Force Structure: Air Force Needs a Periodic Total Force 	 
Assessment (02-MAY-02, GAO-02-541).				 
                                                                 
In May 2000, the Air Force began to test the force requirements  
in its manpower requirements-determination process. The defense  
strategy envisions simultaneously fighting two major theater wars
and conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. The 
Total Force Assessment was the Air Force's first evaluation of	 
manpower adequacy in these contexts since 1995. Because the Total
Force Assessment was not implemented as planned, the Air Force	 
cannot demonstrate that it has the forces needed to carry out the
full spectrum of military operations. Although intended to	 
examine whether authorized Air Force personnel were sufficient to
meet both the wartime and peacetime scenarios, the assessment	 
only addressed the wartime scenario and did not address the	 
adequacy of manpower for conducting multiple contingency	 
operations in peacetime. Further, although Air Force officials	 
concluded that manpower was adequate to support the wartime	 
scenario, this assessment was inconclusive because the effort was
discontinued before all discrepancies in the assessment's results
were resolved. Although the Air Force spent considerable time and
effort conducting at least a portion of its planned assessment,  
it has not used the results to the extent anticipated.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-541 					        
    ACCNO:   A03216						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Air Force Needs a Periodic Total Force  
Assessment							 
     DATE:   05/02/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force personnel				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Military operations				 
	     Strategic mobility forces				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Air Force Manpower Data System			 
	     Air Force Total Force Assessment			 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 


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GAO-02-541
     
Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2002 FORCE STRUCTURE Air Force Needs a Periodic Total Force Assessment

GAO- 02- 541

Page 1 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

May 2, 2002 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

In May 2000, the Air Force initiated an assessment to test whether the force
requirements derived from its manpower requirementsdetermination process
were sufficient to support the spectrum of military operations envisioned in
the defense strategy: from simultaneously fighting two major theater wars to
conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. This assessment,
called the Total Force Assessment, was the Air Force?s first evaluation of
manpower adequacy in these contexts since 1995. Past assessments have been
done on an irregular basis. In addition to assessing whether the Air Force
could support the envisioned wartime and peacetime military operations, the
most recent Total Force Assessment was generally expected to provide
information to assist Air Force leadership in other force- management and
decision- making processes. For example, the Air Force anticipated that
Total Force Assessment results might be used to assess the appropriateness
of its force mix, provide additional support for budgetary submissions, and
provide data for day- to- day management of manpower assets.

A sound process for determining the military services? ability to support
Department of Defense?s (DOD?s) strategy for military operations that occurs
on a regular basis is critical. Without it, the services cannot assess war-
fighting risk and effectively allocate personnel to meet both wartime and
peacetime requirements. In setting its corporate- level performance goals,
DOD has recognized the need for an appropriately sized force to respond to
the full spectrum of crises, and the Congress, too, has

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

demonstrated interest in knowing whether service force size and structure
are consistent with strategy demands.

Accordingly, in this report we address the following questions: (1) Did the
Total Force Assessment demonstrate that the Air Force has the forces needed
to carry out the full spectrum of military operations envisioned in the
defense strategy? (2) To what extent did the Air Force use results from the
Total Force Assessment to improve force- management and decisionmaking
processes? We are providing this report to you because of your oversight
responsibilities and past interest in the Air Force process.

Because the Total Force Assessment was not implemented as planned, the Air
Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the forces needed to carry
out the full spectrum of military operations. Although intended to examine
whether authorized Air Force personnel were sufficient to meet both the
wartime and peacetime scenarios, the assessment only addressed the wartime
scenario. Work on the adequacy of manpower for conducting multiple
contingency operations in peacetime was never initiated. Further, although
Air Force officials concluded that manpower was adequate to support the
wartime scenario, this assessment was somewhat inconclusive because the
effort was discontinued before all discrepancies in the assessment?s results
were resolved. The assessment?s incomplete nature and its irregular timing
suggest that the Air Force is not placing a high priority on this type of
analysis. Not completing the assessment as planned and on a regular basis
impairs the credibility of the process and prevents the Air Force from
consistently and objectively demonstrating that it has a sufficient number
and mix of forces to carry out the defense strategy.

