Military Readiness: Effects of a U.S. Military Presence in Europe
on Mobility Requirements (28-NOV-01, GAO-02-99).		 
								 
The United States maintains 100,000 military personnel		 
permanently stationed in Europe. These forces and their 	 
supporting infrastructure provide rapid response in the event of 
a military crisis and help shape the international environment.  
These forward-deployed forces and equipment also facilitate the  
movement of U.S. forces to an area of operations. DOD has not	 
quantified the impact of a forward presence in Europe on mobility
requirements. However, Defense officials believe that, without	 
forward-deployed forces and equipment in Europe, mobility	 
requirements and costs would be considerably higher and 	 
deployment times longer, increasing war-fighting risk. The U.S.  
en-route system of airbases is critical to operations in Europe  
and Southwest Asia. U.S. prepositioned weapons and equipment in  
the European theater facilitate military operations in nearby	 
areas. Air Force aircraft and personnel deployed in Europe allow 
forces to move more quickly to small-scale contingencies in the  
area and reduce the airlift and sealift burden on U.S.-based	 
units. As with the Air Force, Army combat and support units	 
stationed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly and at less
cost to small-scale contingencies in the area.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-99						        
    ACCNO:   A02473						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Effects of a U.S. Military Presence  
in Europe on Mobility Requirements				 
     DATE:   11/28/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad				 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military airlift operations			 
	     C-17 Aircraft					 
	     DOD Mobility Requirements Study			 
	     Europe						 
	     F-15 Aircraft					 
	     Middle East					 

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GAO-02-99
     
Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY READINESS

Effects of a U. S. Military Presence in Europe on Mobility Requirements

GAO- 02- 99

Page 1 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

November 28, 2001 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John
Warner Ranking Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The United States maintains about 100,000 U. S. military personnel
permanently stationed in Europe. According to the Department of Defense,
these forces and their supporting infrastructure provide rapid response in
the event of a military crisis and help shape the international environment.
These forward- deployed forces and equipment also facilitate the movement of
U. S. forces, or mobility, to an area of operations.

The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
required us to assess the benefits and costs of the U. S. military
engagement in Europe. 1 This letter addresses one aspect of that assessment-
the impact of forward- deployed U. S. forces in Europe on mobility
requirements in the event of a regional conflict in Europe or the Middle
East. A separate GAO report will address other aspects of the mandate. 2
Because of our ongoing work on the Department of Defense?s Mobility
Requirements Study 2005, we agreed with your offices that, for this report,
we would use the study as the basis for a general assessment of how the U.
S. military presence in Europe affects defense mobility requirements.
Specifically, our objective was to provide available information on how
mobility requirements are affected by four elements of

1 P. L. 106- 398, sec. 1223, Oct. 30, 2000. 2 European Security: U. S. and
European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe (GAO- 02-
174, Nov. 28, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

forward presence: (1) the en- route system of airbases, 3 (2) prepositioned
weapons and equipment, (3) Air Force personnel and aircraft, 4 and (4) Army
forces.

Because the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 does not specifically analyze
the effects of a reduction in the U. S. forward presence in Europe on
mobility requirements and because Defense officials stated that they are
unaware of any studies or analyses of this specific issue, we relied
primarily on information from and views of commanders and other highranking
officials on the relative importance of these four elements on mobility. We
also used prior GAO reports that shed some light on these issues.

The Department of Defense has not quantified the impact of forward presence
in Europe on mobility requirements. However, Defense officials believe that,
without forward- deployed forces and equipment in Europe, in some scenarios
mobility requirements and mobility costs would be considerably higher and
deployment times would be longer, which would increase war- fighting risk.
The impact can vary for each of the four elements of forward presence we
discuss:

 The U. S. en- route system of airbases is critical to operations in Europe
and Southwest Asia. Without these bases, which provide refueling and other
logistics support to U. S. airlift aircraft, it would be impossible to meet
wartime requirements in Europe and the Middle East/ Southwest Asia.

 U. S. prepositioned weapons and equipment in the European theater provides
the ability to execute military operations in nearby areas more quickly and
at a lower cost than by using air and sealift from the United States.

 Air Force aircraft and personnel deployed in Europe allow forces to move
more quickly to small- scale contingencies in the area and reduce the burden
on airlift and sealift, if units were coming from the U. S.

 As with the Air Force, Army combat and support units stationed in Europe
allow forces to move more quickly and at less cost to small- scale
contingencies in the area. The Army can also move these units by land at
lower mobility costs than for those units coming from the United States.

