Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to	 
Enhance State and Local Preparedness (01-MAR-02, GAO-02-473T).	 
								 
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in	 
preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the	 
national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly  
intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate 	 
strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, 
and challenges in addressing these issues. Key aspects of this	 
strategy should include a definition and clarification of the	 
appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and	 
local entities. GAO's has found fragmentation and overlap among  
federal assistance programs. Over 40 federal entities have roles 
in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in
a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and	 
duplication of programs. As state and local officials have noted,
this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to	 
identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively
partner with the federal government. Goals and performance	 
measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness
efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however,	 
outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic		 
preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in	 
preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in	 
preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance	 
measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally	 
responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice 
of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve	 
national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as	 
grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the		 
government's capacity to (1) target areas of highest risk to	 
better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most	 
pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties,
and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national	 
goals.								 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-473T					        
    ACCNO:   A02827						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy  
to Enhance State and Local Preparedness 			 
     DATE:   03/01/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Emergency preparedness				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     State/local relations				 
	     Intergovernmental relations			 
	     National defense operations			 
	     DOJ Five-Year Interagency				 
	     Counterterrorism and Technology Crime		 
	     Plan						 
								 
	     Defense Emergency Response Fund			 
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan 			 
	     CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile		 
	     Program						 
								 
	     Emergency Management Accreditation 		 
	     Program						 
								 
	     HHS Temporary Assistance for Needy 		 
	     Families Block Grant				 
								 

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GAO-02-473T
     
United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and
Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m., EST, COMBATING TERRORISM

Friday, March 1, 2002

Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness

Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO-02-473T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here in Nashville to discuss issues
critical to successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and
partnerships with state and local governments in the area of preparedness
for terrorist events. As you know, Mr. Chairman, federal, state, and local
governments have a shared responsibility in preparing for catastrophic
terrorist attacks. But the initial responsibility falls upon local
governments and their organizations-such as police, fire departments,
emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies-which will almost
invariably be the first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the
federal government historically has principally provided leadership,
training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of the September 11th
attacks, for instance, about one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency
Response Fund was dedicated to homeland security, including funds to enhance
state and local government preparedness.

Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly
intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a
firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those
governments in addressing these issues. My comments today are based on a
body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency preparedness and policy
options for the design of federal assistance,1 as well as on our review of
many other studies.2 In addition, we draw on ongoing work for this
subcommittee; pursuant to your request we have begun a review to examine the
preparedness issues confronting state and local governments in a series of
case studies over the next several months. We will examine the state and
local perspective on these issues and thereby help the Congress and the
executive branch to better design and target programs and strategies.

In my testimony, I reiterate GAO's call, expressed in numerous reports and
testimonies over the past years, for development of a national strategy that
will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal,
state and local governments to guard against terrorist attacks. The

1 See attached listing of related GAO products.

2 These studies include the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Third
Annual Report (Arlington, VA: RAND, Dec. 15, 2001) and the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for Security:
Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

creation of the Office of Homeland Security under the leadership of Tom
Ridge is an important and potentially significant first step. We recognize
that the President, in his proposed 2003 budget, has announced that the
Office of Homeland Security will propose such a plan later this year. As it
comes together, we believe that key aspects of this strategy should include:

* A definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and
responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. Our previous work
has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. Over
40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal
efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of a cohesive
effort, and duplication of programs. As state and local officials have
noted, this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify
available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the
federal government.

* The establishment of goals and performance measures to guide the nation's
preparedness efforts. The Congress has long recognized the need to
objectively assess the results of federal programs. For the nation's
preparedness programs, however, outcomes of where the nation should be in
terms of domestic preparedness have yet to be defined. Given the recent and
proposed increases in preparedness funding as well as the need for real and
meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing clear goals and
performance measures is critical to ensuring both a successful and a
fiscally responsible effort.

* A careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best
implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. The choice and
design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can
enhance the government's capacity to (1) target areas of highest risk to
better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs,
(2) promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and (3) track and assess
progress toward achieving national goals.

