Army Readiness: Readiness Improved for Selected Divisions, but	 
Manning Imbalances Persist (20-DEC-01, GAO-02-98).		 
								 
In 1998 and 2000, GAO testified that personnel shortages,	 
assignment priorities, and frequent peacekeeping deployments were
downgrading the combat readiness of the Army's five		 
later-deploying divisions. In July 2001, GAO reported on initial 
observations on personnel readiness issues for these divisions,  
particularly, the progress in achieving the goals of the Army	 
Chief of Staff's manning initiative in October 1999. This	 
initiative was designed to ensure that all active Army units are 
assigned 100 percent of enlisted personnel in terms of the	 
authorized numbers, grades, and skills needed to perform wartime 
missions. Since that report, terrorists attacked the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon, and the Bush administration formulated a new
military strategy. These developments may change how, when, and  
where these divisions will be used--as evidenced by the 	 
deployment of soldiers from the 40th Infantry Division in	 
Operation Enduring Freedom. On the basis of GAO's examination of 
the Army's official readiness and training reports and the	 
discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001 the five	 
divisions reported they were ready and able to perform all or	 
most of their combat missions. Enlisted personnel levels were at 
or near 100 percent of their authorization compared with 93	 
percent in March 1998. However, imbalances of occupational	 
specialty staffing levels for certain combat support skills	 
continue to exist among the five divisions. In the area of	 
training, each division met its requirements for training to	 
prepare for combat missions. Reported readiness based on the	 
amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that	 
equipment was high, indicating that the five divisions were able 
to perform their combat missions, although there were shortages  
of some items and difficulties in maintaining some equipment.	 
According to readiness reports, however, these shortages	 
generally did not degrade readiness. Army officials found it	 
difficult to quantify the varied effects of peacekeeping	 
operations on the five divisions' readiness.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-98						        
    ACCNO:   A02608						        
  TITLE:     Army Readiness: Readiness Improved for Selected	      
Divisions, but Manning Imbalances Persist			 
     DATE:   12/20/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Army personnel					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Military training					 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Peacekeeping					 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 
	     M1A1 Tank						 

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GAO-02-98
     
United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters GAO

December 2001 ARMY READINESS Readiness Improved for Selected Divisions, but
Manning Imbalances Persist

GAO- 02- 98

Page i GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Divisions Report They Can Conduct Wartime
Operations 6 Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Unit Readiness Has Varied 19
Conclusion 21 Recommendation for Executive Action 21 Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation 21 Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 25

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables

Table 1: Peacekeeping Missions and Personnel Deployed for Selected Divisions
(Feb. 1998 Through June 2001) 4 Table 2: Divisions Reporting Selected
Military Occupational

Specialties Shortages (Jan. Through June 2001) 11 Table 3: Selected Military
Occupational Specialty Fill Rates and

Authorizations (May 2001) 12

Figures

Figure 1: Deployment Timeline and Number of Personnel Deployed for Selected
Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001) 5 Figure 2: Enlisted Personnel
Manning Levels for the Five Selected

Divisions (Dec. 1999 Through May 2001) 8 Figure 3: Enlisted Personnel Grade
Levels in the Five Selected

Divisions (May 2001) 9 Figure 4: Enlisted Personnel Fill Rates by Military
Occupational

Specialty in the Five Selected Divisions (May 2001) 10 Figure 5: Aggregate
Average Mission Capable Rate for Ground and

Air Systems for Five Selected Divisions (Jan. Through June 2001) 17 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office METL Mission
Essential Task List

Page 1 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

December 20, 2001 The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives

The Honorable John M. McHugh Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

In 1998 we testified that personnel shortages, assignment priorities, and
frequent peacekeeping deployments were degrading the combat readiness of the
Army's five later- deploying divisions. 1 In October 2000, you requested
that we follow up our 1998 testimony to examine a number of issues
associated with the readiness of the five divisions that had been considered
later- deploying. In July 2001, we reported our initial observations on
personnel readiness issues for these forces, particularly, the progress in
achieving the goals of the Army Chief of Staff's manning initiative of
October 1999. 2 This initiative was designed to ensure that all active Army
units are assigned 100 percent of enlisted personnel in terms of the
authorized numbers, grades, and skills needed to perform wartime missions.
Since that report, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, and the Bush administration formulated a new military strategy.
These developments may change how, when, and where these divisions will be
used- as evidenced by the deployment of soldiers from the 10th Infantry
Division in Operation Enduring Freedom.

