Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for	 
Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges		 
(16-NOV-01, GAO-02-96). 					 
								 
The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War oriented  
force into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better 
able to meet the diverse defense challenges of the future. The	 
far-reaching organizational and operational changes that the Army
plans will effect virtually every element of the Army and take	 
decades to implement. In addition, funding the transformation,	 
including developing and acquiring future combat systems and	 
modernizing aging equipment will be difficult. To implement the  
transformation, the Army has developed a Transformation Campaign 
Plan, which is a a mechanism for integrating transformation	 
efforts within the Army and for achieving the goal of		 
transforming the Army over 30 years. The Army's Transformation	 
Campaign plan serves as a common frame of reference for officials
throughout the Army. It defines transformation goals, sets	 
milestones for achieving them, and assigns lines of		 
responsibilities for each aspect of the plan. The Army has	 
established several forums at various levels of the organization 
to discuss evolving issues and address matters of concern.	 
However, the lack of an overall DOD transformation strategy has  
led the Army to proceed with its transformation plans solely on  
the basis of broad departmental guidance rather than a clear	 
understanding of how its efforts fit into an overall scheme for  
military transformation. Although the results of the Quadrennial 
Defense Review as well as other events are likely to affect the  
Army's plans, the Transformation Campaign Plan appears to be	 
flexible enough to permit the Army to adapt its plans to evolving
events. 							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-96						        
    ACCNO:   A02471						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan   
for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges	 
     DATE:   11/16/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Army procurement					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Logistics						 
	     Mobilization					 
	     Private sector practices				 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Abrams Tank					 
	     Apache Helicopter					 
	     Army Modernization Plan				 
	     Army Transformation Campaign Plan			 
	     Black Hawk Helicopter				 
	     Bradley Fighting Vehicle				 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     DOD Mobility Requirements Study			 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 
	     M1A1 Tank						 
	     Best Practices					 

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GAO-02-96
     
Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces
Major Challenges

GAO- 02- 96

Page i GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Scope and Methodology 3

Briefing Section I Background 6

Briefing Section II Management of the Transformation 14

Briefing Section III Key Challenges 26

Briefing Section IV Conclusions 42

Appendix I Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and
Objectives 44

Appendix II Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation 46

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 47

Table

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan
15 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan Figures

Figure 1: Army?s Depiction of Its Transformation 8 Figure 2: Army?s
Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing

Combat Forces Into the Future Objective Force 10

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief DOD Department of Defense

Page 1 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

November 16, 2001 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W.
Warner Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War- oriented force into
a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet the
diverse defense challenges of the future. The far- reaching organizational
and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every
element of the Army and take decades to implement. In addition, funding the
transformation, including developing and acquiring future combat systems and
modernizing aging equipment, will be difficult. To implement the
transformation, the Army has developed a Transformation Campaign Plan. The
Campaign Plan is a mechanism for integrating transformation efforts within
the Army and for achieving the goal of transforming the Army over 30 years.

Pursuant to our basic legislative responsibilities, we are monitoring the
Army?s transformation efforts. This report is the second of a planned series
of reports related to these efforts. 1 It (1) assesses the Army?s processes
for managing transformation efforts and (2) identifies key challenges that
the Army faces in managing its transformation. We briefed your offices on
the results of our work in July and September 2001. This report summarizes
and updates the major messages of those briefings and is being provided
because of your oversight responsibilities.

1 We previously reported on acquisition challenges of the Army?s
transformation efforts. See Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces
Weapon Systems Challenges

(GAO- 01- 311, May 21, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has a comprehensive process for managing its transformation efforts
over the next 30 years. Its Transformation Campaign Plan serves as a common
frame of reference for officials throughout the Army. It defines
transformation goals, sets milestones for achieving them, and assigns lines
of responsibilities for each aspect of the plan. The Army has established
several forums at various levels of the organization to discuss evolving
issues and address matters of concern. Because the plan affects every part
of the Army, it is accompanied by an electronic tool that permits
responsible parties in the Army to synchronize their efforts, track
progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. To ensure that transformation
becomes a part of the Army?s normal operations rather than a separate
initiative, the Army?s plans have been integrated into existing planning,
budgeting, and decision- making processes. The key strategies and concepts
of the Army?s plans were developed with the participation and ongoing input
of the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Combatant Commands and the Army
Service Component Commands. However, the lack of an overall Department of
Defense (DOD) transformation strategy has led the Army to proceed with its
transformation plans solely on the basis of broad departmental guidance
rather than a clear understanding of how its efforts fit into an overall
scheme for military transformation. Although the results of the Quadrennial
Defense Review as well as other events are likely to affect the Army?s
plans, the Transformation Campaign Plan appears to be flexible enough to
permit the Army to adapt its plans to evolving events.

However, the existence of a comprehensive management plan does not diminish
the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army?s plans are
highly dependent on near- term technological advances that are uncertain and
long- term funding commitments. The following are among the key challenges
that we identified:

 Keeping the program on track despite many uncertainties concerning the
maturity and feasibility of new technologies that will be needed to
implement new warfighting concepts.

