    Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must
    Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues (26-JUL-02,
    GAO-02-808).

    The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United
    Kingdom decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly
    contagious animal disease can cause to a nation's livestock
    industry and other sectors of the economy. By the time the
    disease was eradicated, the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4
    million animals to control the disease, and sustained losses of
    $5 billion in the food and agricultural sectors, as well as
    comparable losses to its tourism industry. Before 2001, the
    United Kingdom had been FMD-free for almost 34 years; following
    the outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally
    restricted from participating in the international trade of live
    animals, and animal and other products that could transmit the
    FMD virus. The United States has adequate processes for obtaining
    information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing U.S.
    Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies and others with this
    information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing
    this information with Customs. The United States recieves
    information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in
    foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health
    organizations, and foreign governments directly. These officials
    collect a wide array of agricultural and animal health
    information about the countries and regions in which they are
    stationed, which allows the United States to have access to
    information on foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However,
    USDA's processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD
    outbreaks are uneven. U.S. measures to prevent the introduction
    of FMD are comparable to those used by other countries and have
    kept the United States free of the the disease for 75 years.
    Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk
    inherent in the ever-increasing volume of international travel
    and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA
    has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from reaching U.S.
    livestock. USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S.
    borders by helping other countries control and eradicate the
    disease. USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive
    measures at ports of entry to ensure that international cargo,
    animals, passengers, and mail do not bring the disease into the
    United States. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States
    will face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and
    quick response, even though USDA and many states have developed
    and tested emergency animal disease response plans.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-808
        ACCNO:   A04062
      TITLE:     Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA
    Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues
         DATE:   07/26/2002
      SUBJECT:   Animal diseases
    	     Infectious diseases
    	     International trade
    	     Livestock products
    	     Emergency preparedness
    	     International relations
    	     United Kingdom

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    GAO-02-808

                                           A

       Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U. S. Senate

       July 2002 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE To Protect U. S. Livestock, USDA Must
       Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues

       GAO- 02- 808

       Letter 1 Executive Summary 2

       Purpose 2 Background 3 Results in Brief 3 Principal Findings 6
       Recommendations for Executive Action 11 Agency Comments 11

       Chapter 1 12

       Introduction FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease 12

       Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive 15 International Community Has
       Guidelines to Control and Eradicate

       FMD 18 An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars 19 Social Impacts of
       an Outbreak Can Be Significant 21 USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U. S.
       Livestock From FMD and

       Other Animal Diseases 22 U. S. Customs Service Supports USDA*s Efforts at
       Ports of Entry 24 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24

       Chapter 2 27

       USDA Has Adequate USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from
       Multiple Sources 27

       Processes to Obtain USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of
       FMD Information on Foreign

       Information to Customs 29 FMD Outbreaks, but

       Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 34

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved

       Chapter 3 35

       U. S. Measures to USDA*s Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other
       Countries

       Help Reduce the Risk to U. S. Livestock 35 Prevent FMD Are

       Despite U. S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to
       Generally Comparable FMD Remains 37

       to Other Countries, but U. S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those
       Used by Other

       Countries 46 Complete Protection

       Conclusions 51 May Be Infeasible

       Recommendation for Executive Action 52 Agency Comments 52

       Chapter 4 53

       Despite Preparation The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed
       and Tested Emergency Response Plans 53

       Efforts, the United Serious Challenges to an Effective U. S. Response Are
       Yet to Be

       States Will Face Resolved 56

       Challenges in Conclusions 68 Recommendation for Executive Action 68

       Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Appendixes

       Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States 69

       Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada
       71

       Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico
       80

       Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom 87

       Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture 96

       Appendix VI: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 100

       Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 101 Tables Table 1:
       Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and

       By- Products 14 Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken
       After the 2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom 31

       Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the
       United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, Fiscal
       Year 2001 45 Table 4: Agriculture- Related Questions on the Prior and
       Revised

       U. S. Declaration Forms 51 Figures Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD,
       1992 through 2002 15

       Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002 17
       Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 49 Figure 4: Canadian
       and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry 50

       Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom 65
       Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the

       United Kingdom 66

       Abbreviations

       APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service BSE bovine spongiform
       encephalopathy CCRA Canada Customs and Revenue Agency CFIA Canadian Food
       Inspection Agency DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
       FAS Foreign Agricultural Service FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

       FMD foot and mouth disease FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service GAO
       General Accounting Office NAHEMS National Animal Health Emergency
       Management System OIE Office International des Epizooties pH potential of
       hydrogen SAGARPA Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural,
       Pesca y

       Alimentaction USDA U. S. Department of Agriculture WTO World Trade
       Organization

       Executive Summary Purpose The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease
       (FMD) in the United Kingdom

       decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious animal
       disease can cause to a nation*s livestock industry and other sectors of
       the economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8 months later,
       the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals to control the
       disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the food and
       agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its tourism
       industry. Before 2001,

       the United Kingdom had been FMD- free for almost 34 years; following the
       outbreak, the country was, until recently, generally restricted from
       participating in the international trade of live animals, and animal and
       other products that could transmit the FMD virus.

       The United States is an FMD- free nation and has not had an outbreak of
       the disease since 1929. In 2001, the U. S. livestock and poultry sector
       was valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock
       industry to the U. S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U. S.
       livestock from FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United
       States (foreign

       animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the U. S. Department
       of Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to determine whether
       (1) U. S. processes to obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD
       outbreaks are adequate, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
       entering the United States are effective and comparable with those of
       other selected countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly
       and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if it were to occur.

       To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports,
       airports, and international mail- processing facilities in New Jersey,
       Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection
       stations on the U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican borders to observe
       inspection procedures for livestock imports and met with government
       officials in these countries who are responsible for protecting their
       nation*s livestock

       from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians in six states that are
       major producers of U. S. livestock, and international passengers and U. S.
       veterinarians who were in the United Kingdom during the outbreak. In
       addition, GAO reviewed and summarized legislation, regulations, and
       publicly available documents on the measures used by the European Union
       and the United Kingdom to prevent the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 1
       for a detailed description of GAO*s scope and methodology.)

       Background FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven- hoofed
       animals such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever
       and blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals
       recover from an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and
       causes severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have human

       health implications. Animals, people, or any materials that bring the
       virus into contact with susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy
       virus, and in the right environmental conditions can persist in
       contaminated items, such as soil and manure, for weeks or months. Only
       about 40 percent of countries worldwide are considered FMD- free, but all
       three North American

       countries are FMD- free. USDA*s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
       (APHIS) is responsible for protecting U. S. livestock from the
       introduction of foreign animal diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its
       responsibilities, APHIS conducts activities to exclude animal disease,
       detect and eradicate it, and educate

       the public about it. APHIS inspectors are present at 144 U. S. ports of
       entry, as well as in some foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of
       international cargo, passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this
       includes all major U. S. ports. In an effort to keep U. S. animals free of
       foreign animal diseases, the U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is an
       important federal partner, supporting USDA*s activities at each of the 301
       ports of entry into the United States. Customs is the first line of
       defense at U. S. ports against the entry of prohibited and illegal items,
       particularly when the port does not have

       APHIS personnel. Results in Brief The United States has adequate processes
       for obtaining information on foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA
       agencies and others with this information, but it does not have adequate
       processes for sharing this information with Customs. The United States
       receives information on FMD outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in
       foreign countries, international agricultural and animal health
       organizations, and foreign governments directly. In particular, USDA has
       animal health experts stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade
       officials stationed in 129 countries. These officials collect a wide array
       of agricultural and animal health information about the countries and
       regions in which they are

       stationed, which allows the United States to have access to information on
       foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However, USDA*s processes for
       disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks are uneven. For
       example, after receiving official notification from the United Kingdom on
       February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that country, USDA
       immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington, D. C., and their
       field locations, and during the month of March provided the public,

       industry, state and local governments, and private veterinarians with
       information and guidance about FMD prevention. But USDA has no formal
       process for providing Customs with information. As a result, Customs
       inspectors at U. S. ports of entry did not receive uniform information or
       guidance on FMD prevention activities after the U. K. outbreak. Customs

       received this information only after formally requesting it from the
       Administrator of APHIS* over a month after the United Kingdom*s
       notification. During this interval, many Customs inspectors said they felt
       ill equipped to adequately process international cargo and passengers at
       U. S. ports of entry. While USDA has taken an interim step to improve
       notification to Customs about foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is recommending
       further improvements to establish a more permanent solution and ensure
       that Customs has clear procedures for handling

       passengers and cargo from countries affected by FMD. U. S. measures to
       prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to those used by other
       countries and have kept the United States free of the disease for almost
       75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of the disease and the risk
       inherent in the ever- increasing volume of international travel and trade,
       U. S. livestock remains vulnerable to the disease. USDA has a twopronged
       approach to prevent FMD from reaching U. S. livestock.  USDA tries to
       keep FMD as far as possible from U. S. borders by helping

       other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example, USDA
       supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD- free buffer
       zone between North and Central America, which are FMD- free,

       and South America, which is not.

        USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at ports
       of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, and mail
       do not bring the disease into the United States. For example, in response
       to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately prohibited imports
       of susceptible animal products from the United Kingdom, including those
       shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
       outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until

       USDA reassessed the United Kingdom*s animal disease status and determined
       the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly, at airports,
       USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to ensure that
       international passengers do not inadvertently bring items

       into the country that could carry the FMD virus. However, these and other
       efforts cannot completely eliminate the vulnerability of U. S. livestock
       because (1) some level of risk is inherent in international travel and
       trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus that may remain viable for days or even
       weeks on shoes and in hay or certain meat and dairy

       products, and (3) the volume of legal and illegal international trade and
       passengers entering the United States makes it impossible for U. S.
       inspectors to inspect and ensure the safety of every shipment, baggage, or

       person entering the country. Furthermore, although the preventive measures
       the United States, Canada, and Mexico have implemented are similar, these
       other countries* implementation measures suggest opportunities for USDA to
       improve its preventive measures. For example, all three countries use
       signs at airports to alert passengers about FMD and the need to keep it
       out of the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican signs are much more
       noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more colorful. GAO is
       recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their

       effectiveness. In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will
       face a number of challenges in mounting an effective and quick response,
       even though USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency
       animal disease response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation,
       coordination, and communication between state and federal agencies and
       between federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA
       is making improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between
       the states. Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate
       infrastructure, including a massive commitment of manpower and laboratory
       resources. USDA has developed agreements with other federal agencies, such
       as the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,

       to leverage additional resources. However, gaps remain. For example, it is
       unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200 additional veterinarians trained in
       responding to foreign animal diseases that it estimates the nation will
       need to respond to an FMD outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating
       to animal identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been

       addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to
       identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it is
       unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner. USDA

       currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues. However,
       the effectiveness and speed of a U. S. response may be compromised if
       these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before an FMD outbreak

       occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans with interim and final
       milestones to ensure that these issues are addressed in a timely fashion.

       Principal Findings USDA Has Adequate

       USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal diseases,
       Processes to Obtain including FMD, from a variety of sources. These
       include USDA*s network Information on Foreign

       of staff stationed in foreign countries, international animal health and
       trade FMD Outbreaks but Can organizations, and the governments of affected
       nations. However, the

       usefulness of the information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a
       Improve Dissemination to foreign country*s willingness to provide accurate
       information in a timely Customs

       fashion. For example, in 2001, Argentine officials did not acknowledge
       that some regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although
       unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had been present for
       several months, according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take
       official action to prohibit FMD- susceptible products from Argentina until
       it received an official notification of the outbreak or obtained
       verifiable scientific evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.

       APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
       foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
       governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
       current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an
       important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
       immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process or
       defined procedures to distribute information on foreign FMD outbreaks to
       Customs. For example, after the U. K. outbreak, APHIS did not inform

       Customs about its decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or
       more vigilantly screen passengers arriving at U. S. ports of entry from
       the United Kingdom. Until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally
       requested this information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS,
       Customs did not receive any official guidance on general inspection
       measures for passengers and products. According to a Customs memorandum
       and officials we spoke to, many Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped
       to

       adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry

       during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. Moreover, according to
       Customs officials, these inspectors are not animal disease specialists,
       and therefore need clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process
       international passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports
       where there is no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although
       Customs had not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the
       past, a Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive
       future alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step,
       however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for

       formal and well- defined communication procedures and protocols between
       APHIS and Customs. U. S. Preventive Measures The United States seeks to
       prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting various

       Are Comparable to Those of programs to control and eradicate the disease
       overseas and by screening Other Countries, but

       livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the nation*s ports
       Providing Complete of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control
       FMD outbreaks, USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U. S.
       borders. For Protection May Be example, in North America, U. S. efforts to
       eradicate and control FMD have Infeasible largely focused on Mexico
       because of the shared border and the possible

       threat that the FMD virus could move overland from South America, where
       the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA helped Mexico eradicate
       FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that Mexico remains disease free.
       Similarly, USDA programs have helped create FMD- free zones in Colombia
       and Panama. These zones will help alert countries in both

       Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from the
       south. Also, when other countries have an outbreak, USDA may provide
       support by sending U. S. veterinarians to help control and eradicate the
       disease. For example, a total of about 327 U. S. animal health
       professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped eradicate the 2001
       outbreak in the United Kingdom.

       USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could enter
       the United States and has implemented measures to prevent potentially
       infected animals or products from entering the country. For example, USDA
       allows imported livestock only from countries that are free of FMD and
       other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by appropriate import
       permits and health certificates and may subject these animals to
       quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD outbreak, USDA prohibits
       the importation of all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior to the
       date of official notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains

       in effect until USDA has reassessed the disease status of the affected

       country and determined the level of trade that can resume. Moreover, USDA
       restricts imports of animal products from FMD- affected countries to those
       that have been processed in such a manner that they inactivate the

       virus and do not present a risk to U. S. livestock. In contrast, other
       products, such as hay used for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy
       products, are completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive
       measures for international passengers and their luggage, garbage from
       international ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment
       returning from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus
       into the country.

       USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United
       States* almost 75- year disease- free status is a measure of the success
       of the department*s efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same
       time,

       these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of risk
       inherent in international trade and travel, no set of measures can ever
       completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the United
       States. Moreover, these experts believe that U. S. vulnerability to an
       outbreak remains because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter the
       country on a variety of animate and inanimate products and (2) the
       magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
       entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for
       USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only one
       contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U. S. animal
       to start a nationwide outbreak.

       Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock from
       FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures that
       are comparable to U. S. measures to ensure that imports of livestock and
       animal products, international mail, and garbage from international
       carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the countries have

       implemented measures differently for international passengers. For
       example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats at ports of entry,
       the United States does not. According to USDA officials, the United States
       does not use disinfectant mats because research indicates that their use
       may cause the virus to spread. Also, while all three countries use signs
       at international airports to alert and inform passengers about the risks
       of FMD, the U. S. signs are not as noticeable as the signs used in Canada
       and Mexico. While GAO recognizes that there is a cost to developing new
       signs, more effective signs may help improve U. S. preventive measures for
       international passengers.

       Despite Preparation Efforts, If FMD enters the United States despite
       USDA*s preventive measures, the

       Serious Challenges to an nation*s ability to identify, control, contain,
       and eradicate the disease Effective U. S. Response Are

       quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the importance Yet
       to Be Resolved

       of an effective response, USDA and many states have developed emergency
       response plans that establish a framework for the key elements necessary
       for a rapid and successful U. S. response and eradication program. These

       plans have been tested, to some extent, by federal and state agencies to
       determine their effectiveness. Planning and testing exercises have also
       identified the following challenges, which could ultimately impede an
       effective and timely U. S. response if they are not resolved before an FMD

       outbreak occurs:

        Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. A
       timely response depends on having livestock producers and private
       veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state and
       federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control before
       the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several federal and
       state animal health officials expressed concern about how

       quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
       United States. According to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped
       raise general awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and
       livestock producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in
       the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and the states increased
       their efforts to inform the livestock industry about the risks and
       symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened
       awareness about FMD, now that the immediate risk from the

       United Kingdom has subsided.

        Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal,
       state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the industry. Recent
       planning efforts and testing exercises have started the process of
       establishing greater coordination and improving the level of cooperation
       and communication between all levels. However, these

       efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according to state
       officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and communication
       between state officials and their federal counterparts vary across states.
       To help address these gaps, USDA is working with other organizations, such
       as the National Emergency Management Association, and is providing funds
       to help states improve their planning for animal emergencies.

        Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of animal
       disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on an adequate
       infrastructure, which should include a national emergency management
       control and command center, technical and other personnel, transportation
       and disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.
       While details for some of these components have been developed, others are
       not yet fully resolved. For example, USDA, in partnership with the Federal
       Emergency Management Agency, has set up a mechanism that will enable it to
       leverage resources for many of the general logistical support activities
       needed to respond to an outbreak. Similarly, USDA*s memorandum of
       understanding with the Department of Defense will help provide needed

       military personnel and equipment to support a response effort. However, it
       is not yet clear how the United States will fill the shortage of at least
       1,200 specially trained veterinarians or the laboratory testing and
       diagnostic capacity that USDA estimates is needed to respond to an animal
       health emergency.

        Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and indemnify
       livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
       outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking system that
       will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and

       slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal disposal
       and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an animal
       identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it in 1999.
       However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted the concept
       because of the costs involved and the potential for the unauthorized
       disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA officials.
       Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration, and rendering
       are the preferred methods for disposing of animal carcasses. However,
       according to federal and state officials, each of these disposal methods
       presents significant implementation challenges that have not yet been
       fully considered, such as the potential to spread the disease if on- farm
       disposal is not feasible, the potential to cause groundwater contamination
       or air pollution, high cost, and concerns about public perception.
       Finally, delays could occur during an FMD eradication effort, because
       producers* fearing that they might not be adequately compensated for the
       fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and materials as well as
       cleaning and disinfecting costs* may not cooperate with responders. To
       address this concern, USDA published a

       proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD- related regulations

       that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be handled during
       an outbreak.

       Recommendations for GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to
       develop (1) a

       Executive Action formal process to disseminate updated information on
       foreign FMD

       outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical
       procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers
       from FMD- affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider
       better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international
       passengers

       do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States. Finally, GAO
       recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones to address the
       outstanding issues that could compromise an effective and rapid U. S.
       response.

       Agency Comments We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report
       for review and comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated
       that the

       report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of
       meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided an
       accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of federal,
       state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the health of U.
       S. agriculture. USDA agreed with the report*s conclusion that because of
       the enormous volume of international travel and trade, there is no way to
       ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However, USDA also believes that
       the short- and long- term measures that it is taking to enhance
       prevention,

       surveillance, emergency preparedness, and coordination with other federal,
       state, and industry organizations is providing a much- needed boost to the
       United States* overall safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, USDA
       agreed that it would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of
       its efforts and make whatever changes are warranted. USDA*s and Customs*
       written comments are presented in appendix V and

       VI, respectively. USDA*s comments include additional information on the
       department*s recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United
       States* ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas of
       (1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control measures, and

       (3) communications and outreach. We have included this information and the
       additional technical comments that USDA provided us with throughout the
       report as appropriate.

       Chapt er 1

       Introduction Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating
       viral animal diseases affecting cloven- hoofed animals such as cattle and
       swine, and has occurred in most countries of the world at some point
       during the last century. Although the disease has no human- health
       implications, it can have enormous economic and social consequences, as
       recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated. These
       consequences occur because the international community values products
       from countries that are FMD- free and generally restricts international
       trade in FMDsusceptible products from countries affected by an outbreak.
       Most FMDaffected countries, therefore, take whatever measures necessary to
       regain their FMD- free status as quickly as possible. In the United
       States, the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has primary
       responsibility for protecting domestic livestock from animal diseases such
       as FMD. The U. S. Customs Service supports USDA in these efforts.

       FMD Is a Highly FMD* a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily
       cloven- hoofed

       Contagious Animal animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats* has 7
       types and over 80 subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of
       the virus does not

       Disease protect animals against infection from the other types. FMD-
       infected

       animals usually develop blister- like lesions in the mouth, on the tongue
       and lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which causes them to
       salivate excessively or become lame. Other symptoms include fever, reduced
       feed consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs are very sensitive to the
       virus and show symptoms of the disease after a short incubation period of
       3 to 5 days. The incubation period in sheep is considerably longer, about
       10 to 14

       days, and the clinical signs of the disease are usually mild and may be
       masked by other conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to
       go unnoticed. The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD
       varies and depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast,
       adult animals usually recover once the disease has run its course.
       However, because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-
       producing animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many
       months, and

       dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease therefore
       can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.

       The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and
       during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the
       virus into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood,
       saliva, and

       feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if pigs become
       infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete large amounts of
       the virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials that are exposed to
       the

       virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into contact with susceptible
       animals. For example, the virus can spread when susceptible animals come
       in contact with contaminated

        animals;

        animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;

        transport vehicles and equipment;

        clothes or shoes worn by people; and

        hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics. 1 The FMD virus has a
       remarkable capability for remaining viable for long periods of time in a
       variety of animate and inanimate objects. For example, the virus can
       persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 hours, manure for 1 to 24
       weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 to 14

       weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and other
       products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen (pH)
       conditions. 2 Generally, the virus can survive freezing but cannot survive
       at temperatures above 50 Celsius (122 Farenheit) and at pH levels of less
       than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the various lengths of time that
       the

       FMD virus can survive in some selected products. 1 A veterinary biologic
       is a product used for diagnosing, preventing, and treating an animal
       disease. These products include vaccines and kits for diagnosing specific
       animal diseases. 2 The pH condition of a product is the measure of its
       degree of acidity or alkalinity; a value of 7 is considered neutral while
       values greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 7 are
       considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain
       viruses, such as FMD.

       Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
       Products Product or by- product Processing or storage conditions Virus
       survival time

       Bacon Salted 183 days Bedding (straw and wood shavings) N/ A 4 weeks
       Buttermilk N/ A 14 days Ham N/ A 16 weeks Hay Ambient temperature Greater
       than 200 days Hides or skins Air dried at 20 C 6 weeks Manure Summer/
       winter 1 week/ 24 weeks Shoes Summer/ winter 9 weeks/ 14 weeks Soil
       Summer/ winter 3- 7 days/ 21 weeks Water Ambient temperature 14 weeks Wool
       Ambient temperature 20 days

       Legend: N/ A= not applicable Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.

       FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal diseases
       that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such as
       vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two foreign
       swine diseases are also clinically identical to FMD* swine vesicular
       disease and vesicular exanthema of swine. The only way to distinguish
       between FMD and these

       other diseases is through laboratory analyses of fluid or tissue samples.
       FMD is also sometimes confused with mad cow disease or bovine spongiform
       encephalopathy (BSE). 3 BSE is a fatal, neuro- degenerative disease found
       in cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract the disease
       through animal feed that contains protein derived from the

       remains of diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally
       fatal disease in humans* known as variant Creutzfeldt- Jacob Disease* is
       linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow

       disease, FMD has no known human health implications. 3 In January 2002, we
       issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the
       Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U. S.
       Prevention Efforts, GAO- 02- 183 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 25, 2002).

       Incidence of FMD FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in
       the world and

       Worldwide Is endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia,
       and South America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of
       FMD include

       Extensive North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the
       Caribbean. Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period
       1992

       through 2002.

       Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002

       Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
       Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
       Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
       Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
       Epizooties.

       In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and during
       the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks. The spread
       of certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how quickly it is
       spreading

       throughout the world. For example, the FMD virus serotype O, known as the
       Pan- Asia strain, was first identified in northern India in 1990 and was
       subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It then spread westward into Saudi
       Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, throughout the Near East and into
       Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The
       PanAsia

       strain was also found in Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 1999
       it was reported in mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By late
       1999 and in 2000, it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently,
       the Pan- Asia strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the
       Primorsky Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free
       from FMD since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan- Asia
       strain is also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United

       Kingdom that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
       Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide,
       including the type O Pan- Asia strain.

       Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002

       Source: GAO*s adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal
       Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference
       Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture
       Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des
       Epizooties.

       In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, Canada,
       and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The United
       States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to eradicate FMD
       from North America.

       International The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)* an
       intergovernmental Community Has organization created in January 1924 by an
       international agreement signed by 28 countries* was established to
       guarantee the transparency of Guidelines to Control

       information on the animal disease status of member countries. In addition,
       and Eradicate FMD

       OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information and
       disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and promotes
       international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, and
       guarantees the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for
       international trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001, OIE had
       158 member countries.

       OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these countries)
       as being FMD- free with or without vaccination if they meet certain
       criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. For
       example, to obtain FMD- free status without vaccination, a member country
       should

       (1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a
       declaration that it has been FMD- free and has not used vaccination for 1
       year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of
       surveillance;

       (4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of FMD;
       and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been imported
       into the country, since such animals can become the source of future
       infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD- free- with- vaccination status, a
       country

       should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease reporting, (2) send a
       declaration that there have been no outbreaks of FMD for 2 years, (3)
       provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance systems and
       has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent and

       control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are carried out
       and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) have an intensive
       and frequent system to detect any viral activity.

       When FMD occurs in an FMD- free country or zone where vaccination is not
       practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to regain
       its FMD- free- without- vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards require
       a country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when
       a

       *stamping out approach* (immediate slaughter of diseased and exposed
       animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the disease before the
       country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD- free status. As part of
       this process, surveillance results of laboratory- screening tests
       (serological surveillance results) must be provided to OIE to prove that
       the disease has been eradicated. If vaccination was used to control the
       outbreak, then the country must wait until 3 months after the last
       vaccinated animal is

       slaughtered and serological surveillance results prove that the disease
       has been eradicated before reapplying for FMD- free status.

       The international community generally places a high value on products from
       countries that are FMD- free without vaccination. Such countries can
       export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD- free
       countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD- free- with-
       vaccination status are restricted to trading animal products that can be
       treated to ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most
       countries that are

       FMD- free without vaccination resort to a stamping out process to
       eradicate the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United Kingdom and Taiwan
       followed this process in 2001 and 1997, respectively. Similarly, if an

       outbreak were to occur in the United States, the current U. S. policy
       requires all infected and exposed animals to be immediately slaughtered
       and disposed of by incineration, burial, or rendering. 4 In recent years,
       the international community has been encouraging the acceptance of
       regionalization policies for international trade. Regionalization involves
       declaring one or more areas of a country FMDfree

       while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a regionalization
       policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United States, even if one
       state or area was infected, the nation as a whole might

       not lose its FMD- free status, and trade restrictions might not be
       enforced on all of our FMD- susceptible products.

       An FMD Outbreak Can An FMD outbreak could cost the U. S. economy billions
       of dollars in both

       Cost Billions of Dollars direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the
       government would include the

       costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance of
       animal movement controls, control areas, and intensified border
       inspections; the destruction and disposal of infected animals; vaccines;
       and compensation to producers for the costs of disease containment.
       However, government compensation programs may not cover 100 percent of
       producers* costs. As a result, direct costs would also occur for
       disinfection and for the value of

       any slaughtered animals not subject to government compensation. According
       to recent U. K. government estimates, the direct costs for control and
       eradication of the 2001 outbreak was about $4 billion. According to
       several estimates, the direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U. S.
       4 Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or chemicals
       to separate the fat from the protein and mineral components.

       outbreak of FMD could range up to $24 billion in current dollars,
       depending, among other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the
       control strategy employed. 5 The value of lost export sales in the event
       of an FMD outbreak would

       represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U. S.
       economy. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the United
       States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U. S. exports of live
       animals and animal products. This ban could result in losses of between $6
       billion and $10 billion a year while the United States eradicated the
       disease and until it regained disease- free status. These losses may be
       mitigated to some extent by increased domestic sales of meat from disease-
       free portions of the United States that may otherwise have been exported.
       However, USDA

       officials believe that many people in the United States would refuse to
       eat meat during an FMD outbreak, thus the offset probably would be
       minimal. Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs
       affecting consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors
       of the economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as
       part of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such
       as meatprocessing

       facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose revenue. Furthermore, an
       FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects such as unemployment, loss of
       income (to the extent that government compensation does not fully
       reimburse producers), and decreased economic activity, which could ripple
       through other sectors of the

       economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could result
       in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom, according to
       government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses to the tourism
       industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the losses sustained
       by the food and agriculture sector. In addition, not only may consumers
       have to pay higher prices for the remaining supply of animal products
       affected by an FMD outbreak, but the price of substitutes is likely to
       rise, as well. For example, as the price of FMD- free meat increases, some
       consumers are likely to buy poultry or other meat substitutes, thus
       causing the prices of these substitute products to rise. However, the
       higher prices that consumers pay for substitutes do

       5 Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U. K. outbreak to
       control the disease. According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a
       comparable outbreak in the United States could require the destruction of
       about 13 million animals.

       not result in a net cost to the economy because these higher prices result
       in increased revenues for poultry producers and others.

       Social Impacts of an An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts,
       such as enormous Outbreak Can Be psychological damage, especially on
       families and localities directly

       affected by the outbreak, as the U. K. experience in 2001 illustrates. For
       Significant

       example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found that
       individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of symptoms,
       including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, increased anger,
       irritability, and general depression. An increase in marital discord was
       also noted. One general practioner reported that 50 percent of his
       patients affected by the FMD outbreak required antidepressant drugs. Some
       farming families even sent their children away from home during the
       outbreak rather than have them witness the slaughter and disposal of the
       family*s livestock.

       Consumer confidence in the safety of the U. K. food supply was also
       adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdom*s
       Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD and
       mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now
       consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these
       consumers have changed their grocery- buying habits.

       An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy
       livestock producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their
       animals had been destroyed and their properties were quarantined.
       According to one

       study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the Cumbria area of the United
       Kingdom, most farming households had to curb their usual daily activities,
       and only the most essential movements on and off the farms were permitted.
       Lost income caused stress to families because they had to cut back on
       their household expenditures and some had to renegotiate loans.

       The study notes that the enforced isolation caused by the quarantines
       added to the tensions and stresses already being experienced by both
       adults and children.

       USDA Is Responsible Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
       Service (APHIS) has for Protecting U. S. the lead responsibility for
       protecting the nation*s livestock from foreign

       animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United States as
       well Livestock From FMD as those thought to have been eradicated.
       Assisting APHIS in this endeavor and Other Animal are USDA*s Foreign
       Agricultural Service, the Food Safety and Inspection Diseases

       Service, and the Homeland Security Council. Within APHIS, several groups
       share responsibility for protecting U. S. livestock from the incursion of
       foreign animal diseases such as FMD:  International Services. Working
       with its counterpart organizations in foreign countries, this group seeks
       to reduce the international spread of animal and poultry diseases. Its
       goal is to protect U. S. livestock and

       poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease- management strategies
       provided to exporting countries before they send their animals and
       products to the United States.

        Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and
       marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary
       biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/ or eliminate animal
       diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and productivity. This

       group administers laws and regulations on importing animals and animal
       products, including embryos and semen, to ensure that imports are free
       from certain disease agents. In addition, Veterinary Services

       provides training for state and private veterinarians on foreign animal
       diseases of concern and provides animal disease diagnostic and
       surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has primary responsibility for
       inspecting and ensuring the safety of live animal and animal product
       imports to the United States. Within Veterinary Services, the Emergency
       Programs unit coordinates efforts to prepare for and respond to animal
       disease outbreaks, including FMD, and in the fall of 2001, published a
       draft plan for responding to an FMD outbreak. It employs veterinarians

       trained to detect and respond to an FMD outbreak. Emergency Programs also
       provides federal and state veterinarians and others with training on
       foreign animal diseases.

        Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDA*s
       primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, as
       well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present at all
       major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments and
       supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X- rays, and hand- held

       remote- sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically inspect
       animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, as well as
       international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, sea, or land
       border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant Protection and

       Quarantine*s Beagle Brigade sniff travelers' luggage for prohibited
       fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and animal pests
       and diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year, it will have
       increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double the level

       available 2 years ago. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA
       stated that by the end of this year, APHIS will also have increased the
       number of its safeguarding personnel to approximately 3,870* an increase
       of 50 percent over its fiscal year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA
       told us that it has hired 18 additional veterinarians who are conducting
       port- of- entry reviews, working

       with state counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on
       working with and handling animal products and byproducts and international
       garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal diseases. In addition,
       USDA*s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates programs designed to
       build new markets and improve the competitive position of U. S.
       agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is responsible for USDA*s
       overseas activities, such as market development, international trade
       agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of statistics
       and market information. FAS supports U. S. agricultural interests through
       its network of agricultural counselors, attaches, and trade officers
       stationed in many foreign countries. FAS officials primarily deal with
       agricultural trade issues and meet with host government and industry
       officials to discuss and facilitate agricultural trade.

