of Large- Dollar Highway Projects, GAO/ RCED- 97- 27 (Washington
D. C.: Feb. 27, 1997). Challenges
Page 9 GAO- 03- 1040T In addition, we have found that FHWA*s oversight
process has not promoted reliable cost estimates. While there are many
reasons for cost
increases, we have found, on projects we have reviewed, that initial cost
estimates were not reliable predictors of the total costs and financing
needs of projects. Rather, these estimates were generally developed for
the environmental review* whose purpose is to compare project
alternatives, not to develop reliable cost estimates. In addition, FHWA
had no standard requirements for preparing cost estimates, and each state
used its own methods and included different types of costs in its
estimates. We have also found that costs exceeded initial estimates on
projects we have reviewed because (1) initial estimates were modified to
reflect more detailed plans and specifications as projects were designed
and (2) the projects* costs were affected by, among other things,
inflation
and changes in scope to accommodate economic development over time. We
also found that highway projects take a long time to complete, and that
the amount of time spent on them is of concern to the Congress, the
federal government, and the states. Completing a major, new, federally
funded highway project that has significant environmental impacts
typically takes from 9 to 19 years and can entail as many as 200 major
steps requiring actions, approvals, or input from a number of federal,
state, and other stakeholders. 8 Finally, we have noted that in many
instances, states construct a major
project as a series of smaller projects, and FHWA approves the estimated
cost of each smaller project when it is ready for construction, rather
than agreeing to the total cost of the major project at the outset. In
some instances, by the time FHWA considers whether to approve the cost of
a major project, a public investment decision may, in effect, already have
been made because substantial funds have been spent on designing the
project and acquiring property, and many of the increases in the project*s
estimated costs have already occurred.
Since 1998, FHWA has taken a number of steps to improve the management and
oversight of major projects in order to better promote cost containment.
For example, FHWA implemented TEA- 21*s requirement that states develop an
annual finance plan for any highway or bridge
8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Highway Infrastructure: Stakeholders*
Views on Time to Conduct Environmental Reviews of Highway Projects, GAO-
03- 534 (Washington D. C.: May 2003). Strategies
Page 10 GAO- 03- 1040T project estimated to cost $1 billion or more and
established a major projects team that currently tracks and reports each
month on 15 such
projects. FHWA has also moved to incorporate greater risk- based
management into its oversight in order to identify areas of weakness
within state transportation programs, set priorities for improvement, and
work with the states to meet those priorities.
The administration*s May 2001 reauthorization measure contains additional
proposed actions. It would introduce more structured FHWA oversight
requirements, including mandatory annual reviews of state transportation
agencies* financial management and *project delivery* systems, as well as
periodic reviews of states* practices for estimating costs, awarding
contracts, and reducing project costs. To improve the quality and
reliability of cost estimates, it would introduce minimum federal
standards for states to use in estimating project costs. The measure would
also strengthen reporting requirements and take new actions to reduce
fraud. 9 Many elements of the administration*s proposal are responsive to
problems and options we have described in past reports and testimony. 10
Should the Congress determine that enhancing federal oversight of major
highway and bridge projects is needed and appropriate, options we have
identified in prior work remain available to build on the administration*s
proposal during the reauthorization process. However, adopting any of
these options would require balancing the states* right to select projects
and desire for flexibility and more autonomy with the federal government*s
interest in ensuring that billions of federal dollars are spent
efficiently and effectively. Furthermore, the additional costs of each of
these options would need to be weighed against its potential benefits.
Options include the following:
9 In particular, the measure requires states or project sponsors to
prepare a project management plan for projects estimated to cost $1
billion or more that would detail processes in place to provide timely
information needed to manage projects* scope, costs, schedule, and federal
requirements. It would also extend the requirement for annual finance
plans to projects receiving $100 million or more in federal funds,
although approval
of those plans could be delegated to the states. In addition, among other
provisions, the proposal would require mandatory debarment of contractors
convicted of fraud related to federal- aid highway or transit programs,
and the suspension of contractors indicted for fraud. 10 See, for example,
U. S. General Accounting Office, Federal- Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight
of Major Highway and Bridge Projects* Issues and Options, GAO- 03- 764T
(Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2003); GAO- 02- 702T; and GAO/ RCED- 97- 27.
