Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation
of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams (17-MAY-02, GAO-02-442).  
                                                                 
In October 1999, the U.S. Army announced its intentions to	 
transform its forces into a more strategically responsive force  
that could more rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all	 
types of military operations, whether small-scale contingencies  
or major theatre wars. Army plans call for an over 30-year	 
transformation that will lead to the ability to deploy a brigade 
anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours,  
and five divisions within 30 days. The first step in this process
is to form and equip six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) by  
2008. The IBCT--intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent 
force that can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world--was	 
devised to fill a gap in military capability. The Army's heavy	 
combat forces, though lethal and survivable, are not rapidly	 
deployable, and its light infantry forces are rapidly deployable 
but lack survivability and lethality. The specific uses that the 
Commanders in Chief (CINC) envision for the IBCTs vary according 
to the unique requirements of their respective regions. However, 
they generally agreed that the IBCTs as envisioned would provide 
them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their	 
operational requirements. The Army faces numerous challenges in  
forming its first IBCT that need to be addressed. For example,	 
some planned combat capabilities will not be present when the	 
IBCT is to be certified for deployment in May 2003. Similarly,	 
training challenges exist since the interim armored vehicle	 
delivery schedule has compressed the time available for training.
Army officials believe that the organization created at Fort	 
Lewis to help form the brigades has been effective in addressing 
day-to-day challenges, thereby permitting brigade officials to	 
concentrate on critical training and operational matters.	 
Further, the Army has a process in place that chronicles lessons 
learned in forming the IBCTs. However, this information is not	 
readily available to the rest of the Army from a central source. 
By not having this information available for research, the Army  
may be unaware of previous best practices or repeat mistakes in  
forming subsequent IBCTs.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-442 					        
    ACCNO:   A03357						        
  TITLE:     Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance  
Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams		 
     DATE:   05/17/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Army personnel					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military training					 
	     Strategic mobility forces				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Warfare						 
	     Abrams Tank					 
	     Army Force XXI Program				 
	     Black Hawk Helicopter				 
	     Bradley Fighting Vehicle				 
	     C-130 Aircraft					 
	     C-17 Aircraft					 
	     C-5 Aircraft					 
	     C-5A Aircraft					 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 
	     Globemaster Aircraft				 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     Interim Armored Vehicle				 
	     M1 Tank						 


******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-442
     
A

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2002 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams

GAO- 02- 442

Results In Brief 2 Background 4 IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap
in Military

Capability 7 Regional Commander in Chiefs View Planned IBCTS Favorably

and Could Use Them in Various Ways 13 IBCTs Would Fill a Capabilities Gap 13
Challenges Have Arisen in Forming the Initial IBCT 19 Installation Support
Needed for IBCTs Has Been Greater than Anticipated 27

Lessons Learned on Brigade Formation Are Not Readily Available 31
Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 34 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 35 Scope and Methodology 37

Appendixes

Appendix I: Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106- 398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions 40

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 45 Figures Figure 1:
Examples of Legacy Weapon Systems- Black Hawk

Helicopter, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Abrams Tank 6 Figure 2:
Representative Interim Armored Vehicles- Mobile Gun

System Vehicle and Infantry Carrier Vehicle 9 Figure 3: C- 130 Aircraft 11
Figure 4: Areas of Operational Responsibility for the Geographical

Combatant Commands 16 Figure 5: Army?s Approach to Develop Multi- Skilled
Soldiers 22 Figure 6: A C- 17 Aircraft and a C- 5A Aircraft That Would
Provide

Strategic Lift for the IBCT 23 Figure 7: Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001
Retention Rates for

Soldiers in the IBCTs, at Fort Lewis, and throughout Forces Command 26
Figure 8: Comparison of IBCT and I Corps Soldiers Electing to

Remain in Their Existing Unit 27

Figure 9: Shoot House Training Facility Constructed at Fort Lewis to Train
IBCT Soldiers to Confront the Enemy in an Urban Setting 29

May 17, 2002 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

In October 1999, the U. S. Army announced its intentions to transform its
forces into a more strategically responsive force that could more rapidly
deploy and effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether
small- scale contingencies or major theater wars. Army plans call for an
over 30- year transformation that will lead to the ability to deploy a
brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and
five divisions within 30 days. The first step in this process is to form and
equip six Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) by 2008. The first two
brigades are being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington, with the goal of
organizing,

equipping, training, and certifying the first such brigade to deploy by May
2003. The Army Chief of Staff stated that it would cost approximately $1
billion to form each brigade.

Because these brigades are entirely new, many questions have arisen as to
how their capabilities differ from those of more traditional brigades, how
the Army plans to use them, and whether they will possess capabilities that
the war- fighting Commanders in Chief (CINC) need. Thus, we monitored IBCT
formation at Fort Lewis during 2001 to gain a better understanding of the
challenges that have arisen that might apply to subsequent brigades

scheduled to be formed in other locations. We also visited the war- fighting
CINCs responsible for Europe, Southwest Asia, Korea, and the Pacific to gain
their perspectives on how they might use these brigades. Our objectives were
to (1) identify the expected capabilities of the IBCT, (2) determine the
CINCs? views on the utility of the IBCTs and how the CINCs might use them,
(3) identify the challenges that have arisen in forming the brigades, and
(4) determine if the Army has an effective means

of capturing lessons learned. This is the third in a planned series of
reports related to Army Transformation and is being provided to you because
of your oversight responsibilities for these issues. 1 Results In Brief The
IBCT- intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent force that can

be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world- was devised to fill a gap in
military capability. The Army?s heavy combat forces, though lethal and
survivable, are not rapidly deployable, and its light infantry forces are
rapidly deployable but lack survivability and lethality. Although the IBCT
is optimized for use in small- scale contingencies, it is also expected to
engage in all types of military conflicts, including a major theater war
when

supplemented with additional forces and weapons. Its interim vehicles are
designed to maneuver in various kinds of terrain, from mountains to urban
settings. Its digital systems are intended to allow soldiers to ?see? an
enhanced view of the battlefield through robust intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance. These capabilities are expected to enable
the IBCT to engage an enemy before coming into actual contact.

The Army will test and validate new doctrine, training, and leadership
development concepts as well as new organizational structures in the IBCTs.
This is intended to provide insights for future transformation.

The war- fighting CINCs believe that the IBCT?s planned capabilities will
help fill a gap in capability by providing a rapidly deployable force that
is both lethal and survivable. The specific uses that the CINCs envision for
the IBCTs vary according to the unique requirements of their respective
regions. However, they generally agreed that the IBCTs as envisioned would
provide them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their

operational requirements. The Army faces numerous challenges in forming its
first IBCT that need to be addressed. For example, some planned combat
capabilities will not be present when the IBCT is to be certified for
deployment in May 2003. Specifically, two interim armored vehicles- the
mobile gun system vehicle and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle-
require further development and will not be delivered until 2004, requiring
substitute

1 U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Has a
Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major
Challenges, GAO- 02- 96 (Washington, D. C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense
Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces

Weapons Systems Challenges (GAO- 01- 311, May 21, 2001).

vehicles in their stead. Similarly, training challenges exist since the
interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available
for training. The IBCT will not have a full 6 months to train after
receiving most of the vehicles as desired by Fort Lewis officials. However,
a senior Fort Lewis official contended that all the training requirements
would be accomplished in the reduced time available. In addition,
maintaining proficiency in digital systems has challenged the IBCT due to
personnel turnover. As a result, the Training and Doctrine Command is
currently developing a plan to sustain soldier skills on the digitized
systems for the two brigades. However, the Army has a draft plan for
sustaining soldiers? skills on digitized systems that will be applicable to
the entire Army. Further, it is questionable whether the Army will be able
to deploy its first

brigades anywhere in the world in 96 hours. While this is now only a goal
for the IBCTs, it is a requirement for units entering the force after 2008.
The first IBCTs will likely not meet this goal due to both the lack of a
sufficient number of aircraft to meet the timetable and possibly the need
for airfield upgrades. Further, the IBCT is designed to carry limited
supplies and after 72 hours to ?reach? for needed logistical support from,
among others, a foreign country?s commercial system. However, the Army has
not yet determined how this approach will work. The deployability

shortfall and combat capability shortfalls create risks for the CINCs to
consider. However, information about the extent of these shortfalls has not
been made available to the CINCs so they can plan for mitigating any
identified risks.

