Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along With Key Strategic 
Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program	 
(05-SEP-03, GAO-03-1031).					 
                                                                 
Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization  
Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001,
the program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade 
long trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended 
planned milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond	 
the 1998 estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to
(1) examine the effect that recent organization changes have had 
on program performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the	 
Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1031					        
    ACCNO:   A08330						        
  TITLE:     Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along With Key   
Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction 
Program 							 
     DATE:   09/05/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Chemical and biological agents			 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     International agreements				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Chemical Weapons Convention			 
	     DOD Chemical Demilitarization Program		 

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GAO-03-1031

Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

September 2003 CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed
to Guide DOD*s Destruction Program

GAO- 03- 1031

The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number
of long- standing leadership, organizational, and strategic planning
issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership at the upper
management levels. For example, the program has had frequent turnover in
the leadership providing oversight. Further, recent reorganizations have
done little to reduce the complex and fragmented organization of the
program. As a result, roles and responsibilities are often unclear and
program actions are not always coordinated. Finally, the absence of a
comprehensive strategy leaves the program without a clear road map and
methods to monitor program performance. Without these key elements, DOD
and the Army have no assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the
chemical stockpile in a safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates.

DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and exceeded
cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost estimates by $1.2
billion, with other factors still to be considered. Almost all of the
incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones because of schedule
delays due to environmental, safety, community relations, and funding
issues. Although neutralization sites have not missed milestones, they
have had delays. DOD and the Army have not developed an approach to
anticipate and influence issues that could adversely impact program
schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and the Army adopt a risk
management approach, the program remains at great risk of missing
milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also likely incur rising costs and
prolong the public*s exposure to the chemical stockpile. Comparison of
1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates

Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization Program
cost and

schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the program underwent a
major reorganization. Following a decade long trend of missed schedule
milestones, in

September 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule,
which extended planned milestones and increased program cost estimates
beyond the 1998 estimate of $15 billion to

$24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine the effect that recent
organization changes have had on program performance and

(2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in meeting the revised
2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines.

GAO recommends that DOD develop an overall strategy for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program that would articulate the program*s

mission, identify the long- term goals and objectives, delineate the roles
and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish near- term
performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk management
approach that anticipates and

influences internal and external factors that could adversely impact
program performance. DOD concurred with GAO*s recommendations and said it
is taking steps to implement them.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1031. To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Ray Decker at (202) 512- 6020. Highlights of GAO- 03-
1031, a report to

congressional committees

September 2003

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed
to Guide DOD*s Destruction Program

Page i GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons Letter 1 Results in Brief 3
Background 4 Long- Standing Management and Organization Weaknesses

Continue to Hamper Program Progress 12 Most Sites Will Miss Schedule
Milestones due to Program*s Inability to Anticipate and Influence Issues
18 Conclusions 24 Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation 26 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28

Appendix II Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status 30

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35

Related GAO Products 37

Tables

Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and
Percentage of Original Stockpile 6 Table 2: CWC Deadlines 6 Table 3:
Comparison of DOD*s 1998 and 2001 Milestones for

Starting and Finishing Agent Destruction Operations 9 Table 4: Transfer of
Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and the Army, 1986- Present
13 Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the
Army, 1986- Present 15 Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone
Dates, by Incineration Site 19 Contents

Page ii GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration
Sites 21 Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities 33 Figure

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates 10
Abbreviations

ACWA Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment CMA Chemical Materials Agency
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program CWC Chemical
Weapons Convention

DOD Department of Defense FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

This is a work of the U. S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this
work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material
separately.

Page 1 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

September 5, 2003 The Honorable John Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl
Levin Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The United States, along with many other countries, is committed to
ridding the world of chemical weapons. In fiscal year 1986, Congress
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the nation*s chemical
weapons stockpile in a safe manner, and DOD designated the Army to set up
and operate the demilitarization program. On an international level, the
United States and more than 150 countries since 1997 have become parties
to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits the use of these
weapons and mandates a deadline of April 2007 to destroy the existing
stockpiles. 1 With the events of September 11, 2001, heightened concerns
over weapons of mass destruction have further raised the awareness of
these chemical weapons and their potential danger to the public.

Since its inception, DOD*s Chemical Demilitarization Program has been
plagued by frequent schedule delays, cost overruns, and continuing
management problems. In 2001, DOD and the Army 2 once again undertook

1 In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical
Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, Apr. 24, 1997. 2 DOD reorganized the
program by elevating its oversight while the Army consolidated functions
at the Assistant Secretary level (Installations and Environment).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

a major reorganization of the program*s complex management structure and
revised its schedule, extending the projected milestones beyond the 2007
CWC deadline. The revisions also increased the estimated costs for
destroying the chemical weapons stockpile by 60 percent, from $15 billion
to $24 billion. Because DOD and the Army have had long- term problems in
meeting past schedule milestones and are now entering a demanding phase of
the program* the planned start of agent destruction operations at multiple
sites, using both incineration and alternative (neutralization)

technologies* there are growing concerns in Congress over DOD*s ability to
accomplish its mission.

In the House Report to the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization budget,
3 Congress mandated that we review and assess the management and status of
the program. In February 2003, we briefed your staffs on our preliminary
findings. As agreed with your offices, this report (1) examines the effect
that recent organizational changes have had on the program*s performance
and (2) assesses the progress that DOD and the Army have made in meeting
the revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and the 2007 CWC deadline.

Leading organizations embrace principles for effectively implementing and
managing programs. Some key aspects of these principles include
promulgating a comprehensive mission statement, long- term and annual
performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation and
corrective action plans. Combined with effective leadership, these
principles provide decision makers with a means to manage risk, understand
a program*s evolution and implementation, and determine whether
initiatives are achieving their desired results.

In assessing the program*s management performance, we compared the
elements of program management documents to the general tenets and
management principles, such as those supported by the Government
Performance and Results Act, to determine if the program has a framework
to produce results. We also compared previous and current program
organizational structures and obtained a rationale for changes from
program officials and documents to determine if lines of authority were
clear and if roles and responsibilities were articulated. To assess

3 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, H. R.
Rept. No. 107- 436, May 3, 2002.

Page 3 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

DOD*s progress in meeting revised schedule and cost estimates, we reviewed
current program estimates, destruction schedules, CWC provisions, and
other documents. We determined issues that had caused delays and
ascertained approaches being used to reduce the potential for

delays in the future. We also met with DOD and Army program officials and
interviewed officials at several destruction sites and state environmental
offices. We conducted our review from August 2002 to June 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix
I.

While DOD and the Army have recently initiated some organizational changes
in the Chemical Demilitarization Program, the program remains in turmoil,
affecting management performance because of long- standing and unresolved
leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues. The lack of
sustained leadership at both the upper levels of oversight and at the
program- manager level confuses the decision- making authority and
obscures accountability. 4 Moreover, the recent reorganization has done
little to reduce the program*s complex management structure. It continues
to have multiple lines of management authority within the Army and

separation of program components between the Army and DOD. These
separations leave roles and responsibilities for the different parts of
the program unclear. Finally, the absence of an overarching, comprehensive
strategy has left the program without a clear, top- level road map to
closely guide and integrate all activities and to monitor program
performance. Without key elements such as effective leadership,

streamlined organization structure, and important management tools
including strategic planning, DOD and the Army have no assurances that
they will be able to meet the program*s principal goal* to destroy the

chemical stockpile in a safe manner and by the Chemical Weapons Convention
2007 deadline.

