Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract Maintenance Work (06/20/2002, GAO-02-623}

-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-623
    TITLE:   Air Force Depot Maintenance: Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract Maintenance Work
     DATE:   06/20/2002



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United States General Accounting Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

June 2002: 

Air Force Depot Maintenance: 

Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract 
Maintenance Work: 

GA0-02-623: 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Reported Carryover Exceeded DOD Standard but Is Unreliable and 
Understated: 

Causes of Reported Carryover: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Sample Element Disposition Table: 

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 
GAO Contact: 
Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Unfilled Orders, Work-In-Process, and Carryover at the End of 
Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2001: 

Table 2: Causes of the Depot Maintenance Activity Group's Unfilled 
Orders as of September 30, 2000: 

Table 3: Delayed Repair Times for KC-135 Aircraft Due to Unanticipated 
Work: 

Table 4: Population Estimates as of September 30, 2000, for Normal and 
Problem Carryover Balances: 

[End of section] 

United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

June 20, 2002: 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

This is the second in a planned series of reports that discusses the 
Defense Working Capital Fund fiscal year-end workload funding issue, 
generally referred to as "carryover." Section 1051 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398) 
required that we review various aspects of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) policy that allows Defense Working Capital Fund activities to 
carry over a 3-month level of work from one fiscal year to the next. 
In May 2001, we reported[Footnote 1] that (1) DOD did not have a sound 
analytical basis for its current 3-month carryover standard, (2) 
military services used different methods to calculate the number of 
months of carryover, and (3) some activity groups underestimated their 
budgeted carryover year after year, thereby providing decisionmakers 
with misleading year-end carryover information resulting in more 
funding being provided than was intended. 

As requested and agreed to with your office, this report assesses 
carryover[Footnote 2] related to the contract portion of the Air Force 
depot maintenance activity group. The DOD 3-month carryover standard 
applies to all DOD activity groups except for the contract portion of 
the Air Force depot maintenance activity group, for which DOD 
established a 4.5-month carryover standard because of the additional 
administrative functions associated with awarding contracts. 
Specifically, our objectives were to (1) determine if the reported 
carryover balance accurately reflected the amount of unfinished work 
on hand at the end of fiscal year 2000 and (2) identify the causes of 
carryover at the end of fiscal year 2000. 

In February 2002, the Air Force began to consider removing the 
contract portion of the depot maintenance activity group from the 
working capital fund. In April 2002, Air Force headquarters directed 
the Air Force Materiel Command to begin planning for this transition. 
If the contract portion is removed from the working capital fund, all 
of the issues identified in this report will still need to be 
addressed except for matters dealing with carryover under the DOD 
working capital fund requirements. 

Our review was performed from July 2001 through May 2002 in accordance 
with U. S. generally accepted government auditing standards. The 
production and financial information we used and referred to in this 
report was provided by the Air Force, and we did not verify it. We 
worked with Air Force officials to validate the reliability of the 
information in its system in determining the reasons for the work not 
being completed at the end of fiscal year 2000. We did not assess the 
work performed by the in-house operations of the depot maintenance 
activity group. Further details on our scope and methodology can be 
found in appendixes I and II. We requested comments on a draft of this 
report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. Written comments 
from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) are reprinted in 
appendix III. 

Results in Brief: 

Reported carryover balances for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were 
inaccurate and, therefore, the balances were not reliable for decision-
making or budget review purposes. The reported carryover balances were 
not accurate due to (1) faulty assumptions used in calculating work-in-
process and (2) records not accurately reflecting work that was 
actually completed by year-end. As a result, the amount of carryover 
reported by the Air Force was understated by tens of millions of 
dollars and customers' funds were idle that could have been used for 
other purposes during the fiscal year. Even though the carryover was 
understated, Air Force reports show that the contract portion of the 
depot maintenance activity group exceeded the 4.5-month carryover 
standard at the end of fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001 by about 
$44 million and $134 million, respectively. Air Force headquarters 
officials stated that the primary reason that they exceeded the 4.5-
month standard for fiscal year 2001 was the receipt of a large amount 
of orders late in the fiscal year. 

Our analysis of about $1.6 billion of reported unfilled orders showed 
that a substantial amount of the work that the activity group carried 
over into fiscal year 2001 was work that it had planned to, but did 
not, complete prior to the end of fiscal year 2000 due to logistical 
and production problems. Specifically, we estimated that about $530 
million[Footnote 3] of work was not completed for two key reasons. 
First, repairs took longer than planned primarily because (1) parts 
needed to perform the repairs were not available from DOD, (2) more 
work was needed to repair the assets than originally planned by the 
Air Force, and (3) contractors had capacity constraints related to 
personnel, facilities, and equipment. Second, work on some assets was 
not started as planned because of the delayed induction of items into 
production at contractors' facilities. Further, we could not determine 
the causes for an estimated $191 million[Footnote 4] of work not being 
done primarily because reliable information was not available on the 
status of contracts that were previously managed by the two air 
logistics centers that were closed in fiscal year 2001. In addition, 
we estimate that about $913 million[Footnote 5] of unfilled orders was 
for work that either (1) had not been planned for completion until 
after fiscal year 2000ï¿½normal carryover or (2) had actually been 
completed but not recorded as completed in the production and cost 
system. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force to 
improve the management and reporting of the carryover for the contract 
portion of the Air Force depot maintenance activity group, including 
(1) improving the assumptions used in calculating work-in-process, (2) 
improving the accuracy of the data in systems, and (3) correcting the 
problems associated with work not being completed as planned, such as 
the long-standing problem related to the lack of parts to fix assets. 
In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 
recommendations and briefly outlined its planned actions for 
addressing them. 

Background: 

The Air Force depot maintenance activity group supports combat 
readiness by providing depot repair services necessary to keep Air 
Force units operating worldwide. The group generates between $5 
billion to $6 billion in annual revenue principally by repairing and 
overhauling a wide range of assets including aircraft, missiles, 
aircraft engines, software, and exchangeable inventory items for 
military services, other government agencies, and foreign governments. 
In performing these services, the group performs the work in-house at 
its depots or through contracts with private industry or other 
government agencies. The group operates under the working capital fund 
concept, where customers are to be charged the anticipated actual 
costs of providing goods and services to them. 

Contract Depot Maintenance Process and Key Controls Used to Manage 
Contracted Work: 

Customers place orders with the Air Force depot maintenance activity 
group. When the activity group accepts the order, the customer's funds 
are obligated. The customer uses the activity group as its purchasing 
agent when it needs a contractor to perform depot-level maintenance 
work. The activity group awards the contract and manages the work 
performed by the contractor. The contract portion of the depot 
maintenance activity group generates between $2 billion and $3 billion 
in annual revenue. In accomplishing this work, the Air Force has about 
5,000 contracts with about 750 contractors that are located in the 
United States as well as overseas. 

