Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency 	 
Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process (15-JUL-03, 	 
GAO-03-1013T).							 
                                                                 
Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an	 
increasingly important role in ensuring the national security of 
the United States. The Departments of State, Homeland Security,  
and Justice, as well as other agencies, are involved in the visa 
process. Each plays an important role in making security	 
decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. 
In two GAO reports, we assessed the effectiveness of the visa	 
process as an antiterrorism tool.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-03-1013T					        
    ACCNO:   A07545						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency  
Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process			 
     DATE:   07/15/2003 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Immigrants 					 
	     Immigration information systems			 
	     Information disclosure				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Passports						 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Law enforcement					 

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GAO-03-1013T

Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Citizenship

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 30 p. m. EDT Tuesday, July 15,
2003 BORDER SECURITY

New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa
Process

Statement of Jess T. Ford Director, International Affairs and Trade

GAO- 03- 1013T

Our analysis of the visa process shows that the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, and Justice could more effectively manage the visa
process if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and
increased agency coordination and information sharing. In our October 2002
report on the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we found that * 
State did not provide clear policies on how consular officers should

balance national security concerns with the desire to facilitate
legitimate travel when issuing visas; and  State and Justice disagreed on
the evidence needed to deny a visa on

terrorism grounds. In our June 2003 report, we found that State had
revoked visas for terrorism concerns but that

 The revocation process was not being used aggressively to alert homeland
security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the
country before their visas were revoked might be security risks; and  The
process broke down when information on revocations was not being

shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement
officials.

These weaknesses diminish the effectiveness of the visa process in keeping
potential terrorists out of the United States.

Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System Inconsistent or
incomplete information flow No information flow Sources: GAO and Art
Explosion.

Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs

revokes visas Department of Homeland Security

Department of State Issuing visas

Managing stays Controlling entries

Department of Homeland Security Department of Justice

Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly
important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The
Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other
agencies, are involved in the visa process. Each plays an important role
in making security

decisions so that potential terrorists do not enter the country. In two
GAO reports, we assessed

the effectiveness of the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. GAO made
numerous recommendations to strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool. Among them, GAO recommended that the Department of
Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Departments of State and
Justice, develop

specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa revocation
process to ensure that when State revokes a visa because of terrorism
concerns, the appropriate units within State, Homeland Security, and the
FBI are notified

immediately and that proper actions are taken. State said it is using our

recommendations as a roadmap for making improvements in the visa process.
Homeland Security

agreed that the visa process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism
tool.

www. gao. gov/ cgi- bin/ getrpt? GAO- 03- 1013T. To view the full
testimony, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512- 4128 or fordj@
gao. gov. Highlights of GAO- 03- 1013T, a testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee

on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship

July 15, 2003

BORDER SECURITY New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed
to Improve Visa Process

Page 1 GAO- 03- 1013T Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
pleased to be here to discuss our recent work on the visa process and some
of the ways we believe this process could be strengthened as an

important part of our country*s border security strategy. Mr. Chairman,
citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States temporarily
for business, tourism, and other reasons generally must apply for and
obtain a U. S. travel document, called a nonimmigrant visa, at U. S.
embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U. S. ports of entry. In
deciding who should and should not receive a visa, consular officers must
perform a risk assessment that balances the need to facilitate legitimate
travel with the need to protect the United States against potential
terrorists and to deter others whose entry is considered likely to be
harmful to U. S. national interests. Consular officers also need to
delicately balance U. S. national security interests with other interests
such as promoting U. S. business, tourism, education and cultural
exchanges, and the overall health of our economy.

Since September 11, 2001, visa operations have played an increasingly
important role in ensuring the national security of the United States. The
Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as other
agencies, are involved in the visa process, with each playing an important
role in making security decisions.

My testimony today is based on two of our recent reports 1 on the visa
process that contained observations and recommendations on ways in which
national and border security could be strengthened through the visa
process, implementation of clear visa policies and guidelines, and sharing
of information and data. The first report focused on the effectiveness of
the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and recommended ways that the
process could be strengthened as a screen against terrorists. The second
report provides examples of how weaknesses in policy and interagency
coordination are affecting border security. In addition to my comments

based on the two reports, I will provide a brief overview of an emerging
visa policy issue that warrants oversight.

