    Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for
    Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges
    (16-NOV-01, GAO-02-96).

    The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War oriented
    force into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better
    able to meet the diverse defense challenges of the future. The
    far-reaching organizational and operational changes that the Army
    plans will effect virtually every element of the Army and take
    decades to implement. In addition, funding the transformation,
    including developing and acquiring future combat systems and
    modernizing aging equipment will be difficult. To implement the
    transformation, the Army has developed a Transformation Campaign
    Plan, which is a a mechanism for integrating transformation
    efforts within the Army and for achieving the goal of
    transforming the Army over 30 years. The Army's Transformation
    Campaign plan serves as a common frame of reference for officials
    throughout the Army. It defines transformation goals, sets
    milestones for achieving them, and assigns lines of
    responsibilities for each aspect of the plan. The Army has
    established several forums at various levels of the organization
    to discuss evolving issues and address matters of concern.
    However, the lack of an overall DOD transformation strategy has
    led the Army to proceed with its transformation plans solely on
    the basis of broad departmental guidance rather than a clear
    understanding of how its efforts fit into an overall scheme for
    military transformation. Although the results of the Quadrennial
    Defense Review as well as other events are likely to affect the
    Army's plans, the Transformation Campaign Plan appears to be
    flexible enough to permit the Army to adapt its plans to evolving
    events.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-96
        ACCNO:   A02471
      TITLE:     Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan
    for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges
         DATE:   11/16/2001
      SUBJECT:   Army procurement
    	     Combat readiness
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Federal agency reorganization
    	     Logistics
    	     Mobilization
    	     Private sector practices
    	     Weapons systems
    	     Abrams Tank
    	     Apache Helicopter
    	     Army Modernization Plan
    	     Army Transformation Campaign Plan
    	     Black Hawk Helicopter
    	     Bradley Fighting Vehicle
    	     C-130 Aircraft
    	     DOD Mobility Requirements Study
    	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
    	     M1A1 Tank
    	     Best Practices

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    GAO-02-96

    Report to Congressional Committees

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    November 2001 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

    Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces
    Major Challenges

    GAO- 02- 96

    Page i GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan Letter 1

    Results in Brief 2 Scope and Methodology 3

    Briefing Section I Background 6

    Briefing Section II Management of the Transformation 14

    Briefing Section III Key Challenges 26

    Briefing Section IV Conclusions 42

    Appendix I Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and
    Objectives 44

    Appendix II Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
    Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation 46

    Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 47

    Table

    Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan
    15 Contents

    Page ii GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan Figures

    Figure 1: Army?s Depiction of Its Transformation 8 Figure 2: Army?s
    Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing

    Combat Forces Into the Future Objective Force 10

    Abbreviations

    CINC Commander in Chief DOD Department of Defense

    Page 1 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    November 16, 2001 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W.
    Warner Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States
    Senate

    The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

    The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War- oriented force into
    a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet the
    diverse defense challenges of the future. The far- reaching organizational
    and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every
    element of the Army and take decades to implement. In addition, funding the
    transformation, including developing and acquiring future combat systems and
    modernizing aging equipment, will be difficult. To implement the
    transformation, the Army has developed a Transformation Campaign Plan. The
    Campaign Plan is a mechanism for integrating transformation efforts within
    the Army and for achieving the goal of transforming the Army over 30 years.

    Pursuant to our basic legislative responsibilities, we are monitoring the
    Army?s transformation efforts. This report is the second of a planned series
    of reports related to these efforts. 1 It (1) assesses the Army?s processes
    for managing transformation efforts and (2) identifies key challenges that
    the Army faces in managing its transformation. We briefed your offices on
    the results of our work in July and September 2001. This report summarizes
    and updates the major messages of those briefings and is being provided
    because of your oversight responsibilities.

    1 We previously reported on acquisition challenges of the Army?s
    transformation efforts. See Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces
    Weapon Systems Challenges

    (GAO- 01- 311, May 21, 2001).

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Page 2 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    The Army has a comprehensive process for managing its transformation efforts
    over the next 30 years. Its Transformation Campaign Plan serves as a common
    frame of reference for officials throughout the Army. It defines
    transformation goals, sets milestones for achieving them, and assigns lines
    of responsibilities for each aspect of the plan. The Army has established
    several forums at various levels of the organization to discuss evolving
    issues and address matters of concern. Because the plan affects every part
    of the Army, it is accompanied by an electronic tool that permits
    responsible parties in the Army to synchronize their efforts, track
    progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. To ensure that transformation
    becomes a part of the Army?s normal operations rather than a separate
    initiative, the Army?s plans have been integrated into existing planning,
    budgeting, and decision- making processes. The key strategies and concepts
    of the Army?s plans were developed with the participation and ongoing input
    of the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Combatant Commands and the Army
    Service Component Commands. However, the lack of an overall Department of
    Defense (DOD) transformation strategy has led the Army to proceed with its
    transformation plans solely on the basis of broad departmental guidance
    rather than a clear understanding of how its efforts fit into an overall
    scheme for military transformation. Although the results of the Quadrennial
    Defense Review as well as other events are likely to affect the Army?s
    plans, the Transformation Campaign Plan appears to be flexible enough to
    permit the Army to adapt its plans to evolving events.