3 A network of overseas airfields that provide logistical support to
aircraft on their way to the war zones. 4 Fighter/ attack, refueling, and
transport aircraft. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

The Department of Defense defines overseas presence as the right mix of
permanently stationed forces, rotationally deployed forces, temporarily
deployed forces, and infrastructure required to conduct the full range of
military operations. Historically, these forces have been concentrated in
three regions- Asia- Pacific, Europe, and Southwest Asia. Forces in Europe
include the major elements of two Army divisions; six Air Force wings, which
include fighter/ attack, refueling, and transport aircraft; one Navy
aircraft carrier battle group; and one Marine Corps amphibious group. 5
Prepositioned items include Army stockpiles of equipment for three heavy
brigades, equipment and supplies for the lead unit of a Marine Corps
expeditionary unit, and six Air Force air base support sets.

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005, issued in January 2001, determined the
number and mix of mobility systems needed to support the national defense
strategy at the time, which required the military to fight and win two
nearly simultaneous major wars. 6 This mix includes both airplanes and ships
owned by Defense as well as volunteer and chartered civilian airplanes and
ships that participate in the Department?s mobility programs. The study
investigated mobility requirements stateside as well as between theaters and
within individual theaters of war. The analysis determined requirements for
the three components of mobility (airlift, sealift, and ground
transportation) and assumed that most forces and prepositioned equipment
currently stationed overseas, including those in Europe, would remain at the
levels planned, at the time of the study, for fiscal year 2005. 7 The study
also modeled the en- route airbases needed to support the movement of forces
and equipment.

The study did not model any scenarios without forward- deployed U. S. troops
and equipment in Europe. The study did conclude, however, that the mobility
force structure planned for fiscal year 2005 was sufficient to

5 We do not address Navy forces afloat in this report because they self-
deploy and thus have little impact on mobility requirements. Marine forces
often deploy with the Navy, but in some instances, these forces would
require airlift support.

6 The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, issued on September 30, 2001,
stated that a new defense strategy will require the U. S. military to
swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping major conflicts, be capable of
decisively defeating an adversary in one of those conflicts, and conduct
small- scale contingency operations elsewhere.

7 Airlift delivers the majority of the initial forces and supplies and would
move these items within the theater. Sealift carries much of the bulk cargo
needed to sustain an operation. Ground transportation moves forces and
supplies from their home stations to air and seaports and within the
theater. Background

Page 4 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

fight and win one major theater war and that a second nearly simultaneous
war could be won by shifting air and sealift mobility assets from one
theater to the other.

During the time of our study, the Department of Defense was conducting the
Quadrennial Defense Review, a congressionally mandated review of national
defense strategy, which is to analyze, among other things, force structure
and military infrastructure. 8 The review?s report, issued on September 30,
2001, stated that the mix of new threats and missions requires the
Department to reevaluate the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 in detail and
adjust the results as necessary. According to a Department official, this
reevaluation includes the en- route basing system, the use of civilian
aircraft, and the mobility requirement for the new national defense
strategy.

A U. S. forward presence in Europe reduces mobility requirements, mobility
costs, war- fighting risk, and time required for deployment to operations in
Europe or Southwest Asia. A reduction in any of the four elements of forward
presence in Europe would have an adverse effect on mobility requirements,
costs, and risk, according to Defense officials. Central Command officials
have told us that the U. S presence in Europe, particularly the en- route
system of airbases and the Air Force assets, would be critical to the
success of their operations in Southwest Asia. 9 European Command officials
also told us that the U. S. presence allows the Commander to manage the
missions assigned to the Command more easily, such as the small- scale
contingencies in Bosnia and Kosovo. 10 Many officials generally agreed that
some elements have a greater relative impact on mobility requirements than
others. DOD officials suggested a relative ranking of U. S. military
presence in Europe starting with the enroute system of airbases as having
the greatest impact on mobility, followed by prepositioned equipment, Air
Force aircraft and personnel, and finally Army combat forces.

8 10 U. S. C. 118. 9 The Central Command oversees the Middle East (excluding
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria), parts of Africa and West Asia, and part of the
Indian Ocean. 10 The European Command is responsible for all U. S. military
activities in Europe, most of Africa, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the South
Atlantic Ocean. Forward Presence

Components Affect Mobility Requirements to Varying Degrees

Page 5 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

The Department of Defense maintains a system of en- route airbases in Europe
and the Pacific to support long- range airlift operations. These bases
provide the basic services, such as parking facilities, maintenance
capabilities, equipment to load and unload cargo if needed, and refueling
capabilities for airlift aircraft as they move on to their final
destinations. Six airbases in Europe are part of this en- route system (see
fig. 1). 11

Figure 1: Location of En- Route Airbases in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Officials from the commands agreed that the en- route system is critical to
operations in Europe and Southwest Asia. The en- route airbase system in
Europe gives transport aircraft the ability to fly from the U. S. to Europe
and continue from Europe into Southwest Asia in the early phase of a

11 Although the United States is currently using facilities at Rhein Main
airbase in Frankfurt, Germany, it has agreed to withdraw by December 31,
2005, in exchange for German construction of additional facilities at
Spangdahlem and Ramstein. En- Route System of

Airbases

Page 6 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

conflict, a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, which is about the distance
a C- 17 can fly without refueling. Defense officials believe that the system
has a significant impact on their ability to move troops and equipment into
any location around the world. For example, the loss of Howard Air Force
Base in Panama made it more difficult for the United States to move forces
quickly and easily into Central and South America.

