Force Structure: Decision to Reduce B-1B Fleet Not Based on Sound
and Complete Analysis (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-846).			 
                                                                 
The B-1B began operations in 1986 as a long-range heavy bomber	 
designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the	 
B-1B's nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, the Air	 
Force continues to rely on the B-1B to support conventional	 
wartime missions. The B-1B has the largest payload of the Air	 
Force's three bombers, and recent modifications have provided the
capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades  
to the B-1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by	 
enabling it to carry three different types of bombs		 
simultaneously and eliminate some of its long-term survivability 
and maintainability problems by improving its radar warning	 
systems, jamming ability, and other electronic countermeasures.  
In May 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense suggested	 
retiring the entire B-1B  fleet by October 2001. In June 2001,	 
the Air Force proposed as alternative that reduced the B-1B fleet
from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at two active duty  
locations instead of the three active duty and two National Guard
locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed		 
implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force	 
completed a review of bomber force structure and provided a	 
report on alternative missions and basing plans. The Air Force	 
began consolidating the fleet in July 2002. GAO found that Air	 
Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a
reduction in B-1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect the	 
Department of Defense's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor
did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing	 
options to know whether they were choosing the most		 
cost-effective alternative. A comparison of active and Guard	 
units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that 
active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the	 
same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and	 
higher mission capable rates than their active duty counterparts.
Additionally, the Guard's B-1B aircrew members were generally	 
more experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the
active duty B-1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members	 
served on active duty prior to joining the Air National Guard.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-846 					        
    ACCNO:   A04795						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Decision to Reduce B-1B Fleet Not Based 
on Sound and Complete Analysis					 
     DATE:   09/06/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force reservists				 
	     Bomber aircraft					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Military cost control				 
	     B-1B Aircraft					 
	     Eagle Aircraft					 
	     F-15E Aircraft					 
	     Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     KC-135 Aircraft					 
	     KC-135R Aircraft					 

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GAO-02-846

   United States General Accounting Office

   Report to the Honorable Max Cleland, U. S. Senate GAO

   September 2002 FORCE STRUCTURE Review of B- 1B Process Identifies
   Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis

   GAO- 02- 846

   Page i GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure Letter 1

   Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Decision to Reduce and Consolidate the B-
   1Bs Based on Budget

   Concerns, Military Judgment, and Incomplete Cost Estimates 5 Guard B- 1B
   Units Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs

   and Are at Least as Capable as Active Units 10 Conclusions 17
   Recommendation for Executive Action 17 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
   18

   Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

   Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 22

   Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 25

   Related GAO Products 26

   Tables

   Table 1: B- 1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation 4 Table 2:
   Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B

   Flying Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999- 2001 11 Table 3: Comparison of
   Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B

   Depot- Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour 12 Table 4: Comparison of
   Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B

   Consumable Supplies Cost per Flying Hour 12 Table 5: Active Duty and Air
   National Guard B- 1B Pilot Experience

   Levels 15 Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Weapon Systems

   Officer Experience Levels 16 Contents

   Page ii GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure Figure

   Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Mission Capable Rates
   (Fiscal Years 1999- 2001) 13

   Abbreviations

   DOD Department of Defense OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

   Page 1 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   September 6, 2002 The Honorable Max Cleland United States Senate

   Dear Senator Cleland: The B- 1B began operations in 1986 as a long- range
   heavy bomber designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the
   B- 1B*s nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, 1 the Air Force
   continues to rely on the B- 1B to support conventional wartime missions.
   The B- 1B, equipped with three weapons bays, has the largest payload of
   the Air Force*s three bombers, 2 and recent modifications have provided
   the capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades to the
   B- 1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by enabling it to carry
   three different types of bombs simultaneously and eliminate some of its
   long- term survivability and maintainability problems by improving its
   radar warning systems, jamming ability, and other electronic
   countermeasure systems.

   In May 2001, as part of a broader Department of Defense (DOD) initiative
   to make funds available to further military transformation, the Office of
   the Secretary of Defense (OSD) suggested retiring the entire B- 1B fleet
   by October 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed an alternative that
   reduced the B- 1B fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at 2
   active duty locations instead of the 3 active duty and 2 Air National
   Guard (Guard) locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed
   implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force completed a
   review of bomber force structure and provided a report on alternative
   missions and basing plans. 3 The report was delivered to Congress on
   February 6, 2002, and after a 15- day period, the Air Force had the
   authority to begin implementing the fleet reduction and consolidation. The
   Air Force began consolidating the fleet in July 2002.

   1 According to the Department of Defense*s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,
   DOD no longer maintains plans to reconstitute the B- 1Bs* nuclear
   capability. 2 The Air Force*s bomber fleet consists of the B- 1B, B- 2,
   and B- 52.

   3 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
   107- 107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215- 16 (2001).

   United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

   Page 2 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   In July 2001, you asked that we review the Air Force decision to reduce
   and consolidate the B- 1B fleet. Subsequent to your request, the Air Force
   submitted the required report to Congress, and your office asked that we
   document and analyze the process used to make the reduction and
   consolidation decision so that the insights gained might assist those who
   make force structure and basing decisions in the future. As agreed, we
   determined what types of analysis DOD and the Air Force did of wartime
   requirements and basing options before deciding on the number of aircraft
   to retain and where to base them. Additionally, at your request, we
   compared the missions, flying hour costs, 4 and selected capabilities of
   the various active and Air National Guard B- 1B units.