1 Such forces deploy in the event of a second simultaneous or nearly
simultaneous majortheater war, or as reinforcements for a larger- than-
expected first war. The Army has 10 active combat divisions, 4 of which- the
82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, 3rd Infantry, and 1st Cavalry- are
"contingency" divisions, the first to deploy to a major- theater war. The
2nd Infantry Division, while not a contingency force, is currently deployed
in Korea. The remaining five divisions- the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th
Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry- are the focus of this report.
For a transcript of our testimony, see Military Readiness: Observations on
Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions

(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 126, Mar. 20, 1998). 2 See Military Readiness:
Preliminary Observations on the Army's Manning Initiative

(GAO- 01- 979R, July 26, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

This report, which was largely completed prior to the events of September
11, 2001, focuses on the other unit- readiness 1 issues you requested that
we review. We analyzed (1) the current state of the combat readiness of
personnel, training, and equipment in these divisions and (2) the effect of
peacekeeping missions on that readiness.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness and
training reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001,
the five divisions reported they were ready and able to perform all or most
of their combat missions. Throughout the review period, these divisions
reported that their readiness was at high levels both overall and in the
specific areas of personnel, training, and equipment. Enlisted personnel
levels were at or near 100 percent of their authorization compared with 93
percent as we reported in March 1998. The divisions also increased the
numbers of assigned personnel by grades to more than 95 percent and skills
(i. e., occupational specialties) to greater than 100 percent by May 2001.

These staffing improvements were due largely to the Army Chief of Staff's
manning initiative. However, imbalances of occupational specialty staffing
levels for certain combat support skills continue to exist among the five
divisions. In one specialty, for example, one division had no positions
filled, while another was staffed at 119 percent of its authorized level. In
the area of training, each division met its requirements for training to
prepare for combat missions. Reported readiness based on the amount of
equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment 2 was high,
indicating that the five divisions were able to perform their combat

1 Unit readiness is the ability of units to accomplish their assigned
missions. Commanders periodically report their units' readiness via the
Status of Resources and Training System, which uses various indicators to
assess the readiness of personnel, training, equipment, and the unit
overall. Commanders also provide comments in these status reports when a
unit's condition needs explanation or discussion. A commander cannot change
the system's measurement of personnel, training, and equipment readiness,
but he can change the unit's overall readiness level if he believes that it
does not truly represent the unit's status.

2 ?Equipment readiness? is indicated in two unit status report resource
areas- equipment on hand status and equipment serviceability status.
?Equipment on hand? indicates whether units have their principal weapon
systems and major equipment items compared with their wartime requirements.
?Equipment serviceability? indicates how well units are maintaining their on
hand reportable equipment. The serviceability rate is a percentage based on
the number of days that reportable equipment is available to the unit and
fully able to do its mission compared with the number of days it could have
been available. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

missions, although there were shortages of some items and difficulties in
maintaining some equipment. Equipment shortages were attributed to outdated
authorization documents and the incomplete fielding of new equipment.
According to readiness reports, however, these shortages generally did not
degrade readiness. Maintenance problems were primarily attributed to the
shortage of personnel with specific repair skills and the difficulties
encountered with old equipment.

Army officials found it difficult to quantify the varied effects of
peacekeeping operations on the five divisions' readiness. According to
division commanders, participation in peacekeeping operations improved
readiness: it enhanced training for some support activities and provided
leadership opportunities for junior officers and senior enlisted personnel.
However, peacekeeping operations can also have negative effects. For
example, absences from home stations due to peacekeeping can erode war-
fighting skills, especially those that require the maneuvering of large
armored or infantry formations. In November 1999, the Army recognizing the
significance of ongoing peacekeeping operations and their effect on reported
readiness, issued supplemental readiness reporting guidance to assist
commanders in determining the availability of unit assets deployed for
peacekeeping operations for redeployment to a war. As a result of the new
guidance, reported readiness significantly improved for two divisions in the
following month. Additionally, the guidance acknowledged the need for
deliberate planning efforts for disengagement, recovery, reconstitution, and
redeployment of Army forces and equipment committed to current and future
peackeeping operations. Divisions have developed disengagement plans
designed to quickly recover and retrain units returning from peackeeping
operations to their critical war- fighting skills.

To address staffing imbalances for occupational specialties common to all
its divisions, we are recommending that the Army develop and implement a
plan to address those imbalances in making staffing decisions affecting the
divisions and monitor its progress in alleviating the imbalances. DOD
concurred with our recommendation.

The Army maintains 10 active divisions- 6 heavy and 4 light, each of which
is assigned 10, 000 to 15,000 personnel. Heavy divisions are armored or
mechanized and equipped with tanks, fighting vehicles, and attack
helicopters. Light forces are airborne, air assault, and infantry divisions
tailored for operations on restricted terrain, such as mountains, jungles,
or urban areas. We reviewed the following five divisions: Background

Page 4 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

 1st Armored Division- Also known as "Old Ironsides," is a heavy armored
division with headquarters and three brigades in Germany and a fourth
brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas.

 1st Infantry Division- Also known as the "Big Red One," is a mechanized
division with two brigades and headquarters in Germany and a third brigade
at Fort Riley, Kansas.

 4th Infantry Division- Also known as "Ivy," is a mechanized division with
two brigades and its headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas, and a third brigade
at Fort Carson, Colorado.

 10th Infantry Division- Also known as the "Mountain" Division, is a light
infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Fort Drum, New York.

 25th Infantry Division- Also known as "Tropic Lightning," is a light
infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii, and a third brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington.

In addition to preparing to fight and win the nation?s wars, these divisions
have deployed soldiers and units periodically to peacekeeping operations.
For example, since 1995 units from the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and 10th
Infantry divisions have deployed at various times to Bosnia as part of an
international peacekeeping force. Since February 1998, these divisions have
deployed 12 brigade- size units and supported numerous smaller deployments.
(See table 1.)

