DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Progress Made to
Develop Business Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work Remains
(19-SEP-03, GAO-03-1018).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop an enterprise
architecture and a transition plan that meets certain
requirements. The act also directed DOD to have a process for
controlling its system investments. As required by the act, GAO
assessed DOD's actions to comply with the act's requirements and
recently issued a report to congressional defense committees.
This report provides further details of GAO's assessment results
regarding (1) the extent to which DOD's actions complied with the
requirements of the act and (2) DOD's plans for further
development and implementation of its architecture.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-03-1018
ACCNO: A08464
TITLE: DOD Business Systems Modernization: Important Progress
Made to Develop Business Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work
Remains
DATE: 09/19/2003
SUBJECT: Auditing standards
Financial analysis
Financial management
Financial management systems
Information systems
Investment planning
Investments
Internal controls
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GAO-03-1018
A
Contents Letter 1
Results in Brief 3 Background 6 DOD Has Taken Positive First Steps in
Complying with Enterprise
Architecture Legislative Requirements, but Much Remains to be Accomplished
16 DOD*s Plans for Evolving and Extending Its Enterprise Architecture
and for Improving Business System Investment Decision Making Are Unclear
50 Conclusions 52 Recommendations 53 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55
Appendixes
Appendix I: SEC. 1004. [of Public Law 107- 314] Development and
Implementation of Financial Management Enterprise Architecture 58
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 60
Appendix III: Status of Prior Recommendations on DOD*s Business Enterprise
Architecture 64
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 68
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 73 GAO Contacts 73
Acknowledgments 73
Tables Table 1: Interrelationship Between Domains and Business Process
Areas 9
Table 2: Summary of GAO*s Enterprise Architecture (EA) Maturity Framework
Stages 18 Table 3: Assessment of DOD*s Enterprise Architecture Efforts
Against GAO*s Enterprise Architecture Maturity Framework 20 Table 4:
Summary of GAO Analysis of JFMIP Requirements 25 Table 5: Detailed
Analysis of the Extent to Which DOD*s *As Is*
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements 33 Table 6: Detailed Analysis of the
Extent to Which DOD*s *To Be*
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements 38
Table 7: Detailed Analysis of the Extent to Which DOD*s Transition Plan
Satisfies Key Architectural Elements 45 Figures Figure 1: Interdependent
C4ISR Views 12
Figure 2: Summary of Extent to Which Version 1.0 of DOD*s Enterprise
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements Governing Architectural Content 30
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Letter
September 19, 2003 Congressional Committees Our research of successful
public and private sector organizations shows that attempting a large-
scale systems modernization program without having a well- defined
modernization blueprint* commonly called an enterprise architecture* and
effective investment management controls, results in systems that are
duplicative, are not well- integrated, are unnecessarily costly to
maintain and interface, and do not effectively optimize mission
performance. Accordingly, in May 2001 1 we recommended that the Department
of Defense (DOD) develop an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain
its almost $20 billion annual investment in business systems and establish
the investment controls needed to implement this architecture. In July
2001, DOD initiated a program to, among other things, address our
recommendations, and began developing a DOD- wide business enterprise
architecture (BEA) in April 2002. This effort is an essential part of the
Secretary of Defense*s broad initiative to *transform the way the
department works and what it works
on.* The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 2
required DOD to develop by May 1, 2003, a financial management enterprise
architecture 3 and a transition plan for implementing the architecture
that meet certain
requirements. The act also requires DOD to control expenditures for
financial system improvements while the architecture and transition plan
are being developed and after they are completed. The act states that the
enterprise architecture shall describe an information infrastructure that,
at
a minimum, would enable DOD to achieve certain capabilities, such as
complying with all federal accounting, financial management, and 1 U. S.
General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Architecture Needed to
Guide
Modernization of DOD*s Financial Operations, GAO- 01- 525 (Washington, D.
C.: May 17, 2001).
2 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107- 314, S: 1004, 116 Stat. 2458, 2629, Dec. 2, 2002. 3 In May
2003, the DOD Comptroller changed the architecture name from the Financial
Management Enterprise Architecture to the BEA to reflect the
transformation of departmentwide business operations and supporting
systems, including accounting and finance, budget formulation,
acquisition, inventory management, logistics, personnel, and
property management systems.
reporting requirements. The act also requires development of a transition
plan for implementing the enterprise architecture that includes, among
other things, a schedule for phasing out existing systems that will not
become part of the *To Be* environment. Finally, before the architecture
and transition plan are approved, the act requires DOD to review proposed
obligations of funds in amounts exceeding $1 million for financial system
improvements to determine if they meet specific conditions called for in
the act. Once the architecture and transition plan are approved, the act
requires DOD to ensure that obligations exceeding $1 million for financial
system investments are consistent with the architecture and the transition
plan.
The act also directs us to submit to congressional defense committees,
within 60 days of DOD*s approval of its enterprise architecture and its
transition plan, an assessment of DOD*s actions taken to comply with these
requirements. (See app. I for a copy of section 1004 of the act.) We
recently issued a report to satisfy this requirement. 4 This report
provides
specific details on our assessment results regarding (1) the extent to
which DOD*s actions complied with the requirements of the act and (2)
DOD*s plans for further development and implementation of its enterprise
architecture. It also makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
for improving DOD*s architecture development, maintenance, and
implementation efforts, including restricting investments in systems until
the architecture is sufficiently defined and effective controls are in
place for ensuring new investments are aligned with it.
We performed our work from March 2003 through June 2003 in accordance with
U. S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Details on our
scope and methodology are included in appendix II. We requested comments
on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Defense or his
designee. Written comments from the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) are addressed in the *Agency Comments and Our Evaluation*
section of this report and are reprinted in appendix IV.
4 U. S. General Accounting Office, Business Systems Modernization: Summary
of GAO*s Assessment of Department of Defense*s Initial Business Enterprise
Architecture, GAO- 03- 877R (Washington, D. C.: July 7, 2003).
Results in Brief As we reported in February 2003, 5 DOD undertook a
challenging and ambitious task* to develop within 1 year a departmentwide
architecture for modernizing its current financial and business operations
and systems. Thus far, DOD has expended tremendous effort and resources
and made important progress in complying with the legislative requirements
aimed at developing and effectively implementing a well- defined
enterprise architecture. Concerning progress, the department has
established some of the architecture management capabilities advocated by
best practices and federal guidance, 6 such as having a program office,
designating a chief architect, and using an architecture development
methodology and automated tool. Further, DOD*s initial version of its BEA
provides a foundation from which to build and ultimately produce a well-
defined business enterprise architecture. For example, the *As Is*
descriptions include an inventory of about 2,300 systems in operation or
under development, and their characteristics, that support DOD*s current
business operations. The *To Be* descriptions address, to at least some
degree, how DOD intends to operate in the future, what information will be
needed to support these future operations, and what technology standards
should govern the design of future systems. At the same time, the initial
version does not yet adequately address the
act*s requirements and other relevant architectural requirements. 7 For
example, While DOD has incorporated many relevant external requirements
from 152 federal sources in developing its *To Be* architecture products,
5 U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Business Systems Modernization:
Improvements to Enterprise Architecture Development and Implementation
Efforts Needed, GAO- 03- 458 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 28, 2003).
6 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1. 1),
GAO- 03- 584G (Washington, D. C.: April 2003).
7 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget Circular A- 130, Management of Federal Information Resources
(Nov. 28, 2000); M. A. Cook, Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Upper Saddle River, N.
J., Prentice Hall: 1996); and National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Information Management Directions: The Integration Challenge,
Special Publication 500- 167 (September 1989).
critical federal requirements governing the *To Be* architecture, such as
federal accounting requirements for recording revenue, are not included.
As a result, the architecture*s descriptions of certain business
processes, such as those associated with revenue accounting and reporting,
which include over $70 billion earned annually by working capital fund
activities, are not complete.
The *As Is* environment provides little descriptive content and does not
satisfy 90 percent of the architectural elements required by relevant
guidance, such as descriptions of the current business operations in terms
of the entities/ people who perform the functions, processes, and
activities, and the locations where the functions, processes, and
activities are performed. As a result, DOD does not have a sufficiently
described picture of its current environment to permit development of a
meaningful and useful transition plan.
The *To Be* architecture does not provide sufficient descriptive content
related to future business operations and supporting technology to permit
effective acquisition and implementation of system solutions and
associated operational change. For example, it does not include
descriptions of the actual systems to be developed or acquired to support
future business operations and the physical infrastructure (e. g.,
hardware and software) that will be needed to support the business
systems. As a result, the *To Be* environment lacks the details needed to
provide DOD with a common vision and frame of reference for defining a
transition plan to guide and constrain capital investments, and thus to
effectively leverage technology to orchestrate logical, systematic change
and optimize enterprisewide mission performance.
The transition plan does not possess the attributes needed to provide a
temporal roadmap for moving from the *As Is* to the *To Be* environment
and is basically a plan to develop a transition plan. For example, such
information as time frames for phasing out existing systems within DOD*s
current inventory of about 2,300 systems, and resource requirements for
implementing the *To Be* architecture, are not part of the transition
plan. As a result, DOD does not yet have a meaningful and reliable basis
for managing the disposition of its existing inventory of about 2,300
systems or for sequencing the introduction of modernized business
operations and supporting systems.
Moreover, DOD has not yet defined and implemented an effective approach to
select and control business systems investments 8 for obligations
exceeding $1 million while the architecture is being developed and after
it is completed. Since enactment of the act, as of June 6, 2003, DOD had
approved one business system improvement for $10 million that met this $1
million threshold and was currently reviewing four others. Our analysis
of DOD*s fiscal years 2003 and 2004 information technology (IT) budget
requests shows that over 200 business systems in each year*s budget,
totaling about $4 billion per year, could involve obligations of funds
that
meet the $1 million threshold. This indicates that the majority of the
billions of dollars that DOD invests in business system improvements
annually have not been subject to the scrutiny of the DOD Comptroller now
called for in the act. Overall, our findings indicate that DOD has taken
positive first steps, but much remains to be accomplished before DOD will
have the kind of blueprint and associated investment controls needed to
successfully modernize its financial management operations and supporting
business systems.
DOD*s position is that, to varying degrees, the initial version of its
architecture fully satisfies the act*s requirements, but it also
recognizes that the architecture needs to be expanded and extended to
provide a sufficient
basis for guiding and constraining investment decisions. DOD*s position is
also that it has taken steps to implement the act*s requirements regarding
approving system investments, but that it needs to do more to effectively
select and control business system investments. DOD attributes the current
state of its architecture and investment management processes to the
limited time it has had to define and implement each, in part because it
was overly optimistic in estimating what it could deliver by May 1, 2003.
Until DOD develops and provides for effective implementation of a
welldefined enterprise architecture, its ability to modernize its business
and systems environments in a way that minimizes risk and maximizes return
on investment will be severely hindered.
According to program officials and the initial version of the transition
plan, DOD intends to extend and evolve the architecture to include the
missing scope and detail. However, it has not defined specific plans
outlining how
8 Business systems include financial and nonfinancial systems, such as
civilian personnel, finance, health, logistics, military personnel,
procurement, and transportation, with the common element being the
generation or use of financial data to support DOD*s business operations.
this will be accomplished. Rather, DOD*s current plan is to develop a
strategy for producing the next version of its architecture, and managing
ongoing and planned investments. Among other things, this strategy is to
provide for
determining the resources needed to further develop the architecture;
developing a methodology for integrating the architecture with other
internal and external architectures; establishing an approach for
maintaining its existing systems inventory; and evaluating the
architecture for completeness, accuracy, and integration
of end- to- end business processes and system functions. In addition, DOD
program documentation provides for initiating pilot projects in the near
term that are to demonstrate and implement a portion of the architecture
and be usable across the department. However, DOD officials stated that
the pilot projects are intended to validate departmentwide business
processes and not to implement production systems. Because of these
differing views of what the pilot projects are intended to achieve, the
purpose and scope of these projects remain unclear, and specific projects
have yet to be selected.
To assist DOD, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
aimed at improving its plans for developing the next version of the
architecture and implementing the institutional means for selecting and
controlling both planned and ongoing system investments. DOD concurred
with 9 of our 10 recommendations, partially concurred with the remaining
one, and described actions recently completed, ongoing, or planned to
implement them.
Background DOD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the
world. In fiscal year 2002, DOD reported that its operations involve about
$700 billion in assets, nearly $1.5 trillion in liabilities, approximately
3.3 million
military and civilian personnel, and disbursements of over $346 billion.
Moreover, execution of these operations spans a wide range of defense
organizations, including the military services and their respective major
commands and functional activities, numerous large defense agencies and
field activities, and various combatant and joint operational commands
that are responsible for military operations for specific geographic
regions or theaters of operations. To execute these military operations,
the department performs an assortment of interrelated and interdependent
business functions, including logistics management, procurement,
healthcare management, and financial management.
The department*s pervasive problems in performing these business functions
are well chronicled by the DOD Inspector General, the military service
audit agencies, and us. Of the 25 areas in the federal government that we
have designated as high risk, 6 are DOD program areas (i. e., systems
modernization management, financial management, contract
management, inventory management, support infrastructure management, and
weapon systems acquisition), and DOD shares responsibility for 3 of the
governmentwide high- risk areas (i. e., strategic human capital
management, protecting information systems and critical infrastructures,
and federal real property). 9 DOD*s problems in each of these areas hinder
the efficiency of operations, and leave the department vulnerable to
fraud, waste, and abuse.
To support its business functions, DOD reports that it currently relies on
about 2,300 systems, including accounting, acquisition, logistics, and
personnel. As we have previously reported, 10 this environment was not
designed to be, but rather has evolved into, an overly complex, and
errorprone IT environment, including (1) little standardization across
DOD, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data
stored in multiple systems, and (4) manual data entry into multiple
systems. For
fiscal year 2003, DOD requested approximately $26 billion in IT funding to
support a wide range of military operations as well as DOD business system
operations. Approximately $18 billion* nearly $5.2 billion for business
systems and $12.8 billion primarily for business systems infrastructure*
relates to the operation, maintenance, and modernization
9 U. S. General Accounting Office, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO- 03-
119 (Washington, D. C.: January 2003); U. S. General Accounting Office,
High Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO- 03- 120
(Washington, D. C.: January 2003); U. S. General Accounting Office, High
Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation*s Critical Infrastructures, GAO- 03- 121
(Washington, D. C.: January 2003); and U. S. General Accounting Office,
High Risk Series: Federal Real Property, GAO- 03- 122 (Washington, D. C.:
January 2003).