The program has missed most schedule milestones and cost estimates
following a decade long trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites will
miss the DOD- approved 2001 schedule milestones because of substantial
delays that stem primarily from a number of problems that DOD and the Army
have not been able to anticipate or influence. These problems include

4 For purposes of this report, upper level refers to the offices of the
assistant secretary or above in the Departments of the Army and Defense.
Results in Brief

Page 4 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

plant safety issues, difficulties in meeting environmental permitting
requirements, public concerns about emergency preparedness plans, and
budgeting shortfalls. Although the neutralization sites have not missed
their milestones yet, they too have experienced delays. Program officials
told us that they have already raised preliminary total program cost
estimates by $1.2 billion, and other factors, yet to be considered, could
raise these estimates even more. DOD and the Army have not developed

an approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could
adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Until DOD and the
Army adopt a comprehensive risk management approach, the program remains
at great risk of not meeting its schedule milestones and the Chemical
Weapons Convention deadline, leading to rising costs and unnecessarily
prolonging the potential risk to the public associated with the storage of
the chemical stockpile.

We are recommending that DOD develop an overall strategy for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program that would articulate the program*s mission,
identify the long- term goals and objectives, delineate the roles and
responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish near- term
performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk management
approach that anticipates and influences internal and external factors
that could adversely impact program performance.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and said it is taking steps to implement them.

In fiscal year 1986, Congress directed DOD to destroy the U. S. stockpile
of lethal chemical agents and munitions. 5 DOD designated the Department
of the Army as its executive agent for the program, and the Army
established the Chemical Demilitarization (or Chem- Demil) Program, which
was charged with the destruction of the stockpile at nine storage sites.
Incineration was selected as the method to destroy the stockpile. 6 In
1988, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) was

created to enhance the emergency management and response capabilities of
communities near the storage sites in case of an accident; the Army and

5 The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, P. L.
99- 145 (Nov. 8, 1985), sec. 1412( a). 6 The Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization was originally referred to as the U. S. Army Chemical
Demilitarization and Remediation Activity. Background

Page 5 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly managed the
program. In 1997, consistent with congressional direction, the Army and
FEMA clarified their CSEPP roles by implementing a management structure
under which FEMA assumed responsibility for off- post (civilian community)
program activities, while the Army continued to manage on- post chemical
emergency preparedness. The Army provides CSEPP funding to FEMA, which is
administered via grants to the states and counties near where stockpile
sites are located in order to carry out the program*s off- post
activities.

Agent destruction began in 1990 at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
Subsequently, Congress directed DOD to evaluate the possibility of using
alternative technologies to incineration. In 1994, the Army initiated a
project to develop nonincineration technologies for use at the two bulk-
agent only sites at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, Indiana. These sites
were selected in part because their stockpiles were relatively simple*
each site had only one type of agent and this agent was stored in bulk-
agent (ton) containers. In 1997, DOD approved pilot testing of a
neutralization technology at these two sites. Also in 1997, Congress
directed DOD to evaluate the use of alternative technologies and suspended
incineration planning activities at two sites with assembled weapons in
Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky. Furthermore, Congress directed
that these two sites be managed in a program independent of the Army*s
Chem- Demil Program and report to DOD instead of the Army. Thus, the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program was established. The
nine sites, the types of agent, and the percentage of the original
stockpiles are shown in table 1.

Page 6 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and
Percentage of Original Stockpile

Source: DOD data. a The stockpile includes two nerve agents, GB and VX,
and blister agents.

In 1997, the United States ratified the CWC, which prohibits the use of
these weapons and mandates the elimination of existing stockpiles by April
29, 2007. 7 A CWC provision allows that extensions of up to 5 years can be
granted. The CWC also contains a series of interim deadlines applicable to
the U. S. stockpile 8 (see table 2).

Table 2: CWC Deadlines

Sources: CWC and U. S. Army. Legend: NA - Not applicable.

7 The CWC implementing legislation, P. L. 105- 277 (Oct. 21, 1998),
provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the
convention*s provisions. 8 This report solely focuses on the weapons the
convention defines as category 1, which are the most dangerous chemicals
in the stockpile.

Site Type of agent a Original agent tonnage Percent of original stockpile

Johnston Atoll Blister and nerve 2,031 6 Tooele, Utah Blister and nerve
13,616 44 Anniston, Ala. Blister and nerve 2,254 7 Umatilla, Oreg. Blister
and nerve 3,717 12 Pine Bluff, Ark. Blister and nerve 3,850 12 Aberdeen,
Md. Blister 1,625 5 Newport, Ind. Nerve 1,269 4 Pueblo, Colo. Blister
2,611 8 Blue Grass, Ky. Blister and nerve 523 2

Total 31,496 100 Required percentage of agent destroyed Deadlines for

destruction Date United States met deadline

1 April 29, 2000 September 1997 20 April 29, 2002 July 2001 45 April 29,
2004 NA 100 April 29, 2007 NA

Page 7 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

The United States met the 1 percent interim deadline in September 1997 and
the 20 percent interim deadline in July 2001. As of June 2003, the Army
was reporting that a total of about 26 percent of the original stockpile
had been destroyed. 9 Three other countries (referred to as states
parties)* India, Russia, and

one other country* have declared chemical weapons stockpiles and are
required to destroy them in accordance with CWC deadlines as well. As of
April 2003, two of these three countries (India and one other country) had
met the 1 percent interim deadline to destroy their stockpiles. 10 Of the
three countries, only India met the second (20 percent) interim deadline
to destroy its stockpile by April 2002. However, Russia, with the largest
declared stockpile* over 40,000 tons* did not meet the 1 percent or the 20
percent interim deadlines, and only began destroying its stockpile in
December 2002. In 2001, Russia requested a 5- year extension to the 2007
deadline. 11 Russia did destroy 1 percent of its stockpile by April 2003,
although it is doubtful that it will meet the 2012 deadline if granted. 12
Traditionally, management and oversight responsibilities for the

Chem- Demil Program reside primarily within three levels at DOD* the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who is the
Defense Acquisition Executive for the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, Technology) who is the Army
Acquisition Executive for the Army, and the Program Manager for Chemical
Demilitarization* because it is a major defense acquisition program. 13 In
addition to these offices, since August 2002, the Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction), has
served as the focal point responsible for oversight, coordination, and
integration of the Chem- Demil Program. 9 As of June 2003, agent had been
destroyed at Johnston Atoll, Tooele, and Aberdeen.

10 One other state party is not included in this assessment because it is
expected to submit a detailed declaration of the chemical weapons
stockpile that was recently discovered on its territory.

11 The CWC*s implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, is in the process of negotiating future Russian
destruction deadlines. 12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U. S.
Efforts to Improve Security of Russian Sites,

GAO- 03- 482 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 24, 2003). 13 DOD Directive 5000.1,
the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003, and DOD Instruction 5002.2,
Operations of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

In May 2001, in response to program cost, schedule, and management
concerns, milestone decision authority was elevated to the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). DOD stated that this
change would streamline future decision making and increase program
oversight. DOD indicated that the change was also consistent with the size
and scope of the program, international treaty obligations, and the level
of local, state, and federal interest in the safe and timely destruction
of the chemical stockpile.

In September 2001, after more than a yearlong review, DOD revised the
program*s schedule milestones for seven of the nine sites and the cost
estimates for all nine sites. 14 These milestones represent the target
dates that each site is supposed to meet for the completion of critical
phases of the project. The phases include design, construction,
systemization, operations, and closure. (Appendix II describes these
phases and provides the status of each site.) The 2001 revision marked the
third time the program extended its schedule milestones and cost estimates
since it became a major defense acquisition program in 1994. The 2001
revision also pushed the milestones for most sites several years beyond
the previous 1998 schedule milestones and, for the first time, beyond the
April 2007 deadline contained in the CWC. Table 3 compares the 1998 and
2001 schedule milestones for starting and finishing agent destruction
operations at the eight sites with chemical agent stockpiles in 2001. 15
The planned agent destruction completion date at some sites was extended
over 5 years.

