Intercity Passenger Rail: Congress Faces Critical Decisions in	 
Developing a National Policy (11-APR-02, GAO-02-522T).		 
								 
Due to	Amtrak's worsening financial condition, there is growing 
agreement that the current mission, funding, and structure for	 
providing intercity passenger rail needs to be changed. Intercity
passenger rail has the potential to generate benefits by	 
complementing other more heavily used modes of transportation in 
markets where rail transport can be competitive. These potential 
benefits include reducing air and highway congestion, reducing	 
pollution caused by automobiles, reducing fuel consumption and	 
energy dependency, and increasing safety. Intercity passenger	 
rail systems, like other intercity transportation systems, are	 
expensive. Amtrak has called for $30 billion in federal capital  
support over 20 years to upgrade its operations and to invest in 
high-speed rail corridors. Amtrak also estimates that the cost to
fully develop the 10 federally designated high-speed rail	 
corridors and Amtrak's Northeast Corridor could exceed $50	 
billion over 20 years. Congress must determine if and how	 
intercity passenger rail fits into the nation's transportation	 
system. and what level of federal investment should be made in	 
light of other competing national priorities. Key initial steps  
in this framework could include (1) establishing clear, 	 
non-conflicting goals for federal support of intercity passenger 
rail systems; (2) establishing the roles of governmental and	 
private entities and developing funding approaches to provide	 
incentives for results and accountability; and (3) ensuring that 
the strategies developed address stake holder interests and limit
unintended consequences.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-522T					        
    ACCNO:   A03042						        
  TITLE:     Intercity Passenger Rail: Congress Faces Critical	      
Decisions in Developing a National Policy			 
     DATE:   04/11/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Mass transit funding				 
	     Railroad transportation operations 		 
	     Mass transit operations				 
	     Railroad industry					 
	     Cost control					 
	     Strategic planning 				 

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GAO-02-522T
     
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Railroads, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Thursday April 11,
2002

INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL

Congress Faces Critical Decisions in Developing a National Policy

Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO- 02- 522T

Page 1 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the opportunity
to testify on the future of intercity passenger rail. As you know, intercity
passenger rail in the United States is at a critical juncture. As has become
increasingly clear and as we observed before this subcommittee last summer,
the current approach to intercity passenger rail is not likely sustainable.
1 Given Amtrak?s worsening financial condition and opportunities for
intercity passenger rail to play a larger role in our nation?s
transportation system, there is growing agreement that the mission, funding,
and structure of the current approach to providing intercity passenger rail
needs to be changed. There is less agreement on how they should be changed.
Both longer- term fiscal pressures and the new commitments undertaken after
September 11 th sharpen the need to look at competing claims and new
priorities. 2 Stated differently, there is a need to consider what is the
proper role of the federal government in intercity passenger rail.

Proposals to revise how intercity passenger rail service is delivered and
financed are emerging. To help assess the benefits to the nation that might
arise from these and other proposals, and whether the expected benefits
warrant the costs, we believe that a framework for developing a national
passenger rail policy would be useful. To assist Congress, our statement
provides initial considerations for this framework. In particular, it
focuses on (1) the potential public benefits of intercity passenger rail
service, (2) the potential costs of providing such service, and (3) initial
considerations that could guide Congress as it debates any future role of
the federal government in supporting intercity passenger rail service. This
statement is based on our discussions with officials from 30 state
departments of transportation, commuter railroads, and freight railroads
that are affected by Amtrak, several prospective intercity rail operators,
and Amtrak. We also draw from our reports on intercity passenger rail,
budget priorities, and lessons learned from federal financial assistance
efforts directed to large organizations. (See app. I for selected products.)

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: The Congress
Faces Critical Decisions About the Role of and Funding for Intercity
Passenger Rail Systems,

GAO/ RCED- 01- 820T (Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2001). 2 U. S. General
Accounting Office, Budget Issues: Long- term Fiscal Challenges, GAO- 02467T
(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

Page 2 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

In summary:  Intercity passenger rail has the potential to generate
benefits to society

(often called public benefits) by complementing other more heavily used
modes of transportation in markets in which rail transport can be
competitive. These potential benefits include stemming the increase in air
and highway congestion, reducing pollution caused by automobiles, reducing
fuel consumption and energy dependency, and increasing safety. The potential
for achieving and maximizing these benefits appears the greatest along
routes that parallel heavily traveled highway or air corridors between two
cities that are not too far apart.  Regarding costs, intercity passenger
rail systems, like other intercity

transportation systems, are expensive. While Amtrak?s and others? estimates
of costs to develop and maintain conventional and high speed passenger rail
systems are very preliminary, it is clear the level of funding needed for
both capital and operations will be significant. For example, Amtrak has
called for $30 billion in federal capital support over 20 years to upgrade
its operations and to invest as seed money in highspeed rail corridors.
Amtrak also estimates that the cost to fully develop the 10 federally
designated high- speed rail corridors and Amtrak?s Northeast Corridor could
exceed $50 billion over 20 years. While we have not assessed these
estimates, we agree that such systems will be costly. Furthermore, our work
indicates that intercity passenger rail will likely continue to require
operating subsidies even if provisions are made to encourage private
operators to provide such service.

 Given the uneven potential for generating social benefits and large costs
of intercity passenger rail, Congress will need a framework for determining
if and how intercity passenger rail fits into our nation?s transportation
system, and what level of federal investment should be made in light of
other competing national priorities. Key initial steps in this framework
could include (1) establishing clear, non- conflicting goals for federal
support of intercity passenger rail systems; (2) establishing the roles of
governmental and private entities and developing funding approaches that
focus on and provide incentives for results and accountability, and (3)
ensuring that the strategies developed address diverse stakeholder
interests, to the extent possible, and limit unintended consequences.

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity
passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service
unprofitable. Although Amtrak was given significant flexibility with
Background

Page 3 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

respect to its route system by the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of
1997, that act also directed it to operate a national passenger rail system
that ties together existing and emerging regional passenger rail service and
other intermodal passenger services.

