Competitive Sourcing: Challenges in Expanding A-76 Governmentwide
(06-MAR-02, GAO-02-498T).
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been at the forefront of
federal agencies in using the OMB Circular A-76 process. In 1995,
DOD made the process a priority to reduce operating costs and
free funds for other priorities. DOD has also augmented the A-76
program with what it terms strategic sourcing--a broader array of
reinvention and reengineering options that may not necessarily
involve A-76 competitions. The number of positions--at one point
229,000--that DOD planned to study and the time frames for the
studies have varied. Current plans are to study approximately
183,000 positions between fiscal years 1997 and 2007. Changes in
the inventory of commercial activities and the current
administration's sourcing initiatives could change the number of
positions studied in the future. However, GAO has not evaluated
the extent to which these changes might occur. DOD has faced a
number of challenges with its A-76 program that may produce
valuable lessons learned for other federal agencies that use the
A-76 process. These include: (1) studies took longer than
initially projected, (2) costs and resources required for the
studies were underestimated, (3) selecting and grouping functions
to compete can be difficult, and (4) determining and maintaining
reliable estimates of savings were difficult. Federal managers,
government workers, and private sector representatives have
expressed concern about the A-76 study process. The Commercial
Activities Panel is studying and has held public hearings about
the policies and procedures, including the A-76 process, and the
transfer of commercial activities from government personnel to
contractors. The panel, comprised of federal and private sector
experts, is required to report its findings and recommendations
to Congress by May 2002.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-498T
ACCNO: A02851
TITLE: Competitive Sourcing: Challenges in Expanding A-76
Governmentwide
DATE: 03/06/2002
SUBJECT: Accountability
Competition
Service contracts
Defense Reform Initiative
OMB Circular A-76 Program
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GAO-02-498T
United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 9:30 a.m.EST
Wednesday, March 6, 2002 COMPETITIVE
SOURCING
Challenges in Expanding A-76 Governmentwide
Statement of Barry W. Holman, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
GAO-02-498T
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to participate in the committee's hearing on
competition and accountability in the federal and service contract workforce
with a particular focus on the use of Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Circular A-76. That circular established federal policy for the performance
of recurring commercial activities. Issued in 1966, OMB supplemented it in
1979 with a handbook of procedures for conducting cost comparison studies to
determine whether commercial activities should be performed by the
government or by the private sector. OMB updated the handbook in 1983, 1996,
and 1999. Cost comparisons completed under Circular A-76 are variously
referred to as public-private competitions, outsourcing, or competitive
sourcing.
Emphasis on use of the A-76 process has varied over the years. The
Department of Defense (DOD), which began giving strong emphasis to the
program in the mid-to late-1990s, has been the primary user of the process.
Greater focus on the potential for expanded use of competitive sourcing
governmentwide began with passage of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform
(FAIR) Act legislation in 1998 requiring agencies to compile annual
inventories of commercial activities. Then, in 2001, OMB began directing
federal agencies to conduct public-private competitions or convert work
involving specified percentages of commercial positions on their FAIR Act
inventories directly to the private sector.
My comments today are largely based on our work in recent years tracking
DOD's progress in implementing its A-76 program with the goal of saving
billions of dollars to apply to other priority needs (see list of related
products at the end of this statement). In response to questions you have
asked me to address, my testimony will highlight (1) DOD's progress under
the A-76 program, (2) challenges faced by DOD that may also be faced by
other government agencies as they pursue A-76 studies, and (3) concerns that
gave rise to the creation of the Commercial Activities Panel to study
sourcing policies and procedures under section 832 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. Chaired by Comptroller General David
M. Walker, the Commercial Activities Panel is required to report its
findings and recommendations to the Congress by May 1, 2002. Given the
ongoing nature of the panel's work, I hope you will appreciate limitations
on my ability to discuss panel deliberations and their potential outcome.