Page 11 GAO- 03- 1040T Have FHWA develop and maintain a management
information system on the cost performance of selected major highway and
bridge projects,
including changes in estimated costs over time and the reasons for such
changes. Such information could help define the scope of the problem with
major projects and provide insights needed to fashion appropriate
solutions.
Clarify uncertainties concerning FHWA*s role and authority. As I
mentioned earlier, the federal- aid highway program is by law a federally
assisted state program, and FHWA continues to question its authority to
encourage or require practices to contain the costs of major highway and
bridge projects. Should uncertainties about FHWA*s role and authority
continue, another option would be to resolve the uncertainties through
reauthorization language.
Have the states track the progress of projects against their initial
baseline cost estimates. The Office of Management and Budget requires
federal agencies, for acquisitions of major capital assets, to prepare
baseline cost and schedule estimates and to track and report the
acquisitions* cost performance. These requirements apply to programs
managed by and acquisitions made by federal agencies, but they do not
apply to the federalaid highway program, a federally assisted state
program. Expanding the federal government*s practice to the federally
assisted highway program could improve the management of major projects by
providing managers
with information for identifying and addressing problems early.
Establish performance goals and strategies for containing costs as
projects
move through their design and construction phases. Such performance goals
could provide financial or other incentives to the states for meeting
agreed- upon goals. Performance provisions such as these have been
established in other federally assisted grant programs and have also been
proposed for use in the federal- aid highway program. Requiring or
encouraging the use of goals and strategies could also improve
accountability and make cost containment an integral part of how states
manage projects over time.
Consider methods for improving the time it takes to plan and construct
major federal- aid highway projects* a process that we reported can take
up to 19 years to complete. Major stakeholders suggested several
approaches to improving the timeliness of these projects, including (1)
improving project management, (2) delegating environmental review and
permitting authority, and (3) improving agency staffing and skills. We
have
recommended that FHWA consider the benefits of the most promising
Page 12 GAO- 03- 1040T approaches and act to foster the adoption of the
most cost- effective and feasible approaches. 11 Reexamine the approval
process for major highway and bridge projects.
This option, which would require federal approval of a major project at
the outset, including its cost estimate and finance plan, would be the
most farreaching and the most difficult option to implement. Potential
models for such a process include the full funding grant agreement used by
FTA for the New Starts program, and, as I testified last year, a DOT task
force*s December 2000 recommendation calling for the establishment of a
separate funding category for initial design work and a new decision point
for advancing highway projects. 12 Over the last 25 years, more than 1.2
million people have died as a result of traffic crashes in the United
States* more than 42,000 in 2002. Since 1982,
about 40 percent of traffic deaths were from alcohol- related crashes. In
addition, traffic crashes are the leading cause of death for people aged 4
though 33. As figure 2 shows, the total number of traffic fatalities has
not significantly decreased in recent years.
11 GAO- 03- 534; GAO- 03- 398; GAO- 02- 1067T. 12 GAO- 02- 702T. NHTSA
Makes
Inconsistent and Limited Use of Oversight Tools
Page 13 GAO- 03- 1040T Figure 2: Total Traffic Fatalities and Fatality
Rate, 1975- 2002
To improve safety on the nation*s highways, NHTSA administers a number of
programs, including the core federally funded highway safety program,
Section 402 State and Community Grants, and several other highway safety
programs that were authorized in 1998 by TEA- 21. The Section 402 program,
established in 1966, makes grants available for each state, based on a
population and road mileage formula, to carry out traffic safety programs
designed to influence drivers* behavior, commonly called behavioral safety
programs. The TEA- 21 programs include seven incentive programs, which are
designed to reduce traffic deaths and injuries by promoting seatbelt use
and reducing alcohol- impaired driving, and two transfer programs, which
penalize states that have not complied with federal requirements for
enacting repeat- offender and open container laws to limit alcohol-
impaired driving. Under these transfer programs, noncompliant states are
required to shift certain funds from federal- aid highway programs to
projects that concern or improve highway safety. In addition, subsequent
to TEA- 21, the Congress required that, starting later this year, states
that do not meet federal requirements for establishing 0.08 blood alcohol
content as the state level for drunk driving will have a
percentage of their federal aid highway funds withheld. During fiscal
years 1998 through 2002, over $2 billion was provided to the states for
highway safety programs.
