Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership 
Sought (12-MAR-02, GAO-02-490T).				 
								 
Protecting the United States and its citizens from terrorism	 
involves both the government and nongovernment sectors. Enhancing
homeland security is more complex because it involves all 50	 
states, the District of Columbia, and the territories; thousands 
of municipalities; and countless private entities. Since	 
September 11, the nation has taken many actions to combat	 
terrorism and enhance homeland security. It is well known that	 
servicemembers are conducting operations in Afghanistan in	 
Operation Enduring Freedom. A variety of legislative and	 
executive branch actions to enhance homeland security have been  
taken or were underway prior to and since September 11. 	 
Government and nongovernment activities are looking to the Office
of Homeland Security for further direction on how to better	 
integrate their missions and more effectively contribute to the  
overarching homeland security effort. Having a common definition 
can help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage by	 
identifying agency roles and responsibilities. Although the	 
agencies are looking for guidance, they also want to ensure that 
their unique missions are factored in as guidance is developed.  
At the same time, without a national strategy, some agencies were
not sure what they should be doing beyond their traditional	 
missions. Once the national strategy is issued, federal, state,  
and local government agencies and private sector organizations	 
will need to work together to effectively implement the goals and
objectives. Public-private partnerships were used to address Y2K 
concerns and similarly can be used to promote the national	 
strategy.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-490T					        
    ACCNO:   A02884						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and     
Partnership Sought						 
     DATE:   03/12/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Private sector					 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile		 
	     Program						 
								 
	     Operation Enduring Freedom 			 
	     Operation Noble Eagle				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-490T
     
United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations House Committee on Government Reform

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m., EST
Tuesday,
March 12, 2002

HOMELAND SECURITY

Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-02-490T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today our country's
progress in combating terrorism to enhance homeland security. Protecting the
United States and its citizens from terrorism is a national effort involving
both the government and nongovernment sectors. Such broad-based efforts are
inherently difficult to lead and manage. More than 40 federal entities alone
are involved in combating terrorism. Enhancing homeland security becomes
even more complex because it involves all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and the territories; thousands of municipalities; and countless
private entities, many of which own the infrastructure that can be attacked.
These organizations have multiple, specialized missions, distinct
organizational cultures, and millions of employees. Some have both
international and domestic components and operations. Trying to effectively
involve them in a single, coordinated effort makes a monumental undertaking.

Since September 11, our nation has taken many actions to combat terrorism
and enhance homeland security. Today, it is well known that our
servicemembers are conducting operations in Afghanistan in Operation
Enduring Freedom. This operation covers offensive actions in the Afghanistan
theater and the North Arabian Sea, and includes ground, air, and naval
forces, and follow-on operations for certain support activities. Less
well-known perhaps is the Department of Defense's other primary ongoing
operation, Noble Eagle, which concerns the direct defense of the U.S.
homeland. This operation protects civilian population centers, critical
infrastructure, and special events such as the recently completed Winter
Olympics held in Salt Lake City. To help provide operational forces, the
department has alerted for activation just over 97,000 reserve component
servicemembers and completed the call-up of more than 78,000 Reserve and
National Guard augmentees.

As requested, my testimony will cover three areas. First, I will discuss
progress in enhancing homeland security through legislative and executive
action prior to and after September 11. Second, I will present the
preliminary results of the work we are doing for you and some of your House
colleagues on integrating the efforts of all levels of government and the
private sector into overall homeland security efforts. Finally, I will
discuss an approach that could be helpful in integrating governmental and
private sector organizations into the Office of Homeland Security's planned
national strategy.