Since the attacks of September 11th, we have seen the nation unite and
better coordinate preparedness efforts among federal, state, and local
agencies, as well as among private businesses, community groups, and
individual citizens. Our challenge now is to build upon this initial
response to further improve our preparedness in a sustainable way that
creates both short-and long-term benefits. We applaud the subcommittee's
interest in addressing this issue now and urge that it continue its efforts
to oversee the efficiency and effectiveness of these key intergovernmental
relationships to define and best achieve the necessary level of national
preparedness.

Background

Because of such emergencies as natural disasters, hazardous material spills,
and riots, all levels of government have had some experience in preparing
for different types of disasters and emergencies. Preparing for all
potential hazards is commonly referred to as the "all-hazards" approach.
While terrorism is a component within an all-hazards approach, terrorist
attacks potentially impose a new level of fiscal, economic, and social
dislocation within this nation's boundaries. Given the specialized resources
that are necessary to address a chemical or biological attack, the range of
governmental services that could be affected, and the vital role played by
private entities in preparing for and mitigating risks, state and local
resources alone will likely be insufficient to meet the terrorist threat.

Some of these specific challenges can be seen in the area of bioterrorism.
For example, a biological agent released covertly might not be recognized
for a week or more because symptoms may only appear several days after the
initial exposure and may be misdiagnosed at first. In addition, some
biological agents, such as smallpox, are communicable and can spread to
others who were not initially exposed. These characteristics require
responses that are unique to bioterrorism, including health surveillance,
epidemiologic investigation, laboratory identification of biological agents,
and distribution of antibiotics or vaccines to large segments of the
population to prevent the spread of an infectious disease. The resources
necessary to undertake these responses are generally beyond state and local
capabilities and would require assistance from and close coordination with
the federal government.

National preparedness is a complex mission that involves a broad range of
functions performed throughout government, including national defense, law
enforcement, transportation, food safety and public health, information
technology, and emergency management, to mention only a few. While only the
federal government is empowered to wage war and regulate interstate
commerce, state and local governments have historically assumed primary
responsibility for managing emergencies through police, fire-fighting, and
emergency medical personnel.

The federal government's role in responding to major disasters is generally
defined in the Stafford Act,3 which requires a finding that the disasters is

3 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, (P.L.
93-288) as amended establishes the process for states to request a
presidential disaster declaration.

so severe as to be beyond the capacity of state and local governments to
respond effectively before major disaster or emergency assistance from the
federal government is warranted. Once a disaster is declared, the federal
government-through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-may
reimburse state and local governments for between 75 and 100 percent of
eligible costs, including response and recovery activities.

There has been an increasing emphasis over the past decade on preparedness
for terrorist events. After the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system
on March 20, 1995, and the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, the
United States initiated a new effort to combat terrorism. In June 1995,
Presidential Decision Directive 39 was issued, enumerating responsibilities
for federal agencies in combating terrorism, including domestic terrorism.
Recognizing the vulnerability of the United States to various forms of
terrorism, the Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act of 1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program) to
train and equip state and local emergency services personnel who would
likely be the first responders to a domestic terrorist event. Other federal
agencies, including those in the Department of Justice, Department of
Energy, FEMA and Environmental Protection Agency, have also developed
programs to assist state and local governments in preparing for terrorist
events.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the subsequent attempts to
contaminate Americans with anthrax, dramatically exposed the nation's
vulnerabilities to domestic terrorism and prompted numerous legislative
proposals to further strengthen our preparedness and response. During the
first session of the 107th Congress, several bills were introduced with
provisions relating to state and local preparedness. For instance, the
Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, which you coï¿½sponsored,
Mr. Chairman, proposes the establishment of a Council on Domestic
Preparedness to enhance the capabilities of state and local emergency
preparedness and response.

The funding for homeland security increased substantially after the attacks.
According to documents supporting the president's fiscal year 2003 budget
request, about $19.5 billion in federal funding for homeland security was
enacted in fiscal year 2002.4 The Congress added to this

4 "Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation." For the complete
document, see the Web site:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.html

amount by passing an emergency supplemental appropriation of $40 billion
dollars.5 According to the budget request documents, about one-quarter of
that amount, nearly $9.8 billion, was dedicated to strengthening our
defenses at home, resulting in an increase in total federal funding on
homeland security of about 50 percent, to $29.3 billion. Table 1 compares
fiscal year 2002 funding for homeland security by major categories with the
president's proposal for fiscal year 2003.