Page 14 GAO- 03- 1040T NHTSA, which oversees the states* highway safety
programs, adopted a performance- based approach to oversight in 1998.
Under this approach,
the states and the federal government are to work together to make the
nation*s highways safer. Each state sets its own safety performance goals
and develops an annual safety plan that describes projects designed to
achieve the goals. NHTSA*s 10 regional offices review the states* annual
plans and provide technical assistance, advice, and comments. 13 NHTSA has
two tools available to strengthen its monitoring and oversight of the
state programs* improvement plans that states not making progress towards
their highway safety goals are to develop, which identify programs and
activities that a state and NHTSA regional office will undertake to help
the state meet its goals; and management reviews, which generally involve
sending a team to a state to review its highway safety operations, examine
its projects, and determine that it is using funds in accordance with
requirements.
Among the key challenges in this area are (1) evaluating how well the
federally funded state highway safety programs are meeting their goals and
(2) determining how well the states are spending and controlling their
federal highway safety funds. In April 2003, we issued a report on NHTSA*s
oversight of state highway safety programs in which we identified
weaknesses in NHTSA*s use of improvement plans and management reviews. 14
Evaluating how well state highway safety programs are meeting their goals
is difficult because, under NHTSA*s performance- based oversight approach,
NHTSA*s guidance does not establish a consistent means of measuring
progress. Although the guidance states that NHTSA can require the
development and implementation of an improvement plan when a state fails
to make progress toward its highway safety performance
goals, the guidance does not establish specific criteria for evaluating
progress. Rather, the guidance simply states that an improvement plan
should be developed when a state is making little or no progress toward
its highway safety goals. As a result, NHTSA*s regional offices have made
limited and inconsistent use of improvement plans, and some states do not
have improvement plans, even though their alcohol- related fatality rates
13 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration also has an oversight
role in highway safety for motor carrier transportation. 14 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Highway Safety: Better Guidance Could Improve Oversight
of State Highway Safety Programs, GAO- 03- 474 (Washington, D. C.: Apr.
21, 2003). Challenges
Page 15 GAO- 03- 1040T have increased or their seat- belt usage rates have
declined. Without a consistent means of measuring progress, NHTSA and
state officials lack common expectations about how to define progress, how
long states
should have to demonstrate progress, how to set and measure highway safety
goals, and when improvement plans should be used to help states meet their
highway safety goals.
To determine how well the states are spending and controlling their
federal highway safety funds, NHTSA*s regional offices can conduct
management reviews of state highway safety programs. Management reviews
completed in 2001 and 2002 identified weaknesses in states* highway safety
programs that needed correction; however, we found that the regional
offices were inconsistent in conducting the reviews because NHTSA*s
guidance does not specify when the reviews should be conducted. The
identified weaknesses included problems with monitoring subgrantees, poor
coordination of programs, financial control problems,
and large unexpended fund balances. Such weaknesses, if not addressed,
could lead to inefficient or unauthorized uses of federal funds. According
to NHTSA officials, management reviews also foster productive
relationships with the states that allow the agency*s regional offices to
work with the states to correct vulnerabilities. These regions* ongoing
involvement with the states also creates opportunities for sharing and
encouraging the implementation of best practices, which may then lead to
more effective safety programs and projects.
To encourage more consistent use of improvement plans and management
reviews, we made recommendations to improve the guidance to NHTSA*s
regional offices on when it is appropriate to use these oversight tools.
In commenting on a draft of the report, NHTSA officials agreed with our
recommendations and said they had begun taking action to develop criteria
and guidance for using the tools.
The administration*s recent proposal to reauthorize TEA- 21 would make
some changes to the safety programs that could also have some impact on
program efficiencies. For example, the proposal would somewhat simplify
the current grant structure for NHTSA*s highway safety programs. The
Section 402 program would have four components: core program formula
grants, safety belt performance grants, general performance grants, and
impaired driving discretionary grants. The safety belt performance grants
would provide funds to states that had passed primary safety belt laws or
achieved 90 percent safety belt usage. In addition, the general
performance grant would provide funds based on overall reductions in (1)
motor Strategies
Page 16 GAO- 03- 1040T vehicle fatalities, (2) alcohol- related
fatalities, and (3) motorcycle, bicycle, and pedestrian fatalities.