Although the Air Force spent considerable time and effort conducting at
least a portion of its planned assessment, it has not used the results to
the full extent anticipated. On the positive side, Total Force Assessment
results have been used by functional managers to discuss the health of their
career fields with the chief of staff of the Air Force. For example, the
Total Force Assessment identified force mix imbalances and as a result some
functional managers have been asked to consider making greater use of
reserve forces. However, the results are not being used as planned to
support changes in Air Force budget submissions or to provide data for day-
to- day management of manpower assets. The Department of the Air Force may
be losing important opportunities to improve overall force management
processes by not fully using the results of the assessment. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

We are recommending that the secretary of defense direct the Air Force to
conduct this assessment on a regular basis and clearly define how its
results will be used.

The Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation, noting that the
Air Force has already taken steps to initiate a new iteration of the Total
Force Assessment, with the first results due for completion in December
2002. The department also provided several observations on our analysis,
which are addressed on pages seven and eight of this report.

The Air Force?s manpower requirements are determined by individual major
commands, using a number of methodologies, including manpower standards,
logistical models, and crew ratios. Once approved by Air Force leadership,
the results serve as the basis for authorizing military, civilian, and
contractor positions in the Air Force and are entered into the Air Force?s
Manpower Data System. 1

The Air Force?s Directorate of Manpower and Organization designed the Total
Force Assessment (TFA) process to assess whether the various methodologies
used by the Air Force to determine manpower requirements generated
sufficient manpower to accomplish two purposes: (1) meet deployment
commitments should it be called on to fight two major theater wars and (2)
conduct multiple small- scale contingency operations in peacetime. To assess
whether the authorized manpower was adequate for the wartime scenario, the
Air Force compared the authorized forces in the Manpower Data System to the
deployment commitments demanded by the two major theater wars. It then
calculated the effect of deploying these forces on the manpower needed to
continue operations at existing airbases (i. e., in- place support forces).
Demands for the deployment commitments were identified using troop
deployment lists 2 generated from war plans for conducting wars in Southwest
and Northeast Asia. The requirements for in- place support forces were
calculated using a model that adjusts manpower requirements to account for
changes in the

1 The Air Force?s Manpower Data System is the official source of manpower
authorization data for active Air Force, Air National Guard, Air Force
Reserve, and civilian and contractor personnel.

2 Includes deploying combat and support forces identified in the Time Phased
Force and Deployment Data, which are based on the operation plans for the
two -major -theater -war scenario. Background

Page 4 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

personnel needed to support ongoing Air Force operations when forces are
deployed. Plans for assessing the adequacy of forces in peacetime were never
finalized.

The Air Force conducted only the wartime component of the assessment, not
the component assessing the adequacy of its manpower in conducting multiple
contingency operations in peacetime. Moreover, the wartime component of the
assessment was stopped before all discrepancies were resolved and, as a
result, it was not conclusive. The incompleteness and irregular timing of
this and similar past assessments indicate that they have not been a high
priority for the Air Force.

The Total Force Assessment was not entirely implemented as planned, and as a
result the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the manpower
needed to carry out the operations envisioned by DOD. Begun in May 2000,
this effort was conducted, in part, to provide the Air Force with an
overarching analysis of its personnel requirements in preparation for the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. It was to be completed by January 2001.
However, as of January 2002, the Air Force had essentially completed its
assessment of wartime requirements, but it had not yet begun its assessment
of whether Air Force authorized personnel were sufficient to support
contingency operations in peacetime. The peacetime analysis was important
because it would demonstrate whether particular career fields might be
overburdened in peacetime even if sufficient forces were available to meet
the two- theater- war scenario.

The results of the wartime analysis were somewhat inconclusive because the
Air Force stopped work on the study before some discrepancies in the
assessment?s results were resolved. These discrepancies occurred because the
process used for the study resulted in double counting some requirements,
which in turn required the Air Force to manually review results for
accuracy. Air Force officials told us they discontinued further work
resolving discrepancies because Air Force leadership believed there was a
strong likelihood that defense guidance would be changed from the Total
Force

Assessment Has Not Established the Air Force?s Ability to Carry Out the
Defense Strategy

Total Force Assessment Not Fully Implemented

Page 5 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

two major theater war scenario to some other scenario. 3 Such a change would
have reduced the utility of any further efforts to produce more accurate
results. At the time they stopped work, Air Force officials had concluded
that results were about 90 percent accurate. According to Air Force
officials, the leadership of the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and
Organization believed that, at that point, the assessment results showed
that forces were adequate to support the wartime scenario, and these results
were subsequently briefed to the chief of staff of the Air Force.