Amtrak operates a 22,000- mile conventional passenger rail system (with
train speeds typically up to 79 miles per hour), primarily over tracks owned
by freight railroads. (See fig. 1.) Federal law requires that freight
railroads give Amtrak trains priority access and charge Amtrak the
incremental cost- rather than the full cost- associated with the use of
their tracks. Amtrak owns 650 miles of track, primarily on the Northeast
Corridor, which runs between Boston and Washington, D. C. On some portions
of this corridor, Amtrak provides high- speed service (up to 150 miles per
hour). In addition, access to this corridor is crucial for 8 commuter
railroads (operated by state and local governments) that serve 1.2 million
passengers each work day. Finally, according to Amtrak, about 38 trains from
6 freight railroads use the corridor each day.

Page 4 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Figure 1: Amtrak?s Route System

Source: Amtrak.

Currently, intercity passenger rail plays a small part in the nation?s
overall transportation system (with the exception of some shorter distance
corridors). On average, about 64,000 passengers in 45 states and the
District of Columbia rode Amtrak trains each day in fiscal year 2001.
(According to Amtrak about two- thirds of its ridership is either wholly or
partially on the Northeast Corridor.) In contrast, in 2000, the latest year
for which data are available, domestic airlines carried about 1. 8 million
passengers per day; and intercity buses carried about 984,000 passengers per
day. Amtrak carried fewer than 1, 000 passengers a day, on average, in 34 of
the states where it operated in fiscal year 2001. 3 (See fig. 2.) Further,

3 Amtrak instituted service in a 46 th state, Maine, in mid December 2001.

Page 5 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Amtrak carried fewer than 100 passengers a day, on average, in 12 of these
states.

Figure 2: Amtrak?s Average Daily Ridership by State, Fiscal Year 2001

Note: Based on number of persons boarding and deboarding trains. Amtrak
began service to Maine in mid- December 2001.

Source: Amtrak.

Page 6 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Amtrak?s ridership in many markets is limited, in part, because it is
generally neither time- nor price- competitive with air service for longer
distances. As a result, Amtrak?s market share relative to air service falls
off rapidly as travel distance- and therefore travel time- increases. (See
fig. 3.)

Figure 3: Amtrak?s Market Share Compared to Air Service for Selected Origins
and Destinations

Note: Generally, longer travel times are consistent with greater distances
between origins and destinations. Data on Northeast Corridor trains reflect
fourth quarter fiscal year 2001 market shares following the launch of Acela
Express. For all other trains, data reflect market shares for fiscal year
2000.

Source: Amtrak.

In addition, highways have made cars competitive with conventional trains
for shorter distances, particularly because the marginal cost of an
additional automobile rider in a single vehicle is small. On a train, the

Page 7 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

additional passenger would typically pay an additional fare. Further, in
contrast to Amtrak?s system, highway and scheduled air systems are true
networks. Amtrak?s system is largely linear, connecting most stations to
other stations on the same route. Transfer points are few, and limited train
frequency can make changing trains impractical. 4

A significant federal investment led to the development of the extensive air
system and highway network. For example, the federal government invested
$225 billion in aviation systems and $607 billion in highways from 1971
through 2000 (in 2000 dollars, latest data available). 5 In contrast, the
federal government provided Amtrak over $39 billion (in 2000 dollars) for
capital and operating expenses from 1971 through 2002. 6 The federal
government also provided substantial incentives to railroads (over whose
tracks Amtrak runs) in the 19 th century to help develop these
transportation systems.

Amtrak?s financial condition has been deteriorating over recent years.
Although its revenue has been increasing, its expenses have been increasing
at a greater rate. It has deferred maintenance on equipment and structures
and has limited funds available for making safety improvements. Amtrak has
mortgaged just about all of its assets other than the Northeast Corridor to
provide it with enough cash to survive. In February 2002, Amtrak announced
that it would need $1.2 billion in federal financial assistance in 2003 to
meet basic needs, more than twice the amount that Congress provided in 2002.
The Department of Transportation?s Inspector General has stated that Amtrak
cannot survive the year on recent levels of federal support.

Proponents of high- speed rail systems (with speeds over 90 miles per hour)
see these systems as a promising means for making trains more

4 Statement of the Honorable Allan Rutter, Federal Railroad Administration,
before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, House
Committee on Appropriations, Feb. 27, 2002.

5 Includes expenditures by the Department of Transportation and other
federal agencies. In nominal dollars, the federal government invested about
$158 billion in aviation systems and about $415 billion in highways from
1971 through 2000.

6 In nominal dollars, Congress provided Amtrak with about $25 billion from
1971 through 2002.

Page 8 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

competitive with other modes of transportation. 7 They see the introduction
of high- speed rail systems in various areas of the country as a cost-
effective means of increasing transportation capacity (the ability to carry
more travelers) and relieving air and highway congestion, among other
things. However, high- speed rail service outside Amtrak?s Northeast
Corridor has not yet been established, partly because of its
multibilliondollar cost and because of concerns about overly optimistic
ridership estimates. 8

High- speed trains can operate on tracks owned by freight railroads that
have been upgraded to accommodate higher speeds or on dedicated rights- of-
way. The greater the passenger train?s speed, the more likely it is to
require a dedicated right- of- way for both safety and operating reasons.
Ten corridors (not including Amtrak?s Northeast Corridor) have been
designated as high- speed rail corridors, either through legislation or by
the Department of Transportation. (See fig. 4.) The 10 federally designated
corridors are generally in various early stages of planning and may be
eligible for federal assistance for planning and technology improvements
through several Department of Transportation programs.

7 The Federal Railroad Administration defines high- speed rail
transportation not by speed of travel but as intercity passenger service
that is time- competitive with airplanes or automobiles on a door- to- door
basis for trips ranging from about 100 to 500 miles. The agency chose a
market- based definition, rather than a speed- based definition, because it
recognizes that opportunities for successful high- speed rail projects
differ markedly among different pairs of cities.