14 The cost estimates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites were based on
incineration technology pending a technology decision. 15 Johnston Atoll
is not included because its stockpile has been destroyed.

Page 9 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Table 3: Comparison of DOD*s 1998 and 2001 Milestones for Starting and
Finishing Agent Destruction Operations

Sources: DOD and U. S. Army. a The 2001 schedule milestones reflect both
Army and DOD changes.

b Tooele was already conducting destruction operations when the 1998 and
2001 estimates for this phase were made. c NA - Not available. Schedules
are to be determined after technology decisions for Blue Grass

and Pueblo are made.

DOD extended the schedule milestones to reflect the Army*s experience at
the two sites* Johnston Atoll and Tooele* that had begun the destruction
process prior to 2001. It found that previous schedule milestones had been
largely based on overly optimistic engineering estimates. Lower
destruction rates stipulated by environmental regulators, and increased
time needed to change the facility*s configuration when switching between
different types of chemical agents and weapons, meant destruction
estimates needed to be lengthened. Moreover, experience at Johnston Atoll,
which began closure activities in 2000, revealed that

previous closure estimates for other sites had been understated. In
addition, DOD*s Cost Analysis Improvement Group modified the site
schedules based on a modeling technique that considered the probabilities
of certain schedule activities taking longer than anticipated. In
particular, the group determined that the operations phase, where agent
destruction

takes place, has the highest probability for schedule delays and
lengthened that phase the most. Because the costs of the program are
directly related to the length of the schedule, DOD also increased the
projected life- cycle costs, from $15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in
2001 (see fig. 1).

Planned agent destruction start date a Planned agent destruction
completion date Site 1998 2001 Change (no. of months) 1998 2001 Change

(no. of months)

Tooele Ongoing Ongoing b NA Oct. 2003 Feb. 2008 + 53 Anniston Jan. 2002
July 2002 + 7 Nov. 2005 May 2011 + 67 Umatilla Feb. 2002 July 2003 + 18
June 2005 Jan. 2011 + 68 Pine Bluff June 2002 Oct. 2003 + 17 Oct. 2005
Nov. 2009 + 50 Aberdeen Jan. 2004 Mar. 2005 + 15 Dec. 2004 Mar. 2008 + 40
Newport Jan. 2004 Dec. 2006 + 36 Dec. 2004 Nov. 2009 + 60 Blue Grass NA c
Pueblo NA c

Page 10 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program Cost Estimates

In December 2001, after the program schedule and costs were revised, the
Army transferred primary program oversight from the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and
Environment). According to the Army, this move streamlined
responsibilities for the program, which were previously divided between
these two offices. In January 2003, the Army reassigned oversight
responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) for all policy and direction for the Chem-
Demil Program and CSEPP. The Secretary of the Army also directed the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Materiel Command, to jointly
establish an agency to perform the chemical demilitarization as well as
the chemical weapons storage functions. In response to this directive, the
Army announced the creation of a new organization* the Chemical

Page 11 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Materials Agency (CMA)* which will merge the demilitarization and the
storage functions. 16 During this transition process, the Program Manager
for Chemical Demilitarization was redesignated as the Program Manager for
the Elimination of Chemical Weapons and will report to the Director of CMA
and have responsibility for each site through the systemization phase. The
Director for Operations will manage the operations and closure phases. As
of June 2003, the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons
was providing day- to- day management for the sites at Anniston, Umatilla,
Newport, and Pine Bluff; the Director for Operations was providing day-
to- day management for the sites at Tooele, Aberdeen, and Johnston Atoll,
and the Program Manager, ACWA, was managing the sites at Pueblo and Blue
Grass.

Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports that have focused on
management, cost, and schedule issues related to the Chem- Demil Program.
For example, in a 1995 testimony we cited the possibility of further cost
growth and schedule slippage due to environmental requirements, public
opposition to the baseline incineration process, and lower than expected
disposal rates. We also testified that weaknesses in

financial management and internal control systems have hampered program
results and alternative technologies were unlikely to mature enough to
meet CWC deadlines.

In 1995, we noted that the emergency preparedness program had been slow to
achieve results and that communities were not fully prepared to respond to
a chemical emergency. In 1997, we found high- level management attention
was needed at the Army and FEMA to clearly define management roles and
responsibilities. In 2001, we found that the Army and FEMA needed a more
proactive approach to improve working relations with CSEPP states and
local communities and to assist them in preparing budgets and complying
with program performance measures.

In 2000, we found that the Chem- Demil Program was hindered by its complex
management structure and ineffective coordination between program offices.
We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to clarify the management roles and responsibilities of program
participants, assign accountability for achieving program goals and
results, and establish procedures to improve

16 According to Army officials, CMA is provisional, but the Army expects
to have this agency fully established by October 2003.

Page 12 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

coordination among the program*s various elements and with state and local
officials.

A detailed list of these reports and other products is included in Related
GAO Products at the end of this report.

Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the
organization of the Chem- Demil Program, the program continues to falter
because several long- standing leadership, organizational, and strategic
planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The absence of sustained leadership
confuses decision- making authority and obscures accountability. In
addition, the Army*s recent reorganization of the program has not reduced
its complex organization nor clarified the roles and responsibilities of
various entities. For example, CMA reports to two different offices with
responsibilities for different phases of the program and left the
management of CSEPP divided between the Army and FEMA. The ACWA program
continues to be managed outside of the Army as directed by Congress.
Finally, the lack of an overarching, comprehensive strategy has left the
Chem- Demil Program without a top- level road map to guide and monitor the
program*s activities. The absence of effective leadership, streamlined
organization, and important management tools, such as strategic planning,
creates a barrier to the program accomplishing the safe destruction of the
chemical stockpile and staying within schedule milestones, thereby raising
program costs.

The Chem- Demil Program has experienced frequent shifts in leadership
providing oversight, both between DOD and the Army and within the Army,
and frequent turnover in key program positions. These shifts have led to
confusion among participants and stakeholders about the program*s decision
making and have obscured accountability. For example, program officials
were not consistent in following through on promised initiatives and some
initiatives were begun but not completed. Also, when leadership
responsibilities changed, new initiatives were often introduced and old

initiatives were abandoned, obscuring accountability for program actions.
The program has lacked sustained leadership above the program level as
demonstrated by the multiple shifts between DOD and the Army for providing
oversight that affects consistent decision making. The leadership
responsible for oversight has shifted between the Army and DOD three times
during the past two decades, with the most recent change occurring in
2001. Table 4 summarizes these changes. As different Long- Standing

Management and Organization Weaknesses Continue to Hamper Program Progress

Shifts in Leadership Confuse Decision- Making Authority and Obscure
Accountability

Changes in Oversight Responsibilities Confuse Decision- Making Role

Page 13 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

offices took over major decision authority, program emphasis frequently
shifted, leaving initiatives pursued but not completed, consistency of
initiatives was not maintained, and responsibility for decisions shifted.
For example, we reported in August 2001 that the Army and FEMA had
addressed some management problems in how they coordinated

emergency preparedness activities after they had established a memorandum
of understanding to clarify roles and responsibilities related to CSEPP.
17 However, according to FEMA officials, DOD did not follow the protocols
for coordination as agreed upon with the Army when making decisions about
emergency preparedness late in 2001. This led to emergency preparedness
items being funded without adequate plans for distribution, which delayed
the process. These changes in oversight responsibilities also left the
stakeholders in the states and local communities uncertain as to the
credibility of federal officials.

Table 4: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and
the Army, 1986- Present

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

17 U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must
Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies GAO- 01- 850 (Washington,
D. C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

Year Oversight authority Action

1986 Army DOD designates the Army as the executive agent for the Chem-
Demil Program.

1994 DOD DOD makes the program a major defense acquisition program and
oversight is elevated to control cost and schedule increases and to raise
program visibility.