    However, the existence of a comprehensive management plan does not diminish
    the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army?s plans are
    highly dependent on near- term technological advances that are uncertain and
    long- term funding commitments. The following are among the key challenges
    that we identified:

     Keeping the program on track despite many uncertainties concerning the
    maturity and feasibility of new technologies that will be needed to
    implement new warfighting concepts.

     Meeting ambitious milestones for forming the first transformational
    brigades despite delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles,
    designating subsequent brigades, and validating capabilities. Results in
    Brief

    Technology Schedule

    Page 3 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

     Achieving highly optimistic goals for equipping the future Objective
    Force, given the uncertainty of whether needed technologies can mature
    quickly enough.

     Maintaining readiness while simultaneously equipping, training, and
    sustaining Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces- three distinctly different
    forces, each with a unique focus. 2  Streamlining logistics to support
    ambitious rapid deployment goals.

     Maintaining continuity and proficiency in the face of frequent rotations,
    training soldiers to the broad range of skills needed to respond to the full
    range of military operations, integrating reserve forces into the Army?s
    transformation plans, and retaining personnel with advanced technical skills
    greatly demanded in the civilian economy.

     Obtaining sustained support of military and civilian leaders as well as
    the Congress over a period of 30 years in the face of competing national
    security priorities and domestic concerns.

    Because the Army is in the early stages of implementing its transformation,
    we are not making any recommendations at this time.

    In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD generally
    agreed with the report and said the Department will continue to address
    these challenges as it attempts to maintain current timelines. DOD also
    provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

    To assess the Army?s management of transformation efforts, we focused our
    review on the key strategic document that the Army developed to guide its
    transformation efforts- the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. To gain a
    clear understanding of transformation plans, we reviewed documents and
    interviewed officials involved in transformation planning in the Offices of
    the Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, D. C.
    To gain a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, we interviewed
    officials and received briefings from the various Army staff offices
    responsible for key aspects of the

    2 Legacy Force refers to those selected existing forces that the Army will
    modernize as it transforms. Interim Force refers to the first six to eight
    brigades that will be used as a bridge to the Army?s future Objective Force,
    which is scheduled to begin fielding in 2008. Acquisitions

    Operations Human Capital Funding

    Scope and Methodology

    Page 4 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    transformation as well as major Army commands, including U. S. Army Training
    and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, and U. S. Army Forces Command,
    Fort McPherson, Georgia. As part of this work, we discussed how the
    transformation was being integrated into Army operations. To determine the
    organizational structure and operational capabilities of the Initial Brigade
    Combat Teams, we obtained documents and interviewed officials of the Army?s
    I Corps, the first Interim Brigade Combat Team, and the Army Training and
    Doctrine Command?s Brigade Coordination Cell, all of which are located at
    Fort Lewis, Washington.

    To gain the perspective of commanders in the field on the extent of their
    participation in transformation plans and issues of concern to them, we
    discussed transformation plans with representatives of the U. S. Central
    Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U. S. Pacific Command and U. S.
    Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U. S. Forces Korea and 8th U. S. Army,
    Seoul, Korea; U. S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; and U. S. Army
    Europe, Heidelberg, Germany. We also discussed with them the extent of their
    participation in forums intended to coordinate transformation.

    From these briefings and discussions, we identified key challenges that the
    transformation poses to the Army. We conducted our review from November 2000
    through August 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards.

    We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
    Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air
    Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office of
    Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies
    available to others on request and through the GAO home page at www. gao.
    gov.

    Page 5 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 3958.
    Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Kenneth F.
    Daniell; Kevin C. Handley; M. Jane Hunt; and Leo B. Sullivan.

    Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities

    and Management

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 6 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section I: Background

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 7 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    The Chief of Staff of the Army announced in October 1999 that the Army was
    developing plans to transform its current Cold War organization and
    equipment to a lighter, more strategically responsive force to fill what it
    sees as a strategic gap in current warfighting capabilities. The Army
    believes that the transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to
    (1) the growing number of peacekeeping operations and small- scale
    contingencies and (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as
    weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. According to Army officials,
    light infantry forces can deploy rapidly but lack combat power, tactical
    mobility, and capability for sustained operations. Conversely, its heavy
    forces that rely more on tanks and other armored vehicles have unmatched
    combat power, tactical mobility, and capability for sustained operations but
    require too much time to deploy and require extensive materiel support.

    Transformation plans call for being able to deploy a combat- capable brigade
    anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five
    divisions in 30 days. To do this, the Army plans to develop new equipment,
    transform its concepts and doctrine, build unit organizations that can adapt
    readily to changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and
    change how it trains its soldiers and leaders.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 8 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    Figure 1: Army?s Depiction of Its Transformation

    Legend: BCT = Brigade Combat Team R& D = research and development S& T =
    science and technology Source: Department of the Army.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 9 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    The Army plans to transform its forces over 30+ years. Its initial plans are
    to form two Interim Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Washington. These
    forces, along with four to six additional brigades, will comprise the Army?s
    Interim Force. 1 According to plans, the brigades will be organized,
    trained, and equipped with new light- armored wheeled vehicles (? interim
    armored vehicles?) that are significantly lighter and more transportable
    than existing tanks and armored vehicles. The initial brigade is to achieve
    its initial operating capability in 2003, and all Interim Force brigades are
    to be formed and equipped by about 2008. The Army is optimizing these forces
    for use in small- scale contingencies but also intends to use them in the
    full range of military operations when augmented and employed with Army
    divisions. During this interim period, they are to validate new doctrine and
    organizational structures, develop insights for subsequent transformation,
    and provide a bridge to the Army?s future force- the Objective Force.

    Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to transition
    to its Objective Force. During this period, all Army forces, including the
    Interim Force, are to be transformed into new organizational structures
    operating under new warfighting doctrine. Their new combat systems are to be
    lighter and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable
    than current systems. Currently, four competing research and development
    teams are working on alternative designs for these future combat systems.
    The Army is to select the most promising technologies from these competing
    teams by 2003.

    As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to maintain the
    organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat force, which it
    terms its Legacy Force, and will modernize selected equipment in this force.
    This equipment includes such major weapons systems as the M1A1 Abrams tank,
    Bradley Fighting vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter. This selective
    modernization is intended to enable the Army to maintain capability and
    readiness until the future combat systems are delivered to the Objective
    Force.

    1 On July 12, 2001, the Army announced the unit designations and locations
    of the next four Interim Brigade Combat Teams. The next four brigades are
    the 172 nd Infantry Brigade (Separate), Forts Wainwright and Richardson,
    Alaska; the 2 nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana; the
    2 nd Brigade, 25 th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii;
    and the 56 th Brigade of the 28 th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
    Pennsylvania Army National Guard.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 10 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    Figure 2: Army?s Estimated Schedule for Transforming Its Existing Combat
    Forces Into the Future Objective Force

    Legend: ARNG = Army National Guard BCT = Brigade Combat Teams CA = counter
    attack FY = fiscal year Source: Department of the Army.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 11 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    The Army?s current combat force is made up of (1) heavy Legacy Forces that
    comprise its Counter Attack Corps, (2) other active- duty combat forces, (3)
    Army National Guard combat forces, and (4) Army National Guard- enhanced
    separate brigades. The six- to eight- brigade Interim Force is to begin
    entering the Army?s force in 2003.

    As figure 2 shows, the Army plans to transform its entire combat force over
    the next 30 years to Objective Force designs while phasing out Legacy and
    Interim Forces. For example, through modernization and recapitalization,
    Counter Attack Corps brigades are to retain their current warfighting
    capabilities until they begin transforming to Objective Force brigades in
    about 2020. The plan calls for their transformation to be completed by 2026.
    Transformation of the active- duty non- Counter Attack Corps, National
    Guard- enhanced separate brigades and other National Guard divisional forces
    is to be completed from 2020 to about 2030. The six to eight Interim Brigade
    Combat Teams are to be the last to transform and will not become part of the
    Objective Force until after 2030.

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 12 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section I: Background Page 13 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army
    Transformation Plan

    Under current plans, the Army?s transformation would affect all elements of
    the Army, including its operational combat force; the Institutional Army,
    which includes the Army?s training centers and schools; and support forces.

    Transforming the Operational Army involves developing new warfighting
    concepts and capabilities- the way the Army fights. Transforming the
    Institutional Army will involve such things as changing training and
    training facilities to support the new operational forces. As part of this
    effort, the Army plans to change the way it trains soldiers and leaders and
    develop multifunctional soldiers who will be better equipped to handle
    complex and varying situations. It plans also to modernize its Combat
    Training Centers and schools to keep pace with changes in force structure,
    doctrine, and technology.

    An important element of transformation will be to streamline support forces
    and logistics processes to enable faster deployment, improve mobility, and
    more effectively sustain operational forces. Finally, the Army is
    considering plans to extend new operational force designs beyond its
    brigades by fielding interim divisions and new capabilities at the corps
    level. The Army has not yet finalized the details of the structures and
    operational concepts at these levels of organization.

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 14 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    To manage its transformation, the Army has developed and adopted a
    Transformation Campaign Plan, which is intended to integrate and synchronize
    all elements of its transformation. This plan establishes a common framework
    for guiding transformation activities throughout the Army and is intended as
    a living document that will require changes and refinements as Army efforts
    evolve.

    The plan describes the national security conditions upon which
    transformation is based; articulates the mission and goals of the Briefing
    Section II: Management of the

    Transformation

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 15 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    transformation; and describes in detail the objectives of, and activities
    associated with, each phase of the transformation. It also establishes major
    decision points and the conditions that must be met to proceed to each
    successive step in its transformation. For example, the decision to
    transition from the Initial Force (first two brigades) to the Interim Force
    is to be made when the first battalion of the initial Brigade Combat Team
    has fielded its Interim Armored Vehicles and associated initial equipment,
    including some substitute items as necessary.

    Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities in Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan
    Lines of operation Secretary of Army oversight Proponent organization

    Strategic Requirements & Planning Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Operations Modernization and Recapitalization Acquisition,
    Logistics & Technology Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Manning the
    Force/ Investing in Quality People Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief
    of Staff for Personnel Maintain Unit Readiness & Training Manpower & Reserve
    Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Training and Leader Development
    Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command Joint/ Army Strategy
    & Concepts International Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Army
    Doctrine Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command Operational
    Force Design Manpower & Reserve Affairs Training & Doctrine Command
    Deploying and Sustaining Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Deputy Chief
    of Staff for Logistics Develop & Acquire Advanced Technology Acquisition,
    Logistics and Technology Army Materiel Command Management of Force Programs
    Manpower & Reserve Affairs Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
    Installations Installations and Environment Assistant Chief of Staff for
    Installations Strategic Communications Public Affairs Army Chief of Staff
    Resourcing Financial Management & Comptroller Program Analysis & Evaluation

    Source: Department of the Army.

