Military Aircraft: Services Need Strategies to Reduce		 
Cannibalizations (21-NOV-01, GAO-02-86).			 
								 
All military services use cannibalization as a routine aircraft  
maintenance practice. The adverse effects of cannibalizations	 
include (1) higher maintenance costs due to increased mechanics' 
workloads, (2) morale and personnel retention problems, and (3)  
taking expensive aircraft out of service for long periods of	 
time. The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft  
and strong incentives for continuing to do so. In the broadest	 
sense, cannibalizations are done because of pressures to meet	 
readiness and operational needs and because of shortcomings in	 
the supply system. Although the services have undertaken some	 
steps to address logistics shortfalls, few specific strategies	 
have been developed to reduce cannibalizations and the associated
maintenance hours.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-86						        
    ACCNO:   A02472						        
    TITLE:   Military Aircraft: Services Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations                                           
     DATE:   11/21/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Aircraft components				 
	     Aircraft maintenance				 
	     Inventory control					 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Air Force Cannibalization Dock Program		 
	     Apache Helicopter					 
	     B-1B Aircraft					 
	     B-52H Aircraft					 
	     Blackhawk Helicopter				 
	     C-5A Aircraft					 
	     C-5B Aircraft					 
	     Chinook Helicopter 				 
	     EA-6B Aircraft					 
	     F-117A Aircraft					 
	     F-15C Aircraft					 
	     F-15E Aircraft					 
	     F-16C Aircraft					 
	     Hawkeye E-2C Aircraft				 
	     KC-135R Aircraft					 
	     OA-10A Aircraft					 
	     P-3C Aircraft					 
	     S-3B Aircraft					 

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GAO-02-86
     
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

November 2001 MILITARY AIRCRAFT Services Need Strategies to Reduce
Cannibalizations

GAO- 02- 86

Page i GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Cannibalizations Are Extensive, but Full
Magnitude Is Unknown 4 Cannibalizations Have Many Negative Effects 12
Services Cannibalize for Many Reasons 19 Strategies to Reduce
Cannibalizations Vary Among Services 22 Conclusions 26 Recommendations for
Executive Action 27 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30

Appendix II Cannibalization Data for the Navy and Marine Corps 32

Appendix III Cannibalization Data for the Air Force 34

Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Defense 35

Tables

Table 1: Cannibalization Rate, Active Inventory, and Average Age of Navy/
Marine Corps Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000 32
Table 2: Cannibalization Rates, Active Inventory, and Average

Age of Air Force Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year
2000 34

Figures

Figure 1: Total Air Force and Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years
1996- 2000 4 Figure 2: Total Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years

1996- 2000 5 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 3: Navy Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of Cannibalizations in
Fiscal Year 2000 7 Figure 4: Navy Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization
Rates

for Fiscal Year 2000 8 Figure 5: Total Air Force Cannibalizations Reported
in Fiscal

Years 1996- 2000 9 Figure 6: Air Force Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number
of

Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000 10 Figure 7: Air Force Aircraft With
the Highest Cannibalization

Rates in Fiscal Year 2000 11 Figure 8: Repairs Require Two Steps-
Cannibalizations, Four 13 Figure 9: Total Reported Cannibalization Personnel
Hours,

Fiscal Years 1996- 2000 14 Figure 10: Personnel Hours Navy Reported Spending
on

Cannibalizations of Six Aircraft 15 Figure 11: Personnel Hours That the Air
Force Reported Spending

on Cannibalizations of Five Aircraft 16 Figure 12: Cannibalized Navy FA- 18
Aircraft 18

Page 1 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

November 21, 2001 The Honorable Christopher Shays Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security,

Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: In January 2001, we reported on the major performance and
accountability challenges facing the Department of Defense and identified
inventory management as a high- risk area because the Department continues
to maintain levels of inventory that are too high, and its management
systems and procedures are ineffective. 1 We warned that if this condition
persists, the Department may not have key items, including spare aircraft
parts, available when needed. This would impair aircraft and other equipment
readiness. To compensate for shortfalls in logistics, all the military
services- Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps- have resorted to
cannibalization. The Department defines cannibalization as removing
serviceable parts from one piece of equipment and installing them in
another.

Because of your concern that heavy use of cannibalization may increase both
aviation maintenance costs and workloads, you asked us to examine the
practice in the services. Accordingly, we determined (1) the extent to which
the Army, the Navy 2 , and the Air Force depend on cannibalizations to
maintain aircraft; (2) the effects of cannibalizations; and (3) the reasons
for cannibalizations. In addition, we assessed the sufficiency of the
actions the Department of Defense and the services are taking to reduce the
practice. We participated with the services in a hearing before your
Subcommittee on May 22, 2001. This report expands on the information
provided in that testimony and provides recommendations. More information on
the scope and methodology of our report is in appendix I.

1 See Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). 2 The Navy?s
data used in this report include data for both Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft, and Navy policies are applicable to the Marines.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

All the military services use cannibalization extensively as a routine
aircraft maintenance practice. In fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the Navy
and the Air Force reported about 850,000 cannibalizations, requiring about
5. 3 million additional maintenance hours. Aircraft that the services depend
on to accomplish their missions had relatively high cannibalization rates.
The numbers, however, are incomplete because the Navy?s data are reportedly
understated by as much as 50 percent, the Air Force underreports
cannibalizations, and the Army does not collect servicewide figures. As a
result, neither the Department of Defense nor the services know the overall
magnitude of the practice.

Cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance
costs by increasing mechanics? workloads, they affect morale and personnel
retention, and they sometimes take expensive aircraft out of service for
long periods of time. Cannibalizations can also create additional mechanical
problems. The effects on workloads seem the most serious: over half of all
aircraft maintenance personnel report working more than 50 hours a week, and
some report working 70 hours or more. A Navy study noted that the additional
work generated by cannibalizations adversely affects morale and lowers
reenlistment rates. At the recent hearings before your Subcommittee, Air
Force and Army officials also acknowledged that cannibalizations may have an
adverse impact on morale and retention. However, because the services do not
track how much time they spend on cannibalizations, they cannot assess all
of the consequences.

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong
incentives for continuing to do so. However, with the exception of the Navy,
they do not consistently track the specific reasons for cannibalizations. As
a result, much of the information on causes is anecdotal. In the broadest
sense, cannibalizations are done because of pressures to meet readiness and
operational needs and because of shortcomings in the supply system. When
parts are not available to repair a malfunctioning aircraft, and the
aircraft is needed to fly a mission, the cannibalization of another aircraft
for parts is often seen as the answer. A Navy study also found that
cannibalizations are sometimes done because mechanics are not trained well
enough to diagnose problems or because testing equipment is either not
available or not working. In these cases, parts are swapped from one
aircraft to another until the problem is solved.