High- speed rail systems are generally of three types: (1) incremental
improvements to existing tracks, signaling systems, and grade crossings and
modern trains that permit speeds between 90 and 150 miles per hour on
existing rights- of- way; (2) completely new infrastructures to support
very- high- speed operations of 200 miles per hour or more; or (3) magnetic
levitation systems that permit speeds of around 300 miles per hour.
Typically, the cost to implement these options grows as the sophistication
of the technology and the speed increase.

8 U. S. General Accounting Office, Surface Infrastructure: High- Speed Rail
Projects in the United States, GAO/ RCED- 99- 44 (Washington, D. C.: Jan.
14, 1999).

Page 9 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Figure 4: Designated High- speed Rail Corridors and Amtrak?s Northeast
Corridor

Source: Federal Railroad Administration.

Empire Corridor Northern New England Corridor Keystone

Corridor Northeast Corridor

Southeast Corridor

Florida Corridor Gulf Coast

Corridor South Central

Corridor Chicago Hub

California Corridor

Pacific Northwest Corridor

Montreal Portland/ Auburn Boston Albany

New York City Philadelphia Washington, D. C.

Hampton Roads Raleigh

Columbia Jacksonville

Orlando Miami Tampa Atlanta

Charlotte Louisville Indianapolis

Detroit Chicago Minneapolis/ St. Paul

Kansas City Tulsa Oklahoma City

Dallas/ Ft. Worth Los Angeles

San Diego Sacramento

San Francisco Bay Area

Eugene Portland

Seattle Vancouver

San Antonio Houston

St. Louis Mobile New Orleans Little Rock

Birmingham Buffalo

Cleveland Pittsburgh

Richmond

Page 10 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Intercity passenger rail has the potential to generate benefits to society
(often called public benefits) by complementing other more heavily used
modes of transportation in markets in which rail transport can be
competitive. 9 These possible benefits include reduced highway and air
travel congestion, 10 pollution, and energy dependence; increased safety;
and an option for travelers to use passenger rail systems in the future.
However, intercity passenger rail service is more likely to achieve these
benefits in some markets rather than others.

One potential public benefit of intercity passenger rail service that is
often cited is the reduced highway congestion that will result if some
people travel by train rather than on highways. The time that people spend
stuck in traffic represents, in part, lost productivity to the economy.
Where congestion exists, intercity passenger rail would not have to capture
a large share of the travelers who would otherwise use other modes to
generate substantial public benefits from reduced highway congestion.
Roadway congestion and gridlock often result when a small number of vehicles
access a roadway that is already at or near capacity. These additional users
have disproportionate, detrimental effects on the flow of traffic and the
users? travel times. As a result, diverting a small group of highway users
to rail transport could have substantial public benefits by reducing roadway
congestion. Because these benefits accrue to highway users and not rail
passengers, an operator of intercity passenger rail service cannot expect to
capture the value of these benefits in fares that rail passengers are
willing to pay.

The specific markets where intercity passenger rail service has the most
potential to generate public benefits from reduced highway congestion now
and in the future are regions where the highway arteries are consistently
operating beyond capacity and are characterized by slowmoving traffic. (See
fig. 5.) Therefore, the rail service likely to alleviate the most highway
congestion would parallel congested corridors that link

9 The identification of public benefits is important because, when public
benefits are substantial, government support for an entity- such as
intercity passenger rail service- can benefit the economy.

10 When considering increasing transportation capacity, federal, state, and
other decisionmakers will need to understand the extent to which travelers
are using existing capacity and are likely to use the increased capacity in
various modes. If new capacity is underutilized (e. g., because it is not
cost competitive or convenient), then the expected benefit will not be fully
realized. Public Benefits of

Intercity Passenger Rail Service May Exist in Certain Markets

Intercity Passenger Rail May Help Alleviate Congestion in Certain Markets

Page 11 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

cities with significant intercity transportation demand and urban
congestion, such as those in the Northeast. For example, the cities of
Seattle, Washington, and Minneapolis/ St. Paul, Minnesota, both have
significant urban highway congestion problems; however, there is little
highway congestion on the route that connects them. Intercity passenger rail
service operating between Boston, Massachusetts, and New York City, or Los
Angeles and San Diego, California, would probably generate greater public
benefits from reduced highway congestion than service running from Seattle
to Minneapolis/ St. Paul. However, realizing these potential public benefits
may be difficult because the prices people pay to drive do not reflect the
true costs of driving, some of which are borne by others due to pollution
and congestion. In addition, Americans continue to have a strong attachment
to cars as their principal transportation choice.

Page 12 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Figure 5: Thirty Metropolitan Areas With the Highest Level of Highway
Congestion, 1999

Source: Texas Transportation Institute.

The public benefits of intercity passenger rail service are also potentially
greater between cities that have well- developed intracity mass transit
systems because intercity passenger rail is more likely to be competitive
with driving on those routes. One reason a traveler may choose driving
between cities over using the train is the mobility a personal vehicle

Page 13 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

provides once the traveler has reached his or her destination. All else
being equal, demand for intercity passenger rail service may potentially be
greater between cities with efficient mass transit systems- for example,
Philadelphia and Washington, D. C.- than between cities without or with less
extensive intracity mass transit systems- for example Sacramento and San
Jose, California- because there is potentially less of a need for a personal
vehicle at the destination. Similarly, congestion is more likely to be
alleviated in those cases where travelers view rail as a more attractive
?door- to- door? travel option (in terms of price, time, comfort, and
safety) than driving if rail terminals are convenient to riders? starting
points and ultimate destinations. Finally, the potential for intercity
passenger rail to reduce highway congestion is greater where there is little
or no additional space to build additional highway lanes and interchanges to
reduce congestion.

Intercity passenger rail service could also potentially ease air travel
congestion (takeoff and landing delays) if it is able to capture enough
market- share to reduce the number of flights between cities through
frequent, competitively priced, and attractive service. 12 (See fig. 6.) As
would be the case with reductions in highway congestion, air travelers, not
rail passengers, would benefit from reductions in air travel congestion. As
a result, for similar reasons, rail service operators may not be able to set
fares that capture the value of these benefits.