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be
Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO- 03- 132NI (Washington, D. C.:
Oct. 21, 2002) and U. S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation
Process, GAO- 03- 798 (Washington, D. C.: June 18, 2003).

Page 2 GAO- 03- 1013T Our analysis of the visa process shows that the
Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice could more
effectively manage the visa

function if they had clear and comprehensive policies and procedures and
increased agency coordination and information sharing. Our October 2002
report addressed the need for a clear policy on how to balance national
security concerns with the desire to facilitate legitimate travel when
issuing visas. It also addressed the need for more coordination and
information sharing to realize the full potential of the visa process. In
addition, there is a need for more human resources and more training for
consular officers. We made several recommendations to the Department of
State and the new Department of Homeland Security to improve this process.
State reported that it plans to use our recommendations as a road map for
improving the visa process.

Our June 2003 report also pointed out that the U. S. government does not
have a clear and comprehensive policy on the interagency visa revocation
process. This process should be used more aggressively to alert homeland

security and law enforcement agencies that individuals who entered the
country before their visas were revoked might be security risks. However,
we found that the process broke down because information on visa
revocations was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and
law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals in
question had already entered the United States prior to revocation. In

our review of the 240 visas that were revoked for terrorism concerns
between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2002, we found numerous cases
where notifications of the revocations did not reach appropriate units
within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 2 and FBI. We also
found evidence that individuals whose visas were revoked because of
terrorism concerns entered the United States and may still remain in the
country. We have made recommendations to the Departments of Homeland
Security, State, and Justice to improve the revocation process. Homeland
Security agreed that the visa revocation process needed to be
strengthened.

2 On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the Department
of Homeland Security. INS inspection functions transferred to the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection; its investigative and enforcement
functions transferred to the Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function
became part of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because
our work focused on visa revocation cases that took place before the March
1 reorganization, our report referred to the U. S. government*s
immigration agency as *INS.* Summary

Page 3 GAO- 03- 1013T State has directed that, beginning August 1, posts
interview all foreign individuals, with a few exceptions, seeking to visit
the United States prior

to visa issuance. The purpose of this guidance is to tighten the visa
process. The new regulations may result in delays if posts do not have
adequate resources to handle the number of interviews.

Mr. Chairman, I now want to provide additional details on the policies,
procedures, and coordination that we described in our reports.

The September 11 attacks illustrated the vulnerabilities in the visa
process when it became known that all 19 of the terrorist hijackers had
been issued visas to enter the United States. Before the attacks, the
State Department*s visa operations focused primarily on screening
applicants to determine whether they intended to work or reside illegally
in the United

States. In deciding on who should receive a visa, consular officers relied
on the State Department*s consular *lookout* system, a name check system
that incorporates information from many agencies, as the primary basis for
identifying potential terrorists. 3 Consular officers were encouraged to
facilitate legitimate travel and, at some posts we visited, faced pressure
to issue visas. The State Department gave overseas consular sections
substantial discretion in determining the level of scrutiny applied to
visa applications and encouraged streamlined procedures to provide
customer service and deal with a large workload. As a result, according to
State Department officials and documents, consular sections worldwide
adopted practices that reduced the review time for visa applications. For
example, some posts decided not to interview applicants who appeared
likely to return to their country at the end of their allotted time in the
United States.

Since the terrorist attacks, the U. S. government has introduced some
changes to strengthen the visa process. For example, the State Department
has, with the help of other agencies, almost doubled the number of names
and the amount of information in the lookout system. Further, the
Department began seeking new or additional interagency clearances on
selected applicants to screen out terrorists, although these checks were

3 U. S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch
Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing
GAO- 03- 322 (Washington, D. C.: Apr. 15, 2003). We recommended a series
of actions including that the Department of Homeland Security and other
agencies that have and use watch lists lead an effort to standardize and
consolidate the federal government*s watch list structures and policies.
Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an

Antiterrorism Tool

Page 4 GAO- 03- 1013T not always completed by other U. S. agencies in a
thorough or timely manner. We also observed that consular officers at some
of the posts we

visited were spending more time reviewing visa applications and
interviewing applicants; they were able to do so, at least temporarily,
because the number of visa applications decreased dramatically after
September 11.