       USDA*s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary
       responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat and
       meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors at
       ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on imported

       meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving countries that
       are eligible to export meat products to the United States. In fulfilling
       this responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic reviews of eligible countries.
       According to USDA, FSIS*s inspection of livestock before slaughter is an
       important surveillance tool for detecting the presence of FMD in the
       United States.

       Finally, USDA*s Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading and
       coordinating USDA*s activities to plan for and manage agriculture- related
       crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as USDA*s
       primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
       facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local
       governments, and private- sector organizations. U. S. Customs Service

       The U. S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nation*s primary enforcement
       Supports USDA*s agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially
       harmful products into the United States, including FMD- contaminated
       products. In Efforts at Ports of

       addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper duties or
       Entry

       tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors work to enforce
       the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as those of USDA.
       Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests and bills of
       lading, and physically inspect cargo and international passengers and
       their luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all 301 ports of entry
       throughout the United States, including international airports and
       seaports and land border crossings along the Canadian and Mexican borders.

       Customs also has inspectors at some foreign locations, such as the
       international airport in Toronto, Canada, where they perform preclearance
       inspections of passengers and their luggage prior to entry into the United
       States. Customs inspectors also examine international mail and packages
       arriving in the United States at the 14 facilities handling mail of
       foreign

       origin. Objectives, Scope, and

       Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U. S. processes to
       Methodology obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks
       are adequate and timely, (2) U. S. measures for preventing FMD from
       entering

       the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected
       countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and effectively
       to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur. To address the first question,
       we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, and we interviewed USDA and
       Customs officials. In particular,

       we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information obtained and
       disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom.

       For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations,
       and other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state
       officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, we
       visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore,
       Maryland; and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for
       international mail, we visited international mail- processing facilities
       in New Jersey and Virginia and one international express package carrier
       in Kentucky. To observe the preventive measures for live animals imported
       through

       U. S.- Canadian and U. S.- Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the
       Sarnia, Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe
       the preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles

       International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance
       procedures used to process international passengers entering the United
       States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We also
       gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is handled
       at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby county

       and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how USDA*s
       guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of disease at U.
       S. livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.

       As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after
       September 11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after the
       U. K. outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of the
       review as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to survey
       passengers who were returning to the United States from the United
       Kingdom, during the outbreak, at the airport after they left the
       passenger- processing area. Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60
       passengers who visited the United Kingdom during the time of the outbreak
       (Mar. through Sept. 2001). We asked them to recall various aspects of
       their return trip and the processing they underwent at U. S. airports.
       These results cannot be generalized and

       represent only the experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In
       addition, because we asked people to recall events after the passage of 4
       to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes might not
       have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon arrival.

       Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the preventive
       measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom with those used by
       the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for our review because
       the ability of the United States to protect its livestock from FMD also
       depends on the ability of our neighbors to prevent the disease; according
       to USDA officials, if any of the three countries has an FMD outbreak, the
       other two are also likely to have an outbreak. We

       included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is a major U. S.
       trading partner and because of its recent experience with FMD. To obtain
       information on the preventive measures used by Canada and Mexico, we

       visited these two countries, met with federal officials, and obtained and
       reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and Mexico, we visited
       airports, seaports, international mail- processing facilities, and border
       crossings to observe the preventive measures used by these countries. To
       obtain information on the United Kingdom*s preventive measures, we

       reviewed and summarized legislation and regulations for the European Union
       and the United Kingdom, as well as other publicly available documents. To
       ensure the accuracy and completeness of our information, we shared the
       summaries that we prepared on the preventive measures used by the three
       countries with officials in these countries and asked for their review and
       comments. The information on these foreign countries* preventive measures
       does not reflect our independent legal analysis.

       Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state emergency
       response plans as well as other key documents and federal legislation and
       regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry representatives, and
       state officials. We also interviewed a group of selected veterinarians and
       animal health technicians who were part of the U. S. contingent that
       supported the United Kingdom*s response efforts in 2001 to obtain their

       perspectives on U. S. preparedness and observations on lessons learned
       from the U. K. outbreak. We interviewed the state veterinarian in six
       states that are major U. S. livestock producers to obtain their
       perspective on their state*s preparedness efforts as well as the overall
       U. S. ability to respond to

       an outbreak if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session
       and a conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health
       Association that included information on U. S. preparedness and response

       to an FMD outbreak. We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this
       report for review and comment. The written comments we received from USDA
       are presented in appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in
       appendix VI. In addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we
       have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate. We conducted our
       work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with generally
       accepted government auditing standards.

       USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Chapt er 2

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved USDA relies on a wide variety of
       sources to obtain information on outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources
       include APHIS and FAS staff stationed abroad, official notifications from
       international trade or animal health organizations, and notifications from
       affected countries. But USDA*s dissemination of this information is more
       problematic because it has no formal process* detailed procedures and
       protocols* for sharing information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs,
       which provides the first line of defense against potentially contaminated
       products entering U. S.

       ports. USDA does, however, share the information it develops with agencies
       within the department, states, public and private veterinarians, industry
       groups, and the public through various methods, including Emails, postings
       to USDA*s Internet site, telephone calls, and media alerts.

       USDA Obtains USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign
       animal diseases, Information on Foreign

       including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA staff
       stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such as OIE
       and FMD Outbreaks from

       the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of affected
       Multiple Sources

       nations. USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a
       range of information on agricultural issues, including the disease status
       of foreign countries. For example, APHIS*s International Services group
       employs over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in 27
       countries around the world. According to APHIS officials, these foreign
       service staff collect agricultural information for the countries they are
       stationed in as well as other countries in the region. Their primary
       sources of information

       include (1) official notifications from foreign governments about changes
       in their country*s animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host
       government, local industry, and private- sector officials; (3) local radio
       and television reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may
       provide early information about potential animal or crop disease problems;
       and (4) informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted
       by the foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather
       references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to

       APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal
       sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the
       United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting imports.

       Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63 agricultural
       counselor, attache, and affiliate foreign national offices; 17
       agricultural trade offices; and a number of agricultural advisers covering
       129 countries

       around the world. According to the FAS officials we spoke with, staff
       stationed overseas have no functional responsibility for tracking foreign
       animal diseases, such as FMD. However, during their routine activities,
       they may become aware of a possible outbreak, in which case they would
       likely relay this information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D. C.
       FAS staff obtain agricultural information from several of the same sources
       accessed by APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry
       reports, meetings with host government officials, and official government
       notifications and documents.

       In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease
       conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its
       evaluation of a country*s eligibility to export meat and meat products to
       the United States. FSIS*s technical staff review the documents provided by
       the foreign country as well as conduct in- country visits before deeming a
       country eligible to export meat and meat products to the United States for
       human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in each eligible exporting
       country, at least annually, and shares any information obtained on
       diseases of concern with APHIS, according to USDA.

       USDA also receives information from international organizations, such as
       OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to follow
       during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both OIE

       and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an official
       notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These
       organizations then provide other member nations with official notification
       of the outbreak.

       In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries
       affected by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading
       partners. For example, major U. S. trading partners often notify USDA
       officials directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom did
       in early 2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom notified
       USDA on the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD* February 21,
       2001. In

       North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have an informal
       understanding that in the event of an FMD outbreak, the affected country
       will immediately report to the other two countries. The usefulness of
       information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a foreign country*s
       willingness to provide accurate information in a timely fashion. There are
       instances, however, when a country may fail to notify OIE, WTO, or its
       major trading partners of a disease outbreak in a timely

       manner. 6 For example, Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some
       regions of their country had been affected with FMD, although unconfirmed
       reports indicated that the disease had been present for several months,
       according to USDA officials. Argentina officially notified OIE on March
       13, 2001, and USDA then took action to prohibit imports of affected
       Argentine products. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated
       that if it had verifiable scientific evidence that FMD existed in
       Argentina, it could have prohibited imports before the country notified

       OIE. USDA Lacks a Formal

       APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about
       Process to Ensure

       foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state
       governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all need
       Dissemination of FMD information about potential FMD outbreaks because
       they all play an Information to

       important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS
       Customs

       immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process,
       including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information on
       foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no assurance that
       Customs inspectors at U. S. ports of entry, and in particular at the ports
       where APHIS does not have a presence, are adequately informed of the

       need to implement controls for potentially contaminated cargo, and
       international passengers and their luggage entering the United States.

       APHIS Uses Multiple APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field
       staff located in the

       Mechanisms to Inform United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state
       governments,

       USDA Agencies and Others industry groups, the public, and the media about
       foreign FMD outbreaks. in the United States About These methods include

       Foreign FMD Outbreaks

        E- mails and electronic alerts,

        memos and letters,

        telephone calls,

        meetings, 6 While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with
       its reporting requirements, WTO can.

        press releases,

        printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),

        public education and outreach,

        toll free information hotline, and

        postings to the Internet (USDA*s Web page). After the 2001 outbreak of
       FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that APHIS used each of these
       methods to distribute information about (1) the disease, (2) the outbreak
       in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing the introduction and spread of
       the disease in the United States. For example, APHIS field locations began
       receiving electronic alerts and E- mails from

       APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same day that the
       United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak. Similarly, by the second
       week of March 2001, USDA had issued several press releases, placed
       information on its Web site about FMD precautions, initiated an
       international travelers* education campaign, and established a toll- free
       number for public inquiries about the disease. Also, shortly after the U.
       K. outbreak began, APHIS distributed several types of printed media to its
       field offices nationwide. According to the Veterinary Services staff in
       the

       field offices we contacted, they distributed these materials to state
       governments, industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed
       posters in public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table
       2 shows selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak
       in the United Kingdom.

       Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 2001
       Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom Date Action taken/ information
       disseminated

       Feb. 21, 2001 APHIS Alert to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port
       Offices prohibiting the importation of all meat products from the United
       Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the
       Isle of Man).

       Feb. 26, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and
       Quarantine inspectors to closely monitor international passengers, in
       particular those arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those
       who had been on a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if
       necessary.

       Mar. 1, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine
       inspectors providing guidance on inspecting farm equipment and tractors as
       well as other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of
       Ireland. Mar. 6, 2001 First team of U. S. veterinarians deployed to the
       United Kingdom to help respond to the outbreak. Mar. 12, 2001 Beginning
       the week of March 12, 2001, a high- ranking APHIS official began a tour of
       major eastern U. S. ports, meeting with U. S. Customs and other federal
       inspection agencies to emphasize the need for

       aggressive exclusion activities. Mar. 13, 2001 APHIS Electronic Alerts and
       USDA news release announcing the prohibition of imported live swine and
       ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat (chilled or frozen), and other
       products of swine and ruminant from all European Union nations (does not
       include cooked pork products).

       Mar. 13, 2001 USDA Media Advisory announcing kick off of traveler*s
       education campaign starting March 14, 2001. Mar. 14, 2001 USDA memo to its
       field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding guidelines for
       importing pets from areas affected with FMD. Mar. 16, 2001 USDA news
       release announcing the establishment of toll- free FMD call lines*
       domestic and international. Mar. 20, 2001 APHIS begins regularly scheduled
       conference calls with the National Association of State Departments of

       Agriculture to discuss APHIS*s FMD exclusion efforts. Mar. 22, 2001
       Specific guidance provided to the U. S. Customs Service on FMD- related
       inspection procedures for cargo and passengers at U. S. ports of entry.

       Mar. 23, 2001 Industry Alert to livestock owners and private- practice
       veterinarians posted to the APHIS Web site, reminding them to report
       unusual animal health symptoms.

       Mar. 2001 Other information issued during the month of March includes

        meetings about FMD with industry, state, and local governments;

        FMD- prevention information developed for airlines;

        warning signs posted at airports;

        public service announcements on radio and television; and

        FMD information for USDA extension agents. Apr. 9, 2001 Secretary of
       Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection
       personnel. Apr. 26, 2001 Secretary of Agriculture assures the Congress
       that compensation would be available to producers in the event of an FMD
       outbreak in the United States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and
       doubling the size of the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200
       current inspectors to critical ports of entry. May 11, 2001 USDA and the
       Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to
       ensure that FMD is kept out of the United States.

       May 2001 USDA issues FMD- prevention guidelines for livestock shows
       agricultural fairs, and other agricultural events.

       However, the effectiveness of USDA*s efforts is uncertain. For example, in
       March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting that
       they

       could assist USDA*s preventive activities by making in- flight
       announcements on international flights to raise passengers* awareness
       about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the
       airlines to use when making these announcements. However, the passengers
       returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom we contacted
       told us that not all the airlines made such announcements. Similarly in
       May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for

       livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs.
       According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are *suggestions* for fair
       organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation are left
       to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed that the

       implementation of APHIS*s guidelines varied dramatically at the two county
       fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example, USDA*s guidelines
       indicate that food should not be allowed in areas where show animals are
       housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed that no restrictions of
       this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the livestock

       owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs generally did
       not know about the risks associated with FMD or the need to take
       precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread. For example,
       one livestock producer told us that FMD was a *European

       problem* and that the United States did not have to worry about it. APHIS
       Does Not Have a While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing
       interested parties Formal Process to Provide

       about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform Customs
       with Information Customs* the first deterrent to the importation of
       potentially FMDaffected

       on Foreign FMD Outbreaks products* about these outbreaks. As Table 2
       shows, after the U. K.

       outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its decisions to
       prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers
       arriving at U. S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Customs did not
       receive any consistent national guidance from APHIS until the Acting

       Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing
       from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16, 2001. As a result, Customs*
       field staff did not receive uniform official guidance on general
       inspection

       measures for passengers and products until March 27, 2001, and specific
       information on at- risk products to be detained at the ports until April
       4, 2001* 37 and 45 days, respectively, after APHIS received the United
       Kingdom*s official notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs
       memorandum and officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped
       to adequately process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry

       during the initial stages of the U. K. outbreak. For example, one Customs

       supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her port
       of entry and that she had no information on how to clean passengers* shoes
       and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to this Customs
       supervisor, the lack of official guidance forced her staff to rely on
       informal and inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS officials located at
       another port of entry. She added that because Customs inspectors are not
       animal disease specialists, they need nontechnical, clear procedures to
       help them

       process international cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at
       those ports where there is no APHIS presence. The Customs* Assistant
       Director for Field Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance
       is needed for all Customs field inspectors. APHIS officials acknowledged
       that they did not notify Customs of the U. K. outbreak. According to these
       officials, because Customs had not sought specific guidance from APHIS
       about prior FMD outbreaks in other

       countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo,
       passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the
       outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them. As
       a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U. K. outbreak, the
       APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that in May
       2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field Operations to
       the list of people to whom she sends E- mail notifications of foreign FMD
       outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field Operations told us
       that this action will help his office better inform Customs* field
       inspectors about future foreign FMD outbreaks.

       Conclusions Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U. S.
       livestock from FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this
       responsibility. Customs is especially critical to keeping FMD-
       contaminated products out of the United States at those ports of entry
       where APHIS is not present. However,

       Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted, coordinated, and
       comprehensive defense against FMD at the nation*s border only if they
       receive current information on the countries that are affected by FMD and

       have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to process at- risk products and
       passengers. APHIS has taken the first interim step to notify Customs of
       future foreign FMD outbreaks, by including a Customs official on one of
       its

       electronic mailing lists. However, we believe that this does not provide a
       permanent solution to the lack of clear communication protocols and
       procedures between APHIS and Customs.

       Recommendations for To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U. S.
       ports of entry are fully

       Executive Action informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we
       recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of
       APHIS to develop (1) a formal written agreement with the Commissioner of
       the Customs Service

       that will clearly delineate the process by which future information on
       foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs and (2) uniform,
       nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can use to process
       international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD- affected countries.

       U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other Countries,
       but Complete

       Chapt er 3

       Protection May Be Infeasible U. S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak*
       control and eradication overseas and the port of entry screening of
       livestock, animal products, and passengers* have been successful since
       1929. Nevertheless, the United States remains vulnerable to an FMD
       outbreak because of the nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it
       can come into the country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both
       legal and illegal passengers and

       cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar challenges in
       protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive measures that are
       comparable to those the United States uses. However, the United States
       could also build on the experiences of other countries to improve its
       preventive measures.

