Force Structure: Decision to Reduce B-1B Fleet Not Based on Sound
and Complete Analysis (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-846).
The B-1B began operations in 1986 as a long-range heavy bomber
designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the
B-1B's nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, the Air
Force continues to rely on the B-1B to support conventional
wartime missions. The B-1B has the largest payload of the Air
Force's three bombers, and recent modifications have provided the
capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades
to the B-1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by
enabling it to carry three different types of bombs
simultaneously and eliminate some of its long-term survivability
and maintainability problems by improving its radar warning
systems, jamming ability, and other electronic countermeasures.
In May 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense suggested
retiring the entire B-1B fleet by October 2001. In June 2001,
the Air Force proposed as alternative that reduced the B-1B fleet
from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at two active duty
locations instead of the three active duty and two National Guard
locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed
implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force
completed a review of bomber force structure and provided a
report on alternative missions and basing plans. The Air Force
began consolidating the fleet in July 2002. GAO found that Air
Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a
reduction in B-1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect the
Department of Defense's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor
did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing
options to know whether they were choosing the most
cost-effective alternative. A comparison of active and Guard
units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that
active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the
same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and
higher mission capable rates than their active duty counterparts.
Additionally, the Guard's B-1B aircrew members were generally
more experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the
active duty B-1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members
served on active duty prior to joining the Air National Guard.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-846
ACCNO: A04795
TITLE: Force Structure: Decision to Reduce B-1B Fleet Not Based
on Sound and Complete Analysis
DATE: 09/06/2002
SUBJECT: Air Force reservists
Bomber aircraft
Combat readiness
Comparative analysis
Cost analysis
Defense capabilities
Military cost control
B-1B Aircraft
Eagle Aircraft
F-15E Aircraft
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System
KC-135 Aircraft
KC-135R Aircraft
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GAO-02-846
United States General Accounting Office
Report to the Honorable Max Cleland, U. S. Senate GAO
September 2002 FORCE STRUCTURE Review of B- 1B Process Identifies
Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis
GAO- 02- 846
Page i GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Decision to Reduce and Consolidate the B-
1Bs Based on Budget
Concerns, Military Judgment, and Incomplete Cost Estimates 5 Guard B- 1B
Units Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs
and Are at Least as Capable as Active Units 10 Conclusions 17
Recommendation for Executive Action 17 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
18
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 22
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 25
Related GAO Products 26
Tables
Table 1: B- 1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation 4 Table 2:
Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B
Flying Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999- 2001 11 Table 3: Comparison of
Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B
Depot- Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour 12 Table 4: Comparison of
Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B
Consumable Supplies Cost per Flying Hour 12 Table 5: Active Duty and Air
National Guard B- 1B Pilot Experience
Levels 15 Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Weapon Systems
Officer Experience Levels 16 Contents
Page ii GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure Figure
Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Mission Capable Rates
(Fiscal Years 1999- 2001) 13
Abbreviations
DOD Department of Defense OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
Page 1 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
September 6, 2002 The Honorable Max Cleland United States Senate
Dear Senator Cleland: The B- 1B began operations in 1986 as a long- range
heavy bomber designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the
B- 1B*s nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, 1 the Air Force
continues to rely on the B- 1B to support conventional wartime missions.
The B- 1B, equipped with three weapons bays, has the largest payload of
the Air Force*s three bombers, 2 and recent modifications have provided
the capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades to the
B- 1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by enabling it to carry
three different types of bombs simultaneously and eliminate some of its
long- term survivability and maintainability problems by improving its
radar warning systems, jamming ability, and other electronic
countermeasure systems.
In May 2001, as part of a broader Department of Defense (DOD) initiative
to make funds available to further military transformation, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) suggested retiring the entire B- 1B fleet
by October 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed an alternative that
reduced the B- 1B fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at 2
active duty locations instead of the 3 active duty and 2 Air National
Guard (Guard) locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed
implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force completed a
review of bomber force structure and provided a report on alternative
missions and basing plans. 3 The report was delivered to Congress on
February 6, 2002, and after a 15- day period, the Air Force had the
authority to begin implementing the fleet reduction and consolidation. The
Air Force began consolidating the fleet in July 2002.
1 According to the Department of Defense*s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,
DOD no longer maintains plans to reconstitute the B- 1Bs* nuclear
capability. 2 The Air Force*s bomber fleet consists of the B- 1B, B- 2,
and B- 52.
3 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107- 107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215- 16 (2001).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
In July 2001, you asked that we review the Air Force decision to reduce
and consolidate the B- 1B fleet. Subsequent to your request, the Air Force
submitted the required report to Congress, and your office asked that we
document and analyze the process used to make the reduction and
consolidation decision so that the insights gained might assist those who
make force structure and basing decisions in the future. As agreed, we
determined what types of analysis DOD and the Air Force did of wartime
requirements and basing options before deciding on the number of aircraft
to retain and where to base them. Additionally, at your request, we
compared the missions, flying hour costs, 4 and selected capabilities of
the various active and Air National Guard B- 1B units.