Additional challenges have arisen at Fort Lewis. As a human capital
challenge, reenlistment data show that digitally trained soldiers have been
transferring out of the IBCT. This disrupts the continuity that is important
to these new brigades. The Army has developed a personnel stabilization
policy to help retain soldiers and avoid the constant training of new
soldiers, but it does not have data to determine why the soldiers left. Such
data would enable the Army to decide what actions might be needed to reduce
personnel turnover. With respect to IBCT installation support, Fort Lewis
has had to assume an increased maintenance workload because the IBCT was
designed with fewer maintenance personnel in order to deploy quickly. Fort
Lewis officials had to request additional funds to absorb the additional
workload. Such a workload increase can be expected at the installations that
will be home stations to future IBCTs.

Army officials believe that the organization created at Fort Lewis to help
form the brigades has been effective in addressing day- to- day challenges,
thereby permitting brigade officials to concentrate on critical training and

operational matters. Further, the Army has a process in place that
chronicles lessons learned in forming the IBCTs. However, this information
is not readily available to the rest of the Army from a central source. By
not having that information available for research, the Army

may be unaware of previous best practices or repeat mistakes in forming
subsequent IBCTs. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Army to

provide the CINCs with the combat capability limitations and logistical
requirements that the first IBCT will have when it is certified for
deployment. This information will assist the CINCs in their planning to
mitigate any risks associated with the employment of the IBCT. Because some
mobility issues are beyond the Army?s purview and a long lead time could be
necessary to rectify any identified shortfalls, we are further recommending
that the Secretary of Defense obtain the Army?s specific IBCT mobility
requirements to meet its 96- hour deployment goal and

determine how best to address any shortfalls. Additional recommendations are
aimed at enhancing future IBCT formation by addressing other challenges that
have arisen in forming the first brigade.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department generally agreed
with the report?s findings and recommendations and outlined ongoing
management actions to address the concerns named in the report. Background
In testimony before the U. S. Senate in March 2000, 2 the Chief of Staff of
the

Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and future
strategic requirements. The Army believes that the transformation is
necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the growing number of
peacekeeping operations and small- scale contingencies and (2) the

challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as subnational and
transnational terrorist groups. The Army plans to transform its forces over
a 30- year period. The first phase of the Army's transformation is to form
six IBCTs, the first two of which are being formed at Fort Lewis,
Washington. The first of these brigades has been in the process of being
formed since fiscal year 2000. The Army's plan is to certify it as achieving
its initial operational

2 Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, March 1,
2000.

capability by May 2003, at which time it will be deployable. The second
brigade is in its early stages of formation. The Army has programmed funding
for six IBCTs and has announced the locations of the remaining four. 3 Under
current plans, all six brigades are to have been formed, equipped, trained,
and ready to deploy by 2008. The Army is also considering how it might
accelerate the fielding of the last three brigades

so that all six can be fielded by 2005. Additionally, the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review stated that an IBCT be stationed in Europe. Because this was
not in the Army's plans, it is considering establishing an IBCT in

Europe. Taken together, the IBCTs represent what the Army terms its Interim
Force because it begins to meet the Army?s rapid deployment needs for the
next decade.

Beginning in 2008 and continuing beyond 2030, the Army plans to transition
to its Objective Force. 4 During this period, all Army forces, including the
IBCTs, are to be transformed into new organizational structures operating
under new war- fighting doctrine. Their new combat systems are to be lighter
and more mobile, deployable, lethal, survivable, and sustainable

than current systems. Four competing research and development teams have
completed work on alternative designs for these future combat systems and a
contract has been awarded to a single lead systems

integrator. As the Army transitions to its Objective Force, it plans to
maintain the organizational designs of a portion of its existing combat
force, which it terms its Legacy Force, and to modernize selected equipment
in this force. This equipment includes such major weapons systems as the
Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Black Hawk helicopter. Figure 1
depicts

these weapons systems. This selective modernization is intended to enable
the Army to maintain capability and readiness until the future combat
systems are delivered to the Objective Force.

3 The first two are a heavy brigade of the 2 nd Infantry Division and a
light infantry brigade of the 25 th Infantry Division both of which are at
Fort Lewis. The next four are the 172 nd Infantry Brigade (Separate), Forts
Wainwright and Richardson, Alaska; the 2 nd Armored

Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, Louisiana; the 2 nd Brigade, 25 th
Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56 th Brigade
of the 28 th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Pennsylvania Army National
Guard.

4 The Objective Force is the force that achieves the objectives of the
Army?s transformation. This future force will be rapidly deployable and
capitalize on advances in science and technology. These advances will enable
the Army to equip its forces with significantly advanced systems such as the
Future Combat System.

Figure 1: Examples of Legacy Weapon Systems- Black Hawk Helicopter, Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and Abrams Tank

Source: U. S. Army.

IBCTS Are Expected to The Army expects the IBCT to provide a force
capability that it does not

Fill a Perceived Gap in currently have: a rapidly deployable early- entry
combat force that is lethal,

survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations,
Military Capability

from small- scale contingencies like the Balkans? missions to a major
theater war. It also expects to use the IBCT to test new concepts that would
be integrated into the Army?s future Objective Force. Many of these concepts
are still under development.

Expected Uses The IBCT has been optimized for small- scale contingencies,
being specifically designed to operate in a variety of terrains, including

mountains and urban areas. Yet it is expected to also be capable of
participating in a major theater war and addressing both conventional and
nonconventional threats. As an early- entry force, the brigade is expected
to have sufficient built- in combat power to conduct immediate combat
operations upon arrival in theater if required. It is designed to supply its
own needs for 72 hours, after which time it would need a source of resupply.
The IBCT is intended, in general, to fight as a component of a division or
corps but also be capable of operating separately under the direct control
of a higher headquarters, such as a joint task force. The Army expects that
in many possible contingencies, the IBCT could initially be the single U. S.
maneuver component under a higher headquarters.

In a major theater war, the IBCT under current plans would fight as a
subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps. However, the
brigade would be augmented with additional mission- specific combat
capabilities such as armor, aviation, and air defense artillery. The Army,
however, is considering the need for an Interim Division structure that
would include IBCTs as the maneuver forces because some analyses have
concluded that placing an IBCT with its differing design into an existing

infantry or armored division might impede the division?s ability to achieve
its full combat capabilities. The Army expects to complete the new
divisional concept by spring 2003 if the Chief of Staff decides to go
forward with it.