According to Defense officials, if the en- route airbase system in Europe
did not exist, it would have to be created before combat forces and
equipment can arrive from the United States and move through on their way to
an operation in Europe or Southwest Asia. This effort would require using
airlift to open airbases along the way, instead of using the same airlift to
carry troops and equipment. Without the system, the Department would require
more air refueling capability, as well as more airlift.

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 concluded that en- route system
capacity is significantly less than requirements but that planned
improvements would largely eliminate the shortfall by 2005. Defense
transportation officials attribute the shortfall to the shrinkage in U. S.
overseas presence and increased reliance on the remaining bases. They
believe that the shortfall would cause forces and equipment to arrive in the
war theater later than planned, increasing the risk of operations not being
executed as planned and the risk of higher casualties. We recently issued a
report on the en- route system. 12 This report discussed the system?s
shortfall in capacity, the reasons for the shortfall and costs associated
with improvements, and the lack of basic information and a coherent
management structure to ensure that the operations of the system can be
carried out efficiently and effectively. We are continuing to study the
system?s planned modernization.

According to U. S. Transportation Command officials, the en- route system
will continue to be evaluated in the context of the new defense strategy.
They stated that they anticipate airlift requirements will be at least as
demanding, and possibly more demanding in the new strategy.

12 Military Readiness: Management Focus Needed on Airfields for Overseas
Deployments

(GAO- 01- 566, June 14, 2001).

Page 7 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

The services have both land- based and sea- based equipment and munitions
prepositioned in Europe. Land- based prepositioned items consist of
equipment and supply sets for three Army brigades, one Army artillery
battalion, and one Marine expeditionary unit, in addition to six Air Force
air base support sets and other Air Force equipment. The Army?s three
brigade sets, two in central Europe and one in Italy, include 348 Abrams
tanks and 240 Bradley fighting vehicles. In Norway, the Army has equipment
for an artillery battalion, which includes 18 self- propelled howitzers, and
the Marine Corps stores equipment and 30- day supplies for a Marine
expeditionary brigade. Air Force air base support sets- temporary shelters
for early- arriving air base personnel- are stored at a site in Luxembourg,
with the other equipment stored in sites around Europe. There are also ships
afloat in the Mediterranean Sea, which carry equipment and munitions for the
Marine Corps and the Air Force (see fig. 2). 13

13 The Army plans to shift its prepositioned equipment in Europe to other
locations. Prepositioned Weapons

and Equipment

Page 8 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Locations of Prepositioned Equipment in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Prepositioned equipment in Europe greatly reduces the amount of time needed
to deploy to a conflict in Europe than if the same forces and equipment have
to be moved from the United States using air and sealift. For example,
officials stated that the Army has established a brigade set of equipment in
Bosnia for rotating troops to use when they deploy to that mission instead
of bringing their own. Using this prepositioned equipment saves about $5.5
million in transportation costs if the unit is coming from the United States
and about $2.5 million if the unit is based in Europe. Furthermore, an
earlier mobility study pointed out that prepositioned equipment is a more
attractive option because it might be less expensive than purchasing more
airlift aircraft. 14

14 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom- Up Review, Department of
Defense.

Page 9 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 assumed both afloat and landbased
prepositioned equipment would be in place and fully stocked in 2005 and did
not model any scenarios without it. Land- based prepositioned equipment in
Europe is not used to support the two major theater war strategy. However,
some prepositioned equipment can be used as reserve during a major conflict
or in small- scale contingencies. In fact, from the start of the mission in
Bosnia in December 1995 to June 1998, the Army lent over 7,900 pieces of
prepositioned equipment to units in Bosnia. The equipment included, among
others, Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and armored personnel
carriers.

Officials did cite some drawbacks to having large quantities of equipment
and weapons prepositioned in specific places. First, it is always difficult
to plan conflicts in advance, and there is always the danger that the
equipment may be in the wrong place or that two conflicts break out at the
same time. Other risks are that prepositioned equipment can be a tempting
target for enemies and that the Department might need more flexibility to
quickly move to other geographical regions than prepositioning allows.