Although the services have undertaken some initiatives to address logistics
shortfalls, few specific strategies have been developed to reduce
cannibalizations and the associated maintenance hours. A number of Results
in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

service working groups have been asked to address cannibalizations, but they
have had very limited success in determining how to reduce them. Because
they view cannibalizations as a symptom of spare parts shortages, the
services have not closely analyzed other possible causes or made concerted
efforts to measure the full extent of the practice. As a result, neither the
Department of Defense nor the services can accurately identify possible
alternatives or their costs, specific improvements or changes that are
needed, or the effects of cannibalizations on morale and retention.

We are making recommendations aimed at establishing standardized,
comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization data collection procedures and
at developing strategies to reduce the amount of time spent on
cannibalizations. In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense acknowledged that cannibalization is a serious issue and generally
agreed with our recommendations. In accordance with the quarterly reporting
requirements of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 (2001 Defense Authorization Act), 3 the Department is
reviewing the services? submissions to ensure that the necessary information
concerning cannibalization is collected. The Department has also initiated
an in- depth assessment of the cannibalization processes, including data
collection and reporting procedures. The Department believes this assessment
will provide a basis for the better reporting of cannibalization information
and reducing cannibalization rates.

Army, Air Force and Navy/ Marine Corps policies allow or support the use of
cannibalization to meet urgent or mission critical requirements. However,
the services? maintenance policies state that such actions should be
minimized, used only after certain conditions have been met, or used only as
a last resort because their use tends to adversely affect morale and to
aggravate the very same supply problems that they are meant to overcome.
Navy policy specifically states that cannibalizations violate personnel
utilization policies because they double the documentation and personnel
hours needed to remove and install parts and components: two parts must be
removed- from two aircraft- and two must be installed, instead of one.
Although Army policy limits cannibalization to whenever a needed item is not
available through the supply system, it allows

3 P. L. 106- 398, sec. 371. Background

Page 4 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

commanders at installation levels and below to use their discretion as to
whether and how much to cannibalize.

In fiscal years 1996- 2000, Air Force and Navy units reported a total of
about 850, 000 cannibalizations, and reported annual figures ranging between
154, 000 and 176, 000. (See fig. 1.)

The numbers remained relatively stable in fiscal years 1996- 99 and dropped
slightly in fiscal year 2000, when the two services reported about 154,000
cannibalizations. The Air Force and the Navy, however, do not report all
cannibalizations, and how much the Army uses cannibalizations is not known
because it requires that only very selected cannibalizations be reported. As
a result, total Servicewide figures may be considerably higher than those
officially reported.

Figure 1: Total Air Force and Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years
1996- 2000

Source: Air Force and Navy data.

Relatively few aircraft types accounted for a large proportion of the
cannibalizations in the Navy and Air Force. We found that selected aircraft
that the services depend on to accomplish their missions had relatively
Cannibalizations Are

Extensive, but Full Magnitude Is Unknown

Page 5 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

high cannibalization rates. Some of these aircraft experienced a significant
increase in the number of cannibalizations from fiscal year 1996 through
fiscal year 2000.

During the 5- year period under study (fiscal years 1996- 2000), the Navy
reported approximately 468,000 cannibalizations, or on average, about 94,000
a year. (See fig. 2.) However, according to recent studies, the actual
number of cannibalizations may be much higher. In fiscal year 1998, a Navy
group noted that as many as half of all Navy cannibalizations may go
unreported. In April 2000, the Navy Inspector General also confirmed that
cannibalizations were being consistently underreported and that commanders
were concerned that cannibalization was becoming an accepted maintenance
practice. 4

Figure 2: Total Navy Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years 1996- 2000

Source: Navy data.

4 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector
General (Apr. 28, 2000). Navy

Page 6 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

In fiscal year 2000, the Navy reported carrying out cannibalizations on 63
different aircraft types. (See app. II.) Five of these aircraft types- FA-
18C, P- 3C, S- 3B, EA- 6B, and E- 2C- accounted for about 35,000 of the
service?s 84,000 reported cannibalizations, or 42 percent of the total for
that year. (See fig. 3.) These five aircraft types accounted for 958
aircraft, or 26 percent of the total inventory for which cannibalizations
were reported in fiscal year 2000. (See app. II.) The FA- 18C is naval
aviation?s principal strike fighter for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The
P- 3C provides the Navy with antisurface warfare, command communication,
battle group support, littoral surveillance, and aerial mining. The EA- 6B
is an allweather electronic attack aircraft that operates from aircraft
carriers and land bases and is the only Department of Defense aircraft that
can electronically jam enemy antiaircraft radar.

Page 7 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 3: Navy Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of Cannibalizations in
Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Navy data.

The Navy measures cannibalization rates as the number of cannibalizations
per 100 flying hours. In the 5- year period, the Navy?s average
cannibalization rate ranged from a high of 9. 6 in fiscal year 1997 to a low
of 8. 8 in fiscal year 2000. In spite of the drop in the servicewide average
rate, four aircraft types (S- 3B, FA- 18E, FA- 18B, F- 14D) had more than
twice the average cannibalization rate in fiscal year 2000, and two others
(E- 2C and EA- 6B) had almost twice the average rate. (See fig. 4.)

Page 8 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 4: Navy Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization Rates for Fiscal
Year 2000

Source: Navy.

In fiscal years 1996- 2000, the Air Force reported about 376, 000
cannibalizations, or on average, about 75,000 a year. (See fig. 5.) However,
as with the Navy, these numbers may also be low. In a 1998 review, the Air
Force Audit Agency noted that maintenance technicians did not always report
cannibalizations. 5 Unlike the Navy Inspector General, the Air Force Audit
Agency did not attempt to quantify the extent of underreporting. But the Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, at the hearing
earlier this year, contended that Air Force information systems, while not
perfect, do allow reasonably good insight into cannibalizations.

5 See Report of Audit on Maintenance Analysis Program, Air Force Audit
Agency (July 31, 1998). Air Force

Page 9 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 5: Total Air Force Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years 1996-
2000

Source: Air Force data.

