Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful	 
Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened	 
(23-AUG-02, GAO-02-904).					 
                                                                 
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's	 
(NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
(R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development,  
testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to 
strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to  
nuclear, chemical and biological attacks. From fiscal year 1998  
through fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification  
R&D program received an average of $218 million per year, for a  
total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was	 
distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of  
the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification
R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs and	 
the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In	 
terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and  
transfer them to, users in the federal government, the		 
intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. In terms of 
project monitoring, the program requires that projects' 	 
life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed 	 
information on project time frames, milestones, users of	 
technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state,	 
and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's	 
R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question  
whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and  
short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of	 
September 11, 2001.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-904 					        
    ACCNO:   A04687						        
  TITLE:     Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful 
Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened	 
     DATE:   08/23/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Biological warfare 				 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     National preparedness				 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Navy Special Reconnaissance Program		 

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GAO-02-904

   Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
   Appropriations, House of Representatives

   United States General Accounting Office

   GAO

   August 2002 NONPROLIFERATION R& D NNSA*s Program Develops Successful
   Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened

   GAO- 02- 904

   Page i GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D Letter 1

   Results in Brief 3 Background 6 Of the $1. 2 Billion That the
   Nonproliferation and Verification R& D

   Program Received over 5 Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA
   National Laboratories 7 Two of Three Research Areas in NNSA*s R& D Program
   Have No

   Process to Identify Users* Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor
   Project Progress 11 Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed
   by NNSA,

   but Some Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed 16
   Conclusions 20 Recommendations for Executive Action 20 Agency Comments 21

   Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23

   Appendix II Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration 26

   Table

   Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
   Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
   2002 9

   Figures

   Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D
   Program, Fiscal Years 1998- 2002 8 Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to
   Nonproliferation and

   Verification R& D Program*s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002 10 Contents

   Page ii GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D Abbreviations

   DOE Department of Energy NISC Nonproliferation and International Security
   Center NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration R& D Research and
   development

   Page 1 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   August 23, 2002 The Honorable Sonny Callahan Chairman The Honorable Peter
   J. Visclosky Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Energy and Water
   Development Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

   The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration*s (NNSA) 1
   Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R& D) Program
   is to conduct needs- driven research, development, testing, and evaluation
   of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States*
   ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological
   attacks. The Department of Energy*s (DOE) national laboratories carry out
   most of the program*s research, while officials at NNSA*s headquarters and
   operations offices provide general oversight and contracting support and
   serve as liaisons to users of the technology developed. 2 NNSA*s program
   makes these technologies available to a number of users from federal
   agencies* such as the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; the
   Customs Service (in the Department of the Treasury); and intelligence
   agencies* and to state and local law enforcement agencies. 3

   1 NNSA was created in March 2000 as a separately organized agency within
   the Department of Energy. It is responsible for enhancing the safety,
   reliability, and performance of the nation*s nuclear weapons; maintaining
   the nation*s ability to design, produce, and test nuclear weapons;
   preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
   designing, building, and maintaining naval nuclear propulsion systems. 2
   DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The
   mission of its 23 national laboratories has evolved. Originally created to
   design and build atomic bombs, these laboratories have since expanded to
   conduct basic and applied research in many disciplines* from high- energy
   physics to advanced computing. 3 Other federal agencies* such as the
   Department of Defense, National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease
   Control and Prevention, and intelligence agencies* share responsibility
   with NNSA for counterterrorism R& D efforts and develop complementary
   technologies designed to detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass
   destruction. For example, the Department of Defense is developing
   technology to protect combatants from chemical and biological agents, and
   the National Institutes of Health are developing new or improved vaccines,
   antibiotics, and antivirals in the event of a biological attack.

   United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

   Page 2 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, the federal government has
   used technologies developed by NNSA*s program to, among other things,
   monitor air samples from the World Trade Center site for hazardous
   chemicals and to assist the cleanup of congressional office buildings
   contaminated by anthrax. In addition, the Washington Metropolitan Area
   Transit Authority has received equipment developed by this program to
   detect chemical agents in the Washington, D. C., subway system (Metro).

   As of fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
   had approximately 220 projects under development. Work carried out in
   these projects covers a wide spectrum of activities, ranging from
   manufacturing specialized satellite- based sensors that detect nuclear
   explosions to exploratory research projects to test whether a technical
   idea with a plausible application to a nuclear, chemical, or biological
   nonproliferation mission is feasible. The program is currently divided
   into three specific research areas labeled as follows:

    Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Develops and manufactures groundand
   satellite- based sensors and computer software for detecting, locating,
   identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions when they occur
   underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space.

    Proliferation Detection. Develops, demonstrates, and delivers longand
   short- range sensor technologies to detect the spread of nuclear,
   chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies worldwide. 4

    Chemical and Biological National Security. Develops, demonstrates, and
   delivers systems to improve the United States* capability to prepare for
   and respond to chemical and biological attacks.

   This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past 5
   years and the program*s distribution of this funding to the national
   laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its three research
   areas;

   4 Prior to fiscal year 2002, the program had a Deterring Proliferation
   research area that developed short- range radiation detection
   technologies, advanced nuclear materials analysis methods, and
   microtechnologies for detection and analysis of proliferation activities.
   In October 2001, the efforts of this research area were consolidated into
   the Proliferation Detection research area.

   Page 3 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   (2) extent to which the program identifies users* needs and monitors
   project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local agencies of
   the usefulness of program- developed technology, particularly in light of
   heightened homeland security concerns following September 11, 2001.