10 U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Financial Management: Important
Steps Underway But Reform Will Require a Long- term Commitment, GAO- 02-
784T (Washington, D. C.: June 4, 2002).
of DOD*s business systems. The remaining $8 billion relates primarily to
command and control systems, including the infrastructure to support these
systems.
One of the seven key elements we have reported 11 as necessary to
successfully execute the department*s business systems modernization
program is establishing and implementing an enterprise architecture.
Subsequently, in its fiscal year 2002 Performance and Accountability
Report, DOD acknowledged that deficiencies in its systems and business
processes hindered the department*s ability to collect and report
financial and performance information that is accurate, reliable, and
timely. The report noted that to address its systemic problems and assist
in the transformation of the department*s business operations, the
department had undertaken the development and implementation of a business
enterprise architecture, or modernization blueprint. Table 1 shows the
scope of DOD*s business operations, including business domains owners, and
related business process areas and supporting functions.
11 U. S. General Accounting Office, Department of Defense: Status of
Financial Management Weaknesses and Progress Toward Reform, GAO- 03- 931T
(Washington D. C.: June 25, 2003).
Table 1: Interrelationship Between Domains and Business Process Areas
Domain Domain owner Business process areas Business process functions
Acquisition/ Procurement Under Secretary of Defense Procurement and
Acquisition Identifying a need and procuring and (Acquisition, Technology
and
acquiring goods and services to satisfy the Logistics)
need (includes managing contracts and purchase card programs).
Finance, Accounting Under Secretary of Defense Accounting Identifying,
measuring, recording, and Operations, and Financial
(Comptroller/ Chief Financial communicating economic information
Management Officer)
about an organization (includes developing and maintaining DOD standard
accounting structure, policies, and cost accounting).
Collection, Accounts Recording, tracking, managing, Receivable, and Cash
monitoring, liquidating, and collecting Management
amounts due to DOD (includes reconciling fund balance with Treasury).
Payables and Disbursing
Receiving payment requests, determining payment due dates, and issuing
payment.
Financial and Management Providing accurate, reliable, and timely
Reporting
financial and management information. Human Resource
Under Secretary of Defense Human Resource Facilitating entry to the
organization, Management (Personnel and Readiness) Management developing
and managing careers, managing benefits and pay, executing
policies and procedures, and managing employee information. Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense Logistics Planning, controlling, and carrying
out the
(Acquisition, Technology and efficient and effective movement and
Logistics)
maintenance of forces (includes inventory and personal property
management).
Strategic Planning and Under Secretary of Defense Strategic Planning and
Strategic planning, developing the Budgeting (Comptroller/ Chief Financial
Budgeting programs and the budget, and executing Officer)
the budget. Installations and
Under Secretary of Defense Real Property and Managing all real property
and Environment (Acquisition, Technology and Environmental Liabilities
environmental controls. Logistics)
Technical Infrastructure Assistant Secretary of Defense All of the above
Providing foundation for enterprise data (Networks and Information
management, reporting, enterprise and Integration)/ Chief Information
technical services, and standards and Officer a
policy (includes information assurance). Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a Formerly known as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence)/ Chief Information Officer.
Enterprise Architecture Is Effective use of enterprise architectures is a
trademark of successful public
Critical to DOD*s Ability to and private organizations. For a decade, we
have promoted the use of
Improve Its Business architectures, recognizing them as a crucial means to
a challenging goal:
Functions agency operational structures that are optimally defined, in
both business
and technological environments. The Congress, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), and the federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council also
have recognized the importance of an architecture- centric approach to
modernization. For example, the Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996 12 mandates
that an agency*s CIO develop, maintain, and facilitate the
implementation of an architecture within the agency and that the agency*s
decisions to invest in IT satisfy specified criteria and take into account
the agency*s business processes. Further, OMB has issued guidance 13 that,
among other things, requires system investments to be consistent with
these architectures.
What Is an Enterprise An enterprise architecture provides a clear and
comprehensive picture of
Architecture? an entity, whether it is an organization (e. g., federal
department or agency)
or a functional or mission area that cuts across more than one
organization (e. g., financial management). This picture consists of
snapshots of both the enterprise*s current or *As Is* operational and
technological environment and its target or *To Be* environment, as well
as a capital investment roadmap for transitioning from the current to the
target environment.
These snapshots further consist of *views,* which are basically one or
more architecture products that provide conceptual or logical
representations of the enterprise. The concept of enterprise architectures
dates back to the mid- 1980s. At that time, John Zachman, widely
recognized as a leader in the field of enterprise architecture, identified
the need to use a logical construction blueprint (i. e., an architecture)
for defining and controlling the integration
of systems and their components. 14 Accordingly, Zachman developed a
structure or *framework* for defining and capturing an architecture. In
his work, Zachman drew parallels to the field of classical architecture
and later
12 The Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 106, Div. E, Title LI,
sections 5122 and 5125, 110 Stat. 679, 683- 85, Feb. 10, 1996 (codified,
as amended, at 40 U. S. C. sections 11312 and 11315( b)( 2)).
13 OMB Circular No. A- 130, Management of Federal Information Resources
(Nov. 28, 2000). 14 J. A. Zachman, *A Framework for Information Systems
Architecture,* IBM Systems Journal 26, no. 3 (1987).
to the aircraft manufacturing industry, in which different work products
(e. g., architect plans, contractor plans, shop plans, and bills of
lading) represent different views of the planned building or aircraft.
Similarly, Zachman*s framework identified the kinds of work products
needed for
people to understand and thus build a given system or entity. This
framework provides for six windows from which to view the enterprise,
which Zachman terms *perspectives* on how a given entity operates: those
of (1) the strategic planner, (2) the system user, (3) the system
designer, (4) the system developer, (5) the subcontractor, and (6) the
system itself. Zachman also proposed six abstractions or models associated
with each of these perspectives: these models cover (1) how the entity
operates, (2) what the entity uses to operate, (3) where the entity
operates, (4) who operates the entity, (5) when entity operations occur,
and (6) why the entity
operates. Zachman*s framework provides a way to identify and describe an
entity*s existing and planned component parts and the parts* relationships
before one begins the costly and time- consuming efforts associated with
developing or transforming the entity. Since Zachman introduced his
framework, a number of other frameworks
have been proposed. In February 1998, DOD directed its components to use
its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework,
Version 2.0. The C4ISR architecture framework defines the type and content
of architectural artifacts, as well as the relationships among artifacts,
that are needed to produce a useful enterprise architecture. Briefly, the
framework decomposes an enterprise architecture into three primary views
(windows into how the enterprise operates): the operational, systems, and
technical views. According to DOD, the three interdependent views are
needed to ensure that IT systems are developed and implemented in an
interoperable and cost- effective manner. (See fig. 1 for an illustration
of the three views.)
Figure 1: Interdependent C4ISR Views Operational view
of Identifies warfighter
levels relationships and
requirements information needs
information Processing intermodal
to nodes,
and requirements
Basic exchange
and exchange
and and
levels new
of Processing
information associations
needlines, technology
requirements Systems
activities, capabilities
supportability
Systems view Technical view
Relates capabilities Prescribes and characteristics
standards to operational
and conventions requirements
to satisfy
Specific capabilities
identified levels
and operational
information requirements
exchange Technical
criteria implementation/
procurement governing
interoperable capabilities
of the
selected system
Source: C4ISR Architecture Framework, Version 2.
More recently, OMB established the Federal Enterprise Architecture Program
Management Office to develop a federated enterprise architecture according
to a collection of five *reference models*:
The Business Reference Model is intended to describe the business
operations of the federal government independent of the agencies that
perform them, including defining the services provided to state and local
governments.
The Performance Reference Model is to provide a common set of general
performance outputs and measures for agencies to use to achieve business
goals and objectives. The Data and Information Reference Model is to
describe, at an
aggregate level, the type of data and information that support program and
business line operations, and the relationships among these types.
The Service Component Reference Model is to identify and classify IT
service (i. e., application) components that support federal agencies and
promote the reuse of components across agencies.
The Technical Reference Model is to describe how technology is supporting
the delivery of service components, including relevant standards for
implementing the technology.
These post- Zachman frameworks differ in their nomenclatures and modeling
approach. However, the frameworks consistently provide for defining an
enterprise*s operations in both (1) logical terms, such as interrelated
business processes and business rules, information needs and flows, and
work locations and users, and (2) technical terms, such as hardware,
software, data, communications, and security attributes and performance
standards. The frameworks also provide for defining these perspectives
both for the enterprise*s *As Is* and *To Be* environments, as well as a
transition plan for moving from the *As Is* to the *To Be* environment.
The importance of developing, implementing, and maintaining an enterprise
architecture is a basic tenet of both organizational transformation and IT
management. Managed properly, an enterprise
architecture can clarify and help optimize the interdependencies and
relationships among an organization*s business operations and the
underlying IT infrastructure and applications that support these
operations. Employed in concert with other important management controls,
such as portfolio- based capital planning and investment control
practices, architectures can greatly increase the chances that
organizations* operational and IT environments will be configured so as to
optimize mission performance. Our experience with federal agencies has
shown that investing in IT without defining these investments in the
context of an architecture often results in systems that are duplicative,
not well integrated, and unnecessarily costly to maintain and interface.
15
Subsection 1004( b) of the act (see app. I) also defines elements required
of DOD*s enterprise architecture that are consistent with the above
mentioned enterprise architecture guidance and requirements. Specifically,
DOD*s financial management enterprise architecture (its BEA) must define
an information infrastructure that would enable DOD to meet certain
requirements and it must include policies, procedures, data standards, and
system interface requirements applicable uniformly throughout DOD.
Prior Reviews of DOD*s For the last 2 years, GAO has addressed the need
for and reviewed DOD*s Enterprise Architecture
efforts to develop an enterprise architecture for modernizing its business
Efforts Have Identified
operations and systems and made recommendations to assist DOD in
Challenges and Weaknesses successfully developing the architecture and
using it to gain control over its ongoing business system investments. In
particular, we reported in May 2001 16 that the department had neither an
enterprise architecture for its financial and financial- related business
operations, nor the management structure, processes, and controls in place
to effectively develop and implement one. We also reported that the
department planned to spend billions of dollars on new and modified
business systems that would function independently from one another and
outside the context of an enterprise architecture. We concluded that if
the department continued down this path, it would only perpetuate its
existing business operations and systems environment, which we described
as duplicative, not interoperable, unnecessarily costly to maintain and
interface, and not optimizing mission performance and accountability. We
made eight recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at
providing the means for effectively developing and implementing an 15 See,
for example, U. S. General Accounting Office, DOD Business Systems
Modernization: Improvements to Enterprise Architecture Development and
Implementation Efforts Needed, GAO- 03- 458 (Washington, D. C.: February
2003); U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: DLA Should
Strengthen Business Systems Modernization Architecture and Investment
Activities, GAO- 01- 631 (Washington, D. C.: June 2001); and U. S. General
Accounting Office, Information Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the
Development of Its Enterprise Architecture, AIMD- 00- 212 (Washington, D.
C.: August 2000).
16 GAO- 01- 525.
enterprise architecture. Of the eight recommendations, DOD has fully
implemented one, partially implemented five, and has not yet implemented
two.
In February 2003, 17 we reported that while DOD is following some
enterprise architecture and IT investment management processes and
controls, it is not following others, in part, because it was focused on
meeting an ambitious schedule. More specifically, with respect to
developing the architecture, we reported that DOD had yet to (1) establish
a governance structure and process controls needed to ensure ownership of
and accountability for the architecture across the department, (2) clearly
communicate to intended stakeholders its purpose, scope, and approach to
developing the architecture, and (3) define and implement an independent
quality assurance process.
We also reported in our February 2003 report that, while DOD had taken
some initial steps aimed at improving its management of ongoing business
system investments, DOD had yet to (1) establish an investment governance
structure and process to align ongoing investments with its architectural
goals and direction, (2) establish and apply common investment criteria to
its ongoing IT system projects, and (3) conduct a
comprehensive review of its ongoing IT investments to ensure they are
consistent with architecture development efforts. We reiterated our
earlier recommendations and made six new recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense to assist DOD in successfully developing an enterprise
architecture and using it to gain control over its ongoing business system
investments. Of the six recommendations we made, DOD has partially
implemented two but has not yet implemented the remaining four. In March
2003, 18 we reported on DOD*s draft version of the BEA, dated
February 7, 2003, and concluded that it did not include a number of items
recommended by relevant architectural guidance and that DOD*s plans would
not fully satisfy the act*s requirements. For example, the draft
architecture did not include a *To Be* security view, which defines the
security requirements, including relevant standards to be applied in
implementing security policies, procedures, and controls. We did not make
17 GAO- 03- 458. 18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information
Technology: Observations on Department of Defense*s Draft Enterprise
Architecture, GAO- 03- 571R (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
recommendations because this draft was a work in process that was changing
daily. However, DOD officials agreed with our preliminary assessment of
the architecture and stated that subsequent versions of the architecture
would provide these missing details. See appendix III for details on the
status of all our recommendations,
including our assessment of DOD*s actions. DOD Has Taken
DOD has made important progress in complying with the legislative Positive
First Steps in requirements to develop and effectively implement a well-
defined enterprise architecture. The department has (1) elected an
incremental Complying with
approach to developing its architecture, (2) adopted some of the
Enterprise
architecture management capabilities advocated by best practices and
federal guidance, 19 such as designating a chief architect, and (3)
developed Architecture
initial versions of architecture products that provide a foundation upon
Legislative
which to build. Nevertheless, DOD*s initial architecture lacks sufficient
Requirements, but
scope and content to fully satisfy legislative requirements, satisfy
relevant architecture guidance, and make informed decisions about systems
Much Remains to be
investments. Moreover, DOD has yet to implement an effective investment
Accomplished
management process to select and control ongoing and planned business
system investments.
DOD Is Following an Our research and experience show that for major
program investments,
Incremental Approach to such as the development of an enterprise
architecture, successful
Developing Its Architecture organizations approach product development in
an incremental fashion, meaning that they initially develop a foundational
product that is expanded
and extended through a series of follow- on products that add more
capability and value. In doing so, these organizations can effectively
mitigate the enormous risk associated with trying to deliver a large and
complex product that requires the execution of many activities over an
extended period of time as a single monolithic product. In effect, this
incremental approach permits a large undertaking to be broken into a
series of smaller projects, or incremental versions, that can be better
controlled to provide reasonable assurance that expectations are met.