Of the 28 Air Force aircraft types that reported cannibalizations in fiscal
year 2000, 4 accounted for about 60 percent of the service?s total. These
included three fighter aircraft (F- 16C, F- 15C, and F- 15E) and the B- 1B
bomber. (See fig. 6.) The active inventory represented by these four
aircraft types included 1,743 aircraft or 42 percent of the total inventory
of aircraft for which cannibalizations were reported in fiscal year 2000.
(See app. III.) Several other aircraft types, including the A- 10A, OA- 10A,
F- 15B, E- 3C, and F- 117A, reported a 100- percent increase in
cannibalizations over the 5- year period from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal
year 2000.

Page 10 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 6: Air Force Aircraft Reporting the Highest Number of
Cannibalizations in Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Air Force data.

Unlike the Navy, the Air Force measures cannibalization rates in terms of
cannibalizations per 100 aircraft sorties (one takeoff and one landing
comprise one sortie). The Air Force?s average cannibalization rate during
the 5- year period ranged from a low of 10.6 in fiscal year 1996 to a high
of 12.7 in fiscal year 1997. However, in fiscal year 2000, the
cannibalization rates of the B- 52H, C- 5B, C- 5A, and B- 1B were all well
over twice the average rate of 11.6. The rates for these four aircraft
ranged from 30 to 85 cannibalizations per 100 sorties. The rates of the F-
15C and F- 15E were almost twice the average at 22 and 23, respectively.
(See fig. 7.)

Page 11 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 7: Air Force Aircraft With the Highest Cannibalization Rates in
Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Air Force data.

We were unable to include Army data in our analysis because, unlike the Navy
and the Air Force, the Army does not track cannibalization servicewide and
does not require subordinate commands to do so. Unit commanders are allowed
to report cannibalizations but do not do so consistently, and the data are
not aggregated at the service level. The Army requires only that
cannibalizations be reported for selected components; these make up less
than 4 percent of all aviation repair parts.

According to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, although the
Army?s reporting systems do not completely track all cannibalizations, there
is evidence that cannibalization rates are higher than desired and that
commanders are using them more than is desired to meet readiness and mission
requirements. 6 Several Army headquarters officials we spoke

6 Statement by Lt. General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics, U. S. Army, before the U. S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations, May 22, 2001. Army

Page 12 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

with agreed that cannibalizations should be tracked to provide an overall
picture of how much cannibalization is used to compensate for parts shortage
or availability. However, the officials also said that they will not be able
to fully track cannibalizations until a new information system is in place
and that such a system will not become operational until 2003 or later.

Cannibalizations are done to meet operational and readiness needs, but they
come at a high cost. Cannibalizations have increased the workload of
maintenance personnel by millions of hours since fiscal year 1996- costly
time that could have been spent more productively. Evidence shows that
increasing the workload of maintenance personnel also has a negative effect
on morale. Cannibalizations also take expensive aircraft out of service,
sometimes for long periods of time, and can create additional mechanical
problems. Nevertheless, it is difficult to gauge the precise effects of
cannibalizations because the services do not know how many are performed,
the specific reasons for performing them, or how much time and money are
spent on them.

Cannibalizations increase the workload of maintenance personnel because they
take at least twice as long as normal repairs. (See fig. 8.) Thus, a direct
cost of cannibalizations is the additional personnel hours required to
remove and reinstall a part. In the process, personnel must also check or
repair other parts disturbed by the cannibalization. Cannibalizations Have

Many Negative Effects

Cannibalizations Increase Workloads

Page 13 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 8: Repairs Require Two Steps- Cannibalizations, Four

Since fiscal year 1996, the Navy and the Air Force have reported spending
about 5. 3 million maintenance hours on cannibalizations- the equivalent of
more than 500 aviation maintenance personnel working full- time for 5 years.
(See fig. 9.) In fiscal year 2000, the Navy reported spending about 441,000
personnel hours on cannibalizations at the squadron level, while the Air
Force reported about 510, 000 hours. According to one official, units do not
have the resources to meet this increased requirement, so maintenance
personnel must work harder and longer, even though they are not paid for
overtime. If these people leave the military because of work and pay
conditions, the services incur additional recruiting, retention, and
training costs to replace them.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 9: Total Reported Cannibalization Personnel Hours, Fiscal Years 1996-
2000

Source: Navy and Air Force data.

Predictably, aircraft with the highest number of cannibalizations also
accounted for a large share of maintenance hours spent on cannibalizations.
For example, the Navy?s FA- 18A, FA- 18C, S- 3B, P- 3C, E2C, and EA- 6B
consumed about 45 percent of the total reported cannibalization hours in
fiscal year 2000. (See fig. 10.) Navy data show that in fiscal years 1996-
2000, about 648,000 hours were spent on cannibalizations of the FA- 18, and
about 152, 000 hours on the EA- 6B.

Page 15 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 10: Personnel Hours Navy Reported Spending on Cannibalizations of Six
Aircraft

Source: Navy data.

In fiscal year 2000, the Air Force?s KC- 135R, F- 15C, F- 15E, F- 16C, and
B- 1B accounted for about 332,000 personnel hours associated with
cannibalizations, while the F- 16C accounted for about 114, 000 of the
total. These five aircraft accounted for about 65 percent of the total
cannibalization hours reported by the Air Force during the fiscal year. (See
fig. 11.)

Page 16 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Figure 11: Personnel Hours That the Air Force Reported Spending on
Cannibalizations of Five Aircraft

Source: Air Force data.

Evidence suggests that cannibalizations have a negative effect on morale
because they are sometimes seen as routinely making unrealistic demands on
maintenance personnel. Cannibalizations may have to be performed at any
time, day or night, and very quickly in order to meet operational
commitments. In such cases, personnel must continue working until the job is
done (without additional pay). Cannibalizations increase the maintenance
personnel hours required for specific repairs, thus increasing the overall
workload. For example, in fiscal year 2000, the Air Force reported that
cannibalizations added 510, 000 maintenance hours to the Potential Effects
on

Morale

Page 17 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

overall workload, or about 7. 2 additional hours per cannibalization action.
For the same period, the Navy reported that cannibalizations added
approximately 441, 000 maintenance hours, or about 5.2 additional hours per
cannibalization. To the extent that cannibalizations contribute to extensive
overtime, they may also have an adverse effect on morale and retention, thus
adding to recruiting and training costs.

In April 2000, the Naval Inspector General reported that cannibalization is
counterproductive and has a ?huge? impact on morale. Our analysis of the
data collected during our 1999 survey of active duty personnel showed that a
significant portion of aviation maintenance personnel reported working more
than 50 hours a week and that some reported working 70 hours. In August
1999, we reported that the majority of the factors that personnel cited as
sources of dissatisfaction and reasons for leaving the military were work-
related, such as lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily
job requirements. 7 At the recent hearing, Air Force and Army officials
acknowledged that cannibalizations may have an adverse impact on morale and
retention. But because they do not track all the maintenance hours they
spend on cannibalizations, the services cannot assess all of the
consequences.

