    Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack
    Submarine Force (14-NOV-01, GAO-02-97).

    Maintaining a capable, appropriately sized submarine force is an
    integral part of the United States' strategy for deterring, and,
    if necessary, conducting wartime operations. Since the end of the
    Cold War, significant changes in the strategic environment have
    led the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce the size of its
    submarine force. DOD developed four options to a carry out the
    reduction: (1) refueling four SSN-688 attack submarines, (2)
    refueling four SSN-688 attack submarines and, upon reaching the
    end of their operational life after 10-12 years, replacing them
    with four new Virginia-class attack submarines, (3) refueling and
    converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs, and (4) refueling four
    SSN-688 attack submarines and converting two Trident SSBNs to
    SSGNs. All four options help to reverse a projected decline in
    attack submarine force levels below the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study's minimum requirement of
    55, but vary considerably in terms of the number of years they
    allow DOD to meet this goal. Both the refueled SSN-688s and SSGNs
    would be capable of performing a variety of peacetime and wartime
    missions, but they differ in the extent to which they can perform
    these missions. Converting four Trident ballistic missile
    submarines to SSGNs is more cost-effective than the other options
    in providing overseas presence.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-97
        ACCNO:   A02451
      TITLE:     Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack
    Submarine Force
         DATE:   11/14/2001
      SUBJECT:   Nuclear armed submarines
    	     Ballistic missiles
    	     Military operations
    	     Trident Submarine
    	     Los Angeles Class Attack Submarine
    	     SSN-688 Submarine
    	     Tomahawk Cruise Missile

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    GAO-02-97

    A

    Report to the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U. S.
    Senate

    November 2001 FORCE STRUCTURE Options for Enhancing the Navy?s Attack
    Submarine Force

    GAO- 02- 97

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Page i GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure Letter 1

    Results in Brief 3 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 5 Scope and
    Methodology 5

    Briefing Section I Background 8

    Briefing Section II Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels 20

    Briefing Section III Comparison of Mission Capabilities and Transformational
    Potential 30

    Briefing Section IV Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
    Effectiveness 76

    Briefing Section V Summary 80

    Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 83 GAO Comments 85

    Appendix II Organizations and Offices Contacted 86

    Table

    Table 1: Net Present Value Operational Life- Cycle Cost for Submarine Force
    Options 4 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure Abbreviations

    DOD Department of Defense SEAL Sea- Air- Land (naval special forces team
    member) SOF Special Operations Forces SSBN Nuclear- Powered Ballistic
    Missile Submarine SSGN Nuclear- Powered Guided Missile Submarine SSN
    Nuclear- Powered Attack Submarine START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties

    Page 1 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    November 14, 2001 The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy Chairman The Honorable
    Jeff Sessions Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on
    Armed Services United States Senate

    Maintaining a capable, appropriately sized submarine force is an integral
    part of the United States? strategy for deterring, and, if necessary,
    conducting wartime operations. Since the end of the Cold War, significant
    changes in the strategic environment have led the Department of Defense
    (DOD) to reduce the size of its submarine force. The United States has two
    types of submarines, both of which are nuclear- powered: attack submarines
    (SSN) and ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Attack submarines are part of
    the conventional forces and have capabilities in several mission areas
    including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, undersea warfare,
    strike warfare, and special operations warfare. Ballistic missile submarines
    are part of the strategic forces and are capable of launching strategic
    nuclear weapons upon short notice. The Trident ballistic missile submarine
    force consists of 18 Ohio- class (SSBN- 726) submarines. 1 DOD has
    determined that it only needs 14 Trident SSBNs to meet future requirements
    for strategic weapons and developed plans in the 1990s to retire 4 of its 18
    Trident SSBNs during fiscal years 2003- 2004. 2

    In the 1990s, DOD also decided to retire several attack submarines by 2003
    because of lower submarine force structure requirements. Most of DOD?s
    current force of 55 nuclear- powered attack submarines are part of the Los
    Angeles- class (SSN- 688). 3 DOD?s plan would have reduced attack

    1 The first ship of the class, the U. S. S. Ohio, was commissioned in 1981.
    Trident submarines take their name from the Trident ballistic missiles they
    carry. 2 Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
    (SSBNs) to NuclearPowered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, Final Report, June 1999.

    3 There are currently 51 Los Angeles- class submarines in the force. The
    first of the class, U. S. S. Los Angeles, was commissioned in 1976.

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    submarine force levels to about 50. However, in 1999, a Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff study concluded that a force structure below 55 attack
    submarines in 2015 and 62 attack submarines in 2025 would leave regional
    military commanders- in- chief with insufficient capability to respond to
    urgent critical demands. 4 To avoid the force falling below 55 with
    scheduled retirements, DOD began considering options to increase attack
    submarine force levels. Specifically, DOD evaluated and estimated the cost
    of (1) refueling SSN- 688 class submarines and (2) refueling and converting
    four Trident submarines scheduled for inactivation in fiscal years 2003-
    2004. The Trident submarines were to be converted to guided missile
    submarines (known as SSGN) to carry conventional Tomahawk landattack
    missiles and special operations forces.

    This report summarizes and updates our analyses of submarine force options
    provided in briefings to your staff in June and July 2001. We evaluated
    options for enhancing the attack submarine force to maintain a minimum of 55
    attack submarines through 2035. To address your request, we assessed the
    following options:

     refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines;

     refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines and, upon reaching the end of
    their operational life after 10- 12 years, replacing them with four new
    Virginia- class attack submarines; 5

     refueling and converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs; and

     refueling four SSN- 688 attack submarines and converting two Trident SSBNs
    to SSGNs.

    Our objectives were to determine how these options compare in terms of their
    (1) effects on DOD?s ability to maintain at least 55 attack submarines
    through fiscal year 2035, (2) capabilities to perform peacetime and wartime
    missions, including their relative contributions to the Navy?s strike
    mission, and their transformational potential, 6 and (3) operational

    4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study, Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, November 1999. 5 The Virginia- class attack submarine, formerly
    called the New Attack Submarine, is the Navy?s newest class of attack
    submarines. The scheduled commissioning for the first ship in the class is
    in 2004.

    6 Transformation is a process of change that involves developing new
    operational concepts, experimenting to determine which ones work and which
    do not, and implementing those that do.

    Page 3 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    life- cycle costs 7 and cost- effectiveness. To assess the options? effects
    on DOD?s projected submarine force structure through fiscal year 2035, we
    used the Navy?s current force structure and long- range shipbuilding plans
    as a baseline. The documents reflect plans to deliver 18 new Virginia- class
    attack submarines by fiscal year 2016. Our analysis did not include an
    assessment of the basis for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    study?s conclusion that DOD will require a minimum of 55 attack submarines
    in the future. Rather, at your request, we focused on assessing options for
    helping DOD to achieve this level of capability. Because each option
    provides certain advantages, the weight attached to each advantage is often
    subjective, and we did not assess the capabilities of other DOD weapon
    systems, we have not drawn a conclusion about which option is best.

    All four options help to reverse a projected decline in attack submarine
    force levels below the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack
    Submarine Study?s minimum requirement of 55, but they vary considerably in
    terms of the number of years they allow DOD to meet this goal. Refueling
    four SSN- 688s and replacing them with four additional Virginia- class
    attack submarines once their service life expires would provide a force
    level of at least 55 submarines for 32 of the 34 years during fiscal years
    2002- 2035. Refueling and converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would
    provide a force of 55 submarines for 28 years. Refueling four SSN- 688s and
    converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would provide a force of 55 submarines
    for 27 years. Finally, refueling four SSN- 688s without plans to replace
    them with additional Virginia- class submarines would allow DOD to meet its
    goal of 55 submarines for 24 of 34 years.