1998 Army DOD delegates decision- making authority to the Army, primarily
as part of its overall effort to reduce responsibilities and staffing of
its offices.

2001 DOD DOD reinstates its position as the program*s top decision maker.
According to DOD, this was done to streamline decision making, which is
consistent with the cost of the program and national and state interest in
the safe and timely destruction of the stockpile.

Page 14 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Leadership responsibilities for the program within the Army have also
transferred three times from one assistant secretary to another (see table
5). During this time, there were numerous CSEPP issues that the Army took
positions on with which FEMA did not concur. For example, in August 2002,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)
officials committed to funding nearly $1 million to study building an
emergency operations center for a community near Umatilla with additional
funds to be provided later. Since the program shifted to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) in 2003,
program officials have been reconsidering this commitment. The problem of
Army and FEMA not speaking with one voice led to confusion among state and
local communities. Further, dual or overlapping authority by the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) in 2001
was not clarified. Without clear lines of authority, one office took
initiatives without consulting the other. As a result, stakeholders were
unclear if initiatives were valid.

In addition to these program shifts, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Chemical Demilitarization)* an oversight office moved from DOD to
the Army in 1998* reported to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) from 1998 until 2001, then to the

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) until
2003, and now again to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology). These many shifts in this oversight office
with responsibility for programmatic decisions left stakeholders confused
about this office*s oversight role and about the necessity of funding
requests it made. As a result, the accumulation of extra funding
ultimately caused Congress to cut the program*s budget. 18 18 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements

Needed in Program Accountability and Financial Management, GAO/ NSIAD- 00-
80 (Washington, D. C.: May 8, 2000).

Page 15 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the Army,
1986- Present

Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Army data.

The Chem- Demil Program has experienced a number of changes and vacancies
in key program leadership positions, which has obscured accountability.
This issue is further compounded, as discussed later, by the lack of a
strategic plan to provide an agreed upon road map for officials to follow.
Within the Army, three different officials have held senior leadership
positions since December 2001. In addition, five officials have served as
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Chem- Demil) during that time.
19 The program manager*s position remained vacant for nearly 1 year, from
April 2002 to February 2003, before being filled. However, in June, after
only 4 months, the program manager resigned and the Army named a
replacement.

Frequent shifts in key leadership positions led to several instances where
this lack of continuity affected decision making and obscured
accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official promised to
support future funding requests for emergency preparedness equipment

19 This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Elimination of Chemical Weapons).

Year Army organization Action

1986 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)

The Secretary of the Army assigned oversight of the Chem- Demil Program to
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment).

1994 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and
Acquisition)

When DOD designated the program a major defense acquisition program, the
Army transferred oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Research, Development, and Acquisition).

2001 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)

To streamline the program*s organizational structure, the Army transferred
oversight back to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and
Environment).

2003 Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology)

The Army transfers the program back to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) when CMA was established.

Frequent Changes in Key Program Officials Obscure Accountability

Page 16 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

from a community, but his successor did not fulfill this promise. This
promise caused communities to submit several funding requests that were
not supported. The lack of leadership continuity makes it unclear who is
accountable when commitments are made but not implemented. Moreover, when
key leaders do not remain in their positions long enough to develop the
needed long- term perspective (on program issues) or to effectively follow
through on program initiatives, it is easy for them to deny responsibility
for previous decisions and avoid current accountability.

The recent reorganization by the Army has not streamlined the program*s
complex organization or clarified roles and responsibilities. For example,
the Director of CMA will now report to two different senior Army
organizations, which is one more than under the previous structure. This
divided reporting approach is still not fully developed, but it may
adversely affect program coordination and accountability. The
reorganization has also divided the responsibility for various program
phases between two offices within CMA. One organization, the Program
Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons, will manage the first
three phases for each site and a newly created organization, the Director
of Operations, will manage the final two phases. This reorganization
changes the cradle- to- grave management approach that was used to manage
sites in the past and has blurred responsibities for officials who
previously provided support in areas such as quality assurance and safety.
Moreover, the reorganization did not address two program components*
communityrelated CSEPP and ACWA. CSEPP will continue to be jointly managed
with FEMA. ACWA, as congressionally directed, will continue to be managed
separately from the Army by DOD.

During the transition process, no implementation plan was promulgated when
the new organization was first announced in January 2003. As of June 2003,
the migration of roles and responsibilities formerly assigned to the
office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization into the new
CMA had not been articulated. For example, several key CMA officials who
had formerly been part of the former program office told us that they were
unsure of their new roles within CMA and the status of

ongoing program initiatives. Furthermore, past relationships and
responsibilities among former program offices and site activities have
been disrupted. Although the establishment of CMA with a new directorate
responsible for operations at Tooele and Aberdeen is underway, former
program office staff told us they did not know how this new organization
would manage the sites in the future. Recent Reorganization Has Not
Reduced

Organizational Complexity

Page 17 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance
documents for the Chem- Demil Program, they have not developed an
overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide the
program and monitor its progress. Leading organizations embrace principles
for effectively implementing and managing programs. Some key aspects of
this approach include promulgating a comprehensive strategy to include
mission, long- term goals, and methods to accomplish these

goals and an implementation plan that includes annual performance goals,
measurable performance indicators, and evaluation and corrective action
plans. According to DOD and Army officials, the Chem- Demil Program relies
primarily on guidance and planning documents related to the acquisition
process. 20 For example, the former program manager drafted several
documents, such as the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization*s
Management Plan and Acquisition Strategy for the Chemical Demilitarization
Program, as the cornerstone of his management approach. Our review of
these and other key documents showed that they did not encompass all
components of the program or other nonacquisition activities. Some
documents had various elements, such as a mission statement, but they were
not consistently written. None contained all of the essential elements
expected in a comprehensive strategy nor contained aspects needed for an
implementation plan, such as an evaluation and corrective action plan.
Further, all documents were out of date and did not reflect recent changes
to the program. DOD and Army officials stated that the program*s strategy
would be

articulated in the updated program*s acquisition strategy to be completed
by the new Director of CMA. According to the draft acquisition strategy,
the focus is to acquire services, systems, and equipment. Again, this
approach does not address all components of the Chem- Demil Program, such
as CSEPP and ACWA.

More importantly, a strategic plan would ensure that all actions support
overall program goals as developed by the appropriate senior- level office
with oversight responsibility for the program. An implementation plan
would define the steps the program would take to accomplish its mission.
Further, a strategy document, coupled with an implementation plan, would
clarify roles and responsibilities and establish program performance
measurements. Together, these documents would provide

20 Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule, and
performance parameters over the program*s life cycle. Program Lacks
Strategy

and Implementation Plan

Page 18 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

the foundation for a well- managed program to provide continuity of
operations for program officials to follow.

The program continues to miss most milestones, following a decade long
trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 scheduled
milestones because of substantial delays during their systematization

(equipment testing) or operations (agent destruction) phases. Delays at
sites using incineration stem primarily from a number of problems that DOD
and the Army have not been able to anticipate or control, such as concerns
involving plant safety, difficulties in meeting environmental permitting
requirements, public concerns about emergency preparedness plans, and
budgeting shortfalls. The neutralization sites have not missed

milestones yet but have experienced delays as well. DOD and the Army have
not developed an approach to anticipate and address potential problems
that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Neither
DOD nor the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management approach to
mitigate potential problems. As a result, the Chem- Demil Program will
have a higher level of risk of missing its schedule milestones and CWC
deadlines, incurring rising costs, and unnecessarily prolonging the
potential risk to the public associated with the storage of the chemical
stockpile.