   We reviewed documentation related to the B- 1B force restructuring and met
   with representatives of OSD, the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and the Air
   National Guard to determine how the Air Force made its decision. We
   obtained and analyzed data for flying hour costs and mission capable rates
   for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001 for all of the B- 1B units and
   obtained data on aircrew experience for both Air National Guard and active
   duty aircrews. Additionally, we visited three of the five B- 1B units. We
   conducted our review from September 2001 through July 2002 in accordance
   with generally accepted government auditing standards. We discuss our
   scope and methodology in more detail in appendix I.

   Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a
   reduction in B- 1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect DOD*s ability to
   meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis
   of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most
   cost- effective alternative. Air Force officials explained that their
   proposal to reduce the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an
   Office of the Secretary of Defense suggestion to eliminate the entire B-
   1B fleet and to address significant funding shortages in the B- 1B
   modification program. Senior Air Force officials further explained that
   they are comfortable with this decision because, based on their military
   judgment, a smaller, fully modified B- 1B fleet will provide more
   capability than a larger fleet with no additional modifications. However,
   the decision was not vetted through established DOD budget processes that
   normally involve a wider range of participants and generally allow more
   time for

   4 The Air Force calculates flying hour costs by dividing the cost of fuel
   and repair parts by the number of hours the aircraft is flown. Results in
   Brief

   Page 3 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   analysis of how proposed force structure changes will affect DOD*s ability
   to meet wartime requirements. Furthermore, Air Force headquarters
   officials appear to have used an inconsistent methodology and incomplete
   cost estimates when considering options for basing the remaining aircraft.
   As a result, the Air Force understated the potential savings for some
   options, and it lacks assurance that the basing option selected, which
   consolidates the B- 1Bs in the active component, is the most cost-
   effective option available. In the absence of standard guidance for
   analyzing basing alternatives, similar problems could occur in the future.

   Our comparison of active and Guard units* missions, flying hour costs, and
   capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for
   substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour
   costs and higher mission capable rates 5 than their active duty
   counterparts. For example, during fiscal years 1999 through 2001, the
   Guard*s B- 1B units averaged both lower flying hour costs and higher
   mission capable rates than the active duty units, although the gap between
   active and Guard mission capable rates narrowed in fiscal year 2001.
   Additionally, the Guard*s B- 1B aircrew members 6 were generally more
   experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the active duty
   B- 1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members served on active duty
   prior to joining the Air National Guard.

   To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment decisions,
   we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
   the Air Force to develop a methodology for assessing and comparing the
   costs of active and reserve units when evaluating potential basing
   options.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
   recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for assessing and
   comparing costs because the department believes that such a methodology
   currently exists. However, DOD*s written comments did not describe the
   methodology or provide any evidence that such a methodology exists and Air
   Force officials told us the Air Force does not have a standard
   methodology. A detailed discussion of DOD*s comments

   5 The Air Force designates a weapon system as mission capable when it can
   perform at least one of its assigned combat missions. The mission capable
   rate measures the amount of time an aircraft is available to complete at
   least one of its assigned missions.

   6 The B- 1B requires four aircrew members, including the pilot, the
   copilot, and the offensive and defensive weapon systems officers.

   Page 4 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   and our response is included in the Agency Comments section of this
   report.

   In a March 1999 white paper 7 detailing modernization plans for the bomber
   fleet, the Air Force advised Congress that it needed 93 B- 1Bs, including
   70 combat- coded aircraft 8 by the end of fiscal year 2004, to meet DOD*s
   strategy of being prepared to win two nearly simultaneous major theater
   wars. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed reducing the fleet from 93 to
   60 aircraft and reducing the number of combat- coded aircraft to 36. Table
   1 compares the force structure before and after OSD*s June 2001 decision
   to reduce and consolidate the B- 1B fleet.

   Table 1: B- 1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation Base Before
   consolidation After consolidation Active duty Number Type Number Type

   Dyess Air Force Base, Texas 40 B- 1Bs 12 combat

   24 training a 4 backup b

   32 B- 1Bs 12 combat 16 training

   2 test 2 backup Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota 26 B- 1Bs 18 combat

   6 training 2 backup

   26 B- 1Bs 24 combat 2 backup

   Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho 7 B- 1Bs 6 combat

   1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c

   Edwards Air Force Base, California 2 B- 1Bs 2 test 2 B- 1Bs 2 test

   Air National Guard

   McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas 9 B- 1Bs 8 combat

   1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c

   Robins Air Force Base, Georgia 9 B- 1Bs 8 combat

   1 backup 0 B- 1Bs c

   Total 93 B- 1Bs 60 B- 1Bs

   a These aircraft are used to train newly qualified pilots as B- 1B pilots.
   b Backup aircraft are located at each unit and are used when a primary
   aircraft is not available. c Units affected received new missions as
   discussed below.

   Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command.

   7 U. S. Air Force, White Paper on Long Range Bombers (Washington, D. C.,
   Mar. 1, 1999). 8 Combat coded means that the aircraft is fully equipped
   and funded to perform all wartime missions. Background

   Page 5 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Partly in response to concerns expressed by Members of Congress about
   OSD*s June 2001 decision to eliminate the B- 1B mission at Mountain Home,
   McConnell, and Robins Air Force Bases, the Air Force identified and
   announced new missions for these locations in September 2001. Planning for
   the new missions is well underway, and the units are expected to
   transition to their new missions in the fourth quarter of fiscal year
   2002. Mountain Home*s current F- 15E squadron will be increased from 18 to
   24 aircraft, and its 7 KC- 135 tankers will be relocated to the Air
   National Guard unit at McConnell Air Force Base. The Air National Guard
   unit at McConnell will be redesignated as the 184th Air Refueling Wing and
   will have 10 KC- 135R tankers. The Guard unit at Robins Air Force Base
   will transition to the 116th Air Control Wing and have 19 Joint
   Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft.