12 For a brief discussion of the role that intercity passenger rail might
play in the development of a national strategy to address air transportation
demand, see U. S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Long-
Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite Recent Reductions in Flight Delay,
GAO- 02- 185 (Washington, D. C.: Dec. 14, 2001).

Page 14 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Figure 6: Fifty Busiest Airports in the United States, 2000

Note: Based on enplanements. The airports are not listed in rank order.
Source: Federal Aviation Administration.

Page 15 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

For rail transport to capture the market- share necessary to reduce air
travel congestion, the distance between potential intercity passenger rail
cities must be short enough to make rail travel times competitive with air
travel times (at comparable costs and levels of comfort). For example,
during the first quarter of 2001, the number of air passengers (as measured
by the number of trips) flying between Chicago, Illinois, and Detroit,
Michigan, was comparable to the number of passengers flying between Chicago
and Orlando, Florida. 13 However, the nonstop air distance from Chicago to
Detroit is 233 miles, and the distance from Chicago to Orlando is almost
1,000 miles. Accordingly, it will be harder for intercity passenger rail to
obtain a sizeable market share between Chicago and Orlando because the
travel time by rail is significantly greater (about 3 hours by air and 40
hours by rail). As previously mentioned, Amtrak?s market share decreases
rapidly as travel time increases. Studies also suggest that as the speed of
intercity passenger rail service increases, the potential benefits
attributable to reductions in airport (and highway) delays increase, as does
the potential distance over which rail is able to compete with air
transport.

Similar to highway congestion, the potential for intercity passenger rail to
reduce air congestion is greater where there is little or no additional
space for runways. For example, San Francisco International airport has
fewer options for increasing capacity than the Denver International Airport.
The potential to reduce air congestion is also greater for markets where
limited competition among airlines results in relatively high air fares. In
such markets, intercity passenger rail service will be better able to
compete than in markets where greater competition among airlines keeps air
fares relatively low.

Proponents of high- speed rail service state that a potential public benefit
of intercity passenger rail is a reduced overall level of vehicle emissions,
which results in lower pollution levels and indirectly reduces some health
and environmental costs. If intercity passenger rail service can provide an
incentive for travelers to shift from automobile to rail travel, this switch
could reduce vehicle emissions and pollution. However, the magnitude of
vehicle emission reductions will depend in part on the type of technology

13 Passenger trips flown per day between Chicago and Detroit, and Chicago
and Orlando were 3,239 and 3,158, respectively. Data were obtained from the
U. S. Department of Transportation publication ?Domestic Airline Fares
Consumer Report: First Quarter 2001 Passenger and Fare Information.?
Intercity Passenger Rail

May Help Reduce Vehicle Emissions in Certain Markets

Page 16 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

used to power rail locomotives. 14 In addition, within the range that most
vehicles are driven, automobile carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons emissions
increase as vehicle speed decreases. 15 Therefore, where intercity passenger
rail is successful at easing roadway congestion, this reduced congestion
could result in less of these forms of pollution from the remaining vehicles
on the highway( s). To the extent that they can be attained, the benefits
from reduced pollution are similar to the benefits from reduced congestion
in that they accrue to society as a whole, and not solely to the riders of
intercity passenger trains.

The ability of intercity passenger rail service in a particular market to
generate benefits from reduced vehicle emissions depends on both the level
of pollution and the likelihood that travelers will choose rail service over
other modes of travel. (See fig. 7.) Markets where intercity passenger rail
service could be competitive with other modes in terms of price, travel
time, and quality and frequency of service are likely to offer the greatest
opportunity to reduce pollution.

14 Conventional electric rail systems (taking into account the emissions of
electric generating power plants) emit less carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,
and nitrous oxides per passenger- mile from burning coal (bituminous),
natural gas, or fuel oil than conventional diesel- powered rail. For
particulate matter, coal- generated electric rail produces more emissions
than diesel, but natural gas- and fuel oil- generated electric rail produces
less than diesel. Wayson, R. L. and W. Bowlby, ?Noise and Air Pollution of
High- Speed Rail Systems,? Journal of Transportation Engineering, Vol. 115,
No. 1, January, 1989.

15 Automobile emissions of nitrogen dioxide increase with vehicle speed.

Page 17 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Figure 7: Areas That Did Not Meet Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 2002

Note: Areas darkened are counties in which the whole county or part of the
county was designated nonattainment for ozone. Ozone is not directly emitted
by mobile sources, but is formed by the airborne reaction of heat and
sunlight with nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds, which, in
turn, are emitted by cars and trucks. In 1999, 34 percent of all nitrogen
oxide emissions and 29 percent of all volatile organic compound emissions
were from motor vehicles.

Source: Environmental Protection Agency.

Where intercity passenger rail exists, results from studies examining the
impact of changes in vehicle emissions and air pollution vary. A 2002 study
by the California Department of Transportation found that improvements to
the three state- supported Amtrak intercity rail routes in California- the
Pacific Surfliner route between San Diego and San Luis

Page 18 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Obispo, the San Joaquin route between Oakland/ Sacramento and Bakersfield,
and the Capitol Corridor route between San Jose and Auburn- would decrease
air pollution from hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions. 16 However,
the study also found that air pollution from certain nitrous oxide and
particulate compounds emitted from the diesel fuel- burning locomotives
would increase. Our 1995 analysis of the Los Angeles to San Diego corridor
projected that eliminating rail service between the cities would lead to a
net increase- although small- in vehicle emissions from added automobiles,
intercity buses, and aircraft. 17

Intercity passenger rail may also generate some public benefit by reducing
the country?s dependency on gasoline and fossil fuels and, therefore, the
costs associated with vulnerability to an energy supply disruption. These
benefits, which would accrue to the public as a whole rather than to
intercity passenger rail travelers only, may be achieved if intercity
passenger rail would require less fuel than would other modes that the rail
passengers might use if intercity passenger rail service were not available.
The extent of these benefits would depend upon how many fewer trips would be
taken via other modes of travel and the technology of the locomotive( s)
used. Furthermore, similar to the link between highway congestion and
vehicle emissions, automobiles burn fuel more efficiently at higher speeds
(up to a point) compared to idling in traffic. Therefore, where intercity
passenger rail service is successful at reducing roadway congestion, the
amount of fuel consumed by the remaining vehicles could be reduced as well.