Most incineration sites will miss important milestones established in 2001
due to schedule delays. For example, delays at Anniston, Umatilla, and
Pine Bluff have already resulted, or will result, in their missing the
2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent destruction operations
(operation phase). 21 Johnston Atoll will miss its schedule milestone for
shutting down the facility (closure phase). 22 The Tooele site has not
missed any milestones since the 2001 schedule was issued; however, the
site has undergone substantial delays in destroying its stockpile
primarily due to a

safety- related incident in July 2002. 23 If additional delays occur at
the 21 At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these sites
were in the systemization phase; thus, their next milestone was to begin
agent destruction operations. 22 At the time of the 2001 schedule
revision, agent destruction operations had been completed and its next
milestone was to complete closure of the facility. 23 According to Army
officials, the United States will not meet the 45 percent interim

CWC deadline by April 2004. Most Sites Will Miss

Schedule Milestones due to Program*s Inability to Anticipate and Influence
Issues

Substantial Delays at Incineration Sites Led to Missed Milestones

Page 19 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as well. Table 6
shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss 2001 schedule
milestones.

Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration Site

Sources: DOD and the U. S. Army. a Program manager*s official estimate for
Pine Bluff and Johnston Atoll; unofficial estimates for other sites based
on discussions with site officials as of June 2003.

The delays at the incineration sites have resulted from various long-
standing issues, which the Army has not been able to effectively
anticipate or control because it does not have a process to identify and
mitigate them. An effectively managed program would have an approach, such
as lessons learned, to identify and mitigate issues. Although the program
now has extensive experience with destroying agents at two sites, the
Chem- Demil Programmatic Lessons Learned Program has been shifted to
individual contractors from a headquarters centralized effort. In
September 2002, we reported on the effectiveness of the centralized
lessons learned program and found it to be generally effective, but it
should be improved and expanded. 24 By decentralizing the program, it is
uncertain how knowledge will be leveraged between sites to avoid or lessen
potential delays due to issues that have previously occurred. In addition,
program officials told us that they were concerned that lessons from the
closure at Johnston Atoll were not being captured and saved for future use
at other sites.

Many delays have resulted from incidents during operations, environmental
permitting, community protection, and funding issues. This continues to be
a trend we identified in previous reports on the

24 U. S General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned
Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and Expanded, GAO- 02-
890 (Washington, D. C.: Sept. 10, 2002).

Site Next project milestone

2001 schedule date to begin next milestone

Estimated a date to begin next phase

Difference between 2001 schedule and

estimate (no. of months)

Anniston Operations July 2002 July 2003 +12 Umatilla Operations July 2003
Dec. 2003 +5 Pine Bluff Operations Oct. 2003 Apr. 2004 +6

Johnston Atoll End of closure Sept. 2003 Jan. 2004 +4

Page 20 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

program. The following examples illustrate some of the issues that have
caused delays at incineration sites since 2001:

 Incidents during operations: Agent destruction operations at Tooele were
suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because of a chemical incident
involving a plant worker who came into contact with a nerve agent while
performing routine maintenance. Subsequent investigations determined that
this event occurred because some procedures related to worker safety were
either inadequate or not followed. A corrective action plan, which
required the implementation of an improved safety plan, was instituted
before operations resumed. Since it resumed operations in March 2003,
Tooele has experienced several temporary shutdowns. (These shutdowns

are discussed further in app. II.)  Environmental permitting: The start
of agent destruction operations at

Umatilla and Anniston sites has been delayed because of several
environmental permitting issues. 25 Delays at the Umatilla site have
resulted from several unanticipated engineering changes related to
reprogramming software and design changes that required permit
modifications. An

additional delay occurred at the Umatilla site when the facility was
temporarily shut down in October 2002 by state regulators because furnaces
were producing an unanticipated high amount of heavy metals during
surrogate agent testing. The testing was suspended until a correction
could be implemented. Delays at the Anniston site occurred because state
environmental regulators did not accept test results for one of the
furnaces because the subcontractor did not follow state permitspecified
protocols.

 Community protection: Destruction operations at the Anniston site have
been delayed because of concerns about emergency preparedness for the
surrounding communities. These concerns included the inadequacy of
protection plans for area schools and for special needs residents.
Although we reported on this issue in July 1996 26 and again in August
2001 and a senior DOD official identified it as a key concern in September
2001, the

25 We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And Materiel:
Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 18
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 10, 1997).

26 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile:
Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses,
GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 150 (Washington, D. C: July 23, 1996) and Chemical
Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for
Emergencies, GAO- 01- 850 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

Page 21 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Army was unable to come to a satisfactory resolution with key state
stakeholders prior to the planned January 2003 start date. As of June
2003, negotiations were still ongoing between the Army and key public
officials to determine when destruction operations could begin.

 Funding: Systemization and closure activities were delayed at Pine Bluff
and Johnston Atoll sites, respectively, because program funds planned for
demilitarization were redirected in fiscal year 2002 by DOD to pay for
$40.5 million for additional community protection equipment for Anniston.
This was an unfunded budget expense, and the Army reduced funds for the
Pine Bluff site by $14.9 million, contributing to construction and
systemization milestones slipping 1 year. The Pine Bluff site was selected
because the loss of funding would not delay the projected start of

operations during that fiscal year. Program officials told us that the
total program cost of this schedule slip would ultimately be $90 million.
Additionally, funds were reduced for the Johnston Atoll site by $25.1
million because it was in closure.

According to an Army official, delays increase program costs by
approximately $250,000 to $300,000 a day or about $10 million per month.
Since 2001, delays have caused cost increases of $256 million at the
incineration sites shown in table 7.

Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration
Sites

Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Army data. Note: Data as of March 2003.

Dollars in millions

Incineration site Cause of delay Cost increase

Johnston Atoll Funding $26 Tooele Incident during operation 75 Anniston
Environmental permitting 45 Umatilla Environmental permitting 20 Pine
Bluff Funding 90

Total $256

Page 22 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Due to the delays, the Army is in the process of developing new milestones
that would extend beyond those adopted in 2001. According to an Army
official, the program will use events that have occurred since 2001 to

present new cost estimates to DOD in preparation for the fiscal year 2005
budget submission. Program officials told us that they estimate costs have
already increased $1.2 billion. This estimated increase is likely to rise
further as additional factors are considered.

The two bulk- agent only sites, Aberdeen and Newport, have experienced
delays but have not breeched their milestones. The schedules were revised
in response to concerns about the continued storage of the chemical
stockpile after the events of September 11, 2001. In 2002, DOD approved
the use of a modified process that will accelerate the rate of destruction
at these two sites. For example, the Army estimates that the modified
process will reduce the length of time needed to complete destruction of
the blister agent stockpile at Aberdeen from 20 months to 6 months. The
Army estimates that this reduction, along with other changes, such as the
off- site shipping of a waste byproduct, will reduce the scheduled end of
operations by 5 years, from 2008 to 2003. Similarly, projections for agent

destruction operations at Newport were reduced from 20 months to 7 months,
and the destruction end date moved up from 2009 to 2004.

While the Aberdeen site did begin destruction operations, as of June 2003,
it had only achieved a peak rate of 2 containers per day, which is far
less than the projected peak daily rate of 12, and had experienced
unanticipated problems removing residual agent from the containers. After
2 months of processing, Army officials said it had initially processed 57
of the 1,815 containers in Aberdeen*s stockpile and will have to do

additional processing of these containers because of a higher amount of
unanticipated hardened agent. Even if the peak daily rate of 12 is
achieved, the site will not meet the October 2003 Army estimate.