Expected Organization, The IBCT is organized primarily as a mobile infantry
organization and will

Equipment, and Capabilities contain about 3, 500 personnel and 890 vehicles.
The brigade includes

headquarters elements; three infantry battalions, composed of three rifle
companies each; an antitank company; an artillery battalion; an engineer
company; a brigade support battalion; a military intelligence company; a

signal company; and a unique Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition squadron. This squadron is expected to be the IBCT?s primary
source of combat information through the traditional role of reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition. However, the squadron is also designed
to develop a situational understanding of other elements within the
operational environment, including political, cultural, economic, and
demographic factors. This awareness is expected to enable the brigade to
anticipate, forestall, or overcome threats from the enemy. The squadron
offers the IBCT a variety of new systems and capabilities that

are generally not contained in an infantry brigade including manned
reconnaissance vehicles and ground reconnaissance scouts,
counterintelligence, human intelligence collectors, unmanned aerial

vehicles, ground sensors, and radars. Moreover, the squadron?s all- weather
intelligence and surveillance capabilities, coupled with the digitized
systems, are designed to enable it to maintain 24- hour operations.

All six of the IBCTs are planned to be equipped with new light- armored
wheeled vehicles, termed interim armored vehicles, which are significantly
lighter and more transportable than existing tanks and armored vehicles.

These vehicles include ten types of vehicles that share a common chassis-
infantry carriers, mobile gun systems, reconnaissance and surveillance
vehicles, and others. These wheeled vehicles are expected to enable the IBCT
to maneuver more easily in a variety of difficult terrains. The first
vehicles were scheduled for delivery to the first brigade in April 2002.
Meanwhile, the brigade has been training on substitute vehicles, including

32 Canadian infantry vehicles and German infantry carrier and nuclear,
biological, and chemical vehicles. These vehicles approximate the
capabilities of the interim armored vehicles. Figure 2 depicts two of the

interim armored vehicles.

Figure 2: Representative Interim Armored Vehicles- Mobile Gun System Vehicle
and Infantry Carrier Vehicle

Source: U. S. Army.

The brigade?s digitized communications are designed to enable brigade
personnel to ?see? the entire battlefield and react before engaging the
enemy. In addition to light armored vehicles equipped with digital systems,
the IBCT is expected to rely on advanced command, control, computer,

communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
purchased from commercial or government sources. The squadron?s allweather
intelligence and surveillance capabilities, together with its digitized
systems, are intended to enable it to maintain 24- hour operations. The Army
expects this awareness to enable the IBCT to anticipate, forestall, or
overcome threats from the enemy.

The IBCT's planned capabilities also differ in other ways from those found
in traditional divisional brigades. For example, the Army determined that
achieving decisive action while operating in various types of terrain,
including urban settings, would require the brigade to possess a combined
arms capability at the company level, rather than at the battalion level.
Focusing on dismounted assault, companies are expected to support themselves
with (1) direct fire from weapon systems on the infantry carrier vehicle and
from the mobile gun system and (2) indirect support through mortars and
artillery. This combined arms capability is to be reinforced through the
Army?s current development of a training program aimed at developing
soldiers with a wider range of skills as well as leaders who can adapt to
many different kinds of conflict situations.

Expected Deployment The Army expects the IBCT to rely on new sustainment
concepts that will

Capability and Relation to permit it to deploy more rapidly because it will
carry fewer supplies and

Objective Force have lighter vehicles, resulting in less weight to be
shipped. Due to its

smaller and lighter vehicles, the Army expects that the IBCT will be
transported within the theater by C- 130 aircraft. There are more of these
aircraft, and they provide greater access to airstrips than would be
possible

with larger C- 17 and C- 5A aircraft that are intended for use in deploying
an IBCT from its home station to the theater. Figure 3 shows a C- 130
aircraft.

Figure 3: C- 130 Aircraft

Source: U. S. Air Force.

The IBCTs will serve an additional purpose in that they will test and
validate new doctrine and organizational structures as well as new combat
training and leadership development concepts. As such, the Army expects

the formation and operation of the IBCT to provide insights for subsequent
transformation.

Estimated Schedule for In September 2001, Army officials announced the
possibility of accelerating

Accelerating IBCTs the formation of the last three IBCTs. Under this
proposal, all six IBCTs

would be formed by 2005, 3 years earlier than planned. A key to acceleration
is the ability of the manufacturer to deliver the vehicles ahead of the
current delivery schedule. According to this schedule, the first IBCT would
begin receiving its vehicles in April 2002. The second brigade would begin
receiving its vehicles in February 2003.

The Army cannot acquire vehicles for more than the second IBCT until it
meets certain legislative requirements. 5 The Army must compare the costs
and operational effectiveness of the Interim Armored Vehicle with its
existing vehicles before it can acquire the Interim Vehicle for the third
IBCT. The Army must also complete an operational evaluation of the first
IBCT. The evaluation must include a unit deployment to the evaluation site
and execution of combat missions across the spectrum of potential threats
and operational scenarios. The Army cannot acquire vehicles for the fourth
and subsequent IBCTs until the Secretary of Defense certifies that the
operational evaluation results indicate that the IBCT design is
operationally effective and suitable. The significance of this is that the
Army would need to complete this evaluation and authorize vehicle production
for the fourth brigade by June 2003 for the Army to accelerate formation of
the fourth and subsequent brigades, as has been proposed. This is because
the manufacturer must have 330 days of lead time to produce and deliver the
vehicles.

5 See appendix I for the specific legislative requirements that are
contained in section 113, Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001, P. L. 106- 398 (Oct. 30, 2000) and section 113,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P. L. 107107 (Dec.
28, 2001).

Regional Commander Our visits to the unified combat commands covering
Europe, Southwest

in Chiefs View Planned Asia, the Pacific, and the United Nations Command/ U.
S. Forces in Korea

confirmed their support for the Army?s plans for the IBCT. They generally
IBCTS Favorably and agree that the current Army force structure does not
meet their

Could Use Them in requirements for a rapidly deployable, lethal, and
survivable force. Various Ways

According to the CINCs, if the IBCTs are formed and deployable as planned,
they should fill the perceived near- term gap in military capability. The
CINCs view the IBCT as a means to provide them with a broader

choice of capabilities to meet their varied operational requirements rather
than a substitute for current force structure. However, CINC planners need
information about the brigade?s deployability and other limitations for
planning purposes. Their anticipated uses of an IBCT vary from serving as an
early entry force within the European Command to conducting reconnaissance
and securing main supply routes in Southwest Asia for the Central Command.
To ensure that the CINCs? needs and concerns are addressed as the
transformation evolves, the Army has created a forum that meets periodically
with their active participation. IBCTs Would Fill a

Our discussions with CINC officials confirmed their agreement with Army
Capabilities Gap

conclusions about a gap in military capability. In announcing the Army?s
plans for its transformation in October 1999, the Army?s Chief of Staff
pointed to this gap in current war- fighting capabilities and the IBCT?s
planned ability to rapidly deploy. He noted that although the Army can
dominate in all types of conflicts, it is not strategically responsive. The
light forces can deploy within a matter of days but lack combat power,
tactical mobility, and the ability to maintain sustained operations. On the
other hand, armor and mechanized forces possess significant combat power and
are able to maintain sustained operations but cannot deploy rapidly. CINC
officials cited past military operations that pointed to this gap. For

example, in the Persian Gulf War, the Army deployed a light infantry force-
the 82 nd Airborne Division- as the early entry force to deter Iraq and
defend Saudi Arabia. However, there is general agreement that this force did
not possess the anti- armor capability to survive and stop a heavy armored
attack. Moreover, it took 6 months to position the heavy forces and
associated support units and supplies needed to mount offensive actions
against Iraq- a time frame that might not be available in the future. The
urban operation in Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 that resulted

in the deaths of 16 U. S. soldiers was also mentioned to illustrate the need

for a force that is lethal, is maneuverable, and provides sufficient
protection to U. S. forces. The difficulty in maneuvering heavy vehicles in
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans was also cited by CINC
representatives as a reason why lighter, more maneuverable vehicles are
needed.