Summary
Background
DOD has been at the forefront of federal agencies in using the A-76 process
in recent years. In 1995, DOD made the process a priority so as to reduce
operating costs and free funds for other priorities. DOD has also augmented
the A-76 program with what it terms strategic sourcing-a broader array of
reinvention and reengineering options that may not necessarily involve A-76
competitions. Over the years, the number of positions-at one point
229,000-that DOD planned to study and the time frames for the studies have
varied. Current plans are to study approximately 183,000 positions between
fiscal years 1997 and 2007. Changes in the inventory of commercial
activities and the current administration's sourcing initiatives could have
the potential to change the number of positions studied in the future.
However, we have not evaluated the extent to which these changes might
occur.
DOD has faced a number of challenges with its A-76 program that may produce
valuable lessons learned for other federal agencies that use the A-76
process. The challenges include the following: (1) studies took longer than
initially projected, (2) costs and resources required for the studies were
underestimated, (3) selecting and grouping functions to compete can be
difficult, and (4) determining and maintaining reliable estimates of savings
were difficult.
Federal managers, government workers, and private sector representatives
have expressed concern about the A-76 study process. As required by
legislation in 2001, the Commercial Activities Panel is studying and has
held public hearings about the policies and procedures, including the A-76
process, that concern the transfer of commercial activities from government
personnel to contractors. The panel, comprised of federal and private sector
experts, is required to report its findings and recommendations to the
Congress by May 1, 2002.
Under A-76, commercial activities may be converted to or from contractor
performance either by direct conversion or by cost comparison. Under direct
conversion, specific conditions allow commercial activities to be moved from
government or contract performance without a cost comparison study (for
example, for activities involving 10 or fewer civilians).1 Generally,
however, commercial functions are to be converted
1 For functions performed by DOD employees, a number of additional
requirements, reports and certifications are addressed in chapter 146 of
title 10 U.S. Code and in recurring provisions in DOD's annual appropriation
acts.
to or from contract performance by cost comparison, whereby the estimated
cost of government performance of a commercial activity is compared to the
cost of contractor performance in accordance with the principles and
procedures set forth in Circular A-76 and the revised supplemental handbook.
As part of this process, the government identifies the work to be performed
(described in the performance work statement), prepares an in-house cost
estimate based on its most efficient organization, and compares it with the
winning offer from the private sector.
According to A-76 guidance, an activity currently performed in-house is
converted to performance by the private sector if the private sector offer
is either 10 percent lower than the direct personnel costs of the in-house
cost estimate or is $10 million less (over the performance period) than the
in-house cost estimate. OMB established this minimum cost differential to
ensure that the government would not convert performance for marginal
savings.
The handbook also provides an administrative appeals process. An eligible
appellant2 must submit an appeal to the agency in writing within 20 days of
the date that all supporting documentation is made publicly available.
Appeals are supposed to be adjudicated within 30 days after they are
received. Private sector offerors who believe that the agency has not
complied with applicable procedures have additional avenues of appeal. They
may file a bid protest with the General Accounting Office or file an action
in a court of competent jurisdiction.3
Circular A-76 requires agencies to maintain annual inventories of commercial
activities performed in-house. A similar requirement was included in the
1998 FAIR Act, which directs agencies to develop annual inventories of their
positions that are not inherently governmental.4 The
2 An eligible appellant is defined as (a) federal employees (or their
representatives) and existing federal contractors affected by a tentative
decision to waive a cost comparison; (b) federal employees (or their
representatives) and contractors who have submitted formal bids or offers
who would be affected by a tentative decision; or (c) agencies that have
submitted formal offers to compete for the right to provide services through
an interservice support agreement.
3 Federal employees do not have standing to file a protest with GAO and have
generally been denied standing to sue in court.
4 Section 5 of P.L. 105-270, codified at 31 U.S.C. 501 note (1998) defines
an inherently governmental function as a "function that is so intimately
related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal
Government employees."
fiscal year 2000 inventory identified approximately 850,000 full-time
equivalent commercial-type positions, of which approximately 450,000 were in
DOD.5 OMB has not yet released DOD's inventory for 2001.
DOD has been the leader among federal agencies in recent years in its use of
OMB Circular A-76, with very limited use occurring in other agencies.