One example we found of how cannibalizations may become the source of waste
or frustration was that of a major EA- 6B component. This component, which
was part of the aircraft?s jamming mechanism, was removed from or
reinstalled on four different aircraft, for a total of 16 times in 6 days.
In another case, an Air Force C- 5 was missing 136 parts, 47 of which had
been used to make another cannibalized aircraft operational.

Aircraft that are missing parts due to cannibalizations may remain grounded
for long periods of time. These aircraft are not available for operations,
thus denying the military the use of valuable assets. Air Force and Navy
guidance states that, to the maximum extent possible, cannibalized aircraft
should not remain grounded for more than 30 consecutive days. Yet we
observed numerous cases in which aircraft were grounded for much longer
periods. One wing we visited provided us a daily aircraft status report
showing that 6 out of 28 aircraft downed for parts had not flown for 37 days
or more. One of these aircraft had not

7 See Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in
Retention Critical Specialties (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 197BR, Aug. 16, 1999).
Expensive Assets

Unusable

Page 18 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

flown for more than 300 days and, according to the Maintenance and Material
Control Officer, was missing 111 parts. As a result, the Navy had been
unable to use this multi- million- dollar asset for almost a year. The
officer estimated that it would take more than 1, 000 maintenance hours to
return the aircraft to flying status.

In another example, four cannibalized FA- 18 aircraft were missing so many
parts that they were referred to as the ?wind chimes.? (See fig. 12.)
According to Navy officials, the number of days that these aircraft had not
flown ranged from 903 to 1, 756 days. They were finally transported to a
Navy depot in July 2000. As of May 2001, one of them, which had been missing
over 400 parts, had been funded for reassembly, while the remaining three
were in storage awaiting funding approval. The depot estimated that the
costs to reassembly the one aircraft would total about $568,000, assuming
that the squadron that owns the aircraft supplies all the missing and failed
parts. The depot?s costs could increase if the squadron is not able to
provide the parts.

Figure 12: Cannibalized Navy FA- 18 Aircraft

Source: Navy.

In another case, a Navy squadron within 30 days of a major exercise reported
that 6 of its 13 assigned aircraft had not flown for 30 or more days- 2
aircraft could not fly because the wing directed that parts be given to
other squadrons. A Navy training squadron we visited had 20 of its 29
aircraft down for parts or maintenance- 6 due to cannibalizations. In fiscal
year 2000, the same squadron reported an average of 113 cannibalizations a
month.

Page 19 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

In order to remove a component, mechanics often have to remove other parts
or components as well. This increases the risk of collateral damage to the
aircraft and other components. For example, Air Force personnel stated that
the removal of a cockpit gauge also requires the removal of its wiring
harness. This operation, if repeated several times, causes excessive wear on
the wiring and ultimately requires the wiring to be replaced as well. The
other services also provided anecdotal evidence indicating that
cannibalizations do indeed increase the possibility of damage to parts
because they involve two aircraft rather than one and are often performed
under very rushed conditions. Furthermore, cannibalizations do not replace a
broken part with a new one, but with a used one. According to one study,
cannibalizations do not restore a component to its full projected life
expectancy but rather increase the chance that the component will break down
prematurely. 8

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong
incentives for continuing to do so. They are operating with chronic spare
parts shortages, high operational tempo, and aging aircraft. The combination
of these factors, along with intense readiness requirements, creates an
environment that encourages cannibalization.

With the exception of the Navy, the services do not record the reasons for
specific cannibalization actions. This lack of information makes it
difficult to develop strategies to reduce cannibalizations. Without such
information, it is impossible to know, for example, whether specific
cannibalizations are done because a part is not available in the supply
system, because a part is in the supply system but not where it is needed,
or for reasons that have nothing to do with the supply system. At least one
study has suggested that as many as half of all Navy cannibalizations are
not caused by supply system problems.

Service officials believe that the spare parts shortage is the main reason
for cannibalizations, and they claim that they must cannibalize if parts are
not available in the right place at the right time. In previous reports, we
addressed some of the reasons for these shortages, such as unexpectedly

8 See Daniel C. Worra, ?Analysis of Aircraft Maintenance Cannibalization
With Respect to Aging Aircraft Within the EA- 6B Community,? Ph. D. Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., Dec. 2000. Potential for
Mechanical

Side Effects Services Cannibalize for Many Reasons

Supply System Problems

Page 20 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

high demand, production or repair delays, and higher- than- expected failure
rates of components.

During an overhaul, Army mechanics found a cracked gear in a Chinook (CH-
47) helicopter transmission. Because this created safety concerns, the
entire fleet was grounded in August 1999 until the gears could be replaced.
The ensuing demand exacerbated an ongoing shortage because there were not
enough transmissions on hand to meet the average monthly demand. As of March
2001, 75 transmissions were still on back order. 9

We previously reported that some Air Force parts were unavailable because
they did not last as long as expected. Thus, the parts in stock were
exhausted before the Air Force could restock them. For example, a skid
detector for the C- 5 aircraft had a 50- percent increase in failures, and
all spare parts were used before the item could be ordered or restocked. 10

We also reported that some Navy parts were not available because of delivery
delays by the contractor. The repairs of two types of EA- 6B antennas were
delayed because the contractor completely halted repair work from December
1999 to about March 2000 because of a company merger. One of these antennas
later had problems passing quality inspections, exacerbating the shortage.
11

The Comptroller General recently testified that for years, the Department of
Defense has had equipment readiness problems because of a lack of key spare
parts. He also said that the lack of spare parts was a major contributor to
lower- than- expected mission- capable rates. 12 In a recent report to
Congress, the Department of Defense identified aviation readiness as one of
its major problems and expressed concern about parts shortages and
maintenance issues. 13 Yet despite these shortages, we found

9 See Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and
Maintenance Effectiveness (GAO- 01- 772, July 31, 2001). 10 See Air Force
Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO- 01- 587, June 27, 2001) 11 See Navy Inventory: Parts
Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance

Effectiveness (GAO- 01- 771, July 31, 2001). 12 See Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: Departments of Defense, State,

and Veterans Affairs (GAO- 01- 492T, Mar. 7, 2001). 13 See Department of
Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, JanuaryFebruary

2001.