    Both the refueled SSN- 688s and SSGNs would be capable of performing a
    variety of peacetime and wartime missions, but they differ in the extent to
    which they can perform these missions. Refueled SSN- 688s would have
    somewhat better capabilities than SSGNs to conduct intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance; support aircraft carrier battle groups;
    and perform undersea and surface warfare. However, SSGNs would have
    significantly better capabilities to strike targets ashore and conduct
    special operations. An SSGN would provide significantly more presence

    7 Operational life- cycle costs include estimated acquisition, operations,
    maintenance and personnel costs during the options? projected operational
    service life. Results in Brief

    Page 4 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    days 8 per year than a refueled SSN- 688- 242 days versus 73 days- because
    SSGNs would have two crews per submarine. These crews would be rotated
    during the middle of planned deployments and, on average, would allow the
    SSGNs to accrue more presence days than a refueled SSN- 688. Finally, SSGNs
    would also provide a superior capability to support the Navy?s
    transformation plans because their large size and longer service life could
    support new technologies and weapons and because their stealth capability
    should help them survive and operate in a high- threat environment.

    The operational life- cycle costs and cost- effectiveness of the four
    options also differ significantly. As table 1 shows, the net present value 9
    life- cycle cost of the four options ranges from $1.8 billion for refueling
    four SSN- 688s to $6.6 billion to refuel four SSN- 688s and to replace them
    with four Virginia- class submarines upon their retirement after 10- 12
    years.

    Table 1: Net Present Value Operational Life- Cycle Cost for Submarine Force
    Options

    Dollars in billions

    Option Option description Fiscal year 2001 dollars

    Net present

    value

    1 Refuel four SSN- 688s $2.2 $1.8 2 Refuel four SSN- 688s and buy four

    Virginia- class replacements 7.6 6. 6

    3 Convert four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs 6.6 4. 8 4 Refuel four SSN- 688s and
    convert two Trident

    SSBNs to SSGNs 5.6 4. 2 Source: GAO analysis.

    Converting four Trident ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs is more cost-
    effective than the other options in providing overseas presence. This
    option?s cost per presence day is $234,000- the lowest of any option. In
    contrast, refueling four SSN- 688s and converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs
    would cost $311,000 per day; refueling four SSN- 688s would cost

    8 By presence days, we mean the number of days during a year either type of
    submarine could spend deployed to overseas theaters. Presence days do not
    include time in the submarines? homeport or in transit to the overseas
    theaters.

    9 Present value analysis converts costs occurring at different times to a
    common unit of measurement by recognizing the time value of money.

    Page 5 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    about $555, 000 per presence day; and refueling four SSN- 688s and replacing
    them with four new Virginia- class submarines would cost $1.1 million per
    day. Converting four Trident submarines to SSGNs would also provide a
    significantly more cost- effective capability to launch Tomahawk missiles
    and provide special operations units than the other options.

    DOD's written comments on a draft of this report are included as appendix I.
    The Department generally agreed with the report but noted that our cost-
    effectiveness comparison did not account for platform replacement costs in
    all four options or across the same number of years. As described in our
    methodology section, we had to use different periods of analysis to match
    the differing operational lifespans of the two submarines. Each option
    provides benefits over different periods thereby making direct comparisons
    difficult. However, to make the options more comparable, we included an
    option that buys four Virginia- class submarines to replace refueled SSN-
    688 submarines once they reach the end of their useful life. By adding the
    depreciated acquisition costs and the operating and support costs for the
    first 10- 12 years of the replacement submarines to the costs associated
    with the refueled SSN- 688s, this option becomes more directly comparable to
    the costs associated with the 20- 22 year life of the SSGN. We did not
    assess options that would involve replacing SSGNs after 22 years because DOD
    has not developed any requirements or cost estimates for their replacement.

    DOD also noted that appropriate metrics would need to be developed for all
    mission areas to fully assess SSN- 688 and SSGNs across a broad set of
    missions. Our report notes that the Navy lacks suitable metrics for missions
    such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, we agree
    that it would be helpful if it developed such metrics.

    To identify how the proposed options would affect the Navy?s submarine force
    structure during fiscal years 2002- 2035, we met with Navy officials and
    obtained pertinent documents concerning the Navy?s currently planned
    submarine force structure for that period and options it has under
    consideration for increasing that structure. We then applied those and
    Agency Comments

    and Our Evaluation Scope and Methodology

    Page 6 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    other options 10 to the currently planned force structure to determine the
    effect of each over the 34- year period. We did not assess the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff Attack Submarine Study?s evaluation that the Navy
    needs a minimum of 55 attack submarines to meet critical demands. We
    evaluated submarine force options through 2035 because the attack
    submarine?s notional life- cycle is very long: an 8- year procurement period
    11 followed by 33 years of operational service life.

    To determine how the options to refuel SSN- 688 attack submarines or to
    convert Trident SSBNs to SSGNs compared in terms of mission capabilities, we
    met with joint command and Navy officials. Appendix II includes a list of
    the organizations we contacted. We discussed the various missions in which
    the submarines would be engaged and the capabilities of the refueled SSN-
    688s and the SSGNs in performing those missions with those officials. In
    addition, we analyzed information the officials provided to determine each
    option?s contribution to performing those missions. We also compared the
    number of presence days each option would provide. We compared the
    respective capabilities of each type of submarine with surface combatants in
    carrying Tomahawk land attack missiles and the contributions each would make
    to peacetime and wartime operations. We also toured SSN- 688 and Trident
    submarines to obtain a better understanding of their capabilities and, in
    the case of Tridents, how they would be modified to accommodate special
    forces and Tomahawk Land Attack missiles. To assess the submarines?
    respective transformational potential we met with defense and industry
    officials and reviewed several reports on their potential contributions to
    transformation and experimentation. We also observed the employment of SSGNs
    in a major wargame that evaluates new operational concepts.

    To determine the options? life- cycle costs and compare their cost-
    effectiveness, we met with Navy officials and obtained estimated
    procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel costs for the options?
    respective time periods. We then determined the cost for each

    10 Since the refueled SSN- 688s would have a service life of about 12 years
    after refueling, we added an option of acquiring and operating four
    additional Virginia- class (SSN- 774) submarines in order to have a time
    period comparable to the SSGN?s 20- 22 year service life. We included 10- 12
    years of Virginia- class acquisition and operating and support costs in this
    option.

    11 The procurement period includes 2 years for the advance procurement of
    long- lead items and 6 years of construction. The procurement decision is
    normally preceded by a 2- year budget cycle.

    Page 7 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    option by fiscal year, converted the costs into fiscal year 2001 dollars,
    and calculated each option?s net present value using a real discount rate.
    Because alternative choices are being compared, we included, as appropriate,
    the cost of decommissioning submarines not chosen for further service. 12 We
    also combined the results of our cost and other analyses to derive a cost
    per presence day, cost per Tomahawk presence day, and cost per Special
    Operations Forces platoon presence day for each option.

    We conducted our review between January 2001 and August 2001 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
    Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the
    Navy; the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management
    and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies available to
    others on request. The report will also be available on GAO?s Web site at
    http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 5140
    or by e- mail at schusterc@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report are
    Janet St. Laurent, Roderick W. Rodgers, Tim F. Stone, Suzanne K. Wren, Mary
    Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and Susan Woodward.

    Carol R. Schuster Director Defense Capabilities and Management

    12 For example, if the four SSN- 688s were refueled, DOD would incur the
    cost of decommissioning four Trident SSBNs in addition to the cost of the
    SSN refueling program. Conversely, if the Trident SSBNs are refueled and
    converted, DOD would need to fund decommissioning the four SSN- 688s.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 8 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The end of the Cold War led to significant changes in both the Navy?s
    nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and nuclear- powered
    attack submarine (SSN) forces. During the Cold War, the ballistic missile
    submarine?s basic mission was to remain hidden at sea to deter a nuclear
    attack on the United States. For this mission, the Navy procured 18 Ohio-
    class (SSBN- 726) submarines, also referred to as Trident ballistic Briefing
    Section I: Background

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 9 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    missile submarines. In 1994, DOD?s Nuclear Posture Review 1 concluded that 4
    of the 18 Trident SSBNs were no longer needed to support the strategic
    nuclear mission. Consequently, DOD decided to inactivate rather than refuel
    the vessels in fiscal years 2003- 2004.