We reviewed documentation related to the B- 1B force restructuring and met
with representatives of OSD, the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and the Air
National Guard to determine how the Air Force made its decision. We
obtained and analyzed data for flying hour costs and mission capable rates
for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001 for all of the B- 1B units and
obtained data on aircrew experience for both Air National Guard and active
duty aircrews. Additionally, we visited three of the five B- 1B units. We
conducted our review from September 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We discuss our
scope and methodology in more detail in appendix I.
Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a
reduction in B- 1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect DOD*s ability to
meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis
of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most
cost- effective alternative. Air Force officials explained that their
proposal to reduce the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an
Office of the Secretary of Defense suggestion to eliminate the entire B-
1B fleet and to address significant funding shortages in the B- 1B
modification program. Senior Air Force officials further explained that
they are comfortable with this decision because, based on their military
judgment, a smaller, fully modified B- 1B fleet will provide more
capability than a larger fleet with no additional modifications. However,
the decision was not vetted through established DOD budget processes that
normally involve a wider range of participants and generally allow more
time for
4 The Air Force calculates flying hour costs by dividing the cost of fuel
and repair parts by the number of hours the aircraft is flown. Results in
Brief
Page 3 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
analysis of how proposed force structure changes will affect DOD*s ability
to meet wartime requirements. Furthermore, Air Force headquarters
officials appear to have used an inconsistent methodology and incomplete
cost estimates when considering options for basing the remaining aircraft.
As a result, the Air Force understated the potential savings for some
options, and it lacks assurance that the basing option selected, which
consolidates the B- 1Bs in the active component, is the most cost-
effective option available. In the absence of standard guidance for
analyzing basing alternatives, similar problems could occur in the future.
Our comparison of active and Guard units* missions, flying hour costs, and
capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for
substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour
costs and higher mission capable rates 5 than their active duty
counterparts. For example, during fiscal years 1999 through 2001, the
Guard*s B- 1B units averaged both lower flying hour costs and higher
mission capable rates than the active duty units, although the gap between
active and Guard mission capable rates narrowed in fiscal year 2001.
Additionally, the Guard*s B- 1B aircrew members 6 were generally more
experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the active duty
B- 1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members served on active duty
prior to joining the Air National Guard.
To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment decisions,
we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to develop a methodology for assessing and comparing the
costs of active and reserve units when evaluating potential basing
options.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for assessing and
comparing costs because the department believes that such a methodology
currently exists. However, DOD*s written comments did not describe the
methodology or provide any evidence that such a methodology exists and Air
Force officials told us the Air Force does not have a standard
methodology. A detailed discussion of DOD*s comments
5 The Air Force designates a weapon system as mission capable when it can
perform at least one of its assigned combat missions. The mission capable
rate measures the amount of time an aircraft is available to complete at
least one of its assigned missions.
6 The B- 1B requires four aircrew members, including the pilot, the
copilot, and the offensive and defensive weapon systems officers.
Page 4 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
and our response is included in the Agency Comments section of this
report.
In a March 1999 white paper 7 detailing modernization plans for the bomber
fleet, the Air Force advised Congress that it needed 93 B- 1Bs, including
70 combat- coded aircraft 8 by the end of fiscal year 2004, to meet DOD*s
strategy of being prepared to win two nearly simultaneous major theater
wars. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed reducing the fleet from 93 to
60 aircraft and reducing the number of combat- coded aircraft to 36. Table
1 compares the force structure before and after OSD*s June 2001 decision
to reduce and consolidate the B- 1B fleet.
Table 1: B- 1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation Base Before
consolidation After consolidation Active duty Number Type Number Type
Dyess Air Force Base, Texas 40 B- 1Bs 12 combat
24 training a 4 backup b
32 B- 1Bs 12 combat 16 training
2 test 2 backup Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota 26 B- 1Bs 18 combat
6 training 2 backup
26 B- 1Bs 24 combat 2 backup
Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho 7 B- 1Bs 6 combat
1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c
Edwards Air Force Base, California 2 B- 1Bs 2 test 2 B- 1Bs 2 test
Air National Guard
McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas 9 B- 1Bs 8 combat
1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia 9 B- 1Bs 8 combat
1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c
Total 93 B- 1Bs 60 B- 1Bs
a These aircraft are used to train newly qualified pilots as B- 1B pilots.
b Backup aircraft are located at each unit and are used when a primary
aircraft is not available. c Units affected received new missions as
discussed below.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command.
7 U. S. Air Force, White Paper on Long Range Bombers (Washington, D. C.,
Mar. 1, 1999). 8 Combat coded means that the aircraft is fully equipped
and funded to perform all wartime missions. Background
Page 5 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Partly in response to concerns expressed by Members of Congress about
OSD*s June 2001 decision to eliminate the B- 1B mission at Mountain Home,
McConnell, and Robins Air Force Bases, the Air Force identified and
announced new missions for these locations in September 2001. Planning for
the new missions is well underway, and the units are expected to
transition to their new missions in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2002. Mountain Home*s current F- 15E squadron will be increased from 18 to
24 aircraft, and its 7 KC- 135 tankers will be relocated to the Air
National Guard unit at McConnell Air Force Base. The Air National Guard
unit at McConnell will be redesignated as the 184th Air Refueling Wing and
will have 10 KC- 135R tankers. The Guard unit at Robins Air Force Base
will transition to the 116th Air Control Wing and have 19 Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft.