The Air Force air logistics centers use the contract depot maintenance 
production and cost system (known as G072D) as a means of combining 
financial and production data for the management of work that is being 
performed by contractors. The Air Force has also established 
procedures and internal controls for the contract portion of the depot 
maintenance activity group, which are described in two Air Force 
Materiel Command Instructions. Command Instruction 21-113 discusses 
the contract maintenance program for the depot maintenance activity 
group and Command Instruction 21-134 discusses the end item 
transaction reporting system (known as G009) and the reporting 
procedures for contractors. Some of the procedures and controls in 
these two instructions follow. 

* Contracts can be awarded for a 12-month period anytime during the 
year. All the items to be repaired will be funded from the 
appropriation of the initial fiscal year. However, work must be 
started on at least one item during the initial fiscal year for the 
entire job cost to be properly charged to appropriated funds for that 
year. 

* At a minimum, assets planned to be sent to contractors for repair 
should be reviewed quarterly. If the assets are not received by the 
contractors and will not be received within a reasonable amount of 
time (60 days), the planned quantities to be repaired and related 
obligated dollars must be reduced accordingly and the contract 
amended, if necessary. 

* Contractors are required to report, at least monthly, on the status 
of the assets being repaired, such as when the (1) assets were 
received, (2) assets were inducted for repair, and (3) work was 
completed on the assets. The production management specialists at the 
air logistics centers are responsible for ensuring that the 
information provided by the contractors is accurate. 

* A review of the contract maintenance ledger produced from the 
production and cost system must be performed quarterly. Particular 
attention should be directed to (1) contractors beginning work on 
assets compared to the plan and (2) contractors completing work on 
assets compared to the plan. Any questionable information must be 
annotated and reviewed and corrections made prior to the next monthly 
processing cycle. 

What Is Carryover and Why Is It Important? 

Carryover is the dollar value of work that has been ordered and funded
(obligated) by customers but not yet completed by working capital fund 
activities at the end of the fiscal year. Carryover consists of both 
the unfinished portion of work started but not yet completed, as well 
as requested work that has not yet commenced. To manage carryover, DOD 
converts the dollar amount of carryover to months of work. This is 
done to put the magnitude of the carryover in proper perspective. For 
example, if an activity group performs $100 million of work in a year 
and had $100 million in carryover at year-end, it would have 12 months 
of carryover. However, if another activity group performs $400 million 
of work in a year and had $100 million in carryover at year-end, this 
group would have 3 months of carryover. 

A DOD regulation allows for some carryover at fiscal year-end to allow 
working capital funds to operate efficiently and effectively. In 1996, 
DOD established a 3-month carryover standard for all the working 
capital fund activities except for the contract portion of the Air 
Force depot maintenance activity group. The Air Force is the only 
military service that includes its contract depot maintenance 
operation in its working capital fund. To reflect this difference, DOD 
established a 4.5-month carryover standard to account for the 
additional administrative functions associated with awarding 
contracts. In May 2001, we reported[Footnote 6] that DOD did not have 
a basis for its carryover standard and recommended that Defense 
determine the appropriate carryover standard for the depot 
maintenance, ordnance, and research and development activity groups. 
DOD is in the process of assessing its carryover standards. Too little 
carryover could result in some depot maintenance activity not having 
work to perform at the beginning of the fiscal year, resulting in the 
inefficient use of personnel. On the other hand, too much carryover 
could result in an activity group receiving funds from customers in 
one fiscal year but not performing the work until well into the next 
fiscal year or subsequent years. By minimizing the amount of the 
carryover, DOD can use its resources most effectively and minimize the 
"banking" of funds for work and programs to be performed in subsequent 
years. 

Plans to Remove the Contract Portion of Depot Maintenance from the 
Working Capital Fund: 

In February 2002, the Air Force began to consider financing the 
contract portion of the depot maintenance activity group with direct 
appropriations. In an April 19, 2002, memorandum, the Air Force stated 
that the overall financial health of the depot maintenance activity 
group has been negatively impacted by the contract operations. 
Further, without direct control over contractor costs, the working 
capital fund mechanism is an inappropriate choice for the contract 
operations. The memorandum directed the Air Force Materiel Command to 
begin planning for the transition of contract depot maintenance 
operations out of the working capital fund immediately. This would be 
a significant change in the financing and accounting for these 
contracts. Under the plan, contracts would be financed with direct 
appropriations, which is how the Army and Navy finance contract depot 
maintenance work, and carryover would no longer be associated with the 
work being performed by the contractor. Instead, funds would be 
managed in terms of the percent of funds obligated and expensed during 
a fiscal year. Further, the Air Force plans on using existing direct 
appropriation fund systems to track repairs and account for the funds 
and would not use its current working capital fund systems. 

Reported Carryover Exceeded DOD Standard but Is Unreliable and 
Understated: 

The lack of accurate carryover information results in the Congress and 
DOD officials not having the information they need to oversee and 
manage the repair of assets. Air Force reports show that the contract 
portion of the depot maintenance activity group exceeded the 4.5-month 
carryover standard at the end of fiscal years 2000 and 2001 by about 
$44 million and $134 million, respectively, thereby resulting in more 
funds being provided than allowed by the DOD carryover standard. 
However, we found that the reported carryover balance did not 
accurately reflect the amount of unfinished work on hand at the end of 
fiscal year 2000 due to (1) faulty assumptions used in calculating 
work-in-process and (2) records not accurately reflecting work that 
was actually completed by year-end. As a result, the amount of 
carryover reported by the Air Force was understated by tens of 
millions of dollars. 

Air Force reports show that the contract portion of the depot 
maintenance activity group exceeded the 4.5-month carryover standard 
at the end of fiscal years 2000 and 2001. The Air Force reported that 
it had about $835 million, which is 4.7 months, of carryover at the 
end of fiscal year 2000, and about $1.1 billion, which is 5.1 months, 
at the end of fiscal year 2001. In the past, the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and/or the congressional defense 
committees used carryover information to determine whether the working 
capital fund activity groups had too much carryover. For example, the 
Congress reduced the Army's and Air Force's fiscal year 2001 Operation 
and Maintenance appropriations by $40.5 million and $52.2 million, 
respectively, because the depot maintenance operations in their 
working capital funds had too much carryover. Similarly, in 2001, the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) reduced the Air Force's 
fiscal year 2003 customers' budget requests by $185 million because 
the contract portion of the depot maintenance activity group would 
have too much carryover at the end of fiscal year 2003. 

Work-In-Process Calculation Is Based on Faulty Assumptions: 

As stated previously, carryover is the amount of unfilled orders less 
the amount of work-in-process. We found that the Air Force does not 
have actual information on the amount of work-in-process performed by 
contractors and, therefore, uses a formula to estimate the amount 
based on the assumption that the contractor will start and complete 
work as planned. However, the assumptions were faulty because the 
contractors did not always start and/or complete the work as planned. 
Using its formula, the Air Force reduced the amount of unfilled orders 
due to work-in-process by about $1 billion, which is 5.6 months, and 
$835 million, which is 4.1 months, in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 
2001, respectively, to determine the amount of carryover for these 2 
years. 