Table 1: Peacekeeping Missions and Personnel Deployed for Selected Divisions
(Feb. 1998 Through June 2001) Division Brigade- sized

deployments Battalion- sized deployments Deployments

< < < < 200 personnel Total deployments

1st Infantry 8 1 0 9 1st Armored 4 1 0 5 10th Infantry 0 4 4 8 25th Infantry
0 1 15 16 4th Infantry 0 2 0 2

Total 12 9 19 40

Legend < means less than Source: GAO's analysis of divisions' data.

Nearly 83 percent of all the deployments- to include all the brigade- sized
deployments- were to the Balkans, while the remaining deployments were to
the Middle East and East Timor. (See fig. 1.)

Page 5 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Figure 1: Deployment Timeline and Number of Personnel Deployed for Selected
Divisions (Feb. 1998 Through June 2001)

Legend TFAS = Task Force Able Sentry SFOR = Stabilization Force- Bosnia KFOR
= Kosovo Force- NATO Operation Joint Guardian TFHawk = Task Force Hawk-
Albania MFO = Multinational Force Observers

Page 6 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Note: Each deployment shown on the timeline is placed beneath the fiscal
year during which it began, first showing the name of the operation,
followed by the number of personnel deployed, then the number of months
deployed. If the data were not available, they are so indicated. a According
to a 10th Infantry division official, this number is an estimate of the
number of soldiers

deployed during 1998 for operations in Bosnia. b The 4th Infantry Division
deployed two battalions to Bosnia during fiscal years 1998- 2000. However,
the division could not provide detailed data showing the total number of
personnel, exact year, or length of time deployed.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Department of the Army's and divisions' data.

Two of these divisions have been involved in transformation activities. The
4th Infantry is the Army's experimental division for advanced war- fighting
concepts, and part of a brigade of the 25th Infantry is designated to test
transformation concepts.

The manning initiative directed all Army units to be staffed at 100 percent
of their authorized personnel by numbers, grades, and skills 3 -and

thereafter to maintain those staffing levels- so that they have the
personnel needed for wartime missions. The initiative redressed staffing
imbalances that had developed in part because staffing priority had been
given to the contingency divisions. It included certain measures to ensure
the maintenance of adequate readiness; for example, units are to have no
fewer than 70 percent of authorized personnel. The Chief of Staff also
emphasized retention and described recruitment as his number one task.

Although the specific details are classified, each of the five divisions
reported they can conduct most or all of their wartime missions. Throughout
January to June 2001, these units reported their overall combat readiness
and their readiness in personnel, training, and equipment to be at high
levels. The division, brigade, and battalion commanders we interviewed
considered the five divisions able to perform their wartime missions.
Although the personnel levels for all five divisions are at or near 100
percent of the enlisted personnel that they are authorized, each has some
shortages in grades and skills. In at least some cases, the redistribution
of existing soldiers would fill these staffing shortages. Training also
improved, which Army officials attributed to (1)

3 Skills are grouped by grade as follows: skill level 1, E1- E4 (lowest
grades of enlisted personnel: Private, Private First Class, Corporal, and
Specialist); level 2, E5- E6 (mid- level noncommissioned officers: Sergeant,
and Staff Sergeant); and level 3, E7- E9 (senior noncommissioned officers:
Sergeant First Class, Master Sergeant, First Sergeant, Sergeant Major,
Command Sergeant Major, and Sergeant Major of the Army). Divisions Report
They

Can Conduct Wartime Operations

Page 7 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

the increase in the number of personnel, prompted by the manning initiative,
and (2) the implementation of a new funding policy for fiscal year 2001 that
restricted the use of training funds to pay for other expenses. However, the
Army could not show specifically how the new funding policy improved
training or unit readiness. In terms of the amount of equipment on hand and
its serviceability, readiness was high during fiscal year 2001, although
some items were in short supply and some equipment difficult to maintain.
Shortages were attributed to outdated authorizations and the incomplete
fielding of new equipment; according to the Army's readiness reports,
equipment shortages generally did not degrade readiness. Equipment
maintenance problems were primarily attributed to the shortage of personnel
with specific repair skills and the difficulties associated with maintaining
old equipment.

As we reported in July 2001, the manning initiative was largely responsible
for staffing the reviewed divisions at authorized enlisted levels and, as a
result, improving personnel readiness. For the time period January through
May 2001, each of the five divisions maintained overall numbers of enlisted
personnel at nearly 100 percent of authorizations, 4 compared with the 93
percent we reported in March 1998. (See fig. 2.)

4 Our analysis did not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington. Manning
Initiative Has

Increased Personnel Fill Rates, but Shortages in Some Skills and Grade
Levels Persist

Page 8 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Figure 2: Enlisted Personnel Manning Levels for the Five Selected Divisions
(Dec. 1999 Through May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command?s data.

The divisions also increased, on average, the numbers of assigned personnel
by grade to more than 95 percent (see fig. 3) and skills to greater than 100
percent (see fig. 4) by May 2001.

Page 9 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Figure 3: Enlisted Personnel Grade Levels in the Five Selected Divisions
(May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command?s data.