Summary

My testimony is generally based on the large body of relevant work that we
have completed or have ongoing.1

A variety of legislative and executive branch actions to enhance homeland
security have been taken or were underway prior to and since September

11. After the attacks, the president issued executive order 13228 to
establish the Office of Homeland Security. The office plans to issue a
national strategy in July 2002. In the interim, federal agencies are
implementing many homeland security initiatives, including planning to
produce new vaccines against anthrax and expanding the existing smallpox
vaccine stockpile; providing additional planning and training for state and
local disaster response; and enhancing aviation, seaport, and border
security. Legislative actions include appropriation of about $19.5 billion
for fiscal year 2002 and about $9.8 billion contained in a $40 billion
emergency supplemental budget shortly after the September 11 terrorist
attack. For fiscal year 2003, the president has requested about $37.7
billion for homeland security.

Our ongoing work indicates that government and nongovernment activities are
looking to the Office of Homeland Security for further direction on how to
better integrate their missions and more effectively contribute to the
overarching homeland security effort. For example, at key federal agencies
we did not find a broadly accepted definition of homeland security. Having a
common definition can help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage
by identifying agency roles and responsibilities. Although the agencies are
looking for guidance, they also want to ensure that their organizations'
unique missions are sufficiently factored in as that guidance is developed.
At the same time, without a national strategy, some agencies were not sure
what else they should be doing beyond their traditional missions. Officials
in state and local governments want funding relief and better access to
threat information from the federal government. Finally, private sector
entities expressed a willingness to contribute to homeland security, but
they are concerned about the potential for excessive federal regulation. If
it is comprehensive, the national strategy should address many of these
issues.

Once the national strategy is issued, the federal, state, and local
government agencies and private sector organizations will need to work

1 See the appendix for a list of selected reports and testimonies.

Improvements to Homeland Security Are in Process

together to effectively implement the goals and objectives. Public-private
partnerships were used to address Y2K concerns and can similarly be used to
promote implementation of the national strategy by public and private sector
organizations.

Legislative and executive branch action has led to a variety of
governmentwide and agency-specific initiatives, started and ongoing, to
enhance homeland security. Establishment of an Office of Homeland Security
and the office's planned national security strategy represent important
governmentwide initiatives to address homeland security concerns. The
planned production of new vaccines or expansion of existing vaccines,
additional intergovernmental-planning and consequence-management efforts,
and enhancements to aviation, seaport, and border security suggest progress
in enhancing homeland security. Moreover, Congress appropriated about $19.5
billion in fiscal year 2002 and about another $9.8 billion contained in a
$40 billion emergency supplemental budget after September 11 to help address
homeland security concerns. The president has requested about $37.7 billion
for fiscal year 2003 for homeland security.

Governmentwide Initiatives

In October 2001, the president established a single focal point to
coordinate efforts to secure the United States from terrorist attacks-the
Office of Homeland Security. This is consistent with a recommendation that
we had previously made. The office is charged with broad responsibilities
including, but not limited to (1) working with federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private entities to develop a national strategy and
to coordinate implementation of the strategy; (2) overseeing prevention,
crisis-management, and consequence-management activities; (3) coordinating
threat and intelligence information; (4) reviewing governmentwide budgets
for homeland security as well as providing advice to agencies and the Office
of Management and Budget on appropriate levels of funding; and (5)
coordinating critical infrastructure protection. The office plans to issue
its national strategy in July 2002. The strategy is to be "national" in
scope not only by including states, localities, and private-sector entities,
as well as federal agencies; but also by setting clear objectives for
homeland security with performance measures to gauge progress. Also, the
plan is to be supported by a crosscutting federal budget plan.

In previous work on combating terrorism,2 we had also recommended that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation work with appropriate agencies to develop a
national-level threat assessment on terrorist use of weapons of mass
destruction. The bureau concurred in July 1999 but never issued the
assessment and has now suspended the effort. We continue to believe that the
threat assessment is needed.

Production of New Vaccines

Progress has been made and efforts are continuing to enhance U.S. capability
to respond to biological terrorism. Research is underway to enable the rapid
identification of biological agents in a variety of settings; develop new or
improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals to improve treatment and
vaccination for infectious diseases caused by biological agents; and develop
and test emergency response equipment such as respiratory and other personal
protective equipment. Another initiative includes the production of 155
million doses of smallpox vaccine to bring the total number of doses in the
nation's stockpile to 286 million by the end of 2002, which is enough to
protect every U.S. citizen. In addition, the National Institutes of Health
plans to award a contract to accelerate development of new vaccines against
anthrax.