    As shown in table 1, the Campaign Plan outlines 14 functional areas for the
    transformation-? lines of operation? in Campaign Plan parlance. These lines
    of operation coincide with such established programmatic and decision-
    making areas as doctrine, training, leader development, organization,
    materiel, soldier systems, and facilities. The last two- Strategic
    Communications and Resourcing- support the overall Campaign Plan. Strategic
    Communications seeks to inform and educate others about the transformation.
    Resourcing includes integrating transformation resource requirements into
    the planning and budgeting process. The mission and objectives for the 14
    lines of operations are listed in appendix I.

    Entities within the Office of the Secretary of the Army and various offices
    under the purview of the Army Chief of Staff have been assigned

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 16 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    responsibilities for the activities associated with these 14 areas. This
    coupling of counterpart civilian and military commands and offices is
    intended to foster cooperation in achieving transformation goals across the
    Army. The Campaign Plan articulates the specific roles and responsibilities
    for these entities and delineates where coordination among offices is
    necessary.

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 17 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 18 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 19 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    The Army Chief of Staff directed that the transformation be planned within
    existing planning and budgeting systems. Accordingly, the Director, Office
    of Program Analysis and Evaluation, is to integrate Army transformation
    requirements into the Army?s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution
    System to ensure that adequate funding is available to meet transformation
    objectives. The Director is to identify and validate resource requirements;
    ensure that the transformation timeline is synchronized with the planning,
    programming, and budgeting process; and prioritize requirements for
    inclusion in the Army?s annual Program Objective Memorandum and annual
    budget.

    The management of transformation- related force structure changes is to be
    accomplished by integrating proposed organizational changes into the
    upcoming Total Army Analysis, a process by which the Army determines its
    force structure. Personnel requirements and changes are to be reflected in
    preparing the Army?s 2003 Program Objective Memorandum. Similarly,
    transformation- related modernization and acquisitions are integrated into
    the existing Army Modernization Plan.

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 20 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 21 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    The Army has established several forums at various levels of the
    organization to discuss evolving issues and address matters of concern.
    These forums coordinate and synchronize decision- making for the Campaign
    Plan throughout the Army. General Officers representing the Campaign Plan?s
    14 lines of operation participate in biweekly synchronization briefings with
    the Army Vice Chief of Staff. Key decision points are discussed at these
    briefings. These briefings are followed by biweekly meetings where staff
    officers representing the lines of operation are provided with feedback on
    decisions made in the General Officer briefings, discuss issues, and assign
    required actions. Another forum for gaining input from the field is the
    Commanders in Chief (CINC) Requirements Task Force, which meets quarterly to
    address current and future CINC requirements. According to Army officials in
    the field, their participation in this forum has enabled them to raise
    issues that concern them. The Army has also established various special task
    forces that meet regularly to address specific issues related to the
    transformation. The Army Chief of Staff receives regular briefings on the
    proceedings of these groups.

    To help manage its decision- making process across the lines of operation,
    the Army has developed a software program that synchronizes and links
    thousands of interrelated tasks, decision points, and milestones.
    Representatives of the lines of operation meet regularly to synchronize and
    track the progress of ongoing tasks and decision points.

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 22 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 23 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    The Interim Brigade Combat Teams are intended to meet what the Army sees as
    a critical strategic capabilities gap. However, the Army is also using the
    Combat Teams as a means for testing and validating the concepts, doctrine,
    and training that the Objective Force may ultimately adopt. As such, the
    ongoing activities of the initial brigades serve as an evaluation mechanism
    for the Campaign Plan.

    As the brigades are being formed, the Army War College complements this
    evaluation activity by conducting wargaming and analyses of new concepts and
    organizational designs. The results of these analyses are fed back to Army
    force developers and trainers so that transformation concepts and plans can
    be continually refined.

    The Army Test and Evaluation Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Army
    schools, and the initial brigade at Fort Lewis are cooperating in capturing
    lessons learned in forming the initial brigade. For example, the Army is
    developing an installation template that subsequent brigades can use to
    establish the necessary facilities and infrastructure needed for these new
    brigades.

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 24 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section II: Management of the Transformation

    Page 25 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    The Secretary of Defense?s 2001 Annual Report to Congress, issued by the
    previous administration, highlighted military transformation as a priority
    activity. It highlighted the importance of service and joint concept
    development and experimentation and new technologies, concepts, and
    capabilities to transformation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    in Joint Vision 2020, also included transformation goals. The current
    administration has indicated that transformation will have a prominent place
    in its defense program. Accordingly, there is a general agreement that
    transformed U. S. military forces are needed to respond effectively to the
    changing security environment of the 21st century.