Page 10 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Figure 4: Enlisted Personnel Fill Rates by Military Occupational Specialty
in the Five Selected Divisions (May 2001)

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO?s analysis of the Army Personnel Command?s data.

According to Army officials, the increase in personnel has had a great
impact not only on personnel readiness but on overall readiness as well.
They believe that the increase in personnel overall, as well as in grade and
skill, increased the number of personnel available to train and perform
maintenance activities, thereby improving overall readiness.

Though manning has improved significantly over the past 2 years, divisions
still have shortages in certain combat support skills that Army commanders
consider critical to their wartime mission. For example, at some time in
those months, all five division commanders considered their staffing of
specialty 96R- ground surveillance system operator- to be critically short.
One commander listed it as critical in all 6 months, while another listed it
for 5; the others did so in at least 2 of the 6 months.

Page 11 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

According to Army officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, this particular specialty has poor retention for initial term
soldiers; retention is better for mid- term and career soldiers. Table 2
shows how many division commanders in a particular month reported a shortage
for the specified military occupational specialty.

Table 2: Divisions Reporting Selected Military Occupational Specialties
Shortages (Jan. Through June 2001)

2001

Military occupational specialty Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June

27E - Land combat electronic missile system repairer 1 1 0 0 00 63Z - M
echanical m aintenance s upervisor 0 1 1 0 00 96H - Imagery ground station
operator 1 0 0 0 00 96R - Ground surveillance system operator 4 4 4 2 22 97E
- I nterrogator 1 1 1 2 23 98J - Electronic intelligence interceptor/
analyst 0 1 1 1 11

Source: GAO's analysis of data from the Army's Unit Status Reporting System.

In addition to the shortages reported at the division level in table 2,
brigade and battalion commanders told us they have experienced shortages
such as aircraft electricians, aviation mechanics; and aircraft power train
repairers. Even though brigade and battalion commanders reported some of
these critical shortages on monthly reports, the shortages might not have
been reported at the division level. 5

Our analysis of fill rates for occupational skill specialties shows that one
area that the Army needs to address is the imbalance of occupational
specialty staffing levels among the five divisions. 6 In some instances, one
or more divisions have too few soldiers for a particular skill, while others

5 Division commanders have the authority to subjectively report or not
report these shortages on monthly reports on the basis of their perceptions
of how essential the specialties are to performing their mission.

6 In March 2000, we reported that aggregate measures of retention mask
significant reductions that occurred among specific groups of enlisted
military personnel in different occupational specialties. While the types of
occupational groups that saw retention declines differed somewhat in each
service, the majority of them were concentrated in the areas of
communications and intelligence and electrical and mechanical equipment
repair. See Military Personnel: Systematic Analyses Needed to Monitor
Retention in Key Careers and Occupations (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 60, Mar. 8, 2000).

Page 12 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

have more soldiers than authorized. As shown in table 3, the Army fill rate
for these selected specialties ranged from 74 to 101 percent, yet the rates
for the five divisions ranged from zero to 133 percent. For example, for
specialty 96H- imagery ground station operator 7 -the Army fill rate was 74
percent, yet the 10th Infantry Division's fill rate was zero percent,
compared with 119 percent for the 4th Infantry Division.

Table 3: Selected Military Occupational Specialty Fill Rates and
Authorizations (May 2001)

Military occupational specialty Army fill rate

Range of authorizations

among divisions

Range of fill rates among

divisions

27E - Land combat electronic missile system repairer 101% 12- 58 67%- 125%
63Z - Mechanical maintenance supervisor 99% 19- 40 79%- 103%

96H - Imagery ground station operator 74% 25- 37 0%- 119% 96R - Ground
surveillance system operator 84% 58- 59 75%- 90%

97E - Interrogator 89% 10- 12 60%- 100% 98J - Electronic intelligence
interceptor/ analyst 85% 5- 9 60%- 133%

Note: Our analysis does not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

Source: GAO's analysis of the Army Personnel Command's data.

The fill rates shown in table 3 are as of May 2001, but in our opinion are
generally representative of the trend from December 1999 through May 2001.
Our review indicates that, in at least some of these cases, the
redistribution of existing soldiers would fill such staffing shortages. For
example, for specialty 27E- land combat electronic missile system repairer-
redistribution would fill three of the five divisions to 100 percent and the
other two to 96 percent.

As we reported earlier, 8 Army officials think it unlikely that the service
can ever fill divisions at 100 percent in the grades and skills required;
they

7 Imagery ground station operator supervises or participates in detecting,
locating, and tracking ground targets and rotary wing and slow- moving fixed
wing aircraft. 8 See GAO- 01- 979R.

Page 13 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

estimate that about 94 percent may be the best they can do. Changes in
requirements can be prompted by a need for greater expertise in a skill, by
the unforeseen alteration of a mission, or by upheavals in global politics.
For instance, the end of the Cold War led the Army to reduce the number of
Russian interpreters it needs, while increasing its requirements for Spanish
interpreters. Also, personnel with highly technical skills may not be easy
to recruit, so a time lag to fill these slots is often inevitable.