   From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, the Nonproliferation and
   Verification R& D Program received an average of about $218 million per
   year, for a total of about $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of the $1. 2
   billion was distributed for R& D at three NNSA national laboratories, Los
   Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico and Lawrence
   Livermore National Laboratory in California. About 14 percent was
   distributed to 10 other national laboratories and DOE facilities. The
   remaining funding was used for the construction of a Nonproliferation and
   International Security Center at the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
   grants to universities and small businesses, and cooperative support for
   other federal agencies* counterterrorism R& D activities* such as R& D for
   chemical and biological detector technology conducted by the U. S. Army.
   In fiscal year 2002, the program received a significant funding increase.
   The program was appropriated a total of about $323 million, which included
   $78 million from the $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act
   passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Regarding
   the amount of funding distributed by research area in fiscal year 2002, 37
   percent of the total $323 million (about $119 million) was allocated to
   the Proliferation Detection research area; 26 percent (about $81 million)
   to the Chemical and Biological National Security research area; and 23
   percent (about $76 million) to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research
   area.

   Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification
   R& D Program lack a formal process to identify users* needs and the tools
   used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA*s
   role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the
   federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and
   others. Because of this, it is important that these users have input to
   project planning and selection and are kept involved as projects progress.
   However, we found that the Chemical and Biological National Security
   research area and the Proliferation Detection research area generally lack
   a formal process for identifying users* needs during various stages of
   project development: from input on which projects to fund, to updates on
   ongoing research. The research areas lack this process because, according
   to program managers and national laboratory officials, the research in
   these two areas is, in many cases, considered to be long- term and the
   Results in Brief

   Page 4 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   feasibility of the resulting technology is usually unknown. Thus, these
   officials believe that user involvement should not occur until the
   research is more mature. However, two separate advisory committees to NNSA
   reported in 2000 and again in 2002 that successfully transferring new
   technologies to users would be aided by opening communications with
   potential users as early as possible and continuing these communications
   through all phases of the R& D project.

   In terms of project monitoring, the program requires that projects*
   lifecycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on
   project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables.
   However, we found that many of the projects* life- cycle plans and
   quarterly reports in the Chemical and Biological National Security
   research area and much of the Proliferation Detection research area did
   not contain the required information. In the Chemical and Biological
   National Security research area, for example, lack of data occurs because
   this research area allocates funds to all projects in the area in a single
   allotment to each national laboratory rather than to individual projects
   (as is done for the other research areas). As a result, projects* life-
   cycle plans and quarterly reports for this research area at each
   laboratory are consolidated into single laboratory- wide reports from
   which it is difficult to glean specific project data. Officials from this
   research area were therefore unable to provide us with even a list of
   their ongoing projects. The program maintains a program management
   information system to track the distribution of funding from NNSA
   headquarters to individual projects at the national laboratories. However,
   the system is not designed to capture* on an individual project, research
   area, or programwide basis* whether projects are on time or within budget.
   Instead, program managers obtain project progress and budget information
   largely through personal interaction with project leaders at the
   laboratories. This report recommends strengthening project plans, reports,
   and information systems to better capture individual project milestones
   and expenditures.

   Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
   developed by NNSA*s R& D program have found the technology useful, but
   some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long- term
   and short- term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of
   September 11, 2001. According to program officials, long- term technology
   needs are not always well understood by users, and current technologies
   will eventually become obsolete and/ or understood by adversaries.
   Therefore, new capabilities through long- term research must be constantly
   pursued. However, some users said that, faced with the continuing
   terrorist threat, NNSA*s R& D program needs to concentrate on
   communicating with and

   Page 5 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   addressing the immediate needs of the user and *first responder*
   communities. For example, according to an official with the Washington
   Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, while it is satisfied with the
   technologies already provided by NNSA, no federal agency is currently
   offering the Transit Authority short- or long- term assistance with its
   needs for post- attack chemical and biological decontamination technology
   tailored to a metropolitan subway system. Several national laboratory
   officials and users told us that this conflict between short- and long-
   term priorities has created a gap in which the most important immediate
   needs of users or highest risks are, in some cases, going unaddressed in
   favor of an advanced technology that can only be delivered over the long-
   term. 5 To better set priorities and define its role in the post-
   September 11th counterterrorism R& D efforts, the director of NNSA*s R& D
   program said that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of
   Homeland Security and is working to better *advertise* the program*s
   projects and capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security.

   Relatedly, to better prioritize and guide counterterrorism R& D efforts
   across the federal government, we have previously recommended that a
   national counterterrorism R& D strategy be developed with the
   participation of federal agencies and state and local authorities to
   reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is especially
   important as the President and the Congress work toward the creation of a
   new Department of Homeland Security that, as currently envisioned, will
   assume leadership of federal counterterrorism R& D activities, including
   the Chemical and Biological National Security research area and certain
   activities of the Proliferation Detection research area. Within the
   context of this strategy, this report recommends that NNSA*s R& D program
   work with the Office of Homeland Security (or, if eventually created, the
   Department of Homeland Security) to clarify the agency*s role in
   conjunction with other federal R& D efforts and to involve potential
   technology users in the R& D process. This recommendation could assist the
   program and the Office of Homeland Security to better leverage R& D
   funding and the technical knowledge of DOE*s national laboratories to meet
   the short- and long- term needs of users.

   5 We were given several specific examples by users of risks they believe
   are going unaddressed in favor of long- term technology research at the
   national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.

   Page 6 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   We provided a draft copy of this report to NNSA for its review and
   comment. NNSA agreed with the draft report*s findings and recommendations.

   The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most
   serious dangers confronting the United States today and will likely
   continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Responsibility for thwarting
   this proliferation is shouldered by numerous federal agencies and by many
   individual departments within these agencies. Each of these departments
   brings a specific perspective, strength, and knowledge base to bear on an
   aspect of the large and complex proliferation problem.