As you know, we have issued numerous reports on the B- 1B bomber in
response to a variety of congressional concerns. In February 1998, for
example, we reported that the Air Force could save millions of dollars
without reducing mission capability by assigning more B- 1Bs to the
reserve component. 9 A list of related GAO products can be found at the
end of this report.
The decision to reduce the B- 1B force was not based on a formal analysis
of how a smaller B- 1B force would impact DOD*s ability to meet wartime
requirements. Air Force officials explained that their decision to reduce
the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an OSD suggestion to
eliminate the entire B- 1B fleet and to address significant funding
shortages in the B- 1B modification program. Furthermore, the decision was
not vetted through established DOD budget processes that normally involve
a wider range of participants and generally allow more time for analysis
of proposed changes. Senior Air Force officials believe, based on their
military judgment, that the decision will not adversely affect DOD*s
ability to implement the national security strategy. With regard to the
Air Force*s
9 We presented six options for placing more B- 1Bs in Air National Guard
units and estimated that implementing our proposed options could produce
savings ranging from $87. 1 million to $235.3 million in fiscal years
1999- 2003. We also recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force
prepare a plan to place more B- 1Bs in the reserve component. In its
response to our report at that time, DOD stated that it had the right mix
of B- 1Bs in the active and reserve components and that it did not plan to
move more B- 1Bs to the reserve component at that time. See U. S. General
Accounting Office, Air Force Bombers: Moving More B- 1s to the Reserves
Could Save Millions without Reducing Mission Capability,
GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 64 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 26, 1998). Decision to Reduce
and Consolidate the B- 1Bs Based on Budget Concerns, Military Judgment,
and Incomplete Cost Estimates
Page 6 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
analysis of basing alternatives, a lack of Air Force guidance led Air
Force officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Programs to develop their own methodology to determine where to base the
reduced B- 1B fleet. These officials did not document their methodology at
the time the decision was made and could not replicate the calculations
used to make the basing decision. However, our review of documents
prepared (at our request) after the decision was made suggests the Air
Force used an inconsistent methodology and incomplete costs when
estimating the savings generated from the consolidation. As a result, it
is not clear whether they chose the most cost- effective alternative.
In May 2001, as it considered changes to the fiscal year 2002 DOD budget
previously submitted to Congress by the prior administration, senior OSD
officials suggested eliminating the entire B- 1B fleet that had
experienced long- standing survivability and reliability problems. OSD
officials in offices such as the Program Analysis and Evaluation did not
undertake any analysis of the impact of the proposed B- 1B retirements on
the Air Force*s ability to meet war- fighting requirements. At that time,
the OSD Comptroller estimated that eliminating the B- 1B would save
approximately $4.5 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2007. The savings
would be achieved by eliminating the B- 1Bs from both the active and Guard
fleets and canceling the B- 1B modernization program, according to an
official in the Comptroller*s office.
Acknowledging that it lacked sufficient funding to complete planned
upgrades to all 93 aircraft, but at the same time believing that some B-
1Bs should be retained, the Air Force proposed reducing the size of the
fleet from 93 to 60 and reinvesting the savings in upgrades to the
remaining 60 aircraft. According to the Secretary of the Air Force and the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the proposal was budget- driven. The
Chief of Staff told us that if the Air Force reduced the number of
aircraft to 60, it would have sufficient funds to upgrade the remaining
aircraft to make them more usable in combat. The Air Force did no formal
analysis of the impact of a smaller B- 1B fleet on its ability to meet
current and future war- fighting requirements when it proposed this
reduction. Senior Air Force leaders told us that they are comfortable with
the proposed reduction because they believe that 60 upgraded aircraft will
provide significantly more capability in terms of effectiveness,
survivability, and maintainability than is available today. The Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) included the reduction in the amended
2002 DOD budget request after discussions with the Secretary of Defense
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Decision to Reduce the
B- 1B Fleet Was Based on Budget Considerations Rather than Requirements
Analysis
Page 7 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
The decision to reduce the number of B- 1Bs was not fully vetted through
the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Under established DOD
procedures, the service sends its budget to the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) where issue area experts review it.
Potential changes in the form of draft program budget decisions are
circulated to the services, the Joint Staff, the Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, and various assistant secretaries of defense who
are in a position to evaluate the impact of the potential budget decisions
on the national military strategy and the objectives of the Secretary of
Defense. Their comments are provided to the Comptroller who considers
them, finalizes the program budget decision, and forwards it to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for signature. According to an official in the
Comptroller*s office, in this instance, the Comptroller approved the
program budget decision that reduced and consolidated the B- 1B fleet
after discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. A draft program budget decision was not circulated to the
Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Joint Staff,
or the Air Force according to representatives of these offices.
Air Force officials told us they were surprised when senior OSD officials
decided to implement the B- 1B fleet reduction in June 2001. While Air
Force officials recommended reducing the fleet, they did not know that the
recommendation was to be included in the fiscal year 2002 amended budget
until just a few days before OSD officials transmitted the budget to
Congress and made it public. These same officials told us that they were
also surprised that the consolidation was to be implemented by October 1,
2001. They believed that they needed about 1 year to implement the
decision.