19 GAO- 03- 584G.
For its enterprise architecture development program, we have recognized
and told DOD that given its plans, capabilities, and status, it would not
be able to produce and approve a complete version of its architecture by
May 1, 2003. Accordingly, we advised DOD to adopt an incremental approach
to developing and implementing its architecture and to represent its
architecture product to stakeholders as an initial version and to define
its plans for evolving and extending this initial version to satisfy the
act and create a well- defined blueprint. Recognizing these obstacles, DOD
has
adopted an incremental approach. Specifically, DOD has designated its
architecture as version 1.0 and has committed to building on this in
producing subsequent versions. According to DOD, the next significant
delivery of the BEA is currently planned for May 2004. DOD Has Recently
Adopted
Effective process controls for managing architecture development, Some,
but Not All Key maintenance, and implementation are recognized hallmarks
of successful Elements of Architecture public and private organizations.
According to guidance published by the federal CIO Council, 20 effective
architecture management consists of a Management Best Practices
number of practices, conditions, and structures. In April 2003, we
published version 1.1 of our enterprise architecture management maturity
framework, which arranges the core elements of the CIO Council*s guidance
into five hierarchical stages. 21 The framework provides an explicit
benchmark for gauging the effectiveness of architecture management and
provides a roadmap for making improvements. Table 2 summarizes the
framework*s five stages of maturity.
20 Chief Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal
Enterprise Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001). 21 GAO- 03- 584G.
Tabl e 2: Summary of GAO*s Enterprise Architecture (EA) Maturity Framework
Stages Stage Description Stage 1: Creating EA awareness Organization does
not have plans to develop and use an architecture, or it has plans that do
not
demonstrate an awareness of the value of having and using an architecture.
While stage 1 agencies may have initiated some EA activity, these
agencies* efforts are ad hoc and unstructured, lack institutional
leadership and direction, and do not provide the management
foundation necessary for successful EA development.
Stage 2: Building the EA Organization recognizes that the EA is a
corporate asset by vesting accountability for it in an management
foundation executive body that represents the entire enterprise. At this
stage, an organization assigns EA management roles and responsibilities
and establishes plans for developing EA products and for measuring program
progress and product quality; it also commits the resources necessary for
developing an architecture* people, processes, and tools. Stage 3:
Developing the EA Organization focuses on developing architecture products
according to the selected framework,
(includes all elements in stage 2) methodology, tool, and established
management plans. Roles and responsibilities assigned in the previous
stage are in place, and resources are being applied to develop actual EA
products. The scope of the architecture has been defined to encompass the
entire enterprise, whether organization- based or function- based.
Stage 4: Completing the EA Organization has completed its EA products,
meaning that the products have been approved by (includes all elements in
stage 3) the EA steering committee or an investment review board, and by
the CIO. Further, an independent agent has assessed the quality (i. e.,
completeness and accuracy) of the EA products. Additionally, evolution of
the approved products is governed by a written EA maintenance policy
approved by the head of the organization.
Stage 5: Leveraging the EA to
Organization has secured senior leadership approval of the EA products and
a written
manage change
institutional policy stating that IT investments must comply with the
architecture, unless granted (includes all elements in stage 4)
an explicit compliance waiver. Further, decision makers are using the
architecture to identify and address ongoing and proposed IT investments
that are conflicting, overlapping, not strategically linked, or redundant.
Also, the organization tracks and measures EA benefits or return on
investment, and adjustments are continuously made to both the EA
management process and the EA products.
Source: GAO.
The state of DOD*s implementation of key enterprise architecture
management practices, conditions, and structures currently places it at
stage 1 of our maturity framework. Specifically, it has satisfied about 80
percent of the core elements associated with building the enterprise
architecture management foundation* stage 2 of our framework* but only
about 41 percent (9 of the 22) of the core elements associated with stages
3, 4, and 5. According to our framework, effective architecture management
is generally not achieved until an enterprise has a completed and approved
architecture that is being effectively maintained and is being used to
leverage organizational change and support investment decision making;
having these characteristics is equivalent to having satisfied all stage 3
core elements and many stage 4 and 5 elements.
With respect to stage 2 core elements, DOD has, for example, established a
program office, assigned a chief architect, and selected a framework
(C4ISR) and an automated tool (e. g., the System Architect by Popkin
Software). However, the department has not satisfied two of the stage 2
core elements that are critical to effective enterprise architecture
management. For example, a committee or group representing the enterprise
has not yet been established to guide, direct, and approve the
architecture. Instead, the current version of its architecture has been
guided and directed by the Business Modernization and Systems Integration
(BMSI) program office. Although the Secretary of Defense has established
Financial Management Modernization Executive and Steering Committees for
the enterprise architecture, which are made up of senior leaders from
across the department, to provide program guidance, these committees are
not accountable for approving the architecture. Instead, the
responsibility of each committee is limited to providing guidance to the
BMSI program office and advising the DOD Comptroller. However, DOD
officials told us that the Executive Committee has approved the
architecture; yet there were no minutes of the Executive Committee
documenting this decision. Without an accountable corporate entity to lead
the architectural effort, there is increased risk that the architecture
will not represent a corporate decision- making tool and will not be
viewed and endorsed as a departmentwide asset. Further, DOD does not have
a written and approved policy for architecture
development, which is a stage 3 core element. Without such a policy that,
for example, identifies the major players in the development process and
provides for architecture guidance, direction, and approval, DOD has been,
and will continue to be, challenged in achieving departmentwide
architecture commitment and support.
The department also has yet to implement numerous stage 4 and 5 core
elements. For example, DOD has not (1) documented and approved a policy
for architecture maintenance, (2) fully implemented an independent
verification and validation function that covers architecture products and
architecture management processes, and (3) made the architecture an
integral component of its IT investment management process.
According to program officials, the department set overly optimistic
expectations and time frames for its enterprise architecture program,
which resulted in the need to establish architecture management process
controls concurrent with developing architecture products. Until the
department implements the core elements of our enterprise architecture
management maturity framework, it is unlikely that it will be able to
either produce and maintain a well- defined architecture or effectively
implement what is produced.
Table 3 provides the results of our assessment of DOD*s satisfaction of
each of the core elements of our maturity framework.
Table 3: Assessment of DOD*s Enterprise Architecture Efforts Against GAO*s
Enterprise Architecture Maturity Framework Stage Core element Satisfied?
Comments Stage 1: EA Agency is aware of EA. Yes In July 2001, the
Secretary of Defense issued a
Awareness memorandum directing the development and implementation of a
departmentwide enterprise architecture.
Stage 2: Building the
Adequate resources exist (funding, Yes According to DOD, it has adequate
program
EA Management
people, tools, and technology). funding. It requested approximately $196.3
million
Foundation
for the program and received about $186.8 million. Further, it reports
that it has skilled staff (government employees and contractors) for its
architecture program. In addition, DOD is using automated tools and
technology, such as System Architect by Popkin Software and the Dynamic
Object- Oriented Requirements System by Telelogic. Committee or group
representing the
No DOD has not assigned responsibility for directing, enterprise is
responsible for directing,
overseeing, and approving the EA to a committee overseeing, and approving
the EA.
or group comprised of representatives from across the department. Program
office responsible for EA
Yes DOD has established a program office that is development and
maintenance exists. responsible for EA development and maintenance. Chief
architect exists. Yes DOD has assigned a chief architect. EA is being
developed using a
Yes The EA is being developed using DOD*s C4ISR framework, methodology,
and automated architecture framework and the Federal Enterprise tool.
Architecture Program Management Office Reference Models. Further, DOD has
a methodology that adapts its development contractor*s architecture
methodology to the C4ISR framework. In addition, DOD is using automated
tools, such as System Architect by Popkin Software, to build the EA, and
Dynamic ObjectOriented Requirements System by Telelogic, as the repository
for requirements information.
EA plans call for describing both the *As Yes EA plans call for describing
the *As Is* and the *To Is* and the *To Be* environments of the Be*
environments, and a sequencing plan. enterprise, as well as a sequencing
plan for transitioning from the *As Is* to the *To Be.*
(Continued From Previous Page)
Stage Core element Satisfied? Comments
EA plans call for describing both the *As Yes EA plans call for describing
both the *As Is* and the Is* and the *To Be* environments in terms
*To Be* environments in terms of business, of business, performance,
performance, information/ data, application/ service, information/ data,
application/ service, and
and technology. technology. EA plans call for business, performance, No
According to DOD, EA plans will not address information/ data,
application/ service, and
security for the *As Is* environment, but will technology descriptions to
address
address security for the *To Be* environment. security.
EA plans call for developing metrics for Yes EA plans call for developing
EA metrics for measuring EA progress, quality, measuring progress,
quality, compliance, and compliance, and return on investment.
return on investment.
Stage 3: Developing Written/ approved organization policy No DOD has a
policy for developing the Global EA Products (includes exists for EA
development. Information Grid (GIG), a which requires that all
all elements from other departmental architectures be in alignment stage
2)
with the GIG. While this policy outlines the roles and responsibilities
for development, maintenance, and implementation of the GIG, it does not
do so
for other architectures, such as the BEA. Such policy should describe, for
example, the scope of the BEA and the processes for BEA oversight,
control, and validation. The policy should also identify the major players
in the development
process, including the chief architect, steering committee, and CIO. The
GIG policy does not provide this information for the BEA. EA products are
under configuration
Yes Configuration of EA products is being managed by management. an
automated tool. EA products describe or will describe Yes According to
plans, EA products will describe the both the *As Is* and the *To Be*
*As Is* and the *To Be* environments, as well as a environments of the
enterprise, as well as
sequencing plan. a sequencing plan for transitioning from the *As Is* to
the *To Be.*
Both the *As Is* and the *To Be* Yes According to plans, the *As Is* and
the *To Be* environments are described or will be environments will be
described in terms of described in terms of business,
business, performance, information/ data, performance, information/ data,
application/ service, and technology. application/ service, and
technology.
Business, performance, information/ data, No According to DOD,
descriptions will not address application/ service, and technology
security for the *As Is* environment, but will descriptions address or
will address
address security for the *To Be* environment. security.
Progress against EA plans is measured Yes DOD is measuring and reporting
progress against and reported. EA plans. For example, the verification and
validation contractor reports on the quality of EA
products, and the development contractor reports weekly on its progress
(cost, schedule, performance).
(Continued From Previous Page)
Stage Core element Satisfied? Comments Stage 4: Completing Written/
approved organization policy
No There is no written/ approved policy for EA
EA Products
exists for EA maintenance. maintenance. (includes all elements from stage
3)
EA products and management processes No EA products undergo verification
and validation; undergo independent verification and
however, as we previously reported, b this function validation. is not
independent of the program office. Further, management processes are not
verified and
validated. EA products describe both the *As Is* and No Version 1.0 of the
EA describes the *As Is* and the the *To Be* environments of the
*To Be* environments of the enterprise, as well as enterprise, as well as
a sequencing plan a sequencing plan; however, as discussed later in for
transitioning from the *As Is* to the *To
this report, this version is missing needed scope Be.* and detail. Both
the *As Is* and the *To Be*
No Version 1.0 of the EA describes the *As Is* and the environments are
described in terms of
*To Be* environments of the enterprise, as well as business, performance,
information/ data,
a sequencing plan; however, as discussed later in application/ service,
and technology. this report, this version is missing needed scope and
detail.
Business, performance, information/ data, No Version 1.0 of the EA
describes the *As Is* and the application/ service, and technology
*To Be* environments of the enterprise, as well as descriptions address
security.
a sequencing plan; however, as discussed later in the report, this version
is missing needed scope and detail. Further, according to DOD, security
will not be addressed for the *As Is* environment. Organization CIO has
approved current
Yes The CIO is a member of the executive committee. version of EA.
According to a DOD program official, the executive committee has approved
the EA. Committee or group representing the
Yes According to a DOD program official, the executive enterprise or the
investment review board committee has approved the EA. has approved
current version of EA.
Quality of EA products is measured and Yes The verification and validation
contractor reviews reported. and reports on the quality of EA products.
Stage 5: Leveraging
Written/ approved organization policy No There is no written/ approved
policy requiring IT
the EA for Managing
exists for IT investment compliance with investment compliance with the
EA. Change
EA. (includes all elements from stage 4)
Process exists to formally manage EA No There is no defined process for
managing changes change. to the EA.
EA is integral component of IT investment No The EA is not being used to
make investment management process. selection and control decisions, and
thus is not
part of the investment management process. EA products are periodically
updated. Yes According to DOD, it plans to periodically update the EA; the
next significant version is to be issued in May 2004. An initial version
(1.0) was issued in
May 2003.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Stage Core element Satisfied? Comments
IT investments comply with EA. No The EA is not being used to select and
control investments, and thus investments do not comply with the
architecture.
Organization head has approved current Ye s According to a program
official, the Secretary of version of EA. Defense orally delegated
approval authority to the
DOD Comptroller, who approved version 1.0 of the EA.
Return on EA investment is measured No Metrics and processes for measuring
EA benefits and reported. have not been developed, thus precluding return
on investment measurement. DOD is not capturing the full cost of its EA
investment* no cost information for fiscal year 2001 exists and actual
government salary expenses are unknown. As of
May 28, 2003, the department had contractually obligated about $116
million and disbursed about $48.5 million.
Compliance with EA is measured and No Metrics for measuring EA compliance
have not reported. been developed, thus precluding measuring and
reporting on compliance. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. a DOD defines
the GIG as the globally interconnected, end- to- end set of information,
capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting,
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to
warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. b GAO- 03- 458.
Initial Version of DOD has expended tremendous effort and resources and
made important
Architecture Provides a progress in complying with the legislative
requirements aimed at Foundation Upon Which to
developing and implementing a well- defined enterprise architecture. Build
Further, DOD*s initial version of its BEA provides a foundation from which
to build and ultimately produce a well- defined business enterprise
architecture. However, the initial architecture does not adequately
address the act*s requirements and other relevant architectural
requirements. 22 Specifically, the initial version of the architecture
does not adequately describe the accounting and financial management
requirements, and the
22 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget Circular A- 130, Management of Federal Information Resources
(Nov. 28, 2000); M. A. Cook, Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Upper Saddle River, N.
J., Prentice Hall: 1996); and National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Information Management Directions: The Integration Challenge,
Special Publication 500- 167 (September 1989).