Finally, the Section 402 program would have an impaired driving
discretionary grant component, which would target funds
to up to 10 states that had the highest impaired driving fatality numbers
or fatality rates. In addition to changing the Section 402 program, the
proposal would expand grants for highway safety information systems and
create new emergency medical service grants. The proposal leaves intact
existing penalties related to open container, repeat offender, and 0.08
blood- alcohol content laws, and establishes a new transfer penalty for
states that fail to pass a primary safety belt law and have safety belt
use rates lower than 90 percent by 2005.
The proposal would also give the states greater flexibility in using their
highway safety funds. A state could move up to half its highway safety
construction funds from the Highway Safety Improvement Program into the
core Section 402 program. A state would also be able to use 100 percent of
its safety belt performance grants for construction purposes if it had a
primary safety belt law, or 50 percent if the grant was based on high
safety belt use. States could also use up to 50 percent of their general
performance grants for safety construction purposes. The New Starts
transit program identifies and funds fixed guideway projects, including
rail, bus rapid transit, trolley, and ferry projects. The New Starts
program provides much of the federal government*s investment in urban mass
transportation. TEA- 21 and subsequent amendments authorized approximately
$10 billion for New Starts projects for fiscal years 1998 through 2003.
The administration*s proposal for the surface transportation
reauthorization, known as the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA), requests that about $9.5
billion be made available for the New Starts program for fiscal years 2004
through 2009.
Unlike the federal highway program and certain transit programs, under
which funds are automatically distributed to states on the basis of
formulas, the New Starts program requires local transit agencies to
compete for New Starts project funds on the basis of specific financial
and project justification criteria. To obtain New Starts funds, a project
must progress through a regional review of alternatives, develop
preliminary engineering plans, and meet FTA*s approval for final design.
FTA assesses the technical merits of a project proposal and its finance
plan and then notifies the Congress that it intends to commit New Starts
funding to certain projects through full funding grant agreements. The
agreement The New Starts Transit Program Has
Faced Challenges in Selection and Oversight of Projects and Has Taken
Steps to Address these Challenges
Page 17 GAO- 03- 1040T establishes the terms and conditions for federal
participation in the project, including the maximum amount of federal
funds* no more than
80 percent of the estimated net cost of the project. 15 While the grant
agreement commits the federal government to providing the federal
contributions to the project over a number of years, these contributions
are subject to the annual appropriations process. State or local sources
provide the remaining funding. The grantee is responsible for all costs
exceeding the federal share, unless the agreement is amended.
To meet the nation*s transportation needs, many states and localities are
planning or building large New Starts projects to replace aging
infrastructure or build new capacity. They are often costly and require
large commitments of public resources, which may take several years to
obtain from federal, state, and local sources. The projects can also be
technically challenging to construct and require their sponsors to resolve
a wide range of social, environmental, land- use, and economic issues
before and during construction.
It is critical that federal and other transportation officials meet two
particular challenges that stem from the costly and lengthy federal
funding commitment associated with New Starts projects. First, they must
have a sound basis for evaluating and selecting projects. Because many
transit projects compete for limited federal transit dollars* there are
currently 52 projects in the New Starts *pipeline** and FTA awards
relatively few full funding grant agreements each year, it is crucial that
local governments choose the most promising projects as candidates for New
Starts funds and that FTA uses a process that effectively selects those
projects that most clearly meet the program*s goals.
Second, FTA, like FHWA, has the challenge of overseeing the planning,
development, and construction of selected projects to ensure they remain
on schedule and within budget, and deliver their expected performance. In
the early 1990s, we designated the transit grants management oversight
program as high risk because it was vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and
15 In response to language contained in a conference report prepared by
the House Appropriations Committee, FTA adopted a 60 percent preference
policy, which in effect generally reduced the level of New Starts federal
funding share for projects from 80
percent to 60 percent. Challenges
Page 18 GAO- 03- 1040T mismanagement. 16 While we have removed it from the
high- risk designation because of improvements FTA has made to this
program, we
have found that major transit projects continue to experience costs and
schedule problems. For example, in August, 1999, we reported that 6 of the
14 transit projects with full funding grant agreements had experienced
cost increases, and 3 of those projects had experienced cost increases
that were more than 25 percent over the estimates approved by FTA in grant
agreements. 17 The key reasons for the increases included (1) higher than
anticipated contract costs, (2) schedule delays, and (3) project scope
changes and system enhancements. A recent testimony by the Department of
Transportation*s Inspector General indicates that major transit projects
continue to experience significant problems including cost increases,
financing problems, schedule delays, and technical or construction
difficulties. 18 FTA has developed strategies to address the twin
challenges of selecting the right projects and monitoring their
implementation costs, schedule,
and performance. First, in response to direction in TEA- 21, FTA developed
a systematic process for evaluating and rating potential New Starts
projects competing for federal funding. 19 Under this process, FTA assigns
individual ratings for a variety of financial and project justification
criteria and then assigns an overall rating of highly recommended,
recommended,
not recommended, or not rated. These criteria reflect a broad range of
benefits and effects of the proposed projects, including capital and
operating finance plans, mobility improvements, environmental benefits,
operating efficiencies, cost- effectiveness, land use, and other factors.