CINC officials pointed out many features of the IBCT that they felt would
address the existing capability shortfalls. These features included its
planned ability to deploy within 96 hours anywhere in the world and to
provide a formidable, survivable deterrent force that could bring combat
power to bear immediately if necessary. Also mentioned was its expected
ability to rapidly transition from being a deterrence, to serving in a
smallscale contingency, to fighting in a major theater of war in the event
operations escalated.

CINC officials also commented on the IBCT?s enhanced capabilities for
situational awareness. Situational awareness is the ability to see and
understand the battlefield before coming into actual contact with the
opponent through the use of advanced integrated systems that provide
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities. This expected improvement in awareness should
provide a major comparative advantage over potential enemies. They also
noted that the IBCT would support their rapid deployment needs

by using interim armored vehicles that would be deployable within theater by
C- 130 aircraft, which are more readily available, better able to access
small airfields, and therefore better able to be moved around the
battlefield. CINC officials also pointed out that the IBCT relies on a
family of vehicles with a common platform, which reduces logistics and
support requirements through commonality of spare parts, fuel, and
lubricants.

While generally positive about the IBCTs, CINC officials cautioned that many
questions remain about whether these brigades will be able to achieve all
their envisioned capabilities, especially by the time they are certified for
deployment. Concerns expressed to us included

 whether the IBCT would actually be available to deploy anywhere in the
world in 96 hours, given many potential competing demands for mobility
assets;

 what combat capability shortfalls might exist in the IBCT until it
receives all its planned vehicles and weapon systems;

 whether new logistics concepts would succeed in reducing supply tonnages
sufficiently to achieve rapid deployment and intratheater goals;

 when the vehicles that need further development, such as the mobile gun
system and the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle, would be
available; and

 whether the IBCT will be able to provide sufficient combat power when
heavy forces are needed.

CINC operational and logistics planners need specific data regarding the
brigade?s combat capabilities and logistics factors that are not yet
available. They emphasized that it was important to have these data to
adequately

integrate the IBCTs into their plans. If, for instance, certain planned
capabilities would not be in place when the first IBCTs become deployable,
planners would need to know this so that they could plan for mitigating any
risks that this might create. For example, Army officials in Korea related
their concern that the IBCT will not include the mobile gun system until

after the Army certifies the brigade as operationally capable. In the Korean
theater, the capability of this weapon system is a high priority. CINC
officials raised additional concerns about the IBCT?s support on our visits.
Logistics planners in Korea said the amounts of fuel, water, and ammunition
used by the brigade need to be analyzed to determine what the theater needs
to have when a brigade arrives. Although Korea contains

significant support resources, logistics planners need to know the unit?s
unique and specific support requirements. In the Pacific Command, questions
remain regarding the adequacy of the IBCT?s 3- day supply of medical items.
CINCs? Employment of

The CINCs? specific requirements and planned use for the IBCTs varies IBCTs
Will Vary

depending on the requirements of their respective areas of operational
responsibility. (See fig. 4.) Officials in both Europe and Korea expressed
their views that IBCTs could be used effectively in their theaters of
operation. Officials of the U. S. Central Command, which covers Southwest
Asia, said that an IBCT had utility in their theater- notably Africa- where
fighting in urban terrain might occur. According to Pacific Command
officials, their theater could use Army forces that are more deployable,
lethal, and sustainable than currently assigned, especially for use in the
urban areas prevalent in that theater. CINC representatives generally did

not expect the IBCT to substitute for forces currently assigned. Rather,
they saw the IBCT as providing them with a broader choice of capabilities to
meet their operational needs.

Figure 4: Areas of Operational Responsibility for the Geographical Combatant
Commands

Source: U. S. Army. Legend: USEUCOM - U. S. European Command USCENTCOM - U.
S. Central Command USPACOM - U. S. Pacific Command UNC/ USFK - United
Nations Command/ U. S. Forces Korea

U. S. European Command The European Command wants the Army to station an
IBCT in its area of responsibility. As noted earlier, the most recent
Quadrennial Defense Review stated that an IBCT would be stationed in Europe.
Command officials emphasized that the planned characteristics of the IBCT-
rapid deployment, enhanced situational awareness, tactical mobility, and

lethality- are key to the requirements of the European theater. Further, the
expected intelligence- gathering capabilities of the IBCT reconnaissance
squadron will exceed that of the Command?s currently assigned divisions.
This capability is a necessity for missions such as those in the Balkans.
Recognizing strategic and tactical mobility deficiencies from past and

ongoing contingency operations in the Balkans, in the year 2000 Command
officials in fact created a rapid reaction force with some of the same
characteristics as the IBCT. This rapid reaction force is composed of both
light and heavy forces and is expected to deploy within 24 hours after being
alerted. By using on- hand forces and equipment, the European Command has
created an immediate reaction force that possesses some of the IBCT's
capabilities. However, this reaction force lacks the intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance systems found in the IBCT that allows
greater situational understanding of the battlefield. Furthermore, the force
is not equipped with the new interim armored vehicles, which allows for a
commonality among sustainment requirements and training. Command officials
said that an IBCT would complement this rapid reaction force by providing an
early entry force that could bring more combat power to bear. U. S. Central
Command The Central Command?s primary area of responsibility is Southwest
Asia

and is one of two geographic areas that have required war planning for a
major theater war. One official noted that an IBCT could provide significant
capability to the CINC's theater engagement plans by providing mobile
training teams and other military- to- military missions with developing
nations.

Command officials stated that the IBCTs would offer new capabilities to
their theater in certain circumstances. For example, had an IBCT been
available during the Persian Gulf War, the IBCT could have been used

rather than the 82 nd Airborne Division since the IBCT's planned anti- armor
capability far exceeds that of a light division. Moreover, the IBCT would be
useful in conducting missions such as reconnaissance and security and
securing main supply routes. Command officials stated that an IBCT would

have been valuable had it been available for the urban mission in Mogadishu,
Somalia, during October 1993. They added that the IBCT could also be used
for evacuating noncombatants. Command officials noted that even though the
IBCT offers them new capabilities, they would not substitute it for the
heavy combat forces that are required for a major war such as the Gulf War.

United Nations Command/ U. S. Army officials in Korea have stated that they
want to station an IBCT in Forces Korea

Korea. According to one senior Army official in Korea, the IBCT would
provide the maneuverability and combat power needed to operate in the
mountains and the increasingly urbanized areas of Korea. War planners in
Korea expressed their view that the IBCT is optimized to meet the
operational requirements of the Korean peninsula and that the IBCT would
have more utility than Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1 tanks. They
explained that these latter weapons would have to be used primarily as
stationary weapon platforms because the terrain and the sprawling urban
terrain limit their use. They noted that IBCTs are more mobile than light
forces and once equipped with all their new weapon systems will have good
lethality and be survivable. Further, according to CINC officials, the
theater will not lose or diminish its combat capability by substituting
IBCTs for heavy forces. U. S. Pacific Command While Pacific Command
officials noted that Army forces currently assigned to the theater are
capable of meeting most CINC operational requirements, an IBCT would bring
certain desirable capabilities to the theater. For

example, an IBCT would provide increased situational awareness, tactical
mobility, and firepower currently unavailable within assigned Army forces.
Command war planners explained that the IBCT?s communications capabilities
would help eliminate some communications shortfalls between and among the
Command?s service components. Moreover, an IBCT could be more effectively
employed for stability and support operations in the

