    Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals
    (15-OCT-01, GAO-02-90).

    As a result of the events surrounding the November 2000
    presidential election, public officials and various interest
    groups have proposed a number of reform measures to address the
    perceived shortcomings of various election systems. When
    considering election reform proposals, careful consideration
    should be given to the way election systems have evolved
    throughout history. If required to adopt federal election reform,
    states and local jurisdictions have indicated their desire to
    have reasonable flexibility and time to implement any changes.
    The complexity and intricacy inherent in the American electoral
    system suggests that the success of an election system is
    contingent on the appropriate integration of people, processes,
    and technology. Failure to coordinate these components can cause
    problems that may be hard to accurately characterize, diagnose
    and correct. This report delineates an analytical framework that
    Congress could use as it weighs the merits of proposed reforms.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-90
        ACCNO:   A02301
        TITLE:   Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals
         DATE:   10/15/2001
      SUBJECT:   Congressional powers
    	     Elections
    	     Information technology
    	     Voting records
    	     Standards and standardization
    	     Congressional/executive relations
    	     DOD Federal Voting Assistance Program

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    GAO-02-90

    A

    October 2001 ELECTIONS A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals

    GAO- 02- 90

    Letter 1 Introduction 4 Results in Brief 6 Section 1: States and Local
    Jurisdictions Indicated the Desire for

    Reasonable Flexibility and Time to Implement Reforms 9 Section 2: Challenges
    Exist to All Parts of Election Systems: People,

    Process, and Technology 18 Section 3: Framework for Assessing Election
    Reform Proposals 43 Section 4: Conclusion 53

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Results of Our Election Work 56 The Scope of Congressional
    Authority in Election

    Administration 56 Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges
    Across the

    Nation 58 Voting Accessibility for Voters with Disabilities 61 Improving
    Voting Assistance for Military and Overseas Voters 63 Status and Use of
    Federal Voting Equipment Standards 65 Statistical Analysis of Factors
    Affecting Uncounted Votes in the 2000

    Presidential Election 66

    Appendix II: List of Recently Issued Election Reports 69 GAO Reports 69
    Other Recent National Reports 69 State Commission and Task Force Reports 70

    Tables Table 1: Percentage of Jurisdictions That Collected Data on Accuracy,
    by Type of Voting Equipment 40

    Table 2: Election Issues and GAO Reports 56 Figures Figure 1: Oklahoma and
    Pennsylvania Illustrate Differences

    Between Statewide Election Systems and Locally Autonomous Jurisdictions 11
    Figure 2: Size of Jurisdiction Affects Magnitude of Key Tasks for Election
    Officials 12 Figure 3: Some States Require An Excuse Before Allowing Voters

    to Cast An Absentee Ballot, But Others Do Not 14 Figure 4: Voting Methods
    Used In November 2000 Election by

    Registered Voters 16

    Figure 5: Jurisdictions Offer Various Types of Voter Education Materials 23
    Figure 6: Prevalence of Potential Impediments at Polling Places

    and Availability of Curbside Voting 25 Figure 7: Persons Voting Absentee in
    the November 2000 Election

    Cast Ballots Both by Mail- in and In- Person Absentee Voting 28 Figure 8:
    Example of An Absentee Ballot Secrecy Envelope That Must Be Completed
    Correctly in Order For the Absentee Ballot to be Counted 30

    Figure 9: Optical Scan Ballots Can Be Mismarked in a Variety of Ways 33
    Figure 10: Voting Technologies Perform Roughly on Par With Each

    Other 37 Figure 11: Percentage of Total Variation in Uncounted Presidential
    Votes Explained By County Demographics, Voting Equipment, State Differences,
    and Unknown Factors 38

    Lett er

    October 15, 2001 The President of the Senate The Speaker of the House of
    Representatives Voting is fundamental to our democracy. Each year the
    millions of people who go to the polls expect that their ballots will be
    cast in private and accurately processed and counted. However, events
    surrounding the November 2000 presidential election raised broad- based
    concerns,

    including such issues as the performance of different types of voting
    equipment, the disqualification of absentee ballots, and the accuracy of
    vote tallies and recounts. As a result, public officials and various
    interest groups have proposed a number of reform measures to address the

    perceived shortcomings of various election systems. As part of the broad
    congressional interest in these issues, we were asked to review certain
    aspects of elections throughout the United States. This capping report draws
    upon the extensive body of recent work done by GAO at the request of several
    congressional leaders, congressional committees and Members of Congress on
    matters surrounding the November 2000

    election. Our work, which culminated in six other reports that are
    summarized in the appendices, addressed the following topics:

    * the scope of Congressional authority in election administration,
    compilation and maintenance of voter registration lists,  absentee and
    early voting,  voting assistance for military and overseas voters,
    election day administration,  voting accessibility for voters with
    disabilities,  vote counts, recounts, and certification,  voting
    technology,  Internet voting, and  status and use of the Federal Election
    Commission voting equipment standards.

    This capping report serves three purposes. First, we discuss how the
    constitutional and operational division of federal and state authority to
    conduct elections has resulted in great variability in the ways elections
    are

    administered in the United States. As a result, given this diversity and the
    decentralized nature of election administration, careful consideration needs
    to be given to the degree of flexibility and the planned timeframes for
    implementing new initiatives.

    Second, in order for election reform to be effective, reform proposals must
    address all major parts of our election systems- its people, processes, and
    technology- which are interconnected and significantly affect the election
    process. We discuss the main challenges that election officials face in each
    of these areas and the need to accurately characterize and diagnose related
    issues.

    Finally, as Congress considers if and how to address the challenges to our
    national election system it will have to deliberate upon a number of reform
    proposals. Based on our work, this report offers basic criteria for
    assessing a range of election reform proposals. It is not our intention to
    advocate any particular reform proposal, but we believe that these criteria
    offer a useful analytical framework with which to consider changes to our
    nation?s election system.

    Copies of this report are being sent to the President, the congressional
    leadership and all other Members of Congress. Copies will also be made
    available to other interested parties via our web site at www. gao. gov. If
    you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this
    report, please contact me at (202) 512- 5500; Norman J. Rabkin at (202) 512-
    3610, Managing Director, Tax Administration and Justice; or Richard M.
    Stana, Director, at (202) 512- 8816. They can also be reached by e- mail at
    rabkinn@ gao. gov and stanar@ gao. gov, respectively.

    David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

    Introduction On November 7, 2000, more than 100 million Americans cast their
    votes for various candidates and ballot issues across the country. This
    hallmark of American democracy unfolded in more than 10, 000 local election

    jurisdictions, which used several different types of voting equipment,
    ranging from hand- counted paper ballots to electronic touchscreen voting
    machines. Staffing the precincts were some 1.4 million dedicated poll
    workers who opened the polls, logged in and assisted voters, closed polls,

    and in many cases, tabulated the votes cast at the precinct. These poll
    workers were assisted by an army of unseen election workers who answered
    phone calls from both voters and poll workers, delivered extra ballots to
    precincts, replaced or repaired broken voting machines, tabulated absentee
    ballots, and compiled the election results from individual precincts within
    their jurisdiction. This highly decentralized, complex, and massive
    logistical effort made it possible for American citizens to participate in
    one of the most fundamental democratic traditions- that of eligible citizens
    to cast their votes for candidates of their choice.

    The controversy surrounding the presidential vote in the November 2000
    election cast America?s election system in a new and revealing light,
    spotlighting issues such as the

     accuracy of voter registration lists;

     procedures used to accept or disqualify absentee ballots for counting;

     variety of ways elections are administered across and within
    jurisdictions;

     widely varying types of voting equipment used to cast and count ballots;
    and

     many different methods of determining voter intent when voters improperly
    or incompletely marked their ballots. Several congressional leaders,
    congressional committees, and Members of Congress asked us to review our
    nation?s election systems. Accordingly, we focused on issues that may affect
    the ability of eligible U. S. citizens to cast their ballots in private and
    have those ballots counted accurately.

    This capping report draws on a considerable body of work recently done by
    GAO on election systems. We address three main issues that Congress may wish
    to keep in mind as it approaches election reform. First, we examine the
    division of federal and state authority to conduct elections and the
    resulting variation among election jurisdictions. Second, we describe the

    challenges that election officials face as they work with the people,
    processes, and technology involved in our administering our nation?s
    election systems. And third, we suggest four criteria that Congress could
    use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals.

    Our work on election systems, which is contained in this capping report and
    six separate reports, took us across the United States and around the world
    as we employed a variety of methods to answer Congress? questions. We
    conducted a detailed analysis of relevant constitutional provisions, federal
    statutes, and federal court decisions as well as state statutes and
    regulations on selected election issues. We met with and reviewed documents
    provided by local election officials in 41 election jurisdictions in 22
    states and met with officials at the Department of State, the Department of
    Defense, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the National Conference
    of State Legislatures. We surveyed District of Columbia and

    state election directors. 1 Moreover, we used a mail survey and a telephone
    survey 2 and interviews with local election officials to obtain information
    about the election process that would generally be representative of the
    more than 10,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States. We also
    visited 585 polling places and met with embassy and military personnel
    abroad and overseas citizens as well as with manufacturers and testers of
    voting equipment. And finally, we reviewed documents provided by state and
    local election officials, voting equipment manufacturers and testers, and
    obtained data on voting methods and election results for the November

    2000 election from Election Data Services, Inc., and other sources. 1 In our
    discussion of state election systems, we include the District of Columbia. 2
    Our mail survey is generalizeable to 90 percent of the U. S. population, and
    our telephone survey is generalizeable nationwide.

    Results in Brief Principal findings from our work provide a context for
    considering challenges and subsequent reforms of our nation?s election
    systems. When

    considering election reform proposals, careful consideration should be given
    to the way election systems have evolved throughout history. First, if
    required to adopt federal election reform, states and local jurisdictions
    have indicated their desire to have reasonable flexibility and time to

    implement any changes. Traditionally, election administration has primarily
    been the responsibility of state and local governments which are guided by a
    tapestry of federal and state laws and regulations. Historically, Congress
    has exercised its constitutional authority to affect the way state and local
    jurisdictions conduct elections, primarily focusing on prohibiting certain
    discriminatory practices and providing statutory protections for the rights
    of groups as racial and language minorities, elderly voters, and voters with
    disabilities. Over time, our nation?s election system has evolved into

    51 individual systems 3 that in turn are administered and principally funded
    by more than 10, 000 counties, cities, townships, and villages. We found
    considerable variation in how these jurisdictions register voters; arrange
    for polling places; recruit, train and pay poll workers; buy and maintain
    voting equipment; conduct the election; and count the votes. Given this
    variability, states and local jurisdictions have indicated the need for

    reasonable flexibility in tailoring reform proposals to accommodate local
    needs. Because implementing reform may require states and local
    jurisdictions to transform long held practices, they will also need
    appropriate time to successfully integrate the changes into policies and
    procedures. Second, our work also underscores the complexity and intricacy
    inherent in the American electoral system. The success of an election system
    is contingent on the appropriate integration of people, processes, and

    technology. Our research disclosed various challenges that election
    officials face in each of these areas.

    People: The people involved in an election include the election officials
    and legions of temporary poll workers who prepare for and conduct the
    election as well as the voters who participate in them. Our work disclosed a
    wide range of challenges election officials faced related to both election
    workers and voters. For example, recruiting and training a sufficient number
    of poll workers presented a challenge to many officials. We 3 Including the
    50 states and the District of Columbia.

    estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions nationwide found it somewhat or
    very difficult to recruit a sufficient number of poll workers. As a second
    example, providing education to voters on election processes and equipment
    also posed a challenge to election officials, in some cases due to a lack of
    funds. We estimate that 38 percent of jurisdictions nationwide support
    federal funding to subsidize voter education. We also found that making
    polling places accessible to voters with disabilities or providing
    alternative methods for voting to individuals with disabilities posed a

    challenge to many election jurisdictions.

    Process: Processes guide people involved in the election process. For
    example, election workers rely on processes as they carry out their duties
    such as registering voters, distributing and processing absentee ballots,

    educating voters, conducting the election, and counting the votes. We found
    that a wide variety of process- related challenges confronted election
    officials. For instance, keeping registration lists accurate and current
    presented a challenge. In some cases, difficulties maintaining current voter
    registration lists were related to the National Voter Registration Act
    (NVRA, which is widely known as the ?Motor Voter? Act) in part because local
    election officials received incomplete or incorrect voter registration

    information from motor vehicle authorities. We estimate that about 46
    percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems with NVRA during the
    November 2000 election. Our work also surfaced process- related challenges
    associated with providing assistance for military personnel and overseas
    citizens absentee voters. These voters? absentee ballots were disqualified
    at higher rates than absentee ballots cast by voters living in the United
    States. We found the availability of assistance to military personnel and
    overseas citizens lacking and recommend that the Departments of State and
    Defense take action to improve voter education and assistance

    efforts. As a final example, determining voter intent when ballots were
    improperly marked presented a challenge to many election officials. We
    estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions
    had no written instructions to interpret voter intent when ballots are
    mismarked. Technology: Technology, such as voting equipment, provides tools
    for

    officials as they administer elections and for voters as they participate in
    them. We identified diverse technology- related challenges facing our
    nation?s election systems. Assessing why voting equipment does not meet the
    needs of a jurisdiction presented a challenge to many election officials. As
    a result, election officials may face a related challenge-- a lack of

    performance data to help them make informed decisions regarding

    acquisition of new voting equipment. Overall, about 96 percent of
    jurisdictions nationwide reported being satisfied with the performance of
    their voting equipment, but this level of satisfaction was typically based
    on election officials? subjective impressions rather than objective
    performance data. We estimate that less than half of election jurisdictions
    collected data on how well their voting equipment performed in the November
    2000 election. In addition to these challenges, we found that federal
    standards for voting equipment should be updated (the FEC has initiated
    plans to issue revised standards in 2002). We are making recommendations to
    the FEC aimed at improving its efforts to update its 1990 voting equipment
    standards. Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting
    equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we also raise as a
    matter for congressional consideration the explicit assignment of
    responsibility in these areas.