According to FTA*s New Starts regulations, a project must have an overall
rating of at least *recommended* to receive a grant agreement. FTA also
considers a number of other *readiness* factors before proposing funding
16 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Evaluating, Overseeing,
and Funding Major Transit Projects (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 104, Washington, DC:
Mar. 8, 2000). 17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Status of
New Starts Transit Projects With Full Funding Grant Agreements, GAO/ RCED-
99- 240 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 19,
1999). 18 See U. S. Department of Transportation, Statement of the
Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, Management of Large Highway
and Transit Projects (Washington, D. C.: May 1, 2002).
19 The exceptions to the ratings process are projects that are statutorily
exempt because they request less than $25 million in New Starts funding.
Strategies
Page 19 GAO- 03- 1040T for a project. For example, FTA proposes funding
only for projects that are expected to enter the final design phase and be
ready for grant
agreements within the next fiscal year. Figure 3 illustrates the New
Starts evaluation and ratings process.
Figure 3: New Starts Evaluation and Ratings Process
Note: According to FTA, the optional criterion of *other factors* gives
grantees the opportunity to provide additional information about the
likelihood of a project*s overall success.
While FTA has made substantial progress in establishing a systematic
process for evaluating and rating potential projects, our work has raised
some concerns about the process. For example, to assist FTA in
prioritizing projects to ensure that the relatively few full funding grant
agreements go to the most important projects, we recommended in March 2000
that FTA further prioritize the projects that it rates as highly
recommended or recommended and ready for New Starts funds. 20 FTA has not
implemented this recommendation. We believe that this recommendation is
still valid because the funding requested for the many
20 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in
Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding Major Transit Projects, GAO/ T- RCED-
00- 104 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 8, 2000).
Page 20 GAO- 03- 1040T projects that are expected to compete for grant
agreements over the next several years is likely to exceed the available
federal dollars. A further
concern about the ratings process stems from FTA*s decision during the
fiscal year 2004 cycle to propose a project for a full funding grant
agreement that had been assigned an overall project rating of *not rated,*
even though FTA*s regulations require that projects have at least a
*recommended* rating to receive a grant agreement. 21 Finally, we found
that FTA needs to provide clearer information and additional guidance
about certain changes it made to the evaluation and ratings process for
the fiscal year 2004 cycle. 22 In work that addressed the challenge of
overseeing ongoing projects once
they are selected to receive a full funding grant agreement, we reported
in March and September 2000 that FTA had improved the quality of the
transit grants management oversight program through strategies that
included upgrading its guidance and training of staff and grantees,
developing standardized oversight procedures, and employing contractor
staff to strengthen its oversight of grantees. FTA also expanded its
oversight efforts to include a formal and rigorous assessment of a
grantee*s financial capacity to build and operate a new project and of the
financial impact of that project on the existing transit system. These
assessments, performed by independent accounting firms, are completed
before FTA commits funds for construction and are updated as needed until
projects are completed. For projects that already have grant agreements,
FTA focuses on the grantee*s ability to finish the project on time and
within the budget established by the grant agreement.