Pacific, providing a rapid deployment capability. They mentioned that the
planned capabilities of the IBCT offer both (1) considerable flexibility by
having substantial nonlethal capabilities for use in stability and support
missions and (2) substantial lethality for more intense operations such as
peace enforcement. Command officials noted that the IBCT?s interim armored
vehicles would provide better protection for infantry forces than

can be provided by currently assigned infantry forces. Forum Exists to
Address

The Army has established a CINC Requirements Task Force that provides a CINC
Concerns

forum for the commanders to voice their current and future requirements.
Army officials assigned to the combatant commands stated that the quarterly
meetings have allowed the CINCs to ensure that their concerns

are heard. Issues raised are then forwarded to the Army staff for
resolution. For example, the task force has addressed issues such as how the
U. S. Pacific Command plans to employ IBCTs in that theater as well as
reintegrating the Army?s first IBCT into the operational plans. Based on
discussions with combatant command officials, the perceived value of the

forum is such that participation at the quarterly meetings is generally
obligatory for command representatives. Challenges Have Fort Lewis officials
said that they are generally satisfied with the progress Arisen in Forming
the

being made to date in fielding the first IBCT and believe the IBCT is on
track to meet its certification milestone of May 2003. However, the Army
Initial IBCT has encountered challenges in forming the IBCT at Fort Lewis.
One challenge to overcome is a combat capability shortfall in the first IBCT
when it is certified. Specifically, certain specialized interim vehicles,
such as the mobile gun system, will not be available. Further, the interim

armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for
soldiers to train on the vehicles; personnel turnover resulted in more time
spent on digital training than planned; and the 96- hour deployment
capability, while a goal rather than a requirement, will not be attained by
the first IBCT. Army planners are still developing plans on how the IBCT

will obtain needed logistics support in the theater after its planned 72-
hour supply is depleted. Other challenges relate more to the first IBCT; its
home station, Fort Lewis; and potentially, future home stations. These
challenges include retention of skilled soldiers and the increased costs to
provide maintenance support and facilities at Fort Lewis and ultimately to
subsequent IBCT home stations.

First IBCT Will Not Possess All Envisioned Combat Capabilities

Delivery Schedule for Interim The first IBCT will not achieve all designed
combat capabilities by the time Armored Vehicles Will Impact

it reaches its certification date because it will not have all the interim
Planned Combat Capabilities at

infantry vehicle variants. One key variant it will lack is the mobile gun
Certification Date

system, which is expected to be more capable than the system currently being
used. Until the first IBCT is fully equipped with its complement of interim
armored vehicles, it will be limited in its designed capabilities by using
in- lieu- of vehicles. Specifically, until the mobile gun system vehicle and
the nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicle arrive, the IBCT cannot fully
meet its planned war- fighting capabilities. These vehicles- particularly
the mobile gun system- are critical to meet the expectations of the war-
fighting CINC in Korea, as well as the Army?s transformation plans.

Based on the current delivery schedule, at the time of its operational
certification in May 2003, the first IBCT will have about 86 percent of its

interim armored vehicles and the remaining 14 percent will be approved
substitutes. Army regulations allow a unit to use substitute equipment and
vehicles to meet its initial operational capability date. The first mobile
gun systems and nuclear, biological, and chemical vehicles will be delivered
beginning in 2004. Delayed Vehicles and Digitized

The Army has encountered training challenges due to the delivery schedule
Systems Have Created Training

for the interim armored vehicles and the need for extensive training on
Challenges

digital systems. Despite these challenges, training officials believe that
the IBCT has made great strides in achieving training goals, including the
transformation goal of developing soldiers who are skilled in a wide range
of tasks so that they can transition quickly from small- scale contingencies
to higher levels of combat and the reverse. Because deliveries of the
interim vehicles are not scheduled to begin until April 2002, the IBCT has
been dependent on substitute wheeled infantry

carriers loaned by the Canadian and German governments. These vehicles have
been passed from unit to unit, thereby limiting training to company level
and below. Training officials said that although they were disappointed that
they did not have sufficient vehicles to train as a battalion or brigade, a
hidden benefit was that the IBCT was able to focus more training on
individual and dismounted infantry skills instead. According to a senior
Fort Lewis official, subsequent brigades should not experience the same
training limitations as the first brigade unless, for any unforeseen reason,
the contractor?s expected delivery schedule cannot be met. However, the
first brigade will experience a further training challenge in that the
revised delivery schedule will compress the time available to train at the
battalion and brigade level to just 3 months. Fort Lewis training officials
would have liked to have a full 6 months to train after receiving

most of the vehicles. However, a senior Fort Lewis official also told us
that he is confident that all the training requirements will be accomplished
in the lesser time available. The need to train IBCT soldiers in digital
systems has posed other

challenges. Digitization provides a critical situational awareness
capability to the IBCT similar to that afforded units at Fort Hood, Texas,
under the Army?s Force XXI program. 6 These systems use sophisticated
information

6 This Army initiative begun, in the mid- 1990s, involved equipping infantry
troops at Fort Hood, Texas, with digitized equipment and testing it in
several field exercises. The IBCT is being equipped with these same
digitized systems.

technology, that allows personnel in the IBCT to achieve superior
battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming
into contact. IBCT soldiers train with many digitized systems and must
maintain specific levels of proficiency. Maintaining proficiency in these
systems has been challenging due to personnel turnover in the IBCT. The Army
does not currently have a formal digital sustainment- training program for
individual soldiers and leaders. Fort Lewis officials cited their

concerns that without a digital sustainment- training program, soldier
skills will quickly erode. The Army Training and Doctrine Command is
currently developing an individual digital sustainment- training program for
the two brigades, which may be applicable to the entire Army. However, the
Army has not yet implemented initial formal training in digitized systems
within its institutional centers and schools; as a result, many individual
leaders and soldiers arrive at the IBCT unit without any prior experience
with the hardware or software. The Army plans to begin teaching digitized
systems at its schoolhouses in 2004, but even then, the training will only
be an initial overview. As part of the Army's multi- skilled soldier
concept, the Army?s Infantry

branch has combined the occupational skill specialties of infantryman,
fighting- vehicle infantryman, and heavy anti- armor weapons infantryman
into a single consolidated specialty and will train them in a wide range of
infantry skills. Army officials spoke favorably about this concept and said
that concerns that the Army may be requiring too many skills and
capabilities for individual soldiers to absorb have not been borne out in

their experience so far. In their view, individual soldiers at Fort Lewis
had adapted well to the requirements of the digitized systems and multiple
combat skills needed for IBCT missions. They are generally satisfied with
the progress being made to date and believe that the IBCT is on track to
meet its certification milestone of May 2003. Figure 5 depicts a schematic
of this multi- skilled soldier approach.

Figure 5: Army?s Approach to Develop Multi- Skilled Soldiers

Source: U. S. Army.

Impediments to Achieving The Army?s ability to meet its rapid deployment
goal for the first IBCT will Deployability Goals

depend on availability of aircraft to transport unit equipment, completed
infrastructure improvements at Fort Lewis specifically, and Air Force
certification of the IBCT as deployable. In commenting on the draft report,
Army officials stated that Air Force certification of the interim armored
vehicle is currently underway with weight and load certification scheduled
for May 2002.