    Our research also indicates that failure to coordinate these components can
    cause problems that may be hard to accurately characterize, diagnose and
    correct. For example, many of the problems that received media attention in
    the November 2000 election were attributed to the failure of voting
    technologies to accurately record the voter?s selections or count the
    ballots. Our analysis showed that the type of voting equipment used
    (including equipment which allowed for error correction) explained a

    relatively small percent of the total variation among jurisdictions in
    uncounted presidential votes. Jurisdictions, however, may still wish to
    obtain benefits from modernizing voting equipment. In addition, many
    election officials pointed to greater voter education as a more immediate
    way to resolve voter error and uncounted votes.

    Third, this report delineates an analytical framework that Congress could
    use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals. This framework
    entails the following four fundamental criteria:

     Criterion I: The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in Election
    Reform. Does the proposed change call for an appropriate federal role in
    affecting election reform, given the historic balance struck between
    Congress? constitutional authority to legislate election administration and
    some states? laws and traditions that grant autonomy to local jurisdictions
    as they administer elections?

     Criterion II: The Balance Between Accessibility and Integrity. 4 How are
    the goals of providing citizens broad access to the voting process balanced
    against the public?s interest in ensuring the integrity of our election
    systems?

     Criterion III: Coordination and Integration of People, Processes, and
    Technology. How does the proposed change affect both the discrete problem it
    is intended to resolve and the election system as a whole?  Criterion IV:
    The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed Election Reforms.

    Have the necessary resources been identified to institute the change and to
    continually monitor and re- evaluate it over time? Section 1: States and

    Election administration in the U. S. is guided by federal and state laws,
    Local Jurisdictions

    regulations and policies. Within the broad framework established by the
    Constitution and federal statutes, each state sets its own requirements for
    Indicated the Desire conducting local, state, and federal elections within
    the state. for Reasonable Consequently, state requirements and processes
    vary considerably, and the

    Flexibility and Time to U. S. election system comprises 51 separate election
    systems. In turn, states typically have decentralized this process so the
    responsibility for Implement Reforms

    administering and funding elections resides in thousands of local government
    election jurisdictions, creating even more variability among our nation?s
    election systems. Thus, in adopting federal election reforms, the degree of
    flexibility and the timeframes for implementing new initiatives need to be
    given careful consideration during deliberation and execution of related
    reforms.

    4 As used in this criterion, accessibility refers to voters? access to the
    political process rather than the access of a voter with disabilities to the
    polling place.

    The Federal Government The constitutional framework for elections
    contemplates both state and Establishes a General federal roles. With regard
    to the administration of federal elections, Framework for Elections,

    Congress has certain constitutional authorities over both congressional and
    presidential elections. 5 Congress has passed legislation relating to the
    but Elections Are Primarily

    administration of federal elections, under its various constitutional the
    Responsibility of State

    authorities in certain areas, including the timing of federal elections,
    voter and Local Governments

    registration, accessibility provisions for the elderly and persons with
    disabilities, and absentee voting. Congress has, however, been most active
    with respect to enacting prohibitions against discriminatory voting
    practices, which apply in the context of both federal and state elections.
    The Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, established the constitutional
    guarantee that no person be denied the right to vote on account of race or

    color. In addition, subsequent amendments to the Act expanded it to include
    protections for members of language minority groups, as well as other
    matters regarding voting registration and procedures.

    Within the broad framework established by the Constitution and federal
    statutes, each state sets the requirements for conducting local, state, and
    federal elections within the state. For example, states regulate such
    aspects of elections as ballot access, registration procedures, absentee
    voting requirements, establishment of voting places, provision of election
    day

    workers, and counting and certifying the vote. The states, in turn have
    typically delegated responsibility for administering and funding state
    election systems to the thousands of local election jurisdictions- more than
    10, 000 nationwide- creating even more variability among our nation?s

    election systems. State election codes and regulations may be very specific
    or very general. In particular, some states have mandated statewide election
    administration guidelines and procedures that foster uniformity in the way
    local jurisdictions conduct elections. It is common for state provisions to
    furnish some guidance regarding voter registration requirements and
    procedures, absentee voting requirements and procedures, performance
    requirements for voting methods used within the state, establishment of
    polling places,

    provision of election day workers, and the count and certification of the
    vote. Other states have guidelines that generally permit local election 5
    For additional details, see Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority
    in Election Administration (GAO- 01- 470, Mar. 13, 2001).

    jurisdictions considerable autonomy and discretion in the way they run
    elections (see figure 1).

    Figure 1: Oklahoma and Pennsylvania Illustrate Differences Between Statewide
    Election Systems and Locally Autonomous Jurisdictions Oklahoma has

    Pennsylvania has

     standard election day

     minimal state guidelines.

     67 counties with 67 different election

     standard poll worker training. systems.

     diverse voting technologies. election mamagement system.

     one type of voting machine.

    Source: GAO analysis based on information from local election officials.

    Great Variability Exists in The variability from state to state becomes even
    more pronounced at the the Ways Various Local

    local level, as local jurisdictions have used the flexibility afforded in
    state Elections Are Conducted

    provisions to create local elections systems that vary from county to
    county, and even, in some cases, within counties. This variation stems from
    several factors. One factor can be a consequence of the size of local
    election jurisdictions, which varies considerably. For example, one rural
    county has 208 registered voters in contrast with a large, urban county,
    such as Los Angeles County, whose total number of registered voters exceeds
    that of 41 states. The complexity of preparing for and conducting an
    election in large jurisdictions is generally greater than in smaller

    jurisdictions. For example, a rural county, with a few thousand voters who
    share the same language, prints its ballot in one language. In contrast, in
    a large, urban jurisdiction with a diverse population of 4 million
    registered voters prints its ballots in 7 different languages. This can also
    have an

    effect on the processes and type of voting equipment used. As illustrated in
    figure 2, the magnitude of other key administrative tasks in this large,
    urban jurisdiction is a thousand times larger than for the small
    jurisdiction.

    Figure 2: Size of Jurisdiction Affects Magnitude of Key Tasks for Election
    Officials Numbers Numbers 4,000,000 4 million

    120,000 100,000

    100,000 90,000

    90,000 80,000

    80,000 70,000

    70,000 60,000

    60,000 50,000

    50,000 40,000

    40,000 30,000

    25,000

    30,000 20,000

    20,000 10,000

    4,963

    10,000 0 2,843 28 5

    0

    Registered voters workers

    precinct Registered voters

    workers precinct

    Poll Voting Poll Voting Source: GAO analysis based on information from local
    election officials.

    Variability can also be a consequence of local needs. For example, a
    jurisdiction with a large population segment that moves out of the location
    each year might opt for certain voter registration and voter education
    processes that reflect the need to address a large voter turnover. As a
    second example, a jurisdiction might use a certain type of voting equipment

    based on financial resource availability. More wealthy jurisdictions have
    had the resources necessary to modernize equipment, while others need to
    make do with what they have. Finally, variability can be a consequence of a
    jurisdiction?s perceived need to maintain voting traditions that have been
    in place for a long time. In two jurisdictions we visited, election
    officials opted to replace lever machines with full- screen electronic
    voting machines because this machine uses a

    ballot that most closely resembles the type of ballot voters were used to
    seeing on lever machines. This choice was possible because ballots did not

    have to be printed in more than two languages in either jurisdiction so the
    ballots could fit on a single page.

    Variability among states and local jurisdictions was evident in each major
    stage of an election-- voter registration, absentee and early voting,
    preparing for and conducting election day activities, and vote counting and
    certification. Some examples follow.

    Who Could Vote Varied For the November 2000 election, the FEC reported that
    nearly 168 million people, or about 82 percent of the voting age population,
    6 were registered to vote. Registering to vote is not a federal requirement,
    but in November 2000, all states except North Dakota required citizens to
    register before voting. At a minimum, every state and the District of
    Columbia required that a voter be a U. S. citizen, at least 18 years of age,
    and a resident.

    Additional requirements to vote, such as time in residence, varied. Due to
    variations in voter eligibility requirements, different citizens with the
    same qualifications would be eligible to vote in some states but not in
    others including (1) those that had completed their sentence after a felony
    conviction; (2) those who had been adjudged mentally incompetent; and (3)
    those who met all of the qualifications to vote but who had not registered
    in accordance with prescribed timeframes.

    When People Could Vote Varied In November 2000, citizens had different
    opportunities for obtaining and successfully casting absentee ballots due to
    the differences in absentee and early voting requirements, administration,
    and procedures. All states allow some provision for absentee balloting;
    some, however, require a reason to vote absentee as indicated in the figure
    below. 6 This number includes active and inactive voters. FEC defines
    inactive voters as those who remain on the registration list but who have
    moved, according to information provided by the Postal Service, have been
    mailed a registration confirmation notice, but have neither responded nor
    offered to vote in the subsequent federal election. All other persons on the

    registration list are considered to be active voters. In The Impact of The
    National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections
    for Federal Office, 19992000, the FEC reported that for the November 2000
    general elections, there were 149,476,705 active registered voters, about 73
    percent of the voting age population.

    Figure 3: Some States Require An Excuse Before Allowing Voters to Cast An
    Absentee Ballot, But Others Do Not WA

    MT ND

    OR NH

    MA SD

    RI WY

    CT N

    NJ NV

    DE UT

    DC CO CA

    KS AZ

    NM OK

    AL S

    TX AK

    HI

    Allows no- excuse voting before election day Requires an excuse to vote
    before election day

    Source: GAO review of state statutes.

    Who Conducted the Election For the November 2000 election, about 1.4 million
    poll workers staffed

    Varied polling places across the country on election day. Although poll
    workers are usually employed for only one day, the success of election

    administration largely hinges upon their ability to perform their jobs well.
    Depending on state law and the organization and traditions of the local
    jurisdiction, poll workers have different titles, levels of pay, training

    requirements, and responsibilities. Some poll workers are elected, some are
    appointed, and some volunteer. Levels of authority and responsibility that
    jurisdictions grant to poll workers also ranged from significant autonomy
    over the operation of the polling place with final authority to interpret
    improper ballot markings to having limited discretion, functioning primarily
    as clerks and facilitators who refer issues and problems back to

    elections headquarters. How Elections Were Conducted

    Jurisdictions followed various procedures on election day that created Vari
    ed

    differences in the way elections were conducted. For example, to determine
    whether a citizen who appeared at the polls was eligible to vote, some
    jurisdictions required voters to identify themselves by stating their names
    and addresses to the poll workers, who also matched the signature on the
    voter application with the voter registration records. Other

    jurisdictions also required voters to present a valid photo identification
    card. In other jurisdictions, a hunting or fishing license was sufficient to
    verify one?s identity. Still other jurisdictions required no identification
    other than the voter stating his or her name. If a voter?s name did not
    appear on the list of registered voters, some jurisdictions accommodated
    these individuals by automatically giving them a provisional ballot which
    may have been counted if the voter?s eligibility was verified at a later
    time. Others did not.

    How the Votes Were Cast Varied Registered voters cast their ballots using
    one of five voting methods in the November 2000 election: hand- counted
    paper ballots and lever, punch card, optical scan, and Direct Recording
    Electronic (DRE) voting equipment. Punch card and optical scan equipment was
    most widely used by registered voters, as figure 4 shows.

    Figure 4: Voting Methods Used In November 2000 Election by Registered Voters
    Percentage 35

    31 31

    30 25 20

    17

    15

    12

    10

    8

    5

    1

    0

    scan card

    Lever DRE

    Mixed ballots

    i cal Punch Opt

    Paper Source: GAO analysis of data from Electronic Data Services and states.

    Election Reform Requires Although the states have traditionally had broad
    authority to regulate and

    An Appreciation for conduct elections, Congress also has broad authority to
    regulate federal Variability Among

    elections, and, in particular, congressional elections. State and local
    Jurisdictions election officials generally use the same people, processes,
    and technology

    to conduct local, state, and federal elections. Consequently, as a practical
    matter, congressionally directed changes in the conduct of congressional
    elections are likely to affect the administration of state and local
    elections. In addition, through the use of its spending power, Congress may
    encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal
    funds. 7

    7 For additional details, see GAO- 01- 470, Mar. 13, 2001.

    Our work found wide variations across the country which have developed over
    time in response to local economic, demographic, political, and cultural
    traditions in each state and local jurisdiction. As might be expected given
    this variety, local election officials do not share a common perspective on
    election reform. For example, when asked their preferences for the use of
    federal funds, should they become available, local election officials
    identified a range of spending priorities, with no

    clear consensus on the top priority. Among these priorities were voter
    education, voting equipment, poll worker pay, and postage for mailing voting
    materials and printing ballots. Nor was there a consensus among

    local election officials on how involved the federal government should be in
    state and local election administration and reform. About 27 percent of the
    local jurisdictions we surveyed supported uniform standards for election
    administration, and 30 percent supported updated federal standards for
    voting equipment. However, many of the jurisdictions we visited did not want
    federal funding for election administration if it meant sacrificing local
    autonomy. Some supported the concept of a federal clearinghouse for sharing
    information about election administration practices.

    National Survey Results

    We estimate that 54 percent of local election officials support federal
    funding to subsidize postage for materials mailed to voters, 42 percent
    support federal funding to help with the operational costs of elections, and
    over 38 percent support federal funding for voter education.

    GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions

    Overall, our work suggests that a "one size fits all" approach may not be
    suitable for every aspect of election administration. In jurisdictions with
    a small number of voters, for example, hand- counted paper ballots may
    produce accurate and complete vote counts. Conversely, full- faced DRE
    equipment (this type of machine uses a large, single- page ballot) could not
    readily accommodate Los Angeles County's long ballot printed in 7 languages.
    Thus, the degree of flexibility afforded local jurisdictions in

    implementing any reform should be given careful consideration when
    deliberating specific reform initiatives. Historically, changes in election
    administration have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Both

    election officials and voters become accustomed to and comfortable with how
    elections are planned and conducted in their individual jurisdictions. Many
    of the underlying conditions associated with the variations are not likely
    to change in the short term. Large- scale, immediate changes in the use of
    people, processes, or technology will not necessarily change those
    conditions. Thus, appropriate time may be needed for state and local
    jurisdictions to determine how to implement changes effectively in their

    specific jurisdictions. Section 2: Challenges

    The second principal finding that emerged from our work is that election
    Exist to All Parts of officials face a range of challenges connected with
    all parts of the election

    system: people, process, and technology. The people involved in an Election
    Systems:

    election include election officials, legions of temporary poll workers, and
    People, Process, and

    voters. Processes guide people as they carry out their duties, such as
    Technology registering voters and conducting the vote. Technology, such as
    voting equipment, provides tools for officials to administer elections and
    for voters to participate in them. National Survey Results

    We estimate that 57 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had major problems
    in one or more areas on election day.

    GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions

    Our work identifies several challenges that can be categorized as primarily
    people, process, or technology- related issues. Although we classify
    problems as falling into one of these three areas, what becomes apparent is
    that a problem in any one of these three broad categories is related in some
    way to another part of the system. For example, people- related challenges

    impinge upon process issues, process challenges affect technology, and
    technology challenges affect people issues.

    Specifically, several challenges emerged from our work on elections. Issues
    with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and

    addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major people- related
    challenges in the November 2000 elections. Election officials confronted
    process- related challenges that included maintaining accurate voter
    registration lists, completing and processing absentee ballots, and
    canvassing the vote. Technology- related challenges that faced our nation?s

    election systems included assessing why voting equipment may fail to meet
    jurisdictions? needs, collecting useful performance data to make informed
    investment decisions, and needing federal leadership in updating and
    implementing standards for voting equipment. Below we highlight the main
    challenges identified through discussions with election officials and

    our analysis. People, Both Election

    Issues with recruiting and training poll workers, educating voters, and
    Workers and Voters,

    addressing needs of voters with disabilities posed major challenges in the
    Presented Challenges

    November 2000 elections. We estimate that over half of the jurisdictions in
    the United States found it somewhat or very difficult to recruit and train a
    sufficient number of poll workers. The major challenge many jurisdictions
    identified regarding voter education was finding sufficient funding. On the
    basis of our mail survey, we estimate that over a third of the jurisdictions
    nationwide believed that the federal government should provide monetary
    assistance for voter education programs. Limited availability of accessible
    buildings and other constraints create obstacles to election officials?
    efforts

    to make polling places accessible to voters with disabilities. We estimate
    that, from the parking area to the voting booth, 16 percent of all polling
    places have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more

    potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one or
    more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting.

    Recruiting and Training Qualified Many election officials told us recruiting
    and training a sufficient number of Poll Workers Presents a Major poll
    workers with appropriate skills to open, operate, and close polling

    Challenge for Many Jurisdictions places was a major challenge on election
    day. Factors that can work in concert to complicate an already difficult
    task for election officials include

    an aging work force, low pay, and little or no poll worker training.

    Recruiting Enough Poll Workers Is Difficult for Many On the basis of our
    mail survey, we estimate that 51 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had a
    somewhat or very difficult time getting enough poll workers. For these
    jurisdictions, obtaining enough poll workers (27

    percent) was the most frequently identified major problem the jurisdictions
    faced. National Survey Results

    We estimate 51 percent of the jurisdictions nationwide reported that it was
    somewhat or very difficult to get a sufficient number of poll workers.

    GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions

    Poll Workers Drawn From Aging Labor Pool

    Many people who are available for occasional full- day employment as poll
    workers are older, perhaps retired, and likely attracted to the work because
    of something other than the pay because poll workers are generally paid low
    wages. For example, an election official in a small jurisdiction said that
    over 70 percent of their poll workers are over 65 years old. One official
    remarked that volunteering is characteristic of an older generation. Several
    officials echoed the statement of an official in a small jurisdiction

    that ?[ o] ur election workforce is aging and we are having difficulty
    recruiting younger workers.? Low Pay, Long Hours May Discourage Younger
    Workers

    The pool of potential poll workers may be shrinking because poll worker pay
    is inadequate to attract employed or more skilled workers and poll workers
    often are required to complete a 15- to 18- hour day. One election

    official reported that ?[ s] ince compensation for this job is only $80 to
    $135 per day, depending upon the election district, it is not sufficient to
    attract a younger workforce.? The length of the day is a complaint of many
    poll workers and may even pose an obstacle for younger workers. Another

    official said that, ?[ w] hat they (the election judges) used to consider as
    a fun and interesting day and an American duty has become ?heavy duty?.? In
    one large jurisdiction, election officials asked poll workers to provide
    feedback on their experience in the November 2000 election. One poll worker
    responded that it was ?[ a] bsolutely, positively too long a day. I am

    26 years old and very athletic and still went home at night and fell asleep
    with my clothes on. With the majority of helpers either older or disabled, I
    have no idea how they survived the day.?

    Poll Workers With Specialized Skills Are Often Difficult to Recruit

    Another problem is addressing the specialized labor needs unique to
    particular polling sites, according to several local election officials.
    Some polling places required poll workers to have specific language skills.
    Finding qualified bilingual workers, specifically workers fluent in Asian
    languages, is one very large jurisdiction?s biggest recruiting problem. Some
    places had trouble finding poll workers who are able to learn the technical
    skills necessary to operate voting equipment. Officials in one very large

    jurisdiction said they have no scarcity of people willing to serve, but
    finding people to meet specialized needs is the issue. Obstacles to
    recruiting poll workers may overlap. One election official wrote that ?[ i]
    t is increasingly difficult to find folks to work for $6 an hour. We are
    relying on older retired

    persons- many who can?t/ won?t keep up with changes in the technology or
    laws. Many of our workers are 70+.? Minimal Training May Not Have Adequately
    Prepared Poll Workers

    for Election Day We estimate that 87 percent of jurisdictions nationwide
    provided some training for poll workers. Poll worker training courses
    generally span a few hours? time and focus on the key processes that poll
    workers should follow, including how to operate voting equipment. Although
    most of the jurisdictions we visited required some poll worker training,
    election officials cited instances where poll workers who had attended
    training still either did not understand what they were to do or chose not
    to follow

    specific instructions on how to run the polls. For example, to handle
    unregistered voters in one very large jurisdiction, the poll workers were
    instructed to provide those voters with questionable credentials a
    provisional ballot. However, some poll workers failed to follow these rules
    and turned away some voters from the polling place. Poll worker training in
    the sites we visited rarely included discussion of the interpersonal skills
    that poll workers should employ when dealing with frustrated citizens or

    with each other. Educating Voters About

    Another people- related challenge concerns educating voters about Processes,
    Voting Equipment is a

    particular processes, such as voter registration and how to operate voting
    Challenge

    equipment. Jurisdictions place varying degrees of emphasis on educating

    voters about election processes and procedures. A lack of funds is the
    primary challenge that election officials said they face in expanding their
    efforts to educate voters about elections. Further, spending for voter
    education is considered discretionary. Some local officials must first take
    care of mandatory items such as equipment, supplies, poll worker salaries
    and polling places. Many officials said that they see voter education as an
    area where federal funds could be particularly helpful. On the basis of our
    mail survey, we estimate that over 38 percent of jurisdictions nationwide
    believed that the federal government should provide monetary assistance for
    voter education programs.

    Voter Education Needed Regarding Processes, Use of Voting Equipment

    How well a jurisdiction educates voters about election processes and how to
    use voting equipment can effect how well an election system functions. For
    example, a number of problems associated with processes, such as requesting
    and completing absentee ballots and registering to vote, are

    precipitated by voters failing to provide complete information or to meet
    deadlines. Voter education can be used to help remedy some of these
    difficulties. How well jurisdictions educate voters on the use of voting
    equipment can affect how easy voters find the equipment to use and integrity
    of the vote. Jurisdictions provide various types of voter education
    materials to help voters correctly use voting equipment.

    Figure 5: Jurisdictions Offer Various Types of Voter Education Materials A

    B

    Tulsa uses the front side (A) of wallet cards to educate voters on the
    proper way to complete optical scan ballots and the reverse side to provide
    (B) schedules for key events.

    Detroit warns voters against choosing more than one candidate in a single
    race on one page of its voter guide.

    Los Angeles County advises voters to remove hanging chads from their punch
    card ballots.

    Cuyhoga County provides instructions on how to vote a punch card ballot.

    Source: Local election officials.

    How frequently the voting equipment counts votes as intended by voters is a
    function not only of equipment design, but of how well poll workers properly
    instructed and guided voters, how well voters followed applicable
    instructions, and what type of assistance was available to help voters who

    have questions or make mistakes in voting. To illustrate this point,
    officials from a very large jurisdiction stated that in the November 2000
    election 1,500 voters had inserted their punch cards in the recording device
    upside down, thus causing their votes to be inaccurately recorded.
    Similarly, at a small jurisdiction that we visited where optical scan
    equipment was used,

    officials reported that some voters incorrectly marked the ovals or used a
    nonreadable pen to mark the ballot, resulting in partially read ballots. In
    a medium- sized jurisdiction that we visited, voters selected a candidate on
    the optical scan ballot and then wrote the candidate?s name in the write- in
    section of the ballot, thus overvoting (making more choices than are
    permitted per contest) and spoiling the ballot. The election officials
    stated that they believed that this misunderstanding contributed to the
    jurisdictions? almost 5- percent overvote rate. In each of these cases, the
    way that the voter completed the ballot caused the vote to be recorded
    inaccurately, even though the voting equipment correctly counted the votes
    as recorded.

    Officials Face Challenges A third people- related challenge surfaced during
    the November 2000 Addressing Needs of Voters with election- making polling
    places accessible to voters with disabilities or Disabilities providing
    alternative voting methods such as curbside voting. The extent

    to which any given feature may prevent or facilitate access to a polling
    place is unknown; however, based on our onsite work during the November 2000
    election, we estimate that, from the parking area to the voting room, 16
    percent of all polling places have no potential impediments, 56 percent have
    one or more potential impediments but offer

    curbside voting, and 28 percent have one or more potential impediments and
    do not offer curbside voting (see fig. 6). 8 These potential impediments
    would primarily affect individuals with mobility impairments and occur most
    often on the route from the parking area to the building or at the entrance
    to the polling place. Inside the voting room, the types and arrangement of
    voting equipment used may also pose challenges for people with mobility,
    vision, or dexterity impairments. 8 Although curbside voting is not
    available at a number of polling places with potential impediments, as noted
    earlier all states have provisions for absentee voting, and many states
    provide for other alternative voting methods or accommodations, which may
    facilitate voting by people with disabilities on or before election day.

    Figure 6: Prevalence of Potential Impediments at Polling Places and
    Availability of Curbside Voting

    Percentage of polling places with no potential impediments

    16%

    Percentage of polling places with

    56% one or more potential impediments

    28%

    that offer curbside voting Percentage of polling places with one or more
    potential impediments that do not offer curbside voting

    Note: These potential impediments are located along the route from the
    parking area to the voting room.

    Source: GAO analysis of polling place data collected on Nov. 7, 2000.

    A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve
    voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling
    places, acquiring new voting equipment, and providing curbside voting. State
    and county election officials we surveyed cited a variety of challenges to
    improving access, including limited availability of accessible facilities
    and funding constraints at the local level. Some disability advocates
    believe that alternative voting methods and accommodations should not be

    viewed as permanent solutions for inaccessible polling places because these
    remedies do not provide the same opportunity for voting afforded the general
    public, that is, in a polling place and in private.

    Processes for Election Election officials confronted process- related
    challenges that included

    Activities Present maintaining accurate voter registration lists, completing
    and processing

    Challenges to Election absentee ballots, and interpreting voter intent. A
    number of jurisdictions

    Administration Officials reported they had trouble maintaining accurate
    voter registration lists

    because of the NVRA. This difficulty, in turn, may have exacerbated problems
    related to qualifying voters at the polls on election day. As the

    number of voters at home and abroad who cast absentee ballots grows,
    challenges related to absentee voting are increasing. Election officials
    reported difficulties with processing millions of absentee ballots cast in
    the weeks and days before election day and noted the added financial burden
    of processing these ballots. Military personnel and overseas citizens?
    absentee ballots were disqualified at a higher rate than voters at home

    which presents another challenge. And finally, interpreting improperly
    marked ballots to determine the voter?s intent was a challenging process
    because local jurisdictions often lack specific, written guidance and the
    task itself can be inherently difficult. NVRA May Complicate Maintenance of
    Voter Registration Lists, Qualifying Voters on Election Day

    National Survey Results

    We estimate that about 46 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had problems
    with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA or motor voter) during the
    November 2000 election.