However, in 2001, OMB signaled its intention to direct greater use of the
circular on a government-wide basis. In a March 9, 2001, memorandum to the
heads and acting heads of departments and agencies, the OMB Deputy Director
directed agencies to take action in fiscal year 2002 to directly convert or
complete public-private competitions of not less than 5 percent of the
full-time equivalent positions listed in their FAIR Act inventories.
Subsequent guidance expanded the requirement by 10 percent in 2003, with the
ultimate goal of competing at least 50 percent.
In 1999, DOD began to augment its A-76 program with what it terms strategic
sourcing.6 Strategic sourcing may encompass consolidation, restructuring, or
reengineering activities; privatization; joint ventures with the private
sector; or the termination of obsolete services. Strategic sourcing can
involve functions or activities regardless of whether they are considered
inherently governmental, military essential, or commercial. I should add
that these actions are recognized in the introduction to the A-76 handbook
as being part of a larger body of options, in addition to A-76, that
agencies must consider as they contemplate reinventing government
operations.
Strategic sourcing initially does not involve A-76 competitions between the
public and the private sector, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and service officials have stressed that strategic sourcing may provide
smarter decisions because it determines whether an activity should be
performed before deciding who should perform it. However, these officials
also emphasized that strategic sourcing is not intended to take the place of
5 Guidance implementing the FAIR Act permitted agencies to exempt many
commercial activities from competitive sourcing consideration on the basis
of legislative restrictions, national security considerations, and other
factors. Accordingly, DOD's fiscal year 2000 inventory of positions it
considers to be potentially subject to competitions was reduced to
approximately 260,000.
6 While strategic sourcing includes A-76 studies, the Department has
commonly used the term to refer to all reinvention efforts other than A-76.
For purposes of this testimony, our reference to strategic sourcing will not
include A-76 studies.
DOD's Ambitious Goals for Using A-76 Have Varied Over Time
A-76 studies and that positions examined under the broader umbrella of
strategic sourcing may be subsequently considered for study under A-76.
After several years of limited use of Circular A-76, the deputy secretary of
defense gave renewed emphasis to the A-76 program in August 1995 when he
directed the services to make outsourcing of support activities a priority
in an effort to reduce operating costs and free up funds to meet other
priority needs. The effort was subsequently incorporated as a major
initiative under the then secretary's Defense Reform Initiative, and the
program became known as competitive sourcing-in recognition of the fact that
either the public or the private sector could win competitions. A-76 goals
for the number of positions to be studied have changed over time, and
out-year study targets are fewer than in previous years. However, future
study targets could be impacted by the current administration's emphasis on
reliance on the private sector for commercial activities.
The number of positions planned for study and the timeframes for
accomplishing those studies have changed over time in response to
difficulties in identifying activities to be studied. In 1997, DOD's plans
called for about 171,000 positions to be studied by the end of fiscal year
2003. In February 1999, we reported that DOD had increased this number to
229,000 but had reduced the number of positions to be studied in the initial
years of the program. In August 2000, DOD decreased the number of positions
to be studied under A-76 to about 203,000, added about 42,000 Navy positions
for consideration under strategic sourcing, and extended the program to
fiscal year 2005. Last year we noted that DOD had reduced the planned number
to study to approximately 160,000 positions under an expanded time frame
extending from 1997 to 2007. It also planned to study about 120,000
positions under strategic sourcing during that timeframe.
More recently, DOD officials told us that the A-76 study goal for fiscal
years 1997-2007 is now approximately 183,000 positions-135,000 between
fiscal years 1997-2001, and 48,000 between fiscal years 2002-2007. 7 It
projects that it will study approximately 144,000 positions under strategic
sourcing. To what extent the A-76 study goals are likely to change in the
7 We did not verify these numbers, and they may be subject to change by DOD.
Numbers reflect positions initially announced to be studied; historically,
actual numbers of positions studied tend to be lower.
future could be a function of changes in inventories of commercial
activities and continuing management emphasis on competitive sourcing.