A 2002 California Department of Transportation study that examined the
impact of passenger rail on fuel consumption estimated that in 2011, 13
million gallons of gasoline could be saved by expanded service on the three
intercity rail corridors cited previously. 18 Similarly, the Congressional
Research Service reported that Amtrak is much more

16 California Department of Transportation, California State Rail Plan:
2001- 02 to 2010- 11 (Jan. 2002). 17 U. S. General Accounting Office,
Amtrak: Issues for Reauthorization,

GAO/ T- RCED- 95- 132 (Washington, D. C.: Mar. 13, 1995). Carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons emissions were predicted to increase, and nitrous oxide and
sulfur dioxide emissions were predicted to decrease.

18 California Department of Transportation, California State Rail Plan:
2001- 02 to 2010- 11 (Jan. 2002). Intercity Passenger Rail

May Contribute to Reduced Energy Dependency and Fossil Fuel Consumption

Page 19 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

energy- efficient than air travel; yet, it also found that Amtrak is much
less energy- efficient than intercity bus transportation and about equally
as energy- efficient as automobiles for trips longer than 75 miles. 19
However, our analysis of the Los Angeles to San Diego corridor projected
that eliminating rail service between the cities would lead to a net
increase in fuel consumption. 20

Another area of potential public benefits from intercity passenger rail is
the relative safety of passenger travel by rail. According to the Federal
Railroad Administration, from 1997 through 2000 Amtrak itself was
responsible for only one passenger fatality. Furthermore, the Transportation
Research Board reports that rail operators caused no passenger fatalities in
25 years of high- speed rail travel in Japan and France. 21

If passengers believe passenger rail is safer than other modes, they may opt
to travel by rail, all else being equal, to improve their own safety. In
addition, some public benefits might also result from more travelers using a
safer mode of travel. For example, if travelers switch from cars to trains,
the reduced highway congestion may lead to fewer accidents for those
travelers continuing to use highways. In addition, society as a whole may
benefit from reduced fatalities and injuries through reduced public spending
on medical care and less lost productivity. These potential public benefits
may be greater for routes that parallel corridors where many accidents occur
and the public benefits from travelers? switching from car to rail are
likely to be the greatest.

19 Congressional Research Service, Amtrak and Energy Conservation (Jan. 19,
1999). The analysis in this report was based on Btu per passenger- mile
results and took into account variations in load factors, congested routes,
and other factors that would affect the outcomes in particular
circumstances. This analysis, however, did not include energy imbedded in
the infrastructure of each mode of intercity passenger transportation or
energy expended in ancillary activities such as powering stations and
repairing roadways and guideways. This limitation complicates any comparison
of relative energy efficiency of different travel modes.

20 GAO/ T- RCED- 95- 132. 21 Transportation Research Circular, ?Research
Problem Statements on Intercity Passenger Rail.? Number 490, Jan. 1999,
Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Passenger Trains
Are a

Safe Mode of Transportation

Page 20 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Other public benefits may result from intercity passenger rail- even if
ridership is fairly limited. One such benefit is sometimes called option
demand: society might be willing to pay to maintain intercity rail service
to retain the option to use it in the future. That is, for some people,
having the option of rail service available in case circumstances change-
such as the availability of air travel or concerns about air travel safety-
could have some value, even if they do not currently plan to use it. A
second type of benefit is sometimes called non- use, or existence, value.
This concept, which is most commonly used as a basis for valuing natural
resources, such as the Grand Canyon, is that people receive value from
knowing that some things exist even if they do not plan to directly use
them.

Although option demand and non- use value are concepts that analysts widely
accept, quantifying these benefits is difficult and sometimes controversial.
They are frequently measured by survey techniques that attempt to estimate
willingness- to- pay. Many researchers find that estimates obtained with
such techniques are less persuasive than estimates derived from information
on actual purchases of goods and services.

Intercity passenger rail systems, like other intercity transportation
systems, are expensive to build, maintain, and operate. Federal spending to
support intercity passenger rail service would have the greatest effect
where the expected public benefits warrant the costs expected to be
incurred. Estimates of the costs of maintaining and expanding current
systems and developing new ones are preliminary. Although we have not
assessed the quality of these estimates, we agree that such systems will be
costly. For example, the amount of funding that Amtrak will likely need for
both capital and operating assistance to maintain intercity passenger rail
service at today?s service levels far exceeds the amounts that have been
provided in recent years. For example, in February 2001, Amtrak estimated
that it would need about $16 billion (in constant 2000 dollars) in federal
capital support from 2001 through 2020 just to maintain current levels of
service. Amtrak expects that an additional $14 billion during this period
would be needed to expand and enhance services. Amtrak anticipated that
state and private support would supplement federal assistance. Other
Benefits May Also

Exist Like Other Modes, Intercity Passenger Rail Requires Substantial
Investment

Page 21 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

This $30 billion estimate is again about half more than the $19.6 billion
(in 2000 dollars) that Amtrak has received in both federal capital and
operating support over the past 20 years (1983 through 2002). 22 Similarly,
the annual amount Amtrak called for- about $1.5 billion per year- is about
50 percent more than the average annual amount that Amtrak has received from
Congress over the past 5 years ($ 1 billion per year, in 2000 dollars). 23

In addition to the substantial funding needed to maintain (and perhaps
enhance) current Amtrak conventional and Northeast Corridor service, full
development of high- speed rail corridors throughout the country would also
be very expensive. Overall costs to develop high- speed corridors are
unknown because these initiatives are in various stages of planning.
However, according to a preliminary Amtrak estimate, the capital costs to
fully develop the federally designated high- speed rail corridors and the
Northeast Corridor could be $50 billion to $70 billion over 20 years. The
federal government could be expected to provide much of these funds. For
example:

 The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative, compromised of nine Midwestern
states, estimates that providing high- speed and other enhanced service
could cost $4.1 billion (in 1998 dollars) over 10 years. The proposal calls
for federal funds to cover 80 percent of infrastructure costs.