    GAO Telephone Survey of Jurisdictions

    Primarily, a citizen?s access to voting was based on the appearance of his
    or her name on a voter registration list, which is compiled and maintained
    by election officials. Officials encountered several process- related
    challenges connected with compiling and maintaining accurate voter
    registration lists, chief among them processing applications submitted
    through sources other than elections offices, such as motor vehicle
    authorities. Specifically, local election officials around the country
    expressed concerns about processing

    voter registration applications submitted at state motor vehicle
    authorities, as permitted by NVRA. They claimed motor vehicle authorities
    forward incomplete, illegible and late applications. Some election officials
    attribute not only missing or incomplete applications to NVRA, but a new
    problem, duplicate registrations. In the words of one official:

    ?You can ask any county clerk in the state and they will tell you that the
    biggest problem is motor voter [NVRA]. Residents can register at the welfare
    office, the health department, the motor vehicle authorities, and they do,
    time and again. This results in tons of registrations which are costly and
    time- consuming to sort through and check against records.?

    Inaccurate registration lists affect other parts of the election system,
    especially qualifying voters on election day. Officials reported that voters
    appeared at the polls on election day claiming to have registered to vote
    through the motor vehicle authority, but their applications never arrived in
    the elections office. These individuals were sometimes turned away from the
    polls. Dealing with voter eligibility issues can be a major problem for

    some jurisdictions. We estimate that 30 percent of jurisdictions considered
    dealing with unregistered voters at the polls to be a major problem.
    Processes for Assisting Citizens All 50 states and the District of Columbia
    allowed some form of absentee or at Home and Abroad with

    early voting to increase voter access, convenience, and participation, and
    Absentee Voting Present

    the number of American voting absentee is growing. Using Census data,
    Challenges

    we estimate that for the November 2000 election about 14 percent of voters
    nationwide cast their ballots before election day. 9 Of these voters, about
    73 percent used mail ballots and 27 percent voted in- person, as seen in
    Figure

    7. This represents an increase from the 1996 presidential election in which
    a total of about 11 percent of voters cast ballots before election day. We
    estimate that nationwide local election officials received about 14. 5
    million

    applications for mail- in absentee ballots (plus or minus 3 million) for the
    November 2000 election.

    9 Based on GAO analysis of U. S. Census Current Population Survey, November
    2000 Voting Supplement.

    Figure 7: Persons Voting Absentee in the November 2000 Election Cast Ballots
    Both by Mail- in and In- Person Absentee Voting

    Voted before election day

    27%

    Voted in person

    14% 73%

    Voted by mail Source: GAO analysis of U. S. Census Bureau Current Population
    Survey, November 2000 Voting Supplement.

    As more voters, at home and abroad, cast absentee ballots, officials from
    several local election jurisdictions reported costs and workload involved in
    reviewing the volume of ballots have grown. Each of the millions of mail- in
    absentee ballots received by local election officials had to be qualified
    before being counted. Officials from one very large jurisdiction stated that
    the sheer volume of mail- in ballots received creates a greater potential
    for

    errors.

    Military and Overseas Citizens? Absentee Ballots Disqualified at Higher
    Rates

    Because military and overseas citizens? absentee ballots are disqualified at
    higher rates than those of citizens voting absentee at home, processes for
    assisting military personnel and overseas citizens need to be improved.
    Although precise numbers are not available, we estimate that counties having
    a voting age population of less than 60, 000 nationwide disqualified about 8
    percent of ballots cast by military and overseas voters. In contrast, the
    ballot disqualification rate for civilian voters not living overseas was
    less than 2 percent. 10 While counties having a voting age population of
    more than 60,000 that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern,
    the data was insufficient to make a national estimate. 11 The survey showed
    that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two- thirds of

    the disqualified absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived
    too late to be counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots
    were not completed properly. The figure below describes the forms that must
    be completed in order for the mail- in absentee ballot to be qualified.

    10 The confidence intervals in this report are calculated at the 95- percent
    confidence level. For example, we are 95 percent certain that the actual
    disqualification rate for civilians not living overseas was between 1.2 and
    2. 4 percent. In this analysis, GAO uses the term "disqualified ballots" to
    refer to absentee ballots that, in the judgement of local election
    officials, did not meet state requirements and that were rejected prior to
    the vote counting process. For instance, the ballot may have been received
    after the deadline or may have lacked certain required information on the
    ballot/ return envelope, such as the voter's signature. Disqualification
    does not refer to ballots that were rejected during ballot

    counting due to problems in reading the ballot and/ or determining a voter's
    actual preferences. 11 Not enough counties in the sample provided data on
    the reasons ballots were disqualified from specific groups of voters, such
    as military versus non- military, to enable GAO to make reasonable estimates
    for these groups.

    Figure 8: Example of An Absentee Ballot Secrecy Envelope That Must Be
    Completed Correctly in Order For the Absentee Ballot to be Counted A

    B

    (A) A voter is to complete

    his or her ballot and place it in the secrecy envelope.

    C

    (B) The secrecy envelope

    containing the ballot is then to be placed into the ballot/ return envelope.

    (C) The voter must sign

    the envelope for the vote to be counted.

    Source: Local election officials.

    Processes for Assisting Military and Overseas Citizens Need Improvement

    The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 12 protects
    the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections for more than 6
    million military and overseas citizens and recommends that states adopt a
    number of provisions that facilitate absentee voting by these populations.
    The Federal Voting Assistance Program, established within the Department of
    Defense (DOD), is responsible for implementing the act by informing U. S.
    citizens worldwide about their right to vote, fostering voting
    participation, and working with states to simplify the registration and
    absentee voting process. Also, the State Department works with DOD

    to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens. 12 42 U. S. C. 1973ff-
    1973ff- 6.

    The extent and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel
    and overseas citizens varied considerably in the November 2000 election.
    While the Federal Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful
    tools for voters and some installations GAO visited had well run programs

    providing assistance and information to potential voters, other
    installations did not meet DOD and service requirements. The variability in
    executing the program is due to incomplete service- level guidance that does
    not reflect DOD's directive, a lack of command support at some
    installations, and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components.
    Finally, the State Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of
    useful

    assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees GAO spoke
    to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial. Also,
    State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in sharing best
    practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program.

    We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State improve (1) the
    clarity and completeness of service guidance, (2) voter education and
    outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of voting assistance
    efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices. 13

    Processes for Interpreting Voter Processes for handling improperly marked
    ballots present a challenge for

    Intent Posed a Challenge to many election officials, especially when an
    election is close. Many states Many specifically require election officials
    to count ballots if the ?intent of the voter? can be determined. Thirty- one
    states and the District of Columbia reported to us that they make some
    determination of voter intent. Voter intent issues arise with paper, optical
    scan, and punch card ballots, not when the ballots are marked properly for
    the type of ballot used, but when there are variations from proper marking.
    During the canvassing stage (when votes are counted and totals calculated),
    election officials are tasked with reviewing ballots that are not properly
    marked and sometimes required to determine how those voters intended to cast
    their votes. After the polls close and ballots are returned to election
    headquarters, workers canvass the votes, a process that entails reviewing
    all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting all valid
    votes. At this point, workers deal with ballots that are either unclearly or
    improperly marked.

    13 The recommendations made to the Secretaries of Defense and State were
    made in Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens
    Should be Improved (GAO- 01- 1026, Sept. 28, 2001)

    Ballots can be improperly marked in variety of ways that differ according to
    the type of voting equipment being used in a jurisdiction. Because the DRE
    and lever machines voters record the vote directly on the equipment rather
    than a separate ballot, there is no opportunity for a mismarked ballot.
    Paper, punch card, and optical scan ballots, however, can be

    improperly marked. For example, on an optical scan ballot voters may have
    circled a candidate?s name, instead of completing the oval, box, or arrow
    next to the candidate?s name as illustrated in figure 9.

    Figure 9: Optical Scan Ballots Can Be Mismarked in a Variety of Ways B

    A. Optical Scan Ballots

    A

    may be improperly marked when voters

    (a) do not complete the arrow,

    (b) circle nominee's names, and

    (c) both fill in the arrow and write in the candidate's name.

    B. Optical scan ballots are properly marked when the ends of the arrow are
    connected.

    ( (a) ( (b) (c) (

    John Doe

    Source: Local election officials and GAO analysis.

    Interpreting a mismarked ballot to determine the voter?s intent can be a
    challenging process. While states may instruct officials to determine
    voter?s intent on mismarked ballots, states do not always provide guidance
    on how to do so. Our work indicates that nationwide about 30 percent of

    local jurisdictions had no instructions, either from the state or local
    jurisdiction, on how to interpret voter intent, for example, how to read

    stray marks on paper ballots or dimples or partially punched chads on punch
    card ballots. We estimate that about 15 percent of jurisdictions had
    instructions developed by the jurisdiction and 23 percent had both state and
    local written guidance. National Survey Results

    We estimate that nationwide about 32 percent of local election jurisdictions
    had no written instructions, either from the state or local jurisdiction, on
    how to interpret voter intent, such as stray marks on ballots or partially
    punched punch card boxes.

    GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions

    Developing processes to interpret a voter?s intent can be challenging, and
    local jurisdictions vary in how they approach this task. Processes for
    handling punch card ballots illustrate this point. Jurisdictions we visited

    reported various ways to handle problem punch card ballots. For example, in
    one jurisdiction, election officials told us if the punch card ballot
    contains a dimple with a pinhole, employees put the original ballot over a

    pink (or duplicate) ballot and held it up to the light. Where they saw
    light, they punched. The employee also turned over the ballot and looked for
    bumps, which indicated the voter inserted the ballot backwards. If a ballot
    contained bumps on the backside, the ballot could be duplicated.

    In another jurisdiction, a vote on a punch card consisted of any removed
    chad plus any chad that freely swung by one side. The person scanning the
    ballot inspected it for improperly punched chads by running the ballot
    through their fingers. In another jurisdiction, the ballot inspection teams

    are given a pair of tweezers and told to remove any chads remaining on the
    punch card. One jurisdiction used persons called ?scanners? to go over the
    ballots before they are counted. Each ballot is inspected for improperly
    punched chad by running the ballot cards between the scanners? fingers. Very
    loose chad will be removed through this process. If the chad does not come
    off and freely swings by one side, it may be removed. Problem ballots, such
    as

    those that are unreadable because of incompletely removed punches or
    incorrect punches, can alter the counting results or create problems with
    the computer processing. They are given to ?makeover scanners? to be remade.
    Technology Challenges While problems related to voting equipment performance
    during the Include Assessing Why

    November 2000 election received a great deal of media attention, the
    Equipment May Not Meet performance of voting equipment is not only a
    function of the technology

    Needs, Collecting Useful design itself. The people who interact with the
    technology and the

    processes governing this interaction can also affect whether voting
    Performance Data, and

    technology meets the needs of a jurisdiction. As a result, assessing why
    Updating Standards voting equipment may not meet needs of some jurisdictions
    can be difficult. Another challenge facing election officials involved
    obtaining

    reliable measures and objective data to make informed decisions about
    whether to invest in new voting equipment or to invest in measures to
    improve performance of existing equipment, such as maintenance personnel.
    Local jurisdictions do not always have the information they need to select
    the most appropriate investment option given their needs

    and resource constraints. Although 96 percent of local jurisdictions report
    that they are satisfied with their voting equipment, less than 50 percent of
    them collect data on how well their equipment performed. This information is
    vital for jurisdictions considering modernizing their equipment. Another
    challenge relates to developing and maintaining

    updated standards for voting equipment. Although the FEC is in the process
    of updating voting equipment standards issued in 1990, responsibility for
    establishing, maintaining, and implementing up- to- date standards for
    voting equipment has not been explicitly assigned. As a result, the 1990
    standards have become dated. Assessing Why Voting Equipment Understanding a
    jurisdiction?s voting equipment needs and why voting May Not Meet
    Jurisdictions? equipment may not meet those needs can pose a challenge. In
    assessing

    Needs Poses a Challenge whether voting equipment meets the needs of a
    jurisdiction?s user communities (both the voters and the officials who
    administer the

    elections), election officials must have reliable measures and objective
    performance data. When voting equipment does not meet the needs of a
    jurisdiction, officials must also understand the cause or causes of the
    problem before they can choose an appropriate solution, such as more voter
    education, increased training for election workers, or acquiring new

    equipment. These causes can be difficult to identify because performance of
    voting equipment is not only a function of the technology design itself,

    but also of the people who interact with the technology and the processes
    governing this interaction. To illustrate this point, our survey of vendors
    showed little difference among the basic performance characteristics of DRE,
    optical scan, and

    punch card equipment. 14 However, when local election jurisdictions?
    experiences with the equipment are considered, performance differences among
    voting equipment became more evident. These differences arise because a
    real- world setting- such as an election in which equipment is operated by
    actual voters, poll workers, and technicians- tends to result in performance
    that differs from that in a controlled setting (such as in the

    manufacturer?s laboratory). This difference demonstrates the importance of
    the effect of people and process on equipment performance.

    While Some Voting Equipment Is Easier to Use, No Clear ?Best Performer?

    Figure 10 shows a relative comparison of certain characteristics- accuracy,
    ease of use, efficiency, and security- of the various types of voting
    equipment used in the November 2000 elections. The comparison reflects the
    results of our analysis of data provided by voting equipment vendors that
    responded to our survey and survey responses of 513 local

    election jurisdictions. 15 With appropriate maintenance and proper
    operation, most equipment performs on par with each other. Some voting
    technology is easier to use thus eliminating some opportunities for voter
    error. Overall, our analysis of both the vendor and jurisdiction data showed
    that DREs are slightly easier to use and slightly more efficient than

    the other types of equipment. In the area of security, DRE and optical scan
    are relatively equal, and in the area of accuracy, all equipment is
    relatively the same.

    14 Our vendor survey did not include lever machines because these machines
    are no longer manufactured. 15 In our survey of jurisdictions, we grouped
    those that used punch card, lever, and handcounted paper ballots, and placed
    them in an ?other? category. In our vendor survey, we excluded lever
    equipment because it is no longer manufactured and, of course, handcounted
    paper ballots, for which no equipment is needed.