   As you know, we have issued numerous reports on the B- 1B bomber in
   response to a variety of congressional concerns. In February 1998, for
   example, we reported that the Air Force could save millions of dollars
   without reducing mission capability by assigning more B- 1Bs to the
   reserve component. 9 A list of related GAO products can be found at the
   end of this report.

   The decision to reduce the B- 1B force was not based on a formal analysis
   of how a smaller B- 1B force would impact DOD*s ability to meet wartime
   requirements. Air Force officials explained that their decision to reduce
   the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an OSD suggestion to
   eliminate the entire B- 1B fleet and to address significant funding
   shortages in the B- 1B modification program. Furthermore, the decision was
   not vetted through established DOD budget processes that normally involve
   a wider range of participants and generally allow more time for analysis
   of proposed changes. Senior Air Force officials believe, based on their
   military judgment, that the decision will not adversely affect DOD*s
   ability to implement the national security strategy. With regard to the
   Air Force*s

   9 We presented six options for placing more B- 1Bs in Air National Guard
   units and estimated that implementing our proposed options could produce
   savings ranging from $87. 1 million to $235.3 million in fiscal years
   1999- 2003. We also recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force
   prepare a plan to place more B- 1Bs in the reserve component. In its
   response to our report at that time, DOD stated that it had the right mix
   of B- 1Bs in the active and reserve components and that it did not plan to
   move more B- 1Bs to the reserve component at that time. See U. S. General
   Accounting Office, Air Force Bombers: Moving More B- 1s to the Reserves
   Could Save Millions without Reducing Mission Capability,

   GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 64 (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 26, 1998). Decision to Reduce

   and Consolidate the B- 1Bs Based on Budget Concerns, Military Judgment,
   and Incomplete Cost Estimates

   Page 6 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   analysis of basing alternatives, a lack of Air Force guidance led Air
   Force officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
   Programs to develop their own methodology to determine where to base the
   reduced B- 1B fleet. These officials did not document their methodology at
   the time the decision was made and could not replicate the calculations
   used to make the basing decision. However, our review of documents
   prepared (at our request) after the decision was made suggests the Air
   Force used an inconsistent methodology and incomplete costs when
   estimating the savings generated from the consolidation. As a result, it
   is not clear whether they chose the most cost- effective alternative.

   In May 2001, as it considered changes to the fiscal year 2002 DOD budget
   previously submitted to Congress by the prior administration, senior OSD
   officials suggested eliminating the entire B- 1B fleet that had
   experienced long- standing survivability and reliability problems. OSD
   officials in offices such as the Program Analysis and Evaluation did not
   undertake any analysis of the impact of the proposed B- 1B retirements on
   the Air Force*s ability to meet war- fighting requirements. At that time,
   the OSD Comptroller estimated that eliminating the B- 1B would save
   approximately $4.5 billion in fiscal years 2002 through 2007. The savings
   would be achieved by eliminating the B- 1Bs from both the active and Guard
   fleets and canceling the B- 1B modernization program, according to an
   official in the Comptroller*s office.

   Acknowledging that it lacked sufficient funding to complete planned
   upgrades to all 93 aircraft, but at the same time believing that some B-
   1Bs should be retained, the Air Force proposed reducing the size of the
   fleet from 93 to 60 and reinvesting the savings in upgrades to the
   remaining 60 aircraft. According to the Secretary of the Air Force and the
   Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the proposal was budget- driven. The
   Chief of Staff told us that if the Air Force reduced the number of
   aircraft to 60, it would have sufficient funds to upgrade the remaining
   aircraft to make them more usable in combat. The Air Force did no formal
   analysis of the impact of a smaller B- 1B fleet on its ability to meet
   current and future war- fighting requirements when it proposed this
   reduction. Senior Air Force leaders told us that they are comfortable with
   the proposed reduction because they believe that 60 upgraded aircraft will
   provide significantly more capability in terms of effectiveness,
   survivability, and maintainability than is available today. The Under
   Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) included the reduction in the amended
   2002 DOD budget request after discussions with the Secretary of Defense
   and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Decision to Reduce the

   B- 1B Fleet Was Based on Budget Considerations Rather than Requirements
   Analysis

   Page 7 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   The decision to reduce the number of B- 1Bs was not fully vetted through
   the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Under established DOD
   procedures, the service sends its budget to the Office of the Under
   Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) where issue area experts review it.
   Potential changes in the form of draft program budget decisions are
   circulated to the services, the Joint Staff, the Director of Program
   Analysis and Evaluation, and various assistant secretaries of defense who
   are in a position to evaluate the impact of the potential budget decisions
   on the national military strategy and the objectives of the Secretary of
   Defense. Their comments are provided to the Comptroller who considers
   them, finalizes the program budget decision, and forwards it to the Deputy
   Secretary of Defense for signature. According to an official in the
   Comptroller*s office, in this instance, the Comptroller approved the
   program budget decision that reduced and consolidated the B- 1B fleet
   after discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary
   of Defense. A draft program budget decision was not circulated to the
   Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Joint Staff,
   or the Air Force according to representatives of these offices.

   Air Force officials told us they were surprised when senior OSD officials
   decided to implement the B- 1B fleet reduction in June 2001. While Air
   Force officials recommended reducing the fleet, they did not know that the
   recommendation was to be included in the fiscal year 2002 amended budget
   until just a few days before OSD officials transmitted the budget to
   Congress and made it public. These same officials told us that they were
   also surprised that the consolidation was to be implemented by October 1,
   2001. They believed that they needed about 1 year to implement the
   decision.