As a result of the short time frame between the OSD decision to implement
the Air Force*s proposal to reduce and consolidate the B- 1Bs and the
release of the amended fiscal year 2002 budget, Air Force officials told
us the Air Force did not have time to
determine if the Guard units would get new missions and identify those
missions or
meet with Members of Congress from the affected states to explain the
decision.
The decision to reduce the fleet and complete the consolidation by October
1, 2001, concerned Members of Congress. As a result, Congress delayed
implementation until the Air Force completed a review of bomber force
structure and provided information on alternative missions and
Page 8 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
basing plans. 10 According to the legislation, the Air Force could begin
implementing the fleet reduction and consolidation 15 days after providing
the required report to Congress. The report was delivered to Congress in
February 2002. Among other things, the report provided a summary of the
(1) Air Force*s reasons for reducing the B- 1B fleet, (2) follow- on
missions for the affected units, and (3) details of the B- 1B
modernization program. The Air Force began relocating and retiring B- 1Bs
in July 2002.
Air Force officers in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
and Programs said they considered a number of basing options before
recommending that the remaining aircraft be consolidated at two active
duty bases. However, they did not document the options considered at the
time the decision was made and could not provide a comprehensive list of
options considered. In early 2002, at our request, they prepared a paper
that outlined some of the options they believed were considered. According
to the paper, the Air Force considered options that would have
consolidated the aircraft at
two active bases and one Guard base,
one Guard base and one active base, or
two active duty bases. The option selected continues to house B- 1Bs at
two active duty bases* 26 at Ellsworth Air Force Base and 32 at Dyess Air
Force Base. 11 According to Air Force officials, they selected this option
because they believed it was the most cost- effective option available.
Specifically, they believed they would achieve significant economies of
scale by consolidating the aircraft at the two largest B- 1B bases, which
were located in the active component.
Air Force headquarters staff told us they had no written guidance or
directives to assist them when they completed the cost analysis for
assessing where to locate the aircraft, and the officers at Air Force
10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107- 107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215- 16 (2001). 11 The remaining two
aircraft will be used for developmental testing and will be located at the
Air Force*s test facility at Edwards Air Force Base. According to Air
Force officials, these aircraft will be altered to such a degree that it
is unlikely that they will ever be used in a nontest environment. The Air
Force Used
Incomplete Cost Data When Deciding Where to Base the Remaining B- 1Bs
Page 9 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
headquarters responsible for evaluating basing options said they received
no guidance from their senior leaders. Consequently, they developed their
own approach for determining where the B- 1Bs should be retained. The Air
Force did not document its methodology at the time the consolidation
decision was made but attempted to reconstruct it in early 2002 at our
request. At that time, however, Air Force officials were unable to
replicate the savings estimates they had developed or provide a complete
explanation of the methodology used to make the basing decision.
Our review of the documentation provided to us by Air Force officials in
early 2002 suggests the Air Force may have used an inconsistent
methodology and incomplete costs when estimating potential savings for
various basing options. According to Air Force officials, for options that
stationed aircraft at both active and Guard locations, the potential
savings estimates were based solely on the anticipated reductions in the
cost of flying hours that would result from the smaller B- 1B force. Other
operations and maintenance costs 12 that would have been saved by reducing
the number of B- 1Bs or eliminating a B- 1B unit were not included in the
estimates for these options. Such costs include depot maintenance, travel,
and contractor logistics support. However, for options that stationed the
aircraft at active bases only and eliminated both Guard units, Air Force
officials included the projected flying hour savings from the smaller
fleet and the Guard*s B- 1B nonflying hour operations and maintenance
costs in the savings estimates. Air Force officials could not explain why
they estimated the cost savings in this manner. However, they noted that
while they obtained complete operations and maintenance data for the Guard
units, they did not obtain similar data for the active units. Using this
methodology, the Air Force estimates for options that included a mix of
active and Guard units understated the savings that could result from
reducing and consolidating the fleet.
Air Force officials said they considered other factors when they assessed
the basing options. One factor was the impact that the consolidation might
have on the individual B- 1B bases. Air Force officials told us that they
realized that they would have to select an option that included Ellsworth
Air Force Base because, without the B- 1B, Ellsworth would have no
12 The Air Force*s operations and maintenance appropriation provides funds
for the day- to- day operations of the Air Force. In addition to funds for
fuel and aircraft repair parts, this account pays for items such as
travel, office supplies, contractor support, communications, computers,
and utilities and provides funds to pay Air Force civilian employees.
Page 10 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
mission and the Air Force had no authority to close the base. A second
factor was the need to avoid generating requirements for construction of
new facilities since this would reduce the potential savings from the
consolidation and might require the Air Force to seek construction funds
from Congress. Several other factors that could have been considered but
were not include: actual flying hour costs, mission capable rates, and
aircrew experience levels for the active and Guard units. According to Air
Force officials, the Air Force did not consider these factors because they
believed the active and Guard units had similar capabilities.
In comparing their assigned missions, flying hour costs, mission capable
rates, aircrew experience, and operational readiness inspections, we found
that Guard units (1) were assigned responsibility for substantially the
same types of missions as their active duty counterparts, (2) had lower
flying hour and higher mission capable rates during fiscal years 1999-
2001, and (3) had more experienced crewmembers than the active duty units
in terms of hours flown. We also found that active and Guard units
received similar scores in their most recent operational readiness
inspections.