    Figure 10: Voting Technologies Perform Roughly on Par With Each Other GAO
    analysis of

    GAO analysis of vendor- reported data jurisdiction- reported data

    Technology Technology Characteristics

    DRE Optical

    Punch DRE

    Optical Othera

    Accuracy Ease of use Efficiency Security

    = Technology type performs slightly better relative to other technology
    types. = Technologies have relatively equal performance, or data were
    insufficient to judge. = Technologies have relatively worse performance. a
    Other includes punch card, lever machines, and paper ballots

    Source: GAO analysis.

    The differences among voting equipment can be attributed, in part, to the
    differences in the equipment itself. However, they also can be attributed to
    the people who use the equipment and the rules or processes that govern its
    use. Further, all voting equipment is influenced by security, testing,
    maintenance, and cost issues, each of which also involves people and
    processes. In addition, the accuracy of voting equipment (as measured by how
    reliably the equipment captures the voter?s intent) can be affected by the
    processes and procedures that govern how voters interact with the
    technologies. Differences in these procedures can have noticeable effects on
    the

    prevalence of undervotes (votes for fewer choices than permitted, such as
    not voting for president) and overvotes, for example. In particular, we
    found that some precinct- count optical scan voting equipment can be
    programmed to return a voter?s ballot if the ballot is overvoted or
    undervoted. Such programming allows the voter to make any changes

    necessary to ensure that the vote is recorded correctly. However, not all
    states allow this. For example, election officials in one Virginia
    jurisdiction state that Virginia jurisdictions must accept ballots as cast.

    Interaction Between People and Technology Affect Uncounted Votes

    Our analysis showed that the type of voting equipment used (including
    equipment which allowed for error correction) explained a relatively small
    percent of the total variation among jurisdictions in uncounted presidential
    votes. The state in which counties were located had more of an effect on the
    number of uncounted presidential votes than either a county?s voting
    equipment or demographic characteristics. Figure 11 shows the results of our
    analysis. 16 Figure 11: Percentage of Total Variation in Uncounted
    Presidential Votes Explained

    By County Demographics, Voting Equipment, State Differences, and Unknown
    Factors

    Unknown State differences

    52% 26%

    County demographics

    16%

    overall Voting equipment 2%

    Error correction 4% a a This contribution of 4% results from an analysis of
    the 404 counties for which we had error correction information. Source: GAO
    analysis.

    Counties? demographic characteristics also affected their percentages of
    uncounted presidential votes. Specifically, counties with higher percentages
    of minority residents tended to have higher percentages of uncounted
    presidential votes, which counties with higher percentages of younger and
    more educated residents tended to have lower percentages of 16 Our findings,
    which are based on aggregate statistics and only those data that were
    comprehensively available for the more than 2,000 counties included in our
    analyses, have methodological limitations that are inherent to statistical
    studies of this type.

    uncounted presidential votes. Counties that used punch card equipment did
    not generally have higher percentages of minority, less educated, or lower
    income residents.

    We found that the state in which counties are located had a greater effect
    on counties? percentage of uncounted presidential votes than did counties?
    voting equipment or demographic characteristics combined. State differences,
    which may have included such factors as statewide voter education efforts
    and state standards for determining that is a valid vote, accounted for 26
    percent of the total variation in uncounted presidential votes across
    counties. County demographic characteristics accounted for 16 percent of the
    variation. Voting equipment, including the use of optical scan error
    correction technology, accounted for a total of about 6 percent of the
    variation in counties? uncounted presidential votes. The largest percentages
    of uncounted presidential votes tended to occur in counties

    that used punch card equipment. Counties that used optical scan equipment
    with error correction had about 1.1 percentage points fewer uncounted
    presidential votes than did counties with punch card equipment. The
    remaining 52 percent of variation was due to unknown factors such as whether
    a county switched to a new type of voting equipment or the

    number of inexperienced voters in a county. Absence of Data Limit Ability to
    Looking back to the technology used in the November 2000 elections, our Make
    Informed Investment

    survey of jurisdictions showed that the vast majority of jurisdictions were
    Decisions satisfied with the performance of their respective technologies.
    However, this satisfaction was in most cases not based on hard data, but on
    the

    subjective impressions of election officials. While these impressions should
    not be discounted, informed decision- making regarding where to make the
    most appropriate investments, for example, in new equipment, training for
    election workers, or voter education, requires more objective data.
    Acquiring new voting equipment is not the only investment option
    jurisdictions may consider, and, in some cases, may not be the most
    appropriate solution for jurisdictions who find their voting equipment does

    not meet their needs. Making wise technology investment decisions present a
    challenge to our election systems. It is extremely important that election
    officials be able to define, measure, evaluate voting equipment performance
    so that they may

    properly assess whether their current technology is meeting their needs.
    This information is also important as election officials consider the
    suitability of available technology options to get the best return on their
    investment if they choose to modernize their voting equipment.

    However, we found that about half of the jurisdictions did not collect
    actual performance data for the voting equipment that they used in the
    November 2000 election. Table 1 shows the percentage of jurisdictions that
    collected

    data on accuracy (which is one measure of performance) by type of voting
    equipment.

    Table 1: Percentage of Jurisdictions That Collected Data on Accuracy, by
    Type of Voting Equipment

    Technology Percentage of jurisdictions that collected accuracy data

    DRE 44 a Optical scan 54 b Other c 42 b a The 95- percent confidence
    interval is plus 7 or minus 8 percentage points. b The 95- percent
    confidence interval is plus or minus 7 percentage points. c Other includes
    punch cards, lever machines, and paper ballots.

    Source: GAO mail survey of jurisdictions.

    Further, it is unclear the extent to which jurisdictions have meaningful
    performance data. For those local election jurisdictions that we visited
    that stated that their voting equipment was 100- percent accurate, none was
    able to provide actual data to substantiate these statements. Similarly, the
    results of our mail survey indicates that only about 51 percent of
    jurisdictions nationwide collected data on undervotes, and about 47 percent
    of jurisdictions nationwide collected data on overvotes for the

    November 2000 election. Jurisdiction election officials were nevertheless
    able to provide their perceptions about how the equipment performed. For
    example, our mail survey results indicated that 96 percent of jurisdictions
    nationwide were

    satisfied with the performance of their voting equipment during the November
    2000 election.

    National Survey Results

    We estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with
    the performance of their voting equipment during the November 2000 election.

    GAO Mail Survey of Jurisdictions

    These perceptions aside, a lack of performance data may limit jurisdictions?
    abilities to select the most appropriate voting equipment that gives them
    the best return on their investment. Thus, without reliable performance
    data, were federal funds to be made available for the purchase of new voting
    equipment, over half of the jurisdictions in the U. S. would not be in the
    best position to make wise investment choices.

    Updating and Implementing While no federal agency has been assigned explicit
    statutory responsibility Voting Equipment Standards for developing voting
    equipment standards, the FEC assumed this role Presents a Challenge

    developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer- based systems, and
    Congress has supported this role with appropriations. These standards
    describe specific performance benchmarks and address many- but not all-
    types of systems requirements. However, these standards have not

    been maintained and are now out of date (the FEC initiated plans to issue
    revised standards in 2002).

    According to FEC officials, the Commission has not proactively maintained
    the standards because it has not been assigned explicit responsibility to do
    so. Without current, relevant, and complete voting equipment standards,
    states may choose not to follow them, resulting in the adoption of disparate
    standards that could drive up the cost of voting equipment and produce

    unevenness among states in the capabilities of their respective voting
    equipment.

    No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role
    of testing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, NASED,
    through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for
    implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting
    independent test authorities, 17 which in turn, test voting equipment
    against the standards. To this end, the committee has developed procedures
    to

    accredit the independent test authorities. 18 When testing is successfully
    completed, the independent test authorities notify the NASED that the voting
    equipment has satisfied testing requirements. 19 As of July 3, 2001, the
    Association had qualified 21 voting equipment, representing 10 vendors.
    Because development, maintenance, and implementation of voting

    equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising
    matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment of
    responsibility in these areas. Additionally, we are making recommendations
    to the FEC aimed at improving its efforts to update its 1990 voting
    equipment standards. 20

    The Interaction of People, Our nation?s election systems are complex and
    intricate. Successful Process, and Technology

    election administration requires the appropriate integration of people,
    Needs To Be Considered

    processes and technology. In the challenges that we have categorized as
    related primarily to this part of the system, it is important to note that
    each of them is related in some way to another part of the system.
    Therefore, in considering election reform proposals, it is important to
    remember that people, processes, and technology issues should not be
    addressed in isolation. Any reform proposal that influences one part of the
    system, for example, a process, may have an unforeseen and perhaps
    undesirable

    17 Independent test authorities are contractors independent from the voting
    equipment vendors and are responsible for testing voting equipment to ensure
    that they meet the Commission's standards.

    18 According to the NASED, accreditation signifies formal recognition that
    the independent test authority possesses or will acquire the competence to
    design and perform specific test methods applicable to voting equipment
    hardware and software, and that the test authority has adequately
    demonstrated its competence for voting equipment testing. 19 Independent
    test authorities notify the Election Center, which serves as the NASED?s
    Secretariat and maintains the list of the association's approved voting
    equipment. 20 The matters for congressional consideration and
    recommendations to the FEC were made in Elections: Status and Use of Federal
    Voting Equipment Standards (GAO- 02- 52,

    Oct. 15, 2001).

    effect on another part of the system, such as the people. Additionally, any
    problem attributed to people, processes, or technology might actually have
    its root cause in a different part of the system or be precipitated by a
    lack of integration among the components of the system.

    For example, many problems that surfaced in the November 2000 election were
    attributed to faulty technology, more specifically to punch card machines.
    While voting technology may need to be modernized, our work showed that any
    of the types of voting equipment, if used properly, can

    reliably record a voter?s selections. In most cases, technology was not the
    dominant factor related to voter error such as mismarked ballots or
    uncounted votes. Rather, problems were more closely related to voter error
    included processes that did not allow for poll workers and voters to
    recognize when errors occurred. In fact, one of the jurisdictions we visited
    that used punch card machines had a voter error rate of 1.2 percent, which
    election officials attributed in part to voter education efforts. Greater
    voter education on voting processes and equipment, rather than the purchase
    of new voting equipment, can be a more immediate way to resolve issues

    related to voter error. Section 3: Framework

    Our work and the work of others have disclosed a number of challenges to for
    Assessing Election

    our national election system. As Congress considers if and how it may wish
    to address these challenges, it may turn to a number of reform Reform
    Proposals proposals put forth by commissions or by proposed legislation. The
    proposals to date may be grouped into broad categories such as those listed
    below:

     providing federal funds for replacing voting equipment,

     providing federal funds for state or locally determined election
    administration needs,

     creating special postal rates, or requiring no postage, for election
    materials,

     creating federal election administration standards, mandatory or
    voluntary,

     updating FEC voluntary voting equipment standards and developing operation
    standards for voting equipment,

     developing or improving electronic voter registration systems and
    statewide information sharing capabilities,

     reforming absentee or early voting requirements,

     creating uniform statewide standards for what constitutes a vote and how
    votes are counted and recounted, and

     mandating the availability of provisional ballots for all jurisdictions.
    Variation in specific proposals may occur because of many factors, including
    the source of the proposal.

    Proposals may be crafted with various goals in mind- among them enhancing
    the accessibility, integrity, fairness, consistency, affordability, and
    sustainability of election systems. While all of these goals are

    consonant with our democratic traditions, some reform proposals may advance
    one goal at the expense of the other. For example, some officials promote
    reforms such as early voting to enhance the accessibility of the electoral
    process to the general public, while others claim such a move could open the
    door to voter fraud and thus may come at the price of the integrity of the
    election system. When reform proposals forward

    competing goals, the debate over election reform becomes more complex and
    assessing different reform proposals more difficult. We do not presume to
    endorse any particular election reform proposal or

    package, because this is best left to the Congress and other elected
    officials. However, our review of state and local practices, as well as our
    analysis of input from state and local officials, suggest criteria that
    Congress could use as it weighs the merits of reform proposals.

     Criterion I: The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in Election
    Reform. Does the proposed change call for an appropriate federal role in
    affecting election reform, given the historic balance struck between
    Congress? constitutional authority to legislate election administration and
    some states? laws and traditions that grant autonomy to local jurisdictions
    as they administer elections?

     Criterion II: The Balance Between Accessibility and Integrity. 21 How are
    the goals of providing citizens broad access to the voting process balanced
    against the public?s interest in ensuring the integrity of our

    election systems?

     Criterion III: Coordination and Integration of People, Processes, and
    Technology. How does the proposed change affect both the discrete 21 As used
    in this criterion, accessibility refers to voters? access to the political
    process rather than the access of a voter with disabilities to the polling
    place.

    problem it is intended to resolve and the election system as a whole?

     Criterion IV: The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed Election
    Reforms. Have the necessary resources been identified to institute the
    change and to continually monitor and re- evaluate it over

    time? We believe using these criteria will help clarify the debate and
    provide a framework to evaluate the potential effects of various election
    reform proposals. The following sections further elaborate how Congress
    might use each of the four criteria.