   As a result of the short time frame between the OSD decision to implement
   the Air Force*s proposal to reduce and consolidate the B- 1Bs and the
   release of the amended fiscal year 2002 budget, Air Force officials told
   us the Air Force did not have time to

    determine if the Guard units would get new missions and identify those
   missions or

    meet with Members of Congress from the affected states to explain the
   decision.

   The decision to reduce the fleet and complete the consolidation by October
   1, 2001, concerned Members of Congress. As a result, Congress delayed
   implementation until the Air Force completed a review of bomber force
   structure and provided information on alternative missions and

   Page 8 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   basing plans. 10 According to the legislation, the Air Force could begin
   implementing the fleet reduction and consolidation 15 days after providing
   the required report to Congress. The report was delivered to Congress in
   February 2002. Among other things, the report provided a summary of the
   (1) Air Force*s reasons for reducing the B- 1B fleet, (2) follow- on
   missions for the affected units, and (3) details of the B- 1B
   modernization program. The Air Force began relocating and retiring B- 1Bs
   in July 2002.

   Air Force officers in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
   and Programs said they considered a number of basing options before
   recommending that the remaining aircraft be consolidated at two active
   duty bases. However, they did not document the options considered at the
   time the decision was made and could not provide a comprehensive list of
   options considered. In early 2002, at our request, they prepared a paper
   that outlined some of the options they believed were considered. According
   to the paper, the Air Force considered options that would have
   consolidated the aircraft at

    two active bases and one Guard base,

    one Guard base and one active base, or

    two active duty bases. The option selected continues to house B- 1Bs at
   two active duty bases* 26 at Ellsworth Air Force Base and 32 at Dyess Air
   Force Base. 11 According to Air Force officials, they selected this option
   because they believed it was the most cost- effective option available.
   Specifically, they believed they would achieve significant economies of
   scale by consolidating the aircraft at the two largest B- 1B bases, which
   were located in the active component.

   Air Force headquarters staff told us they had no written guidance or
   directives to assist them when they completed the cost analysis for
   assessing where to locate the aircraft, and the officers at Air Force

   10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
   107- 107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215- 16 (2001). 11 The remaining two
   aircraft will be used for developmental testing and will be located at the
   Air Force*s test facility at Edwards Air Force Base. According to Air
   Force officials, these aircraft will be altered to such a degree that it
   is unlikely that they will ever be used in a nontest environment. The Air
   Force Used

   Incomplete Cost Data When Deciding Where to Base the Remaining B- 1Bs

   Page 9 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   headquarters responsible for evaluating basing options said they received
   no guidance from their senior leaders. Consequently, they developed their
   own approach for determining where the B- 1Bs should be retained. The Air
   Force did not document its methodology at the time the consolidation
   decision was made but attempted to reconstruct it in early 2002 at our
   request. At that time, however, Air Force officials were unable to
   replicate the savings estimates they had developed or provide a complete
   explanation of the methodology used to make the basing decision.

   Our review of the documentation provided to us by Air Force officials in
   early 2002 suggests the Air Force may have used an inconsistent
   methodology and incomplete costs when estimating potential savings for
   various basing options. According to Air Force officials, for options that
   stationed aircraft at both active and Guard locations, the potential
   savings estimates were based solely on the anticipated reductions in the
   cost of flying hours that would result from the smaller B- 1B force. Other
   operations and maintenance costs 12 that would have been saved by reducing
   the number of B- 1Bs or eliminating a B- 1B unit were not included in the
   estimates for these options. Such costs include depot maintenance, travel,
   and contractor logistics support. However, for options that stationed the
   aircraft at active bases only and eliminated both Guard units, Air Force
   officials included the projected flying hour savings from the smaller
   fleet and the Guard*s B- 1B nonflying hour operations and maintenance
   costs in the savings estimates. Air Force officials could not explain why
   they estimated the cost savings in this manner. However, they noted that
   while they obtained complete operations and maintenance data for the Guard
   units, they did not obtain similar data for the active units. Using this
   methodology, the Air Force estimates for options that included a mix of
   active and Guard units understated the savings that could result from
   reducing and consolidating the fleet.

   Air Force officials said they considered other factors when they assessed
   the basing options. One factor was the impact that the consolidation might
   have on the individual B- 1B bases. Air Force officials told us that they
   realized that they would have to select an option that included Ellsworth
   Air Force Base because, without the B- 1B, Ellsworth would have no

   12 The Air Force*s operations and maintenance appropriation provides funds
   for the day- to- day operations of the Air Force. In addition to funds for
   fuel and aircraft repair parts, this account pays for items such as
   travel, office supplies, contractor support, communications, computers,
   and utilities and provides funds to pay Air Force civilian employees.

   Page 10 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   mission and the Air Force had no authority to close the base. A second
   factor was the need to avoid generating requirements for construction of
   new facilities since this would reduce the potential savings from the
   consolidation and might require the Air Force to seek construction funds
   from Congress. Several other factors that could have been considered but
   were not include: actual flying hour costs, mission capable rates, and
   aircrew experience levels for the active and Guard units. According to Air
   Force officials, the Air Force did not consider these factors because they
   believed the active and Guard units had similar capabilities.

   In comparing their assigned missions, flying hour costs, mission capable
   rates, aircrew experience, and operational readiness inspections, we found
   that Guard units (1) were assigned responsibility for substantially the
   same types of missions as their active duty counterparts, (2) had lower
   flying hour and higher mission capable rates during fiscal years 1999-
   2001, and (3) had more experienced crewmembers than the active duty units
   in terms of hours flown. We also found that active and Guard units
   received similar scores in their most recent operational readiness
   inspections.

