Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful
Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened
(23-AUG-02, GAO-02-904).
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
(R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development,
testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to
strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to
nuclear, chemical and biological attacks. From fiscal year 1998
through fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D program received an average of $218 million per year, for a
total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was
distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of
the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs and
the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In
terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and
transfer them to, users in the federal government, the
intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. In terms of
project monitoring, the program requires that projects'
life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed
information on project time frames, milestones, users of
technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state,
and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's
R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question
whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and
short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-904
ACCNO: A04687
TITLE: Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful
Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened
DATE: 08/23/2002
SUBJECT: Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Counterterrorism
Emergency preparedness
National defense operations
National preparedness
Nuclear proliferation
Terrorism
Program evaluation
Navy Special Reconnaissance Program
******************************************************************
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GAO-02-904
Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
August 2002 NONPROLIFERATION R& D NNSA*s Program Develops Successful
Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened
GAO- 02- 904
Page i GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D Letter 1
Results in Brief 3 Background 6 Of the $1. 2 Billion That the
Nonproliferation and Verification R& D
Program Received over 5 Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA
National Laboratories 7 Two of Three Research Areas in NNSA*s R& D Program
Have No
Process to Identify Users* Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor
Project Progress 11 Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed
by NNSA,
but Some Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed 16
Conclusions 20 Recommendations for Executive Action 20 Agency Comments 21
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23
Appendix II Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 26
Table
Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002 9
Figures
Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D
Program, Fiscal Years 1998- 2002 8 Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to
Nonproliferation and
Verification R& D Program*s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002 10 Contents
Page ii GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D Abbreviations
DOE Department of Energy NISC Nonproliferation and International Security
Center NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration R& D Research and
development
Page 1 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
August 23, 2002 The Honorable Sonny Callahan Chairman The Honorable Peter
J. Visclosky Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Energy and Water
Development Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration*s (NNSA) 1
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R& D) Program
is to conduct needs- driven research, development, testing, and evaluation
of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States*
ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological
attacks. The Department of Energy*s (DOE) national laboratories carry out
most of the program*s research, while officials at NNSA*s headquarters and
operations offices provide general oversight and contracting support and
serve as liaisons to users of the technology developed. 2 NNSA*s program
makes these technologies available to a number of users from federal
agencies* such as the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; the
Customs Service (in the Department of the Treasury); and intelligence
agencies* and to state and local law enforcement agencies. 3
1 NNSA was created in March 2000 as a separately organized agency within
the Department of Energy. It is responsible for enhancing the safety,
reliability, and performance of the nation*s nuclear weapons; maintaining
the nation*s ability to design, produce, and test nuclear weapons;
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
designing, building, and maintaining naval nuclear propulsion systems. 2
DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The
mission of its 23 national laboratories has evolved. Originally created to
design and build atomic bombs, these laboratories have since expanded to
conduct basic and applied research in many disciplines* from high- energy
physics to advanced computing. 3 Other federal agencies* such as the
Department of Defense, National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and intelligence agencies* share responsibility
with NNSA for counterterrorism R& D efforts and develop complementary
technologies designed to detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass
destruction. For example, the Department of Defense is developing
technology to protect combatants from chemical and biological agents, and
the National Institutes of Health are developing new or improved vaccines,
antibiotics, and antivirals in the event of a biological attack.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the federal government has
used technologies developed by NNSA*s program to, among other things,
monitor air samples from the World Trade Center site for hazardous
chemicals and to assist the cleanup of congressional office buildings
contaminated by anthrax. In addition, the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority has received equipment developed by this program to
detect chemical agents in the Washington, D. C., subway system (Metro).
As of fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
had approximately 220 projects under development. Work carried out in
these projects covers a wide spectrum of activities, ranging from
manufacturing specialized satellite- based sensors that detect nuclear
explosions to exploratory research projects to test whether a technical
idea with a plausible application to a nuclear, chemical, or biological
nonproliferation mission is feasible. The program is currently divided
into three specific research areas labeled as follows:
Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Develops and manufactures groundand
satellite- based sensors and computer software for detecting, locating,
identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions when they occur
underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space.
Proliferation Detection. Develops, demonstrates, and delivers longand
short- range sensor technologies to detect the spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies worldwide. 4
Chemical and Biological National Security. Develops, demonstrates, and
delivers systems to improve the United States* capability to prepare for
and respond to chemical and biological attacks.
This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past 5
years and the program*s distribution of this funding to the national
laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its three research
areas;
4 Prior to fiscal year 2002, the program had a Deterring Proliferation
research area that developed short- range radiation detection
technologies, advanced nuclear materials analysis methods, and
microtechnologies for detection and analysis of proliferation activities.
In October 2001, the efforts of this research area were consolidated into
the Proliferation Detection research area.
Page 3 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
(2) extent to which the program identifies users* needs and monitors
project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local agencies of
the usefulness of program- developed technology, particularly in light of
heightened homeland security concerns following September 11, 2001.
From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and
Verification R& D Program received an average of about $218 million per
year, for a total of about $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of the $1. 2
billion was distributed for R& D at three NNSA national laboratories, Los
Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in California. About 14 percent was
distributed to 10 other national laboratories and DOE facilities. The
remaining funding was used for the construction of a Nonproliferation and
International Security Center at the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
grants to universities and small businesses, and cooperative support for
other federal agencies* counterterrorism R& D activities* such as R& D for
chemical and biological detector technology conducted by the U. S. Army.
