Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must	 
Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues (26-JUL-02,	 
GAO-02-808).							 
                                                                 
The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United  
Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly  
contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's livestock	 
industry and other sectors of the economy. By the time the	 
disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4
million animals to control the disease, and sustained losses of  
$5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as	 
comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the	 
United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years; following  
the outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally	 
restricted from participating in the international trade of live 
animals, and animal and other products that could transmit the	 
FMD virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining
information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing U.S. 	 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies and others with this	 
information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing 
this information with Customs. The United States recieves	 
information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in	 
foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health  
organizations, and foreign governments directly. These officials 
collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health		 
information about the countries and regions in which they are	 
stationed, which allows the United States to have access to	 
information on foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However,
USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD	 
outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction  
of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have  
kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years.	 
Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk  
inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel	 
and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA
has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S.	 
livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S.	 
borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the	 
disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive  
measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo,	 
animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the  
United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States
will face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and	 
quick response, even though USDA and many states have developed  
and tested emergency animal disease response plans.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-808 					        
    ACCNO:   A04062						        
  TITLE:     Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA  
Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues		 
     DATE:   07/26/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Animal diseases					 
	     Infectious diseases				 
	     International trade				 
	     Livestock products 				 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     International relations				 
	     United Kingdom					 

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GAO-02-808

                                       A

   Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U. S. Senate

   July 2002 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE To Protect U. S. Livestock, USDA Must
   Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues

   GAO- 02- 808

   Letter 1 Executive Summary 2

   Purpose 2 Background 3 Results in Brief 3 Principal Findings 6
   Recommendations for Executive Action 11 Agency Comments 11

   Chapter 1 12

   Introduction FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease 12

   Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive 15 International Community Has
   Guidelines to Control and Eradicate

   FMD 18 An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars 19 Social Impacts of
   an Outbreak Can Be Significant 21 USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U. S.
   Livestock From FMD and

   Other Animal Diseases 22 U. S. Customs Service Supports USDA*s Efforts at
   Ports of Entry 24 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

   Chapter 2 27

   USDA Has Adequate USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from
   Multiple Sources 27

   Processes to Obtain USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of
   FMD Information on Foreign

   Information to Customs 29 FMD Outbreaks, but

   Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 34

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

   Chapter 3 35

   U. S. Measures to USDA*s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other
   Countries

   Help Reduce the Risk to U. S. Livestock 35 Prevent FMD Are

   Despite U. S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to
   Generally Comparable FMD Remains 37

   to Other Countries, but U. S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those
   Used by Other

   Countries 46 Complete Protection

   Conclusions 51 May Be Infeasible

   Recommendation for Executive Action 52 Agency Comments 52

   Chapter 4 53

   Despite Preparation The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed
   and Tested Emergency Response Plans 53

   Efforts, the United Serious Challenges to an Effective U. S. Response Are
   Yet to Be

   States Will Face Resolved 56

   Challenges in Conclusions 68 Recommendation for Executive Action 68

   Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Appendixes

   Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States 69

   Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
   71

   Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
   80

   Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom 87

   Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture 96

   Appendix VI: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 100

   Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 101 Tables Table 1:
   Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and

   By- Products 14 Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken
   After the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom 31

   Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the
   United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, Fiscal
   Year 2001 45 Table 4: Agriculture- Related Questions on the Prior and
   Revised

   U. S. Declaration Forms 51 Figures Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD,
   1992 through 2002 15

   Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002 17
   Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 49 Figure 4: Canadian
   and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 50

   Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom 65
   Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the

   United Kingdom 66

   Abbreviations

   APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service BSE bovine spongiform
   encephalopathy CCRA Canada Customs and Revenue Agency CFIA Canadian Food
   Inspection Agency DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
   FAS Foreign Agricultural Service FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

   FMD foot and mouth disease FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service GAO
   General Accounting Office NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency
   Management System OIE Office International des Epizooties pH potential of
   hydrogen SAGARPA Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural,
   Pesca y

   Alimentaction USDA U. S. Department of Agriculture WTO World Trade
   Organization

   Executive Summary Purpose The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease
   (FMD) in the United Kingdom

   decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal
   disease can cause to a nation*s livestock industry and other sectors of
   the economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8 months later,
   the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals to control the
   disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the food and
   agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism
   industry. Before 2001,

   the United Kingdom had been FMD- free for almost 34 years; following the
   outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally restricted from
   participating in the international trade of live animals, and animal and
   other products that could transmit the FMD virus.

   The United States is an FMD- free nation and has not had an outbreak of
   the disease since 1929. In 2001, the U. S. livestock and poultry sector
   was valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock
   industry to the U. S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U. S.
   livestock from FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United
   States (foreign

   animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the U. S. Department
   of Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to determine whether
   (1) U. S. processes to obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD
   outbreaks are adequate, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
   entering the United States are effective and comparable with those of
   other selected countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly
   and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if it were to occur.

   To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports,
   airports, and international mail- processing facilities in New Jersey,
   Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection
   stations on the U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican borders to observe
   inspection procedures for livestock imports and met with government
   officials in these countries who are responsible for protecting their
   nation*s livestock

   from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians in six states that are
   major producers of U. S. livestock, and international passengers and U. S.
   veterinarians who were in the United Kingdom during the outbreak. In
   addition, GAO reviewed and summarized legislation, regulations, and
   publicly available documents on the measures used by the European Union
   and the United Kingdom to prevent the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 1
   for a detailed description of GAO*s scope and methodology.)

   Background FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven- hoofed
   animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever
   and blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals
   recover from an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and
   causes severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have human

   health implications. Animals, people, or any materials that bring the
   virus into contact with susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy
   virus, and in the right environmental conditions can persist in
   contaminated items, such as soil and manure, for weeks or months. Only
   about 40 percent of countries worldwide are considered FMD- free, but all
   three North American

   countries are FMD- free. USDA*s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
   (APHIS) is responsible for protecting U. S. livestock from the
   introduction of foreign animal diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its
   responsibilities, APHIS conducts activities to exclude animal disease,
   detect and eradicate it, and educate

   the public about it. APHIS inspectors are present at 144 U. S. ports of
   entry, as well as in some foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of
   international cargo, passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this
   includes all major U. S. ports. In an effort to keep U. S. animals free of
   foreign animal diseases, the U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is an
   important federal partner, supporting USDA*s activities at each of the 301
   ports of entry into the United States. Customs is the first line of
   defense at U. S. ports against the entry of prohibited and illegal items,
   particularly when the port does not have

   APHIS personnel. Results in Brief The United States has adequate processes
   for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA
   agencies and others with this information, but it does not have adequate
   processes for sharing this information with Customs. The United States
   receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in
   foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health
   organizations, and foreign governments directly. In particular, USDA has
   animal health experts stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade
   officials stationed in 129 countries. These officials collect a wide array
   of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and
   regions in which they are

   stationed, which allows the United States to have access to information on
   foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However, USDA*s processes for
   disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. For
   example, after receiving official notification from the United Kingdom on
   February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that country, USDA
   immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington, D. C., and their
   field locations, and during the month of March provided the public,

   industry, state and local governments, and private veterinarians with
   information and guidance about FMD prevention. But USDA has no formal
   process for providing Customs with information. As a result, Customs
   inspectors at U. S. ports of entry did not receive uniform information or
   guidance on FMD prevention activities after the U. K. outbreak. Customs

   received this information only after formally requesting it from the
   Administrator of APHIS* over a month after the United Kingdom*s
   notification. During this interval, many Customs inspectors said they felt
   ill equipped to adequately process international cargo and passengers at
   U. S. ports of entry. While USDA has taken an interim step to improve
   notification to Customs about foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is recommending
   further improvements to establish a more permanent solution and ensure
   that Customs has clear procedures for handling

   passengers and cargo from countries affected by FMD. U. S. measures to
   prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other
   countries and have kept the United States free of the disease for almost
   75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk
   inherent in the ever- increasing volume of international travel and trade,
   U. S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a twopronged
   approach to prevent FMD from reaching U. S. livestock.  USDA tries to
   keep FMD as far as possible from U. S. borders by helping

   other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example, USDA
   supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD- free buffer
   zone between North and Central America, which are FMD- free,

   and South America, which is not.

    USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports
   of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail
   do not bring the disease into the United States. For example, in response
   to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately prohibited imports
   of susceptible animal products from the United Kingdom, including those
   shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
   outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until

   USDA reassessed the United Kingdom*s animal disease status and determined
   the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly, at airports,
   USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to ensure that
   international passengers do not inadvertently bring items

   into the country that could carry the FMD virus. However, these and other
   efforts cannot completely eliminate the vulnerability of U. S. livestock
   because (1) some level of risk is inherent in international travel and
   trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus that may remain viable for days or even
   weeks on shoes and in hay or certain meat and dairy

   products, and (3) the volume of legal and illegal international trade and
   passengers entering the United States makes it impossible for U. S.
   inspectors to inspect and ensure the safety of every shipment, baggage, or

   person entering the country. Furthermore, although the preventive measures
   the United States, Canada, and Mexico have implemented are similar, these
   other countries* implementation measures suggest opportunities for USDA to
   improve its preventive measures. For example, all three countries use
   signs at airports to alert passengers about FMD and the need to keep it
   out of the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican signs are much more
   noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more colorful. GAO is
   recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their

   effectiveness. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will
   face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and quick response,
   even though USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency
   animal disease response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation,
   coordination, and communication between state and federal agencies and
   between federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA
   is making improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between
   the states. Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate
   infrastructure, including a massive commitment of manpower and laboratory
   resources. USDA has developed agreements with other federal agencies, such
   as the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

   to leverage additional resources. However, gaps remain. For example, it is
   unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200 additional veterinarians trained in
   responding to foreign animal diseases that it estimates the nation will
   need to respond to an FMD outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating
   to animal identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been

   addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to
   identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it is
   unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner. USDA

   currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues. However,
   the effectiveness and speed of a U. S. response may be compromised if
   these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before an FMD outbreak

   occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans with interim and final
   milestones to ensure that these issues are addressed in a timely fashion.

   Principal Findings USDA Has Adequate

   USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal diseases,
   Processes to Obtain including FMD, from a variety of sources. These
   include USDA*s network Information on Foreign

   of staff stationed in foreign countries, international animal health and
   trade FMD Outbreaks but Can organizations, and the governments of affected
   nations. However, the

   usefulness of the information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a
   Improve Dissemination to foreign country*s willingness to provide accurate
   information in a timely Customs

   fashion. For example, in 2001, Argentine officials did not acknowledge
   that some regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although
   unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had been present for
   several months, according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take
   official action to prohibit FMD- susceptible products from Argentina until
   it received an official notification of the outbreak or obtained
   verifiable scientific evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.

   APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
   foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
   governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
   current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an
   important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
   immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process or
   defined procedures to distribute information on foreign FMD outbreaks to
   Customs. For example, after the U. K. outbreak, APHIS did not inform

   Customs about its decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or
   more vigilantly screen passengers arriving at U. S. ports of entry from
   the United Kingdom. Until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally
   requested this information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS,
   Customs did not receive any official guidance on general inspection
   measures for passengers and products. According to a Customs memorandum
   and officials we spoke to, many Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped
   to

   adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry

   during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. Moreover, according to
   Customs officials, these inspectors are not animal disease specialists,
   and therefore need clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process
   international passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports
   where there is no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although
   Customs had not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the
   past, a Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive
   future alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step,
   however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for

   formal and well- defined communication procedures and protocols between
   APHIS and Customs. U. S. Preventive Measures The United States seeks to
   prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting various

   Are Comparable to Those of programs to control and eradicate the disease
   overseas and by screening Other Countries, but

   livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the nation*s ports
   Providing Complete of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control
   FMD outbreaks, USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U. S.
   borders. For Protection May Be example, in North America, U. S. efforts to
   eradicate and control FMD have Infeasible largely focused on Mexico
   because of the shared border and the possible

   threat that the FMD virus could move overland from South America, where
   the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA helped Mexico eradicate
   FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that Mexico remains disease free.
   Similarly, USDA programs have helped create FMD- free zones in Colombia
   and Panama. These zones will help alert countries in both

   Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from the
   south. Also, when other countries have an outbreak, USDA may provide
   support by sending U. S. veterinarians to help control and eradicate the
   disease. For example, a total of about 327 U. S. animal health
   professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped eradicate the 2001
   outbreak in the United Kingdom.

   USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could enter
   the United States and has implemented measures to prevent potentially
   infected animals or products from entering the country. For example, USDA
   allows imported livestock only from countries that are free of FMD and
   other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by appropriate import
   permits and health certificates and may subject these animals to
   quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD outbreak, USDA prohibits
   the importation of all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior to the
   date of official notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains

   in effect until USDA has reassessed the disease status of the affected

   country and determined the level of trade that can resume. Moreover, USDA
   restricts imports of animal products from FMD- affected countries to those
   that have been processed in such a manner that they inactivate the

   virus and do not present a risk to U. S. livestock. In contrast, other
   products, such as hay used for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy
   products, are completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive
   measures for international passengers and their luggage, garbage from
   international ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment
   returning from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus
   into the country.

   USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United
   States* almost 75- year disease- free status is a measure of the success
   of the department*s efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same
   time,

   these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of risk
   inherent in international trade and travel, no set of measures can ever
   completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the United
   States. Moreover, these experts believe that U. S. vulnerability to an
   outbreak remains because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter the
   country on a variety of animate and inanimate products and (2) the
   magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
   entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for
   USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only one
   contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U. S. animal
   to start a nationwide outbreak.

   Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock from
   FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures that
   are comparable to U. S. measures to ensure that imports of livestock and
   animal products, international mail, and garbage from international
   carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the countries have

   implemented measures differently for international passengers. For
   example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats at ports of entry,
   the United States does not. According to USDA officials, the United States
   does not use disinfectant mats because research indicates that their use
   may cause the virus to spread. Also, while all three countries use signs
   at international airports to alert and inform passengers about the risks
   of FMD, the U. S. signs are not as noticeable as the signs used in Canada
   and Mexico. While GAO recognizes that there is a cost to developing new
   signs, more effective signs may help improve U. S. preventive measures for
   international passengers.

   Despite Preparation Efforts, If FMD enters the United States despite
   USDA*s preventive measures, the

   Serious Challenges to an nation*s ability to identify, control, contain,
   and eradicate the disease Effective U. S. Response Are

   quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the importance Yet
   to Be Resolved

   of an effective response, USDA and many states have developed emergency
   response plans that establish a framework for the key elements necessary
   for a rapid and successful U. S. response and eradication program. These

   plans have been tested, to some extent, by federal and state agencies to
   determine their effectiveness. Planning and testing exercises have also
   identified the following challenges, which could ultimately impede an
   effective and timely U. S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD

   outbreak occurs:

    Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. A
   timely response depends on having livestock producers and private
   veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state and
   federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control before
   the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several federal and
   state animal health officials expressed concern about how

   quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
   United States. According to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped
   raise general awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and
   livestock producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in
   the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and the states increased
   their efforts to inform the livestock industry about the risks and
   symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened
   awareness about FMD, now that the immediate risk from the

   United Kingdom has subsided.

    Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal,
   state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the industry. Recent
   planning efforts and testing exercises have started the process of
   establishing greater coordination and improving the level of cooperation
   and communication between all levels. However, these

   efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according to state
   officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and communication
   between state officials and their federal counterparts vary across states.
   To help address these gaps, USDA is working with other organizations, such
   as the National Emergency Management Association, and is providing funds
   to help states improve their planning for animal emergencies.

    Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of animal
   disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on an adequate
   infrastructure, which should include a national emergency management
   control and command center, technical and other personnel, transportation
   and disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.
   While details for some of these components have been developed, others are
   not yet fully resolved. For example, USDA, in partnership with the Federal
   Emergency Management Agency, has set up a mechanism that will enable it to
   leverage resources for many of the general logistical support activities
   needed to respond to an outbreak. Similarly, USDA*s memorandum of
   understanding with the Department of Defense will help provide needed

   military personnel and equipment to support a response effort. However, it
   is not yet clear how the United States will fill the shortage of at least
   1,200 specially trained veterinarians or the laboratory testing and
   diagnostic capacity that USDA estimates is needed to respond to an animal
   health emergency.

    Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and indemnify
   livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
   outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking system that
   will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and

   slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal disposal
   and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an animal
   identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it in 1999.
   However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted the concept
   because of the costs involved and the potential for the unauthorized
   disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA officials.
   Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration, and rendering
   are the preferred methods for disposing of animal carcasses. However,
   according to federal and state officials, each of these disposal methods
   presents significant implementation challenges that have not yet been
   fully considered, such as the potential to spread the disease if on- farm
   disposal is not feasible, the potential to cause groundwater contamination
   or air pollution, high cost, and concerns about public perception.
   Finally, delays could occur during an FMD eradication effort, because
   producers* fearing that they might not be adequately compensated for the
   fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and materials as well as
   cleaning and disinfecting costs* may not cooperate with responders. To
   address this concern, USDA published a

   proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD- related regulations

   that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be handled during
   an outbreak.

   Recommendations for GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to
   develop (1) a

   Executive Action formal process to disseminate updated information on
   foreign FMD

   outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical
   procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers
   from FMD- affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider
   better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international
   passengers

   do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States. Finally, GAO
   recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones to address the
   outstanding issues that could compromise an effective and rapid U. S.
   response.

   Agency Comments We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report
   for review and comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated
   that the

   report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of
   meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided an
   accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of federal,
   state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the health of U.
   S. agriculture. USDA agreed with the report*s conclusion that because of
   the enormous volume of international travel and trade, there is no way to
   ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However, USDA also believes that
   the short- and long- term measures that it is taking to enhance
   prevention,

   surveillance, emergency preparedness, and coordination with other federal,
   state, and industry organizations is providing a much- needed boost to the
   United States* overall safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, USDA
   agreed that it would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of
   its efforts and make whatever changes are warranted. USDA*s and Customs*
   written comments are presented in appendix V and

   VI, respectively. USDA*s comments include additional information on the
   department*s recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United
   States* ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas of
   (1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control measures, and

   (3) communications and outreach. We have included this information and the
   additional technical comments that USDA provided us with throughout the
   report as appropriate.

   Chapt er 1

   Introduction Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating
   viral animal diseases affecting cloven- hoofed animals such as cattle and
   swine, and has occurred in most countries of the world at some point
   during the last century. Although the disease has no human- health
   implications, it can have enormous economic and social consequences, as
   recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated. These
   consequences occur because the international community values products
   from countries that are FMD- free and generally restricts international
   trade in FMDsusceptible products from countries affected by an outbreak.
   Most FMDaffected countries, therefore, take whatever measures necessary to
   regain their FMD- free status as quickly as possible. In the United
   States, the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary
   responsibility for protecting domestic livestock from animal diseases such
   as FMD. The U. S. Customs Service supports USDA in these efforts.

   FMD Is a Highly FMD* a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily
   cloven- hoofed

   Contagious Animal animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats* has 7
   types and over 80 subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of
   the virus does not

   Disease protect animals against infection from the other types. FMD-
   infected

   animals usually develop blister- like lesions in the mouth, on the tongue
   and lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which causes them to
   salivate excessively or become lame. Other symptoms include fever, reduced
   feed consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs are very sensitive to the
   virus and show symptoms of the disease after a short incubation period of
   3 to 5 days. The incubation period in sheep is considerably longer, about
   10 to 14

   days, and the clinical signs of the disease are usually mild and may be
   masked by other conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to
   go unnoticed. The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD
   varies and depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast,
   adult animals usually recover once the disease has run its course.
   However, because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-
   producing animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many
   months, and

   dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease therefore
   can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.

   The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and
   during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the
   virus into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood,
   saliva, and

   feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if pigs become
   infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete large amounts of
   the virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials that are exposed to
   the

   virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into contact with susceptible
   animals. For example, the virus can spread when susceptible animals come
   in contact with contaminated

    animals;

    animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;

    transport vehicles and equipment;

    clothes or shoes worn by people; and

    hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics. 1 The FMD virus has a
   remarkable capability for remaining viable for long periods of time in a
   variety of animate and inanimate objects. For example, the virus can
   persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 hours, manure for 1 to 24
   weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 to 14

   weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and other
   products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen (pH)
   conditions. 2 Generally, the virus can survive freezing but cannot survive
   at temperatures above 50 Celsius (122 Farenheit) and at pH levels of less
   than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the various lengths of time that
   the

   FMD virus can survive in some selected products. 1 A veterinary biologic
   is a product used for diagnosing, preventing, and treating an animal
   disease. These products include vaccines and kits for diagnosing specific
   animal diseases. 2 The pH condition of a product is the measure of its
   degree of acidity or alkalinity; a value of 7 is considered neutral while
   values greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 7 are
   considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain
   viruses, such as FMD.

   Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
   Products Product or by- product Processing or storage conditions Virus
   survival time

   Bacon Salted 183 days Bedding (straw and wood shavings) N/ A 4 weeks
   Buttermilk N/ A 14 days Ham N/ A 16 weeks Hay Ambient temperature Greater
   than 200 days Hides or skins Air dried at 20 C 6 weeks Manure Summer/
   winter 1 week/ 24 weeks Shoes Summer/ winter 9 weeks/ 14 weeks Soil
   Summer/ winter 3- 7 days/ 21 weeks Water Ambient temperature 14 weeks Wool
   Ambient temperature 20 days

   Legend: N/ A= not applicable Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.

   FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal diseases
   that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such as
   vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two foreign
   swine diseases are also clinically identical to FMD* swine vesicular
   disease and vesicular exanthema of swine. The only way to distinguish
   between FMD and these

   other diseases is through laboratory analyses of fluid or tissue samples.
   FMD is also sometimes confused with mad cow disease or bovine spongiform
   encephalopathy (BSE). 3 BSE is a fatal, neuro- degenerative disease found
   in cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract the disease
   through animal feed that contains protein derived from the

   remains of diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally
   fatal disease in humans* known as variant Creutzfeldt- Jacob Disease* is
   linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow

   disease, FMD has no known human health implications. 3 In January 2002, we
   issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the
   Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U. S.
   Prevention Efforts, GAO- 02- 183 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 25, 2002).

   Incidence of FMD FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in
   the world and

   Worldwide Is endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia,
   and South America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of
   FMD include

   Extensive North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the
   Caribbean. Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period
   1992

   through 2002.

   Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002

   Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
   Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
   Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
   Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
   Epizooties.

   In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and during
   the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks. The spread
   of certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how quickly it is
   spreading

   throughout the world. For example, the FMD virus serotype O, known as the
   Pan- Asia strain, was first identified in northern India in 1990 and was
   subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It then spread westward into Saudi
   Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, throughout the Near East and into
   Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The
   PanAsia

   strain was also found in Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 1999
   it was reported in mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By late
   1999 and in 2000, it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently,
   the Pan- Asia strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the
   Primorsky Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free
   from FMD since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan- Asia
   strain is also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United

   Kingdom that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
   Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide,
   including the type O Pan- Asia strain.

   Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002

   Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
   Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
   Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
   Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
   Epizooties.

   In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, Canada,
   and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The United
   States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to eradicate FMD
   from North America.

   International The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)* an
   intergovernmental Community Has organization created in January 1924 by an
   international agreement signed by 28 countries* was established to
   guarantee the transparency of Guidelines to Control

   information on the animal disease status of member countries. In addition,
   and Eradicate FMD

   OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information and
   disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and promotes
   international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, and
   guarantees the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for
   international trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001, OIE had
   158 member countries.

   OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these countries)
   as being FMD- free with or without vaccination if they meet certain
   criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. For
   example, to obtain FMD- free status without vaccination, a member country
   should

   (1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a
   declaration that it has been FMD- free and has not used vaccination for 1
   year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of
   surveillance;

   (4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD;
   and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been imported
   into the country, since such animals can become the source of future
   infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD- free- with- vaccination status, a
   country

   should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease reporting, (2) send a
   declaration that there have been no outbreaks of FMD for 2 years, (3)
   provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance systems and
   has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent and

   control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are carried out
   and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) have an intensive
   and frequent system to detect any viral activity.

   When FMD occurs in an FMD- free country or zone where vaccination is not
   practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to regain
   its FMD- free- without- vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards require
   a country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when
   a

   *stamping out approach* (immediate slaughter of diseased and exposed
   animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the disease before the
   country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD- free status. As part of
   this process, surveillance results of laboratory- screening tests
   (serological surveillance results) must be provided to OIE to prove that
   the disease has been eradicated. If vaccination was used to control the
   outbreak, then the country must wait until 3 months after the last
   vaccinated animal is

   slaughtered and serological surveillance results prove that the disease
   has been eradicated before reapplying for FMD- free status.

   The international community generally places a high value on products from
   countries that are FMD- free without vaccination. Such countries can
   export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD- free
   countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD- free- with-
   vaccination status are restricted to trading animal products that can be
   treated to ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most
   countries that are

   FMD- free without vaccination resort to a stamping out process to
   eradicate the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United Kingdom and Taiwan
   followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively. Similarly, if an

   outbreak were to occur in the United States, the current U. S. policy
   requires all infected and exposed animals to be immediately slaughtered
   and disposed of by incineration, burial, or rendering. 4 In recent years,
   the international community has been encouraging the acceptance of
   regionalization policies for international trade. Regionalization involves
   declaring one or more areas of a country FMDfree

   while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a regionalization
   policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United States, even if one
   state or area was infected, the nation as a whole might

   not lose its FMD- free status, and trade restrictions might not be
   enforced on all of our FMD- susceptible products.

   An FMD Outbreak Can An FMD outbreak could cost the U. S. economy billions
   of dollars in both

   Cost Billions of Dollars direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the
   government would include the

   costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance of
   animal movement controls, control areas, and intensified border
   inspections; the destruction and disposal of infected animals; vaccines;
   and compensation to producers for the costs of disease containment.
   However, government compensation programs may not cover 100 percent of
   producers* costs. As a result, direct costs would also occur for
   disinfection and for the value of

   any slaughtered animals not subject to government compensation. According
   to recent U. K. government estimates, the direct costs for control and
   eradication of the 2001 outbreak was about $4 billion. According to
   several estimates, the direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U. S.
   4 Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or chemicals
   to separate the fat from the protein and mineral components.

   outbreak of FMD could range up to $24 billion in current dollars,
   depending, among other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the
   control strategy employed. 5 The value of lost export sales in the event
   of an FMD outbreak would

   represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U. S.
   economy. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United
   States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U. S. exports of live
   animals and animal products. This ban could result in losses of between $6
   billion and $10 billion a year while the United States eradicated the
   disease and until it regained disease- free status. These losses may be
   mitigated to some extent by increased domestic sales of meat from disease-
   free portions of the United States that may otherwise have been exported.
   However, USDA

   officials believe that many people in the United States would refuse to
   eat meat during an FMD outbreak, thus the offset probably would be
   minimal. Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs
   affecting consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors
   of the economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as
   part of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such
   as meatprocessing

   facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose revenue. Furthermore, an
   FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects such as unemployment, loss of
   income (to the extent that government compensation does not fully
   reimburse producers), and decreased economic activity, which could ripple
   through other sectors of the

   economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could result
   in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom, according to
   government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism
   industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained
   by the food and agriculture sector. In addition, not only may consumers
   have to pay higher prices for the remaining supply of animal products
   affected by an FMD outbreak, but the price of substitutes is likely to
   rise, as well. For example, as the price of FMD- free meat increases, some
   consumers are likely to buy poultry or other meat substitutes, thus
   causing the prices of these substitute products to rise. However, the
   higher prices that consumers pay for substitutes do

   5 Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U. K. outbreak to
   control the disease. According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a
   comparable outbreak in the United States could require the destruction of
   about 13 million animals.

   not result in a net cost to the economy because these higher prices result
   in increased revenues for poultry producers and others.

   Social Impacts of an An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts,
   such as enormous Outbreak Can Be psychological damage, especially on
   families and localities directly

   affected by the outbreak, as the U. K. experience in 2001 illustrates. For
   Significant

   example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found that
   individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of symptoms,
   including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, increased anger,
   irritability, and general depression. An increase in marital discord was
   also noted. One general practioner reported that 50 percent of his
   patients affected by the FMD outbreak required antidepressant drugs. Some
   farming families even sent their children away from home during the
   outbreak rather than have them witness the slaughter and disposal of the
   family*s livestock.

   Consumer confidence in the safety of the U. K. food supply was also
   adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdom*s
   Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD and
   mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now
   consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these
   consumers have changed their grocery- buying habits.

   An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy
   livestock producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their
   animals had been destroyed and their properties were quarantined.
   According to one

   study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the Cumbria area of the United
   Kingdom, most farming households had to curb their usual daily activities,
   and only the most essential movements on and off the farms were permitted.
   Lost income caused stress to families because they had to cut back on
   their household expenditures and some had to renegotiate loans.

   The study notes that the enforced isolation caused by the quarantines
   added to the tensions and stresses already being experienced by both
   adults and children.

   USDA Is Responsible Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
   Service (APHIS) has for Protecting U. S. the lead responsibility for
   protecting the nation*s livestock from foreign

   animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as
   well Livestock From FMD as those thought to have been eradicated.
   Assisting APHIS in this endeavor and Other Animal are USDA*s Foreign
   Agricultural Service, the Food Safety and Inspection Diseases

   Service, and the Homeland Security Council. Within APHIS, several groups
   share responsibility for protecting U. S. livestock from the incursion of
   foreign animal diseases such as FMD:  International Services. Working
   with its counterpart organizations in foreign countries, this group seeks
   to reduce the international spread of animal and poultry diseases. Its
   goal is to protect U. S. livestock and

   poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease- management strategies
   provided to exporting countries before they send their animals and
   products to the United States.

    Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and
   marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary
   biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/ or eliminate animal
   diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and productivity. This

   group administers laws and regulations on importing animals and animal
   products, including embryos and semen, to ensure that imports are free
   from certain disease agents. In addition, Veterinary Services

   provides training for state and private veterinarians on foreign animal
   diseases of concern and provides animal disease diagnostic and
   surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has primary responsibility for
   inspecting and ensuring the safety of live animal and animal product
   imports to the United States. Within Veterinary Services, the Emergency
   Programs unit coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to animal
   disease outbreaks, including FMD, and in the fall of 2001, published a
   draft plan for responding to an FMD outbreak. It employs veterinarians

   trained to detect and respond to an FMD outbreak. Emergency Programs also
   provides federal and state veterinarians and others with training on
   foreign animal diseases.

    Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDA*s
   primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, as
   well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present at all
   major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments and
   supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X- rays, and hand- held

   remote- sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically inspect
   animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, as well as
   international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, sea, or land
   border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant Protection and

   Quarantine*s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers' luggage for prohibited
   fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal pests
   and diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year, it will have
   increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double the level

   available 2 years ago. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA
   stated that by the end of this year, APHIS will also have increased the
   number of its safeguarding personnel to approximately 3,870* an increase
   of 50 percent over its fiscal year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA
   told us that it has hired 18 additional veterinarians who are conducting
   port- of- entry reviews, working

   with state counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on
   working with and handling animal products and byproducts and international
   garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal diseases. In addition,
   USDA*s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates programs designed to
   build new markets and improve the competitive position of U. S.
   agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is responsible for USDA*s
   overseas activities, such as market development, international trade
   agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics
   and market information. FAS supports U. S. agricultural interests through
   its network of agricultural counselors, attaches, and trade officers
   stationed in many foreign countries. FAS officials primarily deal with
   agricultural trade issues and meet with host government and industry
   officials to discuss and facilitate agricultural trade.