The number of "push packages" in the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile3 will
increase from 8 to 12. Each push package has quantities of several different
antidotes and antibiotics that can treat and protect persons exposed to
different biological and chemical agents. The push packages are planned to
have enough pharmaceuticals to treat 12 million persons for inhalation
anthrax as compared to the 2 million that could be treated before the
project started. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the concerns you raised prior to
September 11, 2001, about accountability over medical supplies, including
items from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, put responsible agencies
on alert, and they have subsequently improved their

2 Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 14, 1999).

3 The Centers for Disease Control's National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
Program is to ensure the availability and rapid deployment of
pharmaceuticals, antidotes, other medical supplies, and equipment to counter
the effects of biological pathogens and chemical agents.

internal controls  for these items  so they are current,  accounted for, and
ready to use.4

Intergovernmental Planning and Consequence Management

As you know Mr. Chairman, federal, state, and local governments share a
responsibility to prepare for a terrorist incident. The first responders to
a terrorist incident usually belong to local governments and local emergency
response organizations, which include local police and fire departments,
emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies. Historically, the
federal government has primarily provided leadership, training, and funding
assistance.

The president's First Responder Initiative was announced in his State of the
Union address of January 29, 2002. The initiative will be led by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and its proposed fiscal year 2003 budget
includes $3.5 billion to provide the first responder community with funds to
conduct important planning and exercises, purchase equipment, and train
their personnel. At the request of the Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, we have begun to examine the preparedness
issues confronting state and local governments and will report back to the
subcommittee later this year.

Aviation and Seaport Security

Progress has been made in addressing aviation security concerns, but
significant challenges will need to be confronted later this year to meet
established goals and time frames. The Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act in November 2001, which created the
Transportation Security Administration with broad new responsibilities for
aviation security. The administration faces the daunting challenge of
creating this new organizational structure, which must implement more than
two dozen specific actions by the end of 2002. All actions due to date have
been completed, but formidable tasks remain. For example, the administration
is required to have sufficient explosive detection systems in place to
screen all checked baggage at more than 400 airports nationwide by December
31, 2002. As of January 2002, fewer than 170 of these machines had been
installed. The administration estimates that about

4 Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001) and Combating Terrorism: Chemical
and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36,
Oct. 29, 1999).

2,000 additional machines will need to be produced and installed by the end
of the year. Concerns have been raised that the vendors will not be able to
produce sufficient number of machines to meet the deadline. The
administration continues to work to identify ways to fill the gap between
the requirement and the production capability, including considering the use
of noncertified equipment as an interim measure. Also, the administration
needs to hire about 40,000 employees, including more than 30,000 screeners,
federal air marshals, and other officials. Achieving this goal presents a
big challenge because a significant number of the current screening
workforce may not qualify for screening positions. Airport screeners must
now be U.S. citizens and be able to speak and read English. For example,
currently up to 80 percent of the personnel in these positions at Dulles
International Airport in Washington, D.C., do not qualify for employment.

While not currently as high-profile as airport security, the vulnerability
of major commercial seaports to criminal and terrorist activity has caused
concern for many years, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
elevated those concerns again. Even prior to the attacks, this subcommittee
expressed concerns about seaport security and the potential consequences of
a terrorist attack on the successful deployment of our military forces.
Because of these concerns, you asked us to examine the effectiveness of
Department of Defense force protection measures at critical seaports located
within the United States and at overseas locations, and we will issue our
report to you later this year. As part of our work, some of which I can
highlight today, we have observed efforts by the Coast Guard to improve
seaport security since the attacks.