    Beyond these broad documents and statements, the Department of Defense (DOD)
    has not put forward an overall DOD strategy for advancing transformation to
    guide the services? efforts. As a result, each of the services, including
    the Army, has approached transformation without a clear indication of how
    its individual efforts fit into an overall scheme for transformation. In its
    September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report, the Department of Defense
    said it will establish a new office reporting directly to the Secretary and
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Director, Force Transformation will
    evaluate the transformation efforts of the Military Departments and
    recommend steps to integrate their transformation activities.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 26 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 27 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    The Army has made substantial progress in implementing its transformation
    since it was announced in October 1999. By March 2000, the Army had
    completed the requirements and the solicitation to acquire interim armored
    vehicles for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams; the contract was awarded
    November 17, 2000. The Army has also made substantial progress in developing
    new doctrine and organizational and operational designs for the new Brigade
    Combat Teams and has begun forming its initial brigade at Fort Lewis,
    Washington. In February 2000, the Army and the Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency entered into a 6- year collaborative program to explore,
    design, and test new technologies vital to the Army?s future Objective
    Force. These technologies include robotics, sensors, new fuel and power
    systems, advanced armor, and command and control networks. In May 2000, the
    Army selected four contractor teams to concurrently work on design concepts
    for these new capabilities.

    But while progress has been impressive, the Army clearly faces significant,
    interrelated challenges in implementing its transformation. The following
    charts outline what we see as some key challenges in technology, the Interim
    Force schedule, acquisitions, 1 operations, human capital, and funding.

    1 We discussed acquisition challenges in more detail in Defense Acquisition:
    Army Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges (GAO- 01- 311, May 21,
    2001).

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 28 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 29 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    The ultimate success of the Army?s transformation strategy, schedule, and
    key operational capabilities hinges on achieving anticipated science and
    technology advances. The Army believes that science and technology
    breakthroughs within the next 2 to 3 years will enable industry to produce
    lighter, yet highly lethal and survivable, armored combat systems. However,
    such technology breakthroughs are far from certain. The Army is also
    counting on advances in digital communications and computer information
    systems technology to achieve enhanced situational awareness on the
    battlefield. 2 The Army sees this capability as critical to the warfighting
    concepts of both the Interim and Objective Forces and to attaining an
    adequate level of force protection and survivability.

    The Army is also hoping that emerging technology will make it possible to
    produce combat systems that are more reliable and fuel efficient, thus
    reducing the amount of deployed spare parts and fuel to maintain and operate
    them. Reducing the weight of future combat systems and their sustainment
    requirements in this manner is critical to the Army?s ability to meet the
    rapid deployment goals it has set for itself. Advanced digital
    communications and computer capabilities are also critical capabilities in
    order to move to sustainment concepts that rely more on quickly moving
    supplies and parts to the battlefield rather than taking them all along.

    To reduce the weight of armored combat systems while maintaining
    survivability, and improve their reliability and fuel efficiency, the Army
    has asked the science and technology community to provide a comprehensive
    set of technological recommendations by 2003. Much of the technology that
    the Army needs for these capabilities is still in the early stages of
    concept development, and technology advances to provide the answers that the
    Army seeks are not guaranteed. There also are no assurances that industry
    can produce affordable future combat systems light enough to meet the air
    deployability requirements without sacrificing their lethality and
    survivability. Nor are there assurances that advanced digital technology
    will provide the situational awareness and the advancements in logistics
    operations that the Army will need. Many uncertainties surround the
    associated cost and capabilities of these future combat systems, and the
    Army will be challenged in estimating both cost and capabilities until the
    technologies are fully developed and tested.

    2 Situational awareness is the ability to see and understand the battlespace
    before coming into actual contact with the opponent through the use of
    advanced command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence
    systems.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 30 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Owing to delays in the acquisition and fielding schedules for interim
    armored vehicles, the Army is not likely to meet its original schedule for
    forming the planned six to eight Brigade Combat Teams that comprise its
    Interim Force. Longer- than- expected development work for three of the
    interim armored vehicle variants (the mobile gun system, the fire support
    vehicle, and the chemical reconnaissance vehicle) resulted in a 16- month
    delay in the original vehicle- fielding schedule. Also, another contractor
    making an offer protested the award; and work under the contract was

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 31 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    suspended about 4 months, pending the outcome of the protest, which was
    denied in April 2001.

    Delays in fielding the interim armored vehicles have disrupted the Army?s
    original training schedule for the brigade, ultimately setting back the date
    the Army planned to have the brigade reach initial operational capability.
    The original estimate for achieving this milestone has been extended from
    December 2001 to no later than May 2003- a minimum delay of about 16 months.
    Such delays could jeopardize the scheduled transition to the Objective Force
    in 2008, since there may be insufficient time to fully evaluate and refine
    the organizational and operational concepts for the new Interim Brigade
    Combat Teams.

    The Army named its next four Interim Brigade Combat Teams in July 2001- 4
    months later than expected (Mar. 2001). This delay could pose challenges to
    Army planning officials, who say they will need at least 3 to 5 years of
    lead time to plan and construct maintenance and other installation
    facilities that the new brigades will need. Army officials advised us that
    officials were working on these issues even before the locations were
    officially announced and will incorporate needed funding in the next
    programming and budget cycle. They acknowledged, however, that installation
    planners face many challenges in forming the initial brigade as did the
    planners at Fort Lewis.