Initially the Army announced that the IBCTs would be capable of deploying
within 96 hours anywhere in the world, but the Army has since made it a goal
for the IBCTs rather than a requirement. It has not established a substitute
deployability timetable for the first IBCT. However, under current plans,
the Army retains the 96- hour deployment requirement for the future
transformed units entering the Army?s force following formation of

all six brigades in 2008. Other requirements for this future force are to be
able to deploy a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. It
appears that this 96- hour deployability goal for the first IBCT will not be
achieved. Army transportation planners have determined that it would take
201 C- 17 and 51 C- 5 aircraft to transport all of the IBCT?s equipment to

a distant theater. (See fig. 6.) Army officials have stated that with all
the competing demands for these aircraft, the Air Force currently does not
possess sufficient numbers of them to meet the 96- hour goal for the IBCTs.
Additional analyses would be needed to evaluate other ways to supplement

this capability, such as through the forward positioning of some materials
or the use of commercial aircraft. Strategic airlift is an Air Force
responsibility and therefore beyond the purview of the Army.

Figure 6: A C- 17 Aircraft and a C- 5A Aircraft That Would Provide Strategic
Lift for the IBCT

Source: U. S. Air Force.

The installation where an IBCT is located will dictate the additional
infrastructure requirements necessary to deploy the brigade. In October
2000, the Army?s Military Traffic Management Command reported in its Army
Transformation study that the existing infrastructure at Fort Lewis and
McChord Air Force Base could not meet the Army?s requirements for deploying
the IBCT. The study identified five projects at the air base and Fort Lewis
that needed to be constructed or upgraded at an estimated cost of about $52
million. Since the publication of the report, the Army has funded four of
the five projects at a cost of more than $48 million and begun one of the
projects. The remaining project requires improvements to deployment ramps at
McChord Air Force Base. According to Army officials, the remaining project
has not been funded and will most likely not

be completed before the Army certifies the IBCT as deployable in May 2003.

Another impediment to achieving this goal is the Air Force?s certification
that the IBCT and all its equipment items can be loaded on and deployed by
aircraft. The Air Force cannot certify the unit until the vehicles are
fielded and loaded aboard the aircraft in accordance with combat mission
requirements. The fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act
requires the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of
the first IBCT and the Secretary of Defense to certify that its design is
operationally suitable and effective. The evaluation is to include
deployment of the brigade to the site of the evaluation. Generally, the IBCT
cannot be deployed outside the United States until this requirement is met.
7 A successful evaluation will be necessary if the Army is to achieve its
goal

of having six IBCTs by 2008. Other Challenges Have Arisen at Fort Lewis

Personnel Stabilization Has Been Army officials recognized early on that
some form of personnel the Key Human Capital

stabilization policy for the IBCTs might be needed to provide sufficient
Challenge

continuity of leadership and training to the brigade. However, the delay in
setting up the policy and certain exemptions from the policy have led to
more turbulence than officials would have liked. They believe that the
personnel turnover may have diminished training effectiveness in some
instances and may have led to devoting more time than they could afford to

digitization training. Officials explained that the need for stabilization
stems from the unique nature of the training being done at Fort Lewis and
from the normal Army rotational policy that generally has personnel rotating
between assignments in 2 years or less. In short, when the trained personnel
rotate

out of the IBCT, they take their training with them; but no equally trained
personnel are available to rotate in. Consequently, the IBCT requires a
constant program of providing basic training to incoming personnel on
digital equipment, which is available only at Fort Lewis or Fort Hood. 7 The
law permits the Secretary of Defense to waive this limitation if deployment
is required

by national security interests.

Moreover, because this skill is perishable, periodic refresher training is
also required. Similarly, the IBCT is training to future war- fighting
concepts and doctrine and new concepts for leadership development. Finally,
the first IBCT expects to begin receiving some of its interim armored
vehicles, which are not available elsewhere in the Army. These unique
training requirements argue for more continuity than can be achieved through
the normal Army rotational policies that create a constant turnover of
personnel within a 24- month period.

Recognizing this need for more continuity, Fort Lewis officials expressed to
Army headquarters their concern that permitting normal policies to remain in
place would adversely affect the IBCT?s readiness and ability to achieve
certification on time. In response, the Department of the Army established a
formal stabilization policy for the IBCTs in May 2001. Except for certain
exemptions under this policy, soldiers must remain in an IBCT for 1 year
following certification of the brigade?s operational capability.

By stabilizing its soldiers, the unit had hoped to reduce the amount of time
it has to spend on training soldiers new to the IBCT on digital and other
specialized equipment. Unfortunately, the stabilization policy has not been
as effective as officials had hoped. First, the stabilization policy was not
in

place until May 2001, and by then, many IBCT soldiers had already begun
leaving the unit under normal Army rotational procedures. As a result, IBCT
trainers spent much of the year repeating their training to new soldiers.

A second problem in the stabilization policy?s effectiveness stemmed from
the exemptions that are allowed under the policy. For example, soldiers are
allowed to rotate out of an IBCT to attend a required school, when promoted,
or they can elect to leave an IBCT when they come up for

reenlistment. Fort Lewis officials have been encouraged by the fact that
IBCT soldiers re- enlisted in fiscal year 2001 at higher rates than those
achieved by either of the brigade?s higher headquarters- I Corps at Fort
Lewis and Forces Command (FORSCOM). As shown by figure 7, all three
organizations achieved over 100 percent of the retention goals set by the
Army.

Figure 7: Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 Retention Rates for Soldiers in the
IBCTs, at Fort Lewis, and throughout Forces Command

Percent of goal Legend: First term= initial term of service of 3 years or
less. Mid term= a subsequent period of 10 years or less. Source: GAO.

Officials noted, however, that IBCT soldiers who have elected to remain in
the Army have not necessarily elected to remain in the IBCT. As shown by
figure 8, whereas 34 percent on average of I Corps soldiers elected to
remain in their units, only 27 percent of IBCT soldiers elected to stay with
the IBCT. Moreover, despite the acknowledged need for continuity in the
IBCTs, officials have not been capturing data on the reasons why IBCT
soldiers are re- enlisting to leave the brigade early and therefore lack
information that could help them reduce personnel turbulence. Further, data
are not available to determine which re- enlistment options IBCT

soldiers are choosing other than remaining in the unit.

Figure 8: Comparison of IBCT and I Corps Soldiers Electing to Remain in
Their Existing Unit Source: GAO.

Fort Lewis officials said that the problems with stabilization may not be as
severe with subsequent brigades since the stabilization policy will be in
effect from the beginning, unlike the first brigade when the policy was not
instituted until months after its formation began. As a result, Army
officials anticipate that these latter brigades will experience fewer
departures. Personnel turbulence related to reenlistments would become more
significant if the brigades experience slippage in their certification dates
and lose more soldiers to re- enlistment transfers. Installation Support

The Army specifically designed the IBCT to have fewer support personnel,
Needed for IBCTs Has

fewer supplies, and lighter vehicles so that the brigade could be quickly
deployed. As a result, the IBCT cannot provide all its own support and Been
Greater than requires installation support when located at its home station
and other

Anticipated outside support after 72 hours once deployed. In addition, the
home

station must provide additional and costly facilities for that support. The
IBCT is designed with an austere support battalion that contains fewer
mechanics to support and maintain its vehicles. IBCT battalion commanders
pointed out, however, that the number of vehicles to support has remained
the same, even though the number of mechanics has been

reduced by two- thirds. Therefore, the IBCT is capable of conducting only
about one- third of its vehicle maintenance requirements. As a result, the
IBCT must depend on its home installation for scheduled maintenance support.
Fort Lewis addressed this capability limitation by hiring contractors and
temporary employees to meet the IBCT support requirements. Fort Lewis
officials estimate the IBCT?s recurring maintenance requirements at about
$11.1 million a year.