   NNSA and its Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
   Program (R& D program) are key players in the United States*
   nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its unique
   understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power,
   based in large measure on the world- class research, design, and
   engineering capabilities to be found in the multidisciplinary DOE national
   laboratories that conduct basic and applied research in many areas* from
   high- energy physics to advanced computing. As of May 31, 2002, the
   Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s 220 projects were in
   various developmental stages: from research conducted to develop an idea
   and assess the feasibility of producing a prototype, to field
   demonstrating a prototype prior to its transfer to an end user. Some
   examples of successful research projects conducted by NNSA*s
   Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program include:

    The development of ground- based technology for detecting in real time
   short- lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and
   satellite- based detectors that are sensitive to x- ray, gamma ray, and
   neutron emissions. These projects were developed by the Nuclear Explosion
   Monitoring research area.

    Detection equipment, developed by the Proliferation Detection research
   area, that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over the World Trade
   Center site to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals.

    A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of
   congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and equipment to
   detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, D. C., Metro
   subway system was developed by the Chemical and Biological National
   Security research area. Background

   Page 7 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Nearly 75 percent of the $1. 2 billion that NNSA*s R& D program was
   appropriated over the past 5 years was distributed to Los Alamos, Sandia,
   and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. According to program
   officials, these laboratories received the majority of the funding because
   most of the needed expertise for the program*s projects is resident at
   these laboratories. The remaining funding was distributed to other DOE
   laboratories and facilities. NNSA*s R& D program received a total
   appropriation of $322 million in fiscal year 2002, with the most funding
   spent on R& D of Proliferation Detection projects.

   From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002, $1. 2 billion was
   appropriated to NNSA*s R& D program. There was little annual variation in
   the program*s funding between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2001,
   averaging about $218 million per year. (See fig. 1.) However, the program
   received a significant increase in fiscal year 2002, and was appropriated
   about $323 million* including $78 million the program received in the $40
   billion emergency supplemental appropriations act passed in the wake of
   the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Of the $1. 2 Billion

   That the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program Received over 5
   Years, Nearly 75 Percent Went to the 3 NNSA National Laboratories

   Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories Received
   the Majority of Program Funding

   Page 8 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Figure 1: Appropriations to NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D
   Program, Fiscal Years 1998- 2002

   Note: Funding for fiscal year 2002 includes $244 million in the Energy and
   Water Development Appropriations Act for 2002 (P. L. 107- 66)* about $36
   million of which was for construction of the Nonproliferation and
   International Security Center (NISC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory*
   and $78 million received under the 2001 Emergency Supplemental
   Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on
   the United States (P. L. 107- 38).

   Source: GAO*s analysis of data from NNSA.

   Of the $1. 2 billion appropriated to NNSA*s R& D program from fiscal year
   1998 through fiscal year 2002, nearly 75 percent was distributed for R& D
   efforts at three of DOE*s nuclear weapons laboratories* Sandia and Los
   Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico ($ 352.4 million and $313.6
   million, respectively) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
   California ($ 228.2 million). (See table 1.) Fourteen percent was
   distributed to other national laboratories, including, among others,
   Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Washington ($ 85. 0 million) and
   the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Y- 12 Plant in Tennessee ($ 35.1
   million). Six percent was distributed to universities, industry (including
   small businesses), and other governmental agencies. For example, nearly
   $240,000 was obligated to the U. S. Army for chemical and biological agent
   detection research. Finally, about 5 percent or $58. 8 million has been

   Page 9 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   spent from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2002 to build the NISC at
   Los Alamos National Laboratory. This center (that NNSA estimates will cost
   a total of $63 million before construction is complete in fiscal year
   2003) will provide consolidated office and laboratory space for
   nonproliferation R& D activities that are currently housed in 47 different
   structures* many of which, according to NNSA, are old and substandard*
   across the 43- square mile Los Alamos National Laboratory.

   Table 1: Distribution of Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program
   Funding to DOE National Laboratories and Facilities, Fiscal Years 1998-
   2002

   Dollars in millions

   Facility 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Percent

   Sandia National Laboratory $68.2 $68.8 $71.8 $66.8 $76.8 $352.4 29.5 Los
   Alamos National Laboratory 60.2 56.0 56.1 60.6 80.7 313. 6 26.3 Lawrence
   Livermore National Laboratory 36.3 37.9 43.0 42.6 68.4 228. 2 19.1 Pacific
   Northwest National Laboratory 15.5 17.0 17.9 18.5 16.1 85.0 7. 1
   Nonproliferation and International Security Center (Construction) 0.0 0. 0
   6.0 17.0 35.8 58.8 4. 9 Oak Ridge National Laboratory/ Y- 12 Plant 5. 8
   6.6 7. 1 8.2 7. 4 35.1 2. 9 Argonne National Laboratory 2. 0 2.0 3. 2 2.6
   4. 2 14.0 1. 2 Savannah River Technology Center 2.1 2. 5 2.2 2. 2 4.0 13.0
   1. 1 Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 2.8 2. 2 1.8
   1. 5 1.1 9. 4 1.0 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1.3 1. 1 1.9 2. 5
   2.1 8. 9 1.0 Brookhaven National Laboratory 1.2 1. 0 1.0 0. 7 0.5 4. 4
   Less than 1 All others 14.4 7. 6 8.7 15.1 25.5 71.3 6. 0

   Total $210.0 $202.6 $220.5 $238.2 $322.6 $1,193. 9 100

   Note: Totals may not add because of rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
   data from NNSA.

   In fiscal year 2002, R& D activities in the Proliferation Detection
   research area received 37 percent of the $323 million appropriated to
   NNSA*s R& D program. The Chemical and Biological National Security
   research area received 26 percent and the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring
   research area received 23 percent. 6 (See fig. 2.)