In fiscal year 2002, the program received a significant funding increase.
The program was appropriated a total of about $323 million, which included
$78 million from the $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act
passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Regarding
the amount of funding distributed by research area in fiscal year 2002, 37
percent of the total $323 million (about $119 million) was allocated to
the Proliferation Detection research area; 26 percent (about $81 million)
to the Chemical and Biological National Security research area; and 23
percent (about $76 million) to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research
area.
Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification
R& D Program lack a formal process to identify users* needs and the tools
used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA*s
role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the
federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and
others. Because of this, it is important that these users have input to
project planning and selection and are kept involved as projects progress.
However, we found that the Chemical and Biological National Security
research area and the Proliferation Detection research area generally lack
a formal process for identifying users* needs during various stages of
project development: from input on which projects to fund, to updates on
ongoing research. The research areas lack this process because, according
to program managers and national laboratory officials, the research in
these two areas is, in many cases, considered to be long- term and the
Results in Brief
Page 4 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
feasibility of the resulting technology is usually unknown. Thus, these
officials believe that user involvement should not occur until the
research is more mature. However, two separate advisory committees to NNSA
reported in 2000 and again in 2002 that successfully transferring new
technologies to users would be aided by opening communications with
potential users as early as possible and continuing these communications
through all phases of the R& D project.
In terms of project monitoring, the program requires that projects*
lifecycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on
project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables.
However, we found that many of the projects* life- cycle plans and
quarterly reports in the Chemical and Biological National Security
research area and much of the Proliferation Detection research area did
not contain the required information. In the Chemical and Biological
National Security research area, for example, lack of data occurs because
this research area allocates funds to all projects in the area in a single
allotment to each national laboratory rather than to individual projects
(as is done for the other research areas). As a result, projects* life-
cycle plans and quarterly reports for this research area at each
laboratory are consolidated into single laboratory- wide reports from
which it is difficult to glean specific project data. Officials from this
research area were therefore unable to provide us with even a list of
their ongoing projects. The program maintains a program management
information system to track the distribution of funding from NNSA
headquarters to individual projects at the national laboratories. However,
the system is not designed to capture* on an individual project, research
area, or programwide basis* whether projects are on time or within budget.
Instead, program managers obtain project progress and budget information
largely through personal interaction with project leaders at the
laboratories. This report recommends strengthening project plans, reports,
and information systems to better capture individual project milestones
and expenditures.
Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
developed by NNSA*s R& D program have found the technology useful, but
some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long- term
and short- term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. According to program officials, long- term technology
needs are not always well understood by users, and current technologies
will eventually become obsolete and/ or understood by adversaries.
Therefore, new capabilities through long- term research must be constantly
pursued. However, some users said that, faced with the continuing
terrorist threat, NNSA*s R& D program needs to concentrate on
communicating with and
Page 5 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
addressing the immediate needs of the user and *first responder*
communities. For example, according to an official with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, while it is satisfied with the
technologies already provided by NNSA, no federal agency is currently
offering the Transit Authority short- or long- term assistance with its
needs for post- attack chemical and biological decontamination technology
tailored to a metropolitan subway system. Several national laboratory
officials and users told us that this conflict between short- and long-
term priorities has created a gap in which the most important immediate
needs of users or highest risks are, in some cases, going unaddressed in
favor of an advanced technology that can only be delivered over the long-
term. 5 To better set priorities and define its role in the post-
September 11th counterterrorism R& D efforts, the director of NNSA*s R& D
program said that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of
Homeland Security and is working to better *advertise* the program*s
projects and capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security.
Relatedly, to better prioritize and guide counterterrorism R& D efforts
across the federal government, we have previously recommended that a
national counterterrorism R& D strategy be developed with the
participation of federal agencies and state and local authorities to
reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is especially
important as the President and the Congress work toward the creation of a
new Department of Homeland Security that, as currently envisioned, will
assume leadership of federal counterterrorism R& D activities, including
the Chemical and Biological National Security research area and certain
activities of the Proliferation Detection research area. Within the
context of this strategy, this report recommends that NNSA*s R& D program
work with the Office of Homeland Security (or, if eventually created, the
Department of Homeland Security) to clarify the agency*s role in
conjunction with other federal R& D efforts and to involve potential
technology users in the R& D process. This recommendation could assist the
program and the Office of Homeland Security to better leverage R& D
funding and the technical knowledge of DOE*s national laboratories to meet
the short- and long- term needs of users.
5 We were given several specific examples by users of risks they believe
are going unaddressed in favor of long- term technology research at the
national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.
Page 6 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
We provided a draft copy of this report to NNSA for its review and
comment. NNSA agreed with the draft report*s findings and recommendations.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most
serious dangers confronting the United States today and will likely
continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Responsibility for thwarting
this proliferation is shouldered by numerous federal agencies and by many
individual departments within these agencies. Each of these departments
brings a specific perspective, strength, and knowledge base to bear on an
aspect of the large and complex proliferation problem.