    Delays in forming these initial brigades and in evaluating their
    capabilities have raised questions about what capabilities the regional
    CINCs can expect from the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. Planners in the
    field believe that they need better information on the projected combat
    capabilities of these brigades so that they can assess and mitigate any
    risks that might be involved in their employment. Similarly, logistics
    officials in the field expressed a need for better information on how these
    new brigades are to be supported to adequately plan for their use. The
    degree of uncertainty associated with both projected combat capability and
    logistical support will continue to pose substantial challenges to planners
    in the field.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 32 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 33 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    The Army plans to develop the future combat systems concepts, design the
    systems, and field them over an 8- year period. The first Objective Force
    brigade is to be equipped in fiscal year 2008 and reach its initial
    operating capability by fiscal year 2010. However, DOD historically has not
    been able to develop high- technology systems within such a relatively short
    period. Its average acquisition cycle for all systems has been from 10 to 15
    years. For example, both the Comanche helicopter and Crusader self-
    propelled artillery system required significantly more time in development
    than originally envisioned. The Comanche will have been in development for
    23 years and the Crusader for over 16 years before their planned fielding
    dates.

    A key question is whether the envisioned technologies will reach maturity in
    time to meet projected time lines. Under current plans, the Army projects
    that, by 2003, it will need to decide whether the key technologies required
    for the future combat systems will be mature enough to enter the systems
    development stage in fiscal year 2006. Developing these systems is likely to
    require a number of significant advances in science and technology, and Army
    officials agree that counting on the maturity of these systems at the time
    they are needed is high risk. Army officials advised us that, if needed
    technologies were not mature at that time, the Army would proceed with the
    most promising technologies available and then modify the systems later to
    incrementally improve their capabilities over time. The Army realizes that
    it may need to make schedule and other adjustments as conditions change.

    The Army?s plans also call for recapitalizing or upgrading 17 existing
    systems in both active and reserve components to provide combat capability
    until it transitions to the Objective Force. Recapitalization plans include
    such key combat systems as the Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and
    Apache helicopter. (See app. III for a listing.) Concurrently fielding
    interim armored vehicles, developing and procuring future combat systems,
    and carrying out the recapitalization of existing systems will pose
    challenges that may require prioritization and trade- offs.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 34 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    The transformation poses numerous operational challenges related to
    maintenance, training, personnel requirements, installations, and logistics,
    since it will need to simultaneously support three different forces- Legacy,
    Interim, and Objective Forces- beginning in about 2010. Maintaining and
    supporting the Legacy Force?s tracked tanks and combat vehicles, the Interim
    Force?s interim armored vehicles, and the Objective Force?s envisioned
    combat systems will require different types of facilities and occupational
    specialties to maintain them and different logistics operations and support
    capabilities to deploy and sustain them. Similarly,

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 35 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    training three forces is likely to be difficult because officers and
    soldiers will need to undergo training on different equipment and in skills
    geared toward different doctrine, tactics, and organizational designs.
    Furthermore, supporting the different types of training will cause the
    Army?s combat training centers and schools to make significant adjustments.

    Creating the Army?s ability to deploy forces and equipment quickly is a
    critical aspect of the transformation. Ultimately, the Army hopes to attain
    the capability to deploy a combat- capable brigade anywhere in the world in
    96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. To meet
    these capabilities, the Army may need more airlift aircraft than the Air
    Force can provide. In 1998, DOD initiated a major study to update its
    mobility requirements and programs. The study, Mobility Requirements Study
    2005, found that DOD is currently operating with a significant strategic
    airlift shortfall. The study also found that insufficient airlift assets,
    low mission- capable rates for the air fleet, insufficient crew- toaircraft
    ratios, and shortages of spare parts have created shortfalls in strategic
    airlift across the services. Given the current airlift shortfalls and the
    increased demand on airlift that the Army?s transformed forces will require,
    the Army?s goals for rapid air deployability may be difficult to achieve.
    Acknowledging this potential shortfall, Army officials are now examining how
    the deployment goals might be achieved through a combination of airlift,
    fast sealift, and prepositioning of needed equipment abroad.

    One of the principal operational challenges facing the Army is increasing
    strategic responsiveness across the spectrum of potential conflicts anywhere
    in the world. Success will require the Army to improve and streamline
    logistics operations and reduce sustainment requirements. The Army is
    currently working on ways to reduce the sustainment requirements of the
    Interim and Objective Forces to levels well below those of its heavy Legacy
    Forces, which require extensive stockpiled materiel for support. Again,
    success depends on the Army?s development of the technology required to
    produce future combat systems that are as lethal and survivable as the
    current heavy- weapons systems, yet light enough to be transported in a C-
    130- type aircraft. Technological breakthroughs that can reduce sustainment
    requirements through better reliability of systems and increased efficiency
    in power, fuel, and ammunition consumption will be necessary. Advances in
    information technology will also be needed to provide the real- time
    logistics control and support capabilities that are a critical part of the
    Army?s efforts to streamline its logistics processes. In addition, the
    Army?s efforts to

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 36 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    transform its support forces are of major importance to successfully
    reducing the number of people that need to be deployed to support the combat
    forces.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 37 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 38 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Maintaining continuity and skill proficiency will be challenging, given the
    frequency of personnel rotations and the many skill conversions that will be
    required. Significant personnel turbulence could be created as the Army
    converts individuals to different military occupational specialties and
    units to new organizational and operational designs. For example, Army
    officials advised us that the number of military occupational specialties
    will be reduced from about 252 to about 170 over the course of the
    transformation.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 39 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Special human capital challenges will arise from the Army?s decision to
    include one National Guard brigade as part of its Interim Force. Converting
    this brigade will require many personnel to convert to new skills.
    Historically, it has taken long periods of time for reserve personnel to
    attain full skill qualifications in some specialties because of limitations
    on time, training opportunities, and available resources. This is a
    longstanding problem, and the Army recently noted that qualification rates
    in the National Guard have declined over the last 5 years. Recruiting
    sufficient personnel to fully staff units that are expected to deploy
    quickly could also pose challenges, since personnel with the proper skills
    must be recruited within limited geographical areas. Gaining the wide range
    of new skills needed and retaining proficiency in these skills could be
    challenging, given the limited time that reserve forces have available to
    train.