 California estimates that it would cost $4 billion (in 2000 dollars) over
10 years to implement incremental high- speed rail service in that state. It
expects that the federal government will contribute about $3 billion of this
amount.

Recently introduced legislation has also recognized the substantial capital
investment required for intercity passenger rail systems. For example, in
the House of Representatives, the Rail Infrastructure Development and
Expansion Act for the 21 st Century (H. R. 2950) would authorize the
issuance of tax- exempt bonds, grants, direct loans, and loan guarantees of
over $71 billion (in nominal dollars) for high- speed rail infrastructure,
corridor development, rehabilitation, and improvement. In the Senate, the

22 In nominal dollars, Congress provided Amtrak with about $16.6 billion
from 1983 through 2002. 23 In nominal dollars, Congress provided Amtrak with
about $5. 1 billion from 1998 through 2002.

Page 22 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

National Defense Rail Act (S. 1991) would authorize significant funding for
passenger rail infrastructure investment, including $1.5 billion (in nominal
dollars) a year over 6 years for high- speed rail corridor development. In
addition to capital subsidies, intercity passenger rail will likely require

operating subsidies from federal, state, and/ or local stakeholders in order
to be competitive with other transportation modes. In particular, operating
a national intercity passenger rail system as currently structured will
require operating subsidies. Amtrak has only one route- the Metroliner
service on the Northeast Corridor- on which train revenue covers operating
costs. 24 Metroliner service earned an operating profit of $51 million in
fiscal year 2001. Operating losses on other routes ranged from $600,000 to
$71.5 million. In addition, if potential private operators were allowed to
bid for the opportunity to provide train service over discrete routes,
operating subsidies would likely be required. We contacted five private rail
companies that have been identified as possible intercity rail providers.
Four said that although they could provide efficient intercity passenger
rail service, they would still need operating subsidies. The fifth private
operator stated that it had not yet determined whether operating subsidies
would be needed. We also contacted the six freight carriers in North America
about providing intercity passenger rail service. Three of the six said they
would consider providing passenger service if it made business sense and did
not interfere with freight services. However, most of these railroads
indicated that operating subsidies would be needed.

Given the diverse potential benefits of intercity passenger rail systems and
the large costs associated with them, the development of a national
intercity passenger rail policy represents a major challenge. This challenge
is made more difficult because of longer- term fiscal pressures and the new
commitments undertaken after September 11 th . Congress will have to
consider what is the proper role of the federal government in intercity
passenger rail as it examines competing claims and new priorities. When
considering development of a policy for the future of intercity passenger
rail service in the United States, Congress will face the question of
whether and where the potential public benefits are sufficient

24 As measured on a cash basis, that is, revenues less cash expenses.
Depreciation is not included. Another route, the Heartland Flyer between
Texas and Oklahoma made a profit of $600, 000 primarily because the state of
Oklahoma provided Amtrak with $4. 6 million, about 80 percent of the route?s
total revenue. Initial Considerations

in the Development of an Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Page 23 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

to warrant government intervention to ensure that intercity passenger rail
service- which the private sector has not found profitable to provide on its
own- will exist.

As Congress debates a transformation of intercity passenger rail, including
whether continued direct federal government support is warranted, initial
considerations that could be of use are (1) establishing clear,
nonconflicting goals for federal support for intercity passenger rail
systems; (2) establishing the roles of governmental and private entities and
developing funding approaches that focus on and provide incentives for
results and accountability; and (3) ensuring that the strategies developed
address diverse stakeholder interests, to the extent possible, and limit
unintended consequences. Numerous mechanisms and stakeholders could be used
to help Congress incorporate these considerations into a national policy for
intercity passenger rail. A critical initial decision for Congress concerns
the goals of an intercity

passenger rail system within the context of the nation?s passenger
transportation network. Clearly defined goals will provide a foundation for
making other decisions, such as determining the structure of a passenger
rail system, identifying the level of funding required, and determining how
assistance will be provided. For example, Congress might establish the goal
of providing intercity passenger rail service to as many cities and towns
that have existing railroad infrastructure so as to provide enhanced
transportation choice. In contrast, Congress might establish a more limited
goal of contributing to alleviating congestion and improving air quality by
providing intercity passenger rail only between select densely- populated
areas. Clearly, the nature and scope of the selected goals establishes
expectations for the federal government?s financial commitment to intercity
passenger rail.

To help ensure the goals are achieved, conflicting goals should be avoided
to the extent possible because attempts to attain one goal might reduce the
likelihood of attaining another. An example of such a conflict can be seen
in Amtrak?s efforts to maintain its national route system while becoming
free from federal operating assistance. In an effort to maintain a national
system Amtrak has continued to run routes for which fare revenues do not
cover operating costs, even when subsidized by other Amtrak revenues. As
cited earlier, only one route made an operating profit in 2001 without state
support. In addition, the goals should be measurable- that is, they should
identify the amount of public benefits to be attained. Stating goals in
measurable terms makes it easier to assess Establish Clear, Nonconflicting

Goals for Federal Support of Intercity Passenger Rail

Page 24 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

the success or failure of government support for intercity passenger rail
service, and ultimately to hold the intercity passenger rail system
accountable for the results.

Establishing the relative roles of the federal, state, and local governments
and private entities in providing intercity passenger rail service will help
ensure, to the extent practicable, that the goals can be achieved. This step
is critical because defining these roles will help to establish incentives
for leadership, financial participation, risk- sharing, and accountability.
Roles are defined not only by specific structures and organizations but,
perhaps more significantly, by the forms, conditions, and terms of
assistance.

Regarding structures and organizations, for example, should there still be a
government- established entity, such as Amtrak, that provides intercity
passenger rail service? Or should federal and state governments allow
private operators to receive government assistance on a competitive basis to
provide intercity passenger rail service, whether nationally or regionally?
In addition, federal, state, local, and private roles will need to be
established regarding how decisions about routes are made, how costs will be
shared, and what safeguards are used to protect the federal government?s
interests. For example, should any new rail system reflect a top- down
approach in which the federal government or another entity (like Amtrak)
determine the route structure on the basis of a national focus? Or, should
it be a bottom- up system in which entities closer to rail users (such as
states or regional collections of states) decide where intercity passenger
service will generate the most public benefits for their citizenry?
Currently, passenger route decisions are made at a national level through
Amtrak.