Given the dynamics of rapidly evolving military technologies and the skills
needed to employ those technologies, in concert with recent changes to the
U. S. national security and military strategies, it is a challenging task
for the Army to achieve its goal to man all of its active component
divisions at 100 percent of its authorized enlisted personnel by the skills
and grades needed. Army officials acknowledge there have been problems with
recruiting and retaining personnel for these specialties, and several of
them will be placed on the Army's top- 25 recruiting list in fiscal year
2002. 9 However, some of the specialties will remain difficult to staff
because of (1) difficulties in recruiting personnel who can learn the skill;
(2) lengthy advanced individual training courses; (3) small authorizations
that, with the loss of a single soldier, can create drastic shortages in
operating strength; 10 and (4) incomplete equipment fielding and therefore
the personnel are not yet needed. For example, the Army Recruiting Command
added the specialty 98J- electronic intelligence interceptor/ analyst, to
its top- 25 recruiting list at the priority- 1 level for fiscal year 2002.
However, the five divisions are authorized only five to nine positions, so
the loss of a single soldier can create drastic shortages in operating
strength. At the time of our review, two of the divisions still had empty
slots for specialty 98J- electronic intelligence interceptor/ analyst.

9 Each year, the Army targets 25 military occupational specialties as its
top recruiting priorities on the basis of, but not limited to, (1) projected
operational strength, (2) fill priority, (3) inclusion on the Army's 10 most
critical military occupational specialty list, (4) initial training
attrition, (5) training course length, and (6) recruiting history.

10 The occupational specialties included in tables 2 and 3, although
considered low density by the Army, have Army- wide (active component)
authorizations that range from more than 500 to around 850 personnel,
compared with two of the Army's highest- density occupational specialties
which have Army- wide authorizations that range from around 13,000 to more
than 24, 000 personnel.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, shortages of
personnel for combat or combat support occupational specialties can result
in

 ineffective training that is not accomplished as intended by Army doctrine
because troops learn "work arounds" rather than the skills that will be
needed when they go to war and

 impaired ability to sustain critical combat equipment in a high- intensity
conflict.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness and
training reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001,
the five divisions reported they met their training requirements. Reported
training readiness 11 improved early in fiscal year 2001, remained constant
through May 2001 for three of the divisions, and was constant throughout the
fiscal year for the other two. The commanders of the divisions attributed
this improvement to the manning increase. As their units' complement of
personnel more closely reflected the numbers, grades, and skills required
for successful combat, their ability to train increased. During our review,
none of the divisions reported being untrained in any mission- essential
task. 12

Even though commanders stated that training readiness was at high levels,
some told us that the lack of experienced senior enlisted personnel in
equipment repair (such as the military occupational specialty 63Z-
mechanical maintenance supervisor, identified in tables 2 and 3) impeded
development and on- the- job training of newer soldiers. Senior personnel
are very knowledgeable concerning specific equipment, its peculiarities, and
troubleshooting techniques. Without them, it takes longer for newer soldiers
to become proficient in repairing equipment.

The Army also attributed training improvements to a new funding policy
restricting the use of training funds to pay for other expenses, such as
base

11 An assessment of the unit's ability to perform its wartime missions. 12
These tasks are derived from an analysis of a unit's assigned wartime
missions. Missionessential tasks for the reviewed divisions include
deploying, attacking the enemy, conducting area defense, sustaining the
force by providing personnel and logistical support, and protecting the
force from enemy attack and from the effects of nuclear, biological, and
chemical hazards. Divisions Reported

Improvements in Training to Conduct Combat Operations

Page 15 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

operations and real property maintenance. However, the Army could not
demonstrate this effect. Earlier this year we reported that, during fiscal
years 1997- 2000, the Army obligated almost $1 billion less than the nearly
$4.8 billion that the Congress had provided for training. 13 We found no
evidence that this reduction in funding caused a cancellation or delay of
any planned training.

Also as previously reported, since at least the mid- 1990s, the Army has
obligated millions of dollars less than it budgets for the conduct of
training. 14 For example, training in tanks has not been at the 800- mile
level. 15 As of June 2001, with only one quarter remaining in the fiscal
year, it appeared that two divisions- the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored- were
still not training at the 800- mile level. Therefore, the Army cannot
pinpoint a finite correlation between the level of training funds received
and the level of training readiness reported. According to division
commanders, however, a primary drawback of the new funding restriction has
been a decreased ability to maintain training ranges. Before the funding
policy was changed, commanders could use training funds to pay for the
maintenance and operation of these ranges.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports and
discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001, the five divisions
reported the amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that
equipment was in a high state of readiness, indicating that the five
divisions expected to be able to perform their combat missions. Although the
Army met its goals for having certain percentages of equipment on hand and
ready to perform its mission, some units reported shortages of certain
equipment items and difficulty with maintaining old equipment.

13 See Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army
Division Training (GAO- 01- 902, July 5, 2001). 14 See GAO- 01- 902.