The administration*s fiscal year 2004 budget proposal contains three New
Starts initiatives* reducing the maximum federal statutory share to 50
percent, allowing non- fixed- guideway projects to be funded through New
Starts, and replacing the *exempt* classification with a streamlined
ratings 21 According to FTA officials, this project could not be rated
because its local travel forecasting data and models did not support
calculation of a new benefits measure required for the fiscal year 2004
cycle. The officials told us that they decided to select this project for
a proposed grant agreement because they believed that the data problems
would be corrected, and the project would be able to achieve a
*recommended* rating and be ready for a grant agreement by the end of
fiscal year 2004. They said that other proposed projects that received
overall ratings of *recommended* or higher would not be ready at that
time. 22 U. S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: FTA Needs to
Provide Clear Information
and Additional Guidance on the New Starts Ratings Process, GAO- 03- 701
(Washington, D. C.: June 23, 2003).
Page 21 GAO- 03- 1040T process for projects requesting less than $75
million in New Starts funding. These proposed initiatives have advantages
and disadvantages, with
implications for the cost- effectiveness and performance of proposed
projects. First, the reduced federal funding would require local
communities to increase their funding share, creating more incentive for
them to propose the most cost- effective projects; however, localities
might have difficulties generating the increased funding share, and this
initiative could result in funding inequities for transit projects when
compared with highway projects. Second, allowing non- fixed guideway
projects to be funded under New Starts would give local communities more
flexibility in choosing among transit modes and might promote the use of
bus rapid transit, whose costs compare favorably with those of light rail
systems; 23 however, this initiative would change the original fixed
guideway
emphasis of New Starts, which some project sponsors we interviewed believe
might disadvantage traditional New Starts projects. Finally, replacing the
*exempt* classification with a streamlined rating process for all projects
requesting less than $75 million might promote greater performance-
oriented evaluation since all projects would receive a rating. However,
this initiative might reduce the number of smaller communities that would
participate in the New Starts program. The Congress established the
Essential Air Service (EAS) program as part
of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The act guaranteed that
communities served by air carriers before deregulation would continue to
receive a certain level of scheduled air service. Special provisions
guaranteed service to Alaskan communities. In general, the act guaranteed
continued service by authorizing DOT to require carriers to continue
providing service at these communities. If an air carrier could not
continue that service without incurring a loss, DOT could then use EAS
funds to award that carrier a subsidy. Subsidies are to cover the
difference between a carrier*s projected revenues and expenses and to
provide a minimum
amount of profit. Under the Airline Deregulation Act, the EAS program was
intended to sunset, or end, after 10 years. In 1987, the Congress extended
the program for another 10 years, and in 1998, it eliminated the sunset
provision, thereby permanently authorizing EAS.
To be eligible for subsidized service, a community must meet three general
requirements. It must have received scheduled commercial passenger 23 GAO-
03- 729T. DOT*s Essential Air
Service Program Faces Possible Program Modifications Due to Changing
Conditions
Page 22 GAO- 03- 1040T service as of October 1978, may be no closer than
70 highway miles to a medium- or large- hub airport, and must require a
subsidy of less than $200
per person (unless the community is more than 210 highway miles from the
nearest medium- or large- hub airport, in which case no average
perpassenger dollar limit applies). 24 Funding for the EAS program comes
from a combination of permanent
and annual appropriations. Part of its funding comes from the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P. L. 104- 264), which authorized
the collection of user fees for services provided by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to aircraft that neither take off nor land in the
United States, commonly known as overflight fees. The act also permanently
appropriated the first $50 million of such fees for EAS and safety
projects at rural airports. In fiscal year 2003, total EAS program
appropriations were $113 million.
As the airline industry has evolved since the industry was deregulated in
1978, the EAS program has faced increasing challenges to remain viable.
Since fiscal year 1995, the program*s costs have tripled, rising from $37
million to $113 million, and they are likely to continue escalating.
Several factors are likely to affect future subsidy requirements. First,
carriers* operating costs have increased over time, in part because of the
costs associated with meeting federal safety regulations for small
aircraft beginning in 1996. Second, carriers* revenues have been limited
because many individuals traveling to or from EAS- subsidized communities
choose not to fly from the local airport, but rather to use other larger
nearby airports, which generally offer more service at lower airfares. On
average, in 2000, each EAS flight operated with just over 3 passengers.