NNSA and its Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
Program (R& D program) are key players in the United States*
nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its unique
understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power,
based in large measure on the world- class research, design, and
engineering capabilities to be found in the multidisciplinary DOE national
laboratories that conduct basic and applied research in many areas* from
high- energy physics to advanced computing. As of May 31, 2002, the
Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s 220 projects were in
various developmental stages: from research conducted to develop an idea
and assess the feasibility of producing a prototype, to field
demonstrating a prototype prior to its transfer to an end user. Some
examples of successful research projects conducted by NNSA*s
Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program include:
The development of ground- based technology for detecting in real time
short- lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and
satellite- based detectors that are sensitive to x- ray, gamma ray, and
neutron emissions. These projects were developed by the Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring research area.
Detection equipment, developed by the Proliferation Detection research
area, that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over the World Trade
Center site to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals.
A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of
congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and equipment to
detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, D. C., Metro
subway system was developed by the Chemical and Biological National
Security research area. Background
Page 7 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Nearly 75 percent of the $1. 2 billion that NNSA*s R& D program was
appropriated over the past 5 years was distributed to Los Alamos, Sandia,
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. According to program
officials, these laboratories received the majority of the funding because
most of the needed expertise for the program*s projects is resident at
these laboratories. The remaining funding was distributed to other DOE
laboratories and facilities. NNSA*s R& D program received a total
appropriation of $322 million in fiscal year 2002, with the most funding
spent on R& D of Proliferation Detection projects.
From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, $1. 2 billion was
appropriated to NNSA*s R& D program. There was little annual variation in
the program*s funding between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001,
averaging about $218 million per year. (See fig. 1.) However, the program
received a significant increase in fiscal year 2002, and was appropriated
about $323 million* including $78 million the program received in the $40
billion emergency supplemental appropriations act passed in the wake of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Of the $1. 2 Billion
That the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program Received over 5
Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA National Laboratories
Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories Received
the Majority of Program Funding
Page 8 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D
Program, Fiscal Years 1998- 2002
Note: Funding for fiscal year 2002 includes $244 million in the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act for 2002 (P. L. 107- 66)* about $36
million of which was for construction of the Nonproliferation and
International Security Center (NISC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory*
and $78 million received under the 2001 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on
the United States (P. L. 107- 38).
Source: GAO*s analysis of data from NNSA.
Of the $1. 2 billion appropriated to NNSA*s R& D program from fiscal year
1998 through fiscal year 2002, nearly 75 percent was distributed for R& D
efforts at three of DOE*s nuclear weapons laboratories* Sandia and Los
Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico ($ 352.4 million and $313.6
million, respectively) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
California ($ 228.2 million). (See table 1.) Fourteen percent was
distributed to other national laboratories, including, among others,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington ($ 85. 0 million) and
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Y- 12 Plant in Tennessee ($ 35.1
million). Six percent was distributed to universities, industry (including
small businesses), and other governmental agencies. For example, nearly
$240,000 was obligated to the U. S. Army for chemical and biological agent
detection research. Finally, about 5 percent or $58. 8 million has been
Page 9 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
spent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2002 to build the NISC at
Los Alamos National Laboratory. This center (that NNSA estimates will cost
a total of $63 million before construction is complete in fiscal year
2003) will provide consolidated office and laboratory space for
nonproliferation R& D activities that are currently housed in 47 different
structures* many of which, according to NNSA, are old and substandard*
across the 43- square mile Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002
Dollars in millions
Facility 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Percent
Sandia National Laboratory $68.2 $68.8 $71.8 $66.8 $76.8 $352.4 29.5 Los
Alamos National Laboratory 60.2 56.0 56.1 60.6 80.7 313. 6 26.3 Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory 36.3 37.9 43.0 42.6 68.4 228. 2 19.1 Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory 15.5 17.0 17.9 18.5 16.1 85.0 7. 1
Nonproliferation and International Security Center (Construction) 0.0 0. 0
6.0 17.0 35.8 58.8 4. 9 Oak Ridge National Laboratory/ Y- 12 Plant 5. 8
6.6 7. 1 8.2 7. 4 35.1 2. 9 Argonne National Laboratory 2. 0 2.0 3. 2 2.6
4. 2 14.0 1. 2 Savannah River Technology Center 2.1 2. 5 2.2 2. 2 4.0 13.0
1. 1 Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 2.8 2. 2 1.8
1. 5 1.1 9. 4 1.0 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1.3 1. 1 1.9 2. 5
2.1 8. 9 1.0 Brookhaven National Laboratory 1.2 1. 0 1.0 0. 7 0.5 4. 4
Less than 1 All others 14.4 7. 6 8.7 15.1 25.5 71.3 6. 0
Total $210.0 $202.6 $220.5 $238.2 $322.6 $1,193. 9 100
Note: Totals may not add because of rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
data from NNSA.
In fiscal year 2002, R& D activities in the Proliferation Detection
research area received 37 percent of the $323 million appropriated to
NNSA*s R& D program. The Chemical and Biological National Security
research area received 26 percent and the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
research area received 23 percent. 6 (See fig. 2.)