15 The Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy identifies (1) mission-
essential tasks that units must be able to perform in time of war and (2)
the type of training events or exercises and the frequency with which they
should be performed in order to be ready in those tasks. It has established
that the tanks will be driven, on average, 800 miles each year for home
station training- the level of training needed to have a combat- ready
force- and its budget request states that it include funds necessary to
support that training. However, after publication of our report, Defense
Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army Division Training
(GAO- 01- 902, July 5, 2001), the Army budgeted for only 730 miles in it?s
fiscal year 2002 budget. Division's Reported

Equipment Readiness High, but Some Shortages and Maintenance Problems Exist

Page 16 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Division officials attributed equipment shortages to outdated authorization
documents and the incomplete fielding of new equipment. Although unit
commanders cited their top 5 to 10 equipment shortages in monthly readiness
reports, they told us that these shortages did not degrade readiness. For
example, one unit told us that several years ago, new secure- communications
sets for radios were added to its authorized equipment list. The equipment
started a phased entry into the supply system instead of an entry at the
fully authorized level. The result of this phased equipment fielding is that
the unit still does not have these vital sets for all its radios as
authorized.

All the divisions reported the serviceability of their equipment to be at
very high levels of readiness during the period of our review. Our analysis
of the five divisions' reported mission capable rates 16 showed that the
average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and air systems
exceeded the Army's mission capable goals for those systems. (See fig. 5.)

16 Mission capable rates (also referred to as serviceability rates) are the
primary indicator used by a commander to determine equipment readiness. A
mission capable rate indicates the percentage of time during a particular
reporting period that a piece of equipment can fulfill at least one or more
of its missions. During each reporting period, commanders report an
aggregate mission capable rate for all ground systems and air systems.

Page 17 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Figure 5: Aggregate Average Mission Capable Rate for Ground and Air Systems
for Five Selected Divisions (Jan. Through June 2001)

Note: One air system has an Army mission capable goal of 70 percent versus
75 percent for the other air systems.

Source: GAO's analysis of data from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics.

The aggregate average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and
air systems exceeded the Army's mission capable goals during the time of our
review. However, we recently reported that although some Army aviation
systems generally met their mission capable goals, spare parts shortages
have adversely affected operations and led to inefficient maintenance
practices that have lowered the morale of maintenance personnel. 17 Although
generally meeting their mission capable goals indicates that parts shortages
have not affected mission capability, supply

17 See Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and
Maintenance Effectiveness (GAO- 01- 772, July 31, 2001).

Page 18 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

availability rates and the cannibalization 18 of parts from one aircraft to
another indicate that spare parts shortages have indeed been a problem.

According to division officials, by having more people available to make
repairs, the increased numbers of personnel have helped units maintain high
equipment readiness. Maintenance problems that do exist are largely due to
the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills- aircraft
electricians, aviation mechanics, missile system repairers, and aircraft
powertrain repairers- especially at the more experienced supervisory level,
or difficulties encountered trying to maintain old equipment. For example,
at one unit the lack of experienced repair personnel resulted in most of its
mortar guns? failing a recent depot- level inspection. At the unit level,
the repair personnel responsible for the inspections were not experienced
enough to find the defects. If the unit had been called to deploy prior to
the depot- level inspection, 4 of its 18 guns would have been incapable of
performing their missions.

Army officials at another division said they did not always have the skilled
personnel needed to fix new equipment. For instance, a unit had received new
equipment to improve fire accuracy, but it lacked the trained personnel to
repair the item. According to unit officials, if this item were to break
during wartime, the unit's ability to sustain combat would be affected
because the item would have to be sent to a depot for repair.

The maintenance of old equipment also presents a challenge. In June 1999, we
reported that aging Army equipment was becoming increasingly difficult to
maintain and that unit mechanics were devoting increasing amounts of time to
keep equipment operating. 19 During our review, one battalion commander at
Fort Riley 20 told us that, every time the unit uses its nearly 30- year-
old M- 1A1 tanks for training, they break down; if he had to depend upon
these tanks in wartime, he said, he would not have confidence in
accomplishing his mission. His brigade commander,

18 The Army's definition of cannibalization, referred to as "controlled
exchange," is the removal of components from equipment designated for
disposal. 19 We also reported that serviceability rates did not provide a
good assessment of equipment condition because equipment that is old,
unreliable, and difficult to maintain may still be reported serviceable. See
Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of
Army Equipment (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 119, June 16, 1999).

20 Two separate brigades are located at Fort Riley; one is attached to the
1st Armored Division, while the other is attached to the 1st Infantry
Division.

Page 19 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

however, maintained that the brigade, as a whole, would be able to carry out
its mission with the equipment on hand and equipment prepositioned in-
theater. In October 2000, a team from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics was sent to review this brigade and the other brigade located
there to determine what was needed to raise the M1A1 fleet to current
mission- capable standards and to maintain the fleet. The team and brigade
staff identified problems with supply, maintenance, personnel, and training
and identified possible solutions. The report stated that the total
estimated cost of implementing all recommendations exceeded $25 million.

On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports and
deployment schedules and on discussions with division personnel, the number
of peacekeeping missions and their effect on unit readiness have varied.
According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, these effects have
been both positive and negative, but peacekeeping has not interfered with
the divisions' ability to fight and win the nation's wars.