       USDA*s Efforts to As a first line of defense to safeguarding U. S. animal
       resources against the

       Control and Eradicate introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps
       prevent, control, and

       eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate outside the FMD
       in Other

       United States. By helping other nations eradicate or control these
       Countries Help Reduce outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural
       pests and diseases the Risk to U. S.

       reaching U. S. borders. Livestock

       In North America, U. S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have largely
       focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the possible threat of
       the FMD virus*s moving overland from South America, where the disease is
       endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located in Mexico working with
       the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth
       Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. The commission, formed in 1947
       as a combined U. S.- Mexican effort to eradicate FMD from Mexico, 7 built
       Mexico*s animal health infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from
       Mexico in 1954. Today, USDA and Mexican

       veterinarians work together, through the activities of the commission, to
       provide disease surveillance, diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico
       to ensure that the country remains FMD- free. According to USDA officials
       in Mexico, the United States initially covered about 80 percent of the
       costs for the joint program; however, as the Mexican government assumed
       greater responsibility for the program, the U. S. share has decreased to
       about 20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in
       funding

       for the commission*s activities. According to USDA officials, this funding
       7 The commission was originally called the Mexican American Commission for
       the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.

       supports the commission*s high- security laboratory in Mexico City by
       providing training, supplies, and equipment. In addition, for over 30
       years, the United States has held regular meetings on animal health issues
       with the governments of Canada and Mexico to harmonize North America*s
       import requirements and, more recently, to coordinate preventive actions
       and emergency response activities in the event of an FMD outbreak. For
       example, in 2000, the three countries held joint exercises* known as the
       Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test their FMD communication and response
       plans, and to assess their response systems.

       As a result of this exercise, the three governments signed a memorandum of
       understanding to formally establish the North American Animal Health
       Committee. This committee represents animal health issues for the North
       American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to harmonize live animal and
       animal product import requirements for North America. The committee will
       also plan emergency response activities and perform joint test exercises
       to ensure that all three countries remain prepared to respond to an FMD
       outbreak.

       The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD- control zones in
       Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in Central
       and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from South America,
       USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama and Colombia. In
       Panama, USDA supports the U. S.- Panama Cooperative Program for the
       Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains the Darien Gap area
       of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal diseases. This program
       conducts field surveillance at high- risk border

       points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the
       infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative
       Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio- containment,
       diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign
       animal diseases in Central America.

       Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD- free barrier
       along the Colombia- Panama border. 8 This barrier serves as the "first
       line of defense" for preventing the spread of FMD northward into Central
       America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD- free. Until FMD
       is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that 8 This barrier is one
       of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is maintained by the European
       Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.

       maintaining this barrier will prevent the disease*s northward spread. USDA
       provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the program. As
       part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also has
       cooperative agreements with all the other Central American countries to
       support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, including field

       investigations and the collection of laboratory samples for FMD and other
       foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, USDA helps transfer
       surveillance and detection technologies to these countries.

       When FMD strikes other nations* as it did recently, for example, in
       Argentina and the United Kingdom* the United States may assist in
       controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327 U. S.
       animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, helped
       eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans came from
       USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments. Beginning in March
       2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally in groups that
       averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the response for about a

       month. At the peak of the outbreak during March and April, about 100 U. S.
       animal health professionals were assisting in the U. K. response. The U.
       S. responders with whom we spoke participated in surveillance activities,
       such as collecting blood samples, and epidemiology tasks, such as tracking
       and predicting the path of new disease outbreaks. They also issued permits
       and licenses to move animals and products such as silage. By providing
       such assistance, the United States not only helps ensure that the disease
       is eradicated quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-
       infected products to arrive at U. S. ports of entry. 9

       Despite U. S. Preventive Preventive measures at U. S. borders provide the
       second line of defense Measures at Ports of against the incursion of FMD
       into the United States. USDA has identified several key pathways by which
       the FMD- virus could enter the United Entry, Vulnerability to States. To
       respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA FMD Remains

       implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products,
       passengers, and equipment arriving at U. S. borders are free of the virus
       and do not pose a risk to U. S. livestock. However, some level of risk is
       inherent 9 According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U. K.
       outbreak in 2001, another benefit of sending U. S. personnel to assist
       with foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable

       training they receive by handling diseased animals and responding to
       various aspects of a *real life* response.

       in international trade and travel, and no set of measures can ever
       completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the country.
       Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level of inspection
       resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and magnitude of
       cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that continue to enter the
       country, the United States remains vulnerable to an outbreak.

       The United States Has The FMD virus could enter the United States through
       a number of key

       Implemented Preventive pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal
       and other products, Measures for Key Pathways

       international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international
       carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment
       returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed
       and implemented specific preventive measures described below.

       Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such as
       swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA judges
       to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern. 10 For example, in April
       2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or geographical regions as free of FMD.
       (See app. I.) Generally, live animals can be imported only through
       designated ports of entry, the majority of which are located along U. S.
       borders shared with Canada and Mexico, and three others located on the
       east and west coasts. 11 Most live cattle imports into the United States
       originate from Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live

       lamb imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the
       United States must be accompanied by a U. S. import permit and a health
       certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of
       origin. The health certificate states that the animals have been in the
       exporting country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free of
       other diseases

       of concern. 12 Generally, animals arriving from countries other than
       Canada and Mexico may be quarantined. 13 Zoological ruminants and swine
       from

       10 USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a country*s FMD- free
       status using the OIE criteria described in chapter 1, and independently
       validates the country*s disease status reports sent to the OIE. In
       addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the country and
       conducts verification visits to the country. 11 Twenty- six other U. S.
       ports of entry accept live animals on a limited basis. 12 Because the
       incubation period for FMD is significantly less than 60 days, the 60- day
       requirement helps ensure that if animals have been exposed to the FMD
       virus or other serious animal health diseases, they would become
       symptomatic within this period of time.

       FMD- affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be
       processed through USDA*s New York Animal Import Center.

       Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other products
       that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could potentially enter the
       United States during the course of normal international trade. These
       products include animal products meant for human consumption,

       such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal products, such as hides,
       skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well as nonanimal products, such
       as farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA regulates the importation of this
       diverse range of products to help minimize the risk of introducing FMD
       into the United States.

       USDA implements different import rules for FMD- free and FMD- affected
       countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of
       concern, 14 USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product imports. For
       FMD- affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible
       products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the
       outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA reassesses the
       disease status of the affected country and determines the level of trade
       that can resume. USDA allows imports of animal and other products from
       FMD- affected countries only if they meet certain requirements. These

       requirements vary for different kinds of products, as follows:  Animal
       products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh, chilled, or frozen
       meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk are prohibited from FMD-
       affected countries. However, processed meat and dairy products are allowed
       from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain requirements. For
       example, meat products can be imported

       from FMD- affected countries only if (1) the country and meat processing
       plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to the United
       States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet APHIS*s meat-
       processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that meat products from
       these countries are not contaminated with the FMD

       virus, and require that the products be processed in a manner that will 13
       The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals imported and
       the kinds of diseases present in the country of origin. 14 Unrestricted
       trade is generally dependent on a country*s being free of other diseases
       of concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest), and others. FMD is only
       one of the diseases of concern.

       inactivate the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured,
       or canned and shelf- stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U. S.
       import permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the

       country of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, most
       dairy products from FMD- affected countries must meet APHIS*s requirements
       to ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMD*s introduction. For example,
       milk products that are in a concentrated liquid form and are shelf- stable
       without refrigeration are allowed from FMD- affected countries. Some dairy
       products, such as condensed milk require a U. S. import permit, while
       others, such as yogurt and butter are unrestricted and do not require a
       permit. 15  Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products
       are

       allowed from FMD- affected countries if they have been properly treated to
       inactivate the virus; however, a U. S. import permit may be required. For
       example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal trophies
       can be imported into the United States from FMD- affected

       countries.

        Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw used
       for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD- affected countries.
       However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate from the
       exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam cleaned. APHIS
       officials inspect farm equipment at U. S. ports of entry

       to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are found,
       then inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately washed with
       detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before granting
       approval for entry into the United States. All animal and other products
       arriving at U. S. ports of entry, whether from FMD- free or FMD- affected
       countries, are subject to inspection by U. S. federal inspectors. Customs
       officials, who review the documents accompanying the shipments, either
       electronically or on paper, provide the first level of inspection for
       these shipments. On the basis of this review, Customs is authorized to
       either release the shipments into commerce or hold them for USDA
       inspection. USDA provides Customs with a list of products to be flagged
       for inspection by APHIS. APHIS inspectors ensure that all the necessary
       documents accompanying the shipment, such as

       15 The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing conditions for
       the product and determine whether the stated process will inactivate the
       FMD virus.

       import permits and official health certificates, are complete and ensure
       that the shipments match their manifest. In some instances, APHIS
       inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to check their contents.
       After APHIS completes its inspection, the shipment may proceed to FSIS
       and/ or the Food and Drug Administration for further inspection, depending
       on which agency regulates the safety of these products for human health
       issues, or may proceed to Customs for release into commerce. 16 According

       to USDA, FSIS inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments
       of products under FSIS*s jurisdiction and randomly select some for more
       in- depth examination.

       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary
       inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those
       ports staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments
       continue to be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said that
       it is working

       with Customs and other federal agencies to develop an automated targeting
       system, which will serve as an electronic interface among federal agencies
       to identify and automatically segregate high- risk plant cargo and track
       imported animals and animal products. International passengers.
       International passengers who may have been in contact with the FMD virus,
       either through contact with infected animals or materials such as soil and
       manure, or who bring potentially

       contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to the
       United States. USDA provides the following FMD- prevention information and
       types of scrutiny for international passengers in an effort to reduce the
       risk associated with this pathway:

        USDA requests airlines to make in- flight announcements on international
       flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and it plays
       prerecorded announcements about how international passengers can assist in
       keeping FMD out of the United States.

        International passengers must fill out a U. S. Customs declaration form
       that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into the
       country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were in
       contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these

       16 Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by FSIS,
       while others, such as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food and Drug
       Administration to ensure that they are safe for human consumption before
       they are released into U. S. commerce.

       questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at the
       port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x- ray and
       inspect the contents of the passengers* baggage; ask them additional
       questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy
       products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.

        USDA*s Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim
       areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their
       luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors look
       not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and

       leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to
       determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission. If
       the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these passengers are
       referred to the USDA inspection area for further processing.

       After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the
       international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not
       consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the

       airlines they traveled on did not make any in- flight announcements about
       FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs declaration
       form indicated that they had been in contact with animals or visited a
       farm while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred by officials to
       the USDA inspection area at the airport for further processing or they had
       to request USDA personnel at the airports to examine and disinfect the
       shoes that they wore while they were in FMD- affected areas in the United
       Kingdom.

       Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international carriers,
       such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus into the
       United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated with the
       virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that garbage
       from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of so that it
       does not present a risk to U. S. livestock. For example, USDA inspectors
       supervise the removal of all international garbage from airplanes and
       ships. This garbage must be transported in leak- proof containers and must
       be disposed of properly, such as by incineration or sterilization, and

       subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance agreements with
       catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper handling and approved
       disposal methods for international garbage. Before a compliance agreement
       is signed, APHIS officials will, among other things, review the

       application; visit the handling, processing, or disposal facilities;
       observe the operation of any equipment to determine its adequacy for
       handling

       garbage; and certify and approve the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be
       used to process international garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating
       under these compliance agreements to ensure that they abide by the
       conditions stated in the agreement.

       International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the FMD
       virus may also be sent through international mail and courier services to
       U. S. residents. As a result, international mail packages entering the
       United States are subject to inspection by Customs and USDA officials.
       Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the packages and either
       visually inspects or x- rays them as part of its responsibility to screen

       international mail for illegal and prohibited items, such as contraband
       and drugs. At USDA*s request, Customs can also screen international
       packages for prohibited animal products, such as meat and dairy products
       from

       FMD- affected countries. Customs sets aside packages that appear to
       contain such items for USDA*s inspection. USDA officials will review the
       declaration forms and may x- ray or open these packages for physical
       inspection. If the item in the package is a permissible product, the
       officials

       will reseal the package and release it for delivery; otherwise it will be
       confiscated and destroyed. 17 In commenting on a draft of this report,
       USDA noted that mail from high- risk countries is more thoroughly
       scrutinized on the basis of pathway analysis.

       Military personnel and equipment. Because U. S. military forces are
       deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning to
       the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the country.
       As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps oversee the
       reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and personal property to
       reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the United States. For
       example, military personnel must declare all agricultural items they are
       bringing back to the United States and identify whether they have been on
       farms or in contact with animals while abroad. Their clothing and gear
       should also be cleaned and washed before reentering the country.
       Similarly, all military rolling stock, such as humvees, trucks, weapons
       systems, and tanks, as well as other used military gear, such as canvas

       tents, must be thoroughly cleaned before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates,
       and other military equipment must be free of soil, manure, and debris.
       Military equipment used to eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as
       FMD, is not allowed reentry. For small- scale operations, the military
       must 17 Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are
       routinely notified.

       notify USDA at least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U. S. port of
       entry. USDA will determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are
       available at the first port of entry, and all items will be held at this
       port for inspection. If approved cleaning facilities are not available or
       if the equipment is contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA
       will refuse to allow reentry. Large- scale operations require a 30- day
       notification.

       United States Remains The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD
       since 1929, and some Vulnerable to FMD

       USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy
       condition of U. S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of
       U. S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these and
       other

       experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak for
       the following reasons:  FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that
       remains viable for long periods of time.

        FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and inanimate
       items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose varying levels of
       risk to U. S. livestock, according to USDA, it could take only one
       contaminated product to come into contact with one

       susceptible U. S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.

        The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products
       entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for USDA and
       other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most inspections at ports
       of entry are restricted to paper reviews of manifests supported by a
       limited number of judgmentally selected samples for physical inspection.
       For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 470 million international
       passengers and pedestrians arrived at U. S. ports of entry; of these, USDA
       inspected about 102 million. According to APHIS officials, about 30
       percent of the items seized from passengers at airports were prohibited
       animal products or by- products. Table 3

       provides information on the volume/ numbers of passengers, vehicles, and
       cargo entering the United States and the level of APHIS*s inspections for
       fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of international mail entering the
       United States makes it difficult for APHIS and

       Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD- susceptible
       products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the international mail facility
       in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that about 30, 000 international parcels
       pass through their check point every day. This volume of mail

       provides the inspectors approximately 3 seconds per parcel to judge
       whether the package might contain FMD- susceptible products. Moreover,
       mail is processed at the facility during the day and night to keep up with
       the volume of international mail arriving daily. However, APHIS inspectors
       are present only during the day shifts and detector dogs are available for
       only 1 to 2 days per week. Although Customs* inspectors screen packages
       for FMD- susceptible products during the time when APHIS inspectors are
       not available, both APHIS and Customs inspectors told us that the process
       is less effective than having an APHIS

       inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to APHIS*s Assistant Director
       for Port Operations, even doubling or tripling the agency*s inspection
       resources would not significantly reduce the FMD risk from overseas
       entries because the percentage of passengers, vehicles, and cargo
       receiving a physical inspection is likely to continue to be relatively
       low. Table 3: Volume/ Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering
       the United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products,
       Fiscal Year 2001

       Percentage Commodity/ mode Volume/ number a Inspected by APHIS b inspected

       Passengers 472,000,000 101,513,792 21. 5 (all modes of transport) Ships
       215,328 52,016 24. 2

       Aircraft 1,064,923 541,109 49. 0 Cargo

       14, 538, 271 c 2,181,904 d N/ A e

        Rail 1,534,566

        Tr uck s 7,878,000

        Ship 5,125,705

       Mail packages N/ A f 434,216 N/ A Legend: N/ A= not applicable a Source:
       U. S. Customs Service.

       b Source: USDA. c The number of full containers. d The number of bills of
       lading inspected. A single bill of lading may include multiple containers.
       e The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs report
       their data in differing units of measure.

       f The total amount of international mail that entered the United States
       during fiscal year 2001was not available; however, APHIS officials at the
       Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that approximately 30,000
       parcels go past their check point every day.  Moreover, most U. S.
       preventive measures are not designed to intercept illegal entries of
       products or passengers that may harbor the FMD virus.