   With the exception of an additional 24 hours to recall and mobilize Guard
   personnel prior to deployment, the kinds of missions assigned to Guard B-
   1B units and their active duty counterparts are substantially the same.
   For example, the Guard and active duty units have similar wartime mission
   responsibilities, and each of the B- 1B units is assigned to support
   either Central or Pacific theater commanders during wartime. Additionally,
   during peacetime, both active and Guard B- 1B units are scheduled to be
   available to meet ongoing contingency operation needs for 90 days every 15
   months under the Air Force*s Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept. 13 In
   the past, however, the two Guard B- 1B units have worked together to
   support operational requirements during this period so that each unit is
   responsible for a 45- day period rather than the full 90- day period,
   which places less strain on volunteer Guardsmen and their employers.

   13 The Air Force*s Aerospace Expeditionary Force was designed to help
   manage commitments to theater commanders and reduce the deployment burden.
   Active duty and Guard B- 1B units usually meet their commitments in on-
   call status at their home station. Guard B- 1B Units

   Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs and Are at Least as Capable
   as Active Units

   Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Units Have Similar Missions

   Page 11 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   We compared the flying hour costs between active duty and Guard B- 1B
   units for fiscal years 1999- 2001 and found that Guard costs averaged
   about 27 percent lower than active duty costs. The Air Force calculates
   flying hour costs by dividing the cost of fuel and parts by the number of
   hours each unit flies the aircraft. Specifically, the Air Force considers
   the cost of

    aviation fuel, oil, and lubricants;

    depot- level reparables, which are expensive parts that can be fixed and
   used again, such as hydraulic pumps, navigational computers, engines, and
   landing gear; and

    consumable supplies, which are inexpensive parts, such as nuts, bolts,
   and washers, which are used and then discarded.

   Table 2 shows the cost per flying hour for active and Air National Guard
   B- 1B units for fiscal years 1999- 2001.

   Table 2: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Flying
   Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999- 2001

   FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average

   Active duty $14,163 $13,426 $15,818 $14,486 Air National Guard 10,194
   10,997 10,478 10,530 Difference $3,969 $2,428 $5,340 $3,956

   Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
   data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
   and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
   Bases.

   Our analysis showed that the Guard*s lower cost per flying hour was due in
   large part to its significantly lower costs for depot- level reparables
   (see table 3). The Guard attributed its lower reparables costs to the
   higher experience levels of its maintenance personnel. Apprentice
   mechanics in the Guard averaged over 10 years of military experience
   compared to slightly more than 2 years of military experience among
   apprentice active duty mechanics. Officials said that more experienced
   maintenance personnel are often able to identify a problem part and fix it
   at the unit, when appropriate, instead of purchasing a replacement part
   from the Air Force supply system. Guard Flying Hour Costs

   Are Lower

   Page 12 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Table 3: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Depot-
   Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour

   FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average

   Active duty $9,110 $9,219 $9,928 $9,436 Air National Guard 5, 704 7,058
   5,271 5,992 Difference $3,406 $2,161 $4,656 $3,444

   Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
   data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
   and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
   Bases.

   Our analysis also showed that the lower costs of consumables in the Guard
   also contributed to the lower flying hour costs 14 (see table 4). Guard
   officials said that they are able to keep the costs of consumables down
   because their experienced maintenance crews are often able to isolate,
   identify, and fix malfunctioning parts without pulling multiple suspect
   parts off the aircraft. As a result, fewer consumable supplies are used.

   Table 4: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Consumable
   Supplies Cost per Flying Hour

   FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 3- year average

   Active duty $1,776 $1,819 $1,998 $1,869 Air National Guard 1, 160 1,558
   1,324 1,334 Difference $616 $261 $674 $536

   Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding. Source: GAO*s analysis of
   data provided by the Air Combat Command, the Air National Guard Bureau,
   and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and Mountain Home Air Force
   Bases.

   Flying hour costs represent only a portion of the overall costs of
   operating and maintaining B- 1B bombers. Costs such as pilot training,
   test equipment, and depot maintenance are not included in the flying hour
   cost. As we noted earlier, the Air Force did not consider these costs or

   14 The cost of aviation fuel did not contribute significantly to the
   difference in cost per flying hour between active duty and Guard B- 1B
   units, as these costs were very similar between the B- 1B units. Both
   active duty and Guard units pay about the same price for aviation fuel,
   oil, and lubricants.

   Page 13 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   the historical flying hour costs detailed previously when it made its
   basing decision.

   The Guard*s reported mission capable rates were higher than the active
   duty*s reported rates between fiscal year 1999 and 2001. The Air Force
   designates a weapon system as mission capable when it can perform at least
   one of its assigned combat missions. The mission capable rate specifically
   measures the percentage of time a unit*s aircraft are available to meet at
   least one of its missions. On average, the Guard units* B1- B fleet was
   available between 62 and 65 percent of the time during fiscal years 1999
   through 2001. During those same years, the active duty mission capable
   rate performance averaged between 52 and 60 percent (see fig. 1).

   Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B- 1B Mission Capable Rates
   (Fiscal Years 1999- 2001)

   Source: GAO*s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command; the
   116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base; and the 184th Bomb Wing, McConnell
   Air Force Base.

   According to Air Combat Command officials, the active duty units* mission
   capable rate gain in fiscal year 2001 was primarily due to (1) increased
   Guard B- 1B Units Report

   Higher Mission Capable Rates

   Page 14 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   aircraft availability following completion of an extensive modification
   program and (2) improvements in the Air Force*s inventory of spare parts.