In March 1998 we testified that sustained increases in peacekeeping
operations for three of the five divisions exacerbated personnel shortfalls
and degraded unit readiness and training within those divisions. 21 However,
during this review, Army officials found it difficult to quantify the
effects of peacekeeping operations, but they did offer several observations.
These operations improve training for intelligence, medical, logistics,
transportation, and engineering activities because they are called upon to
perform tasks similar to their wartime tasks. Peacekeeping operations have
also provided junior officers and senior enlisted personnel with leadership
opportunities not normally available in a nondeployed status. However, we
were told that peacekeeping operations can erode a unit's warfighting
skills- especially those that require the maneuvering of large armored or
infantry formations, a task considered crucial to the divisions' ability to
perform their wartime missions.

Army officials told us that, for these five divisions, peacekeeping
operations are no longer the exception, but are a regular part of
operations. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders,
sustained peacekeeping operations have changed the five divisions from

21 For a transcript, see Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel
Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 126, Mar.
20, 1998). Impact of

Peacekeeping Missions on Unit Readiness Has Varied

Page 20 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

later deployers to a war to early deployers to ongoing and smaller- scale
operations. In November 1999, the Army provided unit commanders additional
readiness reporting guidance- used in conjunction with Army Regulation 220-
1, Unit Status Reporting- that recognized the significance of ongoing
peacekeeping operations and their effect on reported readiness. The guidance
was formulated to assist commanders in determining whether forces and
equipment deployed to peacekeeping operations could be available to redeploy
to a major- theater war within scheduled deployment time frames. Prior to
the guidance, division commanders generally reported forces and equipment
deployed to peacekeeping operations as unavailable for deployment to a
major- theater war. The guidance also acknowledged the need for units
deployed to peacekeeping operations to have specific plans in place for
their disengagement, recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces
and equipment committed to current and future peackeeping operations prior
to those deployments.

For example, in November 1999, as a result of the unavailability of some
forces and equipment for immediate deployment to a major- theater war, two
divisions reported low levels of readiness. However, the guidance which
provides for consideration that deployed forces and equipment could be
recovered, reconstituted, and available for redeployment within deployment
time frames, allowed the two divisions to report a level of readiness that
reflected the divisions? actual readiness within majortheater war deployment
time frames. Those division commanders reported that without the guidance,
their divisions would have continued to report lower readiness levels that
did not provide an accurate picture of the units? ability to meet wartime
requirements. The divisions? reported readiness continued to remain at high
levels through our review.

According to Army officials, since the reporting guidance was issued, the
divisions have developed detailed plans to quickly recover and retrain them
to their critical war- fighting skills, and to recover and reconstitute
equipment for redeployment within established deployment time frames. For
example, the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions in Germany have
developed plans that include 4 months of training for peacekeeping
operations, 6 months of deployment on such operations, then 6 months of
redeployment and reintegration training. According to Department of the Army
officials, all divisions that participate in peacekeeping operations have
similar plans and those plans can be adjusted to retrain soldiers more
quickly in the event of other contingency operations.

Page 21 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Additionally, to ease the burden of the divisions under review, the Army has
extended their participation in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo-
commonly called rotations- to units of the Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, and other corps- level units. Deployments for missions in Bosnia,
which started in April 2001 and are expected to run through April 2005, will
incorporate Reserve units and six National Guard- enhanced separate
brigades. Furthermore, from June 2001 through May 2005, other active units
from the Army's III Corps (Fort Hood, Tex.), V Corps (Heidelberg, Germany),
and XVIII Airborne Corps (Fort Bragg, N. C.) will support peacekeeping
rotations in Kosovo.

Since our last report, primarily because of the Army Chief of Staff's
manning initiative, which increased enlisted personnel, staffing, and
occupational specialties, the combat readiness of five divisions- the 1st
Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry- has
improved. However, the Army's continuing imbalance of occupational specialty
staffing levels among the five divisions, although a balance difficult to
achieve, should be addressed. These imbalances continue to result in manning
shortfalls in some occupational specialties deemed critical to readiness by
commanders. While some equipment maintenance problems exist, none of them
appear to be "show stoppers" in preparing for wartime missions.

To address staffing imbalances for occupational specialties common to all
its divisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop and
implement a plan to address those imbalances in making staffing decisions
affecting the divisions and monitor the Army's progress in alleviating the
imbalances. The Army's plans should include a means to prioritize the
distribution of skilled personnel not only among these divisions but also
wherever they are needed in the Army.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army develop and
implement a plan to address staffing imbalances for critical occupational
specialties. The Department further stated that the Army?s manning
initiative and innovative enabling programs and policies have provided an
effective blueprint for managing the distribution of soldiers in critical
occupational fields. Although imbalances in some critical skills have
existed, the causes have been identified and the appropriate management
actions taken to correct or smooth the imbalances. Conclusion

Recommendation for Executive Action

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 22 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

We agree with the Department?s view that the Army Chief of Staff?s manning
initiative, along with the Army?s personnel management policies, provides a
blueprint to guide and manage the distribution of soldiers in critical
occupational specialties. However, the Army?s manning initiative and
personnel management policies have not yet resulted in the Army?s meeting
its fiscal year 2001 goals to staff its combat divisions, armored cavalry
regiments, and early deploying nondivisional units at 100 percent of
authorized enlisted personnel by skills and grades needed. We reported in
July 2001 that the Army had achieved only a 93- percent fill rate by skills
and grade level for its combat divisions and armored cavalry regiments, and
only an 86- percent fill rate by skills and grade level for its
nondivisional combat support units. 22