While these actions have strengthened the visa process, our work in 2002
showed that there were widely divergent practices and procedures among and
within overseas posts regarding (1) the authority of consular officers to
deny questionable applicants a visa, (2) the role of the visa process in
ensuring national security, and (3) the types of changes in posts* visa
policies and procedures that are appropriate given the need for heightened
border security. Also, the Departments of State and Justice disagreed on
the evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism grounds. Most consular

officers at the posts we visited stated that more comprehensive guidance
and training would help them use the visa process as an antiterrorism tool
to detect questionable applicants. In July 2002, the Secretary of State
acknowledged that the visa process needed to be strengthened and indicated
that the State Department is working to identify areas for improvement.

In addition, the State Department has stressed that it must have the best
interagency information available on persons who are potential security
risks in order to make good visa decisions. The additional data received
from the intelligence and law enforcement community has increased State*s
access to information for use in the visa adjudication process. In
addition, State indicated that it will work with Homeland Security to
establish the systems and procedures that will ensure seamless sharing of
information in the future.

We also found that human capital limitations are a concern, as some
consular sections may need more staff if the number of visa applicants
returns to pre- September 11 levels or if State continues to institute new
security checks for visa applicants. At some posts the demand for visas
combined with increased workload per visa applicant still exceeded
available staff, as evidenced by the waiting time for a visa appointment

and in overtime of consular staff. Moreover, several posts we visited
reported that they could manage their existing workload with current
staffing but would need more staff if they faced an increase in either
security clearance procedures or visa applications.

Page 5 GAO- 03- 1013T In our October 2002 report, we concluded that the
visa process could be an important tool to keep potential terrorists from
entering the United

States but that weaknesses limited its effectiveness as an antiterrorism
tool. The State Department needed to improve implementation of the visa
process to increase its effectiveness and consistency among posts. To
strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, we recommended that
the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,

 establish clear policy on addressing national security concerns through
the visa process that is balanced with the desire to facilitate legitimate
travel, provide timely customer service, and manage workloads;

 develop comprehensive, risk- based guidelines and standards on how
consular affairs should use the visa process as a screen against potential
terrorists;

 reassess staffing for visa operations in light of the current and
anticipated number of visa applications and, if appropriate, request
additional human resources to ensure that consular sections have adequate
staff with necessary skills; and

 provide consular training courses to improve interview techniques,
recognize fraudulent documents, understand terrorism trends, and better
use the name check system.

To address visa issues requiring coordination and actions across several
agencies, we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security
coordinate with appropriate agencies to

 establish governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed to
deny a visa on terrorism grounds under provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act;  reassess interagency headquarters* security checks on
visa applicants

to verify that all the checks are necessary and promptly conducted, and
provide clear guidance to overseas posts and headquarters agencies on
their roles in conducting these checks;

 consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, visas issued before the
implementation of the new security checks;

 reexamine visa operations on a regular basis to ensure that the
operations effectively contribute to the overall national strategy for

Page 6 GAO- 03- 1013T homeland security; and  ensure that law enforcement
and intelligence agencies promptly

provide information to the State Department on persons who may pose a
security risk and, therefore, should not receive visas.

In its response to our recommendations, the Department of State noted that
it has acted on or is currently acting on some of the issues we reported
and continues to reexamine its visa process. Moreover, in January 2003,
the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs reported that State plans to
use our recommendations as a roadmap for improvements within the Bureau of
Consular Affairs and in consular sections around the world. State has also
indicated that it is currently undertaking a number of initiatives to
review visa policies, staffing, and training needs. Furthermore, State
said it is looking at refining various screening programs and will
coordinate with other agencies to reassess interagency headquarters*
security checks.

In our recent work on visa revocations, we again found weaknesses caused
by the lack of comprehensive policies and coordination between agencies.
The visa revocation process can be an important tool to prevent potential
terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally, information on

suspected terrorists would reach the Department of State before it decides
to issue a visa; however, there will always be some cases in which the
information arrives after the visa has been issued. Revoking a visa can
mitigate this problem, but only if State notifies the appropriate agencies
and if those agencies take appropriate actions to deny entry or
investigate persons with a revoked visa. In our June 2003 report, we
identified the

policies and procedures of several agencies that govern the visa
revocation process and determined the effectiveness of the process. We
focused on all 240 visas that State revoked for terrorism concerns from
September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2002.