   In the 2 years prior to fiscal year 2001, both active and Guard B- 1Bs
   underwent extensive modifications at the depot that improved the
   aircraft*s survivability and equipped the aircraft with more advanced
   munitions. During this time, large portions of the B- 1B fleet were at the
   depot for extended periods. According to Air Combat Command officials,
   active duty B- 1B units experienced reduced mission capable rates because
   maintaining a normal operating tempo with fewer aircraft required each
   aircraft to be flown more frequently and resulted in more wear and tear to
   each aircraft. However, the Guard units* mission capable rates were less
   affected. Both Air Combat Command and Guard unit officials agreed that
   during this time the higher experience levels of Guard maintenance
   personnel and the Guard*s lower operating tempo lessened the impact of
   having large portions of the fleet at the depot on the Guard units*
   mission capable rates. The Air Force completed most of these modifications
   by the end of fiscal year 2000, and the gap between the active and Guard
   mission capable rates narrowed in fiscal year 2001.

   According to Air Combat Command officials, the overall shortage of spare
   parts experienced by the Air Force during the late 1990s also negatively
   affected the active duty B- 1B units* mission capable rates prior to
   fiscal year 2001. 15 Although increased funding led to an improvement in
   the spare parts inventory by fiscal year 1999, it took about 12 to 24
   months for the improvements to be reflected in the units* reported mission
   capable rates according to Air Staff officials. According to Guard
   officials, Guard B- 1B units were less affected by the shortage of spare
   parts because their more experienced maintainers could sometimes repair
   rather than replace problematic components.

   The Air National Guard*s B- 1B pilots and weapon systems officers are
   generally more experienced than their active duty counterparts. The Air
   Force designates aircrew members as *experienced* based on the total
   number of flying hours they have accumulated both overall and in the B-
   1B. 16 A crewmember*s experience level determines the amount of

   15 According to Air Staff officials, the spare parts shortage affected all
   aircraft during 1991- 2000. 16 The same requirements are applied to both
   active duty and Guard aircrew members. Guard B- 1B Aircrews

   Are Generally More Experienced Than Their Active Duty Counterparts

   Page 15 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   training (i. e., flying hours and sorties) he or she is required to
   complete each year, which, in turn, drives the unit*s overall flying hour
   program. For example, units with a higher number of inexperienced aircrew
   members would require a higher allocation of flying hours to meet training
   requirements each year.

   In comparing the Guard and active B- 1B aircrew experience levels, we
   found that the majority of Air National Guard pilots were designated as
   experienced. However, this was not the case for pilots assigned to active
   operations squadrons at Dyess and Ellsworth. Table 5 shows the percentage
   of experienced pilots by unit location.

   Table 5: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Pilot Experience Levels
   Unit location

   Number assigned

   Number designated experienced

   Percent experienced Active units

   Dyess 56 22 39 Ellsworth 66 30 45 Mountain Home 23 12 52

   Air National Guard units

   McConnell 29 25 86 Robins 33 24 73

   Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for training
   and test units is excluded. The three training and test units each were
   staffed with 100- percent experienced pilots.

   Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command, the 184th
   Bomb Wing, and the116th Bomb Wing.

   Many of the Guard pilots also had other flying experience that enhanced
   their ability to pilot the B- 1B. For example, many had prior active duty
   flying experience or flew other aircraft for the Guard. This experience
   contributed to the pilots* overall qualifications, thereby permitting them
   to be designated as experienced more quickly than their active duty
   counterparts.

   Page 16 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   The picture was similar for the B- 1B*s weapon systems officers. For
   example, more than 80 percent of the Air National Guard*s weapons system
   officers were considered experienced, while in the active Air Force only
   about 40 percent were considered experienced. Like the Guard pilots, most
   of the Guard*s weapon systems officers also had experience flying other
   military aircraft that enhanced their ability in the B- 1B. Table 6 shows
   the percentage of experienced weapon systems officers by unit location.

   Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B- 1B Weapon Systems Officer
   Experience Levels

   Unit location Number assigned

   Number designated experienced Percent

   experienced Active units

   Dyess 54 20 37 Ellsworth 61 25 41 Mountain Home 22 10 45

   Air National Guard units

   McConnell 33 29 88 Robins 31 29 94

   Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for training
   and test units is excluded. The three training and test units each were
   staffed with 100- percent experienced weapon systems officers.

   Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Force*s Air Combat Command,
   184th Bomb Wing, and 116th Bomb Wing.

   The Air Force conducts periodic inspections of each of its operational
   units to evaluate the unit*s readiness to perform its wartime mission. The
   readiness inspections, conducted by the Air Combat Command Inspector
   General staff, are intended to create a realistic environment for
   evaluating the units* sustained performance and contingency response. The
   bomb units are evaluated in four major areas: initial response,
   employment, mission support, and ability to survive and operate in a
   hostile environment. The Guard B- 1B units scored as high or higher than
   did the active duty units in the most recent readiness inspections.
   Specifically, the B- 1B bomb units at two active locations (Dyess and
   Ellsworth) and one Guard location (McConnell) each received excellent
   ratings overall in their most recent inspections. The Inspector General
   completed an inspection of Robins* initial response capabilities in July
   2001 and rated the unit as excellent. However, the Inspector General did
   not complete its inspection of the three remaining areas since the Air
   Force had already decided to remove the B- 1Bs from Robins. Additionally,
   the Mountain Home wing, Operational Readiness

   Inspections Yielded Similar Ratings for Active and Guard B- 1B Units

   Page 17 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   which includes B- 1Bs, had not undergone an operational readiness
   inspection at the time of our review.