After being deployed for 72 hours, the IBCT must be supported by other
organizations due to its streamlined support battalion and, under
transformation concepts, must ?reach? for this support. Under the reach
concept, the IBCT is expected to request fuel, ammunition, food, spare

parts, water, and other supplies through an integrated distribution system
by a linked communications network that includes the IBCT home station,
contractor support, and multinational or foreign national commercial

systems. Army logistics planners have not yet determined how all this will
work. Further, in the interim, the support battalion logistical systems are
not yet integrated and lack a dedicated secure network interface to the
Army?s computerized Battle Command System. As a result, IBCT soldiers are
being temporarily used as couriers to relay logistics data between
headquarters. The Army?s immediate solution to this challenge may be to
increase the IBCT support battalion personnel. For the long term, the Army
is developing a system software fix.

Providing support to IBCTs will require Army installations to provide new
and costly facilities to meet IBCT requirements. The extent and cost of
needed improvements at the other installations will vary widely depending
upon the location. Army planners noted that it takes at least 3 to 5 years
to plan and construct maintenance and other needed infrastructure facilities
and that therefore it will be important to develop these plans as soon as
possible. Moreover, Army officials have determined that at a minimum, future
IBCT home stations will require a mission- support training facility, 8 a
fixed tactical Internet, ammunition igloos, and digital classrooms. Examples
of long- term requirements include live- fire ranges, maneuvertraining

areas, mock villages for urban training, and deployment facilities. Figure 9
shows the facility constructed at Fort Lewis to train soldiers in urban
warfare techniques.

8 A mission support training facility provides a comprehensive environment
within which the IBCT can conduct individual and multi- echelon digital
training and mission support.

Figure 9: Shoot House Training Facility Constructed at Fort Lewis to Train
IBCT Soldiers to Confront the Enemy in an Urban Setting

Source: U. S. Army.

At Fort Lewis and Yakima Training Center, existing support facilities- such
as barracks, motor pools, ammunition storage facilities, and training
ranges- need to be upgraded or constructed. To meet IBCT training needs,
Fort Lewis converted an existing building to a mission- support training
facility, which accelerated the normal new construction timeline. However,
all support requirements have not yet been funded. For example, Fort

Lewis has requested about $10 million for IBCT communication infrastructure
requirements that include a secure fiber optic upgrade to

link to McChord Air Force Base. Installations also need the ability to
integrate digitized systems between home stations and training centers.
Brigade Coordination Cell Has

After the Army announced its planned transformation, the Army Chief of
Proven to Be Valuable

Staff designated the U. S. Training and Doctrine Command as the lead agent
Coordinating Mechanism

for transformation. The Command in turn established the Brigade Coordination
Cell (BCC) at Fort Lewis. Its mission is to ensure successful formation of
the first two IBCTs at Fort Lewis, synchronize efforts between FORSCOM and
the Training and Doctrine Command, and provide insight on Army Battle
Command System architecture. The BCC is empowered to directly coordinate
with other Army major commands and agencies. It provides a centralized link
between the IBCT and a variety of Army organizations responsible for
doctrine, training, organization, material, and leadership development. Fort
Lewis officials emphasized to us that resolving some of the challenges they
are facing points to the need for subsequent installations to establish some
sort of mechanism, such as a Brigade Coordination Cell, to deal with the
many issues that will inevitably arise.

The BCC is designed as a matrix organization and conduit for feedback
between various Army organizations pertaining to training, equipment, and
logistics. IBCT soldiers as well as analysts from the BCC, the Army Test and
Evaluation Command, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned evaluate and
validate training doctrine provided by the Infantry and Armor schools. After
training exercises, IBCT commanders and soldiers as well as the appropriate
Army agencies provide informal and formal lessonslearned data to the cell.
The BCC communicates these data to the doctrine writers for their use as
they develop the training support packages for squad- to brigade- level
collective tasks and formulate conceptual guidance for use by the IBCT
commanders. Cell personnel are a part of the working groups created to solve
issues in training, deployment, and logistics. A representative from the
Army Materiel Command coordinates the vehicle fielding and its associated
new equipment training between the IBCT and

the civilian contractors. The BCC supplements an existing staff hierarchy.
It provides staff enforcement and support for the I Corps staff while
existing external to the Fort Lewis chain of command. The BCC is not a
higher headquarters staff for the IBCT. The cell?s focus is the same as its
mission- to successfully deliver the first two IBCTs to the Army.

Senior Fort Lewis officials have stated that the BCC has proven to be a
valuable means of coordinating activities related to brigade formation and
has offered several important benefits. For example, they noted that some of
the difficulties that have arisen have been time- consuming to resolve.

The existence of the BCC has relieved such burdens from brigade operations
personnel so that they could concentrate more on their substantive work,
such as training. The BCC also acted as a communication intermediary between
the IBCT and the institutional schoolhouses to develop training doctrine for
the brigade?s new mission requirements. In addition, the BCC relieved Fort
Lewis from some of the public affairs requirements. The acknowledged
benefits of the BCC have led Fort Lewis officials to conclude that a similar
organization may be needed at subsequent locations.

Lessons Learned on In accordance with Army regulations, 9 the Army routinely
documents the

Brigade Formation lessons it learns from battles, projects, and
reorganizations using

memorandums, after- action reports, messages, briefings, and other Are Not
Readily

historical documents. Various organizations traditionally chronicle Army
Available

strengths and weaknesses with respect to organization, peacekeeping
missions, and wartime operations. During our review, we determined that
while fielding the initial IBCT at Fort Lewis, the Army learned valuable
lessons that would be critical to future IBCT formation. These lessons were
captured and communicated in a variety of ways. However, they were not
always forwarded to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, as required, for
retention. Further, there is no central location or database where all
relevant IBCT lessons learned are available for research. Without having the
lessons learned available, the Army may repeat mistakes in fielding

subsequent brigades and may lose opportunities that could help it field
subsequent brigades more efficiently. Lessons Learned Not Army Regulation
11- 33 designates the Center for Army Lessons Learned as Always Forwarded as

the focal point for its lessons- learned system. The regulation stresses
that Required all Army entities are to forward appropriate analytical data,
including afteraction reports, to the Center. After- action reviews are
structured

9 Army Regulation 11- 33: Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development
and Application, 10 October 1989; Army Regulation 870- 5: Military History:
Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures, 29 January 1999.

discussions among commanders and soldiers after military exercises to
determine what went right or wrong and what can be improved. However, it
appears that the Army is not taking full advantage of this repository to
capture all relevant IBCT lessons learned. For example, we found that
organizations that have played important roles in the initial brigades?
formation are all independently chronicling IBCT fielding information.
Furthermore, there is an indication that all lessons learned are not being
forwarded to the Center. For example, in May 2001, the Army Test and
Evaluation Command published two independent reports that assessed IBCT
training events at the squad and platoon levels at Fort Lewis. These reports
contained analyses and lessons- learned data about training exercises,
equipment, and tasks. The Test and Evaluation Command reports stated that
the after- action reviews identified significant issues in

conducting adequate equipment training. However, the reports are available
from the Test and Evaluation Command, not the Center for Army Lessons
Learned. The Center for Army Lessons Learned published one newsletter dated
July

2001 that identified some lessons learned and issues concerning the IBCT.
This information was compiled from subject matter experts? observations
during training events such as the Senior Leader and Tactical Leaders
Course, digital equipment training, and news articles printed in
professional publications. Center officials stated that as a result of the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, homeland security has
become the Center?s primary focus, not the IBCTs. Although the Center
intends to publish a second newsletter addressing the support concepts and
requirements for the IBCT, it does not anticipate publishing it until later
in 2002. An official at the Center for Army Lessons Learned said that
information comes in sporadically from disparate sources. Although fielding
of the IBCTs is no longer a Center priority, it intends to continue
collecting lessons learned and historical information regarding the fielding
of the IBCTs and to publish subsequent newsletters as appropriate.