    The primary stated Cold War mission of the nuclear- powered attack submarine
    force was to perform anti- submarine warfare missions against the former
    Soviet submarine force. 2 To accomplish this mission the force peaked at a
    Cold War high of 98 nuclear- powered attack submarines at the end of fiscal
    year 1987 3 with the procurement of 62 Los Angeles- class SSN- 688
    submarines in the 1970s and 1980s. Following the Cold War, the Navy began to
    increase emphasis on missions that contribute to United States military
    operations in littoral (near- shore) areas against regional adversaries
    other than Russia. This led DOD to revise its attack submarine force level
    goals downward a number of times throughout the 1990s.

    In 1997, DOD?s Quadrennial Defense Review 4 established a tentative force-
    level goal of 50 attack submarines but required a reevaluation of peacetime
    requirements. The Deputy Secretary of Defense subsequently directed the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine DOD?s attack submarine
    requirements in 2015 and 2025. In December 1999, the Chairman?s study
    concluded that a force structure below 55 attack submarines in 2015 and 62
    attack submarines in 2025 would leave regional military commanders- in-
    chief with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands. The
    study also concluded that 68 attack submarines in 2015 and 76 attack
    submarines in 2025, were required to meet other high priority but less
    critical demands. In April 2000, the DOD?s Defense Planning Guidance
    authorized a force of up to 55 submarines taking into account the
    contributions to conducting attack missions that would be provided by
    converting up to four Trident SSBNs to an SSGN configuration or refueling
    selected SSN- 688s.

    1 The Nuclear Posture Review, undertaken in 1993, assessed policy, doctrine,
    force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure,
    safety, security, and arms control issues.

    2 Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,
    Congressional Research Service, June 2000. 3 Ship Forces of the U. S. Navy -
    Historical Force Levels, Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Requirements
    & Assessments), Department of the Navy. 4 The Quadrennial Defense Review is
    a legislatively mandated review of military strategy and the force structure
    best suited to implement the strategy.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 10 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 11 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    We analyzed options one and three because they were the primary options DOD
    was considering when we began our review. Because option 1 would only
    provide 10- 12 years of operational service life after refueling in contrast
    to the SSGN?s 20- 22 years of operations, we included a second option that
    replaces these four refueled SSN- 688s at the end of their service lives
    with four new Virginia- class submarines. We developed a fourth option that
    refuels four SSN- 688s and converts two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 12 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 13 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The SSGNs would be much larger vessels than the refueled SSN- 688s and, as a
    result, could carry more Tomahawk missiles and Special Operations Forces
    personnel and equipment. The SSN- 688s proposed for refueling are early
    vessels in the Los Angeles- class and were not equipped with the Vertical
    Launch System for Tomahawk missiles as were later submarines in the class.
    As a result, the number of Tomahawk missiles the refueled SSN- 688
    submarines can carry is limited to what can be carried in the torpedo room
    and the torpedo tubes. Moreover, this space must also accommodate other
    weapons, further limiting the number of Tomahawks that can be carried. The
    refueled SSN- 688s would not be modified to carry either dry deck shelters 5
    or Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems. 6 Additionally, because of its limited
    interior space, a refueled SSN- 688 would be able to embark only a limited
    number of Special Operations Forces personnel for a short period of time.

    The two types of submarines would use different concepts for crewing. The
    SSGNs would retain the dual- crewing concept of the Trident SSBNs where each
    SSGN would have two complete crews assigned. The crews would be rotated half
    way through each deployment as well as when the submarines are in refit.
    While one crew serves aboard the submarine, the other trains at shore- based
    facilities. This would allow the SSGN to be operated more intensely than a
    submarine with a single crew and extends the time the SSGN could remain
    overseas. The refueled SSN- 688s would have only a single crew, as do the
    Navy?s other attack submarines.

    5 The dry deck shelter is a deck- mounted cylindrical shelter large enough
    to house a SEAL Delivery Vehicle or a complement of rubber raiding craft.
    The shelter allows the submarine to launch and recover Special Operations
    Forces while submerged. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is a small submersible
    that can carry six Special Operations Forces personnel up to 35 nautical
    miles from the submarine.

    6 The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a submersible with a range of 125
    nautical miles that can carry up to eight Special Operations Forces
    personnel and their equipment.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 14 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Navy.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 15 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The SSGNs would retain the Trident SSBNs? 24 missile tubes. However, in a
    maximum strike configuration, the SSGN would carry a total of 154 Tomahawk
    missiles because 22 of the tubes would be adapted to carrying up to 7
    missiles per tube. The remaining two tubes would be permanently configured
    to support Special Operations Forces personnel and equipment and would not
    be able to carry Tomahawk missiles.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 16 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Navy.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 17 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    To support Special Operations Forces, 2 of the Trident SSBNs? 24 missile
    tubes would be permanently converted to lockin/ lockout chambers. 7 Special
    Operations Forces personnel could leave from and return to the submarine
    while it is submerged through these chambers. Up to eight people could pass
    through each chamber at a time.

    Those two tubes would also serve as the attachment points for the dry deck
    shelter and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. The SSGN could carry two dry
    deck shelters or, potentially, two Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems or one of
    each. Additionally, when conducting Special Operations Forces missions, up
    to eight of the missile tubes could be reconfigured to stow Special
    Operations Forces equipment- leaving the submarine with a capacity for 98
    Tomahawk missiles.

    7 According to Navy officials, because of budgetary and long- lead
    production considerations, only one lockin/ lockout chamber may be installed
    in each of the first two SSGNs.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 18 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 19 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Although it is not yet in force, the START II treaty will limit the United
    States to no more than 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads- of which no more
    than 1,750 may be attributed to submarine- launched ballistic missiles-
    after December 31, 2007. 8

    The Navy has proposed two variants for the converting Trident SSBNs to SSGNs
    each of which has different implications under the terms of the Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II). Under the START accountable
    variant, the warheads that the Trident strategic nuclear missiles originally
    carried aboard the submarines would still count against the United States?
    START I/ II limits because the missile tubes on the submarines would only be
    modified, not removed. Under the START compliant variant, the submarines
    would not count against the warhead limits because the original missile
    tubes designed for the Trident missiles would be removed and smaller tubes
    incapable of launching any strategic missiles would be installed. 9

    The Navy?s analysis has primarily focused on the accountable variant due to
    cost and schedule considerations. This variant?s cost is lower (about 50
    percent less than the compliant version according to the Navy?s original
    estimates). Additionally, Navy officials said that insufficient time remains
    to plan for and acquire the long- lead time material that would be needed to
    modify the first two Ohio- class Trident SSBNs to a START- compliant SSGN
    before those submarines must be refueled.

    The current administration is considering changes in United States nuclear/
    strategic policy that could reduce the number of warheads the United States
    deems necessary to maintain a strong nuclear posture. These changes could
    reduce concerns over the conversions of the Trident SSBNs to SSGNs.

    8 It is Defense?s policy that weapons system programs address pending arms
    control issues. 9 The protocol on procedures governing conversions and
    eliminations of the START I treaty delineates the elimination procedures.

    Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels

    Page 20 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels

    Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels

    Page 21 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The baseline force shown in this figure reflects the number of submarines
    included in DOD?s 2002 amended budget and DOD?s long- range shipbuilding
    plan 10 but does not include any of submarines associated with the four
    options we analyzed. 11 Unless DOD proceeds with one of these options, it
    would not have 55 submarines in the force for 19 of 34 years from fiscal
    years 2002- 2035. As noted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that a force
    structure below this level would not meet requirements.