Page 21 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

that Defense could not document whether the $1. 1 billion that the Congress
provided as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1999 specifically for spare parts was actually used for this purpose.
14

Readiness and operational demands put heavy pressure on the supply system to
provide parts immediately and to wherever they may be needed. The goal of
logistics and maintenance operations is to produce missionready aircraft by
using approved maintenance practices- including the controlled use of
cannibalization. Maintenance personnel told us, however, that they will do
whatever is necessary to keep readiness ratings high, even if this means
routinely cannibalizing aircraft and having personnel work overtime to do
so.

The services also will sometimes cannibalize aircraft when it is faster to
do so than to wait for a part to be delivered from across base or town. A
Navy study group estimated that these cannibalizations may account for as
many as half of all Navy cannibalizations.

Overall, the services believe that cannibalizations allow them to better
perform their operational missions. Information is not available to
determine to what extent cannibalizations contribute positively to
readiness. But two Army studies concluded that readiness would be
significantly degraded if cannibalizations were not performed.

The Department of Defense has stated that as aircraft age, they tend to
break down more often, take longer to inspect and maintain, and are
therefore less available for training and operations. 15 According to
figures by the Congressional Budget Office, the average age of all the
services? aircraft increased from fiscal years 1980 to 2000. 16 The average
age of Navy aircraft rose from 11 to over 16 years, that of Air Force
aircraft climbed from 13 to over 20 years, and that of the Army?s helicopter
fleet grew from 10.2 to 17. 6 years.

14 See Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Is
Lacking

(GAO- 01- 472, June 11, 2001). 15 See Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans
Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft

(GAO- 01- 163, Feb. 9, 2001). 16 See CBO Paper: The Effects of Aging on the
Costs of Operating and Maintaining

Military Equipment (Aug. 2001). Readiness and Operational

Demands Aging Aircraft

Page 22 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

With aging aircraft, obsolescence can be a particularly serious problem.
Original manufacturers may no longer make parts, forcing a new manufacturer
to produce the item. This can result in long delays in filling orders and to
increased cannibalizations. Army and Defense Logistics Agency officials
informed us that the age of the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters
is a contributing factor in these aircrafts? parts shortages. The Army
Materiel Command Commander said in 1999 that the Army expects to maintain an
upgraded model of the almost 40- year- old Chinook, for another 30 years. He
added that the age of these aircraft increases parts consumption and makes
cannibalization necessary. 17 Similarly, the Navy had problems finding a
firm to manufacture F- 14 transmitters and found itself with a shortage of
parts. It had not procured the transmitter for 10 years. Potential
contractors were reluctant to make the part. One contractor willing to do so
could not produce the transmitters on schedule. Consequently, unfilled
demands for the transmitter affected the aircraft?s capability to perform
its missions. 18

The Navy Inspector General has cited three other reasons for
cannibalizations that are related more to maintenance deficiencies than to
parts shortages: (1) lack of experience and insufficiently trained
maintenance personnel, (2) outdated maintenance manuals, and (3) lack of
testing equipment. 19 In other words, cannibalizations are sometimes done to
diagnose a problem or to identify which component is not working properly.
By removing a suspect part and replacing it with one that is known to be
working, a mechanic can identify where a problem lies, even without testing
equipment or proper training.

During the recent hearing, service officials acknowledged that
cannibalization is not a preferred maintenance practice and that, in some
cases, their cannibalization rates are higher than desired. In general, each
noted its commitment to reduce cannibalizations and believes that its
efforts to improve overall logistics support should achieve this result.
Although maintenance policies for each of the services state that

17 See GAO- 01- 772. 18 See GAO- 01- 771. 19 See Final Report of Naval
Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector General (Apr. 28, 2000).
Other Reasons

Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations Vary Among Services

Page 23 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

cannibalizations should be minimized or used sparingly because of their
adverse affects on workloads and morale, we found that, with the exception
of the Navy, the services have few specific strategies in place to address
cannibalizations servicewide. Until the services develop strategies directed
specifically at reducing the maintenance hours associated with
cannibalizations, we believe this inefficient practice will remain a routine
part of aircraft maintenance.

The Department of Defense is working with new reporting requirements for
cannibalizations, but it has not placed the right level of emphasis on the
problem and has not analyzed the full extent of the human capital costs and
effects of cannibalizations. The 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires
that the Department, on a quarterly basis, measure the extent to which each
service uses cannibalizations. Consequently, each service was directed to
report by May 15, 2001, to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness (1) the cannibalization metric applicable
to each weapon system or end item reported in the Department of Defense
Status of Resources and Training System and (2) the maximum acceptable level
for each metric and the rationale for establishing that level. Within 15
calendar days of the end of each quarter, the services are also to report to
the Deputy Under Secretary (1) the data for one year?s cannibalization (the
last completed quarter and the prior three quarters), by weapon system or
end item, and (2) narrative comments whenever an unfavorable trend for any
system is identified and at least whenever the maximum acceptable level is
exceeded for three consecutive quarters. The Department of Defense is
currently working with each of the services to finalize the reporting
requirements. Aside from that, however, it has done little to address the
issue Department- wide.

According to the recent testimony by its officials, the Air Force has
implemented a multifaceted strategy of increased funding for spares,
initiated a new policy, and developed organizational initiatives to reduce
cannibalization rates. Beginning in fiscal year 2000, depot- repairable
spare parts were funded at 100 percent of stated requirements. The Air Force
also implemented a new policy permitting base supply offices to stock any
consumable part that prevents an aircraft from being mission capable. It is
also monitoring how long individual aircraft are in nonfly status if they
have been used as the source of cannibalized parts. Aircraft that exceed the
major command limit- usually 30 to 45 days- are monitored to ensure prompt
return to flying status. Finally, the Air Force has begun a campaign
Department of Defense

Air Force

Page 24 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

to identify all the obstacles to providing adequate spare part supplies. The
analysis is to be completed by the fall of 2001.

The Air Force is also undertaking an initiative to minimize cannibalizations
at bases in Langley, Virginia, and Elmendorf, Alaska. The bases have
instituted a ?consolidated? cannibalization program, referred to as the
Cannibalization Dock Program. The program centralizes cannibalization
management, whereby each of the squadrons in the wing provides a ?donor?
aircraft and a cadre of maintenance personnel on a rotating basis. The
program is designed to ensure that as few aircraft as possible are
cannibalized and that the cannibalized parts are better controlled. While
these efforts are localized, they have reduced the number of cannibalized
aircraft and the amount of time that aircraft remain cannibalized, minimized
the number of personnel performing cannibalizations, and improved quality
control over the process.