At the Newport site, construction problems will delay the start of
operations, missing the program manager*s October 2003 estimate for
starting agent destruction operations. Another possible impediment to
starting operations is the program*s efforts to treat the waste byproduct
at a potential off- site disposal facility in Ohio. These efforts have met
resistance from some community leaders and residents near the potential
disposal site. If the Army is unable to use an off- site facility, the
disposal

may have to be done on site, requiring the construction of a waste
byproduct treatment facility, further causing delays and increasing costs.
Delays at Neutralization

Sites Have Not Led to Missed Milestones

Page 23 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Schedule milestones were not adopted for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites
in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not selected a destruction
technology. Subsequently, DOD selected destruction technologies for these
sites; however, these decisions were made several months beyond the dates
estimated in 2001. For example, while program officials indicated that the
technology decision for the Kentucky site would be made by September 2002,
the decision was not made until February 2003. Significantly, DOD
announced initial schedule milestones for these

two sites that extended beyond the extended April 2012 deadline of the
CWC. According to DOD officials, these schedules are preliminary and will
be reevaluated after the selected contractors complete their initial
design of the facilities. Plans for these sites are immature, and changes
are likely to occur as they move closer to the operations phase still at
least several years away. DOD and the Army have not implemented a
comprehensive risk

management approach that would proactively anticipate and influence issues
that could adversely affect the program*s progress. The program manager*s
office drafted a risk management plan in June 2000, but the plan has not
been formally approved or implemented. According to program

officials, a prior program official drafted the plan and subsequent
officials did not approve or further develop the plan. The draft plan
noted that DOD*s acquisition rules require program managers to establish a
risk management plan to identify and control risk related to performance,
cost, and schedule. 27 Such a plan would allow managers to systematically
identify, analyze, and

influence the risk factors and could help keep the program within its
schedule and cost estimates.

DOD and Army officials have given several reasons for not having an
overall risk management plan. A DOD official indicated that the approach
that has been used to address program problems has been crisis management,
which has forced DOD to react to issues rather than control them. The
deputy program manager stated that the program*s focus has been on
managing individual sites by implementing initiatives to improve
contractor performance as it relates to safety, schedule, and cost. The

27 Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Oct. 30, 2002 (formerly DOD
5000.2- R, Apr. 5, 2002). Risk Management

Approach Needed to Reduce Schedule Delays

Page 24 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

official also said that establishing a formal, integrated risk management
plan has not been a priority. However, an official from the program
manager*s office said the infrastructure is in place to finalize an
integrated risk management plan by October 2003, which coincides with the
date

CMA takes over leadership of the program. However, due to the transition
that the organization is undergoing, the status of this effort is
uncertain.

The Army defines its risk management approach as a process for identifying
and addressing internal and external issues that may have a negative
impact on the program*s progress. A risk management approach has five
basic steps, which assist program leaders in effective decision making for
better program outcomes. Simply stated, the first step is to identify
those issues that pose a risk to the program. For example, a problem in
environmental permitting can significantly delay the program schedule. The
second step is to analyze the risks identified and prioritize

the risks using established criteria. The third step is to create a plan
for action to mitigate the prioritized risks in some order of importance.
The fourth step is to track and validate the actions taken.

The last step is to review and monitor the outcomes of the actions taken
to ensure their effectiveness. Additional remedies may be needed if
actions are not successful or the risks have changed. Risk management is a
continuous, dynamic process and must become a regular part of the
leadership decision process. Without developing such an approach, the
Chem- Demil Program will continue to manage by addressing issues as they
arise and not by developing strategies or contingency plans to meet
program issues. As the program complexity increases with new technologies
and more active sites, a comprehensive risk management approach, as the
acquisition regulations require, would facilitate program success and help
control costs. Such a proactive approach would allow the program to
systematically identify, analyze, and manage the risk factors that could
hamper its efforts to destroy the chemical stockpile and help keep it
within its schedule and cost estimates.

For more than a decade, the Chem- Demil Program has struggled to meet
schedule milestones* and control the enormous costs* for destroying the
nation*s chemical weapons stockpile. The program will also miss future CWC
deadlines. Despite several reorganizations of its complex structure, the
program continues to flounder. Program leadership at both the oversight
and the program manager levels has shifted frequently, contributing to the
program*s continued instability, ineffective decision making, and weak
accountability. The repeated realignments of Conclusions

Page 25 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

the program have done little to resolve its awkward, hydra- like structure
in which roles and responsibilities continue to be poorly defined,
multiple lines of authority exist, and coordination between various
entities is poor. These shifts and realignments have taken place without
the benefit of a comprehensive strategy and an implementation plan that
could help the program clearly define its mission and begin working toward
its goals effectively. If the program had these key pillars, such as a
strategy to guide it from its inception and an implementation plan to
track performance, it would be in a better position to achieve desired
outcomes. The program will have a low probability of achieving its
principal goal of destroying the nation*s chemical weapons stockpile in a
safe manner within the 2001 schedule unless DOD and Army leadership take
immediate action to clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout
the program and implement an overarching strategic plan.

The Chem- Demil Program is entering a crucial period as more of its sites
move into the operations phase. As this occurs, the program faces
potentially greater challenges than it has already encountered, including
the possibilities of growing community resistance, unanticipated technical
problems, and serious site incidents. Unless program leadership is
proactive in identifying potential internal and external issues and
preparing for them, or in reducing the chances that they will occur, the
program remains at great risk of failing to meet its scheduled milestones
and the deadlines set by the CWC. These problems, and subsequent delays,
are likely to continue plaguing the program unless it is able to
incorporate a comprehensive risk management system into its daily routine.
Such a proactive approach would allow the program to systematically
identify, analyze, and manage the risk factors that could hamper its
efforts to destroy the chemical stockpile and help keep it within its
schedule and cost estimates. Without the advantage of having a risk
management tool, the program will continue to be paralyzed by delays
caused by unanticipated issues, resulting in spiraling program costs and
missed deadlines that prolong the dangers of the chemical weapons
stockpile to the American public.

Page 26 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Army, to

 develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical
demilitarization program that would:

 articulate a program mission statement,  identify the program*s long-
term goals and objectives,  delineate the roles and responsibilities of
all DOD and Army offices,

and  establish near- term performance measures, and

 implement a risk management approach that anticipates and influences
internal and external factors that could adversely impact program
performance.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. In concurring with our recommendation to develop an
overall strategy and implementation plan, DOD stated that it is in the

initial stages of developing such a plan and estimates that it will be
completed in fiscal year 2004. In concurring with our recommendation to
implement a risk management approach, DOD stated that the CMA will review
the progress of an evaluation of several components of its risk management
approach within the next 120 days. At that time, DOD will evaluate the
outcome of this review and determine any appropriate action. We believe
these actions should improve program performance provided

DOD*s plan incorporates a clearly articulated mission statement, long-
term goals, well- delineated assignment of roles and responsibilities, and
nearterm performance measures and the Army*s review of its risk management
approach focuses on anticipating and influencing internal and external
factors that could adversely impact the Chem- Demil Program.

DOD*s comments are printed in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretary of the Army; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 27 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

For any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (512) 512-
6020. Key contributors to this report were Donald Snyder, Rodell Anderson,
Bonita Oden, John Buehler, Pam Valentine, Steve Boyles, Nancy Benco, and
Charles Perdue.

Raymond J. Decker Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 28 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

This report focuses on the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem- Demil)
Stockpile Program, one of the components of the Chem- Demil program. Other
components, such as the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program,
were only discussed to determine their effects on the destruction
schedule. To determine if recent changes in the stockpile program*s
management

and oversight have been successful in improving program progress, we
interviewed numerous officials and reviewed various documents. Through a
review of previous and current organizational charts, we noted a number of
changes in the program from 1986 to the present. We interviewed Department
of Defense (DOD) and Army officials to determine what effect
organizational changes and management initiatives had on the program and
to determine if a strategic plan had been developed to manage the program.
We identified organizational changes between DOD and the Army, determined
the rationale for changes, and ascertained the effect of these changes on
program performance. We reviewed Defense Acquisition System directives to
determine the roles and responsibilities of DOD and the Army in managing
the Chemical Demilitarization Program. We assessed Chem- Demil Program*s
Acquisition Strategy and Management and Program Performance plans to
identify elements of a strategic plan and evaluated and compared them to
the general tenets and management principles embraced by the Government
Performance and Results Act. Additionally, we interviewed Office of
Management and Budget officials to discuss their assessment of the
program*s performance and its adherence

to a results- oriented management approach and reviewed DOD directives and
regulations to determine the criteria for strategic planning.