Finally, the number of communities eligible for EAS subsidies has
increased over time, rising from a total of 106 in 1995 to 114 in July
2002 (79 in the continental United States and 35 in Alaska, Hawaii, and
Puerto Rico) and again to 133 in April 2003 (96 in the continental United
States
24 The nation*s commercial airports are categorized into four main
groupings based on the number of passengers boarding an aircraft
(enplaned) for all operations of U. S. carriers in the United States. A
nonhub has less than 0.05 percent of the total annual passenger
enplanements in the United States in any given year. A small hub has at
least 0.05 percent, but less than 0.25 percent, of total enplanements. A
medium hub has at least 0.25 percent and less than 1.0 percent of total U.
S. enplanements, and a large hub has 1. 0 percent or more of total U. S.
enplanements. These definitions are contained in statute. Challenges
Page 23 GAO- 03- 1040T and 37 in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico). The
number of subsidy- eligible communities may continue to grow in the near
term. Figure 4 shows the increase in the number of communities eligible
for EAS- subsidized service
between 1995 and April 2003.
Figure 4: Increase in EAS- Subsidized Communities between 1995 and April
2003
Note: Data for April 2003 show the number of communities receiving EAS-
subsidized service and those where proposed subsidies are under
negotiation.
Over the past year, the Congress, the administration, and we have each
identified a number of potential strategies generally aimed at enhancing
the EAS program*s long- term sustainability. These strategies broadly
address challenges related to the carriers* cost of providing service and
the passenger traffic and revenue that carriers can hope to accrue.
In August 2002, in response to a congressional mandate, we identified and
evaluated four major categories of options to enhance the long- term
Strategies
Page 24 GAO- 03- 1040T viability of the EAS program. 25 In no particular
order, the options we identified were as follows:
Better match capacity with community use by increasing the use of
smaller (i. e., less costly) aircraft and restricting little- used flight
frequencies.
Target subsidized service to more remote communities (i. e., those where
passengers are less likely to drive to another airport) by changing
eligibility criteria.
Consolidate service to multiple communities into regional airports.
Change the form of the federal assistance from carrier subsidies to local
grants that would allow local communities to match their transportation
needs with individually tailored transportation options.
Each of these options could have positive and negative effects, such as
lowering the program*s costs but possibly adversely affecting the
economies of the communities that would lose some or all of their direct
scheduled airline service.
This year*s House- passed version of the FAA reauthorization bill, H. R.
2115, also includes various options to restructure air service to small
communities now served by the EAS program. The bill proposes an
alternative program (the *community and regional choice program*), which
would allow communities to opt out of the EAS program and receive a grant
that they could use to establish and pay for their own service, whether
scheduled air service, air taxi service, surface transportation, or
another alternative.
The complementary Senate FAA reauthorization bill (also H. R. 2115) also
includes specific provisions designed to restructure the EAS program. This
bill would set aside some funds for air service marketing to try to
attract passengers and create a grant program under which up to 10
individual communities or a consortium of communities could opt out of the
existing EAS program and try alternative approaches to improving air
service. In addition, the bill would preclude DOT from terminating, before
the end of
25 U. S. General Accounting Office, Options to Enhance the Long- term
Viability of the Essential Air Service Program, GAO- 02- 997R (Washington,
D. C.: Aug. 30, 2002).
Page 25 GAO- 03- 1040T 2004, a community*s eligibility for an EAS subsidy
because of decreased passenger ridership and revenue.
The administration*s proposal would generally restrict appropriations to
the $50 million from overflight fees and would require communities to help
pay the costs of funding their service. The proposal would also allow
communities to fund transportation options other than scheduled air
service, such as on- demand *air taxis* or ground transportation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you or other members of the Committee may have.
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact JayEtta
Hecker at (202) 512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony included Robert Ciszewski, Steven Cohen, Elizabeth Eisenstadt,
Rita Grieco, Steven Martin, Katherine Siggerud, Glen Trochelman, and
Alwynne Wilbur. Contact and
Acknowledgments
Page 26 GAO- 03- 1040T Federal- Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major
Highway and Bridge Projects* Issues and Options. GAO- 03- 764T.
Washington, D. C.:
May 8, 2003. Transportation Infrastructure Cost and Oversight Issues on
Major Highway and Bridge Projects. GAO- 02- 673. Washington, D. C.: May 1,
2002.
Surface Infrastructure: Costs, Financing, and Schedules for Large- Dollar
Transportation Projects. GAO/ RCED- 98- 64. Washington, D. C.: February
12, 1998.