Regarding financing, the federal government is currently the major public
sector financer of intercity passenger rail (about $1 billion per year on
average from 1998 through 2002). Comparatively, Amtrak estimates that states
will contribute $223 million in 2002 to support specific Amtrak routes and
improve infrastructure. Maintaining current intercity passenger rail service
will likely continue to cost a minimum of $1 billion per year according to
Amtrak and the Department of Transportation?s Inspector General. Federal
funding for intercity passenger rail service will continue to compete with
other national transportation and nontransportation needs.

Most of the officials from the 17 state departments of transportation whom
we contacted indicated that they would be willing to provide funds to
continue intercity passenger rail operations in their states. However, the
Establish Roles of

Governmental and Private Entities in Providing Intercity Passenger Rail

Page 25 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

officials stated that continued federal investment would also be needed.
Moreover, to ensure that intercity rail was on equal footing with other
transportation modes, they suggested that an 80/ 20- federal/ state
costsharing arrangement would be appropriate. However, the officials also
expressed concerns about their ability to form partnerships with other
states to finance intercity passenger rail, noting that determining fair
costsharing arrangements for capital improvements among the states would be
difficult. In addition, some officials commented that investing state funds
in improvements in another state is often politically difficult and, in some
cases, prohibited by law.

The choice and design of tools for providing federal financial assistance
have important consequences for performance, transparency, and
accountability. Governments have at their disposal a wide variety of funding
mechanisms for providing financial assistance, such as grants, bonds, tax
subsidies, loans, loan guarantees, and user fees. The numerous tools vary in
the extent to which they allow federal assistance to (1) generate a stable
source of revenue sufficient to provide the capital needed to develop
intercity passenger rail systems; (2) ensure that investments provide an
appropriate return relative to investments in other intercity transportation
systems; (3) leverage the federal dollar by providing positive incentives
for investments by others and discouraging the replacement of state and
local funds with federal funds (commonly called supplantation or
substitution); and (4) strike a balance between accountability and
flexibility. Various funding mechanisms can also be structured to support or
facilitate the development of partnerships between government and private
entities across regions.

Regardless of the tool( s) selected, specific safeguards would be needed to
protect the federal government?s interests. The safeguards could vary,
depending on the nature of the financial assistance tools used. For example,
the Federal Transit Administration?s (FTA) New Starts program provides
several such safeguards. 25 In this program, FTA evaluates and rates
potential transit projects against project justification and local financial
commitment criteria. The criteria include mobility improvements,
environmental benefits, cost effectiveness, operating efficiencies, local
cost sharing, and quality of capital and operating finance

25 The New Starts program provides grants to local transit providers for
constructing or extending certain types of mass transit systems.

Page 26 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

plans. FTA uses the ratings to decide which projects will proceed to
preliminary engineering and final design phases, be recommended for funding,
and receive grants. In addition, the grant agreement establishes the terms
and conditions for federal participation in a project, including the maximum
amount of federal funds to be made available. Project sponsors are generally
responsible for higher than expected costs.

In addition to the financial tools, other mechanisms could be used to hold
the recipients of financial assistance accountable for results. To improve
federal program effectiveness and public accountability, Congress passed the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act). Under this
act, executive agencies must prepare 5- year strategic plans, annual
performance plans, and annual reports on the extent to which goals were met
and on what actions are needed to achieve or modify goals that have not been
met. By requiring these actions, the Results Act seeks to hold agencies
accountable for results. Similar accountability mechanisms could be built
into intercity passenger rail policy.

Another way to promote performance and accountability would be to require
the intercity passenger rail operator( s) to assume some level of financial
risk. For example, the operator might receive a fixed level of subsidy plus
all the ticket revenue generated. If the sum of the fixed subsidy and ticket
revenue were less than operating expenses, the shortfall would be the
operator?s responsibility to meet. This arrangement would encourage
operators to provide quality service that attracts customers and to operate
efficiently. Several potential private operators that we contacted said that
they would be willing to assume some level of financial risk.

Revising intercity passenger rail policy could have substantial effects on a
number of stakeholders, including Amtrak and its employees, the railroad
retirement and unemployment systems, commuter railroads, states, and freight
railroads. Important attributes of any new national intercity passenger rail
policy are that it addresses diverse stakeholder interests, to the extent
possible, and limits unintended consequences.

Amtrak, its creditors, and its employees could be the groups most directly
affected by substantial changes in intercity passenger rail policy. The most
sweeping effect on these stakeholders would occur if Amtrak were to be
liquidated. Amtrak recently estimated that the net cost (net from sales of
assets) of liquidation could be $7.7 billion to $11.5 billion (in nominal
dollars) over a 5- year period. This cost includes possible losses by
creditors (including labor protection payments to Amtrak employees) Ensure
That Strategies

Address Diverse Stakeholder Interests and Limit Unintended Consequences

Page 27 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

and the railroad retirement and unemployment insurance systems. We are
updating our 1998 assessment 26 of the potential costs of an Amtrak
liquidation for this committee and expect to report on this topic later this
summer.

Similarly, Amtrak?s Northeast Corridor is a vital piece of infrastructure
that would have to be dealt with carefully because of its many other users.
Currently, the corridor handles about 1,200 Amtrak, commuter railroad, and
freight railroad trains a day. By far, the heaviest users of the corridor
are the commuter railroads, which depend at least in some part on access to
the corridor to bring their riders into major cities (on average, about 1.2
million riders per day).

Many state officials told us that intercity passenger rail is an important
part of their transportation systems. Officials in most of the 17 states
that we contacted indicated that they would try to continue some type of
intercity rail service if Amtrak service was discontinued in their states.
However, these officials expressed a number of concerns about their ability
to do so. Two common concerns that they raised were whether new operators
could obtain a right to use freight railroads? tracks under terms similar to
those that apply to Amtrak and whether states could form partnerships with
other states to support intercity passenger rail service. In particular, the
states worry that the freight railroads would not grant a new operator
access rights or would increase their fees above the incremental costs.
Thus, obtaining these rights would greatly affect states? decisions to
support intercity passenger rail.