The amount of work-in-process recorded monthly is affected or is 
determined by the nature of the work, the estimated/actual start date 
of the work, and the expected time to complete the work. For work that 
is planned to be completed in less than 150 days, the Air Force 
assumes that one-fifth of the work will be completed each month and 
records work-in-process accordingly. The calculation for the different 
workload categories is outlined below. 

* For workload categories involving exchangeable inventory items, 
other major end items, and software, the amount of work-in-process is 
based on when the work is planned to begin and assumes that the work 
will be completed within 5 months. Thus, the contractor does not have 
to begin actual work, and the items to be repaired do not even have to 
be at the contractors' plant in order to record work-in-process on 
those specific orders. 

* For workload categories involving aircraft, engines, and missiles, 
the amount of work-in-process is based on when the work actually 
begins at the contractor's plant and assumes that the work will be 
completed within 5 months from that point in time. 

For work planned to be completed in more than 150 days, the Air Force 
has a different calculation to determine the amount of work-in-
process. The calculation for the different workload categories is 
outlined below. 

* For workload categories involving exchangeable inventory items, 
other major end items, and software, the amount of work-in-process is 
based on when the work is planned to begin and assumes that the work 
will be completed in the estimated number of days as planned. For 
example, if the Air Force estimates that the work will be completed in 
1 year, it will record one-twelfth of the amount of the order as work-
in-process each month. The contractor does not have to begin actual 
work in order to start recording work-in-process. 

* For workload categories involving aircraft, engines, and missiles, 
the amount of work-in-process is based on when the work actually 
begins at the contractor's plant and assumes that the work will be 
completed in the estimated number of days as planned. 

For fiscal years 2000 and 2001, the amount of reported work-in-process 
had a significant impact on the amount of carryover, reducing each 
fiscal year's carryover by at least $835 million. Table 1 shows the 
actual reported year-end unfilled orders, work-in process, and 
carryover, in dollars and months for fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 
2001. It also shows the amount of carryover in excess of the 4.5-month 
standard. 

Table 1: Unfilled Orders, Work-In-Process, and Carryover at the End of 
Fiscal Year 2000 and Fiscal Year 2001: 

Description: Unfilled orders; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $1.819 billion; 
Fiscal year 2000 Number of months: 10.3; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $1.966 billion; 
Fiscal year 2001 Number of months[A]: 9.5. 

Description: Less work-in-process; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $984.9 million; 
Fiscal year 2000 Number of months: 5.6; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $835.5 million; 
Fiscal year 2001 Number of months[A]: 4.1. 

Description: Carryover; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $834.5 million; 
Fiscal year 2000 Number of months: 4.7; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $1.130.2 billion; 
Fiscal year 2001 Number of months[A]: 5.5;. 

Description: Air Force adjustment to carryover[B]; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $0.0; 
Fiscal year 2000 Number of months: 0.0; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $68.9 million; 
Fiscal year 2001 Number of months[A]: 0.3. 

Description: Revised carryover; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $834.5 million; 
Fiscal year 2000 Number of months: 4.7; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $1.061 billion; 
Fiscal year 2001 Number of months[A]: 5.1. 

Description: Carryover in excess of 4.5 month standard; 
Fiscal year 2000 Dollar amount: $43.5 million; 
Fiscal year 2001 Dollar amount: $133.6 million; 

[A] Figures do not add due to rounding. 

[B]In accordance with DOD policy, beginning in fiscal year 2001, the 
Air Force began excluding certain work, such as work for foreign 
countries, from its carryover. In May 2001, we recommended in GA0-01-
559 that DOD clarify its policy on these adjustments, and DOD is 
currently reviewing its policy on calculating carryover. 

Source: Air Force budget and accounting reports. 

[End of table] 

According to Air Force Materiel Command officials, the primary reason 
that they exceeded the 4.5-month standard for fiscal year 2001 was the 
receipt of a large amount of orders late in the fiscal year. 
Specifically, actual customer orders exceeded planned customer orders 
by $311 million for fiscal year 2001, with $292 million of that amount 
received in August 2001. Large quantities of orders placed late in the 
fiscal year provide the Air Force limited opportunity to perform the 
work by the end of the fiscal year. 

Air Force officials also stated that the current systems used by 
contract depot maintenance cannot produce a reliable work-in-process 
amount. They further stated that the assumptions used for calculating 
work-in-process do not provide an accurate work-in-process amount, 
particularly the assumption that the work will begin as planned. Air 
Force officials told us, and we agree, that a more accurate way to 
calculate work-in-process would be to eliminate the assumption that 
the contractor will start work as planned and base all work-in-process 
calculations on when the contractor actually starts work. The 
officials said making such a change to the calculation would provide a 
financial incentive for contract depot maintenance to ensure that data 
on when the work actually started is entered into the system in a 
timely manner. The incentive to do so stems from the fact that 
contract depot maintenance bills customers based on the work-in-
process amount that is recorded in the production and cost system. If 
work-in-process is based on when the contractor actually starts work, 
the depot maintenance activity group cannot bill customers until the 
date that the work actually started is recorded in the system. 

Unfilled Order Data in the Production and Cost System Are Unreliable: 

As previously discussed, because the air logistics centers use the 
production and cost system to manage the work performed by 
contractors, it is critical that the unfilled order data be entered 
into the system in an accurate and timely manner. The data in this 
system are also used in the Air Force's budget process and are the 
basis for determining the amount of carryover, which is reported to 
the Congress each fiscal year. However, we found that much of the 
unfilled order data in the system was inaccurate or incomplete because 
the production management specialists, who are primarily responsible 
for data accuracy, did not always (1) ensure that contractor 
production data in the system were correct or (2) enter contract 
information for new customer orders into the production and cost 
system in a timely manner, as the following two examples illustrate. 

* Based on our analysis of a stratified random sample of unfilled 
maintenance requirements at the end of fiscal year 2000, we estimate 
that $256 million[Footnote 7] of the work was actually completed but 
not reflected in the system because the production management 
specialists did not ensure that the data were correct. 

* When contract depot maintenance receives a customer order for work, 
it enters into a contractual relationship for the performance of the 
work and then records information on the contract in the production 
and cost system. Any customer order for which there is no contractual 
information in the system is referred to as "unscheduled" work. We 
found that as of September 30, 2000, contract depot maintenance had at 
least $59.9 million of unscheduled work for which the contracts were 
awarded but the contract information was not recorded in the system.
Our analysis of the $59.9 million showed that $8.6 million was not 
entered into the system for at least 3 months to 5 months after the 
contracts were awarded, while about $15 million was not entered for at 
least 6 months or longer. For example, in one case, an order for
$3.6 million was not entered in the system for 7 months after the 
contract was awarded. In another case, an order for $802,000 was not 
entered into the system for 20 months after the contract was awarded.
In both cases, the lack of production management specialist oversight 
due to either heavy workload or inexperience was cited as the reason 
for not entering the data in a timely manner. Without the contract 
data in the system, there was no information in the system for 
managing repair actions and monitoring the status of the contracts. 