6 Over the course of our review, we analyzed financial data provided by
NNSA dating back to fiscal year 1996 to attempt to find trends in the
distribution of funding to each research area. However, NNSA*s R& D
program changed how its research areas were organized and how funds were
distributed to them several times since 1996. Therefore, annual
distributions of funding to each research area are not comparable.
Proliferation Detection
Projects Received the Most Funding in Fiscal Year 2002
Page 10 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to Nonproliferation and Verification R&
D Program*s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002
Source: GAO*s analysis of data from NNSA.
The Proliferation Detection research area received about $119 million in
fiscal year 2002. The largest single amount ($ 11. 2 million) was
obligated to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for R& D of remote
spectroscopy technology. While many of the specific applications and
characteristics of this technology are classified, the systems developed
are used by several defense and intelligence agencies in a variety of arms
control and treaty verification activities. The technology developed is
particularly useful in identifying chemical releases associated with
proliferation activities. For example, these systems can be used to detect
chemical signatures of agents released on a battlefield. One of these
systems was also used at the World Trade Center site after the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks to monitor for hazardous chemicals that might
affect construction workers.
Chemical and Biological National Security R& D efforts received $81.1
million in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $39.1 million was spent on
demonstration programs of integrated chemical and biological detection
systems. Examples of these systems include the chemical agent detection
system installed in one station of the Washington, D. C., Metro subway
system and a biological agent detection system that was deployed at the
2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Page 11 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
R& D of Nuclear Explosion Monitoring technologies received $75. 6 million
in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $54.5 million was spent primarily at
Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories to provide satellite sensors
for monitoring nuclear explosions in the earth*s atmosphere and in space.
These sensors are installed on U. S. Air Force Global Positioning System
satellites and on Defense Support Program early warning satellites. The
remaining funds in this research area were spent developing and installing
ground- based sensors for monitoring nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,
underground, and underwater and for developing computer software used by
the operator of the U. S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions* the
Air Force Technical Applications Center* to analyze data obtained from
these sensors.
In contrast to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, the
Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National Security
research areas lack a process to identify users* needs and do not have
sufficient information to oversee project progress. For these latter two
research areas, input from specific users is often not sought prior to
funding research projects because the research in these two areas is, in
many cases, considered to be long- term and the feasibility of the
resulting technology is usually unknown. In addition, although required to
have project life- cycle plans and quarterly reports that contain detailed
information on a project*s time frames, milestones, users, and
deliverables, we found that many of these plans and reports for the two
research areas lacked these data. Furthermore, NNSA*s R& D program
management information system is not designed to capture whether projects
are on time or within budget, eliminating an important tool that program
managers could use to monitor their projects.
In the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, specific R& D projects
originate in a classified presidential directive that sets broad
guidelines for a U. S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions. These
broad guidelines are then refined through an interagency process that
includes agencies of the Department of Defense and the intelligence
community to leverage resources and prevent duplication. Specific
requirements for technologies are then transmitted to the Nuclear
Explosion Monitoring research area and specific statements of work and
memorandums of understanding are signed between the research area and
users of the technology* primarily the Air Force Technical Applications
Center* that specify each party*s responsibilities. The Air Force
Technical Applications Center has the operational responsibility for
ground- based and satellite- based sensor Two of Three
Research Areas in NNSA*s R& D Program Have No Process to Identify Users*
Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor Project Progress
User Input to the Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological
National Security Research Areas Is Limited
Page 12 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
systems that provide technical data for verification of nuclear test ban
treaties and nuclear explosion monitoring. The Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring research area in NNSA*s R& D program is the principal developer
of technology for the Air Force Technical Applications Center. As such,
the two parties enjoy a close relationship. This relationship has been
facilitated by the fact that some of the test ban treaties the Center is
responsible for monitoring* such as the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
between the then Soviet Union and the United States that prohibited
underground nuclear explosions above a yield of 150 kilotons* contain
detailed monitoring and verification procedures. In addition, operational
requirements documents for the U. S. system for monitoring nuclear
explosions also contain detailed technical guidelines for researchers
conducting R& D for NNSA*s program to follow.
In the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
Security research areas, the process for identifying users* needs and
developing R& D projects differs from Nuclear Explosion Monitoring.
Instead of beginning with formal, detailed requirements, projects in these
research areas often are of a more exploratory nature, requiring several
years of work before usable technologies are mature and ready for real
world application. User input is often not sought prior to funding such
research because, according to program managers and national laboratory
officials we spoke with, users are often focused on their immediate
operational needs and are unable to define requirements for technology
whose feasibility is still unknown.
In February 2000 and again in March 2002, advisory committees to NNSA
reported that the diverse environment of users* such as the federal
government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others* makes
the task of transferring the knowledge and technology developed by the
NNSA R& D program especially challenging. 7 To maximize the prospects for
successful transfer, the advisory committees recommended that
communications with potential users should be opened as early as possible
and proceed through all phases of the work (research, development, and
demonstration). According to the advisory committees,
7 Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory
Committee, DOE Research and Technology Against the Threat of Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Review of the Department of Energy Office of
Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NN- 20)
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 25, 2000), and Department of Energy, National
Nuclear Security Administration Advisory Committee, Science & Technology
in the NNSA Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs (Washington, D.