 Meeting ambitious milestones for forming the first transformational
brigades despite delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles,
designating subsequent brigades, and validating capabilities. Results in
Brief

Technology Schedule

Page 3 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

 Achieving highly optimistic goals for equipping the future Objective
Force, given the uncertainty of whether needed technologies can mature
quickly enough.

 Maintaining readiness while simultaneously equipping, training, and
sustaining Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces- three distinctly different
forces, each with a unique focus. 2  Streamlining logistics to support
ambitious rapid deployment goals.

 Maintaining continuity and proficiency in the face of frequent rotations,
training soldiers to the broad range of skills needed to respond to the full
range of military operations, integrating reserve forces into the Army?s
transformation plans, and retaining personnel with advanced technical skills
greatly demanded in the civilian economy.

 Obtaining sustained support of military and civilian leaders as well as
the Congress over a period of 30 years in the face of competing national
security priorities and domestic concerns.

Because the Army is in the early stages of implementing its transformation,
we are not making any recommendations at this time.

In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD generally
agreed with the report and said the Department will continue to address
these challenges as it attempts to maintain current timelines. DOD also
provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

To assess the Army?s management of transformation efforts, we focused our
review on the key strategic document that the Army developed to guide its
transformation efforts- the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. To gain a
clear understanding of transformation plans, we reviewed documents and
interviewed officials involved in transformation planning in the Offices of
the Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D. C.
To gain a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, we interviewed
officials and received briefings from the various Army staff offices
responsible for key aspects of the

2 Legacy Force refers to those selected existing forces that the Army will
modernize as it transforms. Interim Force refers to the first six to eight
brigades that will be used as a bridge to the Army?s future Objective Force,
which is scheduled to begin fielding in 2008. Acquisitions

Operations Human Capital Funding

Scope and Methodology

Page 4 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

transformation as well as major Army commands, including U. S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and U. S. Army Forces Command,
Fort McPherson, Georgia. As part of this work, we discussed how the
transformation was being integrated into Army operations. To determine the
organizational structure and operational capabilities of the Initial Brigade
Combat Teams, we obtained documents and interviewed officials of the Army?s
I Corps, the first Interim Brigade Combat Team, and the Army Training and
Doctrine Command?s Brigade Coordination Cell, all of which are located at
Fort Lewis, Washington.

To gain the perspective of commanders in the field on the extent of their
participation in transformation plans and issues of concern to them, we
discussed transformation plans with representatives of the U. S. Central
Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U. S. Pacific Command and U. S.
Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U. S. Forces Korea and 8th U. S. Army,
Seoul, Korea; U. S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; and U. S. Army
Europe, Heidelberg, Germany. We also discussed with them the extent of their
participation in forums intended to coordinate transformation.

From these briefings and discussions, we identified key challenges that the
transformation poses to the Army. We conducted our review from November 2000
through August 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air
Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies
available to others on request and through the GAO home page at www. gao.
gov.

Page 5 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 3958.
Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Kenneth F.
Daniell; Kevin C. Handley; M. Jane Hunt; and Leo B. Sullivan.

Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Briefing Section I: Background Page 6 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

Briefing Section I: Background

Briefing Section I: Background Page 7 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 1999 that the Army was
developing plans to transform its current Cold War organization and
equipment to a lighter, more strategically responsive force to fill what it
sees as a strategic gap in current warfighting capabilities. The Army
believes that the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to
(1) the growing number of peacekeeping operations and small- scale
contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. According to Army officials,
light infantry forces can deploy rapidly but lack combat power, tactical
mobility, and capability for sustained operations. Conversely, its heavy
forces that rely more on tanks and other armored vehicles have unmatched
combat power, tactical mobility, and capability for sustained operations but
require too much time to deploy and require extensive materiel support.

Transformation plans call for being able to deploy a combat- capable brigade
anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five
divisions in 30 days. To do this, the Army plans to develop new equipment,
transform its concepts and doctrine, build unit organizations that can adapt
readily to changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and
change how it trains its soldiers and leaders.

Briefing Section I: Background Page 8 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

Figure 1: Army?s Depiction of Its Transformation

Legend: BCT = Brigade Combat Team R& D = research and development S& T =
science and technology Source: Department of the Army.

Briefing Section I: Background Page 9 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

The Army plans to transform its forces over 30+ years. Its initial plans are
to form two Interim Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washington. These
forces, along with four to six additional brigades, will comprise the Army?s
Interim Force. 1 According to plans, the brigades will be organized,
trained, and equipped with new light- armored wheeled vehicles (? interim
armored vehicles?) that are significantly lighter and more transportable
than existing tanks and armored vehicles. The initial brigade is to achieve
its initial operating capability in 2003, and all Interim Force brigades are
to be formed and equipped by about 2008. The Army is optimizing these forces
for use in small- scale contingencies but also intends to use them in the
full range of military operations when augmented and employed with Army
divisions. During this interim period, they are to validate new doctrine and
organizational structures, develop insights for subsequent transformation,
and provide a bridge to the Army?s future force- the Objective Force.

Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to transition
to its Objective Force. During this period, all Army forces, including the
Interim Force, are to be transformed into new organizational structures
operating under new warfighting doctrine. Their new combat systems are to be
lighter and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable
than current systems. Currently, four competing research and development
teams are working on alternative designs for these future combat systems.
The Army is to select the most promising technologies from these competing
teams by 2003.

As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to maintain the
organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat force, which it
terms its Legacy Force, and will modernize selected equipment in this force.
This equipment includes such major weapons systems as the M1A1 Abrams tank,
Bradley Fighting vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter. This selective
modernization is intended to enable the Army to maintain capability and
readiness until the future combat systems are delivered to the Objective
Force.

1 On July 12, 2001, the Army announced the unit designations and locations
of the next four Interim Brigade Combat Teams. The next four brigades are
the 172 nd Infantry Brigade (Separate), Forts Wainwright and Richardson,
Alaska; the 2 nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana; the
2 nd Brigade, 25 th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;
and the 56 th Brigade of the 28 th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Pennsylvania Army National Guard.

Briefing Section I: Background Page 10 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

Figure 2: Army?s Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing Combat
Forces Into the Future Objective Force

Legend: ARNG = Army National Guard BCT = Brigade Combat Teams CA = counter
attack FY = fiscal year Source: Department of the Army.

Briefing Section I: Background Page 11 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

The Army?s current combat force is made up of (1) heavy Legacy Forces that
comprise its Counter Attack Corps, (2) other active- duty combat forces, (3)
Army National Guard combat forces, and (4) Army National Guard- enhanced
separate brigades. The six- to eight- brigade Interim Force is to begin
entering the Army?s force in 2003.

As figure 2 shows, the Army plans to transform its entire combat force over
the next 30 years to Objective Force designs while phasing out Legacy and
Interim Forces. For example, through modernization and recapitalization,
Counter Attack Corps brigades are to retain their current warfighting
capabilities until they begin transforming to Objective Force brigades in
about 2020. The plan calls for their transformation to be completed by 2026.
Transformation of the active- duty non- Counter Attack Corps, National
Guard- enhanced separate brigades and other National Guard divisional forces
is to be completed from 2020 to about 2030. The six to eight Interim Brigade
Combat Teams are to be the last to transform and will not become part of the
Objective Force until after 2030.

Briefing Section I: Background Page 12 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

Briefing Section I: Background Page 13 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
Transformation Plan

Under current plans, the Army?s transformation would affect all elements of
the Army, including its operational combat force; the Institutional Army,
which includes the Army?s training centers and schools; and support forces.

Transforming the Operational Army involves developing new warfighting
concepts and capabilities- the way the Army fights. Transforming the
Institutional Army will involve such things as changing training and
training facilities to support the new operational forces. As part of this
effort, the Army plans to change the way it trains soldiers and leaders and
develop multifunctional soldiers who will be better equipped to handle
complex and varying situations. It plans also to modernize its Combat
Training Centers and schools to keep pace with changes in force structure,
doctrine, and technology.

An important element of transformation will be to streamline support forces
and logistics processes to enable faster deployment, improve mobility, and
more effectively sustain operational forces. Finally, the Army is
considering plans to extend new operational force designs beyond its
brigades by fielding interim divisions and new capabilities at the corps
level. The Army has not yet finalized the details of the structures and
operational concepts at these levels of organization.

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 14 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

To manage its transformation, the Army has developed and adopted a
Transformation Campaign Plan, which is intended to integrate and synchronize
all elements of its transformation. This plan establishes a common framework
for guiding transformation activities throughout the Army and is intended as
a living document that will require changes and refinements as Army efforts
evolve.

The plan describes the national security conditions upon which
transformation is based; articulates the mission and goals of the Briefing
Section II: Management of the

Transformation

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 15 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

transformation; and describes in detail the objectives of, and activities
associated with, each phase of the transformation. It also establishes major
decision points and the conditions that must be met to proceed to each
successive step in its transformation. For example, the decision to
transition from the Initial Force (first two brigades) to the Interim Force
is to be made when the first battalion of the initial Brigade Combat Team
has fielded its Interim Armored Vehicles and associated initial equipment,
including some substitute items as necessary.

Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan
Lines of operation Secretary of Army oversight Proponent organization

Strategic Requirements & Planning Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations Modernization and Recapitalization Acquisition,
Logistics & Technology Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Manning the
Force/ Investing in Quality People Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel Maintain Unit Readiness & Training Manpower & Reserve
Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Training and Leader Development
Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command Joint/ Army Strategy
& Concepts International Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Army
Doctrine Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command Operational
Force Design Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command
Deploying and Sustaining Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Deputy Chief
of Staff for Logistics Develop & Acquire Advanced Technology Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology Army Materiel Command Management of Force Programs
Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Installations Installations and Environment Assistant Chief of Staff for
Installations Strategic Communications Public Affairs Army Chief of Staff
Resourcing Financial Management & Comptroller Program Analysis & Evaluation

Source: Department of the Army.