Although DOD's fiscal year 2001 inventory of commercial activities has not
been publicly released, we have noted some reductions between previous
inventories as the department has gained experience in completing them. In
reporting on our analysis of DOD's initial FAIR Act inventory, we cited the
need for more consistency in identifying commercial activities.8 We found
that the military services and defense agencies did not always consistently
categorize similar activities. We have not had an opportunity to analyze
more recent inventories to determine to what extent improved guidance may
have helped to increase consistency in categorizing activities. At the same
time, we also previously reported that a number of factors could reduce the
number of additional functions studied under A-76. For example, we noted
that factors such as geographic dispersion of positions and the inability to
separate commercial activities from inherently governmental activities could
limit the number of inventory positions studied. Likewise, the inventory
already makes provision for reducing the number of positions eligible for
competition such as where performance by federal employees was needed
because of national security or operational risk concerns.
On the other hand, The President's Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 2002,
notes "Agencies are developing specific performance plans to meet the 2002
goal of completing public-private or direct conversion competition on not
less than five percent of the full-time equivalent employees listed on the
FAIR Act inventories. The performance target will increase by 10 percent in
2003." Additionally, DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30,
2001, states that the department should "Focus DOD `owned' resources on
excellence in those areas that contribute directly to warfighting. [Original
emphasis.] Only those functions that must be performed by DOD should be kept
by DOD. Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a
core government function. Traditionally, `core' has been very loosely and
imprecisely defined and too often used as a way of protecting existing
arrangements." We have not assessed to what extent efforts in this area are
likely to strengthen emphasis on A-76.
8 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing: More Consistency
Needed in Identifying Commercial Activities, GAO/NSIAD-00-198 (Washington D.
C.: Aug. 11, 2000).
Challenges Faced by DOD That May Be Applicable to Other Federal Agencies
As we tracked DOD's progress in implementing its A-76 program since the
mid-to late-1990s, we identified a number of challenges and concerns that
have surrounded the program-issues that other agencies may encounter as they
seek to respond to the administration's emphasis on competitive sourcing.
They include (1) the time required to complete the studies, (2) cost and
resources to conduct and implement the studies, (3) selecting and grouping
positions to compete, and (4) developing and maintaining reliable estimates
of projected savings expected from the competitions. These need not be
reasons to avoid A-76 studies but are factors that need to be taken into
consideration in planning for the studies.
Studies Took Longer to Complete Than Initially Expected
Individual A-76 studies in DOD have taken longer than initially projected.
In launching its A-76 program, some DOD components made overly optimistic
assumptions about the amount of time needed to complete the competitions.
For example, the Army initially projected that it would take 13 to 21 months
to complete studies, depending on their size. The Navy initially projected
completing its studies in 12 months. The numbers were subsequently adjusted
upward, and the most recent available data indicate that the studies take on
average about 22 months for single-function and 31 months for multifunction
studies. Agencies need to keep these timeframes in mind when projecting
resources required to support the studies and timeframes for when savings
are expected to be realized-and may need to revisit these projections as
they gain experience under the program.
Costs and Resources to Conduct and Implement Studies Were Underestimated
Once DOD components found that the studies were taking longer than initially
projected, they realized that a greater investment of resources would be
needed than originally planned to conduct the studies. For example, the 2001
president's budget showed a wide range of projected study costs, from about
$1,300 per position studied in the Army to about $3,700 in the Navy. Yet,
various officials expressed concern that these figures underestimated the
costs of performing the studies. While the costs they cited varied, some
ranged up to several thousand dollars per position. One factor raising costs
was the extent to which the services used contractors to facilitate
completion of the studies. Given differences in experience levels between
DOD and other agencies in conducting A-76 studies, these other agencies may
need to devote greater resources to training or otherwise obtaining outside
assistance in completing their studies.
In addition to study costs, significant costs can be incurred in
implementing the results of the competitions. Transition costs include the
separation costs for civilian employees who lose their jobs as a result of
competitions won by the private sector or when in-house organizations
require a smaller civilian workforce. Such separation costs include the
costs of voluntary early retirement, voluntary separation incentives, and
involuntary separations through reduction-in-force procedures. Initially, we
found that DOD budget documents had not fully accounted for such costs in
estimating savings that were likely to result from their A-76 studies. More
recently, we found that the Department had improved its inclusion of study
and transition costs in its budget documents.