   Major decisions involving force structure need to be supported by solid
   analysis to document that a range of alternatives has been considered and
   that the decision provides a cost- effective solution consistent with the
   national defense strategy. DOD*s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
   process establishes a consultation process for civilian and military
   leaders to use in reviewing alternatives to the services* current force
   structure. However, the decision to reduce the B- 1B did not fully adhere
   to this process because key offices such as the Office of Program Analysis
   and Evaluation and the Joint Staff did not have an opportunity to review
   and comment on the proposal and conduct analysis before it was approved.
   Moreover, although Air Force and OSD officials are comfortable with the
   decision, based on their military judgment, neither the Air Force nor OSD
   conducted any formal analysis to provide data on how a range of B- 1B
   force size alternatives would impact DOD*s ability to meet potential
   wartime requirements. By following its established budget process more
   closely in the future and allowing experts from various offices to review
   and analyze force structure proposals, DOD could provide better assurance
   to Congress that future force structure decisions are well- supported and
   are in the nation*s long- term interest.

   In addition, the lack of an established Air Force methodology for
   assessing the costs associated with potential basing options led officials
   to use incomplete costs when estimating the projected savings for some of
   the basing options considered. By focusing solely on flying hour costs for
   some basing options, Air Force officials did not consider other operations
   and maintenance savings that a reduction in the number of aircraft or the
   number of B- 1B units would generate. As a result, the Air Force may have
   understated the cost savings of the options that retained B- 1Bs in both
   the Air National Guard and the active components. A more structured cost
   estimating methodology would ensure that that the Air Force considers all
   appropriate costs in calculating the savings for future aircraft
   realignments.

   To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment decisions,
   we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air
   Force to develop a methodology for assessing and comparing the costs of
   active and reserve units so that all potential costs are fully considered
   when evaluating potential basing options and making future basing
   decisions. Conclusions

   Recommendation for Executive Action

   Page 18 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our
   recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for assessing and
   comparing costs to evaluate basing options because it believes that such a
   methodology exists. Furthermore, DOD believes that the Air Force used a
   methodology that considered all costs as well as noncost factors when it
   made its basing decision and that cost- effectiveness, while an important
   criterion, should not be the sole consideration in making basing
   decisions. DOD*s comments are included in this report as appendix II.

   After we received DOD*s comments, we asked the department to provide
   documentation describing its methodology for comparing active and reserve
   unit costs. DOD referred us to the instruction that outlines its Planning,
   Programming and Budgeting System. This instruction describes DOD*s process
   for developing the department*s overall plans and budget; however, it does
   not identify a methodology for assessing and comparing the costs
   associated with active and reserve units. DOD also noted that the Air
   Force*s Total Ownership Cost database encompasses all cost factors related
   to active and reserve costs and ensures that any comparison of active and
   reserve units is done equitably. During our audit work, we assessed
   whether the Total Ownership Cost database could be used to compare total
   operations costs for B- 1Bs located at Guard and active duty units. We
   determined, however, that not all indirect costs for B- 1B units in the
   Guard were included in the database, making it impossible to compare the
   operating costs of Guard and active units equitably. Therefore, we are
   retaining our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the
   Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology.

   In commenting on our presentation of flying hour costs, DOD acknowledged
   the Guard*s lower flying hour costs, but it stated that including
   additional costs would result in more comparable flying hour costs for
   Guard and active duty units. DOD suggested using the direct and indirect
   costs included in the Air Force*s Total Ownership Cost database to
   calculate flying hour costs. In conducting our analysis of flying hour
   costs, we relied on the Air Force*s definition. The Air Force defines
   flying hour costs as the cost of fuel, depot- level reparables, and
   consumable parts divided by the number of hours flown. The Air Force does
   not include other costs such as software maintenance costs, contractor
   support costs, or military personnel costs when it calculates the cost per
   flying hour. DOD is correct when it states that there are other costs
   associated with operating a B- 1B and our report recognizes that fact.

   In commenting on our analysis of active and Guard mission capable rates,
   DOD noted that the difference between active and Guard mission capable
   Agency Comments

   and Our Evaluation

   Page 19 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   rates is not solely attributable to the experience level of Guard
   personnel. The department also noted that the Guard operates newer model
   B- 1B aircraft while the active duty units operate older model aircraft
   and identified this as a factor contributing to lower active duty rates.
   While we recognize that the oldest aircraft in the fleet (1983 and 1984
   models) are concentrated in the active units at Dyess Air Force Base, our
   analysis shows that those aircraft constitute only about one- third (33
   percent) of Dyess* fleet and only about one- fifth (or 20 percent) of the
   active B- 1B fleet overall. Active units at Ellsworth and Mountain Home
   operate newer 1985 and 1986 model aircraft* the same models as those
   operated by the two Guard units. While aircraft age may have some effect
   on mission capable rates, we do not believe, based on our analysis, that
   this effect is significant for the B- 1B force.

   We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
   Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional committees. We
   will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
   report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:// www.
   gao. gov.

   If you or your staff have any questions on this report or wish to discuss
   these matters further, please call me on 202- 512- 4300. Key contacts and
   staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.

   Sincerely yours, Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Managing Director, Defense
   Capabilities and Management

   Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 20 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   To determine what types of analyses the Department of Defense (DOD) and
   the Air Force did of wartime requirements and basing options before
   deciding on the number of aircraft to retain and where to base them, we
   obtained and analyzed the only contemporaneous documents that were
   available from the Air Force* a briefing presented to the Secretary and
   the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the fleet reduction and
   consolidation and a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force to the
   Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) outlining the Air Force*s
   proposal to reduce and consolidate the fleet. Additionally, because the
   Air Force had no documents explaining its methodology for evaluating the
   various basing options it considered, we asked the Air Force, in early
   2002, to document its methodology. The Air Force provided us with a
   statement explaining the methodology; however, it was unable to provide us
   with the cost figures used to estimate the savings. As a result, we could
   not verify the savings estimates that the Air Force attributed to each
   option.