With the exception of an additional 24 hours to recall and mobilize Guard
personnel prior to deployment, the kinds of missions assigned to Guard B-
1B units and their active duty counterparts are substantially the same.
For example, the Guard and active duty units have similar wartime mission
responsibilities, and each of the B- 1B units is assigned to support
either Central or Pacific theater commanders during wartime. Additionally,
during peacetime, both active and Guard B- 1B units are scheduled to be
available to meet ongoing contingency operation needs for 90 days every 15
months under the Air Force*s Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept. 13 In
the past, however, the two Guard B- 1B units have worked together to
support operational requirements during this period so that each unit is
responsible for a 45- day period rather than the full 90- day period,
which places less strain on volunteer Guardsmen and their employers.
13 The Air Force*s Aerospace Expeditionary Force was designed to help
manage commitments to theater commanders and reduce the deployment burden.
Active duty and Guard B- 1B units usually meet their commitments in on-
call status at their home station. Guard B- 1B Units
Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs and Are at Least as Capable
as Active Units
Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Units Have Similar Missions
Page 11 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
We compared the flying hour costs between active duty and Guard B- 1B
units for fiscal years 1999- 2001 and found that Guard costs averaged
about 27 percent lower than active duty costs. The Air Force calculates
flying hour costs by dividing the cost of fuel and parts by the number of
hours each unit flies the aircraft. Specifically, the Air Force considers
the cost of
aviation fuel, oil, and lubricants;
depot- level reparables, which are expensive parts that can be fixed and
used again, such as hydraulic pumps, navigational computers, engines, and
landing gear; and
consumable supplies, which are inexpensive parts, such as nuts, bolts,
and washers, which are used and then discarded.
Table 2 shows the cost per flying hour for active and Air National Guard
B- 1B units for fiscal years 1999- 2001.
Table 2: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Flying
Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999- 2001
FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average
Active duty $14,163 $13,426 $15,818 $14,486 Air National Guard 10,194
10,997 10,478 10,530 Difference $3,969 $2,428 $5,340 $3,956
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
Bases.
Our analysis showed that the Guard*s lower cost per flying hour was due in
large part to its significantly lower costs for depot- level reparables
(see table 3). The Guard attributed its lower reparables costs to the
higher experience levels of its maintenance personnel. Apprentice
mechanics in the Guard averaged over 10 years of military experience
compared to slightly more than 2 years of military experience among
apprentice active duty mechanics. Officials said that more experienced
maintenance personnel are often able to identify a problem part and fix it
at the unit, when appropriate, instead of purchasing a replacement part
from the Air Force supply system. Guard Flying Hour Costs
Are Lower
Page 12 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Table 3: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Depot-
Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour
FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average
Active duty $9,110 $9,219 $9,928 $9,436 Air National Guard 5, 704 7,058
5,271 5,992 Difference $3,406 $2,161 $4,656 $3,444
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
Bases.
Our analysis also showed that the lower costs of consumables in the Guard
also contributed to the lower flying hour costs 14 (see table 4). Guard
officials said that they are able to keep the costs of consumables down
because their experienced maintenance crews are often able to isolate,
identify, and fix malfunctioning parts without pulling multiple suspect
parts off the aircraft. As a result, fewer consumable supplies are used.
Table 4: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Consumable
Supplies Cost per Flying Hour
FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average
Active duty $1,776 $1,819 $1,998 $1,869 Air National Guard 1, 160 1,558
1,324 1,334 Difference $616 $261 $674 $536
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
Bases.
Flying hour costs represent only a portion of the overall costs of
operating and maintaining B- 1B bombers. Costs such as pilot training,
test equipment, and depot maintenance are not included in the flying hour
cost. As we noted earlier, the Air Force did not consider these costs or
14 The cost of aviation fuel did not contribute significantly to the
difference in cost per flying hour between active duty and Guard B- 1B
units, as these costs were very similar between the B- 1B units. Both
active duty and Guard units pay about the same price for aviation fuel,
oil, and lubricants.
Page 13 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
the historical flying hour costs detailed previously when it made its
basing decision.
The Guard*s reported mission capable rates were higher than the active
duty*s reported rates between fiscal year 1999 and 2001. The Air Force
designates a weapon system as mission capable when it can perform at least
one of its assigned combat missions. The mission capable rate specifically
measures the percentage of time a unit*s aircraft are available to meet at
least one of its missions. On average, the Guard units* B1- B fleet was
available between 62 and 65 percent of the time during fiscal years 1999
through 2001. During those same years, the active duty mission capable
rate performance averaged between 52 and 60 percent (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Mission Capable Rates
(Fiscal Years 1999- 2001)
Source: GAO*s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command; the
116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base; and the 184th Bomb Wing, McConnell
Air Force Base.
According to Air Combat Command officials, the active duty units* mission
capable rate gain in fiscal year 2001 was primarily due to (1) increased
Guard B- 1B Units Report
Higher Mission Capable Rates
Page 14 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
aircraft availability following completion of an extensive modification
program and (2) improvements in the Air Force*s inventory of spare parts.