    Criterion I The Appropriate Federal Role in Election

    Reform A threshold consideration in assessing various proposals and
    legislation is the appropriate role of the federal government in effecting
    election reform. Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has
    periodically enacted legislation that mandates elections be conducted in
    particular ways. For example, Congress has prohibited discrimination based
    on certain voter characteristics, such as race or age for both state and
    federal elections. In addition, Congress has broad authority to establish
    requirements for congressional elections that are binding on the states. As
    a practical matter, such requirements may also affect state and local
    elections held in conjunction with elections to federal office. Congress has
    enacted legislation affecting the timing of federal elections, voter
    registration, absentee voting for military and overseas civilian citizens of
    the United States, and voting accessibility for the elderly and the disabled
    in federal

    elections. These statutes have basically focused on facilitating the
    opportunity for voters to participate in the voting process and ensuring
    fair and equitable treatment of voters. Aside from direct regulation of
    election

    administration, Congress may also, in exercising its spending power,
    encourage state action by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal
    funds. The scope of congressional authority in election administration is
    discussed in our March 2001 report. 22

    22 GAO- 01- 470, Mar. 13, 2001.

    This constitutionally- derived authority notwithstanding, election
    administration has principally been the responsibility of state and local
    jurisdictions that conduct elections for local, state, and federal offices.
    As

    discussed elsewhere in this report, states and local jurisdictions have
    determined voter qualifications, types of voting equipment to be used,
    ballot design, selection of poll workers, and what constitutes a vote. This
    historical balance between Congress? constitutional authority to prescribe
    change and the states? and localities? traditional roles in defining the
    terms of election administration raises fundamental policy issues that must
    be confronted in the debate about the federal government?s efforts to pursue

    election reform. Various reform proposals offered to date differ in the role
    envisioned for the federal government. These can be categorized into
    essentially four distinct options for federal action that fall along a
    continuum of low- to high- federal involvement. The first option, falling on
    the low end of the continuum, calls for the federal government to provide
    information, guidance, and encouragement to states and local jurisdictions
    to take action in specific areas. At the second point on the continuum, a
    reform

    proposal may envision a more involved federal role that calls for the
    federal government to provide funds to states and localities to improve
    election administration, allowing each jurisdiction to use the funds where
    it believes they are most needed. At the third point on the continuum,
    proposals may go a step further suggesting that the federal government
    provide funds, contingent on states and local jurisdictions taking specific

    actions or achieving specific results. In this role the federal government
    uses a ?carrot? to encourage a desired behavior by states and local
    jurisdictions. However, the states and local jurisdictions still have the
    ability to opt for the status quo by refusing the federal funds. At the
    fourth point on the continuum, where election reform would involve the
    greatest use of federal authority, the federal government would mandate that
    state

    and local jurisdictions take specific actions or achieve specific results--
    with or without accompanying funding. Historically, this option has been
    used when the federal government wishes to guarantee a voter right or
    protection.

    By way of illustration, consider how Congress would reach different
    conclusions on the issue of replacing existing voting equipment given how it
    might use its authority. Many recommendations from recently completed
    studies and congressional legislative proposals call for providing federal
    assistance to state and local election jurisdictions for replacing voting
    equipment.

     Under the first option, Congress could require the FEC to act as a
    clearinghouse to gather and disseminate information and to sponsor research
    on the various types of voting equipment. The federal government would
    provide information, assistance, and advice that would make it easier for
    that state and local election jurisdictions to examine their choice of
    voting equipment in light of national data on

    specific practices or issues. This approach provides a minimal federal role
    in affecting change, leaving the greatest discretion and control to states
    and local election jurisdictions. This federal role would not entail
    disbursing federal funds to support purchase and installation of new
    technologies, leaving acquisition decisions up to local jurisdictions.

     Under the second option, the federal government could create a grant
    program that would make federal funding available to states to support
    purchase and installation of new voting equipment. Funds would be provided
    with no ?strings? attached regarding which type of equipment the state could
    buy.

     Under the third option, the federal government could create a similar
    grant program to that in the second option, except that strings would be
    attached. For example, funds would only be provided for states to buy
    equipment that meets federal standards, or only for certain types of
    equipment (e. g., precinct- based optical scanners). This further limits
    local jurisdictions? discretion in choosing appropriate equipment and

    allows states to opt out of the program.

     Under the fourth option, the federal government could mandate that only
    certain types of voting equipment could be used in federal elections.
    Congress might or might not provide funding to enable states without this
    type of equipment to purchase and install it. Either way, jurisdictions
    would have no choice but to comply with the law and

    acquire that voting equipment, regardless of whether this choice best meets
    local needs. This option provides the least discretion. Because federal
    elections are usually conducted in conjunction with state and local
    elections, congressional mandates regarding the conduct of federal

    elections would likely involve changes in many, if not all, state and local
    elections.

    Criterion II Balancing Accessibility and Integrity

    In addition to the appropriate federal role in election reform, the degree
    to which reform proposals may affect the accessibility and integrity of an
    election system, our work suggests, is an important criterion for Congress
    to use in assessing the effect of reform proposals on our election systems.

    Some proposals may seek to increase the general public?s access to the
    election system. Accessibility describes the degree to which an election
    system promotes inclusiveness, thus making it as easy as possible for the
    general population to register to vote and to cast their votes. For example,

    reform proposals that attempt to (1) make voter registration less
    cumbersome, (2) give voters more opportunity to cast absentee or early
    ballots, or (3) provide voting equipment that all voters can use with ease
    can be considered as affecting an election system?s accessibility. Other
    proposals may attempt to increase the system?s integrity, that is, the
    degree to which the system is impervious to voter fraud. For instance,
    proposals may implement controls to ensure that (1) voters present
    identification or proof of eligibility at the polls on election day or (2)
    all eligible votes are

    counted can be said to affect an election system?s integrity. The goal of
    making the election system more accessible to voters can run at cross
    purposes with the goal of ensuring the election system?s integrity. This
    tension suggests decision makers should ask how reform proposals

    balance the goals of providing all citizens broad access to the voting
    process against the public interest in ensuring the integrity of the vote.

    Most election reform proposals address one or both of these concepts to some
    degree, with some placing more emphasis on one or the other. The weight
    individual policymakers may place on different concerns could vary,
    depending on how they value different attributes. For example, increasing
    the opportunity to use absentee ballots may improve access to the vote, but
    it also might negate the possibility of using some of the controls that may
    be used at a polling place to assure voter identification and eligibility.
    If increasing access to the vote is deemed more important than ensuring the

    presence of rigorous controls, then reform proposals emphasizing
    accessibility considerations might be preferred.

    In the past when Congress has taken action to change the election system, it
    considered both accessibility and integrity issues. Constitutional
    amendments and federal legislation affecting the election process opened

    access to those whose access was either denied or circumscribed- e. g.,
    African- Americans, women, language minorities, people with disabilities.
    All of these reforms assumed the existence of controls to ensure that only
    those who were otherwise eligible among these groups would be able to
    register to vote and cast their ballots. The most recent federal statute

    affecting the election process- NVRA, or motor voter act- specifically
    recognized the dual goals of access and integrity. The act established
    registration procedures designed to ?increase the number of eligible
    citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office,? without
    compromising ?the integrity of the electoral process? or the maintenance of

    ?accurate and current voter registration rolls.? 23 Creating a proper
    balance between accessibility and integrity is sometimes difficult, as seen
    in the following examples which illustrate the inherent tension between
    these competing goals:

     Requiring that citizens who register to vote present a form of picture
    identification with their residence?s address provides some proof of
    identify and some assurance that the person resides in the voting
    jurisdiction and is therefore eligible to vote in the jurisdiction in which
    he or she is registering. However, this procedure makes it more difficult

    for persons to register to vote if they meet registration qualifications but
    do not have a driver?s license or other picture identification indicating
    their place of residence.  Providing a provisional ballot to every person
    who wishes to vote but is not listed in the poll books at the polling place
    maximizes the

    opportunity of every person to cast a ballot. 24 The purpose of checking
    whether these persons are in fact registered to vote prior to counting 23
    National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U. S. C. 1973gg to 1973gg- 10.
    Also see GAO- 01470, p. 12 and footnote 65). 24 Provisional ballots are not
    an issue in those jurisdictions that do not require registration, such as
    North Dakota, or that permit eligible voters to register and vote on
    election day. Election day registration is permitted in six states.

    their ballots is to assure that the vote count will include only ballots
    cast by eligible voters.  Election officials may go to nursing homes to
    review absentee ballot

    requests, and accept ballots cast by nursing home residents while the
    officials are present to supervise the voting process. In effect, the
    nursing home becomes an unofficial polling place. Residents are provided a
    greater opportunity to vote but with better controls in place to address the
    potential that the absentee ballot might be voted by someone other than the
    registered voter.

     Allowing remote voting via the Internet may improve some voters?
    opportunities to cast a ballot. Although this method is in an experimental
    stage, unresolved questions about its impact on the integrity of election
    systems remain. As with other forms of remote voting, such as absentee
    voting by mail, there is a need to ensure that

    only eligible voters cast ballots, voter privacy is protected, and voters
    are not subject to coercion.

    Criterion III Integration of People, Processes and Technology

    As Congress assesses various reform proposals, it may consider both reforms
    that address a discrete problem and that address the election system more
    broadly. Congress may also be asked to choose among proposals that address
    specific parts of a perceived problem or address perceived problems in a
    more systematic fashion.

    Effective election administration requires the appropriate coordination and
    integration of people, processes, and technology. For example, successfully
    registering a new voter, whether the person registers by mail, at the
    Department of Motor Vehicles, or at the registrar?s office, involves the
    coordination and integration of (1) voters and registration workers who

    know and follow the registration process, including obtaining the
    information required to register successfully; (2) the process for
    registering new voters that guides election workers as they supply the
    correct forms to voters, compile and update voter information, and notify
    voters of their registration status; and (3) a computer system or other
    means of creating and updating a voter registration list to assure an

    accurate, current list of registered voters. Shortcomings in any of three
    areas can affect the ability of persons to register successfully and the
    accuracy of the registration rolls.

    To illustrate the difference between approaching reforms from a discrete
    versus system- wide perspective, consider election reform proposals that
    recommend Congress provide assistance to states and localities to purchase
    new voting equipment in order to reduce voter error. Some of these proposals
    approach voter error as if it were precipitated by a single cause, such as
    the type of voting equipment used. However, introducing new technology alone
    may not necessarily reduce voter error. In fact, switching equipment
    actually may introduce new opportunities for voter error unless the
    jurisdiction deals with the people aspects of successfully fielding new
    voting technology and offers voter education on how to use

    the new equipment effectively. Moreover, successful implementation must
    include processes for dealing with machine failure, ensuring that the
    equipment is programmed properly to accurately count the votes for each
    office on the ballot and that the ballots and machines are secure. Failure
    to consider the interaction of people, processes, and technology in fielding
    new voting equipment may result in increased voter or counting error, rather
    than a decrease.

    As a second example, some proposals suggest a change in process that
    establishes standard voting hours such that all polling places across the
    nation are opened and closed simultaneously, regardless of time zone. With
    this proposal, voters in every part of the country would cast their votes
    while the outcome of the election is still unknown, thus negating any
    influence that media reports of election results may have. Although voter
    participation might increase as a result, this proposal might also have

    unintended consequences for other parts of the election system. For example,
    keeping polling places open at earlier or later hours may increase the
    burden placed on poll workers. Some elections officials currently report
    difficulties in securing poll workers who are willing to work 15 to 18 hour
    days, a situation that might be exacerbated if poll workers were asked to
    work even earlier or later.

    Criterion IV Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed Election Reforms

    The implementation of election reforms will likely increase the overall cost
    of our nation?s election systems. Choosing among election reform proposals,
    therefore, should include a careful assessment of the affordability and
    sustainability of the reform as well as who is expected to shoulder the
    costs. Simply making funding available to state and local governments to
    implement a reform without consideration of whether all associated lifecycle
    costs have been considered or how the reform is to be

    sustained could result in having to revisit reform issues. Historically,
    incurring the costs of election administration and equipment has largely
    fallen to local jurisdictions, with some support provided by the state
    governments. Elections have been conducted over the years with relatively
    small budgets, and election officials consistently find themselves

    competing for funds with other local government priorities. Our work
    confirmed that election administration is not usually at the top of state
    and local funding priorities. As an official in a large election
    jurisdiction told us, election administration is often number 11 in the top
    10 priorities of local government budgets.

    As a result, realistic reform proposals are those that not only identify
    solutions to the issues at hand, but are also affordable and sustainable
    with achievable financial commitments for the federal, state, and local
    government stakeholders. Along these lines, as Congress assesses reform
    proposals, it should consider three factors related to affordability and
    sustainability. The first factor is the initial outlay required to fully
    implement the proposal. In this regard, the assessment should consider
    whether the initial outlay for the proposed reform would be affordable to
    the state and

    localities, including all associated and transition costs (e. g., training
    workers and voters to use new equipment and any changes to voting processes
    necessitated by new equipment). For example, were Congress to implement a
    proposal that requires all states to develop a state- wide voter
    registration system, some states might find themselves unable to comply
    unless federal funding sources were forthcoming. States with

    budgetary pressures that prevented them from quickly implementing the
    federal requirement could be even less likely to supply the funding to
    comply with the federal requirements. In addition, the costs to the other
    components of election administration (e. g., the cost of training election
    workers to use the new voting technology) should also be considered.

    The second factor is whether the federal government and/ or state and local
    jurisdictions could afford the long- term costs of sustaining the proposed
    reform over time. Reform proposals that provide funding for purchasing new
    technology could enable some jurisdictions to upgrade their voting
    equipment. To the extent that a local jurisdiction could sustain the funding
    needed to continue its use, the performance of voting equipment would be
    improved. For example, if the federal government were to make funds
    available to purchase different voting technology (e. g., replacing punch
    cards with electronic equipment), it should have some assurance that the
    additional resources necessary to sustain the reform (e. g., software,

    programming capability, vendor support, and updates) would be available.
    However, not all jurisdictions are in a position to make that commitment.
    The third factor is assigning responsibility for costs, and whether all
    levels of government could commit to implement and sustain the reform. As
    mentioned above, it is doubtful that every local jurisdiction could alone
    commit the resources necessary to fund many of the reforms envisioned in
    several proposals. However, they might be in a position to fund some of

    them, thereby making a commitment to the success of the reform. On the other
    hand, the question arises as to how much of a federal or state presence in
    local election administration is perceived as desirable or financially
    possible.