As shown in table 1, the Campaign Plan outlines 14 functional areas for the
transformation-? lines of operation? in Campaign Plan parlance. These lines
of operation coincide with such established programmatic and decision-
making areas as doctrine, training, leader development, organization,
materiel, soldier systems, and facilities. The last two- Strategic
Communications and Resourcing- support the overall Campaign Plan. Strategic
Communications seeks to inform and educate others about the transformation.
Resourcing includes integrating transformation resource requirements into
the planning and budgeting process. The mission and objectives for the 14
lines of operations are listed in appendix I.

Entities within the Office of the Secretary of the Army and various offices
under the purview of the Army Chief of Staff have been assigned

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 16 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

responsibilities for the activities associated with these 14 areas. This
coupling of counterpart civilian and military commands and offices is
intended to foster cooperation in achieving transformation goals across the
Army. The Campaign Plan articulates the specific roles and responsibilities
for these entities and delineates where coordination among offices is
necessary.

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 17 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 18 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 19 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army Chief of Staff directed that the transformation be planned within
existing planning and budgeting systems. Accordingly, the Director, Office
of Program Analysis and Evaluation, is to integrate Army transformation
requirements into the Army?s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution
System to ensure that adequate funding is available to meet transformation
objectives. The Director is to identify and validate resource requirements;
ensure that the transformation timeline is synchronized with the planning,
programming, and budgeting process; and prioritize requirements for
inclusion in the Army?s annual Program Objective Memorandum and annual
budget.

The management of transformation- related force structure changes is to be
accomplished by integrating proposed organizational changes into the
upcoming Total Army Analysis, a process by which the Army determines its
force structure. Personnel requirements and changes are to be reflected in
preparing the Army?s 2003 Program Objective Memorandum. Similarly,
transformation- related modernization and acquisitions are integrated into
the existing Army Modernization Plan.

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 20 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 21 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has established several forums at various levels of the
organization to discuss evolving issues and address matters of concern.
These forums coordinate and synchronize decision- making for the Campaign
Plan throughout the Army. General Officers representing the Campaign Plan?s
14 lines of operation participate in biweekly synchronization briefings with
the Army Vice Chief of Staff. Key decision points are discussed at these
briefings. These briefings are followed by biweekly meetings where staff
officers representing the lines of operation are provided with feedback on
decisions made in the General Officer briefings, discuss issues, and assign
required actions. Another forum for gaining input from the field is the
Commanders in Chief (CINC) Requirements Task Force, which meets quarterly to
address current and future CINC requirements. According to Army officials in
the field, their participation in this forum has enabled them to raise
issues that concern them. The Army has also established various special task
forces that meet regularly to address specific issues related to the
transformation. The Army Chief of Staff receives regular briefings on the
proceedings of these groups.

To help manage its decision- making process across the lines of operation,
the Army has developed a software program that synchronizes and links
thousands of interrelated tasks, decision points, and milestones.
Representatives of the lines of operation meet regularly to synchronize and
track the progress of ongoing tasks and decision points.

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 22 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 23 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Interim Brigade Combat Teams are intended to meet what the Army sees as
a critical strategic capabilities gap. However, the Army is also using the
Combat Teams as a means for testing and validating the concepts, doctrine,
and training that the Objective Force may ultimately adopt. As such, the
ongoing activities of the initial brigades serve as an evaluation mechanism
for the Campaign Plan.

As the brigades are being formed, the Army War College complements this
evaluation activity by conducting wargaming and analyses of new concepts and
organizational designs. The results of these analyses are fed back to Army
force developers and trainers so that transformation concepts and plans can
be continually refined.

The Army Test and Evaluation Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Army
schools, and the initial brigade at Fort Lewis are cooperating in capturing
lessons learned in forming the initial brigade. For example, the Army is
developing an installation template that subsequent brigades can use to
establish the necessary facilities and infrastructure needed for these new
brigades.

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 24 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

Page 25 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

The Secretary of Defense?s 2001 Annual Report to Congress, issued by the
previous administration, highlighted military transformation as a priority
activity. It highlighted the importance of service and joint concept
development and experimentation and new technologies, concepts, and
capabilities to transformation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in Joint Vision 2020, also included transformation goals. The current
administration has indicated that transformation will have a prominent place
in its defense program. Accordingly, there is a general agreement that
transformed U. S. military forces are needed to respond effectively to the
changing security environment of the 21st century.