C.: Mar. 1, 2002). Proliferation Detection and the
Chemical and Biological National Security Research Areas Often Do Not Seek
User Input before Funding Projects
Page 13 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
it is important that in the earliest phases of concept formulation,
prospective users be made aware of the potential technological and
scientific advances. In addition, uncertainties need to be communicated as
well to minimize surprises. The February 2000 advisory committee report
recognized the need for exploratory projects designed to see whether a
technical idea with a plausible application to a nuclear, chemical, or
biological nonproliferation mission is feasible. In these cases, seeking
input from a user of the technology might not be necessary until technical
feasibility has been proven. However, the advisory committee also reported
that, in general, users should be involved at the earliest stages of the
R& D process and guidelines should be established to define when
exceptions to this are allowed. In addition, involving users at such an
early stage may achieve unexpected benefits. For example, the March 2002
advisory committee report notes that *brainstorming with potential
endusers can sometimes lead to innovative ideas for new technologies.*
In response to the February 2000 advisory committee report, NNSA*s R& D
program reported that it recognized the importance of involving potential
end users of the technology at the earliest date and that it would
continue to emphasize that relationship. 8 Part of the Proliferation
Detection research area* the former Deterring Proliferation research area*
has begun within the past year to establish a process of regular project
reviews with user participation. Under this process, program managers and
potential users conduct regular reviews of each project before key
decisions are made, such as whether to proceed from exploratory research
into product development. The reviews examine how well the project is
linked to user needs, the strength of the researchers* scientific or
technical approach, and the researchers* ability to carry out the project
effectively and efficiently. Users are also involved in broader planning
initiatives in this area. For example, program managers consulted with
officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Coast
Guard, Customs Service, and agencies of the intelligence community, among
others, when preparing a *strategic outlook* for the research area as well
as science and technology *roadmaps* that are intended to guide future R&
D activities in this research area. However, this system has not yet been
adopted in the remainder of the Proliferation Detection research area* the
projects conducting R& D of long- range detector technologies, for
example* or in
8 Department of Energy, Report to the Committees on Appropriations
Regarding the Status of Implementing the Recommendations of the
Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory Committee Review of the
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program
(Washington, D. C.: 2001).
Page 14 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
the Chemical and Biological National Security research area. Program
officials told us that they are looking at ways of adopting the system
across the entire program.
To determine whether strategic and annual performance goals for effective
and efficient use of resources are being met, standards for internal
control in the federal government require that program managers have
access to relevant, reliable, and timely operational and financial data. 9
In 1999, the National Research Council examined ways to improve project
management at DOE. Specifically, the Research Council reported that DOE*s
project documentation was not up to the standards of the private sector
and other government agencies. 10 The Research Council recommended that
DOE should mandate a reporting system that provides the data necessary for
each level of management to track and communicate the cost, schedule, and
scope of a project.
To monitor the progress of NNSA R& D projects by headquarters program
managers, participating laboratories are required to submit, on an annual
basis, project life- cycle plans. These plans are supposed to contain
detailed statements of work that describe the project*s contributions to
overall program goals, scientific and technical merit, and the specific
tasks to be accomplished. In addition, laboratories are required to submit
quarterly reports that indicate all projects* progress to date, issues and
problems encountered, milestones and schedules, and cost data. However, in
the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
Security research areas, these plans and reports are often missing these
data, and the program management information system is not designed to
track whether projects are on time or budget, eliminating an important
tool that could be used to track projects, improve communications across
the program, and provide transparency to other agencies and the Congress.
9 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 21. 3. 1 (Washington, D. C.:
November 1999), and U. S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control
Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO- 01- 1008G (Washington, D. C.: August
2001). 10 National Research Council, Improving Project Management in the
Department of
Energy (Washington, D. C.: 1999). Proliferation Detection
and Chemical and Biological National Security Research Areas Lack a
Transparent System to Monitor Project Progress
Page 15 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Project life- cycle plans for the 10 projects funded in the Nuclear
Explosion Monitoring research area in fiscal year 2002 all contain
information on the project*s objectives and users of the technology. They
also contain annual statements of work that detail time frames,
milestones, and specific deliverables. Quarterly reports for projects in
this research area detail project expenditures, progress in meeting
milestones, and deliverables completed. Thus, program managers at
headquarters have information to monitor projects in this research area
and the primary user of these technologies* the Air Force Technical
Applications Center* reports that time frames and milestones are routinely
met.
Detailed information to monitor project progress is more limited in the
Proliferation Detection research area. Of the 124 projects funded in
fiscal year 2002, over half of the projects* life- cycle plans are missing
information on potential users of the technology, time frames and
milestones, and/ or detailed statements of work that specify deliverables
to be produced. For example, a project at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory to detect nuclear materials in transit received $1. 2 million
in fiscal year 2002, but the project life- cycle plan for this project
contained no information on users of the technology, the schedule of the
project, or how the funds were to be expended. In addition, many of the
life- cycle plans make no distinction between users that potentially would
receive the technology and users that are actually involved in the R& D
process. Moreover, some projects* life- cycle plans have not been recently
updated to show the actual completion of project deliverables. For
example, Sandia National Laboratory has received nearly $120 million since
fiscal year 1993 to develop and demonstrate space- based imaging
technology for nonproliferation treaty monitoring and other national
security and civilian applications. However, its project life- cycle plan
has not been updated with the dates deliverables were received or
milestones that were accomplished since 1999.