    Section 4: Conclusion Events surrounding the November 2000 election brought
    into question the integrity of our nation?s election systems. Although not
    all states and jurisdictions reported experiencing major problems during the
    November 2000 election, important concerns were raised in most jurisdictions
    related to each stage of the election process- registration, absentee and
    early voting, preparing for and conducting election day activities, and vote

    tabulations. Congress has the opportunity to address these challenges now,
    to avoid similar problems in the future. However, addressing these
    challenges involves complex considerations and even more difficult choices
    when considering the range of proposals for election reform.

    Accordingly, we have offered four criteria against which any election reform
    proposals may be measured. These may not be the criteria that every analyst
    would suggest, and each policymaker would not give the same weight to each
    criterion. However, if election system reform proposals were to be evaluated
    as to the (1) appropriate federal role in election reform; (2) balance
    between accessibility and integrity; (3)

    integration of people, process, and technology; and (4) affordability and
    sustainability of election reforms, Congress would have a good foundation
    for devising sustainable solutions that will meet the needs of future
    generations of U. S. citizens.

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Results of Our Election Work This section summarizes the major issues
    contained in the other six reports that we prepared on our nation?s election
    systems. Table 2 lists the issues that we addressed in our elections work
    and the reports that discuss them in further detail.

    Table 2: Election Issues and GAO Reports Election Issues Addressed GAO
    Election Reports

    The scope of congressional authority in election administration Elections:
    The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration (GAO- 01-
    470, Mar. 2001) Compiling and maintaining voter registration lists, absentee
    and Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the

    early voting, election day administration, voting technology, Nation (GAO-
    02- 03, Oct. 2001) Internet- based voting technologies, vote counts,
    certification, and recounts

    Voting accessibility for voters with disabilities Voters with Disabilities:
    Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods (forthcoming)

    Improving voting assistance for military and overseas voters Elections:
    Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should be Improved (GAO
    01- 1026, Sept. 2001) Status and use of federal voting equipment standards
    Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards (GAO- 02-
    52, Oct. 2001) Factors affecting uncounted votes in the 2000 presidential
    election Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors that Affected Uncounted

    Votes in the 2000 Presidential Election (GAO- 02- 122, Oct. 2001)

    Collectively, our extensive research shows that election systems vary widely
    across states and jurisdictions. It also shows that federal, state, and
    local governments face daunting, often long- standing challenges. In the
    following sections we summarize our findings and insights from each of our
    reports.

    The Scope of This report describes Congress? constitutional authority to
    regulate Congressional congressional, presidential, and state and local
    elections and identify major federal statutes enacted in the area of
    election administration. Under the Authority in Election

    Constitution, states are responsible for the administration of both their
    Administration own and federal elections. Accordingly, states and localities
    incur the costs associated with these activities.

    Notwithstanding the state role in administering elections, Congress has
    authority to affect the administration of elections in certain ways.
    Congressional authority to legislate in this area derives from various
    constitutional sources, depending upon the type of election. With regard to

    the administration of federal elections, Congress has constitutional
    authority over both congressional and presidential elections.

    Congress? authority to regulate congressional elections derives primarily
    from Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution (known as the
    Elections Clause). The Elections Clause provides that the states will
    prescribe the ?Times, Places and Manner? of congressional elections, and

    that Congress may ?make or alter? the states? regulations at any time,
    except as to the places of choosing Senators. The courts have held that the
    Elections Clause grants Congress broad authority to override state
    regulations in this area. Therefore, while the Elections Clause contemplates
    both state and federal authority to regulate congressional

    elections, Congress? authority is paramount to that of the states. With
    respect to presidential elections, the text of the Constitution is more
    limited. Specifically, Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, provides that
    ?Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
    which they

    shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
    States.? Despite this limited language, the Supreme Court and federal
    appellate courts have upheld certain federal statutory provisions regulating
    presidential elections that go beyond regulating the ?time? of choosing the
    electors. However, because federal legislation that relates solely to the
    administration of presidential elections has been fairly limited, case law
    on this subject has been sparse. Consequently, the precise parameters of
    Congress? authority to pass legislation relating to presidential elections
    have not been clearly established. With regard to state and local elections,
    although Congress does not have

    general constitutional authority to legislate regarding these elections, a
    number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to enforce
    prohibitions against specific discriminatory practices in state and local
    elections, such as discrimination on the basis of race or color, in all
    elections- federal, state, and local.

    Historically, Congress has passed legislation related to the administration
    of both federal and state elections in several major functional areas of the
    voting process, including: (1) timing of federal elections; (2) voter

    registration; 1 (3) absentee voting requirements; 2 (4) accessibility
    provisions for elderly and disabled voters; 3 and (5) prohibitions against
    discriminatory voting practices. 4 In general, the purpose of these federal
    statutes has been either to prohibit discrimination on the basis of specific
    voter characteristics or make it easier for citizens to register to vote.

    Elections: Perspectives Our report on the administration of the 2000
    elections presents the results

    on Activities and of our review of aspects of elections in the United
    States. Specifically, we

    (1) describe elections in the United States and the activities and
    challenges Challenges Across the associated with each of the four major
    stages of election administration-

    Nation voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and
    conducting

    election day activities, and vote tabulation; (2) identify the types of
    voting methods used, their distribution in the United States, and any
    associated challenges; assess such characteristics of voting equipment as
    accuracy,

    ease of use, efficiency, security, and cost; and estimate the cost of
    replacing existing voting equipment in the United States with either optical
    scan or electronic voting equipment; and (3) identify issues and challenges
    associated with the use of the Internet for voting.

    Although registration is a prerequisite to voting in nearly all states, we
    found that different citizens with the same qualifications would be eligible
    to vote in some states but not in others because of variations in voter
    eligibility requirements. A citizen?s access to voting is primarily based on
    the appearance of his or her name on a voter registration list, which is 1
    The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, commonly referred to as ?motor
    voter.? The Act requires states to establish certain procedures to
    facilitate the registration of voters in

    federal elections, both congressional and presidential, including permitting
    voters to register by mail or in person when applying for a driver?s
    license. 2 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986
    requires states to permit specified domestic and overseas military personnel
    and their dependents and citizens living overseas to vote by absentee ballot
    in federal elections. 3 The Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and
    Handicapped Act of 1984 requires, with some exceptions, local election
    jurisdictions to assure that polling places and registration sites are
    accessible to elderly and disabled voters. 4 The Voting Rights Act of 1965,
    as amended, provides, in general, that no person shall be denied the right
    to vote on account of race or color.

    developed from registration applications and compiled and maintained by
    election officials using various technologies and information sources.
    Election officials nationwide expressed varying degrees of confidence in

    the accuracy of their voter registration lists; however, information about
    list accuracy and currency, as well as the extent of error, was difficult to
    obtain. Among the challenges identified were processing applications

    submitted through sources other than elections offices, such as state motor
    vehicle authorities; obtaining accurate and timely information from numerous
    sources to update voter registration lists; and using technology to help
    process applications and compile registration lists.

    All states allowed some form of absentee or early voting in the November
    2000 election; using U. S. Census data, we estimate that for the November
    2000 election, about 14 percent of voters nationwide cast their ballots
    before election day, three- fourths of them using mail- in ballots and
    onefourth voting in person. However, we found that no national data are
    currently maintained on the number of mail- in absentee ballots
    disqualified. Differences in requirements, administration, and procedures
    resulted in citizens having different opportunities for obtaining and

    successfully casting absentee ballots. For example, the likelihood of a
    ballot being disqualified due to voters? errors in completing and returning
    mail- in absentee ballots varied even, in some instances, among
    jurisdictions in the same state. Among the challenges local election
    officials face are deciding whether and how to process incomplete and late
    mail- in absentee applications and ballots; processing large numbers of

    mail- in absentee applications and ballots in a timely manner; and obtaining
    adequate staffing, ballots, and locations for conducting early voting.

    Election officials across the country, with some variation, performed
    similar duties to prepare for and conduct the November 2000 election. Our
    survey indicated that 57 percent of voting jurisdictions nationwide
    encountered major problems in conducting the 2000 election. While

    jurisdictions did not experience the same problems, more than half cited
    problems with recruiting enough qualified poll workers. However, because few
    jurisdictions systematically collected information on how they administer
    elections, what they consider to be major problems may be based on anecdotal
    information and limited analysis. From the perspective of election
    officials, a major election day challenge is resolving questions about voter
    eligibility. Large numbers of ineligible voters can create long lines, voter
    frustration, and problems for poll workers. Many eligibility issues stem
    from the reliability of voter registration lists.

    Counting votes is not a simple task. It involves counting votes cast before
    and on election day and may be carried out at the precinct, at a central
    location, by hand, or by some type of counting equipment. Vote counting
    problems are highlighted when the election results are close. A ballot may
    not be counted when a voter overvotes- marks for two candidates-- or when
    the ballot cannot be read by the counting equipment. What constitutes a
    proper mark on a ballot differs based on the type of voting

    method used. According to our survey of state election directors, 31 states
    and the District of Columbia have a state law or other provision specifying
    what is a proper ballot marking for each voting method, but state guidance
    also varied from general to specific. Forty- seven states and the District
    of Columbia have laws with provisions for recount, but they vary. For
    example, 17 states provide for a mandatory recount, but two of these require
    a tie vote and another requires a 1 percent or 200 vote difference.

    According to officials in 42 of the jurisdictions that had recounts in the
    2000 election, none of the recounts altered the original election outcome.
    Counting ballots posed several challenges for election officials, including
    counting only votes cast by eligible voters; interpreting variations when
    ballots are not properly marked; and completing the results of a recount in
    a close or contested election in a fair, accurate, and timely manner.

    Four types of voting equipment- punch card, optical scan, lever, and DRE-
    were used in 98 percent of all election jurisdictions in 2000. 5 While a
    survey of vendors showed little performance difference among DRE, optical
    scan, and punch card equipment, local election officials we

    contacted rated DRE as more easy to use than other voting methods. Only
    about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected data on accuracy and few of the
    jurisdictions we visited had collected actual performance data on the voting
    equipment used in the 2000 election. Nevertheless the vast majority of
    jurisdictions across the nation were satisfied with their respective voting

    equipment, based largely on officials? perceptions of how their equipment
    performed. The cost to replace existing voting equipment depends on the type
    of equipment purchased and the number of jurisdictions for which it is
    purchased. We estimated the cost of purchasing optical scan units, not
    including certain software costs, could range from $191 million for optical
    scan machines that use a central- count unit to about $1.3 billion for
    optical scan equipment that counts ballots at the precinct and thus allows
    for voter error correction. We estimated the cost of purchasing touchscreen
    DRE units to be about $3 billion (including one DRE touchscreen unit per

    5 Two percent of jurisdictions used paper ballots; no ?equipment? was
    required.

    precinct equipped for voters with disabilities and one central count optical
    scan unit per county for absentee ballots). Among the voting equipment
    challenges identified by election officials were having reliable measures
    and objective data to know whether the technology used is meeting the
    jurisdictions? needs; ensuring that necessary security, testing, and

    maintenance activities are performed; and ensuring that the technology will
    provide benefits over its useful life commensurate with life cycle costs and
    that these collective costs are affordable and sustainable. Our review
    identified three kinds of internet voting-- at a polling place; in a voting
    ?kiosk? at public places, such as malls or libraries; or at any location,
    including the voter?s workplace or home through a personal computer.
    Although opinion is not unanimous, security is seen as the primary challenge
    for Internet voting. The cost effectiveness of Internet voting remains
    unclear because reliable cost data are not available. The broad application
    of Internet voting presents several social and technological challenges,
    including providing adequate voter privacy safeguards, security for voting
    equipment to ensure that it is adequately safeguarded, and equal access to
    all voters.

    Voting Accessibility for This report examines state and local provisions and
    practices for ensuring

    Voters with Disabilities voting accessibility, both at polling places and
    with respect to alternative

    voting methods and accommodations; estimates the proportion of polling
    places with features that might facilitate or impede access, including
    features of polling booths and voting accommodations; and identifies efforts
    and challenges to improving accessibility.

    All states 6 have provisions (in the form of statutes, regulations, or
    policies) that specifically address voting by people with disabilities.
    However, consistent with the broad discretion afforded states, these
    provisions vary greatly. State laws and policies also vary on how counties
    are to assure accessibility of polling places. Our survey of counties
    confirms that most counties inspect all polling places for accessibility,
    although county

    practices for ensuring accessibility vary. All states provide for one or
    more alternative voting methods or accommodations that may facilitate voting
    by people with disabilities 6 For analytical purposes we treated the
    District of Columbia as a state, resulting in a total of 51 states.

    whose assigned polling places are inaccessible. For example, all states have
    provisions allowing voters with disabilities to vote absentee without notary
    or medical certification requirements, although the deadlines and methods
    (for example, by mail or in person) for absentee voting vary among states.
    In addition, many states, but not all, have laws or policies that provide
    for other accommodations and alternatives for voting on or before election
    day- such as reassignment to a polling place that is accessible, curbside
    voting, or early voting.