   USDA*s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary
   responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat and
   meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors at
   ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on imported

   meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving countries that
   are eligible to export meat products to the United States. In fulfilling
   this responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic reviews of eligible countries.
   According to USDA, FSIS*s inspection of livestock before slaughter is an
   important surveillance tool for detecting the presence of FMD in the
   United States.

   Finally, USDA*s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading and
   coordinating USDA*s activities to plan for and manage agriculture- related
   crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as USDA*s
   primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
   facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local
   governments, and private- sector organizations. U. S. Customs Service

   The U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation*s primary enforcement
   Supports USDA*s agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially
   harmful products into the United States, including FMD- contaminated
   products. In Efforts at Ports of

   addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper duties or
   Entry

   tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors work to enforce
   the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as those of USDA.
   Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests and bills of
   lading, and physically inspect cargo and international passengers and
   their luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all 301 ports of entry
   throughout the United States, including international airports and
   seaports and land border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders.

   Customs also has inspectors at some foreign locations, such as the
   international airport in Toronto, Canada, where they perform preclearance
   inspections of passengers and their luggage prior to entry into the United
   States. Customs inspectors also examine international mail and packages
   arriving in the United States at the 14 facilities handling mail of
   foreign

   origin. Objectives, Scope, and

   Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U. S. processes to
   Methodology obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks
   are adequate and timely, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
   entering

   the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected
   countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively
   to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur. To address the first question,
   we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, and we interviewed USDA and
   Customs officials. In particular,

   we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information obtained and
   disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom.

   For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations,
   and other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state
   officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, we
   visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore,
   Maryland; and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for
   international mail, we visited international mail- processing facilities
   in New Jersey and Virginia and one international express package carrier
   in Kentucky. To observe the preventive measures for live animals imported
   through

   U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the
   Sarnia, Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe
   the preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles

   International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance
   procedures used to process international passengers entering the United
   States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We also
   gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is handled
   at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby county

   and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how USDA*s
   guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of disease at U.
   S. livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.

   As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after
   September 11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after the
   U. K. outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of the
   review as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to survey
   passengers who were returning to the United States from the United
   Kingdom, during the outbreak, at the airport after they left the
   passenger- processing area. Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60
   passengers who visited the United Kingdom during the time of the outbreak
   (Mar. through Sept. 2001). We asked them to recall various aspects of
   their return trip and the processing they underwent at U. S. airports.
   These results cannot be generalized and

   represent only the experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In
   addition, because we asked people to recall events after the passage of 4
   to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes might not
   have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon arrival.

   Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the preventive
   measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom with those used by
   the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for our review because
   the ability of the United States to protect its livestock from FMD also
   depends on the ability of our neighbors to prevent the disease; according
   to USDA officials, if any of the three countries has an FMD outbreak, the
   other two are also likely to have an outbreak. We

   included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is a major U. S.
   trading partner and because of its recent experience with FMD. To obtain
   information on the preventive measures used by Canada and Mexico, we

   visited these two countries, met with federal officials, and obtained and
   reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and Mexico, we visited
   airports, seaports, international mail- processing facilities, and border
   crossings to observe the preventive measures used by these countries. To
   obtain information on the United Kingdom*s preventive measures, we

   reviewed and summarized legislation and regulations for the European Union
   and the United Kingdom, as well as other publicly available documents. To
   ensure the accuracy and completeness of our information, we shared the
   summaries that we prepared on the preventive measures used by the three
   countries with officials in these countries and asked for their review and
   comments. The information on these foreign countries* preventive measures
   does not reflect our independent legal analysis.

   Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state emergency
   response plans as well as other key documents and federal legislation and
   regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry representatives, and
   state officials. We also interviewed a group of selected veterinarians and
   animal health technicians who were part of the U. S. contingent that
   supported the United Kingdom*s response efforts in 2001 to obtain their

   perspectives on U. S. preparedness and observations on lessons learned
   from the U. K. outbreak. We interviewed the state veterinarian in six
   states that are major U. S. livestock producers to obtain their
   perspective on their state*s preparedness efforts as well as the overall
   U. S. ability to respond to

   an outbreak if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session
   and a conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health
   Association that included information on U. S. preparedness and response

   to an FMD outbreak. We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this
   report for review and comment. The written comments we received from USDA
   are presented in appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in
   appendix VI. In addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we
   have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. We conducted our
   work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with generally
   accepted government auditing standards.

   USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Chapt er 2

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved USDA relies on a wide variety of
   sources to obtain information on outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources
   include APHIS and FAS staff stationed abroad, official notifications from
   international trade or animal health organizations, and notifications from
   affected countries. But USDA*s dissemination of this information is more
   problematic because it has no formal process* detailed procedures and
   protocols* for sharing information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs,
   which provides the first line of defense against potentially contaminated
   products entering U. S.

   ports. USDA does, however, share the information it develops with agencies
   within the department, states, public and private veterinarians, industry
   groups, and the public through various methods, including Emails, postings
   to USDA*s Internet site, telephone calls, and media alerts.

   USDA Obtains USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign
   animal diseases, Information on Foreign

   including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA staff
   stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such as OIE
   and FMD Outbreaks from

   the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of affected
   Multiple Sources

   nations. USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a
   range of information on agricultural issues, including the disease status
   of foreign countries. For example, APHIS*s International Services group
   employs over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in 27
   countries around the world. According to APHIS officials, these foreign
   service staff collect agricultural information for the countries they are
   stationed in as well as other countries in the region. Their primary
   sources of information

   include (1) official notifications from foreign governments about changes
   in their country*s animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host
   government, local industry, and private- sector officials; (3) local radio
   and television reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may
   provide early information about potential animal or crop disease problems;
   and (4) informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted
   by the foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather
   references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to

   APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal
   sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the
   United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting imports.

   Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63 agricultural
   counselor, attache, and affiliate foreign national offices; 17
   agricultural trade offices; and a number of agricultural advisers covering
   129 countries

   around the world. According to the FAS officials we spoke with, staff
   stationed overseas have no functional responsibility for tracking foreign
   animal diseases, such as FMD. However, during their routine activities,
   they may become aware of a possible outbreak, in which case they would
   likely relay this information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D. C.
   FAS staff obtain agricultural information from several of the same sources
   accessed by APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry
   reports, meetings with host government officials, and official government
   notifications and documents.

   In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease
   conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its
   evaluation of a country*s eligibility to export meat and meat products to
   the United States. FSIS*s technical staff review the documents provided by
   the foreign country as well as conduct in- country visits before deeming a
   country eligible to export meat and meat products to the United States for
   human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in each eligible exporting
   country, at least annually, and shares any information obtained on
   diseases of concern with APHIS, according to USDA.

   USDA also receives information from international organizations, such as
   OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to follow
   during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both OIE

   and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an official
   notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These
   organizations then provide other member nations with official notification
   of the outbreak.

   In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries
   affected by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading
   partners. For example, major U. S. trading partners often notify USDA
   officials directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom did
   in early 2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom notified
   USDA on the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD* February 21,
   2001. In

   North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have an informal
   understanding that in the event of an FMD outbreak, the affected country
   will immediately report to the other two countries. The usefulness of
   information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a foreign country*s
   willingness to provide accurate information in a timely fashion. There are
   instances, however, when a country may fail to notify OIE, WTO, or its
   major trading partners of a disease outbreak in a timely

   manner. 6 For example, Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some
   regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although unconfirmed
   reports indicated that the disease had been present for several months,
   according to USDA officials. Argentina officially notified OIE on March
   13, 2001, and USDA then took action to prohibit imports of affected
   Argentine products. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated
   that if it had verifiable scientific evidence that FMD existed in
   Argentina, it could have prohibited imports before the country notified

   OIE. USDA Lacks a Formal

   APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
   Process to Ensure

   foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
   governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
   Dissemination of FMD information about potential FMD outbreaks because
   they all play an Information to

   important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
   Customs

   immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process,
   including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information on
   foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no assurance that
   Customs inspectors at U. S. ports of entry, and in particular at the ports
   where APHIS does not have a presence, are adequately informed of the

   need to implement controls for potentially contaminated cargo, and
   international passengers and their luggage entering the United States.

   APHIS Uses Multiple APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field
   staff located in the

   Mechanisms to Inform United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state
   governments,

   USDA Agencies and Others industry groups, the public, and the media about
   foreign FMD outbreaks. in the United States About These methods include

   Foreign FMD Outbreaks

    E- mails and electronic alerts,

    memos and letters,

    telephone calls,

    meetings, 6 While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with
   its reporting requirements, WTO can.

    press releases,

    printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),

    public education and outreach,

    toll free information hotline, and

    postings to the Internet (USDA*s Web page). After the 2001 outbreak of
   FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that APHIS used each of these
   methods to distribute information about (1) the disease, (2) the outbreak
   in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing the introduction and spread of
   the disease in the United States. For example, APHIS field locations began
   receiving electronic alerts and E- mails from

   APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same day that the
   United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak. Similarly, by the second
   week of March 2001, USDA had issued several press releases, placed
   information on its Web site about FMD precautions, initiated an
   international travelers* education campaign, and established a toll- free
   number for public inquiries about the disease. Also, shortly after the U.
   K. outbreak began, APHIS distributed several types of printed media to its
   field offices nationwide. According to the Veterinary Services staff in
   the

   field offices we contacted, they distributed these materials to state
   governments, industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed
   posters in public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table
   2 shows selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak
   in the United Kingdom.

   Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 2001
   Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom Date Action taken/ information
   disseminated

   Feb. 21, 2001 APHIS Alert to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port
   Offices prohibiting the importation of all meat products from the United
   Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the
   Isle of Man).

   Feb. 26, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and
   Quarantine inspectors to closely monitor international passengers, in
   particular those arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those
   who had been on a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if
   necessary.

   Mar. 1, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine
   inspectors providing guidance on inspecting farm equipment and tractors as
   well as other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of
   Ireland. Mar. 6, 2001 First team of U. S. veterinarians deployed to the
   United Kingdom to help respond to the outbreak. Mar. 12, 2001 Beginning
   the week of March 12, 2001, a high- ranking APHIS official began a tour of
   major eastern U. S. ports, meeting with U. S. Customs and other federal
   inspection agencies to emphasize the need for

   aggressive exclusion activities. Mar. 13, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alerts and
   USDA news release announcing the prohibition of imported live swine and
   ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and other
   products of swine and ruminant from all European Union nations (does not
   include cooked pork products).

   Mar. 13, 2001 USDA Media Advisory announcing kick off of traveler*s
   education campaign starting March 14, 2001. Mar. 14, 2001 USDA memo to its
   field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding guidelines for
   importing pets from areas affected with FMD. Mar. 16, 2001 USDA news
   release announcing the establishment of toll- free FMD call lines*
   domestic and international. Mar. 20, 2001 APHIS begins regularly scheduled
   conference calls with the National Association of State Departments of

   Agriculture to discuss APHIS*s FMD exclusion efforts. Mar. 22, 2001
   Specific guidance provided to the U. S. Customs Service on FMD- related
   inspection procedures for cargo and passengers at U. S. ports of entry.

   Mar. 23, 2001 Industry Alert to livestock owners and private- practice
   veterinarians posted to the APHIS Web site, reminding them to report
   unusual animal health symptoms.

   Mar. 2001 Other information issued during the month of March includes

    meetings about FMD with industry, state, and local governments;

    FMD- prevention information developed for airlines;

    warning signs posted at airports;

    public service announcements on radio and television; and

    FMD information for USDA extension agents. Apr. 9, 2001 Secretary of
   Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection
   personnel. Apr. 26, 2001 Secretary of Agriculture assures the Congress
   that compensation would be available to producers in the event of an FMD
   outbreak in the United States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and
   doubling the size of the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200
   current inspectors to critical ports of entry. May 11, 2001 USDA and the
   Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to
   ensure that FMD is kept out of the United States.

   May 2001 USDA issues FMD- prevention guidelines for livestock shows
   agricultural fairs, and other agricultural events.

   However, the effectiveness of USDA*s efforts is uncertain. For example, in
   March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting that
   they

   could assist USDA*s preventive activities by making in- flight
   announcements on international flights to raise passengers* awareness
   about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the
   airlines to use when making these announcements. However, the passengers
   returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom we contacted
   told us that not all the airlines made such announcements. Similarly in
   May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for

   livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs.
   According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are *suggestions* for fair
   organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation are left
   to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed that the

   implementation of APHIS*s guidelines varied dramatically at the two county
   fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example, USDA*s guidelines
   indicate that food should not be allowed in areas where show animals are
   housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed that no restrictions of
   this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the livestock

   owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs generally did
   not know about the risks associated with FMD or the need to take
   precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread. For example,
   one livestock producer told us that FMD was a *European

   problem* and that the United States did not have to worry about it. APHIS
   Does Not Have a While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing
   interested parties Formal Process to Provide

   about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform Customs
   with Information Customs* the first deterrent to the importation of
   potentially FMDaffected

   on Foreign FMD Outbreaks products* about these outbreaks. As Table 2
   shows, after the U. K.

   outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its decisions to
   prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers
   arriving at U. S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Customs did not
   receive any consistent national guidance from APHIS until the Acting

   Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing
   from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16, 2001. As a result, Customs*
   field staff did not receive uniform official guidance on general
   inspection

   measures for passengers and products until March 27, 2001, and specific
   information on at- risk products to be detained at the ports until April
   4, 2001* 37 and 45 days, respectively, after APHIS received the United
   Kingdom*s official notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs
   memorandum and officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped
   to adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry

   during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. For example, one Customs

   supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her port
   of entry and that she had no information on how to clean passengers* shoes
   and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to this Customs
   supervisor, the lack of official guidance forced her staff to rely on
   informal and inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS officials located at
   another port of entry. She added that because Customs inspectors are not
   animal disease specialists, they need nontechnical, clear procedures to
   help them

   process international cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at
   those ports where there is no APHIS presence. The Customs* Assistant
   Director for Field Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance
   is needed for all Customs field inspectors. APHIS officials acknowledged
   that they did not notify Customs of the U. K. outbreak. According to these
   officials, because Customs had not sought specific guidance from APHIS
   about prior FMD outbreaks in other

   countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo,
   passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the
   outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them. As
   a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U. K. outbreak, the
   APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that in May
   2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field Operations to
   the list of people to whom she sends E- mail notifications of foreign FMD
   outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field Operations told us
   that this action will help his office better inform Customs* field
   inspectors about future foreign FMD outbreaks.

   Conclusions Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U. S.
   livestock from FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this
   responsibility. Customs is especially critical to keeping FMD-
   contaminated products out of the United States at those ports of entry
   where APHIS is not present. However,

   Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted, coordinated, and
   comprehensive defense against FMD at the nation*s border only if they
   receive current information on the countries that are affected by FMD and

   have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to process at- risk products and
   passengers. APHIS has taken the first interim step to notify Customs of
   future foreign FMD outbreaks, by including a Customs official on one of
   its

   electronic mailing lists. However, we believe that this does not provide a
   permanent solution to the lack of clear communication protocols and
   procedures between APHIS and Customs.

   Recommendations for To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U. S.
   ports of entry are fully

   Executive Action informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we
   recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of
   APHIS to develop (1) a formal written agreement with the Commissioner of
   the Customs Service

   that will clearly delineate the process by which future information on
   foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs and (2) uniform,
   nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can use to process
   international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD- affected countries.

   U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other Countries,
   but Complete

   Chapt er 3

   Protection May Be Infeasible U. S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak*
   control and eradication overseas and the port of entry screening of
   livestock, animal products, and passengers* have been successful since
   1929. Nevertheless, the United States remains vulnerable to an FMD
   outbreak because of the nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it
   can come into the country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both
   legal and illegal passengers and

   cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar challenges in
   protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive measures that are
   comparable to those the United States uses. However, the United States
   could also build on the experiences of other countries to improve its
   preventive measures.