Project monitoring is even more difficult in the Chemical and Biological
National Security research area. Rather than funding projects
individually, as is done in the other research areas, annual funding for
projects in this area is consolidated into a single allotment for each
national laboratory conducting research. As a result, projects* life-
cycle plans and quarterly reports are consolidated into a single report
encompassing all chemical and biological R& D activities at a specific
laboratory. Obtaining project specific expenditure, time frame and
milestone, and deliverable data from this consolidated report is
difficult. As a result, officials from this research area were unable to
provide us with even a list of their ongoing projects. According to the
program manager for the Chemical and Biological Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring
Research Area Has Sufficient Information to Monitor Projects
Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological National Security
Research Area Plans and Reports Are Incomplete
Page 16 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
National Security research area, this problem will be addressed when
individual project reporting is implemented in fiscal year 2003.
NNSA*s R& D program maintains a program- management information system to
track the distribution of funding from NNSA headquarters to individual
projects at the national laboratories. However, because project funding
for chemical and biological R& D is consolidated into allotments for
entire laboratories, financial information for individual projects in the
Chemical and Biological National Security research area is not readily
available. According to the program manager of the Chemical and Biological
National Security research area, individual project financial information
will be added to the project management information system in fiscal year
2003. Moreover, the system is not designed to capture on an individual-
project, research- area, or programwide basis, whether individual projects
are on time or within budget. While in some cases this information is
available in projects* life- cycle plans and quarterly reports, these
documents are only updated periodically, and program managers lack a
system that can provide, on a continuous basis, data on project
expenditures and schedules. Instead, program managers rely on other means,
such as personal interaction with project leaders at the national
laboratories and other types of project records, to obtain this
information.
Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
developed by NNSA*s R& D program, in general, found the technology useful
and said that they had an effective relationship with the program.
However, some questioned whether the program is achieving the right mix of
long- and short- term research. DOE national laboratory officials told us
that this conflict between short- and long- term priorities has created a
gap in which the most important immediate needs of users may be going
unaddressed in favor of an advanced technology that can only be delivered
over the long- term.
Of the 13 agencies we contacted, all have found the technology received
from NNSA*s R& D program useful and told us that they enjoyed an effective
working relationship with the program. For instance, the Navy Special
Reconnaissance Program works with NNSA*s R& D program in the research and
development of sophisticated imagery technology that is used on Navy
aircraft deployed throughout the world. A Navy official said that this
imagery technology is routinely used to collect critical Program-
Management
Information System Is Not Designed to Track whether Projects Are on Time
or Budget
Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed by NNSA, but Some
Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed
Federal, State, and Local Agencies That Use the Program*s Technology Are
Generally Satisfied
Page 17 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
intelligence for policy makers and that the Navy has a very effective
relationship with NNSA. He told us that the Navy regards scientists in
this program as the foremost experts on these complex systems and that
similar efforts conducted by the private sector do not compare in terms of
capability and quality. Similarly, Utah Department of Health officials
said the biological detection equipment demonstrated by the R& D program
at the 2002 Winter Olympics constituted an important tool in its
counterterrorism efforts at the event. These officials told us that they
especially appreciated that they were always treated as an important
client by NNSA*s R& D program. For example, unlike many private vendors
that approached the department with chemical and biological detection
technology, NNSA*s R& D program was willing to share important validation
data with the department to verify that the technology would perform as
intended. Likewise, an official with the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority indicated that he had been impressed by the
collaborative work involving the R& D program and other federal agencies
and considered this collaboration a model relationship between federal and
local agencies. Other federal agencies that told us NNSA*s technologies
are useful included the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force Technical Applications Center,
Department of Transportation, and Federal Transit Administration.
Some of these agencies also told us that they have been approached by the
R& D program with technologies that they neither requested nor found
particularly useful for their missions. Such comments were made by
officials with the Department of State, Navy Special Reconnaissance
Program, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter
Proliferation Programs, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. However, officials from these
agencies also noted that, although the technologies were not requested or
found useful for their missions, being approached by the program was
useful. This is because the R& D program*s presentations helped them
understand the capabilities of the program in the event that these
technologies were needed in the future.
Long- term R& D to develop capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to
terrorism using weapons of mass destruction is essential. However, some
users questioned whether the program was achieving the right mix between
long- and short- term research. Some said that, faced with the continuing
threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction, NNSA*s R& D
program needs to concentrate on communicating with and A Gap Exists
between
Users* Short- Term Needs and the Program*s Long- Term R& D Focus
Page 18 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
addressing the immediate needs of the user and first responder
communities. For example, according to an official with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NNSA*s R& D program* along with other
federal agencies conducting similar research* is not currently offering
the Transit Authority assistance with its immediate need for post- attack
chemical and biological decontamination technology tailored to a
metropolitan subway system. An official with the Air Force Technical
Applications Center stated that the focus of the R& D program needs to be
on users* immediate needs rather than long- term advanced research. This
official added that the longer a project continues, the more likely that
personnel changes or programmatic inefficiencies would limit opportunities
for the eventual completion of the project and the successful transfer of
technologies to users. 11 Officials from NNSA*s R& D program disagreed,
telling us that the program is better able to address short- term
requirements only because it has been conducting advanced research on the
concepts underlying technologies required by the users. Often, this type
of advanced research is long- term in nature.