The Air Force has almost 33,000 personnel in Europe assigned to six wings,
which include three fighter wings, a refueling wing, an airlift wing, and a
multi- mission wing (see fig. 3). These forces can accomplish all the
traditional Air Force missions, both conventional and nuclear. The units
include 167 fighter/ attack aircraft, 36 transport aircraft, and 15
refueling aircraft. Air Force Aircraft and

Personnel

Page 10 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Major Locations of U. S. Air Forces in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Air Force aircraft deployed in Europe allow forces to move more quickly to
small- scale contingencies and reduce the burden on airlift and sealift. For
example, F- 15 pilots from Aviano Airbase in Italy conducted combat missions
during the first day of the air campaign in Kosovo. Also, the 31st Fighter
Wing based at Aviano is providing the aircraft to support the mission to
monitor, control, and police air space over Bosnia. Central Command
officials stated that combat and transport aircraft are important to have in
Europe and are critical to ensuring the command?s ability to execute its
operational plan for a major theater war in Southwest Asia.

As stated above, the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 modeled the forward-
deployed forces in Europe as they were planned for fiscal year 2005. The
exception is the assumption that those forces currently enforcing the ?no-
fly? zones in Northern and Southern Iraq would no longer be assigned to
those missions and therefore would no longer be

Page 11 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

forward deployed in Europe. This would mean that there would be fewer Air
Force personnel and equipment stationed in Europe and a greater mobility
requirement for U. S. Central Command to execute their operational plan if a
conflict were to arise in Southwest Asia.

There are about 69,400 soldiers based in Europe who are assigned to three
infantry and three armored brigades, an aviation brigade, and numerous
support units (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Major Locations of Active Army Units in Europe

Source: Department of Defense.

Some officials we spoke with stated that, of the four elements of forward
presence, Army combat and support troops would be the easiest to move, if
they were not forward deployed in Europe. In the event of a conflict in
Europe or Southwest Asia, 95 percent of ground troops would move by
commercial airlift. These troops would then fall in on prepositioned
equipment or meet up with their unit equipment, which would move by Army
Forces

Page 12 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

sealift. According to the Mobility Requirements Study 2005, there is
sufficient sealift, except for special purpose sealift, which is used to
move watercraft that cannot self- deploy, to handle the requirements of a
two major theater war strategy. This would leave the Defense- owned
transport aircraft to carry other critical items.

But having Army personnel and equipment stationed in Europe allows the
Commander, U. S. European Command, to deploy troops faster and easier to a
conflict in his theater. For example, forward- deployed troops from Europe
were among the first units deployed in both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations
because they had to travel a much shorter distance from home station to the
theater than troops based in the continental United States. According to a
former commander- in- chief of the European Command, the 1st Armored
Division?s deployment to Bosnia from its bases in Germany reduced the number
of days required for full deployment and cost significantly less than
deployment would have by a similarly equipped unit based stateside using
strategic airlift and sealift. Also, European- based units deploy to Bosnia
and Kosovo primarily by rail and road transportation, and are therefore less
costly to move than forces requiring air transportation.

War fighting risk is another factor to be considered. If personnel, weapons,
and equipment have to be moved to a conflict in Europe or Southwest Asia
from the United States, they would take longer or require more airlift
capacity than the same units coming from Europe, which would increase risk.
For example, the Patriot missile battalion in Europe would need the airlift
capacity of 59 C- 17 cargo aircraft to move to the area of operations under
the Central Command. But the same battalion, coming from the United States,
would require twice the airlift capacity to arrive within the same
timeframe, according to Defense officials. If that capacity were not
available, it would take longer to arrive, which would increase the war
fighting risk. Again, the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 modeled the Army
forces in Europe as they were planned, at the time of the study, for fiscal
year 2005.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with
the information in our report. DOD?s comments are reprinted in appendix I.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Agency Comments

Page 13 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

To determine the impact of U. S. forward presence in Europe on mobility, we
reviewed the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 and other Defense mobility
studies. We obtained briefings, reviewed documents, and interviewed
officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the military services, the Central Command, the European Command, the
U. S. Transportation Command, the Special Operations Command, the Joint
Forces Command, and the Air Mobility Command. We also obtained information
and held discussions with officials at U. S. Army, Europe, and U. S. Air
Forces, Europe, headquarters.

We conducted our review from May 2001 through August 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and The
Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (757) 552- 8100 if you or your staffs have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II.

Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management Scope and

Methodology

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 15 GAO- 02- 99 Military Readiness

William C. Meredith (202) 512- 4275 Ann Borseth (202) 512- 5222

In addition to those named above, Lawrence E. Dixon, Patricia Lentini, Alan
Goldberg, and Stefano Petrucci made key contributions to this report.
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(350047)

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