Our analysis indicated that the U. S. government has no specific written
policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no
written procedures to guide State in notifying relevant agencies of visas
that have been revoked on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written
procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither

they nor the FBI has written internal procedures for notifying appropriate
personnel to take action on visas revoked by the State Department. State
and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures
for how and what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep New
Policies and

Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process

Page 7 GAO- 03- 1013T terrorists out of the United States, but neither
they nor FBI officials had specific policies or procedures that covered
investigating, locating, or

taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already
entered the country.

The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed
to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the
probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United
States. At the time of visa revocation, State should notify its consular
officers at overseas posts, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
FBI. State would have to provide notice of revocation, along with
supporting evidence to the appropriate units within Homeland Security and
the FBI, which would allow them to take appropriate action. In our review
of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within
INS and the FBI did not always receive timely notification of the
revocations; (2) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies*
watch lists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism
grounds entered the United States and may still remain in the country; 4
(4) INS investigators were not usually notified of individuals with
revoked visas who had entered the United States and therefore did not open
investigations on them; and (5) the FBI did not investigate individuals
with revoked visas unless these individuals were also in TIPOFF. For
instance:

 In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate
units within INS did not take place or was not completed in a timely
manner. For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice of
the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47

cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a
cable, which took, on average, 12 days to reach the Unit.

 In cases in which the INS Lookout Unit had received notification, it
generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout database
within 1 day of receiving the notice. In cases where it was not notified,
it could not post information on these individuals in its lookout
database, which precluded INS inspectors at ports of entry from knowing
that these individuals had had their visas revoked.

4 This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of
May 19, 2003. On May 20 and 21, INS and the FBI, respectively, provided
additional information related to this matter. We were not able to
complete analysis of the data prior to the release of our

report due to the nature and volume of the data. The data could show that
the actual number of persons is higher or lower than 30.

Page 8 GAO- 03- 1013T Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter
the revocation action for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list.

 GAO*s analysis of INS arrival and departure data indicates that 29
individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked and
may still remain in the country. These data also show that INS inspectors
admitted at least four other people after the visa revocation, one of whom
may still remain in the country. However, in testimony on

June 18, 2003, the FBI said that none of these 30 individuals posed a
terrorist threat since they were not in TIPOFF, a State- operated
interagency terrorist watch list that FBI*s Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force monitors. State Department officials told us during our review
that State relied on sources of information in addition to TIPOFF in
making visa revocation decisions. INS inspectors prevented at least 14
others from entering the country because the INS watch list

included information on the revocation action or had another lookout on
them.

 INS investigators said they did not open cases on these individuals with
revoked visas who had entered the United States because their unit had not
been notified that State had revoked visas because of terrorism concerns
and that these persons had entered the country. They added that, in the 10
cases that were referred to them, they conducted a full

investigation of possible immigration violations. INS officials said that
it would be challenging to remove individuals with revoked visas who had
entered the United States unless they were in violation of their
immigration status. Homeland Security officials said that the issue of
whether a visa revocation, after an individual is admitted on that visa,
has the effect of rendering the individuals out- of- status is unresolved
legally.

 FBI officials told us they were not concerned about individuals whose
visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns unless the individuals*
names were in TIPOFF. They said that they had a system in place to monitor
individuals in TIPOFF who enter the country but that they would not
investigate individuals who were not in TIPOFF based solely on the
revocation notice from State. FBI*s position indicates that FBI is not
taking into account all sources of information that State uses in
determining if a person may pose a terrorism threat.

We concluded that the visa process could be an important tool to keep
potential terrorists from entering the United States. However, there are
currently major gaps in the notification and investigation processes. One
reason for this is that there are no comprehensive written policies and

Page 9 GAO- 03- 1013T procedures on how notification of a visa revocation
should take place and what agencies should do when they are notified. As a
result, there is heightened risk that persons who State believed should
not have been

issued a visa because of terrorism concerns could enter the country with
revoked visas or be allowed to remain after their visas are revoked
without undergoing investigation or monitoring.