We found that (1) in some cases, the production management specialists 
were not following the regulations regarding data accuracy, (2) in 
other cases, the production management specialists did not know the 
correct treatment for recording data accurately, and (3) standard 
operating procedures for use by the production management specialists 
did not exist to provide detailed instructions on their 
responsibilities for data accuracy. 

Air logistics center officials also told us that production management 
specialists need training that is specific to their day-to-day 
responsibilities and that such training would enhance the production 
management specialists' awareness of the importance of data accuracy.
Air Force Materiel Command officials stated there is a data discipline 
problem that centered around the production management specialists not 
ensuring that the data in the production and cost system are correct 
and up to date. The officials attributed this problem, in part, to the 
lack of clear guidance and detailed operating procedures related to 
how the production management specialists should go about performing 
their day-to-day responsibilities. The officials further told us that 
there is a lack of internal controls or processes to ensure data 
accuracy, such as the use of metrics that could act as "red flags" to 
alert management to possible data problems. In discussing the data 
accuracy problem with Air Force headquarter officials, they told us 
that a contributing factor was the disruption to operations when the 
Air Force hired about 150 new production management specialists in 
fiscal year 2000 because of the closing of two air logistics centers 
and transferring the oversight of their contracts to the remaining 
centers. 

New System Effort Terminated: 

Since 1996, the Air Force has recognized the need to improve the 
reliability of the data in the production and cost system and, until 
February 2002, was developing a new system, the Contract Maintenance 
Accounting and Production Systemï¿½-known as G501-ï¿½to accomplish this. 
According to Air Force officials, implementing the new system would 
have helped alleviate the type of data problems we found because it 
was to be a single, fully integrated real-time web-based system, 
which, among other things, would have streamlined contractor reporting 
of production data. The Air Force had planned to implement the new 
system at the three air logistics centers and at approximately 900 
contractor facilities. The development of the new system initially 
started in 1996 as an effort to redesign the existing production and 
cost system. It was later decided that this system and two other 
legacy systems that currently perform production and accounting 
functions for the contract portion of the depot maintenance activity 
group needed to be replaced since they interacted with each other. 
Thus, in September 1999, a contract was awarded for the development 
project with an estimated completion date of December 2001, which was 
later revised to fiscal year 2005. 

In February 2002, the Air Force began to consider stopping its 
financing of the contract portion of the depot maintenance activity 
group in the working capital fund. As a result, the Air Force has 
stopped working on developing the new system after spending about $7.8 
million. The Air Force plans to use other systems to perform the 
production and accounting functions. 

Causes of Reported Carryover: 

Our analysis of about $1.6 billion of reported unfilled orders showed 
that a substantial amount of the work that the activity group carried 
over into fiscal year 2001 was work that it had planned to complete 
prior to the end of fiscal year 2000 but did not due to logistical and 
production problems. Specifically, we estimated that about $530 
million[Footnote 8] of work was not completed for two key reasons. 
First, repairs took longer than planned primarily because (1) parts 
needed to perform the repairs were not available from DOD, (2) more 
work was needed to repair the assets than originally planned by the 
Air Force, and (3) contractors had capacity constraints related to 
personnel, facilities, and equipment. Second, work on some assets was 
not started as planned because of the delayed induction of items into 
production at contractors' facilities. Further, we could not determine 
the causes for an estimated $191 million[Footnote 9] of work not being 
done primarily because Air Force officials could not provide reliable 
information on the status of contracts that were previously managed by 
the two air logistics centers that were closed in fiscal year 2001. 

In addition, we estimated that about $657 million[Footnote 10] of the 
unfilled orders that the activity group carried over into fiscal year 
2001 was for work that was planned to be completed in fiscal year 
2001. Since this work was expected to be carried over, we classified 
it as normal carryover. The results of our analysis are summarized in 
table 2 and discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 

Table 2: Causes of the Depot Maintenance Activity Group's Unfilled 
Orders as of September 30, 2000: 

Cause: Repair problem; 
Point estimate: $322.4 million; 
Confidence interval at 95% confidence level: +/- $61.7 million. 

Cause: Induction problem; 
Point estimate: $208.0 million; 
Confidence interval at 95% confidence level: +/- $53.2 million. 

Cause: Unknown problem; 
Point estimate: $191.3 million; 
Confidence interval at 95% confidence level: +/- $57.5 million. 

Cause: Normal carryover; 
Point estimate: $656.8 million; 
Confidence interval at 95% confidence level: +/- $58.3 million. 

[End of table] 

Repair Problems Are a Major Cause of Carryover: 

As shown in table 2, we estimated that about $322 million[Footnote 11] 
of the activity group's unfilled orders as of September 30, 2000, were 
for work that was scheduled to be completed prior to September 30, but 
was not completed by then because of longer than expected repair 
times. As the following examples illustrate, our work showed that the 
primary causes of these longer than expected repair times were (1) 
shortages of component parts, (2) unanticipated problems, and (3) 
contractor capacity constraints. 

Shortages of Component Parts: 

For the exchangeable and engine workload categories, a shortage of 
component parts was a major cause of untimely repairs. For example, a 
requirement for the repair of a leading-edge aircraft part[Footnote 
12] was placed on a contract in December 1999 for a unit sales price 
of $39,268 and with an expected completion date of June 2000. In 
January 2000, the contractor inspected the item and determined that 
defective seals would have to be replaced. Because the seals were 
government-furnished material, the contractor submitted a requisition 
to the Defense Logistics Agency. When the seals had not arrived by the 
expected delivery date (May 2000), the contractor requisitioned them 
again and, when the Defense Logistics Agency subsequently advised the 
contractor that the seals were not available, the contractor requested 
and was granted permission to manufacture them. As of November 2001, 
the projected completion date for the manufacture of the seals was 
March 2002, and the leading-edge aircraft part was expected to be 
repaired and available for shipment to the customer almost immediately 
after thatï¿½about 21 months longer than expected. 

The Air Force Materiel Command recently completed a study of this 
longstanding and well-documented problem[Footnote 13] that the Air 
Force refers to as "awaiting parts." Additionally, it developed an 
action plan to correct some of the underlying causes of the awaiting 
parts problem that were identified in the study. The scope of both the 
study and the action plan was limited to depot maintenance work that 
is performed in-house at the three air logistics centers and did not 
cover the contract portion of the activity group. 

Air Force Materiel Command officials have acknowledged that contract 
depot maintenance has unique awaiting parts problems because the 
contract portion of this activity group uses different systems than 
the in-house portion of the group. They indicated that the plan to 
remove contract depot maintenance operations from the Air Force 
Working Capital Fund and to discontinue, as previously discussed, the 
development of the new production and cost system have caused them to 
put virtually all contract depot maintenance initiatives on hold. 

Unanticipated Problems: 

Unanticipated problems were another major cause of repairs not being
performed as planned, especially for the aircraft workload category. 
For example, for the last several years, the contract repair of KC-135 
aircraft, which have an average age of about 40 years, has been a 
large and problematic workload. Specifically, due primarily to 
unanticipated problems, such as the need for major structural repairs, 
work on these aircraft has taken much longer than expected to 
complete. According to data in the production and cost system, as of 
September 30, 2000, a contractor had not completed work on 11 KC-135 
aircraft that were originally scheduled to be completed during fiscal 
year 2000 and two aircraft that were originally scheduled to be 
completed during fiscal years 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
Additionally, as of September 30, 2000, another contractor had not 
completed work on 16 KC-135 aircraft that were originally scheduled to 
be completed during fiscal years 1999 and 2000. 