In the 2 years prior to fiscal year 2001, both active and Guard B- 1Bs
underwent extensive modifications at the depot that improved the
aircraft*s survivability and equipped the aircraft with more advanced
munitions. During this time, large portions of the B- 1B fleet were at the
depot for extended periods. According to Air Combat Command officials,
active duty B- 1B units experienced reduced mission capable rates because
maintaining a normal operating tempo with fewer aircraft required each
aircraft to be flown more frequently and resulted in more wear and tear to
each aircraft. However, the Guard units* mission capable rates were less
affected. Both Air Combat Command and Guard unit officials agreed that
during this time the higher experience levels of Guard maintenance
personnel and the Guard*s lower operating tempo lessened the impact of
having large portions of the fleet at the depot on the Guard units*
mission capable rates. The Air Force completed most of these modifications
by the end of fiscal year 2000, and the gap between the active and Guard
mission capable rates narrowed in fiscal year 2001.
According to Air Combat Command officials, the overall shortage of spare
parts experienced by the Air Force during the late 1990s also negatively
affected the active duty B- 1B units* mission capable rates prior to
fiscal year 2001. 15 Although increased funding led to an improvement in
the spare parts inventory by fiscal year 1999, it took about 12 to 24
months for the improvements to be reflected in the units* reported mission
capable rates according to Air Staff officials. According to Guard
officials, Guard B- 1B units were less affected by the shortage of spare
parts because their more experienced maintainers could sometimes repair
rather than replace problematic components.
The Air National Guard*s B- 1B pilots and weapon systems officers are
generally more experienced than their active duty counterparts. The Air
Force designates aircrew members as *experienced* based on the total
number of flying hours they have accumulated both overall and in the B-
1B. 16 A crewmember*s experience level determines the amount of
15 According to Air Staff officials, the spare parts shortage affected all
aircraft during 1991- 2000. 16 The same requirements are applied to both
active duty and Guard aircrew members. Guard B- 1B Aircrews
Are Generally More Experienced Than Their Active Duty Counterparts
Page 15 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
training (i. e., flying hours and sorties) he or she is required to
complete each year, which, in turn, drives the unit*s overall flying hour
program. For example, units with a higher number of inexperienced aircrew
members would require a higher allocation of flying hours to meet training
requirements each year.
In comparing the Guard and active B- 1B aircrew experience levels, we
found that the majority of Air National Guard pilots were designated as
experienced. However, this was not the case for pilots assigned to active
operations squadrons at Dyess and Ellsworth. Table 5 shows the percentage
of experienced pilots by unit location.
Table 5: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Pilot Experience Levels
Unit location
Number assigned
Number designated experienced
Percent experienced Active units
Dyess 56 22 39 Ellsworth 66 30 45 Mountain Home 23 12 52
Air National Guard units
McConnell 29 25 86 Robins 33 24 73
Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for training
and test units is excluded. The three training and test units each were
staffed with 100- percent experienced pilots.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command, the 184th
Bomb Wing, and the116th Bomb Wing.
Many of the Guard pilots also had other flying experience that enhanced
their ability to pilot the B- 1B. For example, many had prior active duty
flying experience or flew other aircraft for the Guard. This experience
contributed to the pilots* overall qualifications, thereby permitting them
to be designated as experienced more quickly than their active duty
counterparts.
Page 16 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
The picture was similar for the B- 1B*s weapon systems officers. For
example, more than 80 percent of the Air National Guard*s weapons system
officers were considered experienced, while in the active Air Force only
about 40 percent were considered experienced. Like the Guard pilots, most
of the Guard*s weapon systems officers also had experience flying other
military aircraft that enhanced their ability in the B- 1B. Table 6 shows
the percentage of experienced weapon systems officers by unit location.
Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Weapon Systems Officer
Experience Levels
Unit location Number assigned
Number designated experienced Percent
experienced Active units
Dyess 54 20 37 Ellsworth 61 25 41 Mountain Home 22 10 45
Air National Guard units
McConnell 33 29 88 Robins 31 29 94
Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for training
and test units is excluded. The three training and test units each were
staffed with 100- percent experienced weapon systems officers.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Force*s Air Combat Command,
184th Bomb Wing, and 116th Bomb Wing.
The Air Force conducts periodic inspections of each of its operational
units to evaluate the unit*s readiness to perform its wartime mission. The
readiness inspections, conducted by the Air Combat Command Inspector
General staff, are intended to create a realistic environment for
evaluating the units* sustained performance and contingency response. The
bomb units are evaluated in four major areas: initial response,
employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate in a
hostile environment. The Guard B- 1B units scored as high or higher than
did the active duty units in the most recent readiness inspections.
Specifically, the B- 1B bomb units at two active locations (Dyess and
Ellsworth) and one Guard location (McConnell) each received excellent
ratings overall in their most recent inspections. The Inspector General
completed an inspection of Robins* initial response capabilities in July
2001 and rated the unit as excellent. However, the Inspector General did
not complete its inspection of the three remaining areas since the Air
Force had already decided to remove the B- 1Bs from Robins. Additionally,
the Mountain Home wing, Operational Readiness
Inspections Yielded Similar Ratings for Active and Guard B- 1B Units
Page 17 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
which includes B- 1Bs, had not undergone an operational readiness
inspection at the time of our review.