       According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products entering
       the United States is growing, and contraband meat products entering the
       country is the single most important risk for the introduction of FMD. In
       addition, illegal shipments of products from countries other than the
       stated point of origin and illegal immigrants also pose significant risks.
       USDA and Customs annually confiscate thousands of contraband and
       prohibited products at U. S. ports of entry. For example, in fiscal year
       2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of prohibited meat/ poultry and animal
       by- products. According to USDA officials, these seizures are only a small
       portion of the contraband entering the United States. To respond to the
       growing threat from illegal entries, USDA recently

       created the Smuggling Interdiction and Trade Compliance program. Program
       officials collaborate with several federal, state, and private
       organizations to ensure compliance with U. S. agriculture import laws at
       ports of entry. U. S. Preventive U. S. preventive measures for FMD are
       comparable to the measures used by

       Measures Are Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways
       included in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports,
       international

       Comparable to Those mail, and garbage from international carriers. The
       pathway that presented

       Used by Other the most significant area of difference concerned the
       measures used to Countries

       process international passengers entering these countries. (Detailed
       information on the preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the
       United Kingdom are provided in appendixes II through IV of this report.)

       Generally, U. S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the
       other three countries for the following four pathways:

        Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock only
       from approved countries that are FMD- free. Generally, these live animals
       must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that

       have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if
       necessary. In addition, the countries require import permits and health
       certificates to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals are
       imported directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico requires
       an official government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals imported
       from

       countries other than the United States in their country of origin before
       they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) accompany the shipment and
       monitor the health status of the animals while they are in transit.

        Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal product
       imports only from countries that they consider FMD- free and that meet
       their specific animal health and food safety standards. The countries also
       allow certain animal product imports from FMD- affected countries if they
       originate from a preapproved establishment and are

       processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example, meat
       products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf- stable can be
       imported from FMD- affected countries, but unprocessed products, such as
       fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not allowed. In
       addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject to review and
       may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive at the port of
       entry in each of the countries. 18  International mail. The countries
       handle international mail in a similar

       manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing the sender,
       country of origin, and contents of the package. Only packages considered
       suspect, for example, because they do not include required information,
       are from high- risk countries, or have been sent by repeat offenders, are
       selected and opened for further inspection. Canada uses x- ray technology
       to help identify packages containing prohibited items, and Mexican
       officials told us that all international packages arriving

       from FMD- affected countries are opened and inspected for prohibited
       items.

        Garbage from international carriers. The countries* federal agencies
       responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment,
       transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers.
       They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or under
       certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For example, in
       Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved sites located at
       least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock and/ or poultry

       and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 5. 5 feet) of local
       refuse and/ or other standard covering material. At the time of our
       review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals to be fed
       international garbage from airlines or ships. 18 All imported animal
       product shipments receive a documentary review, which usually involves a
       review of the accompanying paperwork, such as import permits and health
       certifications. A percentage of animal product shipments is judgmentally
       selected for physical inspection to ensure that the products do not
       present any animal or public health risk. Samples may be taken for
       laboratory analyses as part of this inspection.

       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United
       Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a member
       of the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade among,
       countries that are FMD- free as well as some that are not.

       The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used to
       prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers.
       Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:

        Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United
       States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert international
       passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U. S. signs were smaller and less
       visible in comparison with the signs used by the other two countries.

       For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall and warned
       passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French about FMD.
       Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, included

       pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast, the first
       U. S. signs were 1- by- 1 foot and included relatively small- sized text
       on a white background that was difficult to read and did not easily convey
       the importance of the message. According to USDA officials, these signs
       were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3- by- 3 feet) that included
       a colored graphic and larger- sized text. While larger, we observed at one
       U. S. international airport that the new signs were placed at a
       considerable distance from arriving passengers. These signs

       were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and therefore were
       several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed that the signs in
       Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible locations that were
       in greater proximity to the passengers. According to agriculture officials
       in all three countries, they are limited in their ability to place signs
       at ports of entry because they have to negotiate the size

       and placement with the port authorities. As a result, they are not always
       able to use the most effective signs or locations. Figures 3 and 4 show
       the signs that were used in the United States and Canada and Mexico.

       Figure 3: U. S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry

       Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry

        Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made changes
       to the declaration forms they use to process international passengers upon
       arrival. For example, after the U. K. outbreak in 2001, Canada reworded
       its declaration form to provide examples of food products of concern, such
       as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico

       developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD- affected
       countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture- related
       questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any changes to its
       declaration form in 2001, and some of the international passengers we
       contacted considered the agriculture- related question on the form
       ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that USDA was

       aware that the question on the form was confusing and ambiguous to

       travelers. This official said that most of the confusion arises because
       the question on the form consolidates three questions into one.

       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has recently
       worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the Customs
       declaration form. The form now includes two agriculturerelated questions
       that USDA believes will be more easily understood by travelers and will
       yield better information to the department to help focus its inspection
       efforts. The new form is currently being distributed

       throughout the country. Because USDA*s actions address our concerns, we
       have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this report. (See table
       4 for a comparison of the agriculture- related questions on the

       prior and revised U. S. declaration forms.) Table 4: Agriculture- Related
       Questions on the Prior and Revised U. S. Declaration Forms Language on
       prior Customs declaration form a Language on revised Customs declaration
       form a

       Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing fruits, plants, Q. 11 I am (We are) bringing

       meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live (a) fruits, plants, food,
       insects: animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, (b) meats,
       animals, animal/ wildlife products: have been on a farm or ranch outside
       the

       (c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails: U. S.

       (d) soil or have been on a farm/ ranch/ pasture: Q. 12 I have (We have)
       been in close proximity of (such as touching or handling) livestock:

       Note: a Both forms require the questions to be answered with either a
       *yes* or *no* response.

        Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico
       developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at
       airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the
       country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose not
       to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the disinfectant
       in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number of uses and may
       begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes that

       were otherwise clean. Conclusions The United States has had significant
       success in keeping the nation*s livestock FMD- free since 1929. To some
       extent, the success of this effort is directly related to the
       effectiveness of U. S. preventive measures both abroad and at the nation*s
       borders. However, because of the extensive

       presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and volume of
       international cargo and travel continue to expand, the nation*s
       vulnerability to an introduction of FMD remains high. The steps that other
       nations have taken to reduce the risk of FMD* such as signs to alert
       international passengers* could help improve USDA*s efforts to protect U.
       S. livestock.

       While we recognize that there is an additional cost to preparing new,
       larger, and more noticeable signs, we believe that, given the significant
       economic costs of an FMD outbreak to the nation, these costs are justified
       if they can help improve our preventive measures.

       Recommendation for To help improve the effectiveness of U. S. measures to
       prevent the

       Executive Action introduction of FMD by international passengers, we
       recommend that the

       Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop more
       effective signage about FMD for ports of entry. Agency Comments In its
       comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in the process
       of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be larger and more
       mobile than the ones that we observed during the course of our work.

       Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face Challenges in
       Responding Quickly

       Chapt er 4

       and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak If FMD enters the United States despite
       USDA*s preventive measures, the nation*s ability to identify, control,
       contain, and eradicate the disease quickly and effectively becomes
       paramount. Recognizing the importance of an effective response and the
       necessity to prepare before an outbreak occurs, USDA and most states have
       developed emergency response plans that establish a framework for the key
       elements necessary for a rapid and successful U. S. response and
       eradication program. Many of these plans have, to some extent, been tested
       by federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. However,
       planning and testing exercises have also identified several challenges
       that could ultimately impede an effective and timely U. S. response if
       they are not resolved before an FMD

       outbreak occurs. The Federal Planning for a coordinated response to
       emergencies, including outbreaks Government and Many

       of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels.
       Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested and
       States Have Developed

       revised their plans in response to the results of these tests. and Tested
       Emergency Response Plans

       Federal and State At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the
       American Red Cross signed

       Governments Have the federal response plan in April 1999, which is
       intended to guide the Developed Emergency federal response to national
       emergencies and augment state response Response Plans efforts. Under this
       plan, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is designated as the
       coordinating agency and is responsible for providing expertise in
       emergency communications, command and control, and public affairs. In the
       event of an FMD outbreak, FEMA would designate USDA as the lead agency and
       work closely with the department to coordinate the support of other
       federal agencies to respond to the outbreak. For example, under the plan,
       Customs would *lock down* ports of entry; the Department of Defense would
       provide personnel, equipment,

       and transport; the Environmental Protection Agency would provide technical
       support on the disposal of animal carcasses; the National Park Service
       would guide the response if wildlife become infected; and other agencies
       would provide additional support. To supplement the federal response plan
       and provide specific guidelines for an animal disease emergency, such as
       implementing quarantines of

       infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDA*s
       Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a
       federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly
       contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the

       involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities,
       policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and
       federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated
       local, state, and federal response. At the state level, many states have
       developed an animal disease

       component for their state*s emergency management plans. According to the
       National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), 19 in January
       2000, only about half the states and U. S. territories had developed
       animal health emergency response plans. At that time, NAHEMS recommended
       that each state develop a plan for responding to animal health emergencies
       that links to their state*s emergency management plan and includes
       information on the following key elements:

        Animal health surveillance and detection systems.

        Control and eradication procedures.

        Communication between key partners.

        Involvement of emergency management officials.

        Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.

        Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in responding
       to natural disasters.

       According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the
       number of states and U. S. territories with animal disease emergency plans
       had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of their
       state*s emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their plan

       included all of the elements listed above. 19 NAHEMS is a joint federal-
       state- industry group whose objectives include improving the U. S. ability
       to respond to animal health emergencies.

       Federal and State Agencies To ensure the efficacy and completeness of
       their plans, the federal Have Tested Their

       government and many of the states have conducted *tabletop* and Emergency
       Response Plans

       functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision
       makers in a relatively stress- free setting to

        discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease
       outbreak;

        evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and

        resolve questions of coordination and responsibility. The setting is
       relatively stress- free because there is no time limit to resolve the
       hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises simulate an
       emergency in the most realistic way possible, without moving people or
       equipment. It is a stressful, real- time exercise in which people apply
       emergency response functions to a hypothetical scenario. According to one
       APHIS official, functional exercises are best described as *dress
       rehearsals* for actual emergencies.

       The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, as
       described below:

        To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is comprehensive
       and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop exercise in 2001. In this
       exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving a modest, limited FMD
       outbreak in the United States and obtained the views of 21 federal
       agencies and the American Red Cross on how they could support the federal
       response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used this information to revise its
       draft national FMD response plan.

        The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000* the
       Tripartite Exercise 2000* to test the plans, policies, and procedures that
       would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in North
       America. The test focused on communication between the various entities
       involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by Canada, Mexico, and the
       United States. The test resulted in many recommendations to improve the
       three countries* abilities to (1) communicate effectively, (2) provide
       program support, and (3) use vaccines. According to the final report, the
       recommendations, if implemented, will improve North America*s overall
       response capacity.

       The three countries have established working groups tasked with responding
       to these recommendations.

       Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted various
       kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other animal
       disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June 2001, the
       Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas Division of
       Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public Safety,
       conducted a 4- day modified functional exercise of the state*s draft FMD
       response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and private
       entities in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test participants*
       abilities to control the simulated outbreak, find and deliver indemnity
       funds, and

       streamline the decision- making processes. Overall, the exercise
       determined that better communication and coordination could improve the
       speed and effectiveness of the state*s response. It also identified areas
       of ambiguity in the plan that left participants without clear directions
       at crucial times during the exercise. According to state officials, the
       plan was revised as a result of the exercise, and according to the
       Executive Director of the Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises
       are necessary to continuously improve the plan. However, the state
       veterinarian also said that he does not believe that adequate resources
       are available either at the federal or state level for such activities.

       Serious Challenges to As the U. K. experience has demonstrated, responding
       to an FMD outbreak

       an Effective U. S. can tax a nation*s fiscal, scientific, and human
       resources. If a similar outbreak were to occur in the United States, the
       nation would face a wide Response Are Yet to Be

       spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and rapid response:
       Resolved

       (1) the need for rapid disease identification and reporting; (2) effective
       communication, coordination, and cooperation between federal, state, and
       local responders; (3) an adequate response infrastructure, including
       equipment, personnel, and laboratory capacity; and (4) clear animal
       identification, indemnification, and disposal policies. While USDA has

       made some progress in addressing some of these issues, significant work
       remains. Rapid Disease Identification

       The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to and
       Reporting mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends
       on livestock producers* and private veterinarians* quickly identifying and
       reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they do
       not

       do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and state
       governments could initiate any action. For example, within the first few
       days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first reports of
       FMD reached British officials, infected animals were criss- crossing the
       country in hundreds of separate movements, putting other livestock at
       risk. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred before any
       suspicion that the disease was present in the country. In contrast, in
       France, county officials quickly identified diseased animals from the
       United Kingdom, and were able to slaughter them quickly and avoid a large-
       scale outbreak. As a result, France sustained minimal animal losses and
       was declared FMD- free within months, while it took the United Kingdom
       almost a year to eradicate

       the disease and regain its FMD- free status. Several federal and state
       animal health officials with whom we spoke were concerned about how
       quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in the
       United States. They told us that livestock producers or veterinarians may
       not readily identify FMD because (1) the disease presents symptoms that
       are similar to other less- serious diseases, (2) FMD

       and other foreign animal diseases are not usually included in veterinary
       school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may never have seen
       FMDinfected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers and veterinarians
       may not report the disease because they are not aware of the reporting
       process or may not realize the criticality of prompt reporting. According
       to USDA officials, the U. K. outbreak helped raise general awareness among
       state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock

       producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the United
       States. An indication of this increased awareness is the doubling of
       foreign animal disease investigations from about 400 in 2000 to more than
       800 in 2001. In addition, federal and state officials told us that the U.
       K. outbreak

       led to greater awareness of the need to have trained diagnosticians for
       foreign animal diseases in the field. In recent years, more field
       veterinarians have attended foreign animal disease training at USDA*s Plum
       Island facility. 20 Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA
       intensified its efforts to

       increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U. K. outbreak
       20 Plum Island is USDA*s high- security laboratory (with a biosafety
       level- III status) located on an island off of Long Island, New York, and
       is the only U. S. laboratory authorized to conduct diagnostic testing of
       FMD- suspected samples using live FMD virus.

       in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed industry and animal
       health associations, and sponsored workshops, conferences, and
       informational telecasts for federal, state, and local officials, and
       others. In addition, the state governments also supported and supplemented
       USDA*s informational efforts. Despite USDA and state efforts to flood the
       livestock industry with information about the risks of FMD during 2001,
       the challenge to USDA will be to maintain this heightened awareness about
       FMD, now that the immediate risk from the U. K. outbreak has subsided.

       Cooperation, Coordination, Cooperation, coordination, and communication
       between federal, state, and

       and Communication local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock
       producers are essential

       for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and test exercises
       have helped start the process of establishing greater coordination and
       improving the level of cooperation and communication between all levels.
       According to a USDA official, for example, USDA*s recent planning efforts
       to develop a national FMD response plan brought together officials from a
       variety of federal agencies to consider the implications of an FMD
       outbreak to their areas of responsibility and helped them develop ways in
       which they could support a federal response.

       Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and coordination
       are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26 U. S. states/
       territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a group of states
       that had agreed to support each other in preparing for and

       responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to
       Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional
       coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern states
       met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated response
       plan for the region.

       While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of
       communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified
       areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the
       Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and
       cooperation between government and industry participants, it also
       identified the need for the following actions:

        Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of
       information.

        Develop written agreements between national animal health and industry
       officials to ensure a continued high level of communication even when
       players change.

        Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop
       collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an
       actual outbreak.

       We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and state
       officials varied by state. For example, while some state officials
       indicated that they had excellent working relationships with their federal
       counterpart located in the state, others told us that cooperation and
       communication were limited. According to one APHIS field veterinarian, the
       level of cooperation and communication depends to a large extent on the
       personalities of the people involved and therefore such variance is to be
       expected. While the development of written agreements as suggested by the
       Tripartite exercise report and NAHEMS could help alleviate this problem,
       as of 2001, only about 32 U. S. states/ territories had such

       agreements or other documents that detailed the respective roles of
       federal and state officials. To help improve cooperation, coordination,
       and communication, USDA officials told us that they are working with
       organizations such as the National Emergency Management Association to
       help states with their animal- emergency- planning efforts. In addition,
       USDA awarded 38 grants totaling $1. 8 million in 2001 to state agencies,
       tribal nations, and emergency management organizations. According to USDA,
       this funding was to be

       used for training, equipment, and emergency- preparedness exercises. In
       commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 2002,
       it announced that it would be making more than $43 million available as
       grants to the states for strengthening homeland security preparedness. Of

       this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet the national
       standards of emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS. Moreover, USDA
       stated that it is working with FEMA to develop a framework for a
       comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign animal disease
       outbreak. The plan will help better ensure the timely dissemination of
       information to critical audiences, including federal agencies, states, and
       industries.