In order to establish a clear indication of how Coast Guard units and
personnel should respond to various threat levels at seaports, the Coast
Guard is developing three new maritime security levels. The first level,
"new normal," will encompass a greater level of security effort in the
ports, including increased emphasis on security patrols, improved awareness
of all activity in and around seaports, and better information about inbound
vessels and their cargo. The other two security levels will contain
increasingly heightened security measures to be taken if threat conditions
escalate. The Coast Guard has also initiated the "sea marshal" program,
whereby armed Coast Guard teams are placed aboard select commercial vessels
navigating the waters of some of our major ports. A third Coast Guard
initiative underway is the development of a vulnerability assessment
methodology that the Coast Guard plans to use at more than 50 major U.S.
seaports to identify vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure at each
port.

Congress is considering legislation to enhance seaport security. The port
and maritime security legislation, which passed the Senate in December,
contains a number of provisions aimed at further improving the state of
seaport security. Among these provisions are establishing local port
security committees, comprised of a broad range of federal, state, and local
governments as well as commercial representatives; requiring vulnerability
assessments at major U.S. seaports; developing comprehensive security plans
for all waterfront facilities; improving collection and coordination of
intelligence; improving training for maritime security professionals; making
federal grants for security infrastructure improvements; and preparing a
national maritime transportation security plan. Moreover, for fiscal year
2002, Congress appropriated $93.3 million to the Transportation Security
Administration for port security assessment and improvements.

                              Border Security

Ports of Entry

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has a number of efforts
underway designed to increase border security to prevent terrorists or other
undesirable aliens from entering the United States. The service proposes to
spend nearly $3 billion on border enforcement in fiscal year 2003, about 75
percent of its total enforcement budget of $4.1 billion. I will describe
some of the service's efforts to increase security at the nation's ports of
entry and between the ports, as well as to coordinate efforts with Canadian
authorities to deter illegal entry into Canada or the United States.

Currently, the United States does not have a system for identifying who has
overstayed their visa, nor a sufficient ability to identify and locate
visitors who may pose a security threat. Consequently, INS is developing an
entry and exit system to create records for aliens arriving in the United
States and match them with those aliens' departure records. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 requires
the attorney general to implement such a system at all airports and seaports
by the end of 2003, at the 50 land border ports with the greatest numbers of
arriving and departing aliens by the end of 2004, and at all ports by the
end of 2005. The USA Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, instructs the
attorney general and the secretary of state to focus on two new elements in
designing an entry and exit system-the development of tamper-resistant
documents readable at ports of entry, and the utilization of biometric
technology. Legislation now before Congress would go further by making the
use of biometrics a requirement in the proposed entry and exit system.

                         Between the Ports of Entry

                          Coordination with Canada

Implementing such a system within the mandated deadlines represents a major
challenge for the INS. According to INS officials, important policy
decisions significantly affecting development, cost, schedule, and operation
of an entry and exit system have yet to be made. For example, it has not
been decided whether arrival and departure data for Canadian citizens will
be recorded in the new system. Currently, Canadian citizens are not required
to present documents to enter the United States. The particular biometric
identifier to be used, such as a fingerprint or facial recognition, has not
been determined. Nor has a decision been made on whether a traveler's
biometric would be checked only upon entry, or at departure, too.

The INS' proposed fiscal year 2003 budget states that INS seeks to spend
$380 million on the proposed system in fiscal year 2003. To increase the
detection and apprehension of inadmissible aliens, including terrorists, at
the nation's ports of entry, the service seeks to add nearly 1,200
inspectors in fiscal year 2003 to operate more inspection lanes at land
ports and air ports of entry, and examine information on arriving passengers
in order to identify high-risk travelers.