   6 Over the course of our review, we analyzed financial data provided by
   NNSA dating back to fiscal year 1996 to attempt to find trends in the
   distribution of funding to each research area. However, NNSA*s R& D
   program changed how its research areas were organized and how funds were
   distributed to them several times since 1996. Therefore, annual
   distributions of funding to each research area are not comparable.
   Proliferation Detection

   Projects Received the Most Funding in Fiscal Year 2002

   Page 10 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Figure 2: Distribution of Funding to Nonproliferation and Verification R&
   D Program*s Research Areas, Fiscal Year 2002

   Source: GAO*s analysis of data from NNSA.

   The Proliferation Detection research area received about $119 million in
   fiscal year 2002. The largest single amount ($ 11. 2 million) was
   obligated to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for R& D of remote
   spectroscopy technology. While many of the specific applications and
   characteristics of this technology are classified, the systems developed
   are used by several defense and intelligence agencies in a variety of arms
   control and treaty verification activities. The technology developed is
   particularly useful in identifying chemical releases associated with
   proliferation activities. For example, these systems can be used to detect
   chemical signatures of agents released on a battlefield. One of these
   systems was also used at the World Trade Center site after the September
   11, 2001, terrorist attacks to monitor for hazardous chemicals that might
   affect construction workers.

   Chemical and Biological National Security R& D efforts received $81.1
   million in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $39.1 million was spent on
   demonstration programs of integrated chemical and biological detection
   systems. Examples of these systems include the chemical agent detection
   system installed in one station of the Washington, D. C., Metro subway
   system and a biological agent detection system that was deployed at the
   2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.

   Page 11 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   R& D of Nuclear Explosion Monitoring technologies received $75. 6 million
   in fiscal year 2002. Of this amount, $54.5 million was spent primarily at
   Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories to provide satellite sensors
   for monitoring nuclear explosions in the earth*s atmosphere and in space.
   These sensors are installed on U. S. Air Force Global Positioning System
   satellites and on Defense Support Program early warning satellites. The
   remaining funds in this research area were spent developing and installing
   ground- based sensors for monitoring nuclear explosions in the atmosphere,
   underground, and underwater and for developing computer software used by
   the operator of the U. S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions* the
   Air Force Technical Applications Center* to analyze data obtained from
   these sensors.

   In contrast to the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, the
   Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National Security
   research areas lack a process to identify users* needs and do not have
   sufficient information to oversee project progress. For these latter two
   research areas, input from specific users is often not sought prior to
   funding research projects because the research in these two areas is, in
   many cases, considered to be long- term and the feasibility of the
   resulting technology is usually unknown. In addition, although required to
   have project life- cycle plans and quarterly reports that contain detailed
   information on a project*s time frames, milestones, users, and
   deliverables, we found that many of these plans and reports for the two
   research areas lacked these data. Furthermore, NNSA*s R& D program
   management information system is not designed to capture whether projects
   are on time or within budget, eliminating an important tool that program
   managers could use to monitor their projects.

   In the Nuclear Explosion Monitoring research area, specific R& D projects
   originate in a classified presidential directive that sets broad
   guidelines for a U. S. system for monitoring nuclear explosions. These
   broad guidelines are then refined through an interagency process that
   includes agencies of the Department of Defense and the intelligence
   community to leverage resources and prevent duplication. Specific
   requirements for technologies are then transmitted to the Nuclear
   Explosion Monitoring research area and specific statements of work and
   memorandums of understanding are signed between the research area and
   users of the technology* primarily the Air Force Technical Applications
   Center* that specify each party*s responsibilities. The Air Force
   Technical Applications Center has the operational responsibility for
   ground- based and satellite- based sensor Two of Three

   Research Areas in NNSA*s R& D Program Have No Process to Identify Users*
   Needs and Lack a Transparent System to Monitor Project Progress

   User Input to the Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological
   National Security Research Areas Is Limited

   Page 12 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   systems that provide technical data for verification of nuclear test ban
   treaties and nuclear explosion monitoring. The Nuclear Explosion
   Monitoring research area in NNSA*s R& D program is the principal developer
   of technology for the Air Force Technical Applications Center. As such,
   the two parties enjoy a close relationship. This relationship has been
   facilitated by the fact that some of the test ban treaties the Center is
   responsible for monitoring* such as the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
   between the then Soviet Union and the United States that prohibited
   underground nuclear explosions above a yield of 150 kilotons* contain
   detailed monitoring and verification procedures. In addition, operational
   requirements documents for the U. S. system for monitoring nuclear
   explosions also contain detailed technical guidelines for researchers
   conducting R& D for NNSA*s program to follow.

   In the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
   Security research areas, the process for identifying users* needs and
   developing R& D projects differs from Nuclear Explosion Monitoring.
   Instead of beginning with formal, detailed requirements, projects in these
   research areas often are of a more exploratory nature, requiring several
   years of work before usable technologies are mature and ready for real
   world application. User input is often not sought prior to funding such
   research because, according to program managers and national laboratory
   officials we spoke with, users are often focused on their immediate
   operational needs and are unable to define requirements for technology
   whose feasibility is still unknown.

   In February 2000 and again in March 2002, advisory committees to NNSA
   reported that the diverse environment of users* such as the federal
   government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others* makes
   the task of transferring the knowledge and technology developed by the
   NNSA R& D program especially challenging. 7 To maximize the prospects for
   successful transfer, the advisory committees recommended that
   communications with potential users should be opened as early as possible
   and proceed through all phases of the work (research, development, and
   demonstration). According to the advisory committees,

   7 Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory
   Committee, DOE Research and Technology Against the Threat of Weapons of
   Mass Destruction: Review of the Department of Energy Office of
   Nonproliferation Research and Engineering (NN- 20)

   (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 25, 2000), and Department of Energy, National
   Nuclear Security Administration Advisory Committee, Science & Technology
   in the NNSA Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs (Washington, D.
   C.: Mar. 1, 2002). Proliferation Detection and the

   Chemical and Biological National Security Research Areas Often Do Not Seek
   User Input before Funding Projects