The magnitude of this problem is illustrated in table 3, which 
compares the initial and actual repair times for KC-135 aircraft at 
the second contractor's facilities during fiscal years 1999 and 2000. 

Table 3: Delayed Repair Times for KC-135 Aircraft Due to Unanticipated 
Work: 

Fiscal year: 1999; 
Number of aircraft repaired:11[A]; 
Average negotiated repair days: 202; 
Average actual repair days: 433; 
Variance: 231. 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Number of aircraft repaired:21[B]; 
Average negotiated repair days: 175; 
Average actual repair days: 418; 
Variance: 243. 

[A] Does not include one aircraft that work was started on in 
September 1999 and was still not finished as of February 2002. 

[B] Does not include one aircraft that work was started on in November 
1999 and was still not finished as of February 2002. 

Source: Aircraft and Missile Maintenance Production/Compression Report. 

[End of table] 

Altogether, the 29 KC-135 aircraft that were scheduled to be completed 
prior to the end of fiscal year 2000, but were not, had an unfilled 
order value of about $86.6 million. 

Contractor Capacity Constraints: 

Contractor capacity constraints are a third cause of repair problems. 
For example, one of the items in the sample was a $1.4 million 
requirement to repair 15 power supply units at a unit sales price of 
$94,879 and with an estimated repair time of 45 days. All work on this 
item, which is a component of an electronic warfare system, was 
scheduled to be completed by June 30, 2000. However, as of September 
30, 2000, only eight items had been repaired and, as of September 30, 
2001, one item had still not been repaired. The prime contractor 
attributed the delayed repairs to personnel constraints. Specifically, 
at one time, there was a steady repair workload for this item, and a 
subcontractor employed three to four people to work on nothing but 
this requirement. When the workload declined, the subcontractor 
released all but one of the employees trained to make the repairs. 
According to the prime contractor, when an order was received in late 
1999, the subcontractor had difficulty finding qualified people to do 
the work. However, the prime contractor also indicated that the 
subcontractor has gradually redeveloped a repair capability in this 
area, is now repairing two items a month, and expects to build up his 
capability to three a month in the near future. 

Delayed Induction of Assets Is Another Major Cause of Carryover: 

As shown in table 2, we estimated that about $208 million[Footnote 14] 
of the activity group's unfilled orders as of September 30, 2000, were 
for work that was scheduled to be completed prior to September 30, but 
was not completed by then because work on the items was not started as 
planned at contractors' facilities. A $9.8 million order to repair 24 
exchangeable inventory items is an example of a requirement that we 
placed in the delayed induction category. In this case, the estimated 
repair time was 90 days, and data in the production and cost system 
indicated that the contractor was expected to complete work on all 24 
items by the end of fiscal year 1999. However, as of the end of fiscal 
year 2000, the contractor had received only 19 of the inventory items. 
The remaining five inventory itemsï¿½which had an unfilled customer 
order value of about $2 millionï¿½were not received by the contractor 
until the third quarter of fiscal year 2001 and we, therefore, 
included $2 million in the delayed induction category. 

One of the underlying causes of the activity group's induction problem 
is that the Air Force Materiel Command has not established effective 
internal control procedures to ensure that production management 
specialists are complying with its policy guidance. For example, Air 
Force Materiel Command Instruction 21-113 states that, at a minimum, 
"review of asset generation should be done on a quarterly basis and, 
if assets will not generate within a reasonable period of time (60 
days), the scheduled input quantities and obligated dollars must be 
reduced accordingly." However, our analysis showed and the Air Force 
Materiel Command agreed that there is no systematic process or 
effective internal controls to ensure that the production management 
specialists are complying with this guidance. A second cause is that 
some of the guidance is inconsistent. For example, Air Force Materiel 
Command Instruction 21-113, "Contract Maintenance Program for Depot 
Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG)," states that work must be started 
on at least one asset during the fiscal year that an order is placed. 
However, the Air Force Logistics Command supplement to Air Force 
Regulation 170-8 states that the contract depot maintenance activity 
group has until December 31 to get a customer's requirement in a 
contract (January 31 for some requirements). Accordingly, one 
regulation requires work to be started on an asset before the fiscal 
year-end, but another regulation does not even require that the 
contract be awarded until the end of the calendar year. 

The Activity Group Is Not Managing a Major Portion of Its Contract 
Workload: 

As shown in table 2, we could not determine the cause of the problem 
for about $191 million[Footnote 15] of unfilled orders that were 
scheduled to be completed prior to September 30, 2000, but were not. 
We could not make this determination because production management 
specialists did not have documentation on the status of the repairs 
needed to make this determination. The two primary reasons that 
information was not available were that production management 
specialists (1) did not have required documentation for many of the 
contracts that were transferred from the Sacramento and San Antonio 
Air Logistics Centers to two of the three remaining centers in October 
2000 and (2) did not maintain information on the status of software 
projects.[Footnote 16] 

Inadequate Documentation on Transferred Contracts Prevents Effective 
Management: 

In October 2000, the Sacramento and San Antonio Air Logistics Centers 
discontinued their contract depot maintenance operations[Footnote 17] 
and transferred management responsibility for their contracts to the 
three remaining centers (Warner Robins, Oklahoma City, and Ogden). As 
part of this management transfer, the Sacramento and San Antonio 
centers shipped contract files and related customer order files to the 
three centers that assumed responsibility for the work. However, in 
many instances, two of the centers that assumed responsibility for the 
work either did not receive the required files or received incomplete 
files. Additionally, for the files they did receive, they found 
numerous and significant discrepancies between the information in the 
contract files and related customer files. Discrepancies were also 
found between these manual records and the data in the production and 
cost system. As a result of these problems, two of the three remaining 
centers have had to reconstruct many of the files and reconcile 
numerous discrepancies.[Footnote 18] Because the Air Force does not 
know the status of these contracts, (1) it is potentially vulnerable 
to paying for goods and services not received or performed and is 
subject to fraud, waste, and abuse, (2) work may have been 
accomplished but not recorded in the system, or (3) the Air Force may 
not be taking prompt and appropriate action to resolve problems that 
are delaying the completion of the work. 

A contract depot maintenance manager at one of the remaining centers 
characterized this records reconstruction and reconciliation effort as
"overwhelming." Specifically, he noted that his center had assumed 
responsibility for 627 contracts (about 20 percent of its total 
workload), and pointed out that the contracts went back to 1981 and 
each contract could have as many as 800 line items. The manager also 
stated that, as of October 2001 (1 year after the transfer), center 
staff had not even looked at many of the contracts and had 
unreconciled problems with many of the contracts that they had 
reviewed. To further illustrate the magnitude of the reconciliation 
problem, he pointed out that their research thus far had determined 
that (1) they did not have contracts for $41 million of work that was 
recorded in the production and cost system and about $3 million in 
contractor payments, (2) the production and cost system contained no 
information on 74 contracts with a total contract amount of $12.6 
million, and (3) contractors were providing automated production data 
for less than 15 percent of the transferred contracts. 