At the time of our review, Air Force officials still planned to conduct the
peacetime analysis, but in view of the change in defense strategy they no
longer plan to complete this portion of the current assessment. Instead, the
Air Force plans to revamp the TFA process. Air Force officials advised us
that in the future the TFA might be streamlined and shortened in duration
since Air Force leadership believes that the current assessment is too time-
consuming and manpower intensive. These officials said that they had
proposed that the next TFA capitalize on the modeling that was used in the
most recent Quadrennial Defense Review to test whether Air Force manpower is
sufficient to meet a wide range of scenarios indicated by that review. Using
this new approach, Air Force officials now anticipate completing a new
iteration of TFA, covering the full spectrum of conflict, by December 2002.

The incomplete implementation of the TFA reflects that, to some extent, the
Air Force has not placed a high priority on achieving the goals of this type
of assessment, as evidenced by the long interval experienced between
assessments. A forerunner to Total Force Assessment, FORSIZE, was last
completed in 1995- more than 6 years ago. No FORSIZE study was conducted in
1996 or 1997 because the analytical resources needed to conduct the
assessment were devoted to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review instead. 4

3 The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report states DOD?s
intentions to shift the focus of U. S. force planning from optimizing for
conflicts in two particular regions to building a portfolio of capabilities
that is robust across the spectrum of possible force requirements. DOD
intends to maintain the ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas
in overlapping time frames.

4 There were no FORSIZE exercises in 1989 through 1993 because of the
changing world environment, numerous Air Force command reorganizations, and
the Persian Gulf War. Air Force Has Not Made

This Type of Analysis a High Priority

Page 6 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Planning for the most recent TFA began in 1999, but efforts were impeded by
other changes the Air Force was undergoing, such as the recognition that the
Air Force needed forces to conduct contingency operations as well as forces
to meet the wartime scenarios, a need that then had to be incorporated in
TFA?s design. While these changes certainly complicated the Air Force
analysis, such uncertainty and change have almost become constants within
DOD. Doing without a regular, institutionalized process- on the basis of
inevitable complications- denies the Air Force?s Directorate of Manpower and
Organization a way to determine objectively whether it has the forces needed
to carry out the defense strategy.

The Air Force did not use the results from the assessment for all of the
purposes it had envisioned. On the positive side, Air Force officials told
us that TFA results had been useful in helping some functional managers
discuss the health of their career fields in briefings to the chief of staff
of the Air Force. For example, the Total Force Assessment showed that the
number of active forces fell somewhat short of the numbers demanded for the
wartime scenario, while the number of reserve forces exceeded demands. In
some situations, functional managers were asked to consider making greater
use of reserve forces if active forces were deemed insufficient. On the
other hand, the Air Force did not use TFA results as anticipated to support
changes in budget submissions or to influence dayto- day management of
manpower assets. Officials also noted that TFA results were not used to
reallocate forces among various functional managers to make the best use of
available forces, although they noted that TFA was not designed to do this.
As a result, TFA has not lived up to its full potential for assisting Air
Force leadership in making manpower decisions that can lead to a more
effective force.

We believe there are two possible reasons why the Air Force did not use TFA
results to the full extent expected. First, because implementation of TFA
was incomplete, the results themselves are incomplete and thus may have been
viewed as of limited value for supporting changes to the budget or in making
day to day management decisions. For example, officials told us that, with
the changes to defense guidance and deployment schedules, TFA results are
now viewed as one more data source on which to base decisions. Second,
because TFA has not been institutionalized and does not occur on a regular
basis, its results may have been viewed as insufficient or not timely for
these purposes; for example, the Air Force might not have been able to link
TFA results to very formalized and regularly occurring systems like the
budget. Air Force Not

Capitalizing as Anticipated on Assessment?s Results

Page 7 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Because the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the forces
necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations envisioned
in defense guidance, its operational risk in both wartime and peacetime may
not be fully understood. Both the secretary of defense and the Congress need
this information to effectively discharge their respective oversight
responsibilities. Without an institutionalized process for assessing risk,
which occurs on a regular basis, the Air Force has no way of knowing what
mitigating actions might be warranted. On the positive side, the Air Force
has identified other aspects of force management that could benefit from the
results of a Total Force Assessment. However, it has not been able to
capitalize on this potential because the results to date have been
incomplete and irregularly obtained. By not placing a high enough priority
on conducting a regularly occurring assessment and by underutilizing
assessment results, the Air Force may be shortchanging itself in terms of
achieving an appropriate force size and mix and in terms of fully developing
the related funding requirements.