The Director of the Fleet Readiness Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, testified in May 2001 that the Navy and the Marine Corps have
initiated a number of actions to reduce cannibalizations. These include
increased funding for spare parts, increased operation and maintenance
funding for the flying- hour program, and specific targeted efforts to
improve the reliability of aircraft and reduce failures. The Director also
cited new programs aimed at identifying and tracking the components that are
cannibalized the most and at improving them.

In March 1998, the Navy established an Aviation Maintenance- Supply
Readiness Study Group to recommend specific actions to reduce aviation
maintenance and supply costs and increase readiness. The Study Group
included cannibalizations in its study and recommended that cannibalizations
and their causes be more closely tracked so that the reasons could be more
precisely identified. As a result, the Navy initiated actions to better
identify the specific causes of cannibalizations and increase the visibility
of items that are being cannibalized extensively. Beginning in June 2001,
the Navy implemented a requirement that more specific reasons for each
cannibalization be reported. Although the Navy already required some
reporting of the specific causes for cannibalizations, the new requirement
increased the number of reportable reason codes. For example, maintenance
personnel are now required to report whether a cannibalization was done (1)
for troubleshooting, (2) because it was directed by higher authority, (3)
because the part was not available in the required time frame to meet a
flight schedule, (4) because the repair part was carried locally but was not
on hand, (5) because the Navy/ Marine Corps

Page 25 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

repair part was not carried in the local supply system, (6) because the
consumable part was not carried or not in stock, or (7) because of a lack of
storage space or testing equipment. A Web site has also been established to
better highlight the items frequently cannibalized and to provide an avenue
for maintenance personnel, program managers, and inventory control personnel
to comment on problems and track progress in resolving issues. In addition,
a new reporting system is being implemented which, according to Navy
officials, should improve reporting accuracy.

On July 31, 2001, the Navy convened a conference to address cannibalization
issues. The conference was attended by senior leaders from various
organizations, including the Defense Logistics Agency, the Naval Air Systems
Command, the Naval Supply Systems Command, Marine Corps headquarters, and
the Naval Inventory Control Point. Also attending were representatives from
Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, the Center for Naval Analysis,
and subordinate commands. Working groups were established to develop actions
to reduce cannibalizations, including updating cannibalization guidance,
determining appropriate disincentives for cannibalizations, improving the
positioning of stock, and identifying more meaningful ways of measuring the
extent of cannibalizations and the amount of maintenance hours spent on
them.

In September 1999, the Army commissioned a study to assess the status of
cannibalization and to determine the need for implementing better controls
over the process. The study, completed in 2000, found a strong appreciation
among unit maintenance officers that cannibalization causes as many problems
as it solves- doubling the man- hours dedicated to a single maintenance
effort. However, it concluded that cannibalization was a good tool for
commanders and that there appeared to be adequate command involvement to
prevent abuse. The study recommended that the Army develop a data-
collection system that would identify all cannibalization actions, thereby
improving data analysis with regard to cannibalizations.

The study cited a controlled experiment conducted by the Army in 1987 to
determine the effects of cannibalizations on the readiness rates of similar
helicopter units. When the units were forced to stop cannibalizations,
readiness rates dropped more than 25 percent, then returned to previous
levels when cannibalizations resumed. Although the Army did not repeat the
experiment, the 2000 study cited the experiment to conclude that Army

Page 26 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

operational readiness would suffer if units were not allowed to cannibalize.

In testimony before your subcommittee on May 22, 2001, the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff for Logistics noted that the full extent to which cannibalization
is used is unknown, as the current information system used in maintenance
and supply has only a limited capability to capture aircraft data. However,
recognizing the need to gain greater visibility over cannibalizations, the
Army is planning to initiate several actions. It is updating its information
system to more effectively capture data on cannibalizations from existing
aviation readiness reports. It is developing a new logistics automation
system that should be able to track cannibalizations, but the system is not
expected to become available until the second quarter of fiscal year 2003.
In addition, it is investing heavily in a repair parts/ spares
recapitalization program, working to improve the reliability of its repair
parts, and undertaking a series of improvements in its logistics system to
increase the availability of spare parts at both the retail and wholesale
levels. It is also undertaking a program to extend the service life of its
helicopters and to replace parts most likely to fail.

Cannibalization is a serious problem with many negative effects. While it is
unlikely that the practice may be completely eliminated, we believe there
are opportunities to reduce it. The services are not recording all
cannibalizations, the specific reasons for them, or how much time or money
they spend on them. Although the Air Force and the Navy have systems in
place to measure the number of cannibalizations, the data may not be
sufficiently accurate. The Army?s current information system does not allow
for the reporting of servicewide data on cannibalizations. As a result,
neither the Department of Defense nor the services can accurately determine
(1) which cannibalizations are necessary and what alternatives, if any, are
available to reduce the number of those that are not; (2) what specific
improvements or changes need to be implemented to effectively limit the
adverse effects of cannibalizations; and (3) to what extent reducing the
workload associated with cannibalizations would increase personnel morale
and retention rates. Having standardized data on cannibalizations should
help managers make sound economic decisions concerning the relative costs of
alternatives, such as changing the stockage levels or storage locations for
specific parts.

We believe that the new requirement to report the use of cannibalizations as
part of the current readiness reporting system outlined in the 2001 Defense
Authorization Act will be beneficial. However, we believe that the
Conclusions

Page 27 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

new reporting requirement established by the Department in response to this
Act could be improved by including the amount of time spent on
cannibalizations. In our opinion, it is the amount of maintenance personnel
time spent on cannibalizations- not only the number of cannibalizations-
that contributes the most to morale and retention problems and to higher
maintenance costs.

Because they view cannibalization as a symptom of supply problems, the
services are relying on improvements in the logistics system to reduce the
practice. We agree that improvements in the supply system should help reduce
cannibalizations, but we believe that actions aimed specifically at reducing
the maintenance hours expended on cannibalizations are also needed. Although
the services have taken some initiatives to address cannibalizations, and
although we believe these initiatives are steps in the right direction, the
magnitude of the problem and the many reasons for cannibalization call for a
more coordinated approach that involves both the Department and the
services. Because cannibalization is a problem whose causes are not service-
specific and whose effects cut across all areas of Defense, the Department
must provide the services with guidance and leadership in tackling the
issue.