To deter illegal entry between the ports of entry and make our borders more
secure, the INS seeks to add an additional 570 Border Patrol agents in
fiscal year 2003. In response to the September 11 attack, of the 570 Border
Patrol positions, INS now seeks to add 285 agents to the northern border,
thereby accelerating a staffing buildup at the northern border. The
remaining half will be deployed to the southwest border. This represents a
departure from previous decisions to deploy most new agent positions to the
southwest border. Along the northern border, the service plans on
maintaining an air surveillance program capable of responding 24 hours a day
7 days a week. Plus it plans to complete the installation of 67 automated
surveillance systems and begin construction of 44 new systems. In addition,
the INS has signed a memorandum of agreement with the Department of Defense
allowing about 700 National Guard troops and equipment, such as helicopters,
to assist in border enforcement duties for up to 6 months. The agreement
allows the use of the troops for such activities as assisting in
surveillance, transporting Border Patrol agents, as well as managing traffic
at ports of entry.

In December 2001, the United States and Canada signed a Smart Border
Declaration calling for increased coordination to create a border that
facilitates the free flow of people and commerce while maintaining homeland
security. The declaration calls for such actions as (1) implementing
collaborative systems to identify security risks while

expediting the flow of low-risk travelers, (2) identifying persons who pose
a security threat before they arrive at North American airports or seaports
through collaborative approaches such as reviewing crew and passenger
manifests, and (3) establishing a secure system to allow low-risk frequent
travelers between the two countries to cross the border more efficiently.
The INS and other U.S. and Canadian agencies are in the initial stages of
working on developing plans and initiatives to implement the declaration's
objectives.

Funding for Homeland Security

Congress has also acted and provided significant homeland security funds.
According to documents supporting the president's fiscal year 2003 budget
request, about $19.5 billion in federal funding for homeland security was
enacted in fiscal year 2002. Congress added about $9.8 billion more in an
emergency supplemental appropriation of $40 billion following the September
11 attacks. The funds were to be used for a variety of homeland security
needs including supporting first responders, defending against biological
terrorism, securing U.S. borders, enhancing aviation security, and
supporting Department of Defense support to homeland security, among other
things. The president has now requested about $37.7 billion for homeland
security in his fiscal year 2003 budget request.

Public and Private Sectors Seek Both Direction From and Partnership With the
Office of Homeland Security

Our ongoing work indicates that federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector are looking for guidance from the Office
of Homeland Security on how to better integrate their missions and more
effectively contribute to the overarching homeland security effort. In
interviews with officials at more than a dozen federal agencies, we found
that a broadly accepted definition of homeland security did not exist. Some
of these officials believed that it was essential that the concept and
related terms be defined, particularly because homeland security initiatives
are crosscutting, and a clear definition promotes a common understanding of
operational plans and requirements, and can help avoid duplication of effort
and gaps in coverage. Common definitions promote more effective agency and
intergovernmental operations and permit more accurate monitoring of homeland
security expenditures at all levels of government. The Office of Homeland
Security may establish such a definition. The Office of Management and
Budget believes a single definition of homeland security can be used to
enforce budget discipline. Although some agencies are looking to the Office
of Homeland Security for guidance on how their agencies should be integrated
into the overall security effort and to explain what else they should be
doing beyond their traditional missions, they also want their viewpoints
incorporated as this

guidance evolves. For example, an official at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention saw the Office of Homeland Security as both providing
leadership and getting "everyone to the table" to facilitate a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities.

State officials told us that they also seek additional clarity on how they
can best participate in the planned national strategy for homeland security.
The planned national strategy should identify additional roles for state and
local governments, but the National Governor's Association made clear to us
that governments oppose mandated participation and prefer broad guidelines
or benchmarks.

State officials were also concerned about the cost of assuming additional
responsibilities, and they plan to rely on the federal government for
funding assistance. The National Governors Association estimates fiscal year
2002 state budget shortfalls of between $40 billion and $50 billion, making
it increasingly difficult for the states to take on expensive, new homeland
security initiatives without federal assistance. As we address the state
fiscal issues through grants and other tools, we must (1) consider targeting
the funds to states and localities with the greatest need, (2) discourage
the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, and (3) strike
a balance between accountability and flexibility.