Major decisions involving force structure need to be supported by solid
analysis to document that a range of alternatives has been considered and
that the decision provides a cost- effective solution consistent with the
national defense strategy. DOD*s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
process establishes a consultation process for civilian and military
leaders to use in reviewing alternatives to the services* current force
structure. However, the decision to reduce the B- 1B did not fully adhere
to this process because key offices such as the Office of Program Analysis
and Evaluation and the Joint Staff did not have an opportunity to review
and comment on the proposal and conduct analysis before it was approved.
Moreover, although Air Force and OSD officials are comfortable with the
decision, based on their military judgment, neither the Air Force nor OSD
conducted any formal analysis to provide data on how a range of B- 1B
force size alternatives would impact DOD*s ability to meet potential
wartime requirements. By following its established budget process more
closely in the future and allowing experts from various offices to review
and analyze force structure proposals, DOD could provide better assurance
to Congress that future force structure decisions are well- supported and
are in the nation*s long- term interest.
In addition, the lack of an established Air Force methodology for
assessing the costs associated with potential basing options led officials
to use incomplete costs when estimating the projected savings for some of
the basing options considered. By focusing solely on flying hour costs for
some basing options, Air Force officials did not consider other operations
and maintenance savings that a reduction in the number of aircraft or the
number of B- 1B units would generate. As a result, the Air Force may have
understated the cost savings of the options that retained B- 1Bs in both
the Air National Guard and the active components. A more structured cost
estimating methodology would ensure that that the Air Force considers all
appropriate costs in calculating the savings for future aircraft
realignments.
To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment decisions,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air
Force to develop a methodology for assessing and comparing the costs of
active and reserve units so that all potential costs are fully considered
when evaluating potential basing options and making future basing
decisions. Conclusions
Recommendation for Executive Action
Page 18 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our
recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for assessing and
comparing costs to evaluate basing options because it believes that such a
methodology exists. Furthermore, DOD believes that the Air Force used a
methodology that considered all costs as well as noncost factors when it
made its basing decision and that cost- effectiveness, while an important
criterion, should not be the sole consideration in making basing
decisions. DOD*s comments are included in this report as appendix II.
After we received DOD*s comments, we asked the department to provide
documentation describing its methodology for comparing active and reserve
unit costs. DOD referred us to the instruction that outlines its Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System. This instruction describes DOD*s process
for developing the department*s overall plans and budget; however, it does
not identify a methodology for assessing and comparing the costs
associated with active and reserve units. DOD also noted that the Air
Force*s Total Ownership Cost database encompasses all cost factors related
to active and reserve costs and ensures that any comparison of active and
reserve units is done equitably. During our audit work, we assessed
whether the Total Ownership Cost database could be used to compare total
operations costs for B- 1Bs located at Guard and active duty units. We
determined, however, that not all indirect costs for B- 1B units in the
Guard were included in the database, making it impossible to compare the
operating costs of Guard and active units equitably. Therefore, we are
retaining our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology.
In commenting on our presentation of flying hour costs, DOD acknowledged
the Guard*s lower flying hour costs, but it stated that including
additional costs would result in more comparable flying hour costs for
Guard and active duty units. DOD suggested using the direct and indirect
costs included in the Air Force*s Total Ownership Cost database to
calculate flying hour costs. In conducting our analysis of flying hour
costs, we relied on the Air Force*s definition. The Air Force defines
flying hour costs as the cost of fuel, depot- level reparables, and
consumable parts divided by the number of hours flown. The Air Force does
not include other costs such as software maintenance costs, contractor
support costs, or military personnel costs when it calculates the cost per
flying hour. DOD is correct when it states that there are other costs
associated with operating a B- 1B and our report recognizes that fact.
In commenting on our analysis of active and Guard mission capable rates,
DOD noted that the difference between active and Guard mission capable
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 19 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
rates is not solely attributable to the experience level of Guard
personnel. The department also noted that the Guard operates newer model
B- 1B aircraft while the active duty units operate older model aircraft
and identified this as a factor contributing to lower active duty rates.
While we recognize that the oldest aircraft in the fleet (1983 and 1984
models) are concentrated in the active units at Dyess Air Force Base, our
analysis shows that those aircraft constitute only about one- third (33
percent) of Dyess* fleet and only about one- fifth (or 20 percent) of the
active B- 1B fleet overall. Active units at Ellsworth and Mountain Home
operate newer 1985 and 1986 model aircraft* the same models as those
operated by the two Guard units. While aircraft age may have some effect
on mission capable rates, we do not believe, based on our analysis, that
this effect is significant for the B- 1B force.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional committees. We
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
gao. gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on this report or wish to discuss
these matters further, please call me on 202- 512- 4300. Key contacts and
staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours, Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Managing Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 20 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
To determine what types of analyses the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Air Force did of wartime requirements and basing options before
deciding on the number of aircraft to retain and where to base them, we
obtained and analyzed the only contemporaneous documents that were
available from the Air Force* a briefing presented to the Secretary and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the fleet reduction and
consolidation and a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force to the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) outlining the Air Force*s
proposal to reduce and consolidate the fleet. Additionally, because the
Air Force had no documents explaining its methodology for evaluating the
various basing options it considered, we asked the Air Force, in early
2002, to document its methodology. The Air Force provided us with a
statement explaining the methodology; however, it was unable to provide us
with the cost figures used to estimate the savings. As a result, we could
not verify the savings estimates that the Air Force attributed to each
option.