    The Army is currently dealing with such personnel issues as shortages of
    junior officers and problems in recruiting and retaining personnel with
    certain skills. The new force designs require increased numbers of some
    specialties, such as military intelligence, that have historically been in
    short supply throughout the Army. For example, the Interim Brigades require
    over 200 military intelligence specialists- about 170 more military
    intelligence specialists than a traditional heavy- combat brigade. The Army
    has experienced shortages in this specialty for many years, and the demand
    for such personnel in ongoing contingency operations abroad has increased.

    The Army?s increased reliance on communications and information systems
    technology for tactical warfighting information and real- time logistics
    control and personnel support will place extra demands on military
    personnel. To maintain, support, and operate future combat systems and
    associated technology, both military and civilian personnel will need to be
    trained in advanced communications, computing, and information systems
    technology. Military personnel will need to periodically repeat training on
    digitized systems to retain proficiency while being trained at the same time
    to develop a wider range of new skills. Scheduling all such training and
    maintaining proficiency will be challenging to the Army?s trainers, and
    maintaining proficiency will challenge individual leaders and soldiers.

    Finally, the Army recognizes that in providing its personnel with advanced
    technology skills, it will need to provide robust quality- of- life programs
    and incentives if it is to retain personnel whose skills are likely to be in
    great demand in the civilian economy.

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 40 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Legend: A/ C = Active Component CTC = Combat Training Centers IAV = Interim
    Armored Vehicle R/ C = Reserve Component

    Briefing Section III: Key Challenges Page 41 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges
    for Army Transformation Plan

    Trade- offs and budget prioritization will likely be needed to maintain
    current readiness and carry out transformation within existing funding
    authority. The Army has already made some difficult trade- off decisions.
    For example, to help fund the acquisition of interim armored vehicles; the
    Army canceled 10 major procurements, restructured four other programs, and
    shifted a significant amount of planned spending from fiscal year 2001
    through fiscal 2005. Further adjustments may be needed, since the Army
    estimates that its planned Legacy Force modernizations alone will require
    about $23 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2007.

    In addition, the Army will be faced with having to balance the
    transformation- related funding with a full range of other budget priorities
    as noted in the Funding briefing chart. The Army says that transformation
    starts first with people and that without adequately manning the force,
    providing for the well- being of soldiers and their family, and investing in
    leader development, the Army cannot achieve its transformation. Balancing
    its funding to meet these important competing Army priorities will be
    difficult. Similarly, the Army will be competing for resources within DOD at
    a time when all the services are facing readiness and modernization
    challenges. Other national spending priorities make it uncertain whether the
    Department can expect substantial funding increases over the long period of
    the transformation.

    Briefing Section IV: Conclusions Page 42 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for
    Army Transformation Plan

    Briefing Section IV: Conclusions

    Briefing Section IV: Conclusions Page 43 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for
    Army Transformation Plan

    The Army?s Transformation Campaign Plan provides a comprehensive, highly
    adaptable, results- oriented plan to guide its transformation efforts over
    the next 30 years. This management vehicle provides a common frame of
    reference for officials throughout the Army, sets clearly defined
    transformation goals and milestones, and assigns clear roles and
    responsibilities for implementing the transformation. The coordination
    forums that the Army has established provide a means to hear and address
    concerns in a timely manner; and the electronic tool that accompanies the
    Campaign Plan enables the Army to synchronize its activities, track
    progress, and adjust plans as problems arise. By using the Interim Brigade
    Combat Teams to validate concepts and by capturing lessons learned, the Army
    has a means to evaluate its efforts and apply lessons learned to future
    brigade formation and ultimately the Objective Force. By integrating the
    transformation into its existing planning, budgeting, and decision- making
    processes, the Army has greater assurance that transformation program and
    funding needs are identified and balanced against other Army priorities. The
    results of the Quadrennial Defense Review as well as other events are likely
    to affect the Army?s plans. We believe that the management construct
    established by the Transformation Campaign Plan is flexible enough to permit
    the Army to adapt its plans to evolving events.

    The existence of a comprehensive management plan, however, does not diminish
    the challenges the Army faces in implementing it. The Army?s plans are
    highly dependent on near- term technological advances and long- term funding
    commitments that make attaining some milestones uncertain. To be successful,
    the transformation will need a sustained commitment by Army leadership and
    support by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    and Congress to sustain the Army?s plans over the long period envisioned for
    the transformation.