   Page 13 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   it is important that in the earliest phases of concept formulation,
   prospective users be made aware of the potential technological and
   scientific advances. In addition, uncertainties need to be communicated as
   well to minimize surprises. The February 2000 advisory committee report
   recognized the need for exploratory projects designed to see whether a
   technical idea with a plausible application to a nuclear, chemical, or
   biological nonproliferation mission is feasible. In these cases, seeking
   input from a user of the technology might not be necessary until technical
   feasibility has been proven. However, the advisory committee also reported
   that, in general, users should be involved at the earliest stages of the
   R& D process and guidelines should be established to define when
   exceptions to this are allowed. In addition, involving users at such an
   early stage may achieve unexpected benefits. For example, the March 2002
   advisory committee report notes that *brainstorming with potential
   endusers can sometimes lead to innovative ideas for new technologies.*

   In response to the February 2000 advisory committee report, NNSA*s R& D
   program reported that it recognized the importance of involving potential
   end users of the technology at the earliest date and that it would
   continue to emphasize that relationship. 8 Part of the Proliferation
   Detection research area* the former Deterring Proliferation research area*
   has begun within the past year to establish a process of regular project
   reviews with user participation. Under this process, program managers and
   potential users conduct regular reviews of each project before key
   decisions are made, such as whether to proceed from exploratory research
   into product development. The reviews examine how well the project is
   linked to user needs, the strength of the researchers* scientific or
   technical approach, and the researchers* ability to carry out the project
   effectively and efficiently. Users are also involved in broader planning
   initiatives in this area. For example, program managers consulted with
   officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State, Coast
   Guard, Customs Service, and agencies of the intelligence community, among
   others, when preparing a *strategic outlook* for the research area as well
   as science and technology *roadmaps* that are intended to guide future R&
   D activities in this research area. However, this system has not yet been
   adopted in the remainder of the Proliferation Detection research area* the
   projects conducting R& D of long- range detector technologies, for
   example* or in

   8 Department of Energy, Report to the Committees on Appropriations
   Regarding the Status of Implementing the Recommendations of the
   Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory Committee Review of the
   Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program
   (Washington, D. C.: 2001).

   Page 14 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   the Chemical and Biological National Security research area. Program
   officials told us that they are looking at ways of adopting the system
   across the entire program.

   To determine whether strategic and annual performance goals for effective
   and efficient use of resources are being met, standards for internal
   control in the federal government require that program managers have
   access to relevant, reliable, and timely operational and financial data. 9
   In 1999, the National Research Council examined ways to improve project
   management at DOE. Specifically, the Research Council reported that DOE*s
   project documentation was not up to the standards of the private sector
   and other government agencies. 10 The Research Council recommended that
   DOE should mandate a reporting system that provides the data necessary for
   each level of management to track and communicate the cost, schedule, and
   scope of a project.

   To monitor the progress of NNSA R& D projects by headquarters program
   managers, participating laboratories are required to submit, on an annual
   basis, project life- cycle plans. These plans are supposed to contain
   detailed statements of work that describe the project*s contributions to
   overall program goals, scientific and technical merit, and the specific
   tasks to be accomplished. In addition, laboratories are required to submit
   quarterly reports that indicate all projects* progress to date, issues and
   problems encountered, milestones and schedules, and cost data. However, in
   the Proliferation Detection and the Chemical and Biological National
   Security research areas, these plans and reports are often missing these
   data, and the program management information system is not designed to
   track whether projects are on time or budget, eliminating an important
   tool that could be used to track projects, improve communications across
   the program, and provide transparency to other agencies and the Congress.

   9 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in
   the Federal Government, GAO/ AIMD- 00- 21. 3. 1 (Washington, D. C.:
   November 1999), and U. S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control
   Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO- 01- 1008G (Washington, D. C.: August
   2001). 10 National Research Council, Improving Project Management in the
   Department of

   Energy (Washington, D. C.: 1999). Proliferation Detection

   and Chemical and Biological National Security Research Areas Lack a
   Transparent System to Monitor Project Progress

   Page 15 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Project life- cycle plans for the 10 projects funded in the Nuclear
   Explosion Monitoring research area in fiscal year 2002 all contain
   information on the project*s objectives and users of the technology. They
   also contain annual statements of work that detail time frames,
   milestones, and specific deliverables. Quarterly reports for projects in
   this research area detail project expenditures, progress in meeting
   milestones, and deliverables completed. Thus, program managers at
   headquarters have information to monitor projects in this research area
   and the primary user of these technologies* the Air Force Technical
   Applications Center* reports that time frames and milestones are routinely
   met.

   Detailed information to monitor project progress is more limited in the
   Proliferation Detection research area. Of the 124 projects funded in
   fiscal year 2002, over half of the projects* life- cycle plans are missing
   information on potential users of the technology, time frames and
   milestones, and/ or detailed statements of work that specify deliverables
   to be produced. For example, a project at Lawrence Livermore National
   Laboratory to detect nuclear materials in transit received $1. 2 million
   in fiscal year 2002, but the project life- cycle plan for this project
   contained no information on users of the technology, the schedule of the
   project, or how the funds were to be expended. In addition, many of the
   life- cycle plans make no distinction between users that potentially would
   receive the technology and users that are actually involved in the R& D
   process. Moreover, some projects* life- cycle plans have not been recently
   updated to show the actual completion of project deliverables. For
   example, Sandia National Laboratory has received nearly $120 million since
   fiscal year 1993 to develop and demonstrate space- based imaging
   technology for nonproliferation treaty monitoring and other national
   security and civilian applications. However, its project life- cycle plan
   has not been updated with the dates deliverables were received or
   milestones that were accomplished since 1999.