To supplement our document review, we interviewed several Air Force
officials who were located in the Washington, D. C., area to determine
what role each may have played in the decision to reduce the fleet and
consolidate it at two bases. The officials were the Chief of Staff, U. S.
Air Force; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, U. S. Air Force;
the former Director of the Air National Guard; and the Assistant for
Operational Readiness, Air National Guard. We also spoke with officials
responsible for overseeing the B- 1B program in the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, U. S. Air Force, Washington, D.
C, to determine if any analysis of current and future wartime requirements
had been completed prior to the decision. We also had numerous meetings
with officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and
Programs, who were responsible for developing the basing options and
estimating the savings that would result for each option to discuss their
methodology and the decision process. We also met with representatives of
the Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to determine
if they had any role in the decision to either reduce the number of B- 1Bs
or consolidate them at two active duty bases. Finally, we met with
representatives of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the
Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation; and the Joint Staff to
determine if they had completed any analysis of the Office of Secretary of
Defense suggestion to eliminate the B- 1B fleet or the Air Force*s
proposal to reduce the fleet. In addition, we reviewed the 1999 and 2001
Air Force bomber white papers and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to
gather insight on current and future B- 1B wartime requirements and copies
of congressional testimonies by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 21 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Staff of the Air Force to document DOD*s rationale for making the B- 1B
decision.
To compare the flying hour costs and the capabilities of the various
active and Air National Guard B- 1B units, we collected and analyzed
flying hour cost data for fiscal years 1999- 2001 from the five B- 1B
units. To verify the data from these sources, we collected and analyzed
cost data for the same years from the Air Combat Command; the Air Force
Cost Analysis Agency, Washington, D. C.; and the Directorate of Logistics,
Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. We also collected
and analyzed (1) mission capable rate data for fiscal years 1999- 2001
from the Air Combat Command and the two Guard units and (2) collected and
analyzed data on aircrew and maintenance crew experience from the Air
Combat Command and the Air National Guard Bureau. To determine if there
were significant differences in active and Guard units* wartime missions,
we reviewed the wartime taskings of all five B- 1B units. To compare the
units* participation in peacetime activities, we reviewed documents
provided by officials at the Air Expeditionary Force Center, Langley Air
Force Base, Virginia. We reviewed and compared the operational readiness
inspections for the bomb wings located at Dyess, Ellsworth, and McConnell
Air Force Bases and the partial operational readiness inspection for the
bomb wing at Robins Air Force Base. The Inspector General staff completed
an inspection of Robins* initial response capabilities in July 2001 but
did not complete its inspection of the three remaining areas since the Air
Force had already decided to remove the B- 1Bs from Robins. The wing at
Mountain Home had not undergone an operational readiness inspection at the
time we completed our review. Our work also included visits to three B- 1B
units to interview officials and obtain documents: 184th Bomb Wing,
McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base,
Texas; and 116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 22 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 23 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 24 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Page 25 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512- 4402 Carole Coffey (202) 512- 5876
In addition to those named above, Sharron Candon, Judith Collins, Penney
Harwell, Jane Hunt, Ken Patton, and Carol Schuster made key contributions
to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments
Page 26 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Air Force Bombers: Moving More B- 1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions
without Reducing Mission Capability. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 64. Washington, D.
C.: February 26, 1998.
Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce
Planned Spending. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 192. Washington, D. C.: September 30,
1996.
Embedded Computers: B- 1B Computers Must Be Upgraded to Support
Conventional Requirements. GAO/ AIMD- 96- 28. Washington, D. C.: February
27, 1996.
B- 1B Conventional Upgrades. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 52R. Washington, D. C.:
December 4, 1995.
B- 1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B- 1B Operational
Readiness Assessment. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 151. Washington, D. C.: July 18,
1995.
Air Force: Assessment of DOD*s Report on Plan and Capabilities for
Evaluating Heavy Bombers. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 99. Washington, D. C.: January
10, 1994.
Strategic Bombers: Issues Relating to the B- 1B*s Availability and Ability
to Perform Conventional Missions. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 81. Washington, D. C.:
January 10, 1994.
The U. S. Nuclear Triad: GAO*s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization
Program. GAO/ T- PEMD- 93- 5. Washington, D. C.: June 10, 1993.
Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-
Consuming, and Costly. GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 45. Washington, D. C.: February 5,
1993.
Strategic Bombers: Need to Redefine Requirements for B- 1B Defensive
Avionics System. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 272. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 1992.
Related GAO Products
Page 27 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
Strategic Bombers: Updated Status of the B- 1B Recovery Program.
GAO/ NSIAD- 91- 189. Washington, D. C.: May 9, 1991.
Strategic Bombers: Issues Related to the B- 1B Aircraft Program.
GAO/ T- NSIAD- 91- 11. Washington, D. C.: March 6, 1991.
(350117)
Page 28 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure
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