State and local governments believe that to function as partners in homeland
security they need better access to threat information. Officials at the
National Emergency Management Association, which represents state and local
emergency management personnel, stated that such personnel experienced
problems receiving critical intelligence information and that this hampered
their ability to help pre-empt terrorists before they strike. According to
these officials, certain state or local emergency management personnel,
emergency management directors, and certain fire and police chiefs hold
security clearances granted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
however, other federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, do not recognize these clearances. Moreover, the National
Governor's Association said that intelligence sharing is a problem between
the federal government and the states. The association explained that most
governors do not have a security clearance and, therefore, do not receive
classified threat information, potentially impacting their ability to
effectively use the National Guard and hampering their emergency
preparedness capability. On the other hand, we were told that local Federal
Bureau of Investigation offices in most states have a good relationship with
the emergency management

community and at times shared sensitive information under certain
circumstances.

The private sector is also concerned about costs, but in the context of new
regulations to promote security. In our discussions with officials from
associations representing the banking, electrical energy, and transportation
sectors, they expressed the conviction that their member companies desire to
fully participate as partners in homeland security programs. These
associations represent major companies that own infrastructure critical to
the functioning of our nation's economy. For example, the North American
Electric Reliability Council is the primary point of contact with the
federal government on issues relating to the security of the nation's
electrical infrastructure. It has partnered with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Energy to establish threat levels that
they in turn share with utility companies within their organization. Such
partnerships are essential, but the private sector may be reluctant to
embrace them because of concern over new and excessive regulation, although
their assets might be better protected. According to National Industrial
Transportation League officials, for example, transport companies express a
willingness to adopt prudent security measures such as increased security
checks in loading areas and security checks for carrier drivers. However,
the league is concerned that the cost of additional layers of security could
cripple their ability to conduct business and felt that a line has to be
drawn between security and the openness needed to conduct business.

If it is to be comprehensive, a national strategy should address many of
these issues.

Once the homeland security strategy is developed, participating public and
private sector organizations will need to understand and prepare for their
defined roles under the strategy. In that connection, Y2K-style partnerships
can be helpful. While the federal government can assign roles to federal
agencies under the strategy, it will need to reach consensus with the other
levels of government and with the private sector on their roles.

As you know Mr. Chairman, the world was concerned about the potential for
computer failures at the start of the year 2000, known as Y2K. The
recognition of the interconnectedness of critical information systems led to
the conclusion that a coordinated effort was needed to address the problem.
Consequently, Congress, the administration, federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private sector organizations collaborated

Y2K Style Partnerships Can Be Useful in Promoting Public-Private
Participation for Homeland Security

to address Y2K issues and prevent the potential disruption that could have
resulted from widespread computer failure. Similarly, the homeland security
strategy is intended to include federal, state, and local government
agencies and private sector entities working collaboratively, as they did in
addressing Y2K issues.

The Y2K task force approach may offer a model for developing the
public-private partnerships necessary under a comprehensive homeland
security strategy. A massive mobilization with federal government leadership
was undertaken in connection with Y2K, which included partnerships with
state, local, and international governments and the private sector and
effective communication to address critical issues. Government actions went
beyond the boundaries of individual programs or agencies and involved
governmentwide oversight, interagency cooperation, and cooperation among
federal, state, and local governments as well as with private sector
entities and even foreign countries. These broad efforts can be grouped into
the following five categories:

* Congressional oversight of agencies to hold them accountable for
demonstrating progress to heighten public awareness of the problem.

* Central leadership and coordination to ensure that federal systems were
ready for the date change, to coordinate efforts primarily with the states,
and to promote private-sector and foreign-government action.

* Partnerships within the intergovernmental system and with the private
entities, divided into key economic sectors to address such issues as
contingency planning.

* Communications to share information on the status of systems, products,
and services, and to share recommended solutions.

* Human capital and budget initiatives to help ensure that the government
could recruit and retain the technical expertise needed to convert systems
and communicate with the other partners and to fund conversion operations.