    Our onsite work on election day 2000 found that polling places are generally
    located in schools, libraries, churches, and town halls, as well as other
    facilities. Although the extent to which any given feature may prevent or
    facilitate access is unknown, we estimate that, from the parking

    area to the voting room, 16 percent of all polling places in the contiguous
    United States have no potential impediments, 56 percent have one or more
    potential impediments but offer curbside voting, and 28 percent have one

    or more potential impediments and do not offer curbside voting. 7 These
    potential impediments would primarily affect individuals with mobility
    impairments and occur most often on the route from the parking area to the
    building or at the entrance to the polling place. Inside the voting room,
    the types and arrangement of voting equipment used may also pose challenges
    for people with mobility, vision, or dexterity impairments. To facilitate
    voting inside the voting room, polling places generally provide

    accommodations, such as voter assistance, magnifying devices, and voting
    instructions or sample ballots in large print. However, none of the polling
    places that we visited had special ballots or voting equipment adapted for
    blind voters. 8

    A number of efforts have been made by states and localities to improve
    voting accessibility for people with disabilities, such as modifying polling
    places, acquiring new voting equipment, and expanding voting options.
    Nevertheless, state and county election officials we surveyed cited a 7
    Although curbside voting is not available at a number of polling places with
    potential impediments, as noted earlier all states have provisions for
    absentee voting, and many states provide for other alternative voting
    methods or accommodations, which may facilitate voting by people with
    disabilities on or before election day.

    8 Although we did not observe such aids on election day, some county
    officials told us that, upon request, they try to provide special aids so
    that blind individuals can vote independently. We may not have observed
    these aids on election day because they may not

    have been requested in advance by voters in the polling places that we
    visited or the local poll workers we interviewed may not have been aware of
    these aids.

    variety of challenges to improving access, including limited availability of
    accessible facilities and funding constraints at the local level. Some
    disability advocates believe that although alternative voting methods and
    accommodations, such as curbside voting, expand options for voters with
    disabilities, they do not provide the same voting opportunities afforded the

    general public (that is, the opportunity to vote independently and privately
    at a polling place) and should not be viewed as permanent solutions for
    inaccessible polling places.

    Improving Voting This report describes the extent and quality of voter
    assistance provided Assistance for Military for uniformed and overseas
    citizens; the challenges that state and local

    requirements may pose to these voters; and the extent of and reasons for and
    Overseas Voters

    disqualification of ballots cast by these voters. The Uniformed and Overseas
    Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 9 protects the right to vote by
    absentee ballot in federal elections for more than 6 million military and
    overseas citizens. The act also recommends that states adopt a number of
    provisions that facilitate absentee voting by these populations. The Federal
    Voting Assistance Program, established within the Department of Defense
    (DOD), is responsible for implementing the act by informing U. S. citizens
    worldwide about their right to vote, fostering voting participation, and
    working with states to simplify the

    registration and absentee voting process. Voter education and assistance
    efforts for military personnel are largely implemented by the military
    services through Voting Assistance Officers. Also, the State Department
    works with DOD to provide voter assistance to overseas citizens. The extent
    and quality of federal voter assistance for military personnel and overseas
    citizens varied considerably for the 2000 general election. The Federal
    Voting Assistance Program developed a number of useful tools

    for voters and Voting Assistance Officers, but many potential voters we
    spoke to were unaware of them. While some installations we visited had well
    run programs providing assistance and information to potential voters, other
    installations did not meet DOD and service requirements because they did not
    provide sufficient numbers of trained Voting Assistance

    Officers, voter training, and voting materials. The variability in executing
    the program is due to incomplete service- level guidance that does not

    9 42 U. S. C. 1973ff- 1973ff- 6.

    reflect DOD?s directive, a lack of command support at some installations,
    and a lack of program oversight by some DOD components. Finally, the State
    Department provided citizens abroad with a variety of useful

    assistance, according to overseas citizens and federal employees we spoke
    to, although both groups believed more outreach could be beneficial. Also,
    State Department Headquarters has not played an active role in sharing best
    practices and lessons learned or in overseeing the program.

    Despite progress made by states to facilitate absentee voting, many military
    and overseas voters we spoke to believe that challenges remain, including
    helping voters understand and comply with state requirements and local
    procedures for absentee voting, such as deadlines for registering and

    returning ballots. Continued efforts by DOD officials to work with the
    states to simplify procedures, modify election schedules, or allow more use
    of technology, such as faxing and the Internet, to speed some portions of
    the voting process may help alleviate the challenges, but state legislative

    actions may be required. Although precise numbers are not available, we
    estimate that small counties (having a voting- age population of less than
    60,000) nationwide disqualified 8. 1 percent (plus or minus 3.2 percent) of
    ballots cast by military and overseas voters. In contrast, the ballot
    disqualification rate for civilian voters not living overseas was 1.8
    percent (plus or minus 0. 6

    percent). 10 While larger counties (having a voting age population of more
    than 60, 000) that responded to GAO's survey showed a similar pattern, the
    data were insufficient to make a national estimate. 11 The survey showed
    that for all absentee ballots cast, almost two- thirds of the disqualified
    absentee ballots were rejected because the ballots arrived too late to be
    counted or the envelopes or forms accompanying the ballots were not
    completed properly. This report includes recommendations to the Secretaries
    of Defense and State to improve (1) the clarity and completeness of service
    guidance, (2)

    10 The confidence intervals in this report are calculated at the 95- percent
    confidence level. For example, we are 95 percent certain that the actual
    disqualification rate for civilians not living overseas was between 1.2 and
    2. 4 percent 11 Not enough counties in the sample provided data on the
    reasons ballots were disqualified from specific groups of voters, such as
    military versus non- military, to enable GAO to make reasonable estimates
    for these groups

    voter education and outreach programs, (3) oversight and evaluation of
    voting assistance efforts, and (4) sharing of best practices. Status and Use
    of

    This report identifies the Federal Election Commission?s (FEC) role Federal
    Voting regarding various voting equipment and assesses how well the FEC is
    fulfilling its role. Our work also identifies the National Association of
    State

    Equipment Standards Election Directors? (NASED) process for testing and
    qualifying voting equipment.

    No federal agency has been assigned explicit statutory responsibility for
    developing voting equipment standards; however, the FEC assumed this role by
    developing voluntary standards in 1990 for computer- based

    equipment, and Congress has supported this role with appropriations. These
    standards describe specific performance benchmarks, and address many- but
    not all- types of systems requirements. In 1997, the FEC initiated efforts
    to evaluate the 1990 standards to identify areas to be updated, and in 1999,
    initiated efforts to update the standards. The FEC plans to issue revised
    standards in 2002. This update is necessary because the FEC has not
    proactively maintained them, thus allowing them to become out of date.
    According to FEC officials, the FEC has not proactively maintained the
    standards because it has not been assigned

    explicit responsibility to do so. Unless voting equipment standards are
    current, relevant, and complete, states may choose not to follow them,
    resulting in the adoption of disparate standards that could drive up the
    cost of voting equipment and produce unevenness among states in the

    capabilities of their respective voting equipment.

    No federal agency has been assigned responsibility for or assumed the role
    of testing voting equipment against the federal standards. Instead, NASED,
    through its Voting Systems Committee, has assumed responsibility for
    implementing the federal voting equipment standards by accrediting
    independent test authorities, 12 which in turn, test voting equipment
    against the standards. To this end, the committee has developed procedures
    to

    accredit the independent test authorities. 13 According to the test
    authorities, testing is generally iterative, in which the voting equipment
    vendors are provided an opportunity to correct deficiencies identified
    during testing and resubmit the modified voting equipment for retesting.
    When testing is successfully completed, the independent test authorities

    notify the NASED that the voting equipment has satisfied testing
    requirements. 14 As of July 3, 2001, the NASED had qualified 21 different
    types of voting equipment, representing 10 vendors. Because development,
    maintenance, and implementation of voting

    equipment standards are very important responsibilities, we are raising
    matters for congressional consideration regarding the explicit assignment of
    responsibility in these areas. Additionally, we are making recommendations
    to the FEC's Commissioners aimed at improving its efforts to update its 1990
    voting equipment standards. Statistical Analysis of

    Our analysis of data from 2,455 counties shows that the type of voting
    Factors Affecting

    equipment that counties used in the 2000 general election had an effect on
    uncounted presidential votes. Specifically, counties that used punch card
    Uncounted Votes in the

    equipment had roughly 0. 6 percentage points higher percentages of 2000
    Presidential

    uncounted presidential votes than counties using electronic, paper, or
    Election

    optical scan voting equipment. Counties using lever equipment had 0.7
    percentage points lower percentages of uncounted presidential votes than
    counties using electronic, paper or optical scan voting equipment. When

    12 Independent test authorities are contractors independent from the voting
    equipment vendors who are responsible for testing voting equipment to ensure
    that they meet the FEC standards

    13 According to the NASED, accreditation signifies formal recognition that
    the independent test authority possesses or will acquire the competence to
    design and perform specific test methods applicable to voting equipment
    hardware and software, and that the test authority has adequately
    demonstrated its competence for voting equipment testing 14 Independent test
    authorities notify the Election Center, which serves as the NASED?s
    Secretariat and maintains the list of the association's approved voting
    equipment

    we supplement this analysis with information about the performance of
    optical scan equipment with error correction from our sample of 404
    counties, we found that counties using punch card equipment had
    significantly higher percentages of uncounted presidential votes than
    counties using error corrected optical scan equipment. If we apply the
    relationship we found in these 404 counties to the larger set of 2,455

    counties, an estimated 300,000 additional votes may have been counted if
    counties that used punch card equipment had, instead, used optical scan
    equipment with error correction. Overall, county voting equipment accounted
    for 2% of the variation in uncounted presidential votes across counties.
    Additionally, the analysis of the subset of 404 counties showed

    that the use of error correction accounts for another 4% of variation in
    uncounted presidential votes across counties. We found that counties?
    demographic characteristics accounted for about 16 percent of the total
    variation in uncounted presidential votes. Counties with higher percentages
    of minority residents were more likely to have higher percentages of
    uncounted presidential votes. Counties with higher percentages of 18- to -24
    year olds and higher education were more likely to have lower percentages of
    uncounted presidential votes.

    The state in which counties are located accounted for about 26 percent of
    the total variation in uncounted presidential votes. Data were not available
    to examine the extent to which specific factors that were common to counties
    within a state but varied across states affected uncounted presidential
    votes. However, such factors may include statewide voter education efforts,
    the number of candidates on the ballot, the extent to which absentee or
    early voting occurred, and the state?s standards for

    determining that is a valid vote. Non- election specific factors, such as
    the percentage of the state?s population for which English is a second
    language, may have also contributed to the variability in uncounted
    presidential votes.

    Our statistical models left about half of the variation in uncounted
    presidential votes unexplained. Several factors may have contributed to this
    remaining variability, including differences among counties, precincts, and
    people. An example of this type of difference is whether a county had
    switched to a new type of voting equipment that voters found difficult to
    operate.

    Our findings, which are based on aggregate statistics and only those data
    that were available for our sample of 2,455 counties, and the subset of 404

    counties, have methodological limitations that are inherent to statistical
    studies of this type.

    Appendi x II

    List of Recently Issued Election Reports GAO Reports Elections: Perspectives
    on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation

    (GAO- 02- 03, Oct. 2001).

    Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards (GAO02- 52,
    Oct. 2001).

    Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting
    Methods (forthcoming).

    Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should be
    Improved (GAO- 01- 1026, Sept. 2001).

    Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors that Affected Uncounted Votes in
    the 2000 Presidential Election (GAO- 02- 122, Oct. 2001).

    Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration
    (GAO- 01- 470, Mar. 2001).

    Bilingual Voting Assistance: Assistance Provided and Costs (GAO/ GGD97- 81,
    May 1997).

    Other Recent National The Constitution Project, Building Consensus for
    Election Reform (Aug. Reports

    2001). National Association of Secretaries of State, State- by- State
    Election Reform Best Practices Report (Aug. 2001).

    The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and
    Confidence in the Electoral Process (July 2001). National Conference of
    State Legislatures, Voting in America: Final Report of the NCSL Elections
    Reform Task Force (Aug. 2001). National Task Force on Election Reform,
    Election 2000: Review and Recommendations by The Nation's Elections
    Administrators (Aug. 2001)

    Caltech- MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is, What Could Be (July
    2001).

    State Commission and (alphabetical order by state)

    Task Force Reports The Governor?s Select Task Force on Election Procedures,
    Standards, and

    Technology, Revitalizing Democracy in Florida (Mar. 2001). Hon. Cathy Cox,
    Georgia Secretary of State, The 2000 Election: A Wake- Up Call For Reform
    and Change - Report to the Governor and Members of the General Assembly
    (Jan. 2001).

    Hon. Chet Culver, Iowa Secretary of State, Commissioner of Elections, and
    Registrar of Voters, Iowa?s Election 2000: Facts, Findings, and Our Future
    (Mar. 2001).

    Hon. Ron Thornburgh, Kansas Secretary of State, Kansas Secretary of State?s
    Six- Point Election Improvement Plan (Jan. 2001). Special Committee on
    Voting Systems and Elections Procedures in Maryland, Report and
    Recommendations (Feb. 2001).

    Hon. Matt Blunt, Missouri Secretary of State, Making Every Vote Count:
    Report of Secretary of State Matt Blunt to the People of Missouri (Jan.
    2001).

    Hon. Bob Brown, Montana Secretary of State, 2001 Election Reform Plan

    (2001). Office of New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, Voting Matters
    in New York: Participation, Choice, Action, Integrity (Feb. 2001).

    Hon. Henry Cellar, Texas Secretary of State, Texas Overvote/ Undervote Study
    (Jan. 2001). Secretary of State Deborah L. Markowitz, Review of Vermont's
    Election Administration and Proposals for Improvement (Jan. 2001).

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

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    Contents

    Contents

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    Page 1 GAO- 02- 90 Elections United States General Accounting Office

    Washington, D. C. 20548 Comptroller General

    of the United States A

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix I Results of Our Election Work

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II List of Recently Issued Election Reports

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    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

    Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

    Address Correction Requested Presorted Standard

    Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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