 Table 1: Homeland Security by Major Funding Categories for Fiscal Year 2002
                     and Proposed for Fiscal Year 2003

                            Dollars in millions

                   Major funding category FY2002 enacted

Emergency supplemental

FY2002 total

                                      The president's FY2003 budget request

           Supporting first responders               $291     $651     $942      $3,500
      Defending against biological terrorism        1,408    3,730     5,138      5,898
            Securing America's borders              8,752    1,194     9,946     10,615
    Using 21st century technology for homeland
                     security                        155         75     230
                Aviation security                   1,543    1,035     2,578      4,800
              DOD homeland security                 4,201     689      4,890      6,815
         Other non-DOD homeland security            3,186    2,384     5,570      5,352
                      Total                        $19,536   $9,758   $29,294   $37,702

A National Strategy Is
Needed to Guide Our
Preparedness Efforts

Source: FY 2003 president's budget document, "Securing the Homeland,
Strengthening the Nation."

We have tracked and analyzed federal programs to combat terrorism for many
years and have repeatedly called for the development of a national strategy
for preparedness. We have not been alone in this message; for instance,
national commissions, such as the Gilmore Commission, and other national
associations, such as the National Emergency Management Association and the
National Governors Association, have advocated the establishment of a
national preparedness strategy. The attorney general's Five-Year Interagency
Counterterrorism Crime and Technology Plan, issued in December 1998,
represents one attempt to develop a national strategy on combating
terrorism. This plan entailed a substantial interagency effort and could
potentially serve as a basis for a national preparedness strategy. However,
we found it lacking in two critical elements necessary for an effective
strategy: (1) measurable outcomes and

52001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, (P.L. 107-38).

(2) identification of state and local government roles in responding to a

6

terrorist attack.

In October 2001, the president established the Office of Homeland Security
as a focal point with a mission to develop and coordinate the implementation
of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from
terrorist threats or attacks. While this action represents a potentially
significant step, the role and effectiveness of the Office of Homeland
Security in setting priorities, interacting with agencies on program
development and implementation, and developing and enforcing overall federal
policy in terrorism-related activities is in the formative stages of being
fully established.

The emphasis needs to be on a national rather than a purely federal
strategy. We have long advocated the involvement of state, local, and
private-sector stakeholders in a collaborative effort to arrive at national
goals. The success of a national preparedness strategy relies on the ability
of all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and
cooperate effectively with one another. To develop this essential national
strategy, the federal role needs to be considered in relation to other
levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and the
most appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and
the private sector to achieve these goals.7

Roles and Missions of Federal, State, and Local Entities Need to Be
Clarified

Although the federal government appears monolithic to many, in the area of
terrorism prevention and response, it has been anything but. More than 40
federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism, and
more than 20 federal entities in bioterrorism alone. The complex
relationships this creates in the area of bioterrorism, as they existed
prior to the recent creation of the Office of Homeland Security, are
illustrated by the chart contained in appendix II. One of the areas that the
Office of Homeland Security will be reviewing is the coordination among
federal agencies and programs.

6 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats
to Strategies and Resources, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218 (Washington, D.C.: July 26,
2000).

7 Another important aspect of enhancing state and local preparedness is risk
management. Risk management is an important tool for prioritizing limited
resources in the face of uncertain threats. For more information on risk
management, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Risk
Management Can Help Us Defend Against Terrorism, GAO-02-208T (Washington,
D.C.: October 31, 2001).

Concerns about coordination and fragmentation in federal preparedness
efforts are well founded. Our past work, conducted prior to the creation of
the Office of Homeland Security, has shown coordination and fragmentation
problems stemming largely from a lack of accountability within the federal
government for terrorism-related programs and activities. There had been no
single leader in charge of the many terrorism-related functions conducted by
different federal departments and agencies. In fact, several agencies had
been assigned leadership and coordination functions, including the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FEMA, and the
Office of Management and Budget. We previously reported that officials from
a number of agencies that combat terrorism believe that the coordination
roles of these various agencies are not always clear. The recent Gilmore
Commission report expressed similar concerns, concluding that the current
coordination structure does not provide the discipline necessary among the
federal agencies involved.