   Project monitoring is even more difficult in the Chemical and Biological
   National Security research area. Rather than funding projects
   individually, as is done in the other research areas, annual funding for
   projects in this area is consolidated into a single allotment for each
   national laboratory conducting research. As a result, projects* life-
   cycle plans and quarterly reports are consolidated into a single report
   encompassing all chemical and biological R& D activities at a specific
   laboratory. Obtaining project specific expenditure, time frame and
   milestone, and deliverable data from this consolidated report is
   difficult. As a result, officials from this research area were unable to
   provide us with even a list of their ongoing projects. According to the
   program manager for the Chemical and Biological Nuclear Explosion
   Monitoring

   Research Area Has Sufficient Information to Monitor Projects

   Proliferation Detection and Chemical and Biological National Security
   Research Area Plans and Reports Are Incomplete

   Page 16 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   National Security research area, this problem will be addressed when
   individual project reporting is implemented in fiscal year 2003.

   NNSA*s R& D program maintains a program- management information system to
   track the distribution of funding from NNSA headquarters to individual
   projects at the national laboratories. However, because project funding
   for chemical and biological R& D is consolidated into allotments for
   entire laboratories, financial information for individual projects in the
   Chemical and Biological National Security research area is not readily
   available. According to the program manager of the Chemical and Biological
   National Security research area, individual project financial information
   will be added to the project management information system in fiscal year
   2003. Moreover, the system is not designed to capture on an individual-
   project, research- area, or programwide basis, whether individual projects
   are on time or within budget. While in some cases this information is
   available in projects* life- cycle plans and quarterly reports, these
   documents are only updated periodically, and program managers lack a
   system that can provide, on a continuous basis, data on project
   expenditures and schedules. Instead, program managers rely on other means,
   such as personal interaction with project leaders at the national
   laboratories and other types of project records, to obtain this
   information.

   Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use technology
   developed by NNSA*s R& D program, in general, found the technology useful
   and said that they had an effective relationship with the program.
   However, some questioned whether the program is achieving the right mix of
   long- and short- term research. DOE national laboratory officials told us
   that this conflict between short- and long- term priorities has created a
   gap in which the most important immediate needs of users may be going
   unaddressed in favor of an advanced technology that can only be delivered
   over the long- term.

   Of the 13 agencies we contacted, all have found the technology received
   from NNSA*s R& D program useful and told us that they enjoyed an effective
   working relationship with the program. For instance, the Navy Special
   Reconnaissance Program works with NNSA*s R& D program in the research and
   development of sophisticated imagery technology that is used on Navy
   aircraft deployed throughout the world. A Navy official said that this
   imagery technology is routinely used to collect critical Program-
   Management

   Information System Is Not Designed to Track whether Projects Are on Time
   or Budget

   Users Generally Satisfied with Technologies Developed by NNSA, but Some
   Feel Their Most Immediate Needs May Be Going Unaddressed

   Federal, State, and Local Agencies That Use the Program*s Technology Are
   Generally Satisfied

   Page 17 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   intelligence for policy makers and that the Navy has a very effective
   relationship with NNSA. He told us that the Navy regards scientists in
   this program as the foremost experts on these complex systems and that
   similar efforts conducted by the private sector do not compare in terms of
   capability and quality. Similarly, Utah Department of Health officials
   said the biological detection equipment demonstrated by the R& D program
   at the 2002 Winter Olympics constituted an important tool in its
   counterterrorism efforts at the event. These officials told us that they
   especially appreciated that they were always treated as an important
   client by NNSA*s R& D program. For example, unlike many private vendors
   that approached the department with chemical and biological detection
   technology, NNSA*s R& D program was willing to share important validation
   data with the department to verify that the technology would perform as
   intended. Likewise, an official with the Washington Metropolitan Area
   Transit Authority indicated that he had been impressed by the
   collaborative work involving the R& D program and other federal agencies
   and considered this collaboration a model relationship between federal and
   local agencies. Other federal agencies that told us NNSA*s technologies
   are useful included the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency,
   Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force Technical Applications Center,
   Department of Transportation, and Federal Transit Administration.

   Some of these agencies also told us that they have been approached by the
   R& D program with technologies that they neither requested nor found
   particularly useful for their missions. Such comments were made by
   officials with the Department of State, Navy Special Reconnaissance
   Program, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter
   Proliferation Programs, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Washington
   Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. However, officials from these
   agencies also noted that, although the technologies were not requested or
   found useful for their missions, being approached by the program was
   useful. This is because the R& D program*s presentations helped them
   understand the capabilities of the program in the event that these
   technologies were needed in the future.

   Long- term R& D to develop capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to
   terrorism using weapons of mass destruction is essential. However, some
   users questioned whether the program was achieving the right mix between
   long- and short- term research. Some said that, faced with the continuing
   threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction, NNSA*s R& D
   program needs to concentrate on communicating with and A Gap Exists
   between

   Users* Short- Term Needs and the Program*s Long- Term R& D Focus

   Page 18 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   addressing the immediate needs of the user and first responder
   communities. For example, according to an official with the Washington
   Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NNSA*s R& D program* along with other
   federal agencies conducting similar research* is not currently offering
   the Transit Authority assistance with its immediate need for post- attack
   chemical and biological decontamination technology tailored to a
   metropolitan subway system. An official with the Air Force Technical
   Applications Center stated that the focus of the R& D program needs to be
   on users* immediate needs rather than long- term advanced research. This
   official added that the longer a project continues, the more likely that
   personnel changes or programmatic inefficiencies would limit opportunities
   for the eventual completion of the project and the successful transfer of
   technologies to users. 11 Officials from NNSA*s R& D program disagreed,
   telling us that the program is better able to address short- term
   requirements only because it has been conducting advanced research on the
   concepts underlying technologies required by the users. Often, this type
   of advanced research is long- term in nature.