   USDA*s Efforts to As a first line of defense to safeguarding U. S. animal
   resources against the

   Control and Eradicate introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps
   prevent, control, and

   eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate outside the FMD
   in Other

   United States. By helping other nations eradicate or control these
   Countries Help Reduce outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural
   pests and diseases the Risk to U. S.

   reaching U. S. borders. Livestock

   In North America, U. S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have largely
   focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the possible threat of
   the FMD virus*s moving overland from South America, where the disease is
   endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located in Mexico working with
   the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth
   Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. The commission, formed in 1947
   as a combined U. S.- Mexican effort to eradicate FMD from Mexico, 7 built
   Mexico*s animal health infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from
   Mexico in 1954. Today, USDA and Mexican

   veterinarians work together, through the activities of the commission, to
   provide disease surveillance, diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico
   to ensure that the country remains FMD- free. According to USDA officials
   in Mexico, the United States initially covered about 80 percent of the
   costs for the joint program; however, as the Mexican government assumed
   greater responsibility for the program, the U. S. share has decreased to
   about 20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in
   funding

   for the commission*s activities. According to USDA officials, this funding
   7 The commission was originally called the Mexican American Commission for
   the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.

   supports the commission*s high- security laboratory in Mexico City by
   providing training, supplies, and equipment. In addition, for over 30
   years, the United States has held regular meetings on animal health issues
   with the governments of Canada and Mexico to harmonize North America*s
   import requirements and, more recently, to coordinate preventive actions
   and emergency response activities in the event of an FMD outbreak. For
   example, in 2000, the three countries held joint exercises* known as the
   Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test their FMD communication and response
   plans, and to assess their response systems.

   As a result of this exercise, the three governments signed a memorandum of
   understanding to formally establish the North American Animal Health
   Committee. This committee represents animal health issues for the North
   American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to harmonize live animal and
   animal product import requirements for North America. The committee will
   also plan emergency response activities and perform joint test exercises
   to ensure that all three countries remain prepared to respond to an FMD
   outbreak.

   The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD- control zones in
   Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in Central
   and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from South America,
   USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama and Colombia. In
   Panama, USDA supports the U. S.- Panama Cooperative Program for the
   Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains the Darien Gap area
   of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal diseases. This program
   conducts field surveillance at high- risk border

   points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the
   infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative
   Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio- containment,
   diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign
   animal diseases in Central America.

   Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD- free barrier
   along the Colombia- Panama border. 8 This barrier serves as the "first
   line of defense" for preventing the spread of FMD northward into Central
   America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD- free. Until FMD
   is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that 8 This barrier is one
   of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is maintained by the European
   Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.

   maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease*s northward spread. USDA
   provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the program. As
   part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also has
   cooperative agreements with all the other Central American countries to
   support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, including field

   investigations and the collection of laboratory samples for FMD and other
   foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, USDA helps transfer
   surveillance and detection technologies to these countries.

   When FMD strikes other nations* as it did recently, for example, in
   Argentina and the United Kingdom* the United States may assist in
   controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327 U. S.
   animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped
   eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans came from
   USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments. Beginning in March
   2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally in groups that
   averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the response for about a

   month. At the peak of the outbreak during March and April, about 100 U. S.
   animal health professionals were assisting in the U. K. response. The U.
   S. responders with whom we spoke participated in surveillance activities,
   such as collecting blood samples, and epidemiology tasks, such as tracking
   and predicting the path of new disease outbreaks. They also issued permits
   and licenses to move animals and products such as silage. By providing
   such assistance, the United States not only helps ensure that the disease
   is eradicated quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-
   infected products to arrive at U. S. ports of entry. 9

   Despite U. S. Preventive Preventive measures at U. S. borders provide the
   second line of defense Measures at Ports of against the incursion of FMD
   into the United States. USDA has identified several key pathways by which
   the FMD- virus could enter the United Entry, Vulnerability to States. To
   respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA FMD Remains

   implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products,
   passengers, and equipment arriving at U. S. borders are free of the virus
   and do not pose a risk to U. S. livestock. However, some level of risk is
   inherent 9 According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U. K.
   outbreak in 2001, another benefit of sending U. S. personnel to assist
   with foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable

   training they receive by handling diseased animals and responding to
   various aspects of a *real life* response.

   in international trade and travel, and no set of measures can ever
   completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the country.
   Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level of inspection
   resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and magnitude of
   cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that continue to enter the
   country, the United States remains vulnerable to an outbreak.

   The United States Has The FMD virus could enter the United States through
   a number of key

   Implemented Preventive pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal
   and other products, Measures for Key Pathways

   international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international
   carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment
   returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed
   and implemented specific preventive measures described below.

   Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such as
   swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA judges
   to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern. 10 For example, in April
   2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or geographical regions as free of FMD.
   (See app. I.) Generally, live animals can be imported only through
   designated ports of entry, the majority of which are located along U. S.
   borders shared with Canada and Mexico, and three others located on the
   east and west coasts. 11 Most live cattle imports into the United States
   originate from Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live

   lamb imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the
   United States must be accompanied by a U. S. import permit and a health
   certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of
   origin. The health certificate states that the animals have been in the
   exporting country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free of
   other diseases

   of concern. 12 Generally, animals arriving from countries other than
   Canada and Mexico may be quarantined. 13 Zoological ruminants and swine
   from

   10 USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a country*s FMD- free
   status using the OIE criteria described in chapter 1, and independently
   validates the country*s disease status reports sent to the OIE. In
   addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the country and
   conducts verification visits to the country. 11 Twenty- six other U. S.
   ports of entry accept live animals on a limited basis. 12 Because the
   incubation period for FMD is significantly less than 60 days, the 60- day
   requirement helps ensure that if animals have been exposed to the FMD
   virus or other serious animal health diseases, they would become
   symptomatic within this period of time.

   FMD- affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be
   processed through USDA*s New York Animal Import Center.

   Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other products
   that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could potentially enter the
   United States during the course of normal international trade. These
   products include animal products meant for human consumption,

   such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal products, such as hides,
   skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well as nonanimal products, such
   as farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA regulates the importation of this
   diverse range of products to help minimize the risk of introducing FMD
   into the United States.

   USDA implements different import rules for FMD- free and FMD- affected
   countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of
   concern, 14 USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product imports. For
   FMD- affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible
   products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
   outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA reassesses the
   disease status of the affected country and determines the level of trade
   that can resume. USDA allows imports of animal and other products from
   FMD- affected countries only if they meet certain requirements. These

   requirements vary for different kinds of products, as follows:  Animal
   products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh, chilled, or frozen
   meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk are prohibited from FMD-
   affected countries. However, processed meat and dairy products are allowed
   from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain requirements. For
   example, meat products can be imported

   from FMD- affected countries only if (1) the country and meat processing
   plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to the United
   States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet APHIS*s meat-
   processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that meat products from
   these countries are not contaminated with the FMD

   virus, and require that the products be processed in a manner that will 13
   The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals imported and
   the kinds of diseases present in the country of origin. 14 Unrestricted
   trade is generally dependent on a country*s being free of other diseases
   of concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest), and others. FMD is only
   one of the diseases of concern.

   inactivate the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured,
   or canned and shelf- stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U. S.
   import permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the

   country of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, most
   dairy products from FMD- affected countries must meet APHIS*s requirements
   to ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD*s introduction. For example,
   milk products that are in a concentrated liquid form and are shelf- stable
   without refrigeration are allowed from FMD- affected countries. Some dairy
   products, such as condensed milk require a U. S. import permit, while
   others, such as yogurt and butter are unrestricted and do not require a
   permit. 15  Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products
   are

   allowed from FMD- affected countries if they have been properly treated to
   inactivate the virus; however, a U. S. import permit may be required. For
   example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal trophies
   can be imported into the United States from FMD- affected

   countries.

    Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw used
   for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD- affected countries.
   However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate from the
   exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam cleaned. APHIS
   officials inspect farm equipment at U. S. ports of entry

   to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are found,
   then inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately washed with
   detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before granting
   approval for entry into the United States. All animal and other products
   arriving at U. S. ports of entry, whether from FMD- free or FMD- affected
   countries, are subject to inspection by U. S. federal inspectors. Customs
   officials, who review the documents accompanying the shipments, either
   electronically or on paper, provide the first level of inspection for
   these shipments. On the basis of this review, Customs is authorized to
   either release the shipments into commerce or hold them for USDA
   inspection. USDA provides Customs with a list of products to be flagged
   for inspection by APHIS. APHIS inspectors ensure that all the necessary
   documents accompanying the shipment, such as

   15 The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing conditions for
   the product and determine whether the stated process will inactivate the
   FMD virus.

   import permits and official health certificates, are complete and ensure
   that the shipments match their manifest. In some instances, APHIS
   inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to check their contents.
   After APHIS completes its inspection, the shipment may proceed to FSIS
   and/ or the Food and Drug Administration for further inspection, depending
   on which agency regulates the safety of these products for human health
   issues, or may proceed to Customs for release into commerce. 16 According

   to USDA, FSIS inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments
   of products under FSIS*s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more
   in- depth examination.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary
   inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those
   ports staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments
   continue to be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said that
   it is working

   with Customs and other federal agencies to develop an automated targeting
   system, which will serve as an electronic interface among federal agencies
   to identify and automatically segregate high- risk plant cargo and track
   imported animals and animal products. International passengers.
   International passengers who may have been in contact with the FMD virus,
   either through contact with infected animals or materials such as soil and
   manure, or who bring potentially

   contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to the
   United States. USDA provides the following FMD- prevention information and
   types of scrutiny for international passengers in an effort to reduce the
   risk associated with this pathway:

    USDA requests airlines to make in- flight announcements on international
   flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and it plays
   prerecorded announcements about how international passengers can assist in
   keeping FMD out of the United States.

    International passengers must fill out a U. S. Customs declaration form
   that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into the
   country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were in
   contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these

   16 Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by FSIS,
   while others, such as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food and Drug
   Administration to ensure that they are safe for human consumption before
   they are released into U. S. commerce.

   questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at the
   port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x- ray and
   inspect the contents of the passengers* baggage; ask them additional
   questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy
   products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.

    USDA*s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim
   areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their
   luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors look
   not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and

   leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to
   determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission. If
   the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these passengers are
   referred to the USDA inspection area for further processing.

   After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the
   international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not
   consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the

   airlines they traveled on did not make any in- flight announcements about
   FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs declaration
   form indicated that they had been in contact with animals or visited a
   farm while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred by officials to
   the USDA inspection area at the airport for further processing or they had
   to request USDA personnel at the airports to examine and disinfect the
   shoes that they wore while they were in FMD- affected areas in the United
   Kingdom.

   Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international carriers,
   such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus into the
   United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated with the
   virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that garbage
   from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of so that it
   does not present a risk to U. S. livestock. For example, USDA inspectors
   supervise the removal of all international garbage from airplanes and
   ships. This garbage must be transported in leak- proof containers and must
   be disposed of properly, such as by incineration or sterilization, and

   subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance agreements with
   catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper handling and approved
   disposal methods for international garbage. Before a compliance agreement
   is signed, APHIS officials will, among other things, review the

   application; visit the handling, processing, or disposal facilities;
   observe the operation of any equipment to determine its adequacy for
   handling

   garbage; and certify and approve the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be
   used to process international garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating
   under these compliance agreements to ensure that they abide by the
   conditions stated in the agreement.

   International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the FMD
   virus may also be sent through international mail and courier services to
   U. S. residents. As a result, international mail packages entering the
   United States are subject to inspection by Customs and USDA officials.
   Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the packages and either
   visually inspects or x- rays them as part of its responsibility to screen

   international mail for illegal and prohibited items, such as contraband
   and drugs. At USDA*s request, Customs can also screen international
   packages for prohibited animal products, such as meat and dairy products
   from

   FMD- affected countries. Customs sets aside packages that appear to
   contain such items for USDA*s inspection. USDA officials will review the
   declaration forms and may x- ray or open these packages for physical
   inspection. If the item in the package is a permissible product, the
   officials

   will reseal the package and release it for delivery; otherwise it will be
   confiscated and destroyed. 17 In commenting on a draft of this report,
   USDA noted that mail from high- risk countries is more thoroughly
   scrutinized on the basis of pathway analysis.

   Military personnel and equipment. Because U. S. military forces are
   deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning to
   the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the country.
   As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps oversee the
   reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and personal property to
   reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the United States. For
   example, military personnel must declare all agricultural items they are
   bringing back to the United States and identify whether they have been on
   farms or in contact with animals while abroad. Their clothing and gear
   should also be cleaned and washed before reentering the country.
   Similarly, all military rolling stock, such as humvees, trucks, weapons
   systems, and tanks, as well as other used military gear, such as canvas

   tents, must be thoroughly cleaned before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates,
   and other military equipment must be free of soil, manure, and debris.
   Military equipment used to eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as
   FMD, is not allowed reentry. For small- scale operations, the military
   must 17 Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are
   routinely notified.

   notify USDA at least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U. S. port of
   entry. USDA will determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are
   available at the first port of entry, and all items will be held at this
   port for inspection. If approved cleaning facilities are not available or
   if the equipment is contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA
   will refuse to allow reentry. Large- scale operations require a 30- day
   notification.

   United States Remains The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD
   since 1929, and some Vulnerable to FMD

   USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy
   condition of U. S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of
   U. S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these and
   other

   experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak for
   the following reasons:  FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that
   remains viable for long periods of time.

    FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and inanimate
   items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose varying levels of
   risk to U. S. livestock, according to USDA, it could take only one
   contaminated product to come into contact with one

   susceptible U. S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.

    The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
   entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for USDA and
   other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most inspections at ports
   of entry are restricted to paper reviews of manifests supported by a
   limited number of judgmentally selected samples for physical inspection.
   For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 470 million international
   passengers and pedestrians arrived at U. S. ports of entry; of these, USDA
   inspected about 102 million. According to APHIS officials, about 30
   percent of the items seized from passengers at airports were prohibited
   animal products or by- products. Table 3

   provides information on the volume/ numbers of passengers, vehicles, and
   cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS*s inspections for
   fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of international mail entering the
   United States makes it difficult for APHIS and

   Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD- susceptible
   products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the international mail facility
   in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that about 30, 000 international parcels
   pass through their check point every day. This volume of mail

   provides the inspectors approximately 3 seconds per parcel to judge
   whether the package might contain FMD- susceptible products. Moreover,
   mail is processed at the facility during the day and night to keep up with
   the volume of international mail arriving daily. However, APHIS inspectors
   are present only during the day shifts and detector dogs are available for
   only 1 to 2 days per week. Although Customs* inspectors screen packages
   for FMD- susceptible products during the time when APHIS inspectors are
   not available, both APHIS and Customs inspectors told us that the process
   is less effective than having an APHIS

   inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to APHIS*s Assistant Director
   for Port Operations, even doubling or tripling the agency*s inspection
   resources would not significantly reduce the FMD risk from overseas
   entries because the percentage of passengers, vehicles, and cargo
   receiving a physical inspection is likely to continue to be relatively
   low. Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering
   the United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products,
   Fiscal Year 2001

   Percentage Commodity/ mode Volume/ number a Inspected by APHIS b inspected

   Passengers 472,000,000 101,513,792 21. 5 (all modes of transport) Ships
   215,328 52,016 24. 2

   Aircraft 1,064,923 541,109 49. 0 Cargo

   14, 538, 271 c 2,181,904 d N/ A e

    Rail 1,534,566

    Tr uck s 7,878,000

    Ship 5,125,705

   Mail packages N/ A f 434,216 N/ A Legend: N/ A= not applicable a Source:
   U. S. Customs Service.

   b Source: USDA. c The number of full containers. d The number of bills of
   lading inspected. A single bill of lading may include multiple containers.
   e The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs report
   their data in differing units of measure.

   f The total amount of international mail that entered the United States
   during fiscal year 2001was not available; however, APHIS officials at the
   Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that approximately 30,000
   parcels go past their check point every day.  Moreover, most U. S.
   preventive measures are not designed to intercept illegal entries of
   products or passengers that may harbor the FMD virus.