Beyond these broad documents and statements, the Department of Defense (DOD)
has not put forward an overall DOD strategy for advancing transformation to
guide the services? efforts. As a result, each of the services, including
the Army, has approached transformation without a clear indication of how
its individual efforts fit into an overall scheme for transformation. In its
September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report, the Department of Defense
said it will establish a new office reporting directly to the Secretary and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Director, Force Transformation will
evaluate the transformation efforts of the Military Departments and
recommend steps to integrate their transformation activities.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 26 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 27 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

The Army has made substantial progress in implementing its transformation
since it was announced in October 1999. By March 2000, the Army had
completed the requirements and the solicitation to acquire interim armored
vehicles for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams; the contract was awarded
November 17, 2000. The Army has also made substantial progress in developing
new doctrine and organizational and operational designs for the new Brigade
Combat Teams and has begun forming its initial brigade at Fort Lewis,
Washington. In February 2000, the Army and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency entered into a 6- year collaborative program to explore,
design, and test new technologies vital to the Army?s future Objective
Force. These technologies include robotics, sensors, new fuel and power
systems, advanced armor, and command and control networks. In May 2000, the
Army selected four contractor teams to concurrently work on design concepts
for these new capabilities.

But while progress has been impressive, the Army clearly faces significant,
interrelated challenges in implementing its transformation. The following
charts outline what we see as some key challenges in technology, the Interim
Force schedule, acquisitions, 1 operations, human capital, and funding.

1 We discussed acquisition challenges in more detail in Defense Acquisition:
Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (GAO- 01- 311, May 21,
2001).

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 28 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 29 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

The ultimate success of the Army?s transformation strategy, schedule, and
key operational capabilities hinges on achieving anticipated science and
technology advances. The Army believes that science and technology
breakthroughs within the next 2 to 3 years will enable industry to produce
lighter, yet highly lethal and survivable, armored combat systems. However,
such technology breakthroughs are far from certain. The Army is also
counting on advances in digital communications and computer information
systems technology to achieve enhanced situational awareness on the
battlefield. 2 The Army sees this capability as critical to the warfighting
concepts of both the Interim and Objective Forces and to attaining an
adequate level of force protection and survivability.

The Army is also hoping that emerging technology will make it possible to
produce combat systems that are more reliable and fuel efficient, thus
reducing the amount of deployed spare parts and fuel to maintain and operate
them. Reducing the weight of future combat systems and their sustainment
requirements in this manner is critical to the Army?s ability to meet the
rapid deployment goals it has set for itself. Advanced digital
communications and computer capabilities are also critical capabilities in
order to move to sustainment concepts that rely more on quickly moving
supplies and parts to the battlefield rather than taking them all along.

To reduce the weight of armored combat systems while maintaining
survivability, and improve their reliability and fuel efficiency, the Army
has asked the science and technology community to provide a comprehensive
set of technological recommendations by 2003. Much of the technology that
the Army needs for these capabilities is still in the early stages of
concept development, and technology advances to provide the answers that the
Army seeks are not guaranteed. There also are no assurances that industry
can produce affordable future combat systems light enough to meet the air
deployability requirements without sacrificing their lethality and
survivability. Nor are there assurances that advanced digital technology
will provide the situational awareness and the advancements in logistics
operations that the Army will need. Many uncertainties surround the
associated cost and capabilities of these future combat systems, and the
Army will be challenged in estimating both cost and capabilities until the
technologies are fully developed and tested.

2 Situational awareness is the ability to see and understand the battlespace
before coming into actual contact with the opponent through the use of
advanced command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence
systems.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 30 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Owing to delays in the acquisition and fielding schedules for interim
armored vehicles, the Army is not likely to meet its original schedule for
forming the planned six to eight Brigade Combat Teams that comprise its
Interim Force. Longer- than- expected development work for three of the
interim armored vehicle variants (the mobile gun system, the fire support
vehicle, and the chemical reconnaissance vehicle) resulted in a 16- month
delay in the original vehicle- fielding schedule. Also, another contractor
making an offer protested the award; and work under the contract was

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 31 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

suspended about 4 months, pending the outcome of the protest, which was
denied in April 2001.

Delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles have disrupted the Army?s
original training schedule for the brigade, ultimately setting back the date
the Army planned to have the brigade reach initial operational capability.
The original estimate for achieving this milestone has been extended from
December 2001 to no later than May 2003- a minimum delay of about 16 months.
Such delays could jeopardize the scheduled transition to the Objective Force
in 2008, since there may be insufficient time to fully evaluate and refine
the organizational and operational concepts for the new Interim Brigade
Combat Teams.

The Army named its next four Interim Brigade Combat Teams in July 2001- 4
months later than expected (Mar. 2001). This delay could pose challenges to
Army planning officials, who say they will need at least 3 to 5 years of
lead time to plan and construct maintenance and other installation
facilities that the new brigades will need. Army officials advised us that
officials were working on these issues even before the locations were
officially announced and will incorporate needed funding in the next
programming and budget cycle. They acknowledged, however, that installation
planners face many challenges in forming the initial brigade as did the
planners at Fort Lewis.