Selecting and Grouping Functions to Compete Can Be Difficult
Selecting and grouping functions and positions to compete can be difficult.
Because most services faced growing difficulties in or resistance to finding
enough study candidates to meet their A-76 study goals, the goals and time
frames for completing studies changed over time; and DOD ultimately approved
strategic sourcing as a way to complement its A-76 program and help achieve
its savings goals.
Guidelines implementing the FAIR Act permit agencies to exclude certain
commercial activities from being deemed eligible for competition such as
patient care in government hospitals. Additionally, as experienced by DOD,
factors such as geographic dispersion of positions and the inability to
separate commercial activities from inherently governmental activities could
limit the number of inventory positions studied. It becomes important to
consider such factors in determining what portions of the FAIR inventories
are expected to be subject to competition.
Developing and Maintaining Reliable Estimates of Savings Were Difficult
Considerable questions have been raised concerning to what extent DOD has
realized savings from its A-76 studies. In part, these concerns were
exacerbated by the lack of a reliable system for capturing initial net
savings estimates and updating them as needed and by other difficulties
associated with the lack of precision often associated with savings
estimates. Our work has shown that while significant savings are being
achieved by DOD's A-76 program, it has been difficult to determine precisely
the magnitude of those savings. Savings may be limited in the short-term
because up-front investment costs associated with conducting and
implementing the studies must be absorbed before long-term savings begin to
accrue. Several of our reports in recent years have highlighted these
issues.
For example, we reported in March 2001 that A-76 competitions had reduced
estimated costs of Defense activities primarily by reducing the number of
positions needed to perform those activities under study.9 This is true
regardless of whether the government's in-house organization or the private
sector wins the competition. Both government and private sector officials
with experience in such studies have stated that, in order to be successful
in an A-76 competition, they must seek to reduce the number of positions
required to perform the function being studied. Related actions may include
restructuring and reclassifying positions and using multiskill and multirole
employees to complete required tasks.
In December 2000, we reported on DOD's savings estimates from a number of
completed A-76 studies.10 We noted that DOD had reported cost reductions of
about 39 percent, yielding an estimated $290 million savings in fiscal year
1999. We also agreed that individual A-76 studies were producing savings but
stressed difficulty in quantifying the savings precisely for a number of
reasons:
* Because of an initial lack of DOD guidance on calculating costs, baseline
costs were sometimes calculated on the basis of average salaries and
authorized personnel levels rather than on actual numbers.
* DOD's savings estimates did not take into consideration the costs of
conducting the studies and implementing the results, which of course must be
offset before net savings begin to accrue.
* There were significant limitations in the database DOD used to calculate
savings.
* Savings become more difficult to assess over time as workload requirements
or missions change, affecting program costs and the baseline from which
savings were initially calculated.
Our August 2000 report assessed the extent to which there were cost savings
from nine A-76 studies conducted by DOD activities.11 The data
9 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76
Studies on Federal Employees' Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary, GAO-01-388
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2001).
10 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of A-76
Studies Over the Past 5 Years, GAO-01-20 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 7, 2000).
11 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Competitive Sourcing: Savings Are
Occurring, but Actions Are Needed to Improve Accuracy of Savings Estimates,
GAO/NSIAD-00-107 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 8, 2000).
showed that DOD realized savings from seven of the cases, but overall less
than Defense components had initially projected. Each of the cases presented
unique circumstances that limited our ability to precisely calculate
savings. Some suggested lower savings. Others suggested higher savings than
initially identified. In two cases, DOD components had included cost
reductions unrelated to the A-76 studies as part of their projected savings.
Additionally, baseline cost estimates used to project savings were usually
calculated using an average cost of salary and benefits for the number of
authorized positions, rather than the actual costs of the positions. The
latter calculation would have been more precise. In four of the nine cases,
actual personnel levels were less than authorized. While most baseline costs
estimates were based largely on personnel costs, up to 15 percent of the
costs associated with the government's most efficient organizations' plans
or the contractors' offers were not personnel costs. Because these types of
costs were not included in the baseline, a comparison of the baseline with
the government's most efficient organization or contractor costs may have
resulted in understating cost savings. On the other hand, savings estimates
did not reflect study and implementation costs, which reduced savings in the
short term.