   According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products entering
   the United States is growing, and contraband meat products entering the
   country is the single most important risk for the introduction of FMD. In
   addition, illegal shipments of products from countries other than the
   stated point of origin and illegal immigrants also pose significant risks.
   USDA and Customs annually confiscate thousands of contraband and
   prohibited products at U. S. ports of entry. For example, in fiscal year
   2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of prohibited meat/ poultry and animal
   by- products. According to USDA officials, these seizures are only a small
   portion of the contraband entering the United States. To respond to the
   growing threat from illegal entries, USDA recently

   created the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance program. Program
   officials collaborate with several federal, state, and private
   organizations to ensure compliance with U. S. agriculture import laws at
   ports of entry. U. S. Preventive U. S. preventive measures for FMD are
   comparable to the measures used by

   Measures Are Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways
   included in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports,
   international

   Comparable to Those mail, and garbage from international carriers. The
   pathway that presented

   Used by Other the most significant area of difference concerned the
   measures used to Countries

   process international passengers entering these countries. (Detailed
   information on the preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the
   United Kingdom are provided in appendixes II through IV of this report.)

   Generally, U. S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the
   other three countries for the following four pathways:

    Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock only
   from approved countries that are FMD- free. Generally, these live animals
   must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that

   have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if
   necessary. In addition, the countries require import permits and health
   certificates to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals are
   imported directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico requires
   an official government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals imported
   from

   countries other than the United States in their country of origin before
   they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) accompany the shipment and
   monitor the health status of the animals while they are in transit.

    Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal product
   imports only from countries that they consider FMD- free and that meet
   their specific animal health and food safety standards. The countries also
   allow certain animal product imports from FMD- affected countries if they
   originate from a preapproved establishment and are

   processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example, meat
   products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf- stable can be
   imported from FMD- affected countries, but unprocessed products, such as
   fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not allowed. In
   addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject to review and
   may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive at the port of
   entry in each of the countries. 18  International mail. The countries
   handle international mail in a similar

   manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing the sender,
   country of origin, and contents of the package. Only packages considered
   suspect, for example, because they do not include required information,
   are from high- risk countries, or have been sent by repeat offenders, are
   selected and opened for further inspection. Canada uses x- ray technology
   to help identify packages containing prohibited items, and Mexican
   officials told us that all international packages arriving

   from FMD- affected countries are opened and inspected for prohibited
   items.

    Garbage from international carriers. The countries* federal agencies
   responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment,
   transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers.
   They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or under
   certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For example, in
   Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved sites located at
   least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock and/ or poultry

   and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 5. 5 feet) of local
   refuse and/ or other standard covering material. At the time of our
   review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals to be fed
   international garbage from airlines or ships. 18 All imported animal
   product shipments receive a documentary review, which usually involves a
   review of the accompanying paperwork, such as import permits and health
   certifications. A percentage of animal product shipments is judgmentally
   selected for physical inspection to ensure that the products do not
   present any animal or public health risk. Samples may be taken for
   laboratory analyses as part of this inspection.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United
   Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a member
   of the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade among,
   countries that are FMD- free as well as some that are not.

   The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used to
   prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers.
   Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:

    Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United
   States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert international
   passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U. S. signs were smaller and less
   visible in comparison with the signs used by the other two countries.

   For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall and warned
   passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French about FMD.
   Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, included

   pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast, the first
   U. S. signs were 1- by- 1 foot and included relatively small- sized text
   on a white background that was difficult to read and did not easily convey
   the importance of the message. According to USDA officials, these signs
   were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3- by- 3 feet) that included
   a colored graphic and larger- sized text. While larger, we observed at one
   U. S. international airport that the new signs were placed at a
   considerable distance from arriving passengers. These signs

   were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and therefore were
   several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed that the signs in
   Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible locations that were
   in greater proximity to the passengers. According to agriculture officials
   in all three countries, they are limited in their ability to place signs
   at ports of entry because they have to negotiate the size

   and placement with the port authorities. As a result, they are not always
   able to use the most effective signs or locations. Figures 3 and 4 show
   the signs that were used in the United States and Canada and Mexico.

   Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry

   Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry

    Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made changes
   to the declaration forms they use to process international passengers upon
   arrival. For example, after the U. K. outbreak in 2001, Canada reworded
   its declaration form to provide examples of food products of concern, such
   as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico

   developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD- affected
   countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture- related
   questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any changes to its
   declaration form in 2001, and some of the international passengers we
   contacted considered the agriculture- related question on the form
   ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that USDA was

   aware that the question on the form was confusing and ambiguous to

   travelers. This official said that most of the confusion arises because
   the question on the form consolidates three questions into one.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has recently
   worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the Customs
   declaration form. The form now includes two agriculturerelated questions
   that USDA believes will be more easily understood by travelers and will
   yield better information to the department to help focus its inspection
   efforts. The new form is currently being distributed

   throughout the country. Because USDA*s actions address our concerns, we
   have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this report. (See table
   4 for a comparison of the agriculture- related questions on the

   prior and revised U. S. declaration forms.) Table 4: Agriculture- Related
   Questions on the Prior and Revised U. S. Declaration Forms Language on
   prior Customs declaration form a Language on revised Customs declaration
   form a

   Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing fruits, plants, Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing

   meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live (a) fruits, plants, food,
   insects: animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, (b) meats,
   animals, animal/ wildlife products: have been on a farm or ranch outside
   the

   (c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails: U. S.

   (d) soil or have been on a farm/ ranch/ pasture: Q. 12 I have (We have)
   been in close proximity of (such as touching or handling) livestock:

   Note: a Both forms require the questions to be answered with either a
   *yes* or *no* response.

    Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico
   developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at
   airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the
   country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose not
   to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the disinfectant
   in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number of uses and may
   begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes that

   were otherwise clean. Conclusions The United States has had significant
   success in keeping the nation*s livestock FMD- free since 1929. To some
   extent, the success of this effort is directly related to the
   effectiveness of U. S. preventive measures both abroad and at the nation*s
   borders. However, because of the extensive

   presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and volume of
   international cargo and travel continue to expand, the nation*s
   vulnerability to an introduction of FMD remains high. The steps that other
   nations have taken to reduce the risk of FMD* such as signs to alert
   international passengers* could help improve USDA*s efforts to protect U.
   S. livestock.

   While we recognize that there is an additional cost to preparing new,
   larger, and more noticeable signs, we believe that, given the significant
   economic costs of an FMD outbreak to the nation, these costs are justified
   if they can help improve our preventive measures.

   Recommendation for To help improve the effectiveness of U. S. measures to
   prevent the

   Executive Action introduction of FMD by international passengers, we
   recommend that the

   Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop more
   effective signage about FMD for ports of entry. Agency Comments In its
   comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in the process
   of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be larger and more
   mobile than the ones that we observed during the course of our work.

   Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face Challenges in
   Responding Quickly

   Chapt er 4

   and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak If FMD enters the United States despite
   USDA*s preventive measures, the nation*s ability to identify, control,
   contain, and eradicate the disease quickly and effectively becomes
   paramount. Recognizing the importance of an effective response and the
   necessity to prepare before an outbreak occurs, USDA and most states have
   developed emergency response plans that establish a framework for the key
   elements necessary for a rapid and successful U. S. response and
   eradication program. Many of these plans have, to some extent, been tested
   by federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. However,
   planning and testing exercises have also identified several challenges
   that could ultimately impede an effective and timely U. S. response if
   they are not resolved before an FMD

   outbreak occurs. The Federal Planning for a coordinated response to
   emergencies, including outbreaks Government and Many

   of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels.
   Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested and
   States Have Developed

   revised their plans in response to the results of these tests. and Tested
   Emergency Response Plans

   Federal and State At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the
   American Red Cross signed

   Governments Have the federal response plan in April 1999, which is
   intended to guide the Developed Emergency federal response to national
   emergencies and augment state response Response Plans efforts. Under this
   plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated as the
   coordinating agency and is responsible for providing expertise in
   emergency communications, command and control, and public affairs. In the
   event of an FMD outbreak, FEMA would designate USDA as the lead agency and
   work closely with the department to coordinate the support of other
   federal agencies to respond to the outbreak. For example, under the plan,
   Customs would *lock down* ports of entry; the Department of Defense would
   provide personnel, equipment,

   and transport; the Environmental Protection Agency would provide technical
   support on the disposal of animal carcasses; the National Park Service
   would guide the response if wildlife become infected; and other agencies
   would provide additional support. To supplement the federal response plan
   and provide specific guidelines for an animal disease emergency, such as
   implementing quarantines of

   infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA*s
   Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a
   federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly
   contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the

   involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities,
   policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and
   federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated
   local, state, and federal response. At the state level, many states have
   developed an animal disease

   component for their state*s emergency management plans. According to the
   National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), 19 in January
   2000, only about half the states and U. S. territories had developed
   animal health emergency response plans. At that time, NAHEMS recommended
   that each state develop a plan for responding to animal health emergencies
   that links to their state*s emergency management plan and includes
   information on the following key elements:

    Animal health surveillance and detection systems.

    Control and eradication procedures.

    Communication between key partners.

    Involvement of emergency management officials.

    Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.

    Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in responding
   to natural disasters.

   According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the
   number of states and U. S. territories with animal disease emergency plans
   had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of their
   state*s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their plan

   included all of the elements listed above. 19 NAHEMS is a joint federal-
   state- industry group whose objectives include improving the U. S. ability
   to respond to animal health emergencies.

   Federal and State Agencies To ensure the efficacy and completeness of
   their plans, the federal Have Tested Their

   government and many of the states have conducted *tabletop* and Emergency
   Response Plans

   functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision
   makers in a relatively stress- free setting to

    discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease
   outbreak;

    evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and

    resolve questions of coordination and responsibility. The setting is
   relatively stress- free because there is no time limit to resolve the
   hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises simulate an
   emergency in the most realistic way possible, without moving people or
   equipment. It is a stressful, real- time exercise in which people apply
   emergency response functions to a hypothetical scenario. According to one
   APHIS official, functional exercises are best described as *dress
   rehearsals* for actual emergencies.

   The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, as
   described below:

    To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is comprehensive
   and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop exercise in 2001. In this
   exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving a modest, limited FMD
   outbreak in the United States and obtained the views of 21 federal
   agencies and the American Red Cross on how they could support the federal
   response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used this information to revise its
   draft national FMD response plan.

    The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000* the
   Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test the plans, policies, and procedures that
   would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in North
   America. The test focused on communication between the various entities
   involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by Canada, Mexico, and the
   United States. The test resulted in many recommendations to improve the
   three countries* abilities to (1) communicate effectively, (2) provide
   program support, and (3) use vaccines. According to the final report, the
   recommendations, if implemented, will improve North America*s overall
   response capacity.

   The three countries have established working groups tasked with responding
   to these recommendations.

   Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted various
   kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other animal
   disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June 2001, the
   Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas Division of
   Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public Safety,
   conducted a 4- day modified functional exercise of the state*s draft FMD
   response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and private
   entities in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test participants*
   abilities to control the simulated outbreak, find and deliver indemnity
   funds, and

   streamline the decision- making processes. Overall, the exercise
   determined that better communication and coordination could improve the
   speed and effectiveness of the state*s response. It also identified areas
   of ambiguity in the plan that left participants without clear directions
   at crucial times during the exercise. According to state officials, the
   plan was revised as a result of the exercise, and according to the
   Executive Director of the Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises
   are necessary to continuously improve the plan. However, the state
   veterinarian also said that he does not believe that adequate resources
   are available either at the federal or state level for such activities.

   Serious Challenges to As the U. K. experience has demonstrated, responding
   to an FMD outbreak

   an Effective U. S. can tax a nation*s fiscal, scientific, and human
   resources. If a similar outbreak were to occur in the United States, the
   nation would face a wide Response Are Yet to Be

   spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and rapid response:
   Resolved

   (1) the need for rapid disease identification and reporting; (2) effective
   communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and
   local responders; (3) an adequate response infrastructure, including
   equipment, personnel, and laboratory capacity; and (4) clear animal
   identification, indemnification, and disposal policies. While USDA has

   made some progress in addressing some of these issues, significant work
   remains. Rapid Disease Identification

   The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to and
   Reporting mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends
   on livestock producers* and private veterinarians* quickly identifying and
   reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they do
   not

   do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and state
   governments could initiate any action. For example, within the first few
   days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first reports of
   FMD reached British officials, infected animals were criss- crossing the
   country in hundreds of separate movements, putting other livestock at
   risk. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any
   suspicion that the disease was present in the country. In contrast, in
   France, county officials quickly identified diseased animals from the
   United Kingdom, and were able to slaughter them quickly and avoid a large-
   scale outbreak. As a result, France sustained minimal animal losses and
   was declared FMD- free within months, while it took the United Kingdom
   almost a year to eradicate

   the disease and regain its FMD- free status. Several federal and state
   animal health officials with whom we spoke were concerned about how
   quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
   United States. They told us that livestock producers or veterinarians may
   not readily identify FMD because (1) the disease presents symptoms that
   are similar to other less- serious diseases, (2) FMD

   and other foreign animal diseases are not usually included in veterinary
   school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may never have seen
   FMDinfected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers and veterinarians
   may not report the disease because they are not aware of the reporting
   process or may not realize the criticality of prompt reporting. According
   to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped raise general awareness among
   state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock

   producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the United
   States. An indication of this increased awareness is the doubling of
   foreign animal disease investigations from about 400 in 2000 to more than
   800 in 2001. In addition, federal and state officials told us that the U.
   K. outbreak

   led to greater awareness of the need to have trained diagnosticians for
   foreign animal diseases in the field. In recent years, more field
   veterinarians have attended foreign animal disease training at USDA*s Plum
   Island facility. 20 Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA
   intensified its efforts to

   increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U. K. outbreak
   20 Plum Island is USDA*s high- security laboratory (with a biosafety
   level- III status) located on an island off of Long Island, New York, and
   is the only U. S. laboratory authorized to conduct diagnostic testing of
   FMD- suspected samples using live FMD virus.

   in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed industry and animal
   health associations, and sponsored workshops, conferences, and
   informational telecasts for federal, state, and local officials, and
   others. In addition, the state governments also supported and supplemented
   USDA*s informational efforts. Despite USDA and state efforts to flood the
   livestock industry with information about the risks of FMD during 2001,
   the challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened awareness about
   FMD, now that the immediate risk from the U. K. outbreak has subsided.

   Cooperation, Coordination, Cooperation, coordination, and communication
   between federal, state, and

   and Communication local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock
   producers are essential

   for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and test exercises
   have helped start the process of establishing greater coordination and
   improving the level of cooperation and communication between all levels.
   According to a USDA official, for example, USDA*s recent planning efforts
   to develop a national FMD response plan brought together officials from a
   variety of federal agencies to consider the implications of an FMD
   outbreak to their areas of responsibility and helped them develop ways in
   which they could support a federal response.

   Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and coordination
   are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26 U. S. states/
   territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a group of states
   that had agreed to support each other in preparing for and

   responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to
   Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional
   coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern states
   met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated response
   plan for the region.

   While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of
   communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified
   areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the
   Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and
   cooperation between government and industry participants, it also
   identified the need for the following actions:

    Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of
   information.

    Develop written agreements between national animal health and industry
   officials to ensure a continued high level of communication even when
   players change.

    Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop
   collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an
   actual outbreak.

   We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and state
   officials varied by state. For example, while some state officials
   indicated that they had excellent working relationships with their federal
   counterpart located in the state, others told us that cooperation and
   communication were limited. According to one APHIS field veterinarian, the
   level of cooperation and communication depends to a large extent on the
   personalities of the people involved and therefore such variance is to be
   expected. While the development of written agreements as suggested by the
   Tripartite exercise report and NAHEMS could help alleviate this problem,
   as of 2001, only about 32 U. S. states/ territories had such

   agreements or other documents that detailed the respective roles of
   federal and state officials. To help improve cooperation, coordination,
   and communication, USDA officials told us that they are working with
   organizations such as the National Emergency Management Association to
   help states with their animal- emergency- planning efforts. In addition,
   USDA awarded 38 grants totaling $1. 8 million in 2001 to state agencies,
   tribal nations, and emergency management organizations. According to USDA,
   this funding was to be

   used for training, equipment, and emergency- preparedness exercises. In
   commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 2002,
   it announced that it would be making more than $43 million available as
   grants to the states for strengthening homeland security preparedness. Of

   this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet the national
   standards of emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS. Moreover, USDA
   stated that it is working with FEMA to develop a framework for a
   comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign animal disease
   outbreak. The plan will help better ensure the timely dissemination of
   information to critical audiences, including federal agencies, states, and
   industries.