    10 Report on Naval Vessel Force Structure Requirements, Department of
    Defense, June 2000. 11 The baseline does not include (1) one SSN- 688
    refueling and two Trident SSBN to SSGNs conversions that are included in the
    President?s fiscal year 2002 budget request; (2) three SSN- 688s that could
    be refueled in fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005; and, (3) two additional
    Trident SSBNs that have been identified for potential conversion to SSGNs.

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    Page 22 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    Refueling four SSN- 688s would enable the Navy to maintain a force level of
    55 submarines for 24 of 34 years in the 2002- 2035 time frame. In fiscal
    years 2017- 2020 and fiscal years 2027- 2030, the force level would fall
    below 55 submarines because refueled SSN- 688s would have exhausted their
    useful hull life, and other attack submarines would have reached the end of
    their useful hull or nuclear reactor core lives.

    Briefing Section II: Effect of Options on Force Structure Levels

    Page 24 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    This option (1) provides four refueled SSN- 688s and (2) upon their
    retirement (10- 12 years after refueling they reach their 33- year hull
    life), replaces them with four Virginia- class submarines. These four
    submarines are in addition to the Virginia- class submarines included in
    DOD?s planned force. The option assumes that the Navy would procure
    additional submarines upon the retirement of the refueled SSN- 688s in order
    to sustain future force levels. It would enable the Navy to maintain a
    minimum of 55 submarines in 32 of 34 years during the 2002- 2035 time frame-
    significantly longer than the SSN- 688 refueling option alone.

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    Page 26 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    Converting four Trident SSBNs 12 into SSGNs would enable the Navy to sustain
    a force of at least 55 attack submarines for 28 of 34 years during 2002-
    2035. This option would not keep pace with planned attack submarine
    retirements leading to a force of less than 55 submarines during fiscal
    years 2002- 2003 and fiscal years 2027- 2030.

    12 With their 42- year service life, Trident SSBNs could, if refueled,
    overhauled, and converted to a conventional SSGN configuration, remain in
    service until 2023- 2026.

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    Page 28 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    Option 4 would enhance the force by refueling four SSN- 688s and funding
    conversion of two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs. This option would enable the Navy
    to sustain a force of at least 55 attack submarines for 27 of 34 years
    during 2002- 2035. Funding for the conversion of two additional Trident
    SSBNs to SSGNs is on the Navy?s fiscal year 2002 unfunded priorities list.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 30 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: GAO?s analysis.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

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    We compared the capabilities of the refueled SSN- 688 and SSGN options in
    seven mission areas and on their transformational potential. We selected
    these capabilities because they comprise the primary roles for both the SSN-
    688 and SSGN, according to Navy officials. We also assessed the submarines?
    transformational potential. To address specific questions raised by the
    Subcommittee about Navy capabilities to conduct strike operations, we also
    compared the respective capabilities of each type of submarine with surface
    combatants in carrying Tomahawk missiles.

    The refueled SSN- 688 and SSGN differ in many respects and have different
    strengths. While these platforms can perform many of the same missions, they
    would not be viewed as interchangeable and would be assigned different
    peacetime and warfighting roles. The refueled SSN- 688s would be assigned
    traditional nuclear attack submarine type missions: intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance; undersea and surface warfare; and battle
    group support. SSGN missions would emphasize providing a forward presence of
    large volume precision strike and Special Operations Forces. In addition,
    the amount of space available on the SSGN would allow for experimentation
    with new technologies and concepts and for fielding transformational
    capabilities in the future.

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    Page 32 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    In strike warfare, Navy aircraft and ships attack targets ashore. The
    Tomahawk missile is a principal strike weapon that submarines, cruisers, and
    destroyers employ. 1 However, these ships also carry other weapons for other
    warfare tasks and those weapons compete with the Tomahawk missiles for
    launcher/ magazine space aboard the ships. For example, in addition to
    Tomahawk missiles, submarines carry torpedoes and mines while cruisers and
    destroyers carry surface to air missiles.

    Compared to the refueled SSN- 688s, the SSGNs would provide a superior
    warfare capability as strike platforms because they would carry more
    Tomahawk missiles. Depending on the amount and type of special operations
    equipment carried, an SSGN could carry from 98 to 154 Tomahawk missiles
    while a refueled SSN- 688 could carry no more than 26- all of which must be
    launched through the submarine?s four torpedo tubes- and would typically
    carry fewer.

    SSGNs would also have another advantage in that they could fire all their
    Tomahawk missiles in one salvo or launch operation. According to Navy
    officials, doing so can preserve the element of surprise, eliminate the
    opportunity for the targets to move, and allow a vessel to rapidly attack
    multiple targets. But, because a refueled SSN- 688 launches its Tomahawks
    from its torpedo tubes, its salvo size is limited to the number of its
    torpedo tubes- four.

    1 Modern U. S. Navy guided missile cruisers are multi- mission surface
    combatants capable of supporting carrier battle groups, amphibious forces,
    or of operating independently and as flagships of surface action groups. The
    cruisers are equipped with Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles giving them
    additional long range strike mission capability. Destroyers and guided
    missile destroyers operate in support of carrier battle groups, surface
    action groups, amphibious groups and replenishment groups. Destroyers
    primarily perform anti- submarine warfare duty while guided missile
    destroyers are multi- mission surface combatants. The addition of the
    Tomahawk capable vertical launch system to many

    Spruance- class destroyers has greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in
    strike warfare. The Navy is planning a new destroyer, the Zumwalt- class
    Land Attack Destroyer, that will carry Tomahawks and other missiles.

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    As a strike warfare platform, an SSGN and a refueled SSN- 688 would have
    several advantages compared to cruisers and destroyers. Because of its
    covertness when operating submerged, a potential adversary would not be
    alerted to an SSGN?s or a refueled SSN- 688?s presence. Additionally, as
    adversaries become increasingly capable of detecting and attacking U. S.
    surface ships, an SSGN or a refueled SSN- 688 would be less vulnerable to
    enemy attack than would surface ships.

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    In addition, converting Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would free up launcher space
    on other vessels for carrying out other missions. For example, other
    submarines could carry more torpedoes and cruisers and destroyers could
    carry more surface- to- air missiles. Also, with an SSGN present, these
    other vessels, unencumbered by the strike mission, would be able to
    concentrate on other tasks such as conducting intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance operations or maritime intercept operations.

    SSGNs would also carry many more Tomahawks than either cruisers or
    destroyers. Based on notional loads- the mix and number of weapons a vessel
    carries that is used for planning purposes 2 -one SSGN can carry as many
    Tomahawks as three to four cruisers and/ or destroyers.

    However, officials told us that unless Tomahawk missile inventories are
    increased the full benefits from the proposed SSGN conversions may not be
    realized. They stated that DOD?s low inventory of Tomahawk missiles is more
    important to address than the number and capacities of the available
    Tomahawk launch vessels. Precision- guided munitions top a list of unfunded
    priorities created by the commander- in- chiefs of the Atlantic and Pacific
    Fleets. The Navy currently plans to use existing Tomahawk missiles for the
    SSGNs. It plans to remove most torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks from all
    submarines to load the SSGNs. These shortfalls will persist under DOD?s
    current budget plans. Moreover, while service officials have not expressed
    any concerns about a shortage of vessels available to launch Tomahawk
    missiles, they have expressed concerns over the current Tomahawk inventory
    shortfalls to include their ability to carryout war plans.

    They also pointed out that concentrating more missiles on fewer launch
    vessels could limit a commander?s flexibility in employing the missiles.
    Additionally, with fewer launch vessels, the impact of a single maintenance
    failure would be greater.

    2 In our analysis, we used the same notional loads for surface ships that
    the Navy uses in its ordnance requirements determination process. We used
    Navy proposed loads for the submarines. Those proposed loads assume that
    most torpedo- launched Tomahawk missiles will be withdrawn from all attack
    submarines.