   Two officials with the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories told us
   that this conflict between short- and long- term priorities has created a
   gap in which the most important immediate needs of users or highest risks
   may be going unaddressed in favor of an advanced technology that can only
   be delivered over the long- term. According to these officials, there is a
   disconnect between what the users and the laboratories believe is the
   laboratories* mission. The laboratories believe that, by focusing on the
   long- term, the R& D program is able to anticipate users* long- term needs
   and look beyond users* immediate requirements. Users feel that they have
   urgent short- term needs that cannot wait for long- term development.
   According to a national laboratory official, the philosophy of the
   laboratories must change. This official indicated that research emphasis
   must be placed on those areas where the greatest risks exist, such as from
   chemical or biological attack. He strongly cautioned that, although
   longterm research is important, it is imperative that the usefulness of
   this research be clearly established in advance and as quickly as
   possible, given counterterrorism technology*s crucial importance in the
   current war against terrorism.

   11 We were given several specific examples by users of risks they believe
   are going unaddressed in favor of long- term technology research at the
   national laboratories. However, these examples are classified.

   Page 19 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   To better set priorities and define its role in the post- September 11th
   counterterrorism R& D efforts, the director of NNSA*s R& D program said
   that he would welcome additional guidance from the Office of Homeland
   Security and is working to better *advertise* the program*s projects and
   capabilities to the Office of Homeland Security. We found that such
   advertisement has met with limited success. For instance, the President*s
   fiscal year 2003 homeland security budget did not discuss NNSA*s role in
   the research and development of detection technology for chemical and
   biological agents, although other federal efforts such as those conducted
   by the Department of Defense and the National Institutes of Health were
   specifically addressed. In addition, the fiscal year 2003 homeland
   security budget stated that DOE was not involved in bioterrorism research
   and development even though NNSA*s R& D program is requesting $35 million
   for bioterrorism research in its fiscal year 2003 budget.

   In our September 2001 report, we noted that federal R& D programs to
   combat terrorism are coordinated in a variety of ways, but this
   coordination is limited by a number of factors, raising the potential for
   duplication of efforts among different federal agencies. 12 This limited
   coordination also raises the possibility that immediate needs may not be
   adequately addressed. For example, officials with the Utah Department of
   Health told us the federal community has only been responsive in providing
   technology to detect attacks and has not offered assistance in responding
   to an attack that would include tracking secondary exposure, population
   quarantine, decontamination, and cleanup. Therefore, we recommended in the
   September 2001 report that a national counterterrorism R& D strategy be
   developed with the participation of federal agencies and state and local
   authorities to reduce duplication and leverage resources. This strategy is
   especially important as the President and the Congress work toward the
   organization of a new Department of Homeland Security that, as currently
   envisioned, will assume leadership of federal counterterrorism R& D
   activities. As proposed, the Chemical and Biological National Security
   research area and the nuclear smuggling and homeland security activities
   of the Proliferation Detection research area would be transferred from
   NNSA to the proposed Department of Homeland Security.

   12 U. S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
   Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO- 01- 822 (Washington, D. C.:
   Sept. 20, 2001). R& D Program Officials Also

   Believe That the Program*s Role in Homeland Defense Needs to Be Better
   Defined

   Page 20 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   NNSA*s Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program has developed
   numerous successful technologies that aid the defense and intelligence
   communities and is an important player in the current U. S. effort to
   combat terrorism. While users are generally pleased with the technology
   the program has provided them, the program*s management information system
   for monitoring its projects* especially for the Proliferation Detection
   and the Chemical and Biological National Security research areas* does not
   provide adequate information to monitor project progress. Standards for
   internal control in the federal government require that important
   information such as progress in meeting milestones, costs, user feedback,
   and deliverables needs to be collected and made available more
   systematically to program managers and to external stakeholders such as
   the Congress. Improved project life- cycle plans, quarterly reports, and
   information systems that track project data could be useful for program
   managers to monitor the projects in their research areas and to better
   communicate project progress to users and to other agencies conducting R&
   D.

   It is important for the program to seek a balance between addressing the
   immediate R& D needs of users and looking beyond the horizon at advanced
   technologies for the future. Some users are concerned that the program*s
   focus is on long- term research. As a result, some feel that the most
   important immediate risks may be ignored in favor of long- term research
   activities being conducted at the national laboratories. While we agree
   that maintaining basic research capabilities is critical, the urgency of
   the current war on terrorism requires that NNSA*s R& D program clarify its
   role in relation to other agencies conducting R& D, systematically involve
   potential technology users in the R& D process, and seek a balance between
   short- and long- term activities. The ability of the program to
   successfully transfer new technologies to users could be strengthened by
   giving potential users opportunities to participate at every stage of the
   research and development process. Communicating with technology users and
   receiving clear guidance from the Office of Homeland Security* or the
   Department of Homeland Security, if established* on what the highest
   priorities are and how NNSA and the DOE national laboratories can play a
   role in addressing those priorities could assist program managers in their
   efforts to prioritize and plan future R& D work.

   To improve the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s management
   of its R& D efforts, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the
   following actions: Conclusions

   Recommendations for Executive Action

   Page 21 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

    Ensure that all of the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program*s
   projects* life- cycle plans and quarterly reports contain complete data on
   project objectives, progress in meeting milestones, user feedback,
   funding, and deliverables and upgrade the program*s project management
   information system to track all of this information to enhance program
   management by providing timely data to program managers and assist
   communications with users and other agencies conducting R& D.

    Work with the Office of Homeland Security (or the Department of Homeland
   Security, if established) to clarify the Nonproliferation and Verification
   R& D Program*s role in relation to other agencies conducting
   counterterrorism R& D and to achieve an appropriate balance between short-
   term and long- term research. In addition, to improve the program*s
   ability to successfully transfer new technologies to users, the program
   should, in cooperation with the Office of Homeland Security, allow users
   opportunities to provide input through all phases of R& D projects.