Delays in forming these initial brigades and in evaluating their
capabilities have raised questions about what capabilities the regional
CINCs can expect from the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Planners in the
field believe that they need better information on the projected combat
capabilities of these brigades so that they can assess and mitigate any
risks that might be involved in their employment. Similarly, logistics
officials in the field expressed a need for better information on how these
new brigades are to be supported to adequately plan for their use. The
degree of uncertainty associated with both projected combat capability and
logistical support will continue to pose substantial challenges to planners
in the field.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 32 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 33 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

The Army plans to develop the future combat systems concepts, design the
systems, and field them over an 8- year period. The first Objective Force
brigade is to be equipped in fiscal year 2008 and reach its initial
operating capability by fiscal year 2010. However, DOD historically has not
been able to develop high- technology systems within such a relatively short
period. Its average acquisition cycle for all systems has been from 10 to 15
years. For example, both the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-
propelled artillery system required significantly more time in development
than originally envisioned. The Comanche will have been in development for
23 years and the Crusader for over 16 years before their planned fielding
dates.

A key question is whether the envisioned technologies will reach maturity in
time to meet projected time lines. Under current plans, the Army projects
that, by 2003, it will need to decide whether the key technologies required
for the future combat systems will be mature enough to enter the systems
development stage in fiscal year 2006. Developing these systems is likely to
require a number of significant advances in science and technology, and Army
officials agree that counting on the maturity of these systems at the time
they are needed is high risk. Army officials advised us that, if needed
technologies were not mature at that time, the Army would proceed with the
most promising technologies available and then modify the systems later to
incrementally improve their capabilities over time. The Army realizes that
it may need to make schedule and other adjustments as conditions change.

The Army?s plans also call for recapitalizing or upgrading 17 existing
systems in both active and reserve components to provide combat capability
until it transitions to the Objective Force. Recapitalization plans include
such key combat systems as the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and
Apache helicopter. (See app. III for a listing.) Concurrently fielding
interim armored vehicles, developing and procuring future combat systems,
and carrying out the recapitalization of existing systems will pose
challenges that may require prioritization and trade- offs.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 34 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

The transformation poses numerous operational challenges related to
maintenance, training, personnel requirements, installations, and logistics,
since it will need to simultaneously support three different forces- Legacy,
Interim, and Objective Forces- beginning in about 2010. Maintaining and
supporting the Legacy Force?s tracked tanks and combat vehicles, the Interim
Force?s interim armored vehicles, and the Objective Force?s envisioned
combat systems will require different types of facilities and occupational
specialties to maintain them and different logistics operations and support
capabilities to deploy and sustain them. Similarly,

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 35 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

training three forces is likely to be difficult because officers and
soldiers will need to undergo training on different equipment and in skills
geared toward different doctrine, tactics, and organizational designs.
Furthermore, supporting the different types of training will cause the
Army?s combat training centers and schools to make significant adjustments.

Creating the Army?s ability to deploy forces and equipment quickly is a
critical aspect of the transformation. Ultimately, the Army hopes to attain
the capability to deploy a combat- capable brigade anywhere in the world in
96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. To meet
these capabilities, the Army may need more airlift aircraft than the Air
Force can provide. In 1998, DOD initiated a major study to update its
mobility requirements and programs. The study, Mobility Requirements Study
2005, found that DOD is currently operating with a significant strategic
airlift shortfall. The study also found that insufficient airlift assets,
low mission- capable rates for the air fleet, insufficient crew- toaircraft
ratios, and shortages of spare parts have created shortfalls in strategic
airlift across the services. Given the current airlift shortfalls and the
increased demand on airlift that the Army?s transformed forces will require,
the Army?s goals for rapid air deployability may be difficult to achieve.
Acknowledging this potential shortfall, Army officials are now examining how
the deployment goals might be achieved through a combination of airlift,
fast sealift, and prepositioning of needed equipment abroad.

One of the principal operational challenges facing the Army is increasing
strategic responsiveness across the spectrum of potential conflicts anywhere
in the world. Success will require the Army to improve and streamline
logistics operations and reduce sustainment requirements. The Army is
currently working on ways to reduce the sustainment requirements of the
Interim and Objective Forces to levels well below those of its heavy Legacy
Forces, which require extensive stockpiled materiel for support. Again,
success depends on the Army?s development of the technology required to
produce future combat systems that are as lethal and survivable as the
current heavy- weapons systems, yet light enough to be transported in a C-
130- type aircraft. Technological breakthroughs that can reduce sustainment
requirements through better reliability of systems and increased efficiency
in power, fuel, and ammunition consumption will be necessary. Advances in
information technology will also be needed to provide the real- time
logistics control and support capabilities that are a critical part of the
Army?s efforts to streamline its logistics processes. In addition, the
Army?s efforts to