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    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    From a fleetwide perspective, the effect of the options on the Navy?s
    overall Tomahawk capability would be small. In analyzing Tomahawk
    capability, we used launcher capability for Navy surface ships and
    submarines, adjusted for notional weapons loads used by the Navy. Based on
    notional loads 3 and the number and composition of ships expected to be in
    the fleet in 2010, 4 fleetwide Tomahawk capability would only increase by
    about 2 percent if the four SSN- 688s were refueled. The four SSGNs would
    increase fleet- wide Tomahawk capability by about 2 percent. The increase
    from converting two SSGNs and refueling the four SSN- 688s would also be
    about 2 percent.

    Overall, submarines- those attack submarines equipped with the Vertical
    Launch System and four SSGNs- would comprise about 25 percent of the fleet-
    wide notional load capability in 2010- about the same percentage as in the
    current fleet.

    3 Our analysis assumes that most torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks are
    withdrawn from all attack submarines if four Trident SSBNs are converted to
    SSGNs according to current Navy plans. If only two Trident SSBNs are
    converted, about half the torpedo tube- launched Tomahawks would be
    withdrawn. SSN- 688s with the Vertical Launch System will still carry
    Tomahawks.

    4 Our analysis was based on a planned force of 135 ships and submarines.
    Because its design has not been definitized, we did not include any DD- 21s
    in our analysis.

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    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    Page 39 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Our analysis shows that an SSGN with a full Tomahawk strike load (154
    missiles) would increase the Tomahawk missiles available in a theater during
    peacetime by about 64 percent over the number that would be available in a
    notional carrier battle group alone. If the SSGN was configured to provide a
    maximum special operations forces capability, 5 the number of available
    Tomahawks would increase by about 38 percent.

    5 The SSGN would carry 98 Tomahawk missiles in this configuration because
    the special operations forces equipment would displace up to 56 missiles.

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    Page 40 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    A force of four SSGNs would make a substantial initial Tomahawk contribution
    to a major theater war, but its contribution would decrease as the war
    progresses. As a ?survivable? strike weapon, 6 Tomahawks would be heavily
    engaged in a conflict?s opening stages, primarily attacking and degrading
    the adversary?s air defense system, thus reducing the risk of loss of U. S.
    manned strike aircraft. However, Tomahawk?s role would diminish as the war
    progresses because the targets would become more suitable for attack by
    manned strike aircraft.

    If, at the beginning of a conflict, one carrier battle group 7 and one SSGN
    with a maximum strike load of Tomahawk missiles were present in the theater,
    we estimate that the SSGN would provide about 44 percent of the total
    Tomahawks available. If warning was sufficient to allow a second SSGN 8 to
    deploy to the region before the conflict started, the two SSGNs would carry
    about 56 per cent of the total number of Tomahawks available to the theater
    commander when the conflict started.

    As the war progresses, additional U. S. forces would flow into the theater.
    These forces would include several additional carrier battle groups and
    could include a third SSGN (in the maximum strike configuration). That SSGN
    would carry about 21 percent of the Tomahawks the additional forces would
    bring into the theater. 9

    6 The Air Force?s B- 2 bomber and F- 117 fighter are also ?survivable?
    strike weapons. 7 Our analysis is based on the same notional carrier battle
    group we used earlier- two guided missile cruisers, two guided missile
    destroyers, and two VLS- equipped SSN- 688 submarines.

    8 We assumed the second SSGN would be configured for special operations
    forces operations and, thus, would have a load of 98 Tomahawk missiles. 9
    This assumes that the ships and submarines initially engaged do not
    replenish their original Tomahawk loads after firing all their missiles and
    does not take in to account the missiles on other Tomahawk- capable ships
    and submarines that may be in the theater.

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    Page 42 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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    Page 43 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    A two SSGN force?s contribution to a major theater war would be less
    substantial than that of a four- SSGN force- both in the initial phase and
    as additional forces flow into the theater. A maximum strike configured SSGN
    operating with a carrier battle group would still provide about 44 percent
    of the total Tomahawk missiles available at the beginning of the conflict.
    But with only two SSGNs in the force, it would be less likely that a second
    SSGN, in either a strike or Special Operations Forces configuration, would
    be able to deploy to the region by the start of the conflict. Thus, either
    fewer Tomahawks would be available for the initial strikes of the conflict
    or other vessels would have to be tasked to carry the Tomahawks that a
    second SSGN would have carried.

    Assuming that the second SSGN deploying to the theater with the additional
    carrier battle groups would be configured for special operations forces, it
    would carry about 15 percent of the Tomahawks the additional forces would
    bring into the theater. 10

    10 This assumes the theater commander wanted one SSGN configured for strike
    and the other configured for special operations.

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    United States special operations forces operate in hostile, denied, or
    politically sensitive areas to conduct a range of special operations, such
    as seizing and destroying weapons of mass destruction and striking targets
    deep within enemy areas. To conduct these operations, special forces are
    inserted into an area by fixed- wing aircraft, helicopter, surface craft, or
    submarines; however, only submarines provide a highly clandestine insertion
    platform that can remain on station for weeks at a time.

    The SSGN would provide special operations forces capability superior to that
    of the refueled SSN- 688s. The SSGN?s larger space for special operations
    forces personnel, mission planning, physical fitness, and equipment storage
    would enable special operations forces to remain on station for about 90 or
    more days as opposed to the 14 days provided by a refueled SSN- 688.

    Because of their limited remaining hull life and technical considerations
    with the older submarines, Navy officials told us the refueled SSN- 688s
    would not be modified to carry dry deck shelters or Advanced SEAL Delivery
    Systems and they would only provide a marginal special operations forces
    capability. Furthermore, the refueled SSN- 688s would be the older ones of
    their class, with limited available space for upgrades, older combat
    systems, and greater acoustic signature.

    The SSGN would provide the only option to replace the dual dry deck shelter
    capability lost with the inactivation of the U. S. S. Kamehameha in October
    2001. 11 Dual host capability provides a long endurance, stealthy, mobile
    operating base for conducting multiple special operations forces missions
    over an extended period of time. Although a limited number of SSN- 688
    submarines have been modified to carry one dry deck shelter or Advanced SEAL
    Delivery System, a DOD study notes that an SSGN with two Advanced SEAL
    Delivery Systems could conduct 50 percent more missions than two SSNs with a
    single Advanced SEAL Delivery System. 12

    11 The U. S. S. Kamehameha is a ballistic missile submarine that has been
    modified to carry two dry deck shelters and special operations forces. 12
    Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
    to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, Final Report, March 1999.

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    Source: Navy.

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    In converting to the SSGN design, the Trident SSBN would be modified to
    carry two dry deck shelters, two Advanced SEAL Delivery Systems, 13 or one
    of each. The dry deck shelter is a large steel structure attached to the
    outside of specially configured submarines. It can be used to transport and
    launch a SEAL Delivery Vehicle or to lockout special operations forces
    personnel. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is a small, wet, battery- powered
    submarine that is stowed in, and launched from the dry deck shelter. It
    operates in shallow waters near the coastline. The SEAL Delivery Vehicle is
    termed a wet submarine since the interior, containing the crew and cargo, is
    fully flooded during submerged operations. Crew and passengers wear scuba
    gear or use the SEAL Delivery Vehicle?s auxiliary life support system during
    transit. Because SEALS are exposed to the water, they have limited endurance
    while in the SEAL Delivery Vehicle.

    The Advanced SEAL Delivery System is a small dry battery powered submarine
    that can clandestinely insert special operations forces. The Advanced SEAL
    Delivery System will eliminate diver exposure to water temperatures during
    transit; have significantly greater range, operating depth, and loiter
    capabilities; and carry more special operations forces than the SEAL
    Delivery Vehicle. Currently, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System is undergoing
    testing.

    13 Further tests must be conducted before a final decision can be made to
    provide the SSGNs with a dual- Advanced SEAL Delivery System capability.