   Adequate Response An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an
   effective

   Infrastructure infrastructure, including a national emergency management
   control and

   command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and disposal
   equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity. To ensure that
   a U. S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly coordinated

   and adequately controlled, USDA has established an Emergency Management
   Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, location. In the event of an
   outbreak, USDA will activate this center to coordinate day- today
   activities during an FMD response and notify U. S. trading partners of the
   status of the outbreak. According to USDA*s draft FMD response plan,

   APHIS will set up the Joint Information Center* collocated with the
   Emergency Management Operations Center* to serve as the primary source of
   public information about the response and will coordinate with other
   federal and state information centers.

   In addition, as the U. K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD
   outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons who
   can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and

   diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; (2)
   biohazard response support for controlling animals* movement and
   decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and personnel;
   and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding responders;
   the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment and supplies;
   and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak, the U. K.
   government had to request specialized animal disease support from several
   countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
   Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide slaughter and
   decontamination support; and use military personnel to provide general
   logistical support. According to a U. K. government working paper issued
   in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, more than 7,000 civil
   servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed forces personnel were
   involved in the response* making it a bigger and more complex logistical
   exercise than the United Kingdom*s involvement in the Gulf War. A recent
   test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel requirements to respond
   to an FMD outbreak in the United States would also be

   enormous* approaching 50, 000 people to support a response. More
   specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be at
   least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 specially
   trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health emergency.
   APHIS officials told us that while state and private veterinarians could
   help

   make up some of this difference, without appropriate training, their help
   would be of limited use.

   To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has
   undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency
   management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies*
   resources to help provide many of the general logistical support
   activities. Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of understanding
   with the Department of Defense to provide military personnel and equipment
   to support a response effort. In addition, APHIS has implemented an
   Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to increase the number of
   veterinarians available to assist in an animal health emergency. The
   program trains federal, state, and private veterinarians to handle
   emergency situations. As of December 2001, APHIS had trained 276 emergency
   veterinarian officers, 145 of whom participated in responding to the U. K.
   outbreak. Moreover, USDA has trained 520 veterinarians across the country
   as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, and they may be called upon to
   provide specialized animal health support in the event of an outbreak.
   Finally, according to APHIS officials, USDA has informal arrangements with
   the United Kingdom and other countries to provide the

   United States with veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada,
   New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently
   drafting a memorandum of understanding that would allow the five countries
   to share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health emergency.
   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it has

   created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private
   veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist APHIS
   veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign

   animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275
   private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department is
   continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will supplement
   the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies and

   organizations. A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic
   laboratory system that is capable of handling the volume of testing and
   analysis necessary in the event of an outbreak. For example, from February
   through December 2001, the United Kingdom*s Pirbright Laboratory, that
   country*s primary reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the
   presence of the FMD

   virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to ensure that the disease

   had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of 2.75 million samples were
   tested as part of the response to the outbreak. Despite this level of
   testing, according to U. S. veterinarians returning from the United
   Kingdom, the United Kingdom had unmet needs for laboratory assistance.

   In the United States, USDA*s Plum Island facility* the primary laboratory
   in the United States that is authorized to test suspected FMD samples*
   would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak, according to
   many federal and state officials with whom we spoke. Recognizing this
   potential problem, the National Association of State Departments of

   Agriculture recently recommended that the United States develop a national
   strategy for animal health diagnostic laboratory services that would
   include USDA*s Plum Island facility and its National Veterinary Services
   Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as state and university laboratories.
   Currently, state diagnostic laboratories have no formal role in a foreign
   animal disease response. In addition, the Director of the Plum

   Island facility stated that the nation needs to look beyond Plum Island
   for laboratory support in the event of a large- scale FMD outbreak. He
   suggested that off- site noncentralized testing, using noninfectious
   material (tests that do not use the live virus), should be considered with
   backup testing support provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us
   that while the idea of a regional laboratory structure has merit, several
   issues would

   have to be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For
   example, laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training
   and certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and
   maintained to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a
   significant commitment of resources.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of its
   efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is providing
   state and university cooperators with $20.6 million to establish a network
   of diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the country.
   This network will permit the rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal
   disease threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier this year it allocated
   $177 million to make improvements at key locations, including its
   diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, and
   that $15.3 million

   was allocated to USDA*s Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid
   detection technology for FMD as well as other animal diseases.

   Animal Identification, The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
   outbreak will require an

   Disposal, and animal identification and tracking system to allow
   responders to identify,

   Indemnification Policies control, and slaughter infected and exposed
   animals as well as clear animal disposal and indemnification policies. The
   2002 farm bill, 21 addresses

   animal disposal and indemnification issues by providing the Secretary of
   Agriculture with broad authority to hold, seize, treat, or destroy any
   animal, as well as to limit interstate livestock movement as part of
   USDA*s efforts to prevent the spread of any livestock disease or pest. The
   Secretary may also take measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest
   or disease of livestock, as needed. In addition, the farm bill requires
   the Secretary to compensate owners on the basis of the fair market value
   of destroyed

   animals and related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop
   specific guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.

   Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak,
   successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is
   essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United States

   generally does not require animal identification, nor does it have a
   system for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to a USDA
   official, in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely have to rely
   on sales records to track animal movements, which could take days, or
   weeks, depending on the accuracy of record- keeping and producer/ seller

   cooperation. The longer it takes to identify animals and track their
   movements from premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to
   contain the outbreak. USDA officials told us that, depending on where the
   outbreak is first identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely
   difficult to trace. For example, if only one farm were infected and
   animals had not recently been moved on or off the premises, no tracing of
   live animals would be necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared
   in a major market or feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on
   almost a daily basis, tracing would be very difficult and time- consuming.

   Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking
   system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the
   Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the 21
   The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
   (the 2002 farm bill) on May 13, 2002.

   industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the
   potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information. The
   Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as

   technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry
   opposition to a national animal identification system. For example, this
   official told us that the National Cattlemen*s Beef Association recently
   indicated some support for such a system. However, the following issues
   will need to be resolved before a national system can be developed and
   implemented:

    The responsibility for funding the system.

    The type of technology that should be employed* strictly visual,
   electronic, or some combination.

    The amount of information that should be included on each animal*s
   identification tag or electronic- tracking device.

    The persons able to access this information.

    The information that should be shared with other federal departments and
   agencies.

    At what point on the farm- to- table continuum should identification
   end? In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the
   disposal of carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the
   potential number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For example,
   during

   the U. K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily sheep, were
   slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA estimates, if
   the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude (affecting

   about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 million animals
   would be affected, and most of them would be cattle and hogs. Generally,
   disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or rendering. In the United

   States, according to USDA*s draft FMD response plan, burial would be the
   preferred method of disposal when conditions make it practical. The plan
   states that burial is the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of
   disposal. When burial is not feasible, the plan recommends incineration as
   the alternative means of disposal even though USDA recognizes that
   incineration is both difficult and expensive. According to a USDA

   veterinarian who helped during the U. K. outbreak, a 200- meter funeral
   pyre was used to incinerate 400 cows or 1, 200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a
   pyre

   required 1,000 railway ties, 8 tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4
   tons of straw, 200 tons of coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In
   addition, heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20
   people, was needed to construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits
   and incineration pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of
   slaughtered animals.

   Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom

   Source: USDA.

   Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United
   Kingdom

   Source: USDA.

   According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of these
   disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges that have
   not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such challenges

   as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to identify burial
   sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits and clearances in
   advance, and the potential to spread the disease if animals have to be
   transported to an off- farm burial site. For incineration, the
   incineration site has to be accessible to large equipment, and yet has to
   be sufficiently away from public view to minimize negative public reaction
   to the sight of

   large burning pyres. In addition, incineration could not only affect air
   quality but also may be ineffective because if not constructed properly,
   the pyres may not generate sufficient temperatures to completely
   incinerate the carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United
   Kingdom

   the pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the
   carcasses were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges because
   transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk of spreading

   the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting procedures would be
   needed at the rendering facility. Some U. S. veterinarians returning from
   the United Kingdom told us that during the outbreak, the United Kingdom
   faced many of these disposal challenges and they were concerned that the

   United States might not have devoted enough attention to deciding how it
   would address these or similar disposal issues. According to APHIS
   officials, USDA is currently creating digital maps of the whole country to
   help identify appropriate burial and incineration locations. In addition,
   USDA is trying to determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely
   converting the meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number
   of animals slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.

   Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to
   ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and
   exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U. K. outbreak, the
   government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak experienced
   delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers* resistance and legal
   challenges. According to state and livestock association officials,
   indemnification would be a significant issue* one that could hamper a
   rapid response in the United States. USDA published a proposed rule on May
   1, 2002, amending the indemnity provisions for its FMD- related
   regulations. This proposed rule clarifies how USDA will determine the
   value of animals and materials affected by an FMD outbreak and how
   indemnity payments will be made to claimants. USDA developed this proposed
   rule because it was concerned that potential delays to an FMD eradication
   program in the United States might occur because of producers* perceptions
   that they might not be adequately

   compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and
   materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs. Under the proposed
   rule, the federal government would pay 100 percent of the costs for the
   purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals if they become infected
   with FMD, as well as for materials contaminated with FMD and the cleaning
   and disinfection of affected premises, according to USDA.

   In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal
   identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely vital
   areas that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of disease. In
   this regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with the agricultural
   industries to provide forums for a national dialogue on the issue of a

   national identification plan for American livestock. The ultimate
   objective is to establish a national identification plan that provides the
   essential

   elements to improve emergency response and meet future needs. USDA further
   stated that it is investing in other options for disposing of carcasses on
   a large scale. Finally, USDA stated that it has extended the comment
   period from July 1 to July 31, 2002, for its proposed regulations that
   address how decisions regarding indemnity payments will be made in the
   event of an FMD outbreak.

   Conclusions If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of
   control, it could ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the
   destruction of millions of

   animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the disease must be
   stamped out quickly. Although the federal government and state governments
   have made significant progress in developing and testing emergency
   response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such as FMD, significant
   issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues could present major
   impediments to an effective and timely response if not addressed before an
   outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has several ongoing efforts to
   resolve many of these issues, the department has not established specific
   time frames for the completion of these efforts. We believe it is critical
   that adequate management attention and resources be made available to
   ensure that these issues are resolved expeditiously.

   Recommendation for To ensure that the United States is well positioned to
   respond effectively to Executive Action

   an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend that the Secretary of
   Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop a plan, which
   should include interim milestones and completion dates, for addressing the
   various unresolved issues that could challenge an effective

   U. S. response.

   Appendi xes Countries Considered FMD- Free by the

   Appendi x I

   United States As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following
   countries/ areas free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest
   (cattle plague): Australia Austria 22 Bahama Islands 22 Barbados Belgium
   22 Belize (British Honduras) Bermuda Canada Channel Islands 22 Chile 22
   Costa Rica Czech Republic 22 Denmark 22 Dominican Republic El Salvador
   Fiji Finland 22 France 22 Germany 22 Greenland Guatemala Haiti Honduras
   Hungary 22 Iceland Italy 22 Jamaica Japan 22 Luxemborg 22 Mexico
   Netherlands 22 New Caledonia 22 New Zealand Nicaragua Northern Ireland 22
   Norway 22 Panama Panama Canal Zone Papua New Guinea 22

   Poland 22 Portugal 22 Republic of Ireland 22 Spain 22 Sweden 22
   Switzerland 22 Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon Tobago Trinidad Trust
   Territories of the Pacific Islands

   22 These countries are included in special categories for FMD and
   rinderpest because even though they have been determined to be free of
   these diseases, one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) they
   supplement their national meat supply through the importation of fresh,
   chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/ areas that
   are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common
   land border with countries/ areas that are not designated as free of
   rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from countries/
   areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD under
   conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into
   the

   United States.

   Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

   Appendi x II

   FMD into Canada This appendix provides summary information on Canada*s
   preventive measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five
   key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals;
   (2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal of
   garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; (4)
   international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
   mail.

   Background The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in
   April 1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and
   plant health inspection programs, which were previously provided by four
   federal agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA
   delivers food,

   plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions across Canada. CFIA
   has 180 field offices, including border ports of entry, and 408 offices in
   nongovernment establishments, such as processing facilities. CFIA also

   has 13 biosecurity level- III laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD
   and large animals. 23 These laboratories provide scientific advice,
   develop new technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.

   The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction of
   diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the importation of
   animals and animal products from foreign countries to reduce the risk of
   introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD. The last outbreak of FMD
   in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection programs for animals,

   food, and plants produced in Canada and commodities and live animals
   imported into Canada. One of these programs is the Animal Health and
   Production program, which is applied at Canadian ports of entry. This
   program covers the issuing of import permits, quarantining of live animal
   imports, negotiating export health requirements with other nations*
   government, and establishing and ensuring compliance with Canadian

   import health standards. In addition, the program is responsible for
   implementing domestic disease control programs, foreign animal disease
   preparedness, and emergency response.

   23 Canada*s biosecurity level- IV laboratory conducts tests on animals
   infected with dangerous zoonotic agents.

   Controls for Live Canada allows live animal imports only from countries
   that are FMD- free

   Animal Imports and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals
   imported into

   Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of entry. For
   example, live animals imported into Canada by air from countries other
   than the United States are required to enter at airports, such as
   Vancouver, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. CFIA generally
   requires that an import permit application be filed in advance of the
   importation of live animals from countries other than the United States.
   The import permit contains information on the (1) importer, who must be a
   Canadian resident;

   (2) exporter; (3) destination of the animal( s); (4) producer; (5) port of
   entry; (6) preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be
   quarantined; and (7) description of animals to be imported including the
   number, species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and
   registration

   numbers or numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle. If
   quarantine periods are required for the animals, CFIA preapproves the
   quarantine premises. The inspection of shipments of live animals at
   Canadian ports of entry includes a document review and verification by
   Canadian Customs and CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-
   load the animals for inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part
   of the physical inspection, inspectors may verify the animal
   identification numbers. CFIA usually requires the importer to have a
   license to move the imported animals to their final destination.
   Additionally, once animals have entered Canada, CFIA can impose post-
   import requirements, which may include the possible quarantine and testing
   or additional treatment of the animals.

   All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet these
   general import requirements. However, once these requirements are met,
   Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the United
   States and those from other countries.

   Live Animals Imported from Generally, live animals entering Canada from
   the United States must the United States

   conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for
   animals from other countries. Depending on an animal*s state of origin and
   the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal diseases
   that Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as brucellosis,
   tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be required. Some states
   have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain kinds of animals on the
   basis of the state*s disease status. For example, as of April 2002, the

   following seven U. S. states were qualified to export restricted feeder
   cattle to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New York, North Dakota, South
   Dakota, and Washington.

   CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals imported
   from the United States. For example, an import permit is not required for
   U. S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for fattening. These
   animals are required only to have an Official Zoosanitary Export
   Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian. The certificate
   contains information on the (1) name and address of the consignor; (2)
   consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals to be exported;
   (4) animal*s origin; (5) results of the veterinary examination of the
   animals; and (6) animal*s residency in the United States, which must be
   for a minimum of 60 days. Additionally, while some animals, such as bob
   calves and restricted feeder cattle, are not required to be tested for
   diseases that Canada does not have such as, tuberculosis, brucellosis,
   blue tongue, and

   anaplasmosis, others, such as breeding cattle, must be tested. Similarly,
   a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not required for
   animals imported from the United States for direct slaughter. U. S.
   livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter are placed in
   sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to the Canadian
   slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals imported for direct
   slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered within 4 days of
   importation.