The lack of documentation for contracts that were transferred from a 
closing facility had resulted in the lack of management oversight. For 
example, 10 of the sample items, with a total unfilled order value of 
$4.5 million as of September 30, 2000, were requirements for work on 
hush houses[Footnote 19] that were contracted for by one of the 
closing air logistics centers. 

Work on several of these hush houses was supposed to be completed 
prior to the end of fiscal year 2000, and work on all of them was 
supposed to be completed prior to the end of fiscal year 2001. 
However, as of December 2001, the air logistics center that assumed 
management responsibility for the contracts was still trying to 
determine the status of the work since it had not received the 
required documentation from the closing center. 

The two centers that have a significant problem in this area have 
recently dedicated several personnel to the resolution of problems 
related to the transferred contracts. However, this work is a time-
consuming and labor-intensive process, and the Air Force Materiel 
Command has not established either a milestone for completing the work 
or a methodology for monitoring progress. Consequently, it is 
uncertain when the centers will have all of the information they need 
to manage these transferred contracts. 

Lack of Actual Production Data Makes Software Unfilled Order Data 
Highly Questionable: 

We estimate that $68 million' of the unfilled orders in the software 
workload category of the sample was for work that was scheduled to be 
completed prior to September 30, 2000, but was not completed as of 
that date. However, we were unable to determine why the completion of 
this work was delayed because production management specialists are 
not required to monitor the status of software projects and did not 
have the documentation needed to identify problems and determine their 
underlying causes. 

For most nonsoftware workloads, the requirement is to repair a 
specific quantity of items within a specified period of time, and 
contractors are required to submit automated production reports that 
show when they (1) receive the items that are to be repaired, (2) 
started work on the items, (3) complete the repairs, and (4) ship 
repaired items to customers. Additionally, production management 
specialists are required to develop schedules that show when work on 
the items is scheduled to start and when repairs are expected to be 
completed. If done properly, this approach ensures that production 
management specialists have the information they need to (1) monitor 
the status of the work, (2) identify problems, and (3) take prompt 
corrective action, when appropriate. 

However, for software workloads, the requirement is not to repair a 
certain number of items, but rather to accomplish certain tasks. For 
example, the task could be to (1) attend and support any lab, ground, 
and flight tests performed on a weapon system, (2) analyze test data, 
or (3) revise weapon system software that does not perform as 
intended, such as an electronic warfare system that does not perform 
effectively in high electro-static environments. As a result, most 
software workloads are expressed as a level of effort, such as in 
number of hours or months to be worked. 

Because production management specialists do not have reliable data on 
the status of software projects, the "actual" production data that 
they enter into the production and cost system are estimates that are 
based on the frequently erroneous assumption that work will begin and 
be accomplished as planned. This problem, which is similar to the 
previously discussed problem with the activity group's work-in-process 
data, makes the reported value of software unfilled orders highly 
questionable. Further, because the reported value of software 
carryover is based on highly questionable estimates for both work-in-
process and undelivered orders, it cannot be relied on. 

Conclusions: 

The Air Force does not have reliable information on the dollar amount 
of carryover for its contract depot maintenance operation due to 
faulty assumptions used in calculating work-in-process and records not 
accurately reflecting work done at year-end. Until the problems are 
corrected, congressional and Defense decisionmakers will be forced to 
make key budget decisions, such as whether or not to enhance or reduce 
customer budgets, based on unreliable information. In addition, due to 
logistical and production problems, hundreds of millions of dollars of 
work was not done as planned and was carried over into the next fiscal 
year. These problems resulted in idle funds that could have been used 
for near-term readiness or other priorities. For the contract portion 
of this activity group to operate more effectively, managers at the 
Air Force Materiel Command and the air logistics centers must be held 
accountable for (1) the accuracy and timeliness of the production and 
financial management information used for decision-making and (2) 
ensuring that the work is completed as planned. Until these weaknesses 
are resolved, concerns will continue to be raised about the amount of 
carryover related to the contract portion of this activity group. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct the Commander, 
Air Force Materiel Command, to do the following. 

* Use the date contractors actually start work, rather than the 
planned start date, to calculate work-in-process for all workload 
categories as long as the contract portion of the activity group 
remains in the working capital fund. 

* Improve the accuracy of the data in its systems that track repair 
actions and account for costs by (1) holding managers accountable for 
ensuring the accuracy of the data, (2) developing standard operating 
procedures that provide detailed guidance on production management 
specialists' day-to-day responsibilities, particularly in the area of 
ensuring data accuracy, (3) providing additional training to 
production management specialists on these procedures, and (4) 
developing metrics that act as "red flags" to alert management of 
possible data problems. At a minimum, the systems should provide 
timely and accurate information on when contractors receive broken 
items for repair, repair work starts on the items, repairs are 
completed, and repaired items are returned to customers. 

* Develop accurate and complete information on contracts that were 
awarded by the San Antonio and Sacramento Air Logistics Centers and 
subsequently transferred to the three remaining centers to avoid loss 
of control that may result in fraud, waste, and abuse. This will 
require, at a minimum, (1) establishing milestones for completing both 
the review of transferred contracts and resolving data problems 
identified during the reviews, (2) using metrics to monitor progress, 
and (3) ensuring that sufficient resources are dedicated to the 
resolution of the problem. 

* Identify the underlying causes of the contract depot maintenance
"awaiting parts" problem. 

* Develop an action plan to address the underlying causes for the 
"awaiting parts" problems similar to the plan that was recently 
developed to address the "awaiting parts" problems for the air 
logistics centers' in-house depot maintenance operations. 

* Provide clear and consistent guidance on how, when, and by whom the 
induction of assets should be monitored. 

* Establish internal control procedures to ensure that the guidance on 
the induction of assets is followed. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD concurred 
with our seven recommendations and identified actions it was taking to
correct the identified deficiencies. For example, to improve the 
accuracy of the data in its systems that track repair actions and 
account for costs, the Air Force is in the process of developing and 
providing training courses to the production management specialists. 
DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members 
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Subcommittee on 
Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services; 
the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations; the 
House Committee on Armed Services; the Subcommittee on Military 
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services; the Ranking Minority 
Member, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations; 
and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others 
upon request. Please contact Greg Pugnetti, Assistant Director, at 
(703) 695-6922 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this 
report. Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 
IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Gregory D. Kutz: 
Director, Financial Management and Assurance: 

Signed by: 

David R. Warren: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine if the reported carryover balances accurately reflected 
the amount of unfinished work on hand at the end of fiscal year 2000, 
we obtained and analyzed the air logistics centers' logistical and 
financial reports that provided information on unfilled orders. We 
also reviewed the computation that the Air Force uses to determine the 
dollar amount and number of months of carryover. This computation is 
the dollar amount of unfilled orders at fiscal year-end less the 
dollar amount of work-in-process which equates to the amount of funds 
that carryover to the next fiscal year. We reviewed the two factors 
(unfilled orders and work-in-process) that are used in the computation 
and obtained documentation that supported the information. Since the 
work-in-process amount is a calculated figure and is not based on 
actual work performed by the contractors, we obtained and analyzed the 
methodology used by the Air Force Materiel Command and the air 
logistics centers to compute the amount of work-in-process. In 
addition, to determine if any of the work had actually been completed, 
we selected and reviewed a stratified random sample of unfilled orders. 