   We provided NNSA with a draft copy of this report for its review and
   comment. NNSA*s written comments are presented in appendix II. NNSA agreed
   with the draft report*s findings and recommendations. Specifically, NNSA
   said that it will apply the technical capabilities of NNSA and the
   national laboratories to work with agencies using technologies developed
   by the Nonproliferation and Verification R& D Program to focus on users*
   short- term operational mission requirements while maintaining the
   program*s ability to meet users* long- term needs. In addition, NNSA said
   that it is in the process of updating the program*s management information
   system and that its efforts to implement a corporate planning,
   programming, budgeting, and evaluation system will help address some of
   the program*s project management issues.

   We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
   with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
   discussion of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.

   We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, NNSA; the
   Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; the
   Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Office of Homeland
   Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate
   congressional Agency Comments

   Page 22 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   committees; and other interested parties. We will also make copies
   available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
   available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov.

   If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
   me at (202) 512- 3841. Key contributors to this report were Gene Aloise,
   Robert J. Baney, Ryan T. Coles, and Melissa A. Roye.

   (Ms.) Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources and Environment

   Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

   Page 23 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   This report examines the (1) funding the program received over the past 5
   years and the program*s distribution of this funding to the national
   laboratories and, for fiscal year 2002, throughout its 3 research areas;
   (2) extent to which the program identifies users* needs and monitors
   project progress; and (3) views of federal, state, and local agencies of
   the usefulness of program- developed technology, particularly in light of
   heightened homeland security concerns following September 11, 2001.

   To determine the amount of funding received by the National Nuclear
   Security Administration*s (NNSA) research and development (R& D) program
   from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002 and the program*s
   distribution of that funding to the national laboratories in the field, we
   examined each of the research area*s financial plans, quarterly project
   reports, and project life- cycle plans. In addition, we queried the R& D
   program*s project management information system for detailed information
   on each project in the R& D program. We also examined the R& D program*s
   funding projections for fiscal year 2003 and analyzed NNSA*s Future- Years
   Nuclear Security Program report to the Congress, dated March 2002, which
   shows funding estimates for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. We further
   reviewed the Office of Homeland Security*s fiscal year 2003 budget report
   that describes the level of funding various federal agencies, including
   NNSA, will be requesting to combat domestic terrorism.

   To determine the extent to which the R& D program identifies users* needs
   and monitors project progress, we analyzed data from several different
   sources, including reports and memorandums generated by the R& D program
   office, independent reviews done on the R& D program by NNSA advisory
   committees, and procedures used in selecting specific R& D program
   projects for funding. With regard to R& D program office reports and
   memorandums, we reviewed, among other things, the NNSA Strategic Plan,
   dated February 2002, and strategic plans prepared by the Nuclear Explosion
   Monitoring area, dated January 2002; Chemical and Biological National
   Security research area, dated spring of 2000; and Deterring Proliferation
   area, dated December 2001. The Proliferation Detection research area had
   not yet prepared a strategic plan at the time of our review. In addition,
   we reviewed various memorandums outlining NNSA*s efforts to develop an
   integrated programming, planning, budgeting, and evaluation process. With
   regard to independent reviews done on the R& D program, we analyzed
   several specific studies. These analyses included the Institute for
   Defense Analysis* study entitled The Organization and Management of the
   Nuclear Weapons Program, dated March 1997; the Department of Energy*s
   (DOE) Nonproliferation and National Security Appendix I: Objectives,
   Scope, and

   Methodology

   Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

   Page 24 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Advisory Committee*s review entitled DOE Research and Technology against
   the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, dated February 2000; and the
   NNSA advisory committee*s report entitled Science & Technology in the NNSA
   Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Programs, dated March 2002.

   To obtain the views of federal, state, and local agencies about the
   usefulness of the R& D program*s technology, we interviewed officials at
   the Department of Transportation, Office of Intelligence and Security;
   Department of State, Office of Technology and Assessments; Navy Special
   Reconnaissance Program; Defense Intelligence Agency; Central Intelligence
   Agency; United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
   Diseases; Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical and Biological Defense
   Directorate; Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
   Counter Proliferation and Chemical and Biological Defense; Air Force
   Technical Applications Center; Federal Transit Administration; Utah
   Department of Health; Association of Public Health Laboratories,
   Infectious Disease Programs; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
   Authority, Counter- Terrorism Development.

   We also reviewed how the R& D program works in conjunction with other
   federal R& D programs by analyzing NNSA*s reports and statements, reports
   generated by other federal executive entities, and interviewing
   individuals who serve on interagency coordinating bodies. With respect to
   NNSA*s reports and statements, we analyzed NNSA*s Report to the Congress
   on the Organization and Operations of the National Nuclear Security
   Administration, dated February 25, 2002, and the statement by the
   Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and
   Engineering, NNSA, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
   Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, dated April 10, 2002.
   With regard to reports generated by other federal executive entities, we
   reviewed the Office of Management and Budget*s Fiscal Year 2001 Annual
   Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism and the Counterproliferation
   Program Review Committee*s report entitled

   Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and Nuclear,
   Biological, and Chemical Terrorism, dated October 2001. We also
   interviewed officials who serve on interagency coordinating bodies,
   including officials both within and outside NNSA. For instance, we
   discussed interagency coordination with the NNSA program managers for the
   Nuclear Explosion Monitoring and Proliferation Detection areas. We also
   discussed interagency coordination with officials at the Office of the
   Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counter Proliferation and

   Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

   Page 25 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Chemical and Biological Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and
   Department of State.

   We conducted our work from October 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
   with generally accepted government auditing standards.

   Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

   Page 26 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D

   Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

   Appendix II: Comments from the National Nuclear Security Administration

   Page 27 GAO- 02- 904 Nonproliferation R& D (360134)

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   Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
   fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
   512- 7470

   Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512- 4800 U.
   S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D. C.
   20548 GAO*s Mission

   Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

   Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
   Programs

   Public Affairs
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