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 36 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

transform its support forces are of major importance to successfully
reducing the number of people that need to be deployed to support the combat
forces.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 37 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 38 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Maintaining continuity and skill proficiency will be challenging, given the
frequency of personnel rotations and the many skill conversions that will be
required. Significant personnel turbulence could be created as the Army
converts individuals to different military occupational specialties and
units to new organizational and operational designs. For example, Army
officials advised us that the number of military occupational specialties
will be reduced from about 252 to about 170 over the course of the
transformation.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 39 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Special human capital challenges will arise from the Army?s decision to
include one National Guard brigade as part of its Interim Force. Converting
this brigade will require many personnel to convert to new skills.
Historically, it has taken long periods of time for reserve personnel to
attain full skill qualifications in some specialties because of limitations
on time, training opportunities, and available resources. This is a
longstanding problem, and the Army recently noted that qualification rates
in the National Guard have declined over the last 5 years. Recruiting
sufficient personnel to fully staff units that are expected to deploy
quickly could also pose challenges, since personnel with the proper skills
must be recruited within limited geographical areas. Gaining the wide range
of new skills needed and retaining proficiency in these skills could be
challenging, given the limited time that reserve forces have available to
train.

The Army is currently dealing with such personnel issues as shortages of
junior officers and problems in recruiting and retaining personnel with
certain skills. The new force designs require increased numbers of some
specialties, such as military intelligence, that have historically been in
short supply throughout the Army. For example, the Interim Brigades require
over 200 military intelligence specialists- about 170 more military
intelligence specialists than a traditional heavy- combat brigade. The Army
has experienced shortages in this specialty for many years, and the demand
for such personnel in ongoing contingency operations abroad has increased.

The Army?s increased reliance on communications and information systems
technology for tactical warfighting information and real- time logistics
control and personnel support will place extra demands on military
personnel. To maintain, support, and operate future combat systems and
associated technology, both military and civilian personnel will need to be
trained in advanced communications, computing, and information systems
technology. Military personnel will need to periodically repeat training on
digitized systems to retain proficiency while being trained at the same time
to develop a wider range of new skills. Scheduling all such training and
maintaining proficiency will be challenging to the Army?s trainers, and
maintaining proficiency will challenge individual leaders and soldiers.

Finally, the Army recognizes that in providing its personnel with advanced
technology skills, it will need to provide robust quality- of- life programs
and incentives if it is to retain personnel whose skills are likely to be in
great demand in the civilian economy.

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 40 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Legend: A/ C = Active Component CTC = Combat Training Centers IAV = Interim
Armored Vehicle R/ C = Reserve Component

Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 41 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
for Army Transformation Plan

Trade- offs and budget prioritization will likely be needed to maintain
current readiness and carry out transformation within existing funding
authority. The Army has already made some difficult trade- off decisions.
For example, to help fund the acquisition of interim armored vehicles; the
Army canceled 10 major procurements, restructured four other programs, and
shifted a significant amount of planned spending from fiscal year 2001
through fiscal 2005. Further adjustments may be needed, since the Army
estimates that its planned Legacy Force modernizations alone will require
about $23 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2007.

In addition, the Army will be faced with having to balance the
transformation- related funding with a full range of other budget priorities
as noted in the Funding briefing chart. The Army says that transformation
starts first with people and that without adequately manning the force,
providing for the well- being of soldiers and their family, and investing in
leader development, the Army cannot achieve its transformation. Balancing
its funding to meet these important competing Army priorities will be
difficult. Similarly, the Army will be competing for resources within DOD at
a time when all the services are facing readiness and modernization
challenges. Other national spending priorities make it uncertain whether the
Department can expect substantial funding increases over the long period of
the transformation.

Briefing Section IV: Conclusions Page 42 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for
Army Transformation Plan

Briefing Section IV: Conclusions

Briefing Section IV: Conclusions Page 43 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for
Army Transformation Plan

The Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan provides a comprehensive, highly
adaptable, results- oriented plan to guide its transformation efforts over
the next 30 years. This management vehicle provides a common frame of
reference for officials throughout the Army, sets clearly defined
transformation goals and milestones, and assigns clear roles and
responsibilities for implementing the transformation. The coordination
forums that the Army has established provide a means to hear and address
concerns in a timely manner; and the electronic tool that accompanies the
Campaign Plan enables the Army to synchronize its activities, track
progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. By using the Interim Brigade
Combat Teams to validate concepts and by capturing lessons learned, the Army
has a means to evaluate its efforts and apply lessons learned to future
brigade formation and ultimately the Objective Force. By integrating the
transformation into its existing planning, budgeting, and decision- making
processes, the Army has greater assurance that transformation program and
funding needs are identified and balanced against other Army priorities. The
results of the Quadrennial Defense Review as well as other events are likely
to affect the Army?s plans. We believe that the management construct
established by the Transformation Campaign Plan is flexible enough to permit
the Army to adapt its plans to evolving events.

The existence of a comprehensive management plan, however, does not diminish
the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army?s plans are
highly dependent on near- term technological advances and long- term funding
commitments that make attaining some milestones uncertain. To be successful,
the transformation will need a sustained commitment by Army leadership and
support by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Congress to sustain the Army?s plans over the long period envisioned for
the transformation.