To strengthen the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General

 develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa
revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for
suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information is transmitted
from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies and their
respective inspection and investigation units in a timely manner;

 develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law
enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals
whose visas have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the
United States after revocation; and

 determine if persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in the
United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat.

In response to our recommendations, the Department of State testified that
the Bureau of Consular Affairs is engaged in an effort to formalize
standard operating procedures. The Department of Homeland Security also
remarked that it was working to better standardize its procedures. The FBI
determined that 47 of the 240 persons with revoked visas were in TIPOFF
and therefore could pose a terrorism threat but that it had no indication
that any of these individuals were in the country.

The Department of State has recently issued guidance to its posts about
using the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. In May 2003, the
Secretary of State announced that, by August 1, 2003, with a few
exceptions, all foreign individuals seeking to visit the United States
would be interviewed prior to receiving a visa. The purpose of this
guidance is to tighten the visa

process to protect U. S. security and to prepare for the eventual
fingerprinting of applicants that State must undertake to meet the
legislated mandate to include a biometric identifier with issued visas. To
comply with the new guidance, some posts may have to make substantial
Plans to Tighten the

Visa Process

Page 10 GAO- 03- 1013T changes in how they handle nonimmigrant
applications. State acknowledges that posts may find that personnel or
facility resources are

not adequate to handle the additional number of interviews. Even though
State expects interview backlogs, the Department has indicated that posts
are to implement the interview requirement with existing resources. It is
not certain what impact the new policy will have on visa issuance.
However, education, business, and government officials have expressed
concern that it was already taking too long to issue visas and that
without a commensurate increase in resources to accommodate the heavier
workload that may result from the new requirement, there could be serious
delays for those seeking to visit the United States. In March 2003, the
House Committee on Science held a hearing on *Dealing with Foreign

Students and Scholars in the Age of Terrorism: Visa Backlogs and Tracking
Systems.* In June 2003, the House Committee on Small Business held a
hearing on *The Visa Approval Backlog and its Impact on American Small
Business. * In both hearings, higher education and business leaders and
agency officials testified on the negative impacts of delays in issuing
visas. The testimonies also highlighted the difficulties of balancing
national security interests with the desire to facilitate travel. At the
request of the House Committee on Science, we are currently examining the
amount of time taken to adjudicate visa applications from foreign science
students and scholars. As part of this work, we will be looking at how the
new interview policy will affect the process.

Before I conclude my statement, I would like to raise some questions that
the subcommittee may want to consider in its oversight role:

 Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice reached
agreement on how best to communicate information on individuals who should
not be issued visas and on individuals whose visas have been revoked? 
Have the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice agreed

on the level of evidence needed to deny and revoke visas?  Does the
Department of State have adequate number of trained staff

for visa processing, especially if the number of visa applicants or
security checks increase?  Do the Departments of Homeland Security and
Justice agree on

whether persons who are in the country and have visas that have been
revoked on terrorism concerns should be investigated and, if so, by

Page 11 GAO- 03- 1013T which agency? Mr. Chairman, I would like to
reiterate our two overarching areas of

concern for U. S. visa policy. First, the U. S. government needs to have
clear, comprehensive policies governing U. S. visa processes and
procedures so that all agencies involved agree on the level of security
screening for foreign nationals both at our consulates abroad and at ports
of entry. These policies should balance the need for national security
with

the desire to facilitate legitimate travel to the United States. The
Departments of State and Homeland Security should coordinate to establish
governmentwide guidelines on the level of evidence needed to deny a visa.
There should also be a specific policy for the interagency visa revocation
process, including the actions that immigration and law

enforcement agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals
with revoked visas who have entered the country.

The second area of concern is the continued need for coordination and
information sharing among agencies. If our intelligence or law enforcement
community is concerned that an individual poses a security risk, we have
to make sure that this information is communicated to the State Department
so that consular officers can deny and, if need be,

revoke visas in a timely manner. Similarly, when State revokes a visa for
terrorism concerns, we have to make sure that full information on the
revocation is communicated to immigration and law enforcement agencies.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have.

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at
(202) 512- 4128. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included John Brummet, Andrea Miller, Kate Brentzel, Janey Cohen, Lynn
Cothern, and Suzanne Dove. Contacts and

Acknowledgements

(320213)

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