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    The SSGN?s special operations forces capabilities exceed those of the
    refueled SSN- 688s on every measure of mission effectiveness. Special
    Operations Command officials stated that these older SSNs are not expected
    to be used for special operations forces operations because they will not be
    modified to carry either a dry deck shelter or Advanced SEAL Delivery
    System. They could, however, embark one special operations forces platoon of
    16 personnel in a crisis for 14 days. In contrast, the SSGN would normally
    carry 66 special operations forces personnel for about 90 days and could
    surge to 102 for short periods of time, if needed. The SSGNs extended
    endurance would allow them to conduct multiple special operations forces
    missions. The SSGNs would be equipped with up to two 9- man lock- out
    chambers 14 while the SSNs would only possess an escape trunk that can be
    used by two to three personnel at a time without their specialized
    equipment. The SSNs would lack dedicated mission readiness facilities such
    as: crew berthing, physical fitness, and mission planning space crucial to
    sustaining special operations forces for extended periods of time.

    14 The chamber has capacity for nine people but one person is an operator.

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    Submarines provide a critical intelligence- gathering capability unavailable
    through other national assets. With their multiple sensors, submarines can
    monitor events in the air, on the surface, or subsurface littoral areas and
    can collect a wide variety of intelligence data, including acoustic,
    signals, visual, and environmental information. Submarines also serve as a

    ?force- multiplier,? by alerting other assets to high interest events. Since
    submarines can operate in areas inaccessible to other platforms or systems,
    they can intercept signals of crucial importance to unfolding international
    events. Moreover, a submarine?s ability to loiter for extended periods of
    time allows it to collect vital information without alerting adversaries to
    modify their behavior.

    According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN- 688 would be a more capable
    intelligence collection platform than the SSGN. The refueled SSN- 688 would
    have better acoustic and signals intelligence capability to identify the
    sound signatures of other submarines and to direct, intercept, and determine
    the bearing of communications. The refueled SSN- 688s would also have the
    low- band sensors for close- in missions that the SSGN would not have. The
    refueled SSNs and SSGNs would have an equal ability to be upgraded to
    observe visual phenomenon such as tests above the sea?s surface that would
    otherwise elude national systems and to use sonar to image the ocean floor,
    identify mines, and conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

    Navy officials further stated that although the SSGN would not be as capable
    an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform as the refueled
    SSN- 688s, it would remain extremely quiet and would have an inherent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. The SSGN could be
    called upon to perform certain intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance missions, as was the converted ballistic missile submarine U.
    S. S. Kamehameha. Because of its size, the SSGNs? antennas and modularity 15
    would be superior to the refueled SSN- 688s. As such, the SSGN would have a
    better capability to share data than the refueled SSN- 688 and to accept new
    and improved technology and sensors. However, the SSGN would have less
    capability to perform acoustic and signals intelligence gathering.

    15 Modular construction uses standardized units or dimensions for flexible
    use. Use of modular design techniques, open architecture, and commercial
    off- the- shelf components permits rapid, less expensive modernization of
    submarines.

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    Undersea Warfare includes detecting and destroying enemy submarines
    (antisubmarine warfare) and laying and countering enemy mines (mine
    warfare). According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN- 688s would provide
    a greater undersea warfare capability than the SSGNs because they would have
    a better acoustic sensor suite and they would be able to carry more than
    twice the number of torpedoes as an SSGN; 16 however, the SSGNs? size,
    flexibility, and growth volume make them ideal platforms for new initiatives
    in undersea warfare. Crews of the SSN- 688s and SSGNs would be trained to
    the same undersea warfare standard, but, according to Navy officials,
    undersea warfare would be a primary mission for the refueled SSNs and a
    secondary mission for the SSGNs.

    The refueled SSN- 688s? sensors for identifying other submarines and for
    intercepting communications and determining their bearing would be slightly
    better than those on the SSGNs. According to Navy officials, the Navy has a
    limited number of mines and equipment necessary to allow submarines and
    other ships to lay them; however, because of this shortage, SSNs are not
    typically configured to conduct these operations. Although the SSGN could be
    modified to lay mines, the Navy does not plan to use it to do this. The SSGN
    would not be able to carry as many mines as the refueled SSN- 688 due to its
    smaller torpedo room. Even though the Navy does not plan to use the SSGN for
    mine warfare missions, it has the potential for launching unmanned
    underwater vehicles, which are stored and launched from a submarine?s
    missile tubes. These vehicles would allow submarines to covertly detect and
    report dangerous mine areas without risk to other naval forces. The SSGNs
    would have more available space than the refueled SSN- 688s for using this
    technology.

    16 Depending on their mission, submarines deploy with a mix of torpedoes,
    Tomahawk cruise missiles, and mines. Torpedoes are the Navy?s principal
    weapons for destroying enemy submarines.

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    Surface Warfare involves detecting and destroying enemy surface ships. To
    detect and destroy surface ships, submarines are equipped with advanced
    sensors and weapon systems. According to Navy officials, the refueled SSN-
    688 and the SSGN would have similar sensors, but the refueled SSN- 688 would
    have a larger torpedo room and would be able to carry twice as many
    torpedoes as the SSGN. While the crews of the refueled SSN- 688s and SSGNs
    would be trained to the same standard, Surface Warfare would be a primary
    mission for the refueled SSN- 688s and a secondary mission for the SSGNs.

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    A carrier battle group is a combat formation of ships and aircraft formed to
    provide a balanced force that would be capable of dealing with a variety of
    threats. The collective capabilities of the battle group would allow it to
    carry out tasks such as supporting peacetime presence requirements,
    maintaining control of designated airspace areas, and projecting power
    ashore. Carrier battle groups are comprised of similar types of ships,
    typically including an aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, a
    guided missile destroyer, a frigate, two attack submarines, and a supply
    ship.

    Battle group support operations are a primary nuclear- powered attack
    submarine mission, and two typically deploy with each battle group. Refueled
    SSN- 688s would provide protection, surveillance, and intelligence support
    to the battle group and their torpedoes contribute to the battle group?s
    defense against enemy submarines and surface ships. In addition, the speed
    of the SSN- 688s is more comparable to the speed of the carrier battle
    group.

    The SSGNs would not routinely be used to provide continuous battle group
    support. While the SSGN would have many of the necessary capabilities to
    conduct these operations, Navy officials told us that the SSGN would be
    employed as a ?theater asset? reporting directly to the regional commander
    in chief and not in direct support of the battle group commander. Moreover,
    the SSGN would not routinely be scheduled to deploy with carrier battle
    groups but instead would remain on deployment for extended periods.

    Further, with its massive load of Tomahawk missiles and special operations
    forces personnel, the SSGN is best suited to perform strike and special
    forces missions. As such, officials stated that it would not be prudent to
    place its large weapons load at risk in conducting battle group support
    operations for which it is not ideally suited.

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    The extent to which submarines would actually be forward deployed in a
    theater of operations is referred to as ?presence.? Forward presence
    activities include mission operations (e. g., intelligence gathering,
    surveillance, and missile patrols), engagements and exercises with U. S. and
    multinational units, maintenance performed while forwardly deployed, port
    visits, and inter- and intra- theater transits.