DOD has revised its information systems to better track the estimated and
actual costs of activities studied but not to revise previous savings
estimates. DOD is also emphasizing the development of standardized baseline
cost data to determine initial savings estimates. In practice, however, many
of the cost elements that are used in A-76 studies will continue to be
estimated because DOD lacks a cost accounting system to measure actual
costs. Further, reported savings from A-76 studies will continue to have
some element of uncertainty and imprecision and will be difficult to track
in the out-years because workload requirements and missions change,
affecting program costs and the baseline from which savings are calculated.
Although comprising a relatively small portion of the government's overall
service contracting activity, competitive sourcing under Circular A-76 has
been the subject of much controversy because of concerns about the process
raised both by the public and private sectors. Federal managers and others
have been concerned about organizational turbulence that typically follows
the announcement of A-76 studies. Government workers have been concerned
about the impact of competition on their jobs, their opportunity for input
into the competitive process, and the lack of parity with industry offerors
to protest A-76 decisions. Industry representatives
Commercial Activities Panel Is Studying Sourcing Policies and Procedures
have complained about the fairness of the process and the lack of a "level
playing field" between the government and the private sector in accounting
for costs. Concerns also have been registered about the adequacy of
oversight of the competition winners' subsequent performance, whether won by
the public or private sector.
Amid these concerns over the A-76 process, the Congress enacted section 832
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The
legislation required the comptroller general to convene a panel of experts
to study the policies and procedures governing the transfer of commercial
activities for the federal government from government to contractor
personnel. The panel, which Comptroller General David M. Walker chairs,
includes senior officials from DOD, OMB, the Office of Personnel Management,
private industry, federal labor organizations, and academia. The Commercial
Activities Panel, as it is known, is required to report its findings and
recommendations to the Congress by May 1, 2002.
The panel had its first meeting on May 8, 2001, at which time it adopted a
mission statement calling for improving the current framework and processes
so that they reflect a balance among taxpayer interests, government needs,
employee rights, and contractor concerns. Subsequently, the panel held three
public hearings. At the first hearing on June 11, in Washington, D.C., over
40 individuals representing a wide spectrum of perspectives presented their
views. The panel subsequently held two additional hearings, on August 8 in
Indianapolis, Indiana, and on August 15 in San Antonio, Texas. The hearing
in San Antonio specifically addressed OMB Circular A-76, focusing on what
works and what does not in the use of that process. The hearing in
Indianapolis explored various alternatives to the use of A-76 in making
sourcing decisions at the federal, and local levels.
Since completion of the field hearings, the panel members have met in
executive session several times, augmented between meetings by work of staff
to help them (1) gather background information on sourcing trends and
challenges, (2) identify sourcing principles and criteria, (3) consider A-76
and other sourcing processes to assess what's working and what's not, and
(4) assess alternatives to the current sourcing processes. Panel
deliberations continue with the goal of meeting the May 1 date for a report
to the Congress.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you
or other members of the committee may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgment For further contacts regarding this statement,
please contact Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-8412 or Marilyn Wasleski at
(202) 512-8436. Other individuals making key contributions to this statement
include Debra McKinney, Donald Bumgardner, Jane Hunt, Nancy Lively,
Stephanie May, and Judith Williams.
A-76 Related GAO Products
DOD Competitive Sourcing: A-76 Program Has Been Augmented by Broader
Reinvention Options. GAO-01-907T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2001.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Effects of A-76 Studies on Federal Employees'
Employment, Pay, and Benefits Vary. GAO-01-388. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2001.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of A-76 Studies Over the Past 5 Years.
GAO-01-20. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2000.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: More Consistency Needed in Identifying Commercial
Activities. GAO/NSIAD-00-198. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2000.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Savings Are Occurring, but Actions Are Needed to
Improve Accuracy of Savings Estimates. GAO/NSIAD-00-107. Washington, D.C.:
August 8, 2000.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Some Progress, but Continuing Challenges Remain in
Meeting Program Goals. GAO/NSIAD-00-106. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2000.