*As Is* and *To Be* environments and the transition plan are not
sufficiently complete to provide a basis for guiding and constraining
investment decisions. Architecture Does Not
DOD elicited and incorporated about 4,000 external requirements in its *To
Adequately Address Federal
Be* architecture from 152 federal sources. Our review of 1, 767 of the
Requirements and Accounting external requirements* specifically those that
were elicited from the Joint Standards
Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) 23 *identified 340 JFMIP
requirements (about 19 percent) that were not adequately addressed in
version 1.0 of the *To Be* architecture. Specifically, DOD (1) omitted
some JFMIP requirements that are significant, (2) included some that are
invalid, and (3) included some that are not appropriate to its business
operations. Mission requirements are one of the key bases for determining
the scope
and content for enterprise architectures. One source of requirements is
the legal, regulatory, and other external constraints that define the
environment within which an enterprise, such as DOD, must operate. If a
given architecture is not developed to adequately recognize these
constraints, and these missing constraints are significant, the
architecture will not provide a sufficient frame of reference for informed
decision
making. The act specifies that the architecture should enable DOD to
comply with all federal accounting, financial management, and reporting
requirements. JFMIP requirements arise from various public laws,
regulations, bulletins, circulars, federal accounting standards, and
leading
practices and are applicable government wide. Agencies must use these
requirements, in addition to agency- unique mission requirements, in
planning and implementing their financial management improvement
projects. DOD*s *To Be* architecture omitted significant JFMIP
requirements. For example, DOD*s architecture did not include any relevant
revenue requirements. These requirements are significant to DOD because
they affect the accounting of and reporting for DOD*s revenue, which
include at least $70 billion earned annually by DOD working capital fund
activities. Department and contractor officials agreed that these system
requirements
23 JFMIP is a joint undertaking of the Department of the Treasury, GAO,
the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of Personnel
Management, working with each other, other agencies, and the private
sector to improve financial management in the federal government. JFMIP
issues a series of requirements in support of agency operations.
were either excluded or not adequately addressed and stated that a
subsequent version of the architecture would include or modify the
requirements. Table 4 summarizes the JFMIP requirements that we reviewed
and the numbers of missing or incomplete requirements we
identified.
Tabl e 4: Summary of GAO Analysis of JFMIP Requirements Number of
Percent of Number missing or missing or of JFMIP
incomplete incomplete JFMIP requirements
requirements requirements
requirements
Revenue 220 220 100 Acquisition 112 10 9 Core Financial 430 4 1 Human
Resources and Payroll 203 37 18 Managerial Cost Accounting 67 30 45
Inventory 141 7 5 Tr ave l 166 12 7 Property Management 78 0 0 Benefit 350
20 6
Tot al 1,767 340 19
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
As another example, the *To Be* architecture did not include requirements
governing accounting for and reporting of national defense plant,
property, and equipment (PP& E) 24 that became valid shortly before the
architecture
was approved. These requirements significantly affect the accounting of
and reporting requirements for a reported 600,000 aircraft, ships, combat
vehicles, missiles and other weapons systems, and related equipment. The
architecture did not incorporate requirements for these accounting
standards 25 even though (1) the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory
Board and the three sponsoring agencies 26 responsible for federal
accounting standards approved them in October 2002 and (2) DOD already
recognized these new PP& E requirements in its fiscal year 2002
Performance and Accountability Report and has begun to implement
them. According to DOD and contractor officials, they used outdated
requirements because the new standard was not in effect when they were
identifying and linking national defense PP& E requirements to activities,
processes, and entities depicted by the architecture. As a result, DOD
must now revise its architecture to reflect these requirements,
activities, and processes to ensure compliance with the new accounting
standard.
Lastly, the architecture includes options for doing business at the
federal level that were not appropriate to DOD*s business operations (i.
e., do not reflect external requirements constraining DOD*s operations).
For example, Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS)
No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, requires operating
materials and supplies to be primarily accounted for using the consumption
method and allows the purchases method to be used as an exception only
under certain conditions. 27 Because DOD*s operating supplies and
materials are considered significant, DOD reports the value of its almost
24 National Defense PP& E assets include weapons systems and support PP& E
owned by DOD or its component entities for use in the performance of
military missions. 25 SFFAS No. 23, Eliminating the Category National
Defense Property, Plant, and Equipment, May 2003.
26 The three sponsoring agencies are the Department of the Treasury, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the General Accounting Office. 27 The
consumption method of accounting requires operating materials and supplies
to be capitalized when purchased and reported as an operating expense when
they are consumed.
Under the purchases method, operating materials and supplies are reported
as an operating expense when they are purchased if their amounts are
insignificant, they are in the hands of the end user for use in normal
operations, or it is not cost effective to apply the consumption method.
$91 billion of operating materials and supplies using the consumption
method of accounting. Developing the architecture to allow DOD to use the
purchases method to account for its inventory and related property may
result in inappropriate use of this method and, therefore, inconsistent
practices and supporting system solutions among DOD components.
According to DOD and contractor officials, both the omission and limited
definition of relevant federal requirements is partly due to not having a
fully functioning quality assurance process to verify and validate the
requirements when the requirements were elicited. In March 2003, following
our previous recommendation to strengthen quality assurance activities,
DOD increased its quality assurance activities. These officials
stated that, as part of their current quality assurance process, they are
identifying additional requirements and deleting existing requirements
that are duplicative or deemed not mandatory. As a result, version 1.0 of
the BEA does not adequately reflect and recognize critical external
requirements, and thus is not yet sufficiently complete for making
informed decisions about system investments.
Initial Version of DOD As previously discussed, the various frameworks
used to develop an
Architecture Is Not Sufficiently enterprise architecture consistently (1)
describe the architectures for both
Complete to Satisfy Act and the enterprise*s *As Is* and *To Be*
environments in logical (e. g., business, Guide and Constrain
performance, application, information) as well as technical (e. g.,
hardware, Modernization Investments
software, data) terms, and (2) define a capital investment sequencing plan
to transition from the *As Is* to the *To Be* environment. However, the
frameworks do not prescribe the degree to which the component parts should
be described to be considered correct, complete, understandable, and
usable* essential attributes of any architecture. This is because the
depth and detail of the descriptive content depend on the architecture*s
intended purpose. In the case of DOD, the act specifies that its
enterprise architecture should enable the department to (1) comply with
all federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements,
(2) routinely produce timely, accurate, and reliable financial information
for management purposes, (3) integrate budget, accounting, and program
information and systems, and (4) provide for the systematic measurement of
performance.
Moreover, DOD*s stated intention is to use the architecture as the basis
for departmentwide business transformation and systems modernization.
Collectively, these purposes necessitate that the architecture provide
considerable depth and detail, as well as logical and rational structuring
and internal linkages. More specifically, they mean that the architecture
should contain sufficient scope and detail to permit, for example, (1)
elimination of duplicative business operations and systems, (2)
standardization and integration of business operations and
interoperability of supporting systems, (3) maximum use of enterprisewide
services, and (4) alignment with related shared solutions, like OMB*s e-
gov initiatives. Moreover, this scope and detail 28 should be accomplished
in a way that (1) provides flexibility in adapting to changes in the
enterprise*s internal and external environments, (2) facilitates its
usefulness and
comprehension by varying perspectives/ users/ stakeholders, and (3)
provides for properly sequencing investments to recognize, for example,
the investments* respective dependencies and relative business value.
Version 1.0 of DOD*s enterprise architecture does not contain sufficient
scope and detail to either satisfy the act*s requirements or effectively
guide and constrain departmentwide business transformation and systems
modernization. This is based on our decomposition of version 1.0 into
various parts and components and comparison of it against relevant
benchmarks. More specifically, we first divided the architecture into the
three primary component parts specified in the act and recognized in best
practices and federal guidance: the *As Is* architecture, the *To Be*
architecture, and the transition plan. We then divided the *As Is* and the
*To Be* architectures into five architectural components similar to those
in OMB*s architecture reference models: the business, information/ data,
services/ applications, technical, and performance components; we added
security as a sixth component because of its recognized importance and
relevance to the other five. We then compared version 1.0 to relevant
28 Subsection 1004( b)( 2) of the act also specifies that DOD*s enterprise
architecture shall *include policies, procedures, data standards, and
system interface requirements that are to apply uniformly throughout the
Department.*
criteria 29 governing the content of key architectural elements for the
transition plan and these six components of the *As Is* and *To Be*
architectures. Based on this comparison, we determined whether version 1.0
of the architecture generally satisfied, did not satisfy, 30 or partially
satisfied 31 each architectural element.
Overall, DOD*s *As Is* architecture did not satisfy 26 of 29 key elements,
and partially satisfied the remaining 3; its *To Be* architecture did not
satisfy 4 of 30 key elements, and partially satisfied the remaining 26;
and its transition plan partially satisfied 2 of the 3 elements, but did
not satisfy the remaining 1 (see fig. 2). This means that version 1. 0 of
DOD*s enterprise architecture does not satisfy the requirements of the act
and is not
sufficiently complete to provide an adequate basis for guiding and
constraining investments in modernized systems. Program officials agreed
that this version of the architecture is not complete, but stated that it
fully satisfies the act, because it addresses, to at least some degree,
each of the act*s requirements. They added that they have accomplished as
much in completing the architecture as was possible in the time available,
and that the department was overly optimistic in estimating what it could
produce by May 1, 2003. We agree that DOD set unrealistic expectations of
the scope and level of architectural definition it could provide by this
time, but do not agree, as discussed in detail in the previous section and
the sections that follow, that it satisfies the act*s requirements. We
also believe that the state of DOD*s architecture is also due to
weaknesses in its architecture development management controls that are
discussed in the previous section, and that our prior recommendations were
aimed at correcting.
29 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A130
(Nov. 28, 2000); Cook, M. A., Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Prentice Hall Inc.:
1996); and National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Information Management Directions: The
Integration Challenge, Special Publication 500- 167 (September 1989).
30 The architecture does not satisfy any aspects of this key architectural
element. 31 The architecture partially satisfies some aspects of this key
architectural element but does not satisfy at least one significant
aspect.
Figure 2: Summary of Extent to Which Version 1.0 of DOD*s Enterprise
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements Governing Architectural Content
Yes No
Partially Total
"As Is" environment 0
26 3
29 "To Be" environment
0 4
26 30
Transition plan 0
1 2
3
"As Is" "To Be"
Transition environment
environment plan
10% 13%
33% 90% 87% 67%
No Partially Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
In addition, the structure of the *To Be* architecture contains internal
linkage, consistency, and navigation limitations that constrain its ease
of use and understandability. For example, explicit linkages among (1)
services/ applications, (2) organizations using the services/
applications,
and (3) technical standards governing the services/ applications were
missing, as were linkages between certain business and information/ data
artifacts. This is important because dependencies exist among these
architectural components and a well- defined architecture makes such
dependencies explicit to ensure that systems are implemented in a
nonduplicative and integrated fashion. We also found instances of internal
inconsistencies. For example, one artifact (a table) indicated that DOD
had not selected any standards for certain security services, while
another artifact identified selected standards for these services. In
another instance, four artifacts listed identified requirement sources for
security, such as the Computer Security Act of 1987 32 and OMB Circular A-
130;
however, the artifacts* respective lists varied and no single list
included all the requirement sources. In another instance, some terms
contained within 32 The Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
235, 101 Stat. 1724, Jan. 8, 1988.
the architecture (e. g., availability, integrity checks, confidentiality,
and authentication) were not consistently defined, and the architecture
did not explain the basis for these inconsistencies. For example, one
artifact defined authentication as the *standard practices followed to
authenticate the identity of system users,* while another artifact defined
it as a *security measure designed to establish the validity of a
transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an
individual*s authorization to receive specific categories of information.*
Such inconsistencies in the architecture can in turn lead to
misinterpretations, and thus incompatibilities, in how systems are
implemented. Additionally, the architecture did not include user
instructions or guidance, making it difficult to navigate and use. For
example, (1) certain artifacts (e. g., diagrams) could not be read on-
line because there was no *zoom* capability enabling enlargement, and (2)
specific content, such as the applicability of security standards to
specific security services, took three persons several days to locate. The
complete results of our analysis of each of version 1.0*s parts and
related components are discussed in detail below.
*As Is* Architecture: This architecture is intended to capture the current
state of enterprise operations in sufficient scope and detail to permit
meaningful analysis of gaps between such things as current and future
processes, data, standards, and systems. It thus should describe, for
those
areas of the enterprise that are likely to change, the current set of
business processes and performance measures that are in place and
operating and, among other things, the information/ data, services/
applications, and technology that are in place to support these processes
and measures. According to relevant guidance, 33 the *As Is* architecture
should contain, for example, a description of (1) the actual business
operations currently
being performed to support the organization*s mission, including the
entities/ people that perform the functions, processes, and activities,
and the locations where the functions, processes, and activities are being
33 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A130
(Nov. 28, 2000); Cook, M. A., Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Prentice Hall Inc.:
1996); and National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Information Management Directions: The
Integration Challenge, Special Publication 500- 167 (September 1989).
performed, (2) the information/ data used by the functions, processes, and
activities, (3) the systems that support the functions, processes, and
activities, including system interfaces, (4) the types of technology (e.
g., hardware and software) and associated technical standards that
comprise the physical systems environment, (5) the security standards and
tools
used to secure and protect systems and data, and (6) the metrics for
evaluating the effectiveness of mission operations and supporting system
performance in achieving mission goals and objectives. Without this
information, an enterprise would be extremely challenged in identifying
the proper sequence of changes needed to move from its current operating
environment to its future, target environment. As stated by one leading
industry authority on enterprise architecture, 34 an organization will be
unable to effectively plan and manage its modernization efforts, and will
waste IT dollars, if it does not have a clear picture of its *As Is*
environment.
Version 1.0 of DOD*s *As Is* architecture provides little of this
descriptive content. On the positive side, it includes an inventory of
about 2, 300 existing systems that support DOD*s current business
operations, including certain characteristics about each (e. g., system
owner, purpose and business process it supports, and vendor). However, the
majority of systems do not have descriptions of system interfaces, and the
inventory
has not been validated and continues to change significantly. For example,
DOD*s current *As Is* systems inventory of about 2,300 systems has
increased approximately 35 percent when compared to its *As Is* inventory
of about 1,700 business systems in October 2002. In addition, DOD*s
architecture does not describe (1) the current business operations in
terms of the entities/ people who perform the functions, processes, and
activities, and the locations where the functions, processes, and
activities are performed, (2) the data/ information being used by the
functions, processes, and activities, (3) the types of technology and
associated technical standards being employed, (4) the security standards
and tools being used, and (5) the performance metrics being used. Instead,
it merely provides a listing of the names of the current business
processes. As a result, DOD does not have a sufficiently described picture
of its current environment to permit development of a meaningful and
useful transition plan. See table 5 for the detailed results of our
analysis of DOD*s *As Is* architecture.