In the past, the absence of a central focal point resulted in two major
problems. The first of these is a lack of a cohesive effort from within the
federal government. For example, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the Department of Transportation have been
overlooked in bioterrorism-related policy and planning, even though these
organizations would play key roles in response to terrorist acts. In this
regard, the Department of Agriculture has been given key responsibilities to
carry out in the event that terrorists were to target the nation's food
supply, but the agency was not consulted in the development of the federal
policy assigning it that role. Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration
was involved with issues associated with the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile, but it was not involved in the selection of all items procured
for the stockpile. Further, the Department of Transportation has
responsibility for delivering supplies under the Federal Response Plan, but
it was not brought into the planning process and consequently did not learn
the extent of its responsibilities until its involvement in subsequent
exercises.

Second, the lack of leadership has resulted in the federal government's
development of programs to assist state and local governments that were
similar and potentially duplicative. After the terrorist attack on the
federal building in Oklahoma City, the federal government created additional
programs that were not well coordinated. For example, FEMA, the Department
of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the
Department of Health and Human Services all offer separate assistance to
state and local governments in planning for emergencies. Additionally, a
number of these agencies also condition receipt of funds on

completion of distinct but overlapping plans. Although the many federal
assistance programs vary somewhat in their target audiences, the potential
redundancy of these federal efforts warrants scrutiny. In this regard, we
recommended in September 2001 that the president work with the Congress to
consolidate some of the activities of the Department of Justice's Office for
State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support under

8

FEMA.

State and local response organizations believe that federal programs
designed to improve preparedness are not well synchronized or organized.
They have repeatedly asked for a one-stop "clearinghouse" for federal
assistance. As state and local officials have noted, the multiplicity of
programs can lead to confusion at the state and local levels and can expend
precious federal resources unnecessarily or make it difficult for them to
identify available federal preparedness resources. As the Gilmore Commission
report notes, state and local officials have voiced frustration about their
attempts to obtain federal funds and have argued that the application
process is burdensome and inconsistent among federal agencies.

Although the federal government can assign roles to federal agencies under a
national preparedness strategy, it will also need to reach consensus with
other levels of government and with the private sector about their
respective roles. Clearly defining the appropriate roles of government may
be difficult because, depending upon the type of incident and the phase of a
given event, the specific roles of local, state and federal governments and
of the private sector may not be separate and distinct.

Performance and Accountability Measures Need to Be Included in National
Strategy

Numerous discussions have been held about the need to enhance the nation's
preparedness, but national preparedness goals and measurable performance
indicators have not yet been developed. These are critical components for
assessing program results. In addition, the capability of state and local
governments to respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks is uncertain.

At the federal level, measuring results for federal programs has been a
longstanding objective of the Congress. The Congress enacted the

8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges
and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.: September 20,
2001).

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (commonly referred to as the
Results Act). The legislation was designed to have agencies focus on the
performance and results of their programs rather than on program resources
and activities, as they had done in the past. Thus, the Results Act became
the primary legislative framework through which agencies are required to set
strategic and annual goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to
which goals are met. The outcome-oriented principles of the Results Act
include (1) establishing general goals and quantifiable, measurable,
outcome-oriented performance goals and related measures; (2) developing
strategies for achieving the goals, including strategies for overcoming or
mitigating major impediments; (3) ensuring that goals at lower
organizational levels align with and support general goals; and (4)
identifying the resources that will be required to achieve the goals.

A former assistant professor of public policy at the Kennedy School of
Government, now the senior director for policy and plans with the Office of
Homeland Security, noted in a December 2000 paper that a preparedness
program lacking broad but measurable objectives is unsustainable.9 This is
because it deprives policymakers of the information they need to make
rational resource allocations, and program managers are prevented from
measuring progress. He recommended that the government develop a new
statistical index of preparedness,10 incorporating a range of different
variables, such as quantitative measures for special equipment, training
programs, and medicines, as well as professional subjective assessments of
the quality of local response capabilities, infrastructure, plans,
readiness, and performance in exercises. Therefore, he advocated that the
index should go well beyond the current rudimentary milestones of program
implementation, such as the amount of training and equipment provided to
individual cities. The index should strive to capture indicators of how well
a particular city or region could actually respond to a serious terrorist
event. This type of index, according to this expert, would then allow the
government to measure the preparedness of different parts of the country in
a consistent and

9 Richard A. Falkenrath, The Problems of Preparedness: Challenges Facing the
U. S. Domestic Preparedness Program (Cambridge, Mass: John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, December 2000).