Two officials with the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories told us
that this conflict between short- and long- term priorities has created a
gap in which the most important immediate needs of users or highest risks
may be going unaddressed in favor of an advanced technology that can only
be delivered over the long- term. According to these officials, there is a
disconnect between what the users and the laboratories believe is the
laboratories* mission. The laboratories believe that, by focusing on the
long- term, the R& D program is able to anticipate users* long- term needs
and look beyond users* immediate requirements. Users feel that they have
urgent short- term needs that cannot wait for long- term development.
According to a national laboratory official, the philosophy of the
laboratories must change. This official indicated that research emphasis
must be placed on those areas where the greatest risks exist, such as from
chemical or biological attack. He strongly cautioned that, although
longterm research is important, it is imperative that the usefulness of
this research be clearly established in advance and as quickly as
possible, given counterterrorism technology*s crucial importance in the
current war against terrorism.
11 We were given several specific examples by users of risks they believe
are going unaddressed in favor of long- term technology research at the
national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.
Page 19 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
To better set priorities and define its role in the post- September 11th
counterterrorism R& D efforts, the director of NNSA*s R& D program said
that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of Homeland
Security and is working to better *advertise* the program*s projects and
capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security. We found that such
advertisement has met with limited success. For instance, the President*s
fiscal year 2003 homeland security budget did not discuss NNSA*s role in
the research and development of detection technology for chemical and
biological agents, although other federal efforts such as those conducted
by the Department of Defense and the National Institutes of Health were
specifically addressed. In addition, the fiscal year 2003 homeland
security budget stated that DOE was not involved in bioterrorism research
and development even though NNSA*s R& D program is requesting $35 million
for bioterrorism research in its fiscal year 2003 budget.
In our September 2001 report, we noted that federal R& D programs to
combat terrorism are coordinated in a variety of ways, but this
coordination is limited by a number of factors, raising the potential for
duplication of efforts among different federal agencies. 12 This limited
coordination also raises the possibility that immediate needs may not be
adequately addressed. For example, officials with the Utah Department of
Health told us the federal community has only been responsive in providing
technology to detect attacks and has not offered assistance in responding
to an attack that would include tracking secondary exposure, population
quarantine, decontamination, and cleanup. Therefore, we recommended in the
September 2001 report that a national counterterrorism R& D strategy be
developed with the participation of federal agencies and state and local
authorities to reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is
especially important as the President and the Congress work toward the
organization of a new Department of Homeland Security that, as currently
envisioned, will assume leadership of federal counterterrorism R& D
activities. As proposed, the Chemical and Biological National Security
research area and the nuclear smuggling and homeland security activities
of the Proliferation Detection research area would be transferred from
NNSA to the proposed Department of Homeland Security.
12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.:
Sept. 20, 2001). R& D Program Officials Also
Believe That the Program*s Role in Homeland Defense Needs to Be Better
Defined
Page 20 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program has developed
numerous successful technologies that aid the defense and intelligence
communities and is an important player in the current U. S. effort to
combat terrorism. While users are generally pleased with the technology
the program has provided them, the program*s management information system
for monitoring its projects* especially for the Proliferation Detection
and the Chemical and Biological National Security research areas* does not
provide adequate information to monitor project progress. Standards for
internal control in the federal government require that important
information such as progress in meeting milestones, costs, user feedback,
and deliverables needs to be collected and made available more
systematically to program managers and to external stakeholders such as
the Congress. Improved project life- cycle plans, quarterly reports, and
information systems that track project data could be useful for program
managers to monitor the projects in their research areas and to better
communicate project progress to users and to other agencies conducting R&
D.
It is important for the program to seek a balance between addressing the
immediate R& D needs of users and looking beyond the horizon at advanced
technologies for the future. Some users are concerned that the program*s
focus is on long- term research. As a result, some feel that the most
important immediate risks may be ignored in favor of long- term research
activities being conducted at the national laboratories. While we agree
that maintaining basic research capabilities is critical, the urgency of
the current war on terrorism requires that NNSA*s R& D program clarify its
role in relation to other agencies conducting R& D, systematically involve
potential technology users in the R& D process, and seek a balance between
short- and long- term activities. The ability of the program to
successfully transfer new technologies to users could be strengthened by
giving potential users opportunities to participate at every stage of the
research and development process. Communicating with technology users and
receiving clear guidance from the Office of Homeland Security* or the
Department of Homeland Security, if established* on what the highest
priorities are and how NNSA and the DOE national laboratories can play a
role in addressing those priorities could assist program managers in their
efforts to prioritize and plan future R& D work.
To improve the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s management
of its R& D efforts, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the
following actions: Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Page 21 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Ensure that all of the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s
projects* life- cycle plans and quarterly reports contain complete data on
project objectives, progress in meeting milestones, user feedback,
funding, and deliverables and upgrade the program*s project management
information system to track all of this information to enhance program
management by providing timely data to program managers and assist
communications with users and other agencies conducting R& D.