Freight railroads would also be directly affected because freight railroads
own nearly all of the tracks in the United States. Freight railroad
officials are concerned about the degree to which providing intercity
passenger rail service does and will affect their ability to serve their
customers and to earn profits. Freight railroads are concerned about the
impact on their business and liability issues if additional conventional
passenger rail service and/ or high- speed rail service operates on their
tracks. Operating high- speed trains on their tracks amplifies these
problems because as passenger train speeds increase, freight railroads must
provide more room

26 U. S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues
Associated With a Possible Amtrak Liquidation, GAO/ RCED- 98- 60
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 2, 1998). In this report, we concluded that the
United States would not be legally liable for secured or unsecured
creditors? claims in the event of an Amtrak liquidation. Nevertheless, we
recognized that creditors could attempt to recover losses from the United
States.

Page 28 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

in order to operate both passenger and freight trains safely. In addition,
freight railroad officials believe that they are not fully compensated for
providing this service. Although the officials were generally open to the
idea of giving new passenger operators access to their tracks, they stated
that they would seek to charge more than the incremental costs associated
with this use. As mentioned earlier, states that we contacted generally had
different expectations about access fees than the freight railroads, which
would also affect their willingness to participate.

In summary Mr. Chairman, there is a growing consensus that the current
approach to providing intercity passenger rail system needs revision. If
Congress wants to retain a system such as the one in place today,
substantially more capital and operating funds are likely to be needed than
are currently provided. Congress will have to weigh the decision of whether
to provide this additional funding for intercity passenger rail against
short- and long- range fiscal challenges in other areas of the federal
budget. With this backdrop, Congress will soon have to decide if and how
intercity passenger rail service can provide public benefits and complement
other modes of transportation as an integrated part of our national
transportation network. The first step is to establish clear and
nonconflicting goals for providing federal assistance for intercity
passenger rail service as part of complementary and mutually reinforcing
national policies for other modes of transportation. All decisions- from
establishing incentives for participation, to ensuring accountability for
results, to determining the structure of intercity passenger rail systems,
to ensuring that the strategies developed address diverse stakeholder
interests- will cascade from the goals that are established. Numerous
mechanisms and stakeholders could be used to help Congress develop a
national policy for intercity passenger rail. We stand ready to assist
Congress in examining this issue.

This concludes our prepared remarks. We would be pleased to answer any
questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.

To assess the potential public benefits of intercity passenger rail service,
we reviewed published economic and transportation literature relating to
intercity passenger rail. To provide information on the costs of providing
intercity passenger rail service, we obtained information from Amtrak, the
Amtrak Reform Council, the Department of Transportation?s Inspector General,
and, where available, from high- speed rail corridors. To Scope and

Methodology

Page 29 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

determine the initial considerations that could guide Congress as it debates
the future role of the federal government in supporting intercity passenger
rail service, we relied upon a number of products that we have issued on
setting budget priorities, assessing investment decisions, and evaluating
federal financial assistance to financially struggling organizations. We
also contacted 30 organizations- states (on and off the Northeast Corridor),
commuter railroads, and freight railroads- that are affected by Amtrak, 5
prospective intercity rail operators, and Amtrak. Our work was carried out
from January through March 2002 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

For further information, please contact either JayEtta Z. Hecker at heckerj@
gao. gov or James Ratzenberger at ratzenbergerj@ gao. gov. Alternatively,
they can be reached at (202) 512- 2834. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Jay Cherlow, Angela Clowers, Libby Halperin,
Alexander Lawrence, Gail Marnik, Jerome Nagy, Ryan Petitte, and James
Ratzenberger. Contacts and Acknowledgments

Page 30 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Regulatory Programs: Balancing Federal and State Responsibilities for
Standard Setting and Implementation. GAO- 02- 495. Washington, D. C.: March
20, 2002.

Budget Issues: Long- Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO- 02- 467T. Washington, D.
C.: Feb. 27, 2002.

Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital Planning Could
be Enhanced. GAO- 01- 744. Washington, D. C.: July 3, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and
Local Preparedness. GAO- 02- 473T. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 1, 2002.

Commercial Aviation: A Framework for Considering Federal Financial
Assistance. GAO- 01- 1163T. Washington, D. C.: Sept. 20, 2001.

Federal Budget: Choosing Public Investment Programs. GAO/ AIMD- 9325.
Washington, D. C.: July 23, 1993.

Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities. GAO/ GGD-
84- 34. Washington, D. C.: Mar. 29, 1984.

Intercity Passenger Rail: The Congress Faces Critical Decisions About the
Role of and Funding for Intercity Passenger Rail Systems., GAO- 01820T.
Washington, D. C.: July 25, 2001.

Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak Will Continue to Have Difficulty
Controlling Its Costs and Meeting Capital Needs. GAO/ RCED- 00- 138.
Washington, D. C.: May 31, 2000.

Northeast Rail Corridor: Information on Users, Funding Sources, and
Expenditures. GAO/ RCED- 96- 144. Washington, D. C.: June 27, 1996.

Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial and Operating Conditions Threaten
Amtrak?s Long- Term Viability. GAO/ RCED- 95- 71. Washington, D. C.: Feb. 6,
1995.

The High Speed Rail Investment Act of 2001. GAO- 01- 756R. Washington, D.
C.: June 25, 2001. Appendix I: Selected GAO Products

Developing National Strategies

Amtrak High- Speed Rail

Page 31 GAO- 02- 522T Transforming Intercity Passenger Rail Policy

Surface Infrastructure: High- Speed Rail Projects in the United States.

GAO/ RCED- 99- 44. Washington, D. C.: Jan. 14, 1999.

High- Speed Ground Transportation: Issues Affecting Development in the
United States. GAO/ RCED- 94- 29. Washington, D. C.: Nov. 17, 1993.

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