       Adequate Response An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an
       effective

       Infrastructure infrastructure, including a national emergency management
       control and

       command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and disposal
       equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity. To ensure that
       a U. S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly coordinated

       and adequately controlled, USDA has established an Emergency Management
       Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, location. In the event of an
       outbreak, USDA will activate this center to coordinate day- today
       activities during an FMD response and notify U. S. trading partners of the
       status of the outbreak. According to USDA*s draft FMD response plan,

       APHIS will set up the Joint Information Center* collocated with the
       Emergency Management Operations Center* to serve as the primary source of
       public information about the response and will coordinate with other
       federal and state information centers.

       In addition, as the U. K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD
       outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons who
       can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and

       diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; (2)
       biohazard response support for controlling animals* movement and
       decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and personnel;
       and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding responders;
       the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment and supplies;
       and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak, the U. K.
       government had to request specialized animal disease support from several
       countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
       Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide slaughter and
       decontamination support; and use military personnel to provide general
       logistical support. According to a U. K. government working paper issued
       in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, more than 7,000 civil
       servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed forces personnel were
       involved in the response* making it a bigger and more complex logistical
       exercise than the United Kingdom*s involvement in the Gulf War. A recent
       test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel requirements to respond
       to an FMD outbreak in the United States would also be

       enormous* approaching 50, 000 people to support a response. More
       specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be at
       least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 specially
       trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health emergency.
       APHIS officials told us that while state and private veterinarians could
       help

       make up some of this difference, without appropriate training, their help
       would be of limited use.

       To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has
       undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency
       management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies*
       resources to help provide many of the general logistical support
       activities. Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of understanding
       with the Department of Defense to provide military personnel and equipment
       to support a response effort. In addition, APHIS has implemented an
       Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to increase the number of
       veterinarians available to assist in an animal health emergency. The
       program trains federal, state, and private veterinarians to handle
       emergency situations. As of December 2001, APHIS had trained 276 emergency
       veterinarian officers, 145 of whom participated in responding to the U. K.
       outbreak. Moreover, USDA has trained 520 veterinarians across the country
       as foreign animal disease diagnosticians, and they may be called upon to
       provide specialized animal health support in the event of an outbreak.
       Finally, according to APHIS officials, USDA has informal arrangements with
       the United Kingdom and other countries to provide the

       United States with veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada,
       New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are currently
       drafting a memorandum of understanding that would allow the five countries
       to share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health emergency.
       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it has

       created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private
       veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist APHIS
       veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign

       animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275
       private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department is
       continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will supplement
       the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies and

       organizations. A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic
       laboratory system that is capable of handling the volume of testing and
       analysis necessary in the event of an outbreak. For example, from February
       through December 2001, the United Kingdom*s Pirbright Laboratory, that
       country*s primary reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the
       presence of the FMD

       virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to ensure that the disease

       had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of 2.75 million samples were
       tested as part of the response to the outbreak. Despite this level of
       testing, according to U. S. veterinarians returning from the United
       Kingdom, the United Kingdom had unmet needs for laboratory assistance.

       In the United States, USDA*s Plum Island facility* the primary laboratory
       in the United States that is authorized to test suspected FMD samples*
       would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD outbreak, according to
       many federal and state officials with whom we spoke. Recognizing this
       potential problem, the National Association of State Departments of

       Agriculture recently recommended that the United States develop a national
       strategy for animal health diagnostic laboratory services that would
       include USDA*s Plum Island facility and its National Veterinary Services
       Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as state and university laboratories.
       Currently, state diagnostic laboratories have no formal role in a foreign
       animal disease response. In addition, the Director of the Plum

       Island facility stated that the nation needs to look beyond Plum Island
       for laboratory support in the event of a large- scale FMD outbreak. He
       suggested that off- site noncentralized testing, using noninfectious
       material (tests that do not use the live virus), should be considered with
       backup testing support provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us
       that while the idea of a regional laboratory structure has merit, several
       issues would

       have to be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For
       example, laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training
       and certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and
       maintained to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a
       significant commitment of resources.

       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of its
       efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is providing
       state and university cooperators with $20.6 million to establish a network
       of diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the country.
       This network will permit the rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal
       disease threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier this year it allocated
       $177 million to make improvements at key locations, including its
       diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, Iowa, and Plum Island, and
       that $15.3 million

       was allocated to USDA*s Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid
       detection technology for FMD as well as other animal diseases.

       Animal Identification, The effectiveness of a U. S. response to an FMD
       outbreak will require an

       Disposal, and animal identification and tracking system to allow
       responders to identify,

       Indemnification Policies control, and slaughter infected and exposed
       animals as well as clear animal disposal and indemnification policies. The
       2002 farm bill, 21 addresses

       animal disposal and indemnification issues by providing the Secretary of
       Agriculture with broad authority to hold, seize, treat, or destroy any
       animal, as well as to limit interstate livestock movement as part of
       USDA*s efforts to prevent the spread of any livestock disease or pest. The
       Secretary may also take measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest
       or disease of livestock, as needed. In addition, the farm bill requires
       the Secretary to compensate owners on the basis of the fair market value
       of destroyed

       animals and related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop
       specific guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.

       Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak,
       successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is
       essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United States

       generally does not require animal identification, nor does it have a
       system for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to a USDA
       official, in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely have to rely
       on sales records to track animal movements, which could take days, or
       weeks, depending on the accuracy of record- keeping and producer/ seller

       cooperation. The longer it takes to identify animals and track their
       movements from premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to
       contain the outbreak. USDA officials told us that, depending on where the
       outbreak is first identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely
       difficult to trace. For example, if only one farm were infected and
       animals had not recently been moved on or off the premises, no tracing of
       live animals would be necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared
       in a major market or feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on
       almost a daily basis, tracing would be very difficult and time- consuming.

       Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking
       system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the
       Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the 21
       The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
       (the 2002 farm bill) on May 13, 2002.

       industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the
       potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information. The
       Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as

       technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry
       opposition to a national animal identification system. For example, this
       official told us that the National Cattlemen*s Beef Association recently
       indicated some support for such a system. However, the following issues
       will need to be resolved before a national system can be developed and
       implemented:

        The responsibility for funding the system.

        The type of technology that should be employed* strictly visual,
       electronic, or some combination.

        The amount of information that should be included on each animal*s
       identification tag or electronic- tracking device.

        The persons able to access this information.

        The information that should be shared with other federal departments and
       agencies.

        At what point on the farm- to- table continuum should identification
       end? In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the
       disposal of carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the
       potential number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For example,
       during

       the U. K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily sheep, were
       slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA estimates, if
       the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude (affecting

       about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 million animals
       would be affected, and most of them would be cattle and hogs. Generally,
       disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or rendering. In the United

       States, according to USDA*s draft FMD response plan, burial would be the
       preferred method of disposal when conditions make it practical. The plan
       states that burial is the fastest, easiest, and most economical method of
       disposal. When burial is not feasible, the plan recommends incineration as
       the alternative means of disposal even though USDA recognizes that
       incineration is both difficult and expensive. According to a USDA

       veterinarian who helped during the U. K. outbreak, a 200- meter funeral
       pyre was used to incinerate 400 cows or 1, 200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a
       pyre

       required 1,000 railway ties, 8 tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4
       tons of straw, 200 tons of coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In
       addition, heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20
       people, was needed to construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits
       and incineration pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of
       slaughtered animals.

       Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom

       Source: USDA.

       Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United
       Kingdom

       Source: USDA.

       According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of these
       disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges that have
       not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such challenges

       as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to identify burial
       sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits and clearances in
       advance, and the potential to spread the disease if animals have to be
       transported to an off- farm burial site. For incineration, the
       incineration site has to be accessible to large equipment, and yet has to
       be sufficiently away from public view to minimize negative public reaction
       to the sight of

       large burning pyres. In addition, incineration could not only affect air
       quality but also may be ineffective because if not constructed properly,
       the pyres may not generate sufficient temperatures to completely
       incinerate the carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United
       Kingdom

       the pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the
       carcasses were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges because
       transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk of spreading

       the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting procedures would be
       needed at the rendering facility. Some U. S. veterinarians returning from
       the United Kingdom told us that during the outbreak, the United Kingdom
       faced many of these disposal challenges and they were concerned that the

       United States might not have devoted enough attention to deciding how it
       would address these or similar disposal issues. According to APHIS
       officials, USDA is currently creating digital maps of the whole country to
       help identify appropriate burial and incineration locations. In addition,
       USDA is trying to determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely
       converting the meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number
       of animals slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.

       Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to
       ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and
       exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U. K. outbreak, the
       government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak experienced
       delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers* resistance and legal
       challenges. According to state and livestock association officials,
       indemnification would be a significant issue* one that could hamper a
       rapid response in the United States. USDA published a proposed rule on May
       1, 2002, amending the indemnity provisions for its FMD- related
       regulations. This proposed rule clarifies how USDA will determine the
       value of animals and materials affected by an FMD outbreak and how
       indemnity payments will be made to claimants. USDA developed this proposed
       rule because it was concerned that potential delays to an FMD eradication
       program in the United States might occur because of producers* perceptions
       that they might not be adequately

       compensated for the fair market value of destroyed animals, products, and
       materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting costs. Under the proposed
       rule, the federal government would pay 100 percent of the costs for the
       purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals if they become infected
       with FMD, as well as for materials contaminated with FMD and the cleaning
       and disinfection of affected premises, according to USDA.

       In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal
       identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely vital
       areas that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of disease. In
       this regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with the agricultural
       industries to provide forums for a national dialogue on the issue of a

       national identification plan for American livestock. The ultimate
       objective is to establish a national identification plan that provides the
       essential

       elements to improve emergency response and meet future needs. USDA further
       stated that it is investing in other options for disposing of carcasses on
       a large scale. Finally, USDA stated that it has extended the comment
       period from July 1 to July 31, 2002, for its proposed regulations that
       address how decisions regarding indemnity payments will be made in the
       event of an FMD outbreak.

       Conclusions If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of
       control, it could ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the
       destruction of millions of

       animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the disease must be
       stamped out quickly. Although the federal government and state governments
       have made significant progress in developing and testing emergency
       response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such as FMD, significant
       issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues could present major
       impediments to an effective and timely response if not addressed before an
       outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has several ongoing efforts to
       resolve many of these issues, the department has not established specific
       time frames for the completion of these efforts. We believe it is critical
       that adequate management attention and resources be made available to
       ensure that these issues are resolved expeditiously.

       Recommendation for To ensure that the United States is well positioned to
       respond effectively to Executive Action

       an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend that the Secretary of
       Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to develop a plan, which
       should include interim milestones and completion dates, for addressing the
       various unresolved issues that could challenge an effective

       U. S. response.

       Appendi xes Countries Considered FMD- Free by the

       Appendi x I

       United States As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following
       countries/ areas free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest
       (cattle plague): Australia Austria 22 Bahama Islands 22 Barbados Belgium
       22 Belize (British Honduras) Bermuda Canada Channel Islands 22 Chile 22
       Costa Rica Czech Republic 22 Denmark 22 Dominican Republic El Salvador
       Fiji Finland 22 France 22 Germany 22 Greenland Guatemala Haiti Honduras
       Hungary 22 Iceland Italy 22 Jamaica Japan 22 Luxemborg 22 Mexico
       Netherlands 22 New Caledonia 22 New Zealand Nicaragua Northern Ireland 22
       Norway 22 Panama Panama Canal Zone Papua New Guinea 22

       Poland 22 Portugal 22 Republic of Ireland 22 Spain 22 Sweden 22
       Switzerland 22 Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon Tobago Trinidad Trust
       Territories of the Pacific Islands

       22 These countries are included in special categories for FMD and
       rinderpest because even though they have been determined to be free of
       these diseases, one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) they
       supplement their national meat supply through the importation of fresh,
       chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/ areas that
       are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common
       land border with countries/ areas that are not designated as free of
       rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from countries/
       areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD under
       conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into
       the

       United States.

       Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

       Appendi x II

       FMD into Canada This appendix provides summary information on Canada*s
       preventive measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five
       key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals;
       (2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal of
       garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; (4)
       international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
       mail.

       Background The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in
       April 1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and
       plant health inspection programs, which were previously provided by four
       federal agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA
       delivers food,

       plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions across Canada. CFIA
       has 180 field offices, including border ports of entry, and 408 offices in
       nongovernment establishments, such as processing facilities. CFIA also

       has 13 biosecurity level- III laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD
       and large animals. 23 These laboratories provide scientific advice,
       develop new technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.

       The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction of
       diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the importation of
       animals and animal products from foreign countries to reduce the risk of
       introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD. The last outbreak of FMD
       in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection programs for animals,

       food, and plants produced in Canada and commodities and live animals
       imported into Canada. One of these programs is the Animal Health and
       Production program, which is applied at Canadian ports of entry. This
       program covers the issuing of import permits, quarantining of live animal
       imports, negotiating export health requirements with other nations*
       government, and establishing and ensuring compliance with Canadian

       import health standards. In addition, the program is responsible for
       implementing domestic disease control programs, foreign animal disease
       preparedness, and emergency response.

       23 Canada*s biosecurity level- IV laboratory conducts tests on animals
       infected with dangerous zoonotic agents.

       Controls for Live Canada allows live animal imports only from countries
       that are FMD- free

       Animal Imports and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals
       imported into

       Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of entry. For
       example, live animals imported into Canada by air from countries other
       than the United States are required to enter at airports, such as
       Vancouver, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. CFIA generally
       requires that an import permit application be filed in advance of the
       importation of live animals from countries other than the United States.
       The import permit contains information on the (1) importer, who must be a
       Canadian resident;

       (2) exporter; (3) destination of the animal( s); (4) producer; (5) port of
       entry; (6) preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be
       quarantined; and (7) description of animals to be imported including the
       number, species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and
       registration

       numbers or numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle. If
       quarantine periods are required for the animals, CFIA preapproves the
       quarantine premises. The inspection of shipments of live animals at
       Canadian ports of entry includes a document review and verification by
       Canadian Customs and CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-
       load the animals for inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part
       of the physical inspection, inspectors may verify the animal
       identification numbers. CFIA usually requires the importer to have a
       license to move the imported animals to their final destination.
       Additionally, once animals have entered Canada, CFIA can impose post-
       import requirements, which may include the possible quarantine and testing
       or additional treatment of the animals.

       All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet these
       general import requirements. However, once these requirements are met,
       Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the United
       States and those from other countries.

       Live Animals Imported from Generally, live animals entering Canada from
       the United States must the United States

       conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for
       animals from other countries. Depending on an animal*s state of origin and
       the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal diseases
       that Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as brucellosis,
       tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be required. Some states
       have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain kinds of animals on the
       basis of the state*s disease status. For example, as of April 2002, the

       following seven U. S. states were qualified to export restricted feeder
       cattle to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New York, North Dakota, South
       Dakota, and Washington.

       CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals imported
       from the United States. For example, an import permit is not required for
       U. S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for fattening. These
       animals are required only to have an Official Zoosanitary Export
       Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian. The certificate
       contains information on the (1) name and address of the consignor; (2)
       consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals to be exported;
       (4) animal*s origin; (5) results of the veterinary examination of the
       animals; and (6) animal*s residency in the United States, which must be
       for a minimum of 60 days. Additionally, while some animals, such as bob
       calves and restricted feeder cattle, are not required to be tested for
       diseases that Canada does not have such as, tuberculosis, brucellosis,
       blue tongue, and

       anaplasmosis, others, such as breeding cattle, must be tested. Similarly,
       a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not required for
       animals imported from the United States for direct slaughter. U. S.
       livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter are placed in
       sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to the Canadian
       slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals imported for direct
       slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered within 4 days of
       importation.