To identify the primary causes of contract depot maintenance 
carryover, we reviewed a stratified random sample of 369 contract 
depot maintenance requirements that, according to the group's 
production and cost system, had been funded by customers, but not yet 
completed by contractors as of September 30, 2000. These 369 depot 
maintenance requirements were selected from five major workload 
categories (aircraft, engines, exchangeable inventory items, missiles 
and other major end items, and software). They accounted for $744.1 
million, about 41.2 percent, of the $1.806 billion of unfilled orders 
that the activity group reported at the end of fiscal year 2000. Of 
the $1.806 billion, about $124 million of the September 30, 2000, 
unfilled orders were customer requirements that, according to the 
production and cost system, had not yet been placed on contract. These 
requirements and an additional $48 million of relatively small orders 
were excluded from our analysis. The remaining $1.634 billion 
represents total unfilled orders. The confidence level used for 
estimating the value of completed and uncompleted work was 95 percent 
and the expected tolerable amount in error (test materiality) was 
$163,392,642. See appendix II for the Sample Element Disposition 
Table. Table 4 discloses the estimates and confidence intervals in 
total and individually for normal carryover, total problem carryover, 
and each of the carryover problems for the carryover balances as of 
September 30, 2000. 

Table 4: Population Estimates as of September 30, 2000, for Normal and 
Problem Carryover Balances:  

Description: Point estimate; 
Normal carryover[A]: $656.8 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Total problem carryover[B]: 
$721.3 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Induction problems[C]: $208.0 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Repair problems[D]: $322.4 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Unknown problems[E]: $191.3 
million; 
Reporting problems[F]: $255.8 million. 

Description: Confidence interval +(-) @ 95% confidence level; 
Normal carryover[A]: $58.3 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Total problem carryover[B]: 
$72.2 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Induction problems[C]: $53.2 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Repair problems[D]: $61.7 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Unknown problems[E]: $57.5 
million; 
Reporting problems[F]: $65.3 million. 

Description: Lower error limit; 
Normal carryover[A]: $598.5 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Total problem carryover[B]: 
$649.2 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Induction problems[C]: $154.8 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Repair problems[D]: $260.7 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Unknown problems[E]: $133.8 
million; 
Reporting problems[F]: $190.5 million. 

Description: Upper error limit; 
Normal carryover[A]: $715.1 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Total problem carryover[B]: 
$793.5 million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Induction problems[C]: $261.2 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Repair problems[D]: $384.0 
million; 
Problem carryover and type of problem: Unknown problems[E]: $248.8 
million; 
Reporting problems[F]: $321.0 million. 

[A] Normal carryover--an unfilled order at the end of a fiscal year 
that is planned to be completed after fiscal year 2000 because the 
order arrived too late in the fiscal year for production to be 
completed or the nature of the work required a long time. 

[B] Problem carryover--an unfilled order at the end of a fiscal year 
that was planned to be completed by the end of the fiscal year but for 
various reasons was not completed, according to the contract 
production and cost system. 

[C] Induction problem--work not started at contractor facilities as of 
September 30, 2000, as scheduled or was started late in the fiscal 
year, which prevented the work from being completed as planned. 

[D] Repair problem--work not repaired by the contractor as planned 
because of a parts problem, a capacity problem, such as manpower 
shortages, or more work needed to be performed than originally planned. 

[E] Unknown problem--neither air logistics center officials nor we 
could determine the cause or the dollar amount of work not completed 
as planned as of September 30, 2000, because the information was not 
available. 

[F] Reporting problem--work that was completed as of September 30, 
2000, but shown as not completed in the contract production and cost 
system. 

[End of table] 

We obtained information on the contractor performing the work, 
financial data, and production data for each item in the sample from 
the production and cost system. This information follows: (1) contract 
number, (2) contract line item number, (3) end item identity, (4) 
fiscal year of order financing the work, (5) production management 
specialist office responsible for overseeing the work, (6) unit sales 
price for the work, (7) quantities of items planned to be repaired and 
when, (8) quantities of items repaired as of September 30, 2000, and 
September 30, 2001, and (9) dollar amount of unfilled orders as of 
September 30, 2000. We analyzed the above information to determine if 
the work was accomplished in fiscal year 2000 as planned and, if not, 
we obtained explanations from the air logistics centers about why the 
work was not completed. 

We performed our review at the headquarters offices of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Secretary of the Air Force,
Washington, D.C.; Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio; the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker Air 
Force Base, Oklahoma; the Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force 
Base, Utah; and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air 
Force Base, Georgia. Our review was performed from July 2001 through 
May 2002 in accordance with U. S. generally accepted government 
auditing standards. The production and financial information referred 
to in this report was provided by the Air Force. We worked with Air 
Force officials to validate the reliability of the information in the 
system to determine the reasons for the work not being completed at 
the end of fiscal year 2000. We requested comments on a draft of this 
report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. DOD provided 
written comments and these comments are presented in the "Agency 
Comments and Our Evaluation" section of this report and are reprinted 
in appendix III. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Sample Element Disposition Table: 

Category: Aircraft: 

Stratum #: 1; 
Stratum range (Low): $50,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $1,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 238; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 2; 
Stratum range (Low): $1,000,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $4,600,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 60; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 3; 
Stratum range (Low): $4,600,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $55,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 12; 
Total number of items sampled: 12. 

Total: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 310; 
Total number of items sampled: 72. 

Category: Engines: 

Stratum #: 1; 
Stratum range (Low): $50,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $2,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 36; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 2; 
Stratum range (Low): $2,000,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $42,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 9; 
Total number of items sampled: 9. 

Total: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 45; 
Total number of items sampled: 39. 

Category: Exchangeable: 

Stratum #: 1; 
Stratum range (Low): $20,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $175,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 3,270; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 2; 
Stratum range (Low): $175,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $725,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 748; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 3; 
Stratum range (Low): $725,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $4,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 178; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 4; 
Stratum range (Low): $4,000,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $43,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 19; 
Total number of items sampled: 19 

Total: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 4,215; 
Total number of items sampled: 109. 

Category: Missiles & Other: 

Stratum #: 1; 
Stratum range (Low): $50,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $250,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 160; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 2; 
Stratum range (Low): $250,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $900,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 67; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 3; 
Stratum range (Low): $900,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $2,600,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 15; 
Total number of items sampled: 15. 

Total: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 242; 
Total number of items sampled: 75. 