34 Troux Technologies, Inc. http:// www. eacommunity. com/ sponsor/ troux_
061903. htm.
Table 5: Detailed Analysis of the Extent to Which DOD*s *As Is*
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements Element satisfied? Key architectural
element Yes No Partially Explanation of partially satisfied Business
A description of the strategic goals, which defines X what an organization
wants to achieve. A business strategy, which defines how the strategic
X goals and objectives will be achieved. An inventory of key policies,
procedures, and X
standards governing how business operations are executed and managed.
A description of key business processes and how X The architecture
contains (1) a list of the names of they support the agency*s mission,
including the the business processes and (2) a high- level (1-
organizational units responsible for performing the
page) graphical depiction of these processes. It business processes and
the locations where the does not contain detailed descriptions of existing
business processes are being performed.
business operations that include, for example, information flows among
activities, organizational units and locations that perform the business
processes, and the technological characteristics of the systems that
perform these processes.
An analysis of deficiencies in the *As Is* business X The architecture
contains an analysis of process environment that are to be addressed, as
well as
area deficiencies. However, this analysis does not obstacles to addressing
these deficiencies, plans for
include the business case( s) for addressing the addressing them, and a
business case for addressing deficiencies. them. An example is an analysis
of the quality of existing data to determine their completeness and
accuracy.
A description of organizational accountability for X execution of current
business policies, procedures, and standards.
Information/ Data
A description of the data management policies, X processes, procedures,
and tools (e. g., CRUD Matrix a ) for analyzing, designing, building, and
maintaining existing databases. A description of the business and
operational rules b X for data standardization to ensure data consistency,
integrity, and accuracy, such as business and security
rules that govern access, maintenance, and use of data.
A data dictionary, which is a repository of standard X data definitions
for applications.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied
A conceptual data model that describes the X fundamental things/ objects
(e. g., invoices, financial statements, inventory) that make up the
business and how they are used, but without regard for how they will be
physically stored. It represents the
consolidated structure of business objects to be used by business
applications. A logical database model that provides the data
X structures that support information flows, and that provides the basis
for developing the schemas for designing, building, and maintaining the
existing physical databases.
A metadata c model that specifies the rules and X standards for access to
information. A description of information flows and relationships
X between organizational units, business operations, and applications.
Services/ Applications
A stable listing of business application systems and X There is a list of
systems, but the respective system components and their interfaces.
interfaces have not been described. Further, this
list continues to change. A description of the common technical approach,
X policies, and procedures for developing/ acquiring business application
systems throughout their life cycle, including requirements management,
design, implementation, testing, deployment, operations, and maintenance.
The common technical approach
should also describe the process for integrating legacy systems with the
systems to be developed/ acquired.
Technical
Descriptions of the enterprise infrastructure services d X to include
specific details regarding the functionality and capabilities that these
services provide to enable systems applications.
Identification of the technical standards e implemented X for each
enterprise service. A description of the physical IT infrastructure needed
X to support the current and any newly developed and/ or acquired systems
outside the scope of the architecture, including the relationships among
hardware, software, and communications devices.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied
Common policies and procedures for X developing/ acquiring infrastructure
systems throughout their life cycle, including requirements management,
design, implementation, testing, deployment, operations, and maintenance.
Security
A description of the policies, procedures, goals, X strategies, and
requirements relevant to information assurance and security.
A listing of security and information assurance X related terms. A listing
of accountable organizations and their
X respective responsibilities for implementing enterprise security
services.
A description of operational security rules that are X derived from
security policies. A description of enterprise security infrastructure
X services (e. g., identification and authentication) needed to protect
the department*s assets, and the means for implementing such a service (e.
g.,
firewalls and intrusion detection software). A description of the security
standards f implemented
X for each enterprise service to secure assets. These standards should be
derived from security requirements.
A description of the protection mechanisms X implemented to secure the
department*s assets, such as firewalls and intrusion detection software,
including a description of the relationships among these protection
mechanisms.
Performance
A description of the performance management X process, including how the
organization measures, tracks, evaluates, and predicts business
performance with respect to business functions, baseline data, and
service levels. A description of customer- focused, measurable goals
X and outcomes for business products and services. A description of
measurable goals and outcomes for
X managing technology to enable the achievement of business goals and
outcomes. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a A CRUD (create, read, update, and/ or delete) matrix shows the specific
business functions and applications that create, read, update, and/ or
delete specific data elements, which enables the organization to develop
applications.
b Business and operational rules define specific constraints for the data,
such as security needs (e. g., confidentiality and access of data), and
actions that should or should not occur such as updating or deleting data.
c Metadata are *data about data* that enable automation and consistent
management and use of
information, such as rules and standards. d Examples of enterprise
services include application services, such as web services, and
collaboration
services, such as instant messaging or voice conferencing. e Technical
standards are strict rules and protocols governing how a given enterprise
service is to be
implemented. f Security standards cover such services as identification
and authentication, audit trail creation, access
controls, virus prevention, and intrusion prevention and detection.
*To Be* Architecture: This architecture is intended to capture the vision
of future business operations and supporting technology. It should
describe the desired capabilities and structures at a specified point( s)
in the future. The *To Be* architecture should show, for example, future
business
processes, information needs, and supporting infrastructure, and it should
be fiscally and technologically achievable. According to relevant
guidance, 35 the *To Be* architecture should contain, among other things,
a description of (1) the future business operations that will be performed
to support the organization*s mission, including the entities/ people that
will
perform the functions, processes, and activities, and the locations where
the functions, processes, and activities will be performed, (2) the
logical database model that is to be used to guide the creation of the
physical databases where information will be stored, (3) the systems to be
developed or acquired to support the business operations, (4) the physical
infrastructure (e. g., hardware and software) that will be needed to
support the business systems, (5) the organizations that will be
accountable for implementing security and the tools to be used to secure
and protect systems and data, and (6) the metrics that will be used to
evaluate the effectiveness of mission operations and supporting system
performance in achieving mission goals and objectives. By including these,
the architecture would allow DOD to satisfy the act*s requirements, such
as routinely providing timely, accurate, and reliable information for
management decision making.
35 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1. 0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A130
(Nov. 28, 2000); Cook, M. A., Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Prentice Hall Inc.:
1996); and National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Information Management Directions: The
Integration Challenge, Special Publication 500- 167 (September 1989).
Version 1.0 of DOD*s *To Be* architecture provides some of this
descriptive content, but not to the extent needed to meet the act*s
requirements and permit effective acquisition and implementation of system
solutions and associated operational change. On the positive side, it
contains a description of the future business operations and a logical
database model. However, the future business operations are not described
in terms of the entities/ people who will perform the functions,
processes, and activities, and the locations where the functions,
processes, and activities will be performed. Further, we found no linkage
between the logical database model and the conceptual data model, which
raises concerns regarding the utility of this model in supporting
information flows for business operations and systems. In addition, it
does not describe (1) the actual systems to be developed or acquired to
support future business operations, (2) the physical infrastructure (e.
g., hardware and software) that will be needed to support the business
systems, (3) the organizations that will be accountable for implementing
security and the tools to be used to secure and protect systems and data,
and (4) the metrics that will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of
mission operations and supporting system performance in achieving mission
goals and objectives. Without this information, the organization will not
have a common vision and frame of reference for defining a transition plan
to guide and constrain capital investment, and thus will be unable to
effectively leverage technology to orchestrate logical and systematic
change and optimize enterprisewide mission performance. See table 6 for
the results of our analysis of DOD*s *To Be* architecture.
Table 6: Detailed Analysis of the Extent to Which DOD*s *To Be*
Architecture Satisfies Key Elements Element satisfied? Key architectural
element Yes No Partially Explanation of partially satisfied Business
A description of the strategic goals, which define X The architecture
contains a description of the strategic what an organization wants to
achieve. goals, but does not address how it will support the
department*s warfighter goals. A business strategy, which defines how the
X The architecture lists business strategies, such as strategic goals and
objectives will be achieved. utilizing more commercial practices to
promote private sector partnerships, but does not describe how these
strategies will be implemented. Common policies, procedures, and business
rules
X The architecture does not have common policies and for consistent
implementation of architecture. procedures, nor has it defined a plan for
achieving this.
It does, however, recognize the need for such policies, procedures, and
business rules, and provides a general time frame for when they will be
developed. The architecture includes high- level descriptions of business
rules, but does not formally define how these rules will be automated and
implemented.
A description of key business processes and how X The architecture has a
high- level description of they support the agency*s mission, including
the processes, without a specific identification of organizational units
responsible for performing organizations and locations. the business
processes and the locations where the business processes are performed.
A description of the architecture governance X The architecture has a
draft concept for governance, structure and processes to ensure that the
but does not describe, for example, the process for department*s business
transformation effort ensuring compliance with the architecture and the
remains compliant with the architecture.
processes for managing risks and approving the architecture and systems
investments.
A listing of opportunities to unify and/ or simplify X The architecture
contains a list of deficiencies for the systems and processes across the
agency. operational activities, but not for systems. For example, it does
not identify the specific pilot projects that will be conducted, nor does
it identify the resources (funding
and staffing) needed for conducting these pilots. A description of the
organizational approach for
X The architecture has a notional organizational communications and
interactions among structure for communications and interactions among
business lines and program areas for
departmental entities for reporting and management management reporting,
operational functions, purposes. and architecture development and use.
Information/ Data
Description of data management policies, X The architecture contains a
high- level data processes, procedures, and tools (e. g., CRUD management
strategy, including guidelines, and an Matrix) for analyzing, designing,
building, and
approach for managing the data in an EA environment. maintaining databases
in an enterprise
However, it does not identify the policies, processes, architected
environment. procedures, and tools to be used.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied
A description of the business and operational X The architecture contains
descriptions of data rules for data standardization to ensure data
standards upon which business rules can later be consistency, integrity,
and accuracy, such as developed. The architecture contains rules for
security, business and security rules that govern access,
but lacks the details needed to consistently enforce maintenance, and use
of data.
these rules (e. g., the rules do not always identify the event, entity
name, and the action to occur). In addition, the architecture does not
provide any evidence as to whether these business rules have been verified
and validated for completeness.
A data dictionary, which is a repository of X The architecture contains a
data dictionary comprised standard data definitions for applications. of a
list of terms and their respective definitions. However, the architecture
does not have a complete list of terms nor does it contain a list of the
data elements a needed to support systems and database design.
A conceptual data model that describes the X The architecture contains a
high- level conceptual data fundamental things/ objects (e. g., invoices,
model that does not specify how the business objects financial statements,
inventory) that make up the
are used by applications (i. e., does not show how the business and how
they are used, but without
information is used by the enterprise). Further, this regard for how they
will be physically stored. It
model does not show a consolidated view of the data represents the
consolidated structure of business (business objects) to be used by
applications. objects to be used by business applications.
A logical database model that provides the data X The architecture
contains data structures, which structures that support information flows,
and that
describe, for example, data entities, attributes, and provides the basis
for developing the schemas for
relationships among data. However, the model has not designing, building,
and maintaining the physical
been verified or validated for completeness with databases.
respect to business relevance (i. e., business scenarios do not show
evidence of this validation), nor are there criteria for defining the
number of business scenarios that have to be completed. In addition, it
does not show the relationship among the data structures in this data
model nor the data structure underlying the data/ information flows for
business operations and systems. Further, the architecture does not
contain a
unified enterprise data model that reconciles the independent data models
that have been developed for each business process area. A metadata model
that specifies the rules and
X The architecture notes that an approach, strategy, and standards for
access to information. plan for creating and managing metadata have not
yet
been developed. However, it notes that these documents will be created at
a later time.
A description of information flows and X The architecture contains
notional system- to- system relationships between organizational units,
relationships, including how the system may support business operations,
and system elements.
business activities, which can be used to extend development of the
architecture, but the architecture does not link organizational units to
business operations and system elements (e. g., hardware and software).
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied Services/ Applications
A description of the business application systems X The architecture has
grouped business functions into and system components and their
interfaces. system entities b and identified the communication
paths between these entities; however, these entities are notional. A
description of the common technical approach,
X The architecture does not have a common technical policies, and
procedures for developing/ acquiring
approach and policies and procedures, nor has it business application
systems throughout their life defined a plan for achieving this. It does,
however, cycle, including requirements management,
recognize the need for having an approach and design, implementation,
testing, deployment, policies and procedures, and provides a general time
operations, and maintenance. The common frame for when they will be
developed.
technical approach should also describe the process for integrating legacy
systems with the systems to be developed/ acquired.
Technical Descriptions of the enterprise infrastructure X The architecture
contains high- level definitions for the services to include specific
details regarding the
enterprise services. However, the specific enterprise functionality and
capabilities these services will services for this architecture are to be
developed within provide to enable systems applications.
the context of the GIG*s enterprise services, and, according to DOD, the
GIG is not complete and is still evolving.
Identification of the technical standards to be X DOD has identified
enterprise infrastructure services implemented for each enterprise
service. for system entities. However, standards profiles that
support the services, and commonly apply to all system entities, are not
clearly identified and described. DOD has not yet defined standards
profiles to be employed in the conduct of business processes.
A description of the physical IT infrastructure X needed to support the
developed and/ or acquired systems, including the relationships among
hardware, software, and communications devices. Common policies and
procedures for
X The architecture does not have common policies and developing/ acquiring
infrastructure systems
procedures, nor has it defined a plan for achieving this. throughout their
life cycle including requirements
It does, however, recognize the need for having these management, design,
implementation, testing,
policies and procedures, and provides a general time deployment,
operations, and maintenance. These frame for when they will be developed.
policies and procedures should also address the integration of
applications, including legacy systems.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied Security
A description of the policies, procedures, goals, X The architecture
refers to policies, but application of strategies, and requirements
relevant to
the policies is inconsistent within the architecture. It information
assurance and security.
does not contain procedures; but recognizes the need for them and provides
a general time frame for when they will be developed. The architecture
contains hypothetical security goals for such attributes as risk
and impact assessments. It also contains a high- level strategy that
explains where information assurance should be addressed in the
architecture and the target capabilities needed for information assurance
(e. g.,
threat/ vulnerability assessments). In addition, the architecture lists
relevant security requirements. However, the goals, strategies, and
requirements have not been mapped to specific physical security systems
solutions. It is also unclear how information assurance activities will
support the department*s warfighter goals. A listing of security and
information assurance
X The data dictionary does list some security- related related terms.
terms (e. g., availability, integrity, and authentication);
however, the definitions for these terms are inconsistent with the
definitions contained in the existing policy.