To enable the Air Force to objectively demonstrate it has the forces
necessary to support the spectrum of military operations envisioned in the
defense strategy and to enhance force management processes, we recommend
that the secretary of defense direct the secretary of the Air Force to
institutionalize a Total Force Assessment process to be conducted on a
regular basis with clearly articulated uses for its results.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation that the Air Force institutionalize TFA but took issue with
some of the findings and analysis in our assessment. DOD?s concerns center
around whether the Air Force implemented TFA as planned and was able to
establish its ability to carry out the full spectrum of missions envisioned
by the defense strategy. Our assertion that the TFA was not implemented as
planned is based on the fact that the chief of staff of the Air Force
tasking letter that initiated TFA and the subsequent overarching guidance
written by the Air Force specified an assessment of manpower requirements
for both peacetime and wartime operations. At the time of our review, the
Air Force had completed the wartime portion, but had not yet addressed
peacetime operations. We understand, and noted in our report, that the Air
Force now expects to complete a new iteration of TFA, covering the full
spectrum of conflict, by December 2002. We endorse this effort and are
hopeful that it reaches fruition. It does not alter the fact, however, that
the fiscal year 1999 TFA was not fully implemented as planned, and that,
lacking requirements for peacetime operations, it did Conclusions

Recommendation for Executive Action

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 8 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

not objectively establish the Air Force?s ability to fully execute the
defense guidance.

DOD?s comments also stress that the two major theater war portion of TFA was
completed and briefed to the chief of staff of the Air Force and that the
results showed that the Air Force had sufficient manpower to satisfy mission
requirements. Our report acknowledges these facts. We noted, however, that
the numbers resulting from the assessment were somewhat inconclusive and
less useful than they might have been because work on the study was
discontinued before all discrepancies were resolved. As stated in our
report, Air Force officials estimated that final results were about 90
percent accurate.

DOD?s comments further questioned our conclusion that TFA had not
capitalized as anticipated on the assessment?s results, stating that the
results of TFA were used widely for initiating taskings and making
decisions. Our report does not indicate that TFA results were not used at
all, only that its intended potential was not realized. We were unable to
document the extent to which TFA was used for tasking and decisionmaking
because the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and Organization did not
produce a final report on TFA results, and it did not establish procedures
for systematically tracking issues developed from TFA data and resulting
actions to resolve them. Based on information provided by Air Force
officials, we did acknowledge in our report that TFA results were used by
functional managers to explore increasing the use of reserve forces to
mitigate shortfalls in the active forces. However, during our review Air
Force officials told us that TFA results would not be used for other
purposes envisioned in the initial guidance written for TFA (e. g.,
supporting budget submissions and for day- to- day management of manpower
assets). The department?s written comments are presented in their entirety
in appendix I.

To evaluate whether the Air Force?s Total Force Assessment demonstrated that
forces are adequate to carry out the defense strategy, we reviewed Air Force
policy, guidance, and documents used in planning and conducting the
assessment from calendar year 1999 through 2001. We also reviewed the
assessment?s results and discussed these results with officials responsible
for this analysis. These included representatives of the Air Force?s
Directorate of Manpower and Organization at the Pentagon; Air Force Manpower
Readiness Flight at Fort Detrick, Maryland; and the Air Force Manpower and
Innovation Agency in San Antonio, Texas. We also discussed the assessment?s
methodology and past assessments with these Scope and

Methodology

Page 9 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

officials. We did not independently verify the underlying
manpowerrequirements system information that serves as the starting point
for the Total Force Assessment. To determine how the Air Force used the
assessment?s results, we identified its anticipated uses and discussed with
Air Force officials how these results were actually used.

We conducted our review from July 2001 through January 2002, in accordance
with generally accepted government audit standards. We obtained comments on
a draft of this report from the Department of Defense and incorporated its
comments where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense and the
director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested
parties on request. If you or your staff has any questions about this
report, please call me at (202) 512- 3958. Major contributors to this report
were Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, James K. Mahaffey, Norman L. Jessup, Jr., and Susan
K. Woodward.

Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 10 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 11 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 12 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 13 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 14 GAO- 02- 541 Force Structure (350088)

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