Category: Software: 

Stratum #: 1; 
Stratum range (Low): $50,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $500,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 189; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 2; 
Stratum range (Low): $500,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $2,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 61; 
Total number of items sampled: 30. 

Stratum #: 3; 
Stratum range (Low): $2,000,000.00; 
Stratum range (High): $27,000,000.00; 
Total number of transactions in the population: 14; 
Total number of items sampled: 14. 

Total: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 264; 
Total number of items sampled: 74. 

Totals: 
Total number of transactions in the population: 5,076; 
Total number of items sampled: 369. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Comptroller: 
1100 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1100: 

May 30, 2002: 

Mr. Greg Kutz: 
Director, Financial Management and Assurance: 
U.S. General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Kutz: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "Air Force Depot Maintenance: 
Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract 
maintenance Workï¿½ dated April 22, 2002 (GAO 02-623). 

The DoD has reviewed the draft report and concurs with the 
recommendations. Specific comments for each recommendation are 
enclosed. My point of contact is Mr. Robert Donnelly, 703-697-1880. 
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. An identical letter is being sent to Mr. Warren, who was also 
responsible for this audit. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Dov S. Zakheim: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

cc: 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics: 
DoD Inspector General: 
Defense Finance & Accounting Service: 
Joint Staff (J4): 

[End of letter] 

DoD Comments On The Draft General Accounting Office Report, Air Force 
Depot Maintenance: "Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of 
Funded Contract Maintenance Work" GA0-02-623: 

The following comments are provided for each recommendation and its 
associated findings. 

Recommendation 1: Use the date contractors actually start work rather 
than the planned start date to calculate work-in-process for all 
workload categories as long as the contract portion of the activity 
group remains in the working capital fund. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The Air Force has indicated that they intend to 
request authority to remove contract depot maintenance from the 
Working Capital Fund (WCF). If this request is approved, work in 
process (WIP) will no longer be a valid measure of performance. If 
removed from the WCF, contract depot maintenance efforts will be 
monitored and reported in the same manner as any other appropriated 
entity would monitor them. 

Recommendation 2: Improve the accuracy of the data in its systems that 
track repair actions and account for costs by (1) holding managers 
accountable for ensuring the accuracy of the data; (2) developing 
standard operating procedures that provide detailed guidance on 
production management specialists' day-to-day responsibilities, 
particularly in the area of ensuring data accuracy; (3) providing
additional training to production management specialists on these 
procedures; and (4) developing metrics that act as "red flags" to 
alert management of possible data problems. At a minimum, the systems 
should provide timely and accurate information on when contractors 
receive broken items, items are input into work, repairs are completed,
and repaired items are returned to customers. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The recommendations address problems that must 
be dealt with even if contract depot maintenance is removed from the 
WCF. To improve performance in this area, the Air Force has hired a 
number of production management specialists (PMS) and they are in
the process of providing various training courses. Air Force has 
identified and/or developed several training courses to address these 
weaknesses. 

Recommendation 3: Develop accurate and complete information on 
contracts that were awarded by the San Antonio and Sacramento Air 
Logistic Centers and subsequently transferred to the three remaining 
centers to avoid loss of control that may result in fraud, waste, and 
abuse. This will require, at a minimum: (1) establishing milestones
for completing both the review of transferred contracts and resolving 
data problems identified during the reviews; (2) using metrics to 
monitor progress; and (3) ensuring that sufficient resources are 
dedicated to the resolution of the problem. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The Air Force is taking a two-tiered approach to 
manage contracts that were transferred from closed Air Logistics 
Centers (ALC). First, the ALCs have established a formal group that is 
systematically investigating and reconciling contracts that were
transferred from the closed ALCs. During the course of this process, 
the status of reconciliation will be provided to each respective ALC 
Commander. 

Recommendation 4: Identify the underlying causes of the contract depot 
maintenance awaiting parts problem. Additionally, develop an action 
plan to address the underlying causes for the awaiting parts problems 
similar to the plan that was recently developed to address the 
awaiting parts problems for the ALC's in-house depot maintenance 
operations. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The Air Force has established a team to address 
the awaiting parts issue for both in-house and contract workload. 

Recommendation 5: Provide clear and consistent guidance on how, when, 
and by whom the induction of assets should be monitored. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The Air Force will update guidance to address 
how, when, and by whom the induction of assets should be monitored. 

Recommendation 6: Establish internal control procedures to ensure that 
the guidance on the induction of assets is followed. 

DoD Comments: Concur. The culmination of the above actions will 
strengthen the Air Force's internal control over the induction of 
assets. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact: 

Greg Pugnetti, (703) 695-6922. 

Acknowledgments: 

Staff who made key contributions to this report were Sharon Byrd,
Francine DelVecchio, Karl Gustafson, William Hill, Ron Tobias, and 
Eddie Uyekawa. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Working Capital Fund: 
Improvements Needed for Managing the Backlog of Funded Work, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-559] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 30, 2001). 

[2] The carryover amount includes work for which obligations have been 
made but which has not yet started and the cost to complete work that 
has been started. The Air Force calculates carryover by subtracting 
the amount of work-in-process from the amount of unfilled orders. 
Unfilled orders equals the dollar value of customer orders received 
less revenue earned. Revenue is earned as repairs on undelivered items 
are completed. Work-in-process is the cost of the materials, labor, 
and indirect costs used in producing an end item or service on an 
order that is not yet complete. 

[3] Estimate made as a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $81 million. 

[4] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $58 million. 

[5] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $87 million. 

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Working Capital Fund: 
Improvements Needed for Managing the Backlog of Funded Work, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-559] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 30, 2001). 

[7] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $65 million. 

[8] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $81 million. 

[9] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $58 million. 

[10] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $58 million. 

[11] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $62 million. 

[12] The leading edge is a part located in front of the engine on a C-
5 aircraft that helps direct air into the engine. 

[13] This problem is discussed in our report entitled, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Air Force Supply: Management Actions Create Spare 
Parts Shortages and Operational Problems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-99-77] (Washington, D.C.: 
April 29, 1999). 

[14] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $53 million. 

[15] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $58 million. 

[16] Although this problem applied primarily to software workloads, we 
found similar problems with other workloads that have an output 
expressed as a level of effort, such as months or hours of work, 
rather than items repaired. 

[17] In fiscal year 2001, the Air Force completed the closure of the 
Sacramento and San Antonio Air Logistics Centers, as directed by the 
1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. 

[18] We did not find this to be a significant problem at one of the 
remaining air logistics centers primarily because an entire product 
directorate, including key personnel from the contract depot 
maintenance function, transferred with the workload from one of the 
closing air logistics centers. Personnel from the contract function 
brought the contract information (e.g., contract files) with them in 
order to avoid any problems with missing data According to officials 
at the remaining center, the work that the transferred product 
directorate performs accounts for about 65 percent of the remaining 
center's total workload. 

[19] Hush houses are structures that contain noise suppression 
systems. They are used to reduce the noise associated with engine 
tests. 

[20] Estimate made at a 95 percent confidence level with a confidence 
interval of +/- $10 million. 

[End of section] 

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