10It was recommended that this index be classified so as to avoid calling
attention to the country's most vulnerable areas.

comparable way, providing a reasonable baseline against which to measure
progress.

In October 2001, FEMA's director recognized that assessments of state and
local capabilities have to be viewed in terms of the level of preparedness
being sought and what measurement should be used for preparedness. The
director noted that the federal government should not provide funding
without assessing what the funds will accomplish. Moreover, the president's
fiscal year 2003 budget request for $3.5 billion through FEMA for first
responders-local police, firefighters, and emergency medical
professionals-provides that these funds be accompanied by a process for
evaluating the effort to build response capabilities, in order to validate
that effort and direct future resources.

FEMA has developed an assessment tool that could be used in developing
performance and accountability measures for a national strategy. To ensure
that states are adequately prepared for a terrorist attack, FEMA was
directed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations to assess states'
response capabilities. In response, FEMA developed a self-assessment
tool-the Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR)-that focuses on 13 key
emergency management functions, including hazard identification and risk
assessment, hazard mitigation, and resource management. However, these key
emergency management functions do not specifically address public health
issues. In its fiscal year 2001 CAR report, FEMA concluded that states were
only marginally capable of responding to a terrorist event involving a
weapon of mass destruction. Moreover, the president's fiscal year 2003
budget proposal acknowledges that our capabilities for responding to a
terrorist attack vary widely across the country. Many areas have little or
no capability to respond to a terrorist attack that uses weapons of mass
destruction. The budget proposal further adds that even the best prepared
states and localities do not possess adequate resources to respond to the
full range of terrorist threats we face.

Proposed standards have been developed for state and local emergency
management programs by a consortium of emergency managers from all levels of
government and are currently being pilot tested through the Emergency
Management Accreditation Program at the state and local levels. Its purpose
is to establish minimum acceptable performance criteria by which emergency
managers can assess and enhance current programs to mitigate, prepare for,
respond to, and recover from disasters and emergencies. For example, one
such standard is the requirement that (1) the program must develop the
capability to direct, control, and coordinate response and recovery
operations, (2) that an incident

management system must be utilized, and (3) that organizational roles and
responsibilities shall be identified in the emergency operational plans.

Although FEMA has experience in working with others in the development of
assessment tools, it has had difficulty in measuring program performance. As
the president's fiscal year 2003 budget request acknowledges, FEMA generally
performs well in delivering resources to stricken communities and disaster
victims quickly. The agency performs less well in its oversight role of
ensuring the effective use of such assistance. Further, the agency has not
been effective in linking resources to performance information. FEMA's
Office of Inspector General has found that FEMA did not have an ability to
measure state disaster risks and performance capability, and it concluded
that the agency needed to determine how to measure state and local
preparedness programs.

Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Designing Assistance

Grants

Our previous work on federal programs suggests that the choice and design of
policy tools have important consequences for performance and accountability.
Governments have at their disposal a variety of policy instruments, such as
grants, regulations, tax incentives, and regional coordination and
partnerships, that they can use to motivate or mandate other levels of
government and private-sector entities to take actions to address security
concerns.

The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success
and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical
national goals. Key to the national effort will be determining the
appropriate level of funding so that policies and tools can be designed and
targeted to elicit a prompt, adequate, and sustainable response while also
protecting against federal funds being used to substitute for spending that
would have occurred anyway.

The federal government often uses grants to state and local governments as a
means of delivering federal programs. Categorical grants typically permit
funds to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes. Block grants
typically can be used by state and local governments to support a range of
activities aimed at achieving a broad national purpose and to provide a
great deal of discretion to state and local officials. Either type of grant
can be designed to (1) target the funds to states and localities with the
greatest need, (2) discourage the replacement of state and local funds with
federal funds, commonly referred to as "supplantation," with a
maintenance-of-effort requirement that recipients maintain their level of

previous funding, and (3) strike a balance between accountability and
flexibility. More specifically:

* Targeting: The formula for the distribution of any new grant could be
based on several considerations, including the state or local government's
capacity to respond to a disaster. This capacity depends on several factors,
the most important of which perhaps is the underlying strength of the
state's tax base and whether that base is expanding or is in decline. In an
August 2001 report on disaster assistance, we recommended that the director
of FEMA consider replacing the per-capita measure of state capability with a
more sensitive measure, such as the amount of a state's total taxable
resources, to assess the capabilities of state and local governments to
respond to a disaster.11 Other key considerations include the level of need
and the costs of preparedness.