Competitive Contracting: The Understandability of FAIR Act Inventories Was
Limited. GAO/GGD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2000.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Potential Impact on Emergency Response Operations
at Chemical Storage Facilities Is Minimal.
GAO/NSIAD-00-88. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2000.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Plan Needed to Mitigate Risks in Army Logistics
Modernization Program. GAO/NSIAD-00-19. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 1999.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Air Force Reserve Command A-76 Competitions.
GAO/NSIAD-99-235R. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 1999.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Lessons Learned System Could Enhance A-76 Study
Process. GAO/NSIAD-99-152. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1999.
Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and Challenges.
GAO/NSIAD-99-87. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 1999.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Status of Efforts to Implement Personnel
Reductions in the Army Materiel Command. GAO/NSIAD-99-123. Washington, D.C.:
March 31, 1999.
Defense Reform Initiative: Progress, Opportunities, and Challenges.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-95. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 1999.
Force Structure: A-76 Not Applicable to Air Force 38th Engineering
Installation Wing Plan. GAO/NSIAD-99-73. Washington, D.C.: February 26,
1999.
Future Years Defense Program: How Savings From Reform Initiatives Affect
DOD's 1999-2003 Program. GAO/NSIAD-99-66. Washington, D.C.: February 25,
1999.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Results of Recent Competitions.
GAO/NSIAD-99-44. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999.
DOD Competitive Sourcing: Questions About Goals, Pace, and Risks of
Key Reform Initiative. GAO/NSIAD-99-46. Washington, D.C.:
February 22, 1999.
OMB Circular A-76: Oversight and Implementation Issues.
GAO/T-GGD-98-146. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 1998.
Quadrennial Defense Review: Some Personnel Cuts and Associated Savings May
Not Be Achieved. GAO/NSIAD-98-100. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1998.
Competitive Contracting: Information Related to the Redrafts of the Freedom
From Government Competition Act. GAO/GGD/NSIAD-98-167R. Washington, D.C.:
April 27, 1998.
Defense Outsourcing: Impact on Navy Sea-Shore Rotations.
GAO/NSIAD-98-107. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 1998.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense Reform
Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-115. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998.
Defense Management: Challenges Facing DOD in Implementing Defense Reform
Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-98-122. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1998.
Base Operations: DOD's Use of Single Contracts for Multiple Support
Services. GAO/NSIAD-98-82. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1998.
Defense Outsourcing: Better Data Needed to Support Overhead Rates for
A-76 Studies. GAO/NSIAD-98-62. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1998.
Outsourcing DOD Logistics: Savings Achievable But Defense Science
Board's Projections Are Overstated. GAO/NSIAD-98-48. Washington, D.C.:
December 8, 1997.
Financial Management: Outsourcing of Finance and Accounting
Functions. GAO/AIMD/NSIAD-98-43. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 1997.
Base Operations: Contracting for Firefighters and Security Guards.
GAO/NSIAD-97-200BR. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 1997.
Terms Related to Privatization Activities and Processes.
GAO/GGD-97-121. Washington, D.C.: July 1997.
Defense Outsourcing: Challenges Facing DOD as It Attempts to Save
Billions in Infrastructure Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110. Washington, D.C.:
March 12, 1997.
Base Operations: Challenges Confronting DOD as It Renews Emphasis
on Outsourcing. GAO/NSIAD-97-86. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1997.
Public-Private Mix: Effectiveness and Performance of GSA's In-House
and Contracted Services. GAO/GGD-95-204. Washington, D.C.:
September 29, 1995.
Government Contractors: An Overview of the Federal Contracting-Out
Program. GAO/T-GGD-95-131. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 1995.
Government Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing Inherently
Governmental Functions? GAO/GGD-92-11. Washington, D.C.:
November 18, 1991.
OMB Circular A-76: Legislation Has Curbed Many Cost Studies in
Military Services. GAO/GGD-91-100. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1991.
OMB Circular A-76: DOD's Reported Savings Figures Are Incomplete
and Inaccurate. GAO/GGD-90-58. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1990.
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