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 44 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

Line of operation Mission and objective

Strategic Requirements and Planning Address strategic requirements and
planning to ensure that throughout the transformation process, all critical
Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements are supported; incorporate emerging
Army capabilities into CINC requirements for the future and within joint and
services? strategic documents. Modernization and Recapitalization Ensure
modernization and recapitalization of Army forces. Conduct force development

for Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces, including the fielding and
integration of new equipment and force designs. Ensure that investment plans
support overall force development. Manning the Force and Investing in
Quality People Man the force for full- spectrum operations and invest in
quality people to ensure a

trained and ready force. Man the warfighting units at 100 percent; recruit
and retain to meet the Army?s needs; field soldier- usable equipment; manage
attrition and separation; redesign business practices and adapt personnel
services and support to available technology; and enhance the well- being of
the Army family. Maintain Unit Readiness and Training Maintain required
levels of unit readiness and training; analyze effects of

transformation on readiness resource levels and provide recommendations to
minimize turbulence, instability, and lowered overall readiness levels;
continue to implement changes to AR 220- 1 and the automated readiness
system, which will capture readiness requirements of the future force
structure. Training and Leader Development Ensure training and leader
development actions required to maintain trained and

ready Legacy Forces and produce transformed units and leaders capable of
joint warfighting, as well as change. Create a learning environment that is
responsive to emerging technologies and continually improves processes,
procedures, and products that support the force. Joint/ Army Strategy and
Concepts Ensure that transformation of the operational Army has a firm
strategic and

operational foundation by embedding the requirement for strategically
responsive, fully dominant landpower in key national, Defense Department,
joint service, and Army documents for strategy, concepts, and doctrine. Army
Doctrine Integrate the development of Army doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures to

support the transformation of the Army. Ensure that current doctrine is
revised to support the Legacy Force through transformation and that Interim
Force doctrine is developed and revised to support the Objective Force.
Ensure integration with emerging joint and multinational doctrine throughout
transformation to define the Army?s capabilities and contributions in joint
and multinational operations. Operational Force Design Develop and field
operational force designs for combat forces, command and control,

and support elements that are strategically responsive and dominant at every
point on the spectrum of operations. Deploying and Sustaining Ensure that
Army forces are capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and

future operational force deployment goals. Effectively sustain the full
spectrum of Army operations, while synchronizing Army and joint service
efforts to (1) reduce the operational force sustainment requirement and
related combat service and combat service support demand on lift, (2) reduce
deployed combat support footprint in the combat zone, (3) transform the
institutional support elements of the Army to be more strategically
responsive (across the full spectrum), and (4) reduce the cost for
logistics/ support without reducing warfighting capability. Develop and
Acquire Advanced Technology Develop and acquire advanced technology to
provide materiel solutions for the

Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces. Management of Force Programs Assess
and design the institutional Army throughout transformation; integrate

institutional reengineering initiatives using existing force management
processes, while examining options for more efficient management practices.

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix I:
Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and Objectives

Appendix I: Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and
Objectives

Page 45 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

Line of operation Mission and objective

Installations Manage, modernize, and refine installations as strategic
assets throughout the Army?s transformation; ensure that necessary real
property support and services at installations are provided during
transformation and are provided for the Objective Force, while providing
proper stewardship of the environment. Strategic Communications Synchronize
and coordinate the transformation?s strategic communications efforts to

internal and external audiences to inform, educate, and build consensus; to
garner support; and to acquire the resources for the Army?s transformation.
Resourcing Integrate Army transformation requirements with the Army?s
Planning, Programming,

Budgeting, and Execution System and ensure adequate funding for
transformation objectives.

Source: Department of the Army.

Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation

Page 46 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

System Description Combat systems

M1 A1/ A2 Abrams Tank Heavy armor tracked combat vehicle M2/ M3 Bradley
Fighting Vehicle Infantry and cavalry tracked combat vehicle M113 Family of
Vehicles Family of tracked vehicles Patriot Missile System Provides defense
against aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical

ballistic missiles Multiple- Launch Rocket System Rocket launcher M992 Field
Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle Provides resupply and support of field
artillery units

Aviation systems

AH- 64 A/ D Apache/ Longbow Helicopter Attack/ reconnaissance helicopter UH-
60 Black Hawk Helicopter Utility and assault helicopter CH- 47 Chinook
Helicopter Cargo helicopter

Combat support systems

M48/ M60 Armored Vehicle- Launched Bridge Provides assault- bridging
capabilities for tank and mechanized battalions M9 Armored Combat Earthmover
Multipurpose engineer vehicle AN/ TPQ- 36/ 37 Firefinder Artillery locating
radar Small Emplacement Excavator All- purpose, wheeled engineer vehicle
High- Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Light, tactical vehicle AN/
ASM- 190 (includes AN/ ASM- 146, AN/ ASM- 147, and AN/ ASM- 189) Electronic
shop shelter M88 Hercules Equipment recovery, combat utility lift and
evacuation system Heavy Expanded- Mobility Tactical Truck 10- ton, 8- wheel
drive family of vehicle systems

Source: Department of the Army.

Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

(350008)

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