   CFIA encourages U. S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of
   time to ease the border review process. 24 Once a truckload of U. S.
   livestock arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a preclearance
   document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the CFIA inspection
   area, where inspectors review the documentation to ensure that the
   information provided is correct. When required, CFIA unloads cattle

   for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections on the trailers if
   the load is small and it is safe to do so. U. S. livestock imported for
   direct slaughter requires only a visual inspection; however, imported
   breeding cattle are checked for health status, and their ear tags and
   tattoos are verified against the documentation provided. Every transporter
   is required

   24 Live animals in transit by air are off- loaded only to change planes
   and, if destined for the United States, are placed in sealed trucks before
   leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow animals to transit Canada that would
   normally not be allowed into the country.

   to clean and disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping
   vessels that have been used to transport livestock immediately after they
   have been unloaded. A U. S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-
   authorized veterinarian

   must accompany swine imports from the United States. The certificate
   contains the name and address of both the consignor and consignee and
   complete identification of the animals to be exported, including
   certification that the (1) United States is free of hog cholera; (2) herd
   of origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo rabies for the past 12
   months, and that the animals exported have been tested for these two

   diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from other animals for at least
   30 days prior to export; (4) animals have been transported in cleaned and
   disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals have not been fed any garbage at any
   time. Additionally, all swine imported from the United States must be
   quarantined in Canada for at least 30 days in a CFIA- approved quarantine

   station. Swine shipments imported directly for slaughter are required to
   have an import permit.

   CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United States
   to be accompanied by a U. S. origin health certificate and an import
   permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1) registered
   name and identification number of the parents, (2) species and breed,

   (3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection
   premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle,
   and (6) name and address of the consignee.

   Live Animals Imported from To prevent the introduction of disease and
   control the importation of

   Other Countries animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture
   designates countries or parts of countries free from specific diseases.
   Canada designates countries

   to be FMD- free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease in the
   country or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak of the
   disease, (3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to
   prevent the

   introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the spread
   of the disease, and (6) the zoo- sanitary infrastructure. Importing
   countries must also be free of other Office of International des
   Epizooties (OIE) List A diseases in addition to FMD, such as rinderpest
   and classical swine fever. Importing countries that have OIE List B
   diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad cow
   disease; tuberculosis; and brucellosis must provide additional
   documentation proving that the herds being exported to Canada are free of
   these diseases. At the time of

   our review, in addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle
   imports only from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted only
   from the United States. If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and
   other diseases of concern,

   the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals. CFIA
   generally requires that all live animals imported into the country have a
   unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions for
   animals imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle must be
   tested for tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis,
   unless the

   exporting country is considered free of these diseases and certifies that
   it is free of other diseases of concern. CFIA has established additional
   requirements for importing horses into Canada from FMD- affected
   countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses from FMD- affected countries
   must be quarantined and washed with a disinfectant. In addition, their
   hooves and all equipment, such as saddles and tack, and all transportation
   vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected. Bedding and manure must be
   placed in bags and incinerated.

   Controls for Imported Canada allows only imports of FMD- susceptible
   animal products, such as Animal Products

   fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some animal
   products may be imported from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain
   requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue

   Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to ensure
   that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing the
   products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United States are
   generally required only to present proof of the country of origin at the
   port of entry. Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-
   free by CFIA can

   generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with live
   animal imports, to designate a country as FMD- free, CFIA reviews
   information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2) time
   since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect;

   (4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the disease;
   (5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6) zoo- sanitary
   infrastructure. For all countries, Canada also has a country- by- country
   meat inspection

   and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the

   country's overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments
   operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat
   products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews relevant
   legislation and related technical information, including the country*s
   residue- monitoring program. If the requesting country has legislation
   equivalent to Canada*s, a visit is made to the country to study the

   actual implementation of the legislation in establishments. On the basis
   of satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments wishing to
   export meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains a list of the

   countries and establishments that have been approved to export certain
   types of meat products into Canada. For those countries where the meat
   inspection system as a whole has not been approved, importation may be

   limited to specific meat products. Importations from countries that are
   not considered free from FMD are normally limited, to include the
   following: (1) commercially sterile canned cooked meat products; (2)
   pasteurized, canned, cured, and boneless meat products; and (3) cooked,
   frozen, tubed and boneless beef from specified

   establishments in certain countries. Milk products are allowed entry if
   they have been treated properly and are certified accordingly.
   Establishments approved for meat and meat product exports to Canada are
   periodically reviewed.

   All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to
   monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a shipment
   is identified as containing meat products, it must be held until the CFIA
   inspector reviews the information, such as the Official Meat Inspection

   Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the exporting country.
   The Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains information on the (1)
   name and address of the exporter and importer; (2) certificate number,
   country code, and exporting establishment number; (3) establishment number
   and

   name, and country where the animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the
   carrier; (5) port of loading and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number
   and description of the meat products; and (8) numbers from the official
   seal on the container and the container numbers. Depending on the
   exporting country, additional certifications may be required. Some animal
   product shipments are exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit
   through Canada to another country. CFIA does not review these shipments,
   provided they remain under a Customs bond and originate in a country and
   are of a type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into Canada.
   Animal product imports from the United States are generally required only
   to present proof of country of origin. However, some U. S.

   products, such as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import
   permit.

   CFIA*s sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes
   require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all
   containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to identify
   any evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer labels. For
   shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory containers, a full
   inspection of affected containers is conducted. For canned meat products,

   random inspections are carried out by the inspector on a minimum of 40
   cases, which are to be representative of the inspection lot and not
   include more than 5 containers from each of the cases. When there are
   fewer than 40 cases in an inspection lot, inspectors select the
   appropriate number of containers out of each case to make up the required
   sample. For

   inspection lots having fewer than 200 containers, the entire inspection
   lot must be examined, and the total number of containers must be recorded
   on the report form. When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the
   inspector must immediately hold the animal products and notify the area
   office by

   telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must
   officially notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or
   partially refused and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or
   remove it from Canada or it will be destroyed under direct supervision of
   a CFIA inspector.

   Controls for Garbage from international airlines and ships must be
   disposed of and

   International Garbage treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector.
   Garbage from carriers

   of U. S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar to those
   for Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to be disposed
   of by incineration, heat treatment at 100 Celsius for 30 minutes, or
   burial at a CFIA- approved site. In addition, the transportation routes
   for international garbage are approved in advance along with alternative
   routes in case of an emergency. Transporters are responsible for
   maintaining their trucks in good condition and checking to ensure that
   there are no possible leaks.

   Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that
   garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage can
   be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate
   incineration or burial sites. The ships* destinations are also recorded at
   the first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal galleys to
   ensure that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto Canadian land.
   At

   subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the galley seals. Seals
   may be broken under CFIA presence but must be resealed prior to departure
   if the ship is going to additional Canadian ports. All foodstuffs and pet
   animals are to remain on the ship and are allowed off only with the
   written permission of CFIA. If ships do not comply with these
   requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from entering Canadian

   waters. Controls for

   CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained
   International detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of
   prohibited plants and animal products. International passengers are
   required to declare all Passengers

   animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain animal
   products can result in fines. International passengers, except those
   arriving from the United States, are not allowed to bring meat and meat
   products into Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of cheese.
   Passengers not

   declaring prohibited items are subject to monetary penalties of up to Can.
   $400. At the main Canadian international airports, CFIA has approximately
   nine dogs trained to sniff baggage accompanying international passengers
   before they proceed through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog
   program is part of CFIA*s front line of defense against pests and
   diseases. The dogs are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits,
   plants, and meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk
   through the baggage claim area looking for anything that might be
   considered suspicious. CFIA made a number of changes to the international
   passenger controls as

   a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts of
   Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the
   airports, (2) x- ray passengers* baggage, and (3) mount a public awareness
   campaign.

   As a part of the public awareness campaign, large signs were placed around
   the airport terminals informing the public about FMD and precautions that
   should be taken to prevent its introduction into Canada. Brochures were
   also printed conveying similar information and handed to international

   passengers arriving from FMD- infected countries. In addition, CCRA
   officials asked specific questions about whether the passengers had been
   around farm animals or visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in
   Canada* even if the relevant question was not marked on the declaration

   card. This additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was
   declared FMD- free. Moreover, all international passengers entering Canada
   were required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who indicated that
   they might present an FMD risk were asked additional

   questions about their activities and* as deemed necessary* their shoes
   were sent out for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to Canada
   from countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at

   the teams* expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European
   outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they
   are planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the
   messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases.

   Controls for CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving
   into Canada by International Mail

   mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to open
   mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection by
   agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a seal
   with a code indicating which agency should perform a further inspection.

   Generally, each package is then x- rayed. Problem importers/ exporters are
   identified through a computer system, and these packages are given
   additional scrutiny. Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the
   recipient responsible for items sent through the mail, rather than the
   sender. As a result, recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they
   receive inappropriate items through the mail. For example, if personal
   shipments of prohibited

   agricultural products are sent through the mail, the recipient can be
   subject to monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. For commercial
   shipments, however, penalties for prohibited agricultural products can
   currently be as much as Can. $6,000. In addition, criminal penalties can
   also be imposed, depending on the nature of the offense.

   Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

   Appendi x II I FMD into Mexico This appendix provides summary information
   on the preventive measures that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not
   enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the
   importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products; (3)
   the handling and disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as
   airplanes and ships;

   (4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
   mail. Background The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of
   Foot and Mouth

   Disease, formed in 1947, combined U. S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate
   FMD from Mexico. 25 The commission built Mexico*s animal health
   infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954.
   Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number of
   activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2)
   responding to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on
   emergency plans and programs, (4) promoting public information programs,
   and (5) preparing and updating Mexico*s emergency foreign animal disease
   response plans.

   Mexico*s Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y
   Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish, and
   food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other things,
   (1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo- sanitary rules
   used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of entry, and (3) the
   animal health measures used in response to a foreign animal disease

   emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of which are at
   international ports of entry, such as border crossings, airports, and
   seaports. For 2001, SAGARPA*s budget for borders, ports, and airports was
   about Mex. $11 million (approximately U. S. $1. 1 million). All imports of
   live animals and agricultural products must be processed through one of

   SAGARPA*s offices. In addition, SAGARPA officials enforce compliance with
   Mexico*s official zoo- sanitary rules (1) at Customs offices, (2) at
   quarantine stations, (3) at inspection points, and (4) in other countries
   where treaties and accords have been approved. SAGARPA divides Mexico into
   eight regions and assigns a veterinarian coordinator to each region for
   animal disease surveillance and for 25 The commission is currently called
   the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot- and-
   Mouth and other Exotic Animal Diseases.

   activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal disease
   outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico established 29
   animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout Mexico, these

   groups include over 900 government and private veterinarians trained in
   identifying and responding to foreign animal diseases, including FMD.
   Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity level- III laboratory capable of
   testing for foreign animal diseases. 26 In 2001, Mexico reported
   performing 220 investigations into suspicious cases that might have been
   FMD. All investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus.
   Controls for Live

   SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries. Animal
   Imports Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that
   have the FMD virus. SAGARPA*s general requirements for all live animal
   imports include advance notification to SAGARPA*s official veterinarians
   at the ports of entry. The amount of time required for official advance

   notification depends on the animals* country of origin. Before live
   animals can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends official veterinarians to the
   exporting country to ensure that the live animals to be exported are free
   of disease. Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of
   entry, official veterinarians review all the documents and physically
   inspect the animals. Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican
   sanitary import permit; (2) a

   country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip certificate, if
   applicable; (4) a registration certificate, if applicable; and (5) a
   commercial license. The sanitary import permit certifies that the
   exporting country has met Mexican importation requirements. The health
   certificate contains information on the

    name and address of the importer,

    place of origin and destination of the animals,

    animal health production standards of the exporting country, 26 A
   biosecurity level- III laboratory is one that maintains a high security
   level and employs extreme control measures in the handling of samples.
   Such laboratories install special control measures to reduce the risk of
   pathogens escaping into the surrounding environment by using air filters
   and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant showers prior to leaving
   the facility.

    place where the certificate was issued, and

    time period for which the certificate is effective. All animals imported
   into Mexico must have individual identification marks or numbers unless
   they are imported for immediate slaughter. If animals are imported for
   direct slaughter, the only information that needs to be recorded is the
   number of animals and their origin. Additionally, all live

   animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and depending on how tame the
   animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt, and the entire animal is
   hosed down with disinfectant. Additionally, the trucks and containers that
   transported the animals are disinfected, and any bedding or waste from the

   animals is incinerated at the port of entry. Generally, all live animals,
   regardless of their country of origin, must meet these import
   requirements. However once these requirements are met, Mexico has separate
   procedures for live animals imported from the United States and those
   imported from other countries. Live Animal Imports from

   Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are the
   United States

   allowed to conform to less- stringent entry requirements than animals
   imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United States
   frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis of a U. S.
   veterinary inspection. U. S. animals that arrive in Mexico via air or sea
   are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit when
   facilities for inspection are available at the port of entry within
   Mexico.

   Before crossing the border, U. S. animals must remain on the U. S. side of
   the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When
   Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U. S.

   counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the animals,
   (2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3) require
   animals to be disinfected and/ or immunized, or (4) apply other animal
   health safety measures.

   Live Animal Imports from In addition to the general requirements listed
   above, all live animals

   Other Countries entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other
   import requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than
   the

   United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment. As
   a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two

   official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals
   before they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are
   responsible for developing an animal health report for the animals being
   exported, which will document information on the health of the animals
   from the time the veterinarians arrive in the exporting country until the
   shipment of animals

   arrives in Mexico. As a result, before the animals are loaded onto the
   ship for transport to Mexico, the Mexican veterinarians will examine the
   paperwork and inspect each animal. One of the veterinarians will then
   accompany the shipment and monitor the animals for clinical signs of
   disease while in transit to Mexico. According to Mexican officials,
   because the majority of live animal imports into Mexico come from
   Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in
   transit is usually considered an adequate quarantine period for the
   animals. For

   example, the voyage from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days
   and serves as an adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live
   animal imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also
   transported to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports,
   they too are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board
   the ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to
   Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the shipment

   can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting country. Controls
   for Imported

   SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services Animal
   Products at Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products
   comply with all Mexican import requirements before they are released into
   commerce.

   Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that
   SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which
   countries are FMD- free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or
   restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico does
   allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as long

   as SAGARPA has approved the animal- product- processing plants and the
   products are shipped with the required health and sanitary certificates.
   Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are allowed into Mexico

   only if they have been properly heat- treated or subjected to maturation
   processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other products, such as machinery,
   vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must undergo disinfection

   procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being allowed into the country.
   Products denied entry into Mexico must be immediately reexported or
   destroyed.

   All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPA*s
   inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports.
   Some imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports of
   entry that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA officials
   review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in Mexico to

   ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country without
   inspection. The broker initiates the importation and inspection process
   for animal products at the port of entry by presenting the required
   paperwork, including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection
   services from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will review
   the paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the shipment.
   The health certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of
   the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the specific
   destination

   of the animal products, (3) animal health production standards used by the
   exporting country, (4) place where the certificate was issued, and (5)
   time period for which the certificate is effective. If the import
   documents are in order and the products are from permissible countries,
   the container is unloaded from the vessel and transported to the official
   warehouse for further inspection.

   SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products or
   farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico has
   deemed as high- risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on the
   outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm machinery and
   other equipment from high- risk countries must be completely disinfected.
   Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are physically inspected by
   SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the refrigerated section of
   the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists of (1) a paperwork review,
   including a review of the Mexican sanitary import permit and

   health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting
   country, and (2) a visual inspection of the meat packages for the meat-
   processing plant*s seal, lot number, and factory number to ensure that the
   product came from an approved plant in the country of origin. In addition,
   SAGARPA officials may collect product samples for laboratory analysis. 27
   27 Mexico has a meat- product- sampling scheme, which is detailed in the
   country*s meat

   inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are taken from a shipment of
   25 tons of meat. The system is based on a judgmental sampling process;
   however, importers who have had problems in the past are sampled more
   often.