In addition, some of the terms that are not listed (e. g., need- to- know
and nonrepudiation) are critical to implementing effective information
assurance controls.
A listing of accountable organizations and their X respective
responsibilities for implementing enterprise security services.
A description of operational security rules that are X derived from
security policies. A description of enterprise security infrastructure
X The architecture contains generic descriptions of services (e. g.,
identification and authentication)
enterprise security services, but does not specify the that will be needed
to protect the department*s means for implementation. assets, and the
means for implementing such services (e. g., firewalls and intrusion
detection software). A description of the security standards to be
X The architecture describes the enterprise services and implemented for
each enterprise service to
associated standards that apply to individual system secure assets. These
standards should be
entities. However, it does not link requirements to derived from security
requirements.
standards and vice versa.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied
A description of the protection mechanisms that X will be implemented to
secure the department*s assets, such as firewalls and intrusion detection
software, including a description of the relationships among these
protection mechanisms.
Performance A description of the performance management X The architecture
contains a high- level proposal to process, including how the organization
will
develop this process; however, buy- in has not been measure, track,
evaluate, and predict business
achieved. Until buy- in is obtained, the development of performance with
respect to business functions,
such a process will not be an architectural baseline data, and service
levels.
requirement. A description of customer- focused measurable X The
architecture contains performance metrics for goals and outcomes for
business products and operational activities and notional systems;
however, services.
these metrics are not linked to measurable goals associated with business
products and services.
A description of measurable goals and outcomes X The architecture contains
plans to establish baseline for managing technology to enable the
measures that can be used to establish technical achievement of business
goals and outcomes. performance measures, but it does not yet recognize
the need to tie these measures to the business
goals/ outcomes. Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
a Data elements are basic units of information that cannot be further
subdivided. For example, you may create a data structure called *Address,
* which contains the data elements *Street Address, City, State, and Zip
Code. *
b System entities are logical groups of system functions (e. g., general
ledger, payroll) representing *To Be* capabilities and requirements.
Transition Plan: According to relevant guidance and best practices, 36 the
transition plan should provide a temporal roadmap for moving from the *As
Is* to the *To Be* environment. An important step in the development of a
well- defined transition plan is a gap analysis that compares the *As Is*
and *To Be* architectures to identify differences. Other important steps
include analyses of technology opportunities and market place trends as
well as assessments of fiscal and budgetary realities and institutional
acquisition
and development capabilities. Using such analyses and assessments, options
are explored and decisions are made regarding which legacy systems to
retain, modify, or retire, and which new systems to introduce on either a
tactical (temporary) basis or to pursue as strategic solutions.
Accordingly, transition plans identify legacy, migration, and new systems,
and sequence them to show, for example, the phasing out and termination of
systems and capabilities, and the timing of the introduction of new
systems and capabilities. Furthermore, they do so in light of resource
constraints, such as budget, people, acquisition/ development process
maturity, and associated time frames. Recognizing the importance of a
well- defined transition plan, the act 37 also required DOD to identify
(1) all mission- critical or mission- essential operational and
developmental financial and nonfinancial systems, (2) the actual costs to
operate and maintain these systems during fiscal year 2002, and (3) the
estimated costs for fiscal year 2003.
DOD*s transition plan generally does not possess these attributes, and is
basically a plan to develop a transition plan. Specifically, it does not
(1) provide a gap analysis identifying the needed changes to current
business processes and systems, (2) identify all of the systems that will
not become part of the *To Be* architecture as well as the time frames for
phasing out these systems, (3) show a time- based strategy for replacing
legacy systems, including identification of intermediate (i. e.,
migration) systems that may be temporarily needed, and (4) define the
resources (e. g.,
funding and staff) needed to transition to the target environment.
Further, while the transition plan contained system cost information for
fiscal years 2002 and 2003, it did not associate this information, as
specified in the act,
36 See for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officer Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1.0 (February 2001); and Office of Management and
Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A- 130
(Nov. 28, 2000).
37 Section 1004 of Public Law 107- 314.
with mission- critical or mission- essential operational and developmental
financial and nonfinancial systems.
DOD attributed the state of its transition plan to attempting to develop
this plan concurrently with developing its *As Is* and *To Be*
architectures, which it found was not feasible. As a result, DOD does not
yet have a meaningful and reliable basis for managing the disposition of
its existing inventory of about 2,300 systems or for sequencing the
introduction of modernized business operations and supporting systems. See
table 7 for the detailed results of our analysis of DOD*s transition plan.
Table 7: Detailed Analysis of the Extent to Which DOD*s Transition Plan
Satisfies Key Architectural Elements Element satisfied? Key architectural
element Yes No Partially Explanation of partially satisfied Transition
Plan
Analysis of the gaps between the baseline and target X The transition plan
does not contain a detailed gap architecture for business processes,
analysis that shows how and when operational and information/ data, and
services/ application systems to
system deficiencies will be addressed. define missing and needed
capabilities. The transition plan does, however, provide general time
frames for when some potential needed capabilities will be developed, such
as incentives and training plans.
A high- level strategy a for implementing the enterprise architecture,
including specific time- phased milestones for acquiring and deploying
systems, performance metrics, and financial and nonfinancial
resource needs. This strategy should include: A listing of the legacy
systems that will not be part X
Of the about 2,300 existing systems in DOD*s of the *To Be* environment
and the schedule for current inventory, DOD has identified 558 legacy
terminating these systems.
systems and provided retirement dates for 68 (31 have specific termination
dates and 37 have only fiscal year). In other cases, DOD has not specified
any time frames or schedules for termination.
A strategy that recognizes the need to train staff X
The transition plan recognizes that training will be relevant to changes
to policies, procedures, needed, but does not contain specific information
business processes, and systems to enable as to when training will occur,
the types of training operational efficiency and effectiveness. This
that will be needed to address changes, and the strategy should contain
milestone dates for training
anticipated costs. staff and associated costs. A list of the systems to
be developed/ acquired to
X A description of future systems has been provided; achieve business
needs.
however, the systems described are notional. A strategy for employing
enterprise application
X The transition plan contains a high- level strategy integration (EAI)
plans, methods, and tools to, for that could be employed for EAI. However,
it does example, provide for efficiently reusing applications
not address the plans, methods, and tools to be that already exist
concurrent with adding new used. applications and databases.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Element satisfied? Key architectural element Yes No Partially Explanation
of partially satisfied
A technical (systems, infrastructure, and data) migration plan that shows:
the transition from legacy to replacement systems X with explicit sunset
dates and intermediate systems that may be temporarily needed to sustain
existing functionality during the transition period;
an analysis of system interdependencies, including X the level of effort
required to implement related systems in a sequenced portfolio of projects
that includes milestones, time lines, costs, and capabilities; and
a cost estimate for the initial phase( s) of the X transition, and high-
level cost projection for transition to the target architecture. Source:
GAO analysis of DOD data.
a An acquisition/ business strategy is a plan of action for achieving a
specific goal or result through contracting for software products and
services.
Contractor Review of DOD*s verification and validation contractor assessed
Version 1. 0 of its Version 1.0 of the
architecture against relevant best practices to determine its quality. In
June 2003, 38 consistent with our assessment, this contractor reported
that while Architecture Also Identified DOD*s architecture contained
significant content, it lacked the depth and Weaknesses
detail needed to begin building and implementing modernized systems and
making operational changes. Further, the contractor reported that the
architecture was not easily understandable and that its utility to
stakeholders in system acquisition planning was limited. According to the
contractor, these conclusions were based on the following findings.
Linkages among architecture products had not been defined, making it
difficult to navigate through the architecture. Architecture products
did not adequately describe the *As Is*
environment, including business processes and existing business
application systems and supporting technology, which would make it
38 MITRE Technical Report: Review of Financial Management Enterprise
Architecture (FMEA), Version 1.0 (June 2003).
difficult for DOD to perform a gap analysis to support development of a
transition plan.
Architecture products did not adequately describe the *To Be*
environment, including (1) business rules governing how data are to be
accessed and used within the automated environment, (2) migration and
target systems and applications, (3) enterprise infrastructure services
and the technical standards relevant to each service, (4) security needs,
including standards and protection mechanisms (e. g., firewalls), and (5)
performance metrics.
The transition plan was merely a plan to develop a transition plan. As a
result, the contractor recommended, among other things, that the
department discontinue further development of the *To Be* architecture
until it addressed identified deficiencies. Program officials stated that
they will address these comments in subsequent versions of the
architecture.
However, they could not provide us with any written plans governing the
scope of comments to be addressed, and how they will be addressed and
validated.
DOD Has Yet to Establish an Using the architecture as an integral
investment management frame of
Effective Investment reference is essential to effectively selecting and
controlling business
Management Process for system investments and to moving the organization
toward the target
Selecting and Controlling architecture. Such use of an architecture is
provided for in legislation,
federal guidance, and best practices. In addition, subsection 1004( d) of
the Business System
act stipulates that any amount in excess of $1 million may be obligated
for Investments
system improvements only if the DOD Comptroller makes a determination that
the improvement is necessary for (1) critical national security capability
or critical safety and security requirements or (2) prevention of
significant adverse effect on a project that is needed to achieve an
essential capability. The act further states that once the architecture is
approved, the DOD Comptroller must determine that expenditures for system
improvements are consistent with the enterprise architecture and the
transition plan. These legislative requirements are consistent with our
open recommendations to DOD for selecting and controlling business systems
investments. Specifically, we recommended that DOD gain control over
business system investments by establishing a hierarchy of investment
review boards from across the department, establishing a standard set of
criteria to ensure alignment and consistency with the architecture, and
directing the boards to perform a comprehensive review of all ongoing
business system investments. (App. III contains details on the status of
DOD*s efforts to address our open recommendations.)
To comply with the legislative requirement and address our
recommendations, the DOD Comptroller issued a memorandum on March 7, 2003,
to DOD*s component organizations stating that the BMSI office* which is
responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of the
architecture* must review all system initiatives with expenditures in
excess of $1 million. In addition, the memorandum directs the DOD
components, as an integral part of the review and approval process, to
present information to DOD Comptroller officials and relevant domain
owners that demonstrates that each investment (1) complies with the
architecture, and (2) is economically justified.
DOD has not yet defined and implemented an effective investment management
process to proactively identify and control system investments exceeding
$1 million while the architecture is being developed and after it is
completed. Based on DOD data, as of June 6, 2003, the DOD Comptroller had
approved one system initiative with expenditures exceeding $1 million
since enactment of the act, and was reviewing four others. The one system
approval for $10 million was an enhancement to the Mechanization of
Contract Administrative Services (MOCAS) system* which is DOD*s primary
contractor pay system and is used to maintain data on the majority of
DOD*s weapons systems as well as service contracts administered by the
Defense Contract Management Agency. According to DOD, the enhancements to
MOCAS are essential because the system intended to replace MOCAS* Defense
Procurement Payment System* was terminated in December 2002 by the DOD
Comptroller after 7 years of
effort and an investment of $126 million because of poor program
performance and increasing costs. In approving the enhancements to MOCAS,
the DOD Comptroller determined that it was needed to assure
continued system operations and that the failure of MOCAS would jeopardize
DOD*s ability to pay contractors on time, which is one of the criteria in
the act.
BMSI officials stated that the department*s current process for selecting
and controlling business system investments depends on the system owners
coming forward with the request for approval, and that it has not
established the means to determine which systems should be submitted for
review. In response to our prior open recommendations, the DOD Comptroller
states that the department is currently establishing a governance
structure that includes an investment review board and making
the domain owners an integral part of the review and approval process for
selecting and controlling business system investments. According to DOD
officials, the board is to utilize a portfolio management approach based
on established approval thresholds to address investment decisions across
the department. Further, DOD officials state that the department is
developing standard criteria to be used by the investment boards to assess
business
system investments, including consistency with the architecture. However,
this proposed governance concept has not yet been adopted. We discuss this
process in more detail later in this report. Our analysis of DOD*s fiscal
years 2003 and 2004 IT budget requests shows that over 200 systems in each
year*s budget, totaling about $4 billion per year, could involve
obligations of funds that meet the $1 million threshold. This indicates
that the majority of the billions of dollars that DOD invests in
business system improvements annually have not been subjected to the
scrutiny of the DOD Comptroller as now called for in the act. The act
places limitations on the legal authority of individual program and
government contracting officials to obligate funds in support of the
systems for which they are responsible, but DOD has yet to proactively
manage investments to avoid violations of the limitations and to review
investments in any meaningful way to enforce these statutory limitations.
Program officials acknowledge that the department, at a minimum, could use
DOD*s IT budget documentation to proactively fulfill the act*s
requirements. Until DOD strengthens its process for selecting and
controlling business system investments and adopts an effective governance
concept, it remains exposed to the risk of spending billions of dollars on
duplicative, stove- piped, nonintegrated systems that do not optimize
mission performance and accountability and, therefore, do not support the
department*s transformation goals.
DOD*s Plans for According to DOD officials, it intends to (1) further
develop, evolve, and
Evolving and extend the architecture, including the transition plan, and
issue a revised
version, and (2) improve processes for selecting and controlling business
Extending Its
systems investments. However, DOD*s plans for this next phase have not
Enterprise
been explicitly defined. Until they are clearly and completely defined and
Architecture and for
effectively implemented, the department risks perpetuating past business
system investment practices and spending tens of billions of dollars on
Improving Business incompatible, duplicative, and nonintegrated systems.
System Investment Decision Making Are Unclear
DOD*s Plans for Issuing According to DOD, it intends to issue its next
significant version of the
Next Version of architecture in May 2004 and this update is to extend and
evolve the Architecture Products Are
architecture. To accomplish this, program documentation states that DOD
Unclear
will, among other things, determine the contractor resources needed to
evolve and extend the
architecture; develop a methodology for integrating the architecture
with DOD*s GIG
and OMB*s Federal Enterprise Architecture; 39 establish an approach for
maintaining its existing systems inventory;
and evaluate the architecture for completeness, accuracy, and
integration of
end- to- end business processes and system functions. However, how DOD
will accomplish these and other activities associated with effectively
updating its architecture has not been defined, nor have such things as
roles and responsibilities for executing activities, dependencies among
activities, and measures of activity progress. Rather, the department
basically has plans to develop a strategy that will define
39 See the background section of this report for a description of OMB*s
Federal Enterprise Architecture.
this next phase of activities. By following this approach, DOD will again
be setting unrealistic expectations; and without clearly defined plans for
evolving and extending the architecture, the department is at risk of
falling short of its intended goals to centrally guide and direct its
architecture efforts.