To determine the progress that DOD and the Army have made in meeting
revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) deadlines, we interviewed relevant program officials and reviewed a
number of documents. We reviewed the Army*s current program office
estimates to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile and weekly and monthly
destruction schedules to understand how sites will perform and synchronize
activities to meet milestones. We interviewed DOD*s Cost Analysis
Improvement Group to determine how DOD developed estimates for the 2001
milestone schedules for each site. However, we did not independently
evaluate the reliability of the methodology the Cost Analysis Improvement
Group used to develop its estimate. Further, we interviewed program
officials to determine the status of the destruction process at
incineration and neutralization sites and the impact of delays on schedule
and cost. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 29 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

We reviewed Selected Acquisition Reports and Acquisition Program Baselines
to identify the increase in program cost estimates in 1998 and 2001 and to
determine the relationship between changes to schedule milestones and
increased program cost. Our analysis identified the effect that schedule
delays would have on schedule milestones at incineration

and neutralization sites. Additionally, the analysis also identified types
of schedule delays and the impact on program cost. Through interviews with
program officials, we discussed the status of factors that increase
program life- cycle cost estimates. We examined the Chem- Demil Program*s
draft risk management plans to determine if the Army had developed a
comprehensive risk management approach to address potential problems that
could adversely affect program schedules, cost, and safety. Through an
analysis of other risk management plans, we identified elements of a risk
management process. We reviewed CWC documents to determine deadlines for
the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile. We interviewed program
officials to discuss the potential implications of not meeting interim
milestones and CWC deadlines.

During the review, we visited and obtained information from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of the Army
(Installations and Environment) and (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology); the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of State,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the DOD Inspector General in
Washington, D. C. and met with the Director of Chemical Materials Agency
and the Program Managers for Chemical Demilitarization and Assembled
Chemical Weapons Assessment in Edgewood, Maryland. We also met project
managers, site project managers, state environmental offices, and
contractors associated with disposal sites in Aberdeen, Maryland;
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. We also
interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency officials concerning
funding of emergency preparedness program activities.

We conducted our review from August 2002 to June 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status

Page 30 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

When developing schedules, the Army divides the demilitarization process
into five major phases. The five major phases are facility design,
construction, systemization, operations, and closure. Some activities of
one phase may overlap the preceding phase. The nine sites are at different
phases of the process.

Design

During the design phase, the Army obtains the required environmental
permits. The permits are required to comply with federal, state, and local
environmental laws and regulations to build and operate chemical disposal
facilities. The permits specify construction parameters and establish
operations guidelines and emission limitations. Subsequent engineering
changes to the facility are incorporated into the permits through formal
permit modification procedures. During this phase, the Army originally
solicited contract proposals from systems contractors to build, and
operate, the chemical demilitarization facility and selected a systems
contractor. Now, the Army uses a design/ build approach, whereby the
contractor completes both phases. The Army originally provided the systems
contractors with the design for the incineration facilities; however,
systems contractors developed the facility design for the neutralization
facilities. Construction

During the construction phase, the Army, with the contractor*s input,
develops a master project schedule that identifies all major project tasks
and milestones associated with site design, construction, systemization,
operations, and closure. For each phase in the master project schedule,
the contractor develops detailed weekly schedules to identify and sequence
the activities necessary to meet contract milestones. Army site project
managers review and approve the detailed schedules to monitor the systems
contractor*s performance. After developing the schedules, the contractor
builds a disposal site and acquires, installs, and integrates the
necessary equipment to destroy the stockpile and begins hiring, training,
and certifying operations staff.

Systemization

During systemization, the systems contractor also prepares and executes a
systemization implementation plan, which describes how the contractor will
ensure the site is prepared to conduct agent operations. The Appendix II:
Major Schedule Phases

Associated with Chemical Demilitarization Process and Current Facility
Status

The Army*s Demilitarization Process

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status

Page 31 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

contractor begins executing the implementation plan by testing system
components. The contractor then tests individual systems to identify and
correct any equipment flaws. After systems testing, the contractor
conducts integrated operations tests. For example, the contractor uses
simulated munitions to test the rocket processing line from receipt of the
munitions through incineration. Army staff observe and approve key

elements of each integrated operations test, which allows the contractor
to continue the systemization process. Once the Army approves the
integrated operations test, the contractor tests the system by conducting
mini and surrogate trial burns. During minitrial burns, the contractor
adds measured amounts of metals to a surrogate material to demonstrate the

system*s emissions will not exceed allowable rates. In conducting
surrogate trial burns, the contractor destroys nonagent compounds similar
in makeup to the agents to be destroyed at the site. By using surrogate
agents, the contractor tests destruction techniques without threatening
people or the environment. Both the minitrial burn test results and the
surrogate trial burn test results are submitted to environmental
regulators for review and approval. When the environmental regulators
approve the surrogate trial burns, the contractor conducts an Operational
Readiness

Review to validate standard operating procedures and to verify the
proficiency of the workforce. During the Operational Readiness Review, the
workforce demonstrates knowledge of operating policies and procedures by
destroying simulated munitions. After systemization, the contractor begins
the operations phase; that is, the destruction of chemical munitions.

Operations

The operations phase is when weapons and agents are destroyed. Weapons are
destroyed by campaign, which is the complete destruction of like chemical
weapons at a given site. Operations for incineration and alternative
technologies differ. The following examples pertain to an incineration
site. In its first campaign, Umatilla plans to destroy its stockpile of
M55 rockets filled with one type of nerve agent. Then a second campaign is
planned to destroy its stockpile of M55 rockets filled with another type
of nerve agent. After each campaign, the site must be reconfigured. The
Army refers to this process as an agent changeover. During the changeover,
the contractor decontaminates the site of any prior

nerve agent residue. The contractor then adjusts the monitoring, sampling,
and laboratory equipment to test for the next nerve agent. The contractor
also validates the operating procedures for the second agent destruction
process. Some operating procedures may be rewritten because the processing
rates among chemical agents differ. Although the operations

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status

Page 32 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

staff have been trained and certified on specific equipment, the staff are
re- trained on the operating parameters of processing VX agent.

In the third and forth campaigns at Umatilla, the contractor plans to
destroy 8- inch VX projectiles and 155- millimeter projectiles,
respectively. Because the third campaign involves a different weapon than
the second campaign (i. e., from rockets in the second campaign to
projectiles in the third campaign), the contractor will replace equipment
during the changeover. For example, the machine that disassembles rockets
will be replaced with a machine that disassembles projectiles.
Additionally, a changeover may require certain processes to be bypassed.
For instance, if a changeover involved changing processes from weapons
with explosives to weapons without explosives, the explosives removal
equipment and

deactivation furnace would be bypassed. For the changeover to the fourth
campaign at Umatilla, the contractor will adjust equipment to handle
differences in weapon size. For example, the contractor will adjust the
conveyor system to accommodate the 155- millimeter projectiles. The
contractor also will change the location of monitoring equipment.