DOT*s Budget: Management and Performance Issues Facing the Department in
Fiscal Year 1999. GAO/ T- RCED/ AIMD- 98- 76. Washington, D. C.: February
12, 1998.
Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large- Dollar Highway
Projects. GAO/ RCED- 97- 27. Washington, D. C.: February 27, 1997.
Transportation Infrastructure: Progress on and Challenges to Central
Artery/ Tunnel Project*s Costs and Financing. GAO/ RCED- 97- 170.
Washington, D. C.: July 17, 1997.
Transportation Infrastructure: Central Artery/ Tunnel Project Faces
Financial Uncertainties. GAO/ RCED- 96- 1313. Washington, D. C.: May 10,
1996.
Central Artery/ Tunnel Project. GAO/ RCED- 95- 213R. Washington, D. C.:
June 2, 1995. Highway Safety: Research Continues on a Variety of Factors
That
Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes. GAO- 03- 436. Washington, D. C.:
March 31, 2003.
Highway Safety: Better Guidance Could Improve Oversight of State Highway
Safety Programs. GAO- 03- 474. Washington, D. C.: April 21, 2003. Highway
Safety: Factors Contributing to Traffic Crashes and NHTSA*s
Efforts to Address Them. GAO- 03- 730T. Washington, D. C.: May 22, 2003.
Appendix 1: Related GAO Products
Federal- Aid Highways Highway Safety
Page 27 GAO- 03- 1040T Federal Transit Administration: Bus Rapid Transit
Offers Communities a Flexible Mass Transit Option. GAO- 03- 729T.
Washington, D. C.: June 24, 2003.
Mass Transit: FTA Needs to Provide Clear Information and Additional
Guidance on the New Starts Ratings Process. GAO- 03- 701. Washington, D.
C.: June 23, 2003.
Mass Transit: FTA*s New Starts Commitments for Fiscal Year 2003.
GAO- 02- 603. Washington, D. C.: April 30, 2002.
Mass Transit: FTA Could Relieve New Starts Program Funding Constraints.
GAO- 01- 987. Washington, D. C.: August 15, 2001. Mass Transit: Project
Management Oversight Benefits and Future
Funding Requirements. GAO/ RCED- 99- 240. Washington, D. C.: August 19,
1999.
Mass Transit: Implementation of FTA*s New Starts Evaluation Process and FY
2001 Funding Proposals. GAO/ RCED- 00- 149. Washington, D. C.: April 28,
2000.
Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding Major
Transit Projects. GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 104. Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2000.
Mass Transit: Status of New Starts Transit Projects With Full Funding
Grant Agreements, GAO/ RCED- 99- 240. Washington, D. C.: Aug. 19, 1999.
Mass Transit: FTA*s Progress in Developing and Implementing a New Starts
Evaluation Process. GAO/ RCED- 99- 113. Washington, D. C.: April 26, 1999.
Commercial Aviation: Issues Regarding Federal Assistance for Enhancing Air
Service to Small Communities. GAO- 03- 540T. Washington, D. C.: March 11,
2003.
Commercial Aviation: Factors Affecting Efforts to Improve Air Service at
Small Community Airports. GAO- 03- 330. Washington, D. C.: January 17,
2003.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect
Competition. GAO- 03- 171T. Washington, D. C.: October 2, 2002. Mass
Transit
Essential Air Service
Page 28 GAO- 03- 1040T Options to Enhance the Long- term Viability of the
Essential Air Service Program. GAO- 02- 997R. Washington, D. C.: Aug. 30,
2002.
Commercial Aviation: Air Service Trends at Small Communities Since October
2000. GAO- 02- 432. Washington, D. C.: August 30, 2002.
Essential Air Service: Changes in Passenger Traffic, Subsidy Levels, and
Air Carrier Costs. T- RCED- 00- 185. Washington, D. C.: May 25, 2000.
Essential Air Service: Changes in Subsidy Levels, Air Carrier Costs, and
Passenger Traffic. RCED- 00- 34. Washington, D. C.: April 14, 2000.
(544079)
This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm
of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of
the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of
public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail
this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select
*Subscribe to e- mail alerts* under the *Order GAO Products* heading.
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to: U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D. C. 20548 To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000
TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202) 512- 6061
Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470 Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512-
4800
U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548 GAO*s Mission Obtaining Copies of
GAO Reports and Testimony
Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***