DOD*s Plans for Improving As previously described, DOD has a proposed
governance concept that Controls over Ongoing and
describes how and by whom business transformation requirements Planned
Business System
identified by the architecture will be implemented in the department. This
Investments Are Unclear
proposal vests the business line representatives or domain owners with the
authority, responsibility, and accountability for business transformation,
implementation of the architecture, development and execution of the
transition plan, and portfolio management within their domains. This
proposal also designates the domain owners of the business process areas
and provides them a high- level description of their roles and
responsibilities. In addition, the proposal allocates the current
inventory of about 2,300 systems to these domain owners as portfolios of
investments to manage.
However, it is not clear how the proposed approach will be implemented,
and how it will satisfy the act*s investment selection and control
requirements. Further, it is also not clear how the proposed approach will
address our recommendations for establishing a hierarchy of investment
review boards and an explicit set of standard criteria for selecting,
controlling, and evaluating IT investments as a portfolio of options, with
one criterion to ensure consistency and compliance with ongoing
architecture development efforts.
According to DOD officials, as a first step, the domain owners will
validate cost and other functional information associated with the
existing inventory of about 2,300 systems and identify those inventoried
systems that will not become part of the *To Be* architecture. According
to DOD, these efforts will evolve over time and, therefore, its plans do
not include a completion date.
Moreover, DOD program documentation provides for initiating pilot projects
in the near term that are to demonstrate and implement a portion of the
architecture and be usable across the department. In contrast, DOD
officials stated that the pilot projects are intended to validate
departmentwide business processes and not to implement production systems.
Thus, the purpose and scope of these projects remain unclear and
specific projects have yet to be selected. If DOD intends for these
projects to demonstrate or validate an enterprisewide business process to
address a current deficiency in DOD*s business operations and systems,
such as the lack of common data standards, these projects could help DOD
improve its architecture and thus could be reasonable investments.
However, if the pilot projects are to be used to acquire and implement
system solutions and place them into production to achieve an operational
capability, it is unclear how DOD will ensure architecture alignment and
manage the risk associated with investing in more systems before it has a
well- defined blueprint and an effective investment management process to
guide and control them.
Conclusions Recent legislation and our past recommendations to DOD
recognize that it is absolutely essential to have and use a well- defined
enterprise
architecture to guide and constrain DOD*s business systems modernization
program. DOD*s efforts to date to develop such an architecture, and
satisfy its legislative mandate, are good first steps to this end, but
more steps are needed before it will have an adequate basis for acquiring
and implementing its desired systems environment. In our view, DOD*s BEA
(version 1.0) provides a foundation for it to move forward in adding
missing architectural scope and detail, and ultimately validating that the
architecture is sufficiently complete and correct.
DOD has not, however, made similar strides in its efforts to control its
ongoing and planned systems investments. In effect, nothing significant
has changed since our prior review in the way that DOD is investing
billions of dollars annually in existing and new systems. This means that
the department has yet to implement our prior recommendations for
controlling systems funding, and it has not yet defined and implemented an
effective approach to satisfy legislative requirements for approving
systems
investments over $1 million. As a result, billions of dollars continue to
be at risk of being spent on more systems that are duplicative, are not
interoperable, cost more to maintain than necessary, and do not optimize
mission performance and accountability.
The future of DOD*s architecture development and implementation activities
is difficult to understand because DOD*s near- term plans are unclear. As
a result, DOD*s business systems modernization efforts remain exposed to
considerable risk. It is critical for DOD to effectively expand and extend
its architecture to the point that it provides a sound basis for
departmentwide investment decision making, and that in doing so, it
continue to centrally guide and direct its architecture development
efforts and not allow DOD domain owners to proceed independently.
Similarly, it is critical for DOD to immediately gain control over near-
term investments pending the architecture*s completion. This includes
justifying further investment in each ongoing system project beyond fiscal
year 2003 and not starting any new projects that are intended to be put
into production and provide operational capabilities, pilot or otherwise,
until the (1) architecture has been sufficiently completed and (2) DOD has
established an effective institutional approach to make informed systems
investment decisions, including ensuring that each investment is
architecturally aligned. To do less continues to put billions of dollars
at unnecessary risk of perpetuating today*s legacy systems environment.
Recommendations Because our open recommendations to DOD for managing the
development, maintenance, and implementation of its BEA, including
effectively controlling ongoing investment in business systems, are
critical to the success of its modernization and transformation efforts,
we reiterate the recommendations that we made in our May 2001 40 and
February 2003 41 reports. To further assist the department in effectively
implementing these recommendations, we are augmenting them by providing
the following more specific implementation steps. Specifically, we
recommend to the Secretary of Defense that he or his appropriate designee,
define and implement an effective investment management process to
proactively identify, control, and obtain DOD Comptroller review and
approval of expenditures for new and ongoing business system investments
exceeding $1 million while the architecture is being developed and after
it is completed, and which includes clearly defined domain owners* roles
and responsibilities for selecting and controlling ongoing and planned
system investments;
implement the core elements in our EA Framework for Assessing and
Improving Enterprise Architecture Management that we identify in this
report as not satisfied, including ensuring that minutes of the
executive body charged with directing, overseeing, and approving the
architecture are prepared and maintained;
40 GAO- 01- 525. 41 GAO- 03- 458.
update version 1.0 of the architecture to include the 340 Joint
Financial Management Improvement Program requirements that our report
identified as omitted or not fully addressed;
update version 1.0 of the architecture to include the 29 key elements
governing the *As Is* architectural content that our report identified as
not being fully satisfied;
update version 1.0 of the BEA to include the 30 key elements governing
the *To Be* architectural content that our report identified as not being
fully satisfied;
update version 1.0 to ensure that *To Be* architecture artifacts are
internally consistent, to include addressing the inconsistencies described
in this report, as well as including user instructions or guidance for
easier architecture navigation and use;
update version 1.0 of the architecture to include (1) the three key
elements governing the transition plan content that our report identified
as not being fully satisfied and (2) those system investments that will
not become part of the *To Be* architecture, including time frames for
phasing out those systems; update version 1.0 of the architecture to
address comments made by the
verification and validation contractor; develop a well- defined near-
term plan for extending and evolving the
architecture and ensure that this plan includes addressing our
recommendations, defining roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders
involved in extending and evolving the architecture, explaining
dependencies among planned activities, and defining measures of activity
progress; and
limit the pilot projects to small, low- cost, low- risk prototype
investments that are intended to provide knowledge needed to extend and
evolve the architecture, and are not to acquire and implement
production version system solutions or to deploy an operational system
capability.
Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report
(reprinted in app. IV), the
Our Evaluation department concurred with 9 of our 10 recommendations,
partially
concurred with the remaining one, and described recently completed,
ongoing, or planned efforts to address them. We will evaluate whether
DOD*s efforts fully address our recommendations in future BEA reviews.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation regarding the
architectural content of the *As Is* environment stating that because the
current operating environment is dynamic, complete satisfaction of the 29
key elements that our report identified is not realistically achievable.
DOD stated that such data, even if they were possible to obtain, would be
obsolete upon arrival and, therefore, the department does not deem the
data collection effort to be cost effective. DOD stated that it is
currently analyzing the 29 key elements and that as part of its
incremental development approach, it will collect relevant *As Is*
documentation, where appropriate, and will include the data in future
releases of the BEA.
We agree that architectural information that does not provide value
commensurate with cost should not be captured in the BEA. However, DOD*s
comments concerning the missing 29 *As Is* key elements do not contain
sufficient context, detail, and explanation to understand which key
elements DOD proposes to satisfy and which it does not. Further, its
comments do not adequately explain and justify why key elements should be
waived. As noted in our report, DOD*s *As Is* architecture products
provide little descriptive content and do not satisfy 90 percent of the
architectural elements required by relevant guidance needed to permit
development of a meaningful and useful transition plan. Further, as noted
in our March 2003 report, 42 while further development of the *As Is*
environment can coincide with the development of the transition plan, not
having defined the *As Is* operations and technology at this juncture is
risky because it defers until too late in the architecture development
cycle creation of sufficient descriptive content and context to develop an
effective transition plan. We are sending copies of this report to
interested congressional
committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary
of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)/ Chief
42 GAO- 03- 571R.
Information Officer; the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics); the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness); and the Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service. This
report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
report, please contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512- 9095 or kutzg@ gao.
gov, or Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512- 3439 or hiter@ gao. gov. Major
contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix V.
Gregory D. Kutz Director Financial Management and Assurance Randolph C.
Hite Director Information Technology Architecture and System Issues
List of Committees
The Honorable John W. Warner Chairman The Honorable Carl Levin Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate The
Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Ike
Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John P.
Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on
Appropriations House of Representatives
Appendi xes SEC. 1004. [of Public Law 107- 314] Development and
Implementation of Financial
Appendi x I Management Enterprise Architecture
Appendi x II
Scope and Methodology To accomplish our objectives for determining (1) the
extent to which DOD*s actions complied with the requirements of section
1004 of Public Law 107- 314 and (2) DOD*s plans for further development
and implementation of the architecture, we assessed DOD*s initial
architecture, which, according to DOD, was approved by the DOD Comptroller
and transmitted to the Comptroller General on May 8, 2003. This report
provides specific details on our assessment results. Our overall
assessment of DOD*s initial architecture was issued on July 7, 2003, 1
which satisfied the legislative requirement that we submit a report to
congressional defense committees within 60 days of the architecture*s
approval.
Consistent with the act and as agreed with congressional defense
committees* staffs, this assessment focused on (1) compliance with all
federal accounting, financial management, and reporting requirements, (2)
the content of the *As Is* and *To Be* environments, (3) the content of
the transition plan to include time- phased milestones for phasing out
existing systems, resource needs for implementing the *To Be* environment,
and information on the systems inventory, and (4) the extent to which DOD
is controlling its business system investments. In addition, we used our
Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework 2 that describes the
five stages of management maturity to determine the
extent to which DOD has adopted key elements of architecture management
best practices. To make this determination, we reviewed program
documentation, such as program policies and procedures, steering and
executive committee charters, and architecture products, and compared them
to the elements in the framework. We did not validate the cost and budget
information provided by the program*s budget analyst. Specific to our
review of federal requirements, we could not determine
whether the architecture contained all federal accounting, financial
management, and reporting requirements because a central repository of all
such requirements does not exist. Nevertheless, to assess the completeness
of the federal requirements, we compared the about 4,000 external
requirements 3 contained in the architecture to those listed in 1 GAO- 03-
877R.
2 GAO- 03- 584G. 3 External requirements are those that are obtained from
authoritative sources and constrain various aspects of the architecture.
selected JFMIP federal systems requirements publications. 4 Of the 4, 000
external requirements incorporated in the initial architecture, we
performed a detailed review of 1,767 (about 45 percent), all of which were
JFMIP requirements. Specifically, we identified whether these requirements
were incorporated in the initial architecture, relevant to DOD*s business
operations, or were current. To supplement our
documentation review, we held interviews with government and contractor
officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
and IBM. For our review of the architecture, 5 our internal team of
architecture
experts identified relevant criteria to be used to assess the architecture
products, including best practices and federal guidance. 6
In reviewing the criteria, these experts categorized the key requirements
according to their relevance to the three primary component parts of the
architecture specified in the act and recognized in best practices and
federal guidance: the *As Is* architecture, the *To Be* architecture, and
the transition plan. For ease of reporting, they further divided the *As
Is* and *To Be* architectures into five architectural components similar
to OMB*s architecture reference models: business, information/ data,
services/ applications, technical, and performance. We added security as a
sixth component because of its recognized importance in the various
4 We used nine JFMIP systems requirements documents: JFMIP- SR- 03- 01,
Revenue System Requirements (January 2003); JFMIP- SR- 02- 02,
Acquisition/ Financial Systems Interface Requirements (June 2002); JFMIP-
SR- 02- 01, Core Financial System Requirements (November 2001); JFMIP- SR-
99- 5, Human Resources & Payroll Systems Requirements (April 1999); JFMIP-
FFMSR- 8, System Requirements for Managerial Cost Accounting (February
1998); JFMIP- FFMSR- 7, Inventory System Requirements (June 1995); JFMIP-
SR99-
9, Travel System Requirements (July 1999); JFMIP- SR- 00- 4, Property
Management Systems Requirements (October 2000); JFMIP- SR- 01- 01, Benefit
System Requirements (September 2001).
5 We reviewed version 1.0 of DOD*s BEA including the transition plan,
which was completed on April 30, 2003, and according to program officials,
approved on May 8, 2003, by the department*s Comptroller.
6 See, for example, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise
Architecture Business Reference Model, Version 1.0 (2002); Chief
Information Officers Council, A Practical Guide to Federal Enterprise
Architecture, Version 1.0 (February 2001); Office of Management and
Budget, Management of Federal Information Resources, Circular No. A130
(Nov. 28, 2000); M. A. Cook, Building Enterprise Information
Architectures: Reengineering Information Systems (Upper Saddle River, N.
J., Prentice Hall: 1996); and
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Management
Directions: The Integration Challenge, Special Publication 500- 167
(September 1989).
architecture frameworks and relevance to the other five architectural
components. For each of these six architectural components, we identified
the key architectural requirements that would need to be addressed for the
*As Is* and *To Be* environments for the department to create an
architecture that would be effective in facilitating its business
modernization efforts and documented this information in detailed
matrices. These experts also identified the key architectural requirements
for the transition plan component of the architecture, which were also
documented in a detailed matrix. We then compared the architecture
products including the transition plan against the identified criteria
governing their content and documented the results of our analysis in the
matrices.
We interviewed program officials, including the program director, the
Chief Architect, and contractor staff (IBM and MITRE) to discuss our
preliminary findings and to clarify the intended scope and purpose of this
version of the architecture. We also participated in a 2- day architecture
walkthrough in which DOD officials provided a progress update on the
department*s development of the architecture and future plans for further
evolution and
implementation of the architecture. In addition, we reviewed the program*s
verification and validation contractor*s (MITRE) report 7 documenting its
assessment of version 1.0 of the architecture including the transition
plan. We also interviewed program officials as to the department*s plans
for addressing MITRE*s comments.