Work with the Office of Homeland Security (or the Department of Homeland
Security, if established) to clarify the Nonproliferation and Verification
R& D Program*s role in relation to other agencies conducting
counterterrorism R& D and to achieve an appropriate balance between short-
term and long- term research. In addition, to improve the program*s
ability to successfully transfer new technologies to users, the program
should, in cooperation with the Office of Homeland Security, allow users
opportunities to provide input through all phases of R& D projects.
We provided NNSA with a draft copy of this report for its review and
comment. NNSA*s written comments are presented in appendix II. NNSA agreed
with the draft report*s findings and recommendations. Specifically, NNSA
said that it will apply the technical capabilities of NNSA and the
national laboratories to work with agencies using technologies developed
by the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program to focus on users*
short- term operational mission requirements while maintaining the
program*s ability to meet users* long- term needs. In addition, NNSA said
that it is in the process of updating the program*s management information
system and that its efforts to implement a corporate planning,
programming, budgeting, and evaluation system will help address some of
the program*s project management issues.
We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, NNSA; the
Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the
Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Office of Homeland
Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate
congressional Agency Comments
Page 22 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
committees; and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report were Gene Aloise,
Robert J. Baney, Ryan T. Coles, and Melissa A. Roye.
(Ms.) Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 23 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past 5
years and the program*s distribution of this funding to the national
laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its 3 research areas;
(2) extent to which the program identifies users* needs and monitors
project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local agencies of
the usefulness of program- developed technology, particularly in light of
heightened homeland security concerns following September 11, 2001.
To determine the amount of funding received by the National Nuclear
Security Administration*s (NNSA) research and development (R& D) program
from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002 and the program*s
distribution of that funding to the national laboratories in the field, we
examined each of the research area*s financial plans, quarterly project
reports, and project life- cycle plans. In addition, we queried the R& D
program*s project management information system for detailed information
on each project in the R& D program. We also examined the R& D program*s
funding projections for fiscal year 2003 and analyzed NNSA*s Future- Years
Nuclear Security Program report to the Congress, dated March 2002, which
shows funding estimates for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. We further
reviewed the Office of Homeland Security*s fiscal year 2003 budget report
that describes the level of funding various federal agencies, including
NNSA, will be requesting to combat domestic terrorism.
To determine the extent to which the R& D program identifies users* needs
and monitors project progress, we analyzed data from several different
sources, including reports and memorandums generated by the R& D program
office, independent reviews done on the R& D program by NNSA advisory
committees, and procedures used in selecting specific R& D program
projects for funding. With regard to R& D program office reports and
memorandums, we reviewed, among other things, the NNSA Strategic Plan,
dated February 2002, and strategic plans prepared by the Nuclear Explosion
Monitoring area, dated January 2002; Chemical and Biological National
Security research area, dated spring of 2000; and Deterring Proliferation
area, dated December 2001. The Proliferation Detection research area had
not yet prepared a strategic plan at the time of our review. In addition,
we reviewed various memorandums outlining NNSA*s efforts to develop an
integrated programming, planning, budgeting, and evaluation process. With
regard to independent reviews done on the R& D program, we analyzed
several specific studies. These analyses included the Institute for
Defense Analysis* study entitled The Organization and Management of the
Nuclear Weapons Program, dated March 1997; the Department of Energy*s
(DOE) Nonproliferation and National Security Appendix I: Objectives,
Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 24 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Advisory Committee*s review entitled DOE Research and Technology against
the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, dated February 2000; and the
NNSA advisory committee*s report entitled Science & Technology in the NNSA
Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs, dated March 2002.
To obtain the views of federal, state, and local agencies about the
usefulness of the R& D program*s technology, we interviewed officials at
the Department of Transportation, Office of Intelligence and Security;
Department of State, Office of Technology and Assessments; Navy Special
Reconnaissance Program; Defense Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence
Agency; United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases; Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical and Biological Defense
Directorate; Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Counter Proliferation and Chemical and Biological Defense; Air Force
Technical Applications Center; Federal Transit Administration; Utah
Department of Health; Association of Public Health Laboratories,
Infectious Disease Programs; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, Counter- Terrorism Development.
We also reviewed how the R& D program works in conjunction with other
federal R& D programs by analyzing NNSA*s reports and statements, reports
generated by other federal executive entities, and interviewing
individuals who serve on interagency coordinating bodies. With respect to
NNSA*s reports and statements, we analyzed NNSA*s Report to the Congress
on the Organization and Operations of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, dated February 25, 2002, and the statement by the
Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and
Engineering, NNSA, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, dated April 10, 2002.
With regard to reports generated by other federal executive entities, we
reviewed the Office of Management and Budget*s Fiscal Year 2001 Annual
Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism and the Counterproliferation
Program Review Committee*s report entitled
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism, dated October 2001. We also
interviewed officials who serve on interagency coordinating bodies,
including officials both within and outside NNSA. For instance, we
discussed interagency coordination with the NNSA program managers for the
Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Proliferation Detection areas. We also
discussed interagency coordination with officials at the Office of the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter Proliferation and
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 25 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Chemical and Biological Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and
Department of State.
We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
Page 26 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration
Page 27 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D (360134)
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