To permit the Department of Defense and the services to more accurately
determine the extent of cannibalizations, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to establish
standardized, comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization datacollection
procedures and systems for cannibalizations. The procedures should require
the accurate documentation of the number of cannibalizations, the associated
maintenance hours, and the specific reasons for the cannibalizations. They
should also require the services to identify any adverse effects of
cannibalizations on maintenance costs and personnel.

The 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to
measure, on a quarterly basis, the extent of cannibalizations. We recommend
that the Secretary of Defense require the services to measure and report the
number of maintenance hours associated with cannibalizations.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to
develop strategies to reduce the number of maintenance hours spent on
cannibalization, ensure that cannibalized aircraft do not remain grounded
for long periods of time, and reduce the adverse effects of cannibalizations
Recommendations for

Executive Action

Page 28 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

on maintenance costs and personnel. At a minimum, the strategies should
include criteria to determine (1) which cannibalizations are appropriate,
(2) cannibalization- reduction goals, and (3) the actions to be taken to
meet those goals. The services must assign responsibility for ensuring that
goals are being met and allocate resources for this purpose.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with the intent of all our recommendations and commented that
cannibalization is a serious issue. The Department indicated, however, that
cannibalization accounts for a ?negligible percentage? of total maintenance
hours. We believe that that the 5.3 million maintenance hours spent by the
Navy and the Air Force on cannibalizations in fiscal years 1996- 2000- the
equivalent of more than 500 aviation personnel working fulltime for 5 years-
is significant, especially considering that, as our report points out, the
Navy?s data are probably understated by as much as 50 percent, the Air Force
underreports cannibalizations, and the Army does not collect servicewide
figures. In addition, virtually all Navy and Air Force aircraft types
reported cannibalization actions for fiscal year 2000. Several of these
aircraft experienced cannibalization rates from about 2 to over 7 times the
service average. These data suggest that the services may benefit most by
focusing their attention on specific aircraft types where cannibalization
problems are the most severe.

The Department does not agree that cannibalization is a pervasive problem
throughout the military. While the Department indicated that a few weapons
systems are showing cannibalization rates higher than desired, overall
cannibalizations are declining- for example, the levels for fiscal year 2000
are the lowest in 4 years. Even so, as our report indicates, the Navy and
the Air Force still reported spending almost 1 million personnel hours
cannibalizing aircraft that year. And senior service officials, who
testified before your subcommittee on May 22, 2001, acknowledged that
cannibalization rates are too high and need to be reduced.

The Department concurred with our recommendation to establish standardized,
comprehensive, and reliable cannibalization data collection procedures.
According to the Department, an in- depth assessment of the impact of
cannibalization has already been initiated. The Department said that the
assessment will identify the causes and effects of cannibalizations and will
recommend improvements. The Department said this assessment will provide a
basis for potential modifications to logistics management policies and
strategies. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 29 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

With regard to our recommendation that the number of maintenance hours
associated with cannibalizations be included in the Quarterly Readiness
Report to the Congress, the Department said the recommendation was
?redundant? because existing legislation already requires that this be done.
However, our review of the latest readiness report (for the quarter ending
June 2001) revealed that while cannibalization rates were being reported by
weapon system, the associated maintenance hours were not. We believe that
the hours spent on cannibalizations, not the number of cannibalizations, are
the most important indicator of the negative impact of the practice on
maintenance personnel and that this information should be included in the
readiness reports. Although the Department has not made the number of
personnel hours spent on cannibalizations part of its reporting requirement,
it did state that it is reviewing the data submitted by the services to
ensure that all necessary information is collected.

We performed our work from July 2000 through November 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our scope and
methodology are provided as appendix I.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
its issuance. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Secretaries of Defense, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army; the
Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; the Director, Defense Logistics Agency; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available
to other interested parties upon request. If you or your staff have any
questions about the report, please contact me at (202) 512- 5140.

Key contributors to this assignment were William Meredith, Harry Taylor,
Hugh Brady, Douglas Mills, Janine Cantin, and Stefano Petrucci.

Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 30 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

We performed our review at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service
headquarters, aviation commands, and other locations as appropriate. To
identify Department of Defense and service policies and practices regarding
cannibalization, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense and
service headquarters and aviation command personnel responsible for aircraft
maintenance policies and oversight, reviewed applicable regulations and
other guidance concerning the practice, and analyzed statistical data
regarding cannibalization rates. We held discussions concerning the pros and
cons of cannibalization, its impact on readiness, the alternatives and their
relative costs, and any efforts on the part of the Department of Defense to
address the issue. We obtained statistics concerning cannibalizations from
fiscal year 1996 through fiscal 2000, identified weapons systems most
dependent on the practice to maintain readiness, and documented the reasons
for dependence. We did not independently verify the number of
cannibalizations, associated maintenance hours, or cannibalization rates
provided by the individual services. We also visited aircraft maintenance
units to discuss the use of cannibalizations and tracking processes. We
discussed the impact of cannibalizations on personnel and other readiness
issues, the time involved, the processes used to decide when
cannibalizations should be used, and alternatives.

To determine the extent to which the services depend on cannibalizations, we
requested that the services provide statistics for fiscal years 1996- 2000
covering the total reported cannibalization actions, rates, and associated
maintenance hours broken out by weapon system. With the exception of the
Army, these data were provided by Navy and Air Force headquarters
organizations; the Navy?s data included Marine Corps figures. The Navy?s and
Marine Corps? data on cannibalizations were obtained from the Navy?s
Aviation Maintenance and Material Management Information System (AV- 3M),
and the Aircraft Inventory Readiness Reporting System (AIRRS) maintained at
the Naval Air Systems Command located at the Patuxent River Naval Air
Station, Maryland. The Air Force?s data were obtained from the Reliability
and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) and provided to us by
Headquarters U. S. Air Force. Since the Army does not collect data on
servicewide cannibalizations, we discussed the extent that the Army
cannibalizes aircraft with officials at the Army?s Aviation and Missile
Command in Huntsville, Alabama; U. S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson,
Georgia; and the Army?s 101st Airborne Division at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.
Although they provided us with some limited statistics regarding the number
of cannibalizations, we did not include them in our report because the data
were not comparable to those provided by the other services. Appendix I:
Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 31 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

To determine the effects of and reasons for cannibalization, we discussed
the issues with maintenance and supply personnel and obtained studies and
documentation during visits to various military headquarters and aviation
activities, including the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk,
Virginia, and Pacific, San Diego, California; headquarters and selected
squadrons of Strike Fighter Wing U. S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, located
at Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia Beach, Virginia, and at Lemoore Naval
Air Station, California, respectively; and Commander, Electronic Attack Wing
Pacific and selected squadrons at Whidbey Island Naval Air Station,
Washington. For the Air Force, we held discussions with and obtained
available documentation from officials at the Headquarters, Air Combat
Command, 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and selected fighter squadrons at Langley
Air Force Base, Hampton, Virginia; Air Mobility Command Headquarters, Scott
Air Force Base, Illinois; and the 436th Airlift Wing at Dover Air Force
Base, Delaware. We also held discussions with and obtained documentation
from officials at the Army?s Aviation and Missile Command, U. S. Army Forces
Command, and Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, 101st Aviation Brigade,
and the 159th Aviation Brigade at Ft. Campbell. We also discussed and
obtained documentation on the effect of cannibalization on personnel with
officials at Marine Corps Headquarters, II Marine Air Wing and various
squadrons at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, Havelock, North
Carolina, and at New River Marine Corps Air Station, Jacksonville, North
Carolina.