* Maintenance of effort: In our earlier work, we found that substitution is
to be expected in any grant and, on average, every additional federal grant
dollar results in about 60 cents of supplantion.12 We found that
supplantation is particularly likely for block grants supporting areas with
prior state and local involvement. Our recent work on the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families block grant found that a strong maintenance of
effort provision limits states' ability to supplant.13 Recipients can be
penalized for not meeting a maintenance-of-effort requirement.

* Balance accountability and flexibility: Experience with block grants shows
that such programs are sustainable if they are accompanied by sufficient
information and accountability for national outcomes to enable them to
compete for funding in the congressional appropriations process.
Accountability can be established for measured results and outcomes that
permitting greater flexibility in how funds are used while at the same time
ensuring some national oversight.

Grants previously have been used for enhancing preparedness and recent
proposals direct new funding to local governments. In recent discussions,
local officials expressed their view that federal grants would be more

11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed
in Disaster Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures,
GAO-01-837 (Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001).

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could
Help Federal Resources Go Further, GAO-AIMD-97-7 (Washington, D.C.: December
18, 1996).

13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Welfare Reform: Challenges in Maintaining
a Federal-State Fiscal Partnership, GAO-01-828 (Washington, D.C.: August 10,
2001).

                                Regulations

effective if local officials were allowed more flexibility in the use of
funds. They have suggested that some funding should be allocated directly to
local governments. They have expressed a preference for block grants, which
would distribute funds directly to local governments for a variety of
security-related expenses.

Recent funding proposals, such as the $3.5 billion block grant for first
responders contained in the president's fiscal year 2003 budget, have
included some of these provisions. This matching grant would be administered
by FEMA, with 25 percent being distributed to the states based on
population. The remainder would go to states for pass-through to local
jurisdictions, also on a population basis, but states would be given the
discretion to determine the boundaries of sub-state areas for such a
pass-through-that is, a state could pass through the funds to a metropolitan
area or to individual local governments within such an area. Although the
state and local jurisdictions would have discretion to tailor the assistance
to meet local needs, it is anticipated that more than one-third of the funds
would be used to improve communications; an additional one-third would be
used to equip state and local first responders, and the remainder would be
used for training, planning, technical assistance, and administration.

Federal, state and local governments share authority for setting standards
through regulations in several areas, including infrastructure and programs
vital to preparedness (for example, highways, water systems, public health).
In designing regulations, key considerations include how to provide federal
protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate balance
between federal and state and local authorities and between the public and
private sectors (for example, for chemical and nuclear facilities). In
designing a regulatory approach, the challenges include determining who will
set the standards and who will implement or enforce them. Five models of
shared regulatory authority are:

* Fixed federal standards that preempt all state regulatory action in the
subject area covered;

* Federal minimum standards that preempt less stringent state laws but
permit states to establish standards that are more stringent than the
federal;

* Inclusion of federal regulatory provisions not established through
preemption in grants or other forms of assistance that states may choose to
accept;

* Cooperative programs in which voluntary national standards are formulated
by federal and state officials working together;

* Widespread state adoption of voluntary standards formulated by
quasi-official entities.

Any one of these shared regulatory approaches could be used in designing
standards for preparedness. The first two of these mechanisms involve
federal preemption. The other three represent alternatives to preemption.
Each mechanism offers different advantages and limitations that reflect some
of the key considerations in the federal-state balance.

Tax Incentives To the extent that private entities will be called upon to
improve security over dangerous materials or to protect vital assets, the
federal government can use tax incentives to encourage and enforce their
activities. Tax incentives are the result of special exclusions, exemptions,
deductions, credits, deferrals, or tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike
grants, tax incentives do not generally permit the same degree of federal
oversight and targeting, and they are generally available by formula to all
potential beneficiaries who satisfy congressionally established criteria.