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    While either refueling four SSN- 688s or refueling and converting four
    Trident SSBNs to SSGNs would add four submarines to the fleet, the options
    do not provide equal forward presence capability. The dual crewing of the
    Trident force would enable four SSGNs to provide more forward presence than
    four refueled SSN- 688s. 17 A DOD analysis concluded that 8- 10 single- crew
    ships (such as the SSN- 688s being considered for refueling) would be
    required to provide the same level of forward presence capability as four
    dual crewed SSGNs. 18

    According to an analysis performed for the Navy, a fleet of four SSGNs could
    provide on average a total 2.65 submarines deployed in three theaters and
    the flexibility to surge from theater to theater. 19 In contrast, four
    refueled SSN- 688s would provide less than one submarine forwardly deployed.
    The Navy has not fully analyzed the forward presence coverage that a force
    of two SSGNs would provide. However, officials note that two ships can only
    provide continuous presence in one theater and that employing only two SSGNs
    reduces schedule flexibility. In addition, the two SSGN option would reduce
    the availability of the SSGN to free up other naval forces such as
    destroyers and attack submarines for higher priority missions such as
    theater ballistic missile defense, anti- air warfare, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, and sea control. Furthermore, officials
    told us that it would make economic and logistical sense to base a force of
    two SSGNs in one homeport rather than a homeport on each U. S. coast.
    However, basing two SSGNs on a single coast would mean that either the
    Pacific or European theaters would not routinely reap the deployment
    benefits of the SSGN.

    17 The SSGN?s concept of operations is a preliminary estimate based on the
    Trident SSBN and attack submarine historical deployment structures and
    maintenance patterns, the Trident submarine?s high deployment tempo and
    extended deployments demonstrated in a series of strategic submarine
    exercised called Submarine Continuity of Operations. For further
    information, see Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile
    Submarines (SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs),
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, June 1999.

    18 Analysis of Converting Trident- Class Ballistic Missile Submarines
    (SSBNs) to Nuclear- Powered Guided- Missile Submarines (SSGNs), Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, March 1999.

    19 Trident SSGN Marginal Utility Analysis: 2010 Peacetime Presence, Center
    for Naval Analyses, March 2001.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 60 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 61 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The SSGN?s presence capabilities exceed those of the SSN- 688s proposed for
    refueling. Each SSGN would provide 242 presence days per year for a total of
    968 days for a force of four SSGNs. In contrast, a refueled SSN- 688 would
    provide only 73 presence days per year or 292 presence days for a force of
    four SSNs.

    As noted earlier, the SSGN would provide vastly greater Tomahawk presence
    days with an average of 334 Tomahawks per day in- theater for a four SSGN
    force. 20 In contrast, four refueled SSN- 688s would only provide an average
    of 10 Tomahawks per day in- theater at any given time.

    Similarly, four SSGNs would provide an average of 14 special operations
    forces platoons in- theater. In contrast, refueled SSN- 688s could surge up
    to one platoon for a limited duration.

    20 This assumes a load of 98 and 154 Tomahawk missiles in the special
    operations and maximum strike configurations, respectively.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 62 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 63 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    In December 1999, the Chairman?s study concluded that a force structure
    below 55 attack submarines in 2015 and 62 attack submarines in 2025 would
    leave regional military commanders- in- chief with insufficient capability
    to respond to urgent crucial demands. A force of 55 attack submarines
    provides just over 4,000 days of presence in overseas theaters each year (an
    attack submarine provides 73 presence days annually) and 62 attack
    submarines would provide about 4,500 presence days. The study also concluded
    that 68 attack submarines in 2015 and 76 in 2025, were required to meet
    other high priority but less critical demands. These force levels would
    equate to 5,000 and 5,500 presence days, respectively. 21

    Our review did not evaluate the validity of the study?s force structure
    recommendations, although we did examine the extent to which the proposed
    options would help DOD achieve the lower of these goals established by this
    study.

    Without additional submarines the baseline force would not meet attack
    submarine presence day goals for 19 years between 2002 and 2035.

    21 We rounded presence days to the nearest hundred.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 64 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 65 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Of the proposed options, refueling four SSN- 688s contributes the least
    toward meeting DOD?s presence day goals. This option helps DOD to achieve
    its presence day goals for 9 additional years (from 2004 to 2012) above that
    provided by the baseline force. However, DOD would still be unable to meet
    its presence day goals for 10 years between 2002 and 2035.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 66 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 67 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Refueling four SSN- 688s and replacing them with Virginia- class submarines
    helps DOD achieve its presence day force structure goals for 17 additional
    years over that provided by the baseline force. DOD would be unable to meet
    its presence day goals in only 2002- 2003. This is the only option that
    would have no presence day gaps between 2004- 2035.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 68 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 69 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Of the proposed options, converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs contributes
    the most presence days and helps DOD achieve its presence day goal for 14
    additional years over that provided by the baseline force. With the four
    SSGN option, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for only 5 years
    (between fiscal year 2002 and 2035).

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 70 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 71 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Option 4 would enhance the submarine force by refueling four SSN- 688s and
    converting two Trident SSBNs to SSGNs. This option helps DOD achieve its
    presence day goals for 13 additional years over that provided by the
    baseline force. However, DOD would fall short of its presence day goal for 6
    years (fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and fiscal years 2027 to 2030).

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 72 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 73 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    One goal of naval transformation efforts is to counter challenges expected
    in the future. One of the challenges facing the Navy is the use of anti-
    access or area denial strategies by potential adversaries. Such strategies
    aim to deny U. S. forces access to the ports, airfields, bases, and near-
    shore sea areas they depend on to conduct military operations. Systems
    intended to counter U. S. naval forces in littoral areas could include
    advanced diesel- electric submarines, mines, anti- ship cruise missiles,
    air- defense systems, and potentially, weapons of mass destruction. Defense
    analysts 22 envision that undersea platforms that can penetrate these areas
    do not require forward basing agreements and would be of increased value in
    the future. The Navy?s current submarine transformation efforts include a
    project on ideas for expanding the number and variety of weapons and sensors
    carried by Navy attack submarines.

    Transformation advocates have identified the SSGN as having transformational
    potential while the refueled SSN- 688s would provide no new capabilities and
    have limited remaining hull life and available volume for upgrades. As a
    quiet, self- sustaining undersea platform, the SSGN could penetrate the
    littoral battlespace and counter area denial tactics. The large size and
    stability of the SSGN would allow for modifications to enable
    experimentation with future concepts and such potentially transformational
    capabilities.

    Officials noted, however, that a two SSGN class would provide less
    flexibility than the four- ship class to conduct joint experimentation,
    transformational concept development and special operations forces
    operations while at the same time attempting to provide any significant
    amount of forward presence.

    22 A Strategy for a Long Peace, Kosiak, Krepinevich, and Vickers, Center for
    Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 74 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Transformation advocates have long identified the SSGN as having
    transformational potential. In 1996, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
    Assessments identified the SSGN as a promising alternative for the Navy?s

    ?restructuring efforts.? 23 In 1997, the National Defense Panel, created by
    Congress to review the 1997 QDR and assess force alternatives, recommended
    that the Navy look closely at converting Trident SSBNs to

    23 A Navy for a New Era, Krepinevich, Andrew, Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Assessments, May 1996.

    Briefing Section III: Comparison of Mission Capabilities and
    Transformational Potential

    Page 75 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    alternative missions. 24 In 1998, The Defense Science Board Study ?Joint

    Operational Superiority in the 21st Century? also endorsed the SSGN concept.
    In addition, Congress has had continuing interest in the SSGN concept and
    has provided funding for studies and initial design work.

    The continuing interest in the SSGN concept by transformation advocates
    stems from the SSGN?s transformational features. First, the SSGN?s stealth
    would be advantageous to survival in the crowded near shore waters where the
    Navy expects to operate in the 21st century. The SSGN would be able to
    operate covertly near enemy coasts undetected for weeks or months, if
    necessary. Second, its speed, mobility, and range combined with large,
    flexible payloads would enable it to respond to a variety of developing
    world events. Third, because submarines do not require extensive logistics
    support to operate forwardly they would not be dependent on vulnerable
    forward bases or surface assets. Fourth, the SSGN?s precision- guided
    Tomahawk missiles would reach distant targets about 1,000 miles away,
    providing extensive strike capability into areas denied other U. S. forces.
    Furthermore, it would have the potential to carry follow- on weapons such as
    unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles, improved communications and other new
    technologies to counter emerging threats. Fifth, the Navy has made a concept
    known as network centric warfare the centerpiece of its efforts to transform
    its forces. 25 With its improved communications, large antennas for sharing
    data and the ability to network with other naval and joint warfighting
    elements the SSGN would further contribute to the Navy?s vision for network
    centric warfare. Sixth, the SSGNs combination of stealth, intelligence
    gathering, and special operations capability would enable it to conduct its
    own unique forms of information warfare. And finally, war games and
    experimentation with the SSGN show its potential for using a mix of
    shortreaction strike weapons and enhanced intelligence collection
    capabilities to counter the challenge of mobile targets.