   To supplement our document review, we interviewed several Air Force
   officials who were located in the Washington, D. C., area to determine
   what role each may have played in the decision to reduce the fleet and
   consolidate it at two bases. The officials were the Chief of Staff, U. S.
   Air Force; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, U. S. Air Force;
   the former Director of the Air National Guard; and the Assistant for
   Operational Readiness, Air National Guard. We also spoke with officials
   responsible for overseeing the B- 1B program in the Office of the Deputy
   Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, U. S. Air Force, Washington, D.
   C, to determine if any analysis of current and future wartime requirements
   had been completed prior to the decision. We also had numerous meetings
   with officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and
   Programs, who were responsible for developing the basing options and
   estimating the savings that would result for each option to discuss their
   methodology and the decision process. We also met with representatives of
   the Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to determine
   if they had any role in the decision to either reduce the number of B- 1Bs
   or consolidate them at two active duty bases. Finally, we met with
   representatives of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the
   Director, Program, Analysis, and Evaluation; and the Joint Staff to
   determine if they had completed any analysis of the Office of Secretary of
   Defense suggestion to eliminate the B- 1B fleet or the Air Force*s
   proposal to reduce the fleet. In addition, we reviewed the 1999 and 2001
   Air Force bomber white papers and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to
   gather insight on current and future B- 1B wartime requirements and copies
   of congressional testimonies by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
   Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of
   Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

   Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 21 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Staff of the Air Force to document DOD*s rationale for making the B- 1B
   decision.

   To compare the flying hour costs and the capabilities of the various
   active and Air National Guard B- 1B units, we collected and analyzed
   flying hour cost data for fiscal years 1999- 2001 from the five B- 1B
   units. To verify the data from these sources, we collected and analyzed
   cost data for the same years from the Air Combat Command; the Air Force
   Cost Analysis Agency, Washington, D. C.; and the Directorate of Logistics,
   Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. We also collected
   and analyzed (1) mission capable rate data for fiscal years 1999- 2001
   from the Air Combat Command and the two Guard units and (2) collected and
   analyzed data on aircrew and maintenance crew experience from the Air
   Combat Command and the Air National Guard Bureau. To determine if there
   were significant differences in active and Guard units* wartime missions,
   we reviewed the wartime taskings of all five B- 1B units. To compare the
   units* participation in peacetime activities, we reviewed documents
   provided by officials at the Air Expeditionary Force Center, Langley Air
   Force Base, Virginia. We reviewed and compared the operational readiness
   inspections for the bomb wings located at Dyess, Ellsworth, and McConnell
   Air Force Bases and the partial operational readiness inspection for the
   bomb wing at Robins Air Force Base. The Inspector General staff completed
   an inspection of Robins* initial response capabilities in July 2001 but
   did not complete its inspection of the three remaining areas since the Air
   Force had already decided to remove the B- 1Bs from Robins. The wing at
   Mountain Home had not undergone an operational readiness inspection at the
   time we completed our review. Our work also included visits to three B- 1B
   units to interview officials and obtain documents: 184th Bomb Wing,
   McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air Force Base,
   Texas; and 116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.

   Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

   Page 22 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

   Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

   Page 23 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense

   Page 24 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Page 25 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Janet St. Laurent (202) 512- 4402 Carole Coffey (202) 512- 5876

   In addition to those named above, Sharron Candon, Judith Collins, Penney
   Harwell, Jane Hunt, Ken Patton, and Carol Schuster made key contributions
   to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff

   Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

   Page 26 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Air Force Bombers: Moving More B- 1s to the Reserves Could Save Millions
   without Reducing Mission Capability. GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 64. Washington, D.
   C.: February 26, 1998.

   Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce
   Planned Spending. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 192. Washington, D. C.: September 30,
   1996.

   Embedded Computers: B- 1B Computers Must Be Upgraded to Support
   Conventional Requirements. GAO/ AIMD- 96- 28. Washington, D. C.: February
   27, 1996.

   B- 1B Conventional Upgrades. GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 52R. Washington, D. C.:
   December 4, 1995.

   B- 1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B- 1B Operational
   Readiness Assessment. GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 151. Washington, D. C.: July 18,
   1995.

   Air Force: Assessment of DOD*s Report on Plan and Capabilities for
   Evaluating Heavy Bombers. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 99. Washington, D. C.: January
   10, 1994.

   Strategic Bombers: Issues Relating to the B- 1B*s Availability and Ability
   to Perform Conventional Missions. GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 81. Washington, D. C.:
   January 10, 1994.

   The U. S. Nuclear Triad: GAO*s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization
   Program. GAO/ T- PEMD- 93- 5. Washington, D. C.: June 10, 1993.

   Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-
   Consuming, and Costly. GAO/ NSIAD- 93- 45. Washington, D. C.: February 5,
   1993.

   Strategic Bombers: Need to Redefine Requirements for B- 1B Defensive
   Avionics System. GAO/ NSIAD- 92- 272. Washington, D. C.: July 17, 1992.
   Related GAO Products

   Page 27 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

   Strategic Bombers: Updated Status of the B- 1B Recovery Program.

   GAO/ NSIAD- 91- 189. Washington, D. C.: May 9, 1991.

   Strategic Bombers: Issues Related to the B- 1B Aircraft Program.

   GAO/ T- NSIAD- 91- 11. Washington, D. C.: March 6, 1991.

   (350117)

   Page 28 GAO- 02- 846 Force Structure

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