       CFIA encourages U. S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of
       time to ease the border review process. 24 Once a truckload of U. S.
       livestock arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a preclearance
       document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the CFIA inspection
       area, where inspectors review the documentation to ensure that the
       information provided is correct. When required, CFIA unloads cattle

       for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections on the trailers if
       the load is small and it is safe to do so. U. S. livestock imported for
       direct slaughter requires only a visual inspection; however, imported
       breeding cattle are checked for health status, and their ear tags and
       tattoos are verified against the documentation provided. Every transporter
       is required

       24 Live animals in transit by air are off- loaded only to change planes
       and, if destined for the United States, are placed in sealed trucks before
       leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow animals to transit Canada that would
       normally not be allowed into the country.

       to clean and disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping
       vessels that have been used to transport livestock immediately after they
       have been unloaded. A U. S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-
       authorized veterinarian

       must accompany swine imports from the United States. The certificate
       contains the name and address of both the consignor and consignee and
       complete identification of the animals to be exported, including
       certification that the (1) United States is free of hog cholera; (2) herd
       of origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo rabies for the past 12
       months, and that the animals exported have been tested for these two

       diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from other animals for at least
       30 days prior to export; (4) animals have been transported in cleaned and
       disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals have not been fed any garbage at any
       time. Additionally, all swine imported from the United States must be
       quarantined in Canada for at least 30 days in a CFIA- approved quarantine

       station. Swine shipments imported directly for slaughter are required to
       have an import permit.

       CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United States
       to be accompanied by a U. S. origin health certificate and an import
       permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1) registered
       name and identification number of the parents, (2) species and breed,

       (3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection
       premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting vehicle,
       and (6) name and address of the consignee.

       Live Animals Imported from To prevent the introduction of disease and
       control the importation of

       Other Countries animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture
       designates countries or parts of countries free from specific diseases.
       Canada designates countries

       to be FMD- free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease in the
       country or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak of the
       disease, (3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to
       prevent the

       introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the spread
       of the disease, and (6) the zoo- sanitary infrastructure. Importing
       countries must also be free of other Office of International des
       Epizooties (OIE) List A diseases in addition to FMD, such as rinderpest
       and classical swine fever. Importing countries that have OIE List B
       diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad cow
       disease; tuberculosis; and brucellosis must provide additional
       documentation proving that the herds being exported to Canada are free of
       these diseases. At the time of

       our review, in addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle
       imports only from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted only
       from the United States. If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and
       other diseases of concern,

       the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals. CFIA
       generally requires that all live animals imported into the country have a
       unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions for
       animals imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle must be
       tested for tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis,
       unless the

       exporting country is considered free of these diseases and certifies that
       it is free of other diseases of concern. CFIA has established additional
       requirements for importing horses into Canada from FMD- affected
       countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses from FMD- affected countries
       must be quarantined and washed with a disinfectant. In addition, their
       hooves and all equipment, such as saddles and tack, and all transportation
       vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected. Bedding and manure must be
       placed in bags and incinerated.

       Controls for Imported Canada allows only imports of FMD- susceptible
       animal products, such as Animal Products

       fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some animal
       products may be imported from FMD- affected countries if they meet certain
       requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue

       Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to ensure
       that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing the
       products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United States are
       generally required only to present proof of the country of origin at the
       port of entry. Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-
       free by CFIA can

       generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with live
       animal imports, to designate a country as FMD- free, CFIA reviews
       information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2) time
       since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect;

       (4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the disease;
       (5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6) zoo- sanitary
       infrastructure. For all countries, Canada also has a country- by- country
       meat inspection

       and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the

       country's overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments
       operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat
       products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews relevant
       legislation and related technical information, including the country*s
       residue- monitoring program. If the requesting country has legislation
       equivalent to Canada*s, a visit is made to the country to study the

       actual implementation of the legislation in establishments. On the basis
       of satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments wishing to
       export meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains a list of the

       countries and establishments that have been approved to export certain
       types of meat products into Canada. For those countries where the meat
       inspection system as a whole has not been approved, importation may be

       limited to specific meat products. Importations from countries that are
       not considered free from FMD are normally limited, to include the
       following: (1) commercially sterile canned cooked meat products; (2)
       pasteurized, canned, cured, and boneless meat products; and (3) cooked,
       frozen, tubed and boneless beef from specified

       establishments in certain countries. Milk products are allowed entry if
       they have been treated properly and are certified accordingly.
       Establishments approved for meat and meat product exports to Canada are
       periodically reviewed.

       All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to
       monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a shipment
       is identified as containing meat products, it must be held until the CFIA
       inspector reviews the information, such as the Official Meat Inspection

       Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the exporting country.
       The Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains information on the (1)
       name and address of the exporter and importer; (2) certificate number,
       country code, and exporting establishment number; (3) establishment number
       and

       name, and country where the animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the
       carrier; (5) port of loading and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number
       and description of the meat products; and (8) numbers from the official
       seal on the container and the container numbers. Depending on the
       exporting country, additional certifications may be required. Some animal
       product shipments are exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit
       through Canada to another country. CFIA does not review these shipments,
       provided they remain under a Customs bond and originate in a country and
       are of a type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into Canada.
       Animal product imports from the United States are generally required only
       to present proof of country of origin. However, some U. S.

       products, such as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import
       permit.

       CFIA*s sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes
       require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all
       containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to identify
       any evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer labels. For
       shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory containers, a full
       inspection of affected containers is conducted. For canned meat products,

       random inspections are carried out by the inspector on a minimum of 40
       cases, which are to be representative of the inspection lot and not
       include more than 5 containers from each of the cases. When there are
       fewer than 40 cases in an inspection lot, inspectors select the
       appropriate number of containers out of each case to make up the required
       sample. For

       inspection lots having fewer than 200 containers, the entire inspection
       lot must be examined, and the total number of containers must be recorded
       on the report form. When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the
       inspector must immediately hold the animal products and notify the area
       office by

       telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must
       officially notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or
       partially refused and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or
       remove it from Canada or it will be destroyed under direct supervision of
       a CFIA inspector.

       Controls for Garbage from international airlines and ships must be
       disposed of and

       International Garbage treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector.
       Garbage from carriers

       of U. S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar to those
       for Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to be disposed
       of by incineration, heat treatment at 100 Celsius for 30 minutes, or
       burial at a CFIA- approved site. In addition, the transportation routes
       for international garbage are approved in advance along with alternative
       routes in case of an emergency. Transporters are responsible for
       maintaining their trucks in good condition and checking to ensure that
       there are no possible leaks.

       Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that
       garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage can
       be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate
       incineration or burial sites. The ships* destinations are also recorded at
       the first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal galleys to
       ensure that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto Canadian land.
       At

       subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the galley seals. Seals
       may be broken under CFIA presence but must be resealed prior to departure
       if the ship is going to additional Canadian ports. All foodstuffs and pet
       animals are to remain on the ship and are allowed off only with the
       written permission of CFIA. If ships do not comply with these
       requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from entering Canadian

       waters. Controls for

       CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained
       International detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of
       prohibited plants and animal products. International passengers are
       required to declare all Passengers

       animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain animal
       products can result in fines. International passengers, except those
       arriving from the United States, are not allowed to bring meat and meat
       products into Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of cheese.
       Passengers not

       declaring prohibited items are subject to monetary penalties of up to Can.
       $400. At the main Canadian international airports, CFIA has approximately
       nine dogs trained to sniff baggage accompanying international passengers
       before they proceed through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog
       program is part of CFIA*s front line of defense against pests and
       diseases. The dogs are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits,
       plants, and meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk
       through the baggage claim area looking for anything that might be
       considered suspicious. CFIA made a number of changes to the international
       passenger controls as

       a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts of
       Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the
       airports, (2) x- ray passengers* baggage, and (3) mount a public awareness
       campaign.

       As a part of the public awareness campaign, large signs were placed around
       the airport terminals informing the public about FMD and precautions that
       should be taken to prevent its introduction into Canada. Brochures were
       also printed conveying similar information and handed to international

       passengers arriving from FMD- infected countries. In addition, CCRA
       officials asked specific questions about whether the passengers had been
       around farm animals or visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in
       Canada* even if the relevant question was not marked on the declaration

       card. This additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was
       declared FMD- free. Moreover, all international passengers entering Canada
       were required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who indicated that
       they might present an FMD risk were asked additional

       questions about their activities and* as deemed necessary* their shoes
       were sent out for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to Canada
       from countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at

       the teams* expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European
       outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they
       are planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the
       messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases.

       Controls for CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving
       into Canada by International Mail

       mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to open
       mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection by
       agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a seal
       with a code indicating which agency should perform a further inspection.

       Generally, each package is then x- rayed. Problem importers/ exporters are
       identified through a computer system, and these packages are given
       additional scrutiny. Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the
       recipient responsible for items sent through the mail, rather than the
       sender. As a result, recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they
       receive inappropriate items through the mail. For example, if personal
       shipments of prohibited

       agricultural products are sent through the mail, the recipient can be
       subject to monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. For commercial
       shipments, however, penalties for prohibited agricultural products can
       currently be as much as Can. $6,000. In addition, criminal penalties can
       also be imposed, depending on the nature of the offense.

       Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

       Appendi x II I FMD into Mexico This appendix provides summary information
       on the preventive measures that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not
       enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the
       importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products; (3)
       the handling and disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as
       airplanes and ships;

       (4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through international
       mail. Background The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of
       Foot and Mouth

       Disease, formed in 1947, combined U. S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate
       FMD from Mexico. 25 The commission built Mexico*s animal health
       infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954.
       Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number of
       activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2)
       responding to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on
       emergency plans and programs, (4) promoting public information programs,
       and (5) preparing and updating Mexico*s emergency foreign animal disease
       response plans.

       Mexico*s Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y
       Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish, and
       food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other things,
       (1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo- sanitary rules
       used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of entry, and (3) the
       animal health measures used in response to a foreign animal disease

       emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of which are at
       international ports of entry, such as border crossings, airports, and
       seaports. For 2001, SAGARPA*s budget for borders, ports, and airports was
       about Mex. $11 million (approximately U. S. $1. 1 million). All imports of
       live animals and agricultural products must be processed through one of

       SAGARPA*s offices. In addition, SAGARPA officials enforce compliance with
       Mexico*s official zoo- sanitary rules (1) at Customs offices, (2) at
       quarantine stations, (3) at inspection points, and (4) in other countries
       where treaties and accords have been approved. SAGARPA divides Mexico into
       eight regions and assigns a veterinarian coordinator to each region for
       animal disease surveillance and for 25 The commission is currently called
       the Mexico- United States Commission for the Prevention of Foot- and-
       Mouth and other Exotic Animal Diseases.

       activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal disease
       outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico established 29
       animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout Mexico, these

       groups include over 900 government and private veterinarians trained in
       identifying and responding to foreign animal diseases, including FMD.
       Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity level- III laboratory capable of
       testing for foreign animal diseases. 26 In 2001, Mexico reported
       performing 220 investigations into suspicious cases that might have been
       FMD. All investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus.
       Controls for Live

       SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries. Animal
       Imports Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that
       have the FMD virus. SAGARPA*s general requirements for all live animal
       imports include advance notification to SAGARPA*s official veterinarians
       at the ports of entry. The amount of time required for official advance

       notification depends on the animals* country of origin. Before live
       animals can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends official veterinarians to the
       exporting country to ensure that the live animals to be exported are free
       of disease. Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of
       entry, official veterinarians review all the documents and physically
       inspect the animals. Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican
       sanitary import permit; (2) a

       country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip certificate, if
       applicable; (4) a registration certificate, if applicable; and (5) a
       commercial license. The sanitary import permit certifies that the
       exporting country has met Mexican importation requirements. The health
       certificate contains information on the

        name and address of the importer,

        place of origin and destination of the animals,

        animal health production standards of the exporting country, 26 A
       biosecurity level- III laboratory is one that maintains a high security
       level and employs extreme control measures in the handling of samples.
       Such laboratories install special control measures to reduce the risk of
       pathogens escaping into the surrounding environment by using air filters
       and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant showers prior to leaving
       the facility.

        place where the certificate was issued, and

        time period for which the certificate is effective. All animals imported
       into Mexico must have individual identification marks or numbers unless
       they are imported for immediate slaughter. If animals are imported for
       direct slaughter, the only information that needs to be recorded is the
       number of animals and their origin. Additionally, all live

       animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and depending on how tame the
       animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt, and the entire animal is
       hosed down with disinfectant. Additionally, the trucks and containers that
       transported the animals are disinfected, and any bedding or waste from the

       animals is incinerated at the port of entry. Generally, all live animals,
       regardless of their country of origin, must meet these import
       requirements. However once these requirements are met, Mexico has separate
       procedures for live animals imported from the United States and those
       imported from other countries. Live Animal Imports from

       Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are the
       United States

       allowed to conform to less- stringent entry requirements than animals
       imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United States
       frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis of a U. S.
       veterinary inspection. U. S. animals that arrive in Mexico via air or sea
       are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit when
       facilities for inspection are available at the port of entry within
       Mexico.

       Before crossing the border, U. S. animals must remain on the U. S. side of
       the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When
       Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U. S.

       counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the animals,
       (2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3) require
       animals to be disinfected and/ or immunized, or (4) apply other animal
       health safety measures.

       Live Animal Imports from In addition to the general requirements listed
       above, all live animals

       Other Countries entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other
       import requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than
       the

       United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment. As
       a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two

       official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals
       before they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are
       responsible for developing an animal health report for the animals being
       exported, which will document information on the health of the animals
       from the time the veterinarians arrive in the exporting country until the
       shipment of animals

       arrives in Mexico. As a result, before the animals are loaded onto the
       ship for transport to Mexico, the Mexican veterinarians will examine the
       paperwork and inspect each animal. One of the veterinarians will then
       accompany the shipment and monitor the animals for clinical signs of
       disease while in transit to Mexico. According to Mexican officials,
       because the majority of live animal imports into Mexico come from
       Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in
       transit is usually considered an adequate quarantine period for the
       animals. For

       example, the voyage from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days
       and serves as an adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live
       animal imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also
       transported to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports,
       they too are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board
       the ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to
       Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the shipment

       can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting country. Controls
       for Imported

       SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services Animal
       Products at Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products
       comply with all Mexican import requirements before they are released into
       commerce.

       Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that
       SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which
       countries are FMD- free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or
       restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico does
       allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as long

       as SAGARPA has approved the animal- product- processing plants and the
       products are shipped with the required health and sanitary certificates.
       Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are allowed into Mexico

       only if they have been properly heat- treated or subjected to maturation
       processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other products, such as machinery,
       vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must undergo disinfection

       procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being allowed into the country.
       Products denied entry into Mexico must be immediately reexported or
       destroyed.

       All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPA*s
       inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports.
       Some imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports of
       entry that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA officials
       review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in Mexico to

       ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country without
       inspection. The broker initiates the importation and inspection process
       for animal products at the port of entry by presenting the required
       paperwork, including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection
       services from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will review
       the paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the shipment.
       The health certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of
       the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the specific
       destination

       of the animal products, (3) animal health production standards used by the
       exporting country, (4) place where the certificate was issued, and (5)
       time period for which the certificate is effective. If the import
       documents are in order and the products are from permissible countries,
       the container is unloaded from the vessel and transported to the official
       warehouse for further inspection.

       SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products or
       farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico has
       deemed as high- risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on the
       outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm machinery and
       other equipment from high- risk countries must be completely disinfected.
       Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are physically inspected by
       SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the refrigerated section of
       the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists of (1) a paperwork review,
       including a review of the Mexican sanitary import permit and

       health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting
       country, and (2) a visual inspection of the meat packages for the meat-
       processing plant*s seal, lot number, and factory number to ensure that the
       product came from an approved plant in the country of origin. In addition,
       SAGARPA officials may collect product samples for laboratory analysis. 27
       27 Mexico has a meat- product- sampling scheme, which is detailed in the
       country*s meat

       inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are taken from a shipment of
       25 tons of meat. The system is based on a judgmental sampling process;
       however, importers who have had problems in the past are sampled more
       often.