Closure

After destruction of the stockpile, the systems contractor begins closing
the site. During the closure phase, the contractor decontaminates and
disassembles the remaining systems, structures, and components used during
the demilitarization effort, and the contractor performs any other
procedures required by state environmental regulations or permits. The
contractor removes, disassembles, decontaminates, and destroys the
equipment, including ancillary equipment such as pipes, valves, and
switches. The contractor also decontaminates buildings by washing and
scrubbing concrete surfaces. Additionally, the contractor removes and
destroys the surface concrete from the walls, ceilings, and floors. With
the exception of the Umatilla site, the structures will remain standing.
Any waste generated during the decontamination process is destroyed.

The Army*s nine chemical demilitarization sites are in different phases of
the demilitarization process. The Johnston Atoll site completed the
destruction of its stockpile and closure is almost complete. The sites at
Tooele, Utah, and Aberdeen, Maryland, are in the operations phase, each
using different technologies, to destroy chemical agent and munitions. The
remaining six facilities are in systems design, construction and/ or
systemization. Table 8 provides details on the status of each of the nine
chemical demilitarization sites. Status of the

Demilitarization Sites

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status

Page 33 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities Incineration site
Current phase Status as of June 30, 2003

Johnston Atoll Closure  The Army completed operations in November 2000
and began closure activities in January 2001.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is September 2003;
however, the Army expects to complete closure in January 2004.

Tooele, Utah Operations  The Army began operations in August 1996. 
After a 9- month shutdown, operations resumed in March 2003. Operations
were suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because a worker was exposed
to chemical agent.

 Subsequent to resuming operations in March 2003, the Army suspended
agent operations five times, for a total of 12 days. The suspensions
occurred because of various operational problems including: contamination
of an agent collection tank, air monitors erroneously reporting the
presence of agent, problems associated with processing spent decontaminate
solution, a power outage, and a chemical event.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is February 2008;
however, the Army expects to complete operations in January 2006.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is September 2010;
however, the Army expects to complete closure in May 2008.

Anniston, Ala. Systemization  The Army completed systemization in January
2003. However, due to congressional concerns that the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) had not adequately prepared the
community for an accidental release of agent, the Army did not begin agent
operations as planned and

agreed to address the following four CSEPP issues before beginning
operations: (1) overpressurize schools and community facilities located
within a 12- mile radius of the stockpile, (2) establish protection for
individuals who are unable to carry out protective action recommendations
because of disability, illness, inability to understand instructions in
English, or are underage and unattended, (3) assume responsibility for
turning on the sirens for zones located closest to the Anniston Army
Depot, and (4) use the Environmental Protection Agency*s new Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels.

 On June 5, 2003, the Army sent official 30- day notification, as
required, to Congress that the site is ready to begin operations.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is May 2011; however,
the Army expects to complete operations in July 2009.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is December 2013;
however, the Army expects to complete closure in November 2011.

Umatilla, Oreg. Systemization  The DOD schedule milestone to start
operations is July 2003; however, the Army now expects to begin operations
in December 2003 because of a minitrial burn failure.

 The Army is conducting surrogate trial burns, which are expected to be
complete in August 2003.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is January 2011;
however, the Army expects to complete operations in May 2009.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is June 2014; however,
the Army expects to complete closure in February 2012.

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with Chemical
Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status

Page 34 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Incineration site Current phase Status as of June 30, 2003

Pine Bluff, Ark. Systemization  The DOD schedule milestone to begin
operations is October 2003; however, because of funding reductions, the
Army expects to begin operations in April 2004.

 The Army is conducting systems testing, which is expected to be complete
in August 2003.

 The Army expects to begin surrogate trial burns in June 2003 and
complete the trial burns in April 2004.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is November 2009;
however, the Army expects to complete operations in January 2009.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is December 2011;
however, the Army expects to complete closure in December 2010.

Neutralization site Aberdeen, Md. Operations  The Army began operations
in April 2003 and the DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is
March 2004; however, the Army expects to complete operations in September
2003.  The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is December 2006;
however,

the Army expects to complete closure in July 2005. Newport, Ind.
Systemization  The Army began systemization in September 2002 and the DOD
schedule

milestone to complete systemization is February 2005; however, the Army
expects to complete systemization in October 2003.

 The DOD schedule milestone to start operations is February 2005;
however, the Army expects to start operations in October 2003. The DOD
schedule milestone to complete operations is January 2006; however, the
Army expects to complete operations by April 2004.

 The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is April 2009; however,
the Army expects to complete closure in September 2006.

Pueblo, Colo. Design  The Army awarded a systems contract in September
2002 to design a demilitarization site.

 The Army is reviewing a proposed design and build plan with the systems
contractor. After the Army approves the design and build plan, the
contractor will begin site preparation activities.

 The DOD schedule estimates operations will be completed by April 2010.
(The Army has not developed an estimated destruction schedule.)

Blue Grass, Ky. Design  The Army solicited systems contractor proposals
in February 2003.

 The Army selected a systems contractor in June 2003.

 The DOD schedule estimates operations will be completed by May 2014.
(The Army has not developed an estimated destruction schedule.)

Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Army data.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Related GAO Products Page 37 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could Be
Improved and Expanded. GAO- 02- 890. Washington, D. C.: September 10,
2002.

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for
Emergencies. GAO- 01- 850. Washington, D. C.: August 13, 2001.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program Accountability
and Financial Management. GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 80. Washington, D. C.: May 8,
2000.

Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low- Level
Exposures. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 228. Washington, D. C.: September 23, 1998.

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the
Emergency Preparedness Program. GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 91. Washington, D. C.:
June 11, 1997.

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and
Schedule. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97- 118. Washington, D. C.: March 11, 1997.
Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama

Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 150. Washington, D.
C.: July 23, 1996.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD*s Management.

GAO/ T- NSIAD- 95- 185. Washington, D. C.: July 13, 1995.

Chemical Weapons: Army*s Emergency Preparedness Program Has Financial
Management Weaknesses. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 94. Washington, D. C.: March 15,
1995.

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 66R.
Washington, D. C.: January 12, 1995.

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U. S. Stockpile. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 67.
Washington, D. C.: December 22, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare
Materiel Can Be Improved. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 55. Washington, D. C.: December
20, 1994. Related GAO Products

Related GAO Products Page 38 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies. GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 94- 159. Washington, D. C.: April 26, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternatives
to Destruction. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 123. Washington, D. C.: March 18, 1994.

Arms Control: Status of U. S.- Russian Agreements and the Chemical Weapons
Convention. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 136. Washington, D. C.: March 15, 1994.

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army*s Emergency Preparedness Program Has Been
Slow to Achieve Results. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 91. Washington, D. C.: February
22, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to
Emergencies. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 93- 18. Washington, D. C.: July 16, 1993.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, and
Performance. GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 50. Washington, D. C.: January 21, 1993.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental Permitting
and Testing Experience. GAO/ T- NSIAD- 92- 43. Washington, D. C.: June 16,
1992.

Chemical Weapons Disposal. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 219R. Washington, D. C.: May
14, 1992.

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and Schedule Slippages
Are Likely to Continue. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 18. Washington, D. C.: November
20, 1991.

Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U. S. Chemical Stockpile. GAO/
NSIAD- 91- 200. Washington, D. C.: May 15, 1991.

Chemical Warfare: DOD*s Effort to Remove U. S. Chemical Weapons From
Germany. GAO/ NSIAD- 91- 105. Washington, D. C.: February 13, 1991.

Chemical Weapons: Status of the Army*s M687 Binary Program. GAO/ NSIAD-
90- 295. Washington, D. C.: September 28, 1990.

Related GAO Products Page 39 GAO- 03- 1031 Chemical Weapons

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Army*s Prototype
Disposal Facility. GAO/ NSIAD- 90- 222. Washington, D. C.: July 30, 1990.
Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army*s Plan to Destroy Obsolete

U. S. Stockpile. GAO/ NSIAD- 90- 155. Washington, D. C.: May 24, 1990.

(350340)

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