As we reported in September 2000,5 the value of federal leadership,
oversight, and partnerships was repeatedly cited as a key to success in
addressing Y2K issues at a Lessons Learned summit that was broadly attended
by representatives from public and private sector entities. Developing a
homeland security plan may require a similar level of

5 Year 2000  Computing Challenge: Lessons Can Be Applied to Other Management
Challenges (GAO/AIMD-00-290, Sept. 12, 2000).

leadership, oversight, and partnerships with state and local governments,
and the private sector. In addition, as in the case of Y2K efforts,
Congressional oversight will be very important in connection with the design
and implementation of the homeland security strategy.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have. Please
contact me at (202) 512-4300 for more information. Raymond J. Decker, Brian.
J. Lepore, Stephen L. Caldwell, Lorelei St. James, Patricia Sari-Spear, Kim
Seay, William J. Rigazio, Matthew W. Ullengren, Deborah Colantonio, and
Susan Woodward made key contributions to this statement.

Related GAO Products

                              Homeland Security

Homeland  Security:  Challenges   and  Strategies  in  Addressing  Short-and
Long-Term National Needs (GAO-02-160T, November 7, 2001).

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts
(GAO-02-208T, October 31, 2001).

Homeland  Security:  Need to  Consider  VA's Role  in Strengthening  Federal
Preparedness (GAO-02-145T, October 15, 2001).

Homeland Security: Key Elements  of a Risk Management Approach (GAO-02-150T,
October 12, 2001).

Homeland  Security:   A  Framework  for  Addressing   the  Nation's  Issues
(GAO-01-1158T, September 21, 2001).

                             Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and
Local Preparedness (GAO-02-483T, March 1, 2002).

Combating Terrorism: Considerations For Investing Resources in Chemical and
Biological Preparedness (GAO-01-162T, October 17, 2001).

Combating  Terrorism:  Selected   Challenges  and  Related  Recommendations
(GAO-01-822, September 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism:  Actions Needed to Improve  DOD's Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, September 19, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's Council on
Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response
(GAO-01-660T, April 24, 2001).

Combating  Terrorism: Comments  on Counterterrorism Leadership  and National
Strategy (GAO-01-556T, March 27, 2001).

Combating  Terrorism:  FEMA  Continues  to  Make  Progress  in  Coordinating
Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, March 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities:
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, November 30, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, March 21, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, October 20, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs
(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and
Sustainment Costs (GAO-NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear
(GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, March 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
Focus and Efficiency (GAO-NSIAD-99-3, November 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, October 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, December 1, 1997).

Public Health Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's
Role in Public Health Protection (GAO-02-235T, November 15, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-149T,
October 10, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO-02-141T, October
10, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness (GAO-02-129T, October 5, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-915,
September 28, 2001).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory
Management Are Needed (GAO-01-667, September 28, 2001).

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness
(GAO/HEHS-00-180, September 11, 2000).

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 7, 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-159, August 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, March 16, 1999).

Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster
Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures (GAO-01-837,
August 31, 2001).

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO-01-832, July 9, 2001).

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies
(GAO-01-850, August 13, 2001).

Budget and Management  Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies
(GAO-01-1084SP, August 2001).

Managing for Results: Federal  Managers' Views on Key Management Issues Vary
Widely Across Agencies (GAO-010592, May 2001).

Determining  Performance  and  Accountability  Challenges  and  High  Risks
(GAO-01-159SP, November 2000).

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation
and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-156, August 29, 1997).

Government  Restructuring:  Identifying  Potential  Duplication  in  Federal
Missions and Approaches (GAO/T-AIMD-95-161, June 7, 1995).

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principals (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95ï¿½166, May
17, 1995).

Grant Design

(350174)

Grant  Programs:  Design  Features  Shape Flexibility,  Accountability,  and
Performance Information (GAO/GGD-98-137, June 22, 1998).

Federal Grants: Design Improvements  Could Help Federal Resources Go Further
(GAO/AIMD-97-7, December 18, 1996).

Block    Grants:   Issues    in   Designing   Accountability    Provisions
(GAO/AIMD-95-226, September 1, 1995).
*** End of document. ***