We agree with the Army?s assessment that broad transformational change,
equipment modernization programs and other short- term changes to force
structure will continue to challenge the Army?s management of soldiers in
low- density and difficult- to- fill occupational fields. However, the
staffing imbalances we identified in this report were representative of a
trend from December 1999 through May 2001. Therefore, we continue to believe
that the Secretary of the Army should take the steps necessary to ensure
that the Army addresses staffing imbalances in not only these five divisions
but wherever they are needed in the Army and continue to monitor the Army?s
progress in alleviating the imbalances. The Department?s comments are
reprinted in appendix I.

As requested, we updated our 1998 testimony 23 to determine (1) the current
combat readiness of personnel, training, and equipment in these divisions
and (2) the effect of peacekeeping missions on that readiness. We obtained
data from and interviewed officials with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the Army Personnel Command; Army
Forces Command; and U. S. Army Forces Europe; and division, brigade, and
battalion commanders and staff from the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry
Division, 4th Infantry Division, 10th Infantry Division, and 25th Infantry
Division.

22 See GAO- 01- 979R. 23 See GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 126. Scope and

Methodology

Page 23 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

To determine the current combat readiness of the Army's personnel, training,
and equipment in the selected divisions, we reviewed the Army's Unit Status
Reporting Regulation 220- 1 to determine the criteria for unit readiness
reports and interviewed division officials regarding their readiness status
and how it is reported. We reviewed reports in the Unit Status Reporting
System from the five divisions and two separately reporting brigade combat
teams located at Ft. Riley, Kansas for February 1998 to June 2001. We
focused our assessment of the current state of combat readiness for each
unit overall and in the measured areas of personnel, training, and equipment
on readiness data for the time period January through June 2001. We analyzed
the overall ratings as well as those for personnel, training, equipment on
hand, and equipment condition. We trended reported readiness for each of the
five divisions and the two separately reporting brigades located at Ft.
Riley, Kansas for the time period February 1998 through May 2001. We also
reviewed commanders' assessment letters, which provided a narrative
assessment of a unit's readiness to accomplish its wartime mission.
Additionally, to further determine readiness for the measured areas of
personnel, training and equipment, we did the following:

 Personnel: We analyzed enlisted manning data for each of the divisions
over an 18- month period; these data came in electronic form from the Army,
Personnel Command. We compared authorized and assigned numbers from these
data across the divisions 24 as well as across the Army overall. We gathered
additional data and conducted interviews with applicable Army personnel to
determine the reasons for manning imbalances and for low fill rates for
specific military occupational specialties considered by division commanders
as critical to sustaining combat.

 Training: We obtained and reviewed quarterly training briefings and
mission- essential task list (METL) data from the divisions and the two
separately reporting brigades. We analyzed METL assessment data to determine
whether divisions were fully or partially trained. To determine whether the
implementation of a new policy restricting the movement of operation and
maintenance training funds improved readiness, we interviewed officials in
the Resource Management Offices of the five divisions. We analyzed the
operation and maintenance funds obligated for fiscal years 1998 through
2001. 25 For fiscal year 2001, the year the new

24 Our analysis did not include personnel data for the 25 th Infantry
Division?s 1 st Brigade, located at Ft. Lewis, Washington. 25 Data for
fiscal year 2001 were as of the latest date available from each location.

Page 24 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

policy became effective, we compared tank miles driven with operations and
maintenance funds obligated. We also interviewed division, brigade, and
battalion commanders to determine the effect that the new funding policy had
on training and unit readiness.

 Equipment: We reviewed division equipment- on- hand and equipment shortage
lists. We analyzed divisions' mission capable rates and compared those rates
with reported readiness levels. We interviewed division, brigade, and
battalion commanders, as well as division logistics officials to determine
whether equipment shortages or serviceability issues adversely affected unit
readiness or the ability to train.

To determine whether peacekeeping missions have affected readiness, we
interviewed Department of the Army officials from the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, and division, brigade, and battalion
commanders at four of the five divisions. We analyzed data on the number and
types of deployments for fiscal years 1998 to 2001 and compared the timing
of deployments with readiness indicators. We reviewed the Army's three-
phase training plans to reintegrate troops returning from peacekeeping
missions and retrain them to fight major- theater wars. We reviewed recently
published GAO, Congressional Research Service, and RAND reports.

We conducted our review from December 2000 through October 2001 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. We will send copies to other interested
parties upon request. Please contact me on (757) 552- 8111 if you or your
staff have any questions about this report. Additional contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix II.

Neal P. Curtin, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO- 02- 98 Army Readiness

William M. Solis (202) 512- 8365 Claudia J. Dickey (202) 512- 6399

Other staff who made key contributions to this report were Connie W. Sawyer,
Donna M. Rogers, Melissa McDowell, Lauren S. Johnson, Nancy Ragsdale, James
E. Lewis, and Nadine Furr. GAO Contacts

Staff Acknowledgments Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

(350018)

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