Regional Coordination and Promoting partnerships between critical actors
(including different levels

Intergovernmental Partnerships of government and the private sector)
facilitates the maximizing of resources and also supports coordination on a
regional level. Partnerships could encompass federal, state, and local
governments working together to share information, develop communications
technology, and provide mutual aid. The federal government may be able to
offer state and local governments assistance in certain areas, such as risk
management and intelligence sharing. In turn, state and local governments
have much to offer in terms of knowledge of local vulnerabilities and
resources, such as local law enforcement personnel, available to respond to
threats in their communities.

Since the events of September 11th, local officials have emphasized the
importance of regional coordination. Regional resources, such as equipment
and expertise, are essential because of proximity, which allows for quick
deployment, and experience in working within the region. Large-scale or
labor-intensive incidents quickly deplete a given locality's supply of
trained responders. Some cities have spread training and equipment to
neighboring municipal areas so that their mutual aid partners can help.
These partnerships afford economies of scale across a region. In events that
require a quick response, such as a chemical attack, regional agreements
take on greater importance because many local officials do

not think that federal and state resources can arrive in sufficient time to
help.

Mutual aid agreements provide a structure for assistance and for sharing
resources among jurisdictions in response to an emergency. Because
individual jurisdictions may not have all the resources they need to respond
to all types of emergencies, these agreements allow for resources to be
deployed quickly within a region. The terms of mutual aid agreements vary
for different services and different localities. These agreements may
provide for the state to share services, personnel, supplies, and equipment
with counties, towns, and municipalities within the state, with neighboring
states, or, in the case of states bordering Canada, with jurisdictions in
another country. Some of the agreements also provide for cooperative
planning, training, and exercises in preparation for emergencies. Some of
these agreements involve private companies and local military bases, as well
as local government entities. Such agreements were in place for the three
sites that were involved on September 11th- New York City, the Pentagon, and
a rural area of Pennsylvania-and provide examples of some of the benefits of
mutual aid agreements and of coordination within a region.

With regard to regional planning and coordination, there may be federal
programs that could provide models for funding proposals. In the 1962
Federal-Aid Highway Act, the federal government established a comprehensive
cooperative process for transportation planning. This model of regional
planning continues today under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
century (TEA-21, originally ISTEA) program. This model emphasizes the role
of state and local officials in developing a plan to meet regional
transportation needs. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) coordinate
the regional planning process and adopt a plan, which is then approved by
the state.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, as increasing demands are placed on budgets at
all levels of government, it will be necessary to make sound choices to
maintain fiscal stability. All levels of government and the private sector
will have to communicate and cooperate effectively with each other across a
broad range of issues to develop a national strategy to better target
available resources to address the urgent national preparedness needs.
Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key
aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today - a definition
and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an
establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of
appropriate tools-

is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness
strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist
attacks.

This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512-2834, or Paul Posner at (202) 512-9573. Other key contributors to this
testimony include Jack Burriesci, Matthew Ebert, Colin J. Fallon, Thomas
James, Kristen Sullivan Massey, Yvonne Pufahl, Jack Schulze, and Amelia
Shachoy.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

Related GAO Products

                              Homeland Security

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA's Role in Strengthening Federal
Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-150T.
Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Issues.
GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

                             Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and
Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.: September 19,
2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's Council on
Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-

14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.
GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and
Sustainment Costs. GAO-NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear.
GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism.
GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
Focus and Efficiency. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.: December 1,
1997.

                                Public Health

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role in
Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-149T.
Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.
Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington, D.C.:
October 5, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-915.
Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory
Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.
GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and
Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.: August 16,
1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 1999.

Disaster Assistance Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster
Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837.
Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington, D.C.: July
9, 2001.

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies.
GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

                            Budget and Management

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.
Washington, D.C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key Management Issues Vary
Widely across Agencies. GAO-01-0592. Washington, D.C.: May 2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks.
GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation
and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 1997.

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal
Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 1995.

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principals. GAO/T-GGD/AIMDï¿½95-166.
Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1995.

Grant Design

(450092)

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and
Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go Further.
GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions.
GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.
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