       Once all the reviews and inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors
       complete the inspection report and make a final recommendation on whether
       the shipment should be released. Cargo cannot leave the warehouse at the
       port of entry without forms from SAGARPA stating that the cargo has been
       inspected and deemed safe to enter the country. After

       the main SAGARPA office issues the final certificate of importation and
       releases the shipment, the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs*
       inspection. Mexican Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or

       restricted products are not entering the country. Controls for

       SAGARPA officials supervise the off- loading and disposal of organic waste
       International Garbage and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from
       FMD- affected countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated.
       Incinerators in two locations accept international garbage* one in Mexico
       City and one in Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are
       allowed to dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other
       Mexican ports must take their garbage with them.

       Controls for In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that
       all International international passengers have to complete upon entry
       into Mexico, all

       passengers from FMD- affected countries must fill out a special, detailed
       Passengers

       questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help prevent the
       introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products that they may be
       carrying and (2) providing information about their contact with animals in
       the country from which they are arriving. In addition, the form asks
       passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico where they could come into

       contact with live animals. At airports and marine ports of entry,
       international passengers from highrisk countries must walk over special
       mats soaked with disinfectant to disinfect their shoes. According to
       Mexican officials, the disinfectant mats are changed every month, and
       before the arrival of a high- risk flight at the airport, SAGARPA
       officials apply fresh disinfectant to the mat. In addition,

       until January 2002, the outside surface of baggage arriving from high-
       risk countries was sprayed with disinfectant as it was loaded onto the
       conveyor belt and before it entered the baggage claim area of the airport.
       Baggage

       from high- risk flights is also x- rayed and inspected for illegal
       products by official inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products
       are incinerated.

       Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport in
       English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent the
       introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican requirements
       described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning travelers about the
       dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports.

       Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships
       arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal and
       use of food in the ship*s galley that is intended for the crew. As part of
       this inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list of all the
       seaports that the ship has stopped at before arriving in Mexico to
       determine whether it docked in ports that pose a risk for FMD, (2) review
       the list of all food

       products on board the ship, (3) visually inspect the food in the galley,
       (4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are from
       highrisk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main entrances of the
       ship. Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port for more than 3 or 4
       days are allowed to consume some of the products in the galley while they
       are docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go ashore must go through the

       same procedures as other international passengers arriving at any port of
       entry* complete immigration and customs forms, declare any products of
       animal or plant origin that they may be carrying, and walk over
       disinfectant mats.

       Controls for SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all
       international mail International Mail

       deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail. According to
       Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100 percent of all
       the international packages arriving from FMD- affected countries but only
       randomly sample packages arriving from the United States and Canada.
       According to these officials, the post office facility in Mexico City
       receives about 500 packages per international mail delivery. Inspectors do
       not leave the postal facility until all of the packages that arrived on a
       particular day have been inspected, according to officials. Any prohibited
       products sent through international mail that are confiscated are
       incinerated.

       Measures for Preventing the Introduction of

       Appendi x I V

       FMD into the United Kingdom This appendix provides summary information on
       the preventive measures used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does
       not enter the country via five key pathways included in our review: (1)
       the importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products;
       (3) the handling and

       disposal of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and
       ships; (4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through
       international mail. Because the United Kingdom is subject to the
       directives of the

       European Union Economic Community, for each pathway, this appendix
       summarizes (1) the preventive measures established by the European Union
       for trade between member states and nonmember countries and

       (2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom. Background
       The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic

       Community 28 and is subject to the European Union*s directives. One E. U.
       goal was to develop a common market without borders among the member
       states. The European Union established directives that approximated

       member states* laws and developed rules applicable to all member states.
       These directives harmonized the European Union*s laws so that member
       states could consistently follow and apply the same rules uniformly in a
       common market. For example, each member state must follow guidelines

       governing the import of live animals and animal products to prevent the
       introduction of foreign animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European
       Union. In addition, each member state is allowed to have national
       provisions as needed. As a result, the United Kingdom has its own
       legislation governing the imports of live animals and animal products that
       implements the European Union*s directives and covers areas that are not
       harmonized by these directives. When the European Union becomes aware of
       an outbreak of disease in another member state or in a nonmember country
       that may constitute a

       serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a
       declaration making it an offense for any member state to import specific
       animals or animal products from the affected country or region. In the
       event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take emergency safeguard
       measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of particular species of
       animals or animal products from affected member states to 28 Member states
       include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
       Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain,
       Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

       other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal products from
       affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain circumstances,
       member states may invoke additional safeguarding

       procedures and take "interim safeguard and protective measures." Member
       states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of
       the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them. The
       Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the federal
       agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related issues.
       DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in the United
       Kingdom. E. U. and U. K. Controls The European Union has established
       separate preventive measures for for Live Animal

       imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember
       states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to ensure
       Imports

       that live animal imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imports

       Live animal trade between member states requires an official veterinarian
       of Live Animals from from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior
       to their movement and Member States

       certify them as disease- free. This certification ensures that the (1)
       animals have originated from an FMD- free country or have been tested for
       diseases of concern, (2) animals have been isolated for a specified period
       of time,

       (3) country has an official disease surveillance program, and (4) animal
       production standards have been met. Member states must also ensure that
       the animals to be exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo
       routine veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as
       required by E. U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the
       original transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of live
       animals traded between member states are generally performed in the
       country of

       origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the destination member
       state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the destination member
       state are responsible for performing these checks. E. U. Measures for
       Imports

       Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or of
       Live Animals from areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has
       approved the Nonmember Countries

       country as being FMD- free. This approval is granted on a country-
       bycountry basis after the following factors have been considered for the
       nonmember country:

        The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
       animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
       environmental health situations that may exist.

        The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of
       infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading partners.

        The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
       infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
       imports.

        The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
       services.

        Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
       hormones.

       In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union
       when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or
       are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to
       travel. Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported out
       of the country or slaughtered. Live animal shipments from nonmember
       countries must enter the

       European Union through approved member states* border inspection posts. A
       health certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the exporting
       country must accompany all shipments. E. U. directives have harmonized the
       inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to ensure the quality
       and equality at all member states* ports of entry. At border inspection
       posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, identity, and physical
       checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment is allowed to enter
       into free circulation within the European Union. The

       border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show no
       clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and brucellosis
       are allowed into the European Union. Border inspection posts are required
       to inform other member states* border inspection posts of any live animal
       shipments denied entry and the reasons for the denial.

       U. K. Measures for Imports Animals can be imported from member states to
       go directly to slaughter of Live Animals from facilities, move through
       approved holding centers to slaughter facilities, or Member States

       go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export health certificate
       and a license for animal movement must accompany animals arriving from
       member states. Veterinary inspectors have the authority to inspect animals
       imported into the United Kingdom from member states at their point of
       destination to ensure that E. U. requirements have been met. Inspectors
       can stop a shipment of animals while in transit if the transporter does
       not

       have the appropriate documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are
       required to be slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved
       facility. Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member
       state for 6 months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter
       animals, 3 months. DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to
       transport live animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain
       the following

       information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date of
       pick- ups, including the name of the producer or business and the address
       of the animal- holding center; (2) species, origin, and number of animals
       transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4) individual
       animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD outbreak, as a
       temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required to have, at all
       times while in the United Kingdom, proof of disinfection.

       In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and
       maintain information on the owner*s name, the registration number of the
       transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For cattle,
       they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into the United
       Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and proposed

       destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine, operators
       are required to record only the registration number of the holding center
       or the herd of origin and the proposed destination. Owners and operators
       of slaughter facilities are generally not required to maintain this
       information.

       U. K. Measures for Imports The United Kingdom has adopted the European
       Union*s directives for of Live Animals from importing live animals and has
       spelled out the details for implementing Nonmember Countries

       these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through
       another member state*s border inspection post are required to have both a
       border certificate of examination and the original health certificate when
       they arrive at the U. K. destination. The United Kingdom also has

       procedures for post- import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary
       inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a member
       state*s border inspection post. These post- import checks can occur at the
       imported animals* destination or while they are in transit. As a result of
       these checks, if disease is suspected, animals may be quarantined,
       slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live animals from nonmember
       countries are required to enter the United Kingdom through certain ports
       of entry such as, Heathrow, Luton, Stansted, and Prestwick. E. U. and U.
       K. Controls The European Union has established separate preventive
       measures for for Imported Animal

       imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The United
       Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product Products

       imports are disease free. E. U. Measures for Imported Animal products
       imported by a member state from other member states Animal Products from

       must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the Member
       States

       European Union*s animal health requirements and are under the control of
       an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for ensuring
       that its animal products are safe and disease free. Intracommunity
       shipments of animal products must be accompanied by an official health
       certificate or commercial document that contains information on the origin
       and destination of the products. As a result of the European Union*s
       common market rules, there are no routine public health checks at member
       states* ports of entry for shipments originating in another member state.
       However,

       E. U. rules permit random spot checks of shipments at the place of
       destination.

       E. U. Measures for Imported Member states can import animal products only
       from nonmember

       Animal Products from countries or parts of a nonmember country approved by
       the European Nonmember Countries

       Union. As with live animal imports, approval is considered on a countryby-
       country basis after the following factors have been considered:

        The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic
       animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and
       environmental health situations that may exist.

        The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or
       contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.

        The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control
       infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to
       imports.

        The structure and authority of veterinary services, including laboratory
       services.

        Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as
       hormones.

       Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member states
       through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a health
       certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country.
       Official veterinarians at the member states* border inspection post are
       responsible for ensuring that the following three types of checks on
       shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the information
       provided is verified:

        A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation accompanying
       the shipment, the importer*s advance written notice specifying the number
       and nature of the shipment, and the estimated time of arrival at the port
       of entry.  An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment
       are the

       same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not arrive
       in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps, official
       marks, and health marks identifying the country and establishment of
       origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in officially sealed
       containers are not opened unless there is doubt about the authenticity of
       the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such cases, the containers
       will be opened and inspected to ensure that the stamps, health marks, and
       other marks identifying the country and establishment of origin are
       present on the shipment and conform to those on the certificate or
       document accompanying the shipment.  A physical check of the shipment
       involves inspecting the contents to

       ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During a
       physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory analysis.
       Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage of imported
       shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. The percentage
       varies according to the product and the country of origin. For example,
       veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish

       products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50 percent
       of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed animal protein
       shipments.

       In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not meet
       requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is reexported
       if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For shipments
       where reexportation is not possible, the product is destroyed. E. U. rules
       allow for the importation of some types of animal products, such as canned
       meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries that have FMD, as
       long as specific food- processing procedures are followed to inactivate
       the virus. For example, milk products imported from FMD

       countries must be properly heat- treated. Imports of semen and embryos
       from nonmember countries are accepted by the European Union if the
       shipment (1) comes from an FMD- free country; (2) is accompanied by a
       signed health certificate attesting to the diseasefree

       status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or embryos are derived;
       and (3) comes through an approved collection center. The information in
       the accompanying documents is checked at the member states* border
       inspection post to determine if the shipment meets the

       European Union*s requirements before it is released. The European Union
       has additional requirements for imported germplasm; however, these are
       currently being updated.

       U. K. Measures for Imported Animal products from other member states must
       be accompanied by all the

       Animal Products from documents required by E. U. rules and are deliverable
       only to the address in Member States

       the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents. Official U. K.
       veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary checks for products
       imported from other member states, which may include the sampling of the
       product at the U. K. destination.

       U. K. Measures for Imports In order to ensure that animal diseases are not
       imported into the United

       of Animal Products from Kingdom via animal products from nonmember
       countries, DEFRA enforces Nonmember Countries

       a system of controls that relies primarily on the health certification
       accompanying the shipment and post- import official veterinary inspections
       of the shipment. Imports from nonmember countries are permitted only
       through about 26 approved border inspection posts in the United Kingdom.

       E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules require that garbage from
       international carriers, such as for International airplanes and ships, be
       removed under official control for destruction. In

       the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as *catering waste*
       Garbage and, according to U. K. regulations, represents the most likely
       route by which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter the
       country. As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of all
       catering waste from international carriers that arrive in the United
       Kingdom. To ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues licenses,
       which

       delineate how the catering waste is to be transported, including the
       transportation route for the waste from the port of entry to the disposal
       site and how it is to be disposed of, which could either be at an approved

       landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the United Kingdom cannot be fed any
       imported catering waste. E. U. and U. K. Controls E. U. rules set limits
       on what products international passengers can bring

       for International from nonmember countries into member states. For
       example, personal imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are
       illegal. However, Passengers

       passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from nonmember
       countries if (1) the products are meant for human consumption, (2) the
       products come from an E. U.- approved country, and (3) the quantity
       imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds) per person. Passengers
       traveling within the European Union are allowed to import meat, animal,
       and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as long as the product
       originates from another member state. The United Kingdom follows the E. U.
       rules for personal imports of animal products by international passengers.
       The United Kingdom can impose

       penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for passengers found
       smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat. Additional
       restrictions on personal imports of international travelers may be imposed
       as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in various parts of the

       world. As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products,
       such as meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at
       various ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about prohibited
       items and

       warn them about potential penalties for illegal imports.

       U. K. Controls for We are not aware of any specific E. U. requirements for
       international mail.

       International Mail However, U. K. Customs* inspectors examine all
       international mail packages for prohibited and restricted items. For
       example, packages

       containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened
       and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember
       countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does not

       exceed 1 kilogram (2. 2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in
       hermetically sealed containers, and it is intended for personal
       consumption only. Packages found in contravention of these regulations are
       liable to be seized without compensation. Meat or meat products sent to
       the United Kingdom via international mail from other member states are
       allowed if they are for personal consumption and do not exceed 10
       kilograms. Additional evidence may be required to support claims that
       imports in excess of 10 kilograms are for personal use. Further
       restrictions on imported items sent through international mail may be
       imposed as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in other
       countries.

       Comments from the U. S. Department of

       Appendi x V Agriculture

       Appendi x VI Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

       Appendi x VII

       GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Lawrence Dyckman (202)
       512- 3841 Anu Mittal (202) 512- 9846 Acknowledgments In addition to the
       persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl, and

       Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important
       contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood, Judy
       Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.

       (360116)

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       a

       GAO United States General Accounting Office

       Page i GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Contents

       Contents

       Page ii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Contents

       Page iii GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Contents

       Page iv GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548

       Page 1 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       A

       July 26, 2002 Lett er

       The Honorable Tom Daschle United States Senate

       Dear Senator Daschle: As requested, we are reporting on the United States*
       ability to prevent the introduction of foot and mouth disease. This report
       contains recommendations to the U. S. Department of Agriculture on the
       need to develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on
       foreign disease outbreaks to the Customs Service, improve some of the
       preventive measures used in the United States, and

       develop plans and timetables to address any outstanding issues that could
       impede a U. S. response. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly
       announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this
       report until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send
       copies to other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of
       Agriculture; the Commissioner of Customs; and the Director, Office of
       Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others

       upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
       the GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
       questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512- 3841. Key
       contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.

       Sincerely yours, Lawrence J. Dyckman Director, Natural Resources and
       Environment

       Page 2 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 3 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 4 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 5 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 6 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 7 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 8 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 9 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 10 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Executive Summary Page 11 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Page 12 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 13 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 14 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 15 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 16 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 17 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 18 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 19 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 20 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 21 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 22 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 23 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 24 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 25 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 1 Introduction

       Page 26 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Page 27 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 28 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 29 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 30 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 31 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 32 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 33 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Chapter 2 USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD
       Outbreaks, but

       Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved Page 34 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and
       Mouth Disease

       Page 35 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 36 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 37 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 38 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 39 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 40 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 41 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 42 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 43 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 44 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 45 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 46 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 47 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 48 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 49 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 50 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

       Page 51 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 3 U. S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to Other
       Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible

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       Chapter 4

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

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       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 55 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 56 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 57 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 58 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 59 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 60 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 61 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 62 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 63 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 64 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 65 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 66 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

       Page 67 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Chapter 4 Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face
       Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak

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       Page 69 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Appendix I

       Appendix I Countries Considered FMD- Free by the United States

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       Appendix II

       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Canada

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       Appendix III

       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix III Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into Mexico

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       Appendix IV

       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

       Page 94 GAO- 02- 808 Foot and Mouth Disease

       Appendix IV Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the
       United Kingdom

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       Appendix V

       Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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       Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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       Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Department of Agriculture

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       Appendix VI

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       Appendix VII

       United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

       Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

       Address Service Requested Presorted Standard

       Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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