    24 Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense and National
    Security in the 21st Century, Odeen, Philip A., et al., December 1997. 25
    Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused

    (GAO- 01- 853, Aug. 2001).

    Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
    Effectiveness

    Page 76 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    To compare the operational life- cycle cost of the options, we obtained
    estimated procurement, operations, maintenance, and personnel costs;
    determined the funds needed in each fiscal year for each option; converted
    the costs into fiscal year 2001 dollars; and calculated each option?s net
    Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options?

    Life- Cycle Costs and Cost- Effectiveness

    Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
    Effectiveness

    Page 77 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    present value. 1 Because alternative choices are being compared we included
    the cost of decommissionings that are a consequence of that choice. For
    example, if the choice is to refuel SSN- 688s, DOD would incur the cost of
    decommissioning four Trident SSBNs (about $425 million) in addition to the
    cost of the SSN- 688 refueling program. On the other hand, if the choice
    were to refuel and convert Trident SSBNs, DOD would need to spend about $200
    million to decommission four SSN- 688s.

    Each of the force structure options provides benefits over different time
    periods making direct comparisons difficult. Refueling of SSN- 688s covers a
    period of 10 to 12 years of operational service whereas converting Trident
    SSBNs into SSGNs covers a period of 20 to 22 years of operational service.
    Because the SSN- 688 refueling option does not sustain force level goals of
    55 submarines beyond 2016 we considered a third option that buys Virginia-
    class submarine replacements for decommissioning refueled SSN- 688s.
    Virginia- class submarines have a 6- year construction period preceded by 2
    years of advanced procurement of long- lead equipment (mostly propulsion-
    related equipment), for a total procurement cycle of 8 years for each ship.
    The net effect of this construction cycle is that the expenditure of
    procurement funds for replacement submarines begins 2 to 4 years after each
    SSN- 688 is refueled. In order to make the time period for replacement
    program option comparable to the 20- to 22- year time period for Trident
    SSGNs, our analysis includes the 10 to 12 years provided by the refueled
    SSN- 688s and the first 10 to 12 years of service life for the Virginia-
    class submarines. Because the Virginia- class submarines are estimated to
    have a useful service life of 33 years, we subtract the remaining value of
    its 21 to 23 years of unused service life from the initial investment cost
    using a depreciation analysis. We also included the Virginia- class
    submarine operating and support costs for the first 10 to 12 years.

    Since the costs were converted to fiscal 2001 dollars, we used a real
    discount rate (Treasury borrowing rate minus forecasted inflation) in
    calculating the net present value.

    1 Because investment alternatives normally incur different costs over
    different time streams, it is our policy to compare the alternatives on an
    equal economic basis using a technique called present value analysis. This
    analysis, by recognizing the time value of money, converts costs occurring
    at different times to a common unit of measurement, is predicated on the
    theory that costs incurred in the future are worth less than costs incurred
    today. Present value analysis also provides a means to transform a stream of
    costs to a single number so it can be compared to another.

    Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
    Effectiveness

    Page 78 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

    Briefing Section IV: Analysis of Options? Life- Cycle Costs and Cost-
    Effectiveness

    Page 79 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Cost- effectiveness analysis seeks to find the least costly alternative for
    achieving a given program or policy result. We evaluated the
    costeffectiveness of the submarine force options in three program areas: (1)
    submarine presence days, (2) Tomahawk presence days, and (3) special
    operations forces presence days. Each of these metrics is measurable and are
    primary missions of the proposed SSGN. Suitable metrics for other missions,
    such as battle group support and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance, were unavailable. The cost of a presence day was determined
    by dividing the option?s net present value by the total presence days
    provided by that option. Each deployed Tomahawk counts as a Tomahawk
    presence day as does each special operations forces platoon presence day.

    Converting four Trident SSBNs to SSGNs is the most cost- effective
    alternative for providing presence days and in supporting the Tomahawk
    strike and special operations forces missions. The two key factors affecting
    the cost- effectiveness measures are the SSGN?s (1) extended deployment
    periods and (2) massive payload capacities. The SSGN achieves its presence
    days superior ?return on investment? by employing two crews and rotating
    these crews while the ship is forwardly deployed. An SSGN is estimated to be
    able to spend 66 percent of its time forward deployed per year compared to
    20 percent for a refueled SSN- 688.

    Notwithstanding the SSGN?s superior cost- effectiveness in the three mission
    areas we evaluated, the refueled SSN- 688s would provide valuable mission
    support in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
    undersea warfare, and carrier battle group support.

    Briefing Section V: Summary Page 80 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Briefing Section V: Summary

    Briefing Section V: Summary Page 81 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Briefing Section V: Summary Page 82 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Page 83 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Note: Draft report was submitted as GAO- 01- 115. GAO comments supplementing
    those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 3. See comment 2.

    See comment 1.

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Page 84 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    See comment 4.

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Page 85 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    The following is our response to the Department of Defense?s (DOD) letter
    dated September 18, 2001.

    1. DOD's comments restates the requirements discussed on page 9. 2. DOD's
    comment restates our finding in the Results in Brief, on page 3. 3. See our
    response in the Agency Comments section of the letter on

    page 5. 4. We agree with Defense?s comment that the SSGN would substantially

    enhance in- theater Tomahawk presence. Our comparison- which is based on the
    notional Tomahawk loads the Navy uses in its ordnance requirements
    determination process and not on budget constrained peacetime actual loads-
    shows that an SSGN?s presence in a theater substantially enhances the
    Tomahawk presence. GAO Comments

    Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted

    Page 86 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    Department of Defense Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
    Evaluation Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics

    Defense Intelligence Agency The Joint Staff

    Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate Chief of Naval
    Operations

    Submarine Warfare Division Surface Warfare Division Resources, Requirements
    & Assessments Division Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
    Research, Development and Acquisition

    Naval Sea Systems Command Nuclear Propulsion Directorate Program Executive
    Officer, Submarines

    Virginia- class Program Management Office Trident Conversion (SSGN) Project
    Team Strategic Systems Programs Office of Naval Intelligence Other
    Organizations

    Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Congressional Budget Office
    Appendix II: Organizations and Offices

    Contacted Washington, D. C., Area

    Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted

    Page 87 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    U. S. Joint Forces Command U. S. Atlantic Fleet

    Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle
    Team TWO

    U. S. Central Command U. S. Naval Forces Central Command U. S. Fifth Fleet
    (Bahrain via video conference) U. S. Special Operations Command

    Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay Submarine Group 10

    Submarine Squadron 16 Trident Refit Facility Trident Training Facility U. S.
    S. Rhode Island (SSBN- 740) (Blue)

    Naval War College Naval Undersea Warfare Center

    Naval Special Warfare Command U. S. Pacific Command

    Cruise Missile Support Activity Norfolk, Virginia, Area

    Tampa, Florida, Area Kings Bay, Georgia, Area

    Newport, Rhode Island, Area

    San Diego, California, Area Honolulu, Hawaii, Area

    Appendix II: Organizations and Offices Contacted

    Page 88 GAO- 02- 97 Force Structure

    U. S. Pacific Fleet Special Operations Command, Pacific Fleet Submarine
    Force, Pacific Fleet U. S. S. Kamehameha (SSN- 642) U. S. S. Buffalo (SSN-
    715) Naval Special Warfare SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE

    Advanced SEAL Delivery System U. S. European Command

    U. S. Naval Forces Europe Other Contacts

    (350033)

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