To review DOD*s actions to comply with the conditions for obligations in
excess of $1 million for financial system improvements, we obtained and
reviewed memorandums and other documentation regarding the approval
of expenditures for system investments in excess of $1 million. We also
reviewed and analyzed the DOD IT budget requests for fiscal years 2003 and
2004 to identify systems that met the $1 million threshold and compared
this to the total number of systems DOD reviewed and approved to measure
DOD*s progress in reviewing those systems that meet the
legislative threshold. To augment our document reviews and analyses, we
interviewed officials from various DOD organizations, including the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness).
7 MITRE Technical Report: Review of Financial Management Enterprise
Architecture (FMEA), Version 1.0 (June 2003).
To determine DOD*s plans for further development and implementation of the
architecture, we reviewed the initial transition plan and IBM*s statement
of work, DOD*s proposed governance concept, and program documentation
pertaining to plans for implementing pilot projects. We also reviewed
DOD*s response to the recommendations we made in our February 2003 report
8 pertaining to controlling ongoing and planned IT systems investments. To
augment our document reviews and analyses, we interviewed government and
contractor officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) and IBM.
We conducted our work primarily at DOD headquarters offices in Washington,
D. C., and Arlington, Virginia, and we performed our work from March 2003
through June 2003 in accordance with U. S. generally accepted government
auditing standards. We requested comments on a draft of this report from
the Secretary of Defense or his designee. Written comments from the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) are addressed in the *Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation* section of this report and are
reprinted in appendix IV. 8 GAO- 03- 458.
Status of Prior Recommendations on DOD*s Appendi x III
Business Enterprise Architecture Status of recommendation Not
DOD comments and our Recommendations Implemented Partial implemented
assessment
GAO- 01- 525: Information Technology: Architecture Needed to Guide
Modernization of DOD*s Financial Operations. May 17, 2001. 1) The
Secretary of Defense immediately designate
X DOD financial management modernization a departmental priority and
accordingly direct the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to lead an integrated program across the department
for modernizing and optimizing financial management operations and
systems.
2) The Secretary immediately issue a DOD policy that X As discussed in
this report, DOD directs the development, implementation, and
has a policy for developing the maintenance of a financial management
enterprise
Global Information Grid (GIG), architecture.
which requires that all departmental architectures be in alignment with
the GIG. While this policy outlines the roles and responsibilities for
development,
maintenance, and implementation of the GIG, it does not do so for other
departmental architectures, including the BEA.
3) The Secretary immediately modify the Senior X The department has
established
Financial Management Oversight Council*s charter to the Financial
Management Executive and Steering designate the Deputy Secretary of
Defense as the Committees to serve as advisory Council chair and the Under
Secretary of Defense
bodies to the Under Secretary of (Comptroller) as the Council vice- chair;
Defense (Comptroller) for financial empower the Council to serve as
DOD*s financial
management modernization. management enterprise architecture steering
However, as discussed in this committee, giving it the responsibility and
authority to
report, DOD has not assigned ensure that a DOD financial management
enterprise
responsibility for directing, architecture is developed and maintained in
overseeing, and approving the accordance with the DOD C4ISR Architecture
BEA to a committee or group Framework;
comprised of representatives from empower the Council to serve as DOD*s
financial
across the department. management investment review board, giving it the
responsibility and authority to (1) select and control all DOD financial
management investments and In addition, DOD has not yet
(2) ensure that its investment decisions treat established a hierarchy of
compliance with the financial management enterprise
investment review boards, each architecture as an explicit condition for
investment
responsible and accountable for approval that can be waived only if
justified by a
selecting and controlling compelling written analysis; and
investments that meet defined expand the role of the Council*s System
Compliance criteria, including compliance with Working Group to include
supporting the Council in the enterprise architecture. determining the
compliance of each system investment with the enterprise architecture at
key decision points in the system*s development or acquisition life cycle.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Status of recommendation Not
DOD comments and our Recommendations Implemented Partial implemented
assessment
4) The Secretary immediately make the Assistant X The Assistant Secretary
of
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Defense (Networks and
Communications & Intelligence), in collaboration with the
Information Integration)/ Chief Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
accountable Information Officer, is a member of to the Senior Financial
Management Oversight Council the Executive and Steering for developing and
maintaining a DOD financial
Committees; however, as management enterprise architecture.
discussed previously, members* roles and responsibilities are In
fulfilling this responsibility, the Assistant Secretary
advisory in nature. appoint a Chief Architect for DOD financial management
modernization and establish and adequately staff and DOD established a
Financial fund an enterprise architecture program office that is
Management Modernization responsible for developing and maintaining a DOD-
wide Program Office in July 2001. Also, financial management enterprise
architecture in a DOD has appointed a chief manner that is consistent with
the framework defined in architect and, according to DOD, it the CIO
Council*s published guide for managing has adequate program funding and
enterprise architectures. In particular, the Assistant
staff for developing and Secretary should take appropriate steps to ensure
that maintaining its BEA. However, the the Chief Architect chief
architect*s roles and
responsibilities have not yet been obtains executive buy- in and
support;
defined. establishes architecture management structure and
controls; defines the architecture process and approach; develops the
baseline architecture, the target
architecture, and the sequencing plan; facilitates the use of the
architecture to guide financial
management modernization projects and investments; and maintains the
architecture.
5) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, X The program office,
which the chief
Control, Communications & Intelligence) report at least architect is part
of, briefs the
quarterly to the Senior Financial Management Oversight Steering Committee
monthly on Council on the chief architect*s progress in developing a
the status of DOD*s efforts for financial management enterprise
architecture, including developing its BEA; however the chief architect*s
adherence to enterprise architecture
meeting minutes are not prepared policy and guidance from OMB, the CIO
Council, and and maintained. Also, as noted DOD. previously, DOD has not
issued a policy on the development,
implementation, and maintenance of the BEA.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Status of recommendation Not
DOD comments and our Recommendations Implemented Partial implemented
assessment
6) The Senior Financial Management Oversight Council X Senate Report 107-
213, enacted report to the Secretary of Defense every 6 months on
on July 18, 2002, directs that the progress in developing and implementing
a financial
department report every 6 months management enterprise architecture.
to congressional defense committees on the status of the architecture
effort. DOD submitted the first report on January 31, 2003. In doing so,
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), who is the chair of
the Executive and Steering Committees, approved the semiannual report. 7)
The Secretary report every 6 months to the X Senate Report 107- 213
directs congressional defense authorizing and appropriating that the
department report every 6 committees on progress in developing and
implementing
months on the status of the a financial management enterprise
architecture.
architecture effort. DOD submitted the first report on January 31, 2003.
8) Until a financial management enterprise architecture X DOD has not yet
defined and is developed and the Council is positioned to serve as
implemented an effective approach DOD*s financial management investment
review board
for selecting and controlling as recommended above, the Secretary of
Defense limit
business systems investments. DOD components* financial management
investments to DOD has stated that the department plans to establish a
deployment of systems that have already been fully
governance structure that includes tested and involve no additional
development or investment review boards to help acquisition cost;
control investment in business stay- in- business maintenance needed to
keep existing systems and help ensure systems operational;
consistency with the architecture. management controls needed to
effectively invest in modernized systems; and
new systems or existing system changes that are congressionally directed
or are relatively small, cost effective, and low risk and can be delivered
in a relatively short time frame.
GAO- 03- 458: DOD Business Systems Modernization: Improvements to
Enterprise Architecture Development and Implementation Efforts Needed.
February 28, 2003.
1) The Secretary of Defense ensure that the enterprise X As discussed in
this report, DOD architecture executive committee members are
has not assigned responsibility for singularly and collectively made
explicitly accountable to directing, overseeing, and the Secretary for the
delivery of the enterprise
approving the EA to a committee architecture including approval of each
version of the
or group comprised of architecture. representatives from across the
department.
(Continued From Previous Page)
Status of recommendation Not
DOD comments and our Recommendations Implemented Partial implemented
assessment
2) The Secretary of Defense ensure that the enterprise X DOD has a
communications and architecture program is supported by a proactive change
management plan, but marketing and communication program.
steps have not yet been taken to implement the plan.
3) The Secretary of Defense ensure that the quality X DOD*s quality
assurance function assurance function
does not yet address process includes the review of adherence to process
standards standards and program and reliability of reported program
performance,
performance nor is it yet an is made independent of the program
management independent function. However, function, and DOD stated that it
intends to make is not performed by subject matter experts involved in
this function independent. Further, the development of key architecture
products.
DOD subject matter experts continue to be involved in the quality
assurance function.
4) The Secretary gain control over ongoing IT X As discussed in this
report, DOD investments by establishing a hierarchy of investment
has not yet established investment review boards, each responsible and
accountable for
review boards to control its IT selecting and controlling investments that
meet defined
investments. DOD has stated that threshold criteria, and each composed of
the appropriate
it is in the process of establishing a level of executive representatives,
depending on the
review board and defining the roles threshold criteria, from across the
department.
and responsibilities. 5) The Secretary gain control over ongoing IT X As
discussed in this report, DOD investments by establishing a standard set
of criteria to
has not yet established an include (1) alignment and consistency with the
DOD investment review board nor has it enterprise architecture and (2) our
open established standard criteria to be recommendations governing
limitations in business
used in assessing ongoing IT system investments pending development of the
investments, including alignment architecture.
and consistency with the BEA. 6) The Secretary gain control over ongoing
IT X As discussed above, the investments by directing these boards to
immediately
investment review boards and apply these criteria in completing reviews of
all ongoing standard criteria have not yet been IT investments, and to not
fund investments that do not
established. DOD states that it is meet these criteria unless they are
otherwise justified by working with the domain owners to explicit criteria
waivers.
develop a governance structure that identifies critical processes and
enterprise requirements to improve control over its IT investments.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Appendi x IV Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendi x V
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Jenniffer Wilson,
(202) 512- 9192 Cynthia Jackson, (202) 512- 5086 Acknowledgments In
addition to the individuals named above, key contributors to this report
included Beatrice Alff, Nabajyoti Barkakati, Justin Booth, Francine
Delvecchio, Francis Dymond, Jason Kelly, Neelaxi Lakhmani, Anh Le, Evelyn
Logue, Mai Nguyen, Darby Smith, Stacey Smith, Alan Steiner, Randolph
Tekeley, William Wadsworth, and James Weidner.
(192100)
Report to Congressional Committees
September 2003 DOD BUSINESS SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION
Important Progress Made to Develop Business Enterprise Architecture, but
Much Work Remains
GAO- 03- 1018
a
GAO United States General Accounting Office
DOD has expended tremendous effort and resources and made important
progress in complying with the act*s requirements aimed at developing and
effectively implementing a well- defined business enterprise architecture.
Further, DOD*s initial version of its architecture provides a foundation
from which to build and ultimately produce a well- defined architecture.
For example, the *As Is* environment includes an inventory of about 2,300
existing systems and their characteristics that support DOD*s current
business operations; and the *To Be* environment addresses, to at least
some degree, how DOD intends to operate in the future, what information
will be needed to support these future operations, and what technology
standards should govern the design of future systems. Further, DOD has
established some of the architecture management capabilities advocated by
best practices and federal guidance, such as having a program office,
designating a chief architect, and using an architecture development
methodology and automated tool. At the same time, DOD*s initial
architecture does not yet adequately address the act*s requirements and
other relevant architectural requirements governing the scope and content.
For example, critical federal requirements governing the *To Be*
architecture, such as federal accounting requirements for recording
revenue, are not included in the initial architecture. Other items not
included are
descriptions of the current business operations in terms of entities and
people who perform the functions, processes, and activities and the
locations where these are performed; descriptions of the systems to be
developed or acquired to support
future business operations; and time frames for phasing out existing
systems.
Furthermore, DOD has not yet implemented an effective investment
management process for selecting and controlling ongoing and planned
business system investments. Until it does, DOD remains at risk of
spending billions of dollars on duplicative, stove- piped, nonintegrated
systems that do not optimize mission performance and accountability and,
therefore, do not support the department*s business transformation goals.
Overall, our findings indicate that DOD has taken positive first steps,
but much remains to be accomplished before DOD will have the kind of
blueprint and associated investment controls to successfully modernize its
business operations and supporting systems. According to program officials
and the initial version of the transition plan, DOD intends to extend and
evolve the architecture to include the missing scope and detail; however,
it has not yet defined specific plans outlining how this will be
accomplished. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Department of Defense
(DOD) to develop an enterprise architecture and a
transition plan that meets certain requirements. The act also directed DOD
to have a process for controlling its system investments. As required by
the act, GAO assessed DOD*s actions to comply with the act*s requirements
and recently issued a report to
congressional defense committees. This report provides further details of
GAO*s assessment results regarding (1) the extent to which DOD*s actions
complied with the
requirements of the act and (2) DOD*s plans for further development and
implementation of its architecture. To further assist DOD in its efforts
to effectively develop and implement an enterprise architecture and to
guide and constrain its business system investments, GAO is making
recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense aimed at improving DOD*s plans for developing the next version
of the architecture and implementing the institutional means for selecting
and controlling both planned and ongoing business system investments. DOD
concurred with 9 of our 10 recommendations, partially
concurred with the remaining one, and described completed, ongoing, or
planned actions to address them.
www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1018 To view the full product,
including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Gregory Kutz, (202) 512- 9095 (kutzg@ gao. gov) or
Randolph Hite, (202) 512- 3439 (hiter@ gao. gov). Highlights of GAO- 03-
1018, a report to congressional committees
September 2003
DOD BUSINESS SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION
Important Progress Made to Develop Business Enterprise Architecture, but
Much Work Remains
Page i GAO- 03- 1018 DOD Business Enterprise Architecture
Contents
Page ii GAO- 03- 1018 DOD Business Enterprise Architecture
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Appendix I
Appendix I SEC. 1004. [of Public Law 107- 314] Development and
Implementation of
Financial Management Enterprise Architecture Page 59 GAO- 03- 1018 DOD
Business Enterprise Architecture
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Appendix II
Appendix II Scope and Methodology
Page 61 GAO- 03- 1018 DOD Business Enterprise Architecture
Appendix II Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II Scope and Methodology
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Appendix III
Appendix III Status of Prior Recommendations on DOD*s Business Enterprise
Architecture
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Appendix III Status of Prior Recommendations on DOD*s Business Enterprise
Architecture
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Appendix III Status of Prior Recommendations on DOD*s Business Enterprise
Architecture
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Appendix IV
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense Page 69 GAO- 03- 1018
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Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense Page 70 GAO- 03- 1018
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Appendix V
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