   Once all the reviews and inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors
   complete the inspection report and make a final recommendation on whether
   the shipment should be released. Cargo cannot leave the warehouse at the
   port of entry without forms from SAGARPA stating that the cargo has been
   inspected and deemed safe to enter the country. After

   the main SAGARPA office issues the final certificate of importation and
   releases the shipment, the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs*
   inspection. Mexican Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or

   restricted products are not entering the country. Controls for

   SAGARPA officials supervise the off- loading and disposal of organic waste
   International Garbage and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from
   FMD- affected countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated.
   Incinerators in two locations accept international garbage* one in Mexico
   City and one in Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are
   allowed to dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other
   Mexican ports must take their garbage with them.

   Controls for In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that
   all International international passengers have to complete upon entry
   into Mexico, all

   passengers from FMD- affected countries must fill out a special, detailed
   Passengers

   questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help prevent the
   introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products that they may be
   carrying and (2) providing information about their contact with animals in
   the country from which they are arriving. In addition, the form asks
   passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico where they could come into

   contact with live animals. At airports and marine ports of entry,
   international passengers from highrisk countries must walk over special
   mats soaked with disinfectant to disinfect their shoes. According to
   Mexican officials, the disinfectant mats are changed every month, and
   before the arrival of a high- risk flight at the airport, SAGARPA
   officials apply fresh disinfectant to the mat. In addition,

   until January 2002, the outside surface of baggage arriving from high-
   risk countries was sprayed with disinfectant as it was loaded onto the
   conveyor belt and before it entered the baggage claim area of the airport.
   Baggage

   from high- risk flights is also x- rayed and inspected for illegal
   products by official inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products
   are incinerated.

   Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport in
   English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent the
   introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican requirements
   described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning travelers about the
   dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports.

   Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships
   arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal and
   use of food in the ship*s galley that is intended for the crew. As part of
   this inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list of all the
   seaports that the ship has stopped at before arriving in Mexico to
   determine whether it docked in ports that pose a risk for FMD, (2) review
   the list of all food

   products on board the ship, (3) visually inspect the food in the galley,
   (4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are from
   highrisk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main entrances of the
   ship. Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port for more than 3 or 4
   days are allowed to consume some of the products in the galley while they
   are docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go ashore must go through the

   same procedures as other international passengers arriving at any port of
   entry* complete immigration and customs forms, declare any products of
   animal or plant origin that they may be carrying, and walk over
   disinfectant mats.

   Controls for SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all
   international mail International Mail

   deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail. According to
   Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100 percent of all
   the international packages arriving from FMD- affected countries but only
   randomly sample packages arriving from the United States and Canada.
   According to these officials, the post office facility in Mexico City
   receives about 500 packages per international mail delivery. Inspectors do
   not leave the postal facility until all of the packages that arrived on a
   particular day have been inspected, according to officials. Any prohibited
   products sent through international mail that are confiscated are
   incinerated.

   Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

   Appendi x I V

   FMD into the United Kingdom This appendix provides summary information on
   the preventive measures used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does
   not enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1)
   the importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products;
   (3) the handling and

   disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and
   ships; (4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through
   international mail. Because the United Kingdom is subject to the
   directives of the

   European Union Economic Community, for each pathway, this appendix
   summarizes (1) the preventive measures established by the European Union
   for trade between member states and nonmember countries and

   (2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom. Background
   The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic

   Community 28 and is subject to the European Union*s directives. One E. U.
   goal was to develop a common market without borders among the member
   states. The European Union established directives that approximated

   member states* laws and developed rules applicable to all member states.
   These directives harmonized the European Union*s laws so that member
   states could consistently follow and apply the same rules uniformly in a
   common market. For example, each member state must follow guidelines

   governing the import of live animals and animal products to prevent the
   introduction of foreign animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European
   Union. In addition, each member state is allowed to have national
   provisions as needed. As a result, the United Kingdom has its own
   legislation governing the imports of live animals and animal products that
   implements the European Union*s directives and covers areas that are not
   harmonized by these directives. When the European Union becomes aware of
   an outbreak of disease in another member state or in a nonmember country
   that may constitute a

   serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a
   declaration making it an offense for any member state to import specific
   animals or animal products from the affected country or region. In the
   event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take emergency safeguard
   measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of particular species of
   animals or animal products from affected member states to 28 Member states
   include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
   Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain,
   Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

   other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal products from
   affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain circumstances,
   member states may invoke additional safeguarding

   procedures and take "interim safeguard and protective measures." Member
   states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of
   the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them. The
   Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the federal
   agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related issues.
   DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in the United
   Kingdom. E. U. and U. K. Controls The European Union has established
   separate preventive measures for for Live Animal

   imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember
   states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to ensure
   Imports

   that live animal imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imports

   Live animal trade between member states requires an official veterinarian
   of Live Animals from from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior
   to their movement and Member States

   certify them as disease- free. This certification ensures that the (1)
   animals have originated from an FMD- free country or have been tested for
   diseases of concern, (2) animals have been isolated for a specified period
   of time,

   (3) country has an official disease surveillance program, and (4) animal
   production standards have been met. Member states must also ensure that
   the animals to be exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo
   routine veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as
   required by E. U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the
   original transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of live
   animals traded between member states are generally performed in the
   country of

   origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the destination member
   state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the destination member
   state are responsible for performing these checks. E. U. Measures for
   Imports

   Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or of
   Live Animals from areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has
   approved the Nonmember Countries

   country as being FMD- free. This approval is granted on a country-
   bycountry basis after the following factors have been considered for the
   nonmember country:

    The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
   animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
   environmental health situations that may exist.

    The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of
   infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading partners.

    The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
   infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
   imports.

    The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
   services.

    Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
   hormones.

   In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union
   when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or
   are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to
   travel. Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported out
   of the country or slaughtered. Live animal shipments from nonmember
   countries must enter the

   European Union through approved member states* border inspection posts. A
   health certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the exporting
   country must accompany all shipments. E. U. directives have harmonized the
   inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to ensure the quality
   and equality at all member states* ports of entry. At border inspection
   posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, identity, and physical
   checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment is allowed to enter
   into free circulation within the European Union. The

   border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show no
   clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and brucellosis
   are allowed into the European Union. Border inspection posts are required
   to inform other member states* border inspection posts of any live animal
   shipments denied entry and the reasons for the denial.

   U. K. Measures for Imports Animals can be imported from member states to
   go directly to slaughter of Live Animals from facilities, move through
   approved holding centers to slaughter facilities, or Member States

   go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export health certificate
   and a license for animal movement must accompany animals arriving from
   member states. Veterinary inspectors have the authority to inspect animals
   imported into the United Kingdom from member states at their point of
   destination to ensure that E. U. requirements have been met. Inspectors
   can stop a shipment of animals while in transit if the transporter does
   not

   have the appropriate documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are
   required to be slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved
   facility. Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member
   state for 6 months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter
   animals, 3 months. DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to
   transport live animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain
   the following

   information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date of
   pick- ups, including the name of the producer or business and the address
   of the animal- holding center; (2) species, origin, and number of animals
   transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4) individual
   animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD outbreak, as a
   temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required to have, at all
   times while in the United Kingdom, proof of disinfection.

   In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and
   maintain information on the owner*s name, the registration number of the
   transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For cattle,
   they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into the United
   Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and proposed

   destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine, operators
   are required to record only the registration number of the holding center
   or the herd of origin and the proposed destination. Owners and operators
   of slaughter facilities are generally not required to maintain this
   information.

   U. K. Measures for Imports The United Kingdom has adopted the European
   Union*s directives for of Live Animals from importing live animals and has
   spelled out the details for implementing Nonmember Countries

   these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through
   another member state*s border inspection post are required to have both a
   border certificate of examination and the original health certificate when
   they arrive at the U. K. destination. The United Kingdom also has

   procedures for post- import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary
   inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a member
   state*s border inspection post. These post- import checks can occur at the
   imported animals* destination or while they are in transit. As a result of
   these checks, if disease is suspected, animals may be quarantined,
   slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live animals from nonmember
   countries are required to enter the United Kingdom through certain ports
   of entry such as, Heathrow, Luton, Stansted, and Prestwick. E. U. and U.
   K. Controls The European Union has established separate preventive
   measures for for Imported Animal

   imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The United
   Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product Products

   imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imported Animal products
   imported by a member state from other member states Animal Products from

   must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the Member
   States

   European Union*s animal health requirements and are under the control of
   an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for ensuring
   that its animal products are safe and disease free. Intracommunity
   shipments of animal products must be accompanied by an official health
   certificate or commercial document that contains information on the origin
   and destination of the products. As a result of the European Union*s
   common market rules, there are no routine public health checks at member
   states* ports of entry for shipments originating in another member state.
   However,

   E. U. rules permit random spot checks of shipments at the place of
   destination.

   E. U. Measures for Imported Member states can import animal products only
   from nonmember

   Animal Products from countries or parts of a nonmember country approved by
   the European Nonmember Countries

   Union. As with live animal imports, approval is considered on a countryby-
   country basis after the following factors have been considered:

    The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
   animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
   environmental health situations that may exist.

    The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or
   contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.

    The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
   infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
   imports.

    The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
   services.

    Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
   hormones.

   Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member states
   through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a health
   certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country.
   Official veterinarians at the member states* border inspection post are
   responsible for ensuring that the following three types of checks on
   shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the information
   provided is verified:

    A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation accompanying
   the shipment, the importer*s advance written notice specifying the number
   and nature of the shipment, and the estimated time of arrival at the port
   of entry.  An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment
   are the

   same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not arrive
   in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps, official
   marks, and health marks identifying the country and establishment of
   origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in officially sealed
   containers are not opened unless there is doubt about the authenticity of
   the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such cases, the containers
   will be opened and inspected to ensure that the stamps, health marks, and
   other marks identifying the country and establishment of origin are
   present on the shipment and conform to those on the certificate or
   document accompanying the shipment.  A physical check of the shipment
   involves inspecting the contents to

   ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During a
   physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory analysis.
   Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage of imported
   shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. The percentage
   varies according to the product and the country of origin. For example,
   veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish

   products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50 percent
   of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed animal protein
   shipments.

   In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not meet
   requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is reexported
   if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For shipments
   where reexportation is not possible, the product is destroyed. E. U. rules
   allow for the importation of some types of animal products, such as canned
   meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries that have FMD, as
   long as specific food- processing procedures are followed to inactivate
   the virus. For example, milk products imported from FMD

   countries must be properly heat- treated. Imports of semen and embryos
   from nonmember countries are accepted by the European Union if the
   shipment (1) comes from an FMD- free country; (2) is accompanied by a
   signed health certificate attesting to the diseasefree

   status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or embryos are derived;
   and (3) comes through an approved collection center. The information in
   the accompanying documents is checked at the member states* border
   inspection post to determine if the shipment meets the

   European Union*s requirements before it is released. The European Union
   has additional requirements for imported germplasm; however, these are
   currently being updated.

   U. K. Measures for Imported Animal products from other member states must
   be accompanied by all the

   Animal Products from documents required by E. U. rules and are deliverable
   only to the address in Member States

   the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents. Official U. K.
   veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary checks for products
   imported from other member states, which may include the sampling of the
   product at the U. K. destination.

   U. K. Measures for Imports In order to ensure that animal diseases are not
   imported into the United

   of Animal Products from Kingdom via animal products from nonmember
   countries, DEFRA enforces Nonmember Countries

   a system of controls that relies primarily on the health certification
   accompanying the shipment and post- import official veterinary inspections
   of the shipment. Imports from nonmember countries are permitted only
   through about 26 approved border inspection posts in the United Kingdom.

   E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules require that garbage from
   international carriers, such as for International airplanes and ships, be
   removed under official control for destruction. In

   the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as *catering waste*
   Garbage and, according to U. K. regulations, represents the most likely
   route by which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter the
   country. As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of all
   catering waste from international carriers that arrive in the United
   Kingdom. To ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues licenses,
   which

   delineate how the catering waste is to be transported, including the
   transportation route for the waste from the port of entry to the disposal
   site and how it is to be disposed of, which could either be at an approved

   landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the United Kingdom cannot be fed any
   imported catering waste. E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules set limits
   on what products international passengers can bring

   for International from nonmember countries into member states. For
   example, personal imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are
   illegal. However, Passengers

   passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from nonmember
   countries if (1) the products are meant for human consumption, (2) the
   products come from an E. U.- approved country, and (3) the quantity
   imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds) per person. Passengers
   traveling within the European Union are allowed to import meat, animal,
   and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as long as the product
   originates from another member state. The United Kingdom follows the E. U.
   rules for personal imports of animal products by international passengers.
   The United Kingdom can impose

   penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for passengers found
   smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat. Additional
   restrictions on personal imports of international travelers may be imposed
   as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in various parts of the

   world. As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products,
   such as meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at
   various ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about prohibited
   items and

   warn them about potential penalties for illegal imports.

   U. K. Controls for We are not aware of any specific E. U. requirements for
   international mail.

   International Mail However, U. K. Customs* inspectors examine all
   international mail packages for prohibited and restricted items. For
   example, packages

   containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened
   and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember
   countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does not

   exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in
   hermetically sealed containers, and it is intended for personal
   consumption only. Packages found in contravention of these regulations are
   liable to be seized without compensation. Meat or meat products sent to
   the United Kingdom via international mail from other member states are
   allowed if they are for personal consumption and do not exceed 10
   kilograms. Additional evidence may be required to support claims that
   imports in excess of 10 kilograms are for personal use. Further
   restrictions on imported items sent through international mail may be
   imposed as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in other
   countries.

   Comments from the U. S. Department of

   Appendi x V Agriculture

   Appendi x VI Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

   Appendi x VII

   GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Lawrence Dyckman (202)
   512- 3841 Anu Mittal (202) 512- 9846 Acknowledgments In addition to the
   persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl, and

   Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important
   contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood, Judy
   Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.

   (360116)

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   a

   GAO United States General Accounting Office

   Page i GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Contents

   Contents

   Page ii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Contents

   Page iii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Contents

   Page iv GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548

   Page 1 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   A

   July 26, 2002 Lett er

   The Honorable Tom Daschle United States Senate

   Dear Senator Daschle: As requested, we are reporting on the United States*
   ability to prevent the introduction of foot and mouth disease. This report
   contains recommendations to the U. S. Department of Agriculture on the
   need to develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on
   foreign disease outbreaks to the Customs Service, improve some of the
   preventive measures used in the United States, and

   develop plans and timetables to address any outstanding issues that could
   impede a U. S. response. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly
   announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this
   report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send
   copies to other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
   Agriculture; the Commissioner of Customs; and the Director, Office of
   Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others

   upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
   the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
   questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512- 3841. Key
   contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

   Sincerely yours, Lawrence J. Dyckman Director, Natural Resources and
   Environment

   Page 2 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 3 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 4 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 5 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 6 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 7 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 8 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 9 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 10 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Executive Summary Page 11 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Page 12 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 13 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 14 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 15 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 16 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 17 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 18 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 19 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 20 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 21 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 22 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 23 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 24 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 25 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 1 Introduction

   Page 26 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Page 27 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 28 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 29 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 30 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 31 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 32 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 33 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
   Outbreaks, but

   Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 34 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
   Mouth Disease

   Page 35 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 36 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 37 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 38 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 39 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 40 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 41 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 42 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 43 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 44 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 45 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 46 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 47 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 48 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 49 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

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   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

   Page 51 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
   Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

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   Chapter 4

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

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   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 55 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 56 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 57 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 58 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 59 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 60 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 61 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 62 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 63 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 64 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 65 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 66 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

   Page 67 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
   Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

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   Page 69 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

   Appendix I

   Appendix I Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States

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   Appendix II

   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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   Appendix III

   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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   Appendix IV

   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
   United Kingdom

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   Appendix V

   Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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   Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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   Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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   Appendix VI

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   Appendix VII

   United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

   Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

   Address Service Requested Presorted Standard

   Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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