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Page 44 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

    Line of operation Mission and objective

    Strategic Requirements and Planning Address strategic requirements and
    planning to ensure that throughout the transformation process, all critical
    Commander in Chief (CINC) requirements are supported; incorporate emerging
    Army capabilities into CINC requirements for the future and within joint and
    services? strategic documents. Modernization and Recapitalization Ensure
    modernization and recapitalization of Army forces. Conduct force development

    for Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces, including the fielding and
    integration of new equipment and force designs. Ensure that investment plans
    support overall force development. Manning the Force and Investing in
    Quality People Man the force for full- spectrum operations and invest in
    quality people to ensure a

    trained and ready force. Man the warfighting units at 100 percent; recruit
    and retain to meet the Army?s needs; field soldier- usable equipment; manage
    attrition and separation; redesign business practices and adapt personnel
    services and support to available technology; and enhance the well- being of
    the Army family. Maintain Unit Readiness and Training Maintain required
    levels of unit readiness and training; analyze effects of

    transformation on readiness resource levels and provide recommendations to
    minimize turbulence, instability, and lowered overall readiness levels;
    continue to implement changes to AR 220- 1 and the automated readiness
    system, which will capture readiness requirements of the future force
    structure. Training and Leader Development Ensure training and leader
    development actions required to maintain trained and

    ready Legacy Forces and produce transformed units and leaders capable of
    joint warfighting, as well as change. Create a learning environment that is
    responsive to emerging technologies and continually improves processes,
    procedures, and products that support the force. Joint/ Army Strategy and
    Concepts Ensure that transformation of the operational Army has a firm
    strategic and

    operational foundation by embedding the requirement for strategically
    responsive, fully dominant landpower in key national, Defense Department,
    joint service, and Army documents for strategy, concepts, and doctrine. Army
    Doctrine Integrate the development of Army doctrine, tactics, techniques,
    and procedures to

    support the transformation of the Army. Ensure that current doctrine is
    revised to support the Legacy Force through transformation and that Interim
    Force doctrine is developed and revised to support the Objective Force.
    Ensure integration with emerging joint and multinational doctrine throughout
    transformation to define the Army?s capabilities and contributions in joint
    and multinational operations. Operational Force Design Develop and field
    operational force designs for combat forces, command and control,

    and support elements that are strategically responsive and dominant at every
    point on the spectrum of operations. Deploying and Sustaining Ensure that
    Army forces are capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and

    future operational force deployment goals. Effectively sustain the full
    spectrum of Army operations, while synchronizing Army and joint service
    efforts to (1) reduce the operational force sustainment requirement and
    related combat service and combat service support demand on lift, (2) reduce
    deployed combat support footprint in the combat zone, (3) transform the
    institutional support elements of the Army to be more strategically
    responsive (across the full spectrum), and (4) reduce the cost for
    logistics/ support without reducing warfighting capability. Develop and
    Acquire Advanced Technology Develop and acquire advanced technology to
    provide materiel solutions for the

    Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces. Management of Force Programs Assess
    and design the institutional Army throughout transformation; integrate

    institutional reengineering initiatives using existing force management
    processes, while examining options for more efficient management practices.

    Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense Appendix I:
    Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and Objectives

    Appendix I: Transformation Campaign Plan?s Lines of Operation, Missions, and
    Objectives

    Page 45 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

    Line of operation Mission and objective

    Installations Manage, modernize, and refine installations as strategic
    assets throughout the Army?s transformation; ensure that necessary real
    property support and services at installations are provided during
    transformation and are provided for the Objective Force, while providing
    proper stewardship of the environment. Strategic Communications Synchronize
    and coordinate the transformation?s strategic communications efforts to

    internal and external audiences to inform, educate, and build consensus; to
    garner support; and to acquire the resources for the Army?s transformation.
    Resourcing Integrate Army transformation requirements with the Army?s
    Planning, Programming,

    Budgeting, and Execution System and ensure adequate funding for
    transformation objectives.

    Source: Department of the Army.

    Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
    Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation

    Page 46 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation P

    System Description Combat systems

    M1 A1/ A2 Abrams Tank Heavy armor tracked combat vehicle M2/ M3 Bradley
    Fighting Vehicle Infantry and cavalry tracked combat vehicle M113 Family of
    Vehicles Family of tracked vehicles Patriot Missile System Provides defense
    against aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical

    ballistic missiles Multiple- Launch Rocket System Rocket launcher M992 Field
    Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle Provides resupply and support of field
    artillery units

    Aviation systems

    AH- 64 A/ D Apache/ Longbow Helicopter Attack/ reconnaissance helicopter UH-
    60 Black Hawk Helicopter Utility and assault helicopter CH- 47 Chinook
    Helicopter Cargo helicopter

    Combat support systems

    M48/ M60 Armored Vehicle- Launched Bridge Provides assault- bridging
    capabilities for tank and mechanized battalions M9 Armored Combat Earthmover
    Multipurpose engineer vehicle AN/ TPQ- 36/ 37 Firefinder Artillery locating
    radar Small Emplacement Excavator All- purpose, wheeled engineer vehicle
    High- Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle Light, tactical vehicle AN/
    ASM- 190 (includes AN/ ASM- 146, AN/ ASM- 147, and AN/ ASM- 189) Electronic
    shop shelter M88 Hercules Equipment recovery, combat utility lift and
    evacuation system Heavy Expanded- Mobility Tactical Truck 10- ton, 8- wheel
    drive family of vehicle systems

    Source: Department of the Army.

    Appendix II: Combat, Aircraft, and Support Systems and Equipment Planned for
    Recapitalization or Upgrade During Army Transformation

    Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

    Page 47 GAO- 02- 96 Major Challenges for Army Transformation Plan

    Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

    (350008)

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