To identify the actions that the Department of Defense and the services are
taking to reduce cannibalizations, we held discussions with the responsible
offices within each service and the Department of Defense, analyzed
regulations and guidance, and reviewed studies and other documentation. We
focused our work concerning this objective at the following headquarters
locations: Department of Defense?s Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, the Naval Air Systems Command
located at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station, the Air Force Headquarters
Logistics Directorate, the Air Combat and Mobility Commands, Department of
the Army Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces Command, and the Army Aviation and
Missile Command. In addition, we attended a Navy Conference addressing
cannibalization issues. We also obtained and analyzed testimony by the
Director, Fleet Readiness Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
U. S. Navy; the Deputy Chief of Staff/ Installations and Logistics, U. S.
Air Force; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, U. S. Army, provided
at the May 22, 2001, hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, on cannibalization of military aircraft parts.

Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the Navy and Marine Corps

Page 32 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Table 1: Cannibalization Rate, Active Inventory, and Average Age of Navy/
Marine Corps Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000

Type/ model/ series

Cannibalizations per 100 fly/ hrs.

(FY 2000) Active inventory (Mar. 2000) Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

F- 14D 32.8 46 14 FA- 18B 27.7 31 17 FA- 18E 21.5 26 2 S- 3B 18.2 111 25 EA-
6B 16.7 123 19 E- 2C 16.2 73 9 F- 14A 14.3 87 21 SH- 3H 13.6 17 36 MH- 53E
13.5 43 11 CH- 46D 12.7 26 34 TAV- 8B 12.0 18 12 AH- 1W 11.3 194 11 FA- 18C
11.2 407 9 YSH- 60F 11.0 1 0 F- 14B 10.8 71 15 FA- 18A 9.7 225 15 SH- 60F
9.7 75 10 P- 3C 9.2 244 24 AV- 8B 8.2 153 8 FA- 18D 8.2 142 9 CH- 53E 7.5
165 13 CH- 60S 7.0 3 0 UH- 60A 7.0 1 16 UH- 1N 6.9 103 26 HH- 1N 6.5 35 28
KC- 130F 6.0 35 39 CH- 46E 5.7 229 33 SH- 60B 5.2 158 12 UH- 3H 5.2 53 37
EP- 3E 5.0 11 31 CH- 53D 4.9 56 31 HH- 60H 4.4 39 8 UH- 46D 4.4 11 35 C- 2A
4.0 38 14 FA- 18F 4.0 28 1 KC- 130R 4.0 14 24 SH- 2G 4. 0 14 13 TA- 4J 4. 0
19 32 HH- 46D 3.8 42 36

Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the Navy and Marine Corps

Appendix II: Cannibalization Data for the Navy and Marine Corps

Page 33 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Type/ model/ series

Cannibalizations per 100 fly/ hrs.

(FY 2000) Active inventory (Mar. 2000) Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

F- 5E 3.0 32 16 KC- 130T 3.0 28 12 T- 2C 3.0 110 29 T- 38A 3.0 10 13 TH- 57C
3.0 84 18 TH- 6B 3. 0 6 10 C- 130T 2.0 20 7 T- 45A 2.0 74 6 T- 45C 2.0 50 2
VH- 3A 2. 0 2 39 C- 130H a 0 N/ A C- 20D a 2 14 C- 20G a 5 7 C- 9B a 17 25
DC- 9 a 11 14 E- 6A a 4 10 E- 6B a 12 11 F- 5F a 4 21 OH- 58C a 4 4 P- 3B a
28 33 TE- 2C a 2 13 UP- 3A a 4 38 UP- 3B a 0 N/ A VP- 3A a 5 39

Legend: N/ A = not applicable a Reported rate more than zero but less than
one cannibalization per 100 flying hours.

Appendix III: Cannibalization Data for the Air Force

Page 34 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Table 2: Cannibalization Rates, Active Inventory, and Average Age of Air
Force Aircraft Reporting Cannibalization Hours in Fiscal Year 2000

Aircraft model/ series

Cannibalizations per 100 sorties

(FY 2000) Active inventory (Mar. 2001) Average age in

years (Mar. 2001)

B- 1B 85.4 93 14 C- 5A 54.6 74 30 C- 5B 42.2 50 13 B- 52H 30.2 94 39 F- 15E
22.8 217 10 F- 15C 22.0 346 18 E- 3C 17.6 9 18 E- 3B 17.1 23 23 C- 130J 16.7
12 1 C- 141C 13.6 63 35 OA- 10A 10.7 118 20 C- 5C 10.5 2 31 KC- 135R 10.3
356 39 F- 16C 9.5 1, 087 11 C- 141B 9.3 61 34 KC- 135T 9.3 54 41 A- 10A 8.3
249 20 KC- 135E 7.8 132 42 F- 15A 7.0 102 23 F- 15B 6.9 20 24 F- 15D 6.8 54
18 C- 130E 5.5 223 36 C- 130H 4.4 286 14 F- 16A 3.8 84 18 F- 16D 3.6 182 11
C- 17A 3.4 73 4 F- 16B 3.0 41 19 F- 117A 1.7 52 10

Appendix III: Cannibalization Data for the Air Force

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 35 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO- 02- 86 Military Aircraft (350087)

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To order by phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (301) 413- 0006 Fax: (202)
258- 4066

GAO Building Room 1100, 700 4th Street, NW (corner of 4th and G Streets, NW)
Washington, D. C. 20013

Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm, E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov, or 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system).

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512- 4800 U. S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G. Street NW, Room 7149, Washington, D. C.
20548 GAO?s Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone Visit GAO?s Document Distribution Center

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs

Public Affairs
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