Fort Lewis Held Conference Officials at Fort Lewis, at the behest of
FORSCOM, hosted an Information to Share Lessons Learned

Exchange Conference, from November 27 to November 29, 2001, to provide a
forum to communicate IBCT lessons learned to officials who will be
overseeing formation of subsequent IBCTs as well as to officials from
organizations such as Army headquarters, U. S. Army Europe, U. S. Army
Pacific, and the National Guard Bureau. At this conference, Fort Lewis
officials noted the challenges that they had faced in several areas. The
problem areas included personnel turnover and stabilization, digitization

training, classroom shortages, issues related to maintenance and support,
budget shortfalls related to vehicle maintenance, difficulties related to
equipment turn- in, and deficiencies in installation infrastructure. Other
lessons learned concerned information technology requirements and the need
to establish working relationships throughout the Army. Fort Lewis officials
told us that they hoped that the conference attendees would use these
lessons learned as they plan and budget for the subsequent brigades at their
locations starting in fiscal years 2004 and beyond. However, it did not
appear that these valuable lessons learned would

necessarily be readily available for future use. We were told, for example,
that FORSCOM would maintain copies of the various slide presentations given
at the conference on its Web site for about 12 days. Moreover, there was no
plan to submit this information to the Center for Army Lessons Learned for
later availability to interested officials of subsequent brigades. While
Army officials emphasized that lessons learned are being discussed

at all levels throughout the Army, one official commented that he was
waiting for the Center for Army Lessons Learned to contact him regarding the
lessons identified by his department rather than being proactive about
forwarding the information to the Center. Senior officials at Fort Lewis did
not know of any other central repository for such information. In our
opinion, with the frequent turnover of personnel in the brigades and in some
installation functions, it would be valuable to have all IBCT lessons

learned available in a central repository. Conclusions Successful formation
of the first IBCT is critical to the Army's

transformation plan because it will begin to fill a near- term gap in
military capability and test new concepts that would be integrated into the
future Objective Force. Although Army officials are pleased with the
progress made thus far, concerns remain about whether all capabilities
envisioned for the brigade will be achieved in time for the IBCT?s May 2003

certification milestone. Concerns include, notably, the unavailability of
the mobile gun system, which provides a key combat capability, and the
likelihood that the IBCT will be unable to meet the 96- hour deployment goal
due to insufficient quantities of aircraft. Because the IBCT could be
deployed to their theaters, it is important that CINC war planners know as
soon as possible what planned capabilities are likely to be missing when the
brigade is certified as having achieved its initial operating capability.
Similarly, logistics planners will need logistics data soon to enable them
to

plan how best to meet the support requirements of the IBCT if it is deployed
to their theater.

Certain challenges have also arisen in forming the first IBCT at Fort Lewis.
These challenges include concerns about retaining skilled personnel in the
brigade, the ability of IBCT soldiers to sustain their skills on digital
systems, and the need for and cost of facility improvements to support the
formation of this brigade and, potentially, subsequent brigades. Taking
actions now to address these and other challenges faced by the Fort Lewis
facility could enhance the chances that subsequent IBCT formations will be
accomplished smoothly.

The BCC set up at Fort Lewis appears to have been an effective means of
funneling the day- to- day challenges that have arisen in forming the IBCT
to the appropriate Army entity for resolution and thus allowing brigade
officials to focus on critical training and operational matters. Each
installation will likely experience similar issues and benefit from a
similar organization. The experiences of those forming the first IBCT and of
Fort Lewis in hosting the IBCT provide examples of pitfalls and best
practices that, if systematically recorded and made available in a central
repository to others throughout the Army, could help the Army form
subsequent brigades more efficiently. The Army?s Center for Lessons Learned
is the designated focal point for lessons learned; however, the Center is
neither collecting nor receiving all the lessons learned from forming the
first IBCT.

Recommendations for To ensure that regional CINCs have the information they
need to plan for

Executive Action mitigating any risks associated with shortfalls in IBCT
combat capability as

well as logistical requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to

 estimate the combat capabilities that will exist at the time the IBCTs are
certified as deployable and set milestones for providing this information to
CINC planners and

 provide CINC planners with relevant logistics information as soon as
possible so that they can adequately plan how best to support the IBCTs.

Because some mobility issues are beyond the Army?s purview and a long lead
time could be necessary to rectify any identified shortfalls, we are further
recommending that the Secretary of Defense obtain the Army?s specific IBCT
mobility requirements to meet its goal for deploying a

brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours and determine how best to address
any shortfalls.

To assist subsequent installations where IBCTs will be formed in their
planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of
the Army to

 expedite development of a program to sustain personnel skills on digitized
equipment so that it will be available for subsequent IBCTs,

 collect and analyze data on why soldiers leave the IBCTs and take
appropriate action to reduce personnel turnover,

 estimate the extent and cost of facility improvements that will be needed
at installations scheduled to accommodate the subsequent IBCTs to assist
them in their planning,

 establish a BCC- type organization at subsequent IBCT locations to deal
with day- to- day challenges, and  provide a central collection point for
IBCT lessons learned so as to

make the information available to personnel throughout the Army. Agency
Comments and

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense Our
Evaluation

generally agreed with the report?s findings and recommendations and outlined
ongoing management actions to address the concerns noted in the report. In
addition, we obtained technical comments from the Department on a draft of
this report and incorporated them where appropriate.

In responding to our recommendations that the Army estimate the combat
capabilities and logistics requirements of the IBCT and provide the data to
CINC planners, the Department acknowledged that since the first IBCT has not
been fully fielded, there might be some planning information shortfalls that
may inhibit CINC war planning. However, the Department noted that the Army,
through the CINC Requirements Task Force, has provided a successful forum to
address CINC concerns and derive solutions. We acknowledge that the CINC
Requirements Task Force meetings provide a

valuable communication tool. Nevertheless, during our fieldwork, CINC
operational and logistics planners, who have been represented at these
meetings, expressed concerns about not yet receiving specifics regarding the
combat capabilities of the IBCT and its logistics requirements. As noted in
our report, the planners emphasized that it was important to have these data
to adequately integrate the IBCTs into their plans. Moreover, if certain
planned capabilities would not be in place when the first IBCTs

become deployable, the planners would need to know this. Accordingly, we do
not believe that the CINCs? participation in the Requirements Task Force can
substitute for being directly provided data on planned combat capabilities
and logistics requirements, as we recommended. Providing information as soon
as possible to the CINCs would enable operational planners to begin their
risk mitigation process in developing their contingency and operational
plans. Regarding Army mobility requirements for the IBCTs, the Department

stated that the Army would continue to define the mobility requirements to
meet the goals for IBCT deployment. We recognize that prioritization and
allocation of lift assets is an operational challenge to be faced by the
CINCs and acknowledge that timely allocation of strategic and tactical
mobility is needed for the IBCTs to meet planned operational capabilities.
However, because the Army does not control mobility allocations, we believe
that our

recommendation is appropriately directed to the Secretary of Defense, who is
in a better position to assess how best to mitigate any projected
shortfalls. With respect to our recommendation that the Army expedite
development

of a program to sustain personnel skills on digitized equipment that will be
available for subsequent IBCTs, the Department said that its ability to
accelerate digitized training at the proponent schools was limited due to
the equipment delivery schedules. Our recommendation, however, was directed
at accelerating development of a sustainment training program for future use
at the IBCT locations rather than the proponent schools, as noted in our
report. During our review, Army officials expressed concerns that the
individual soldiers? digitization skills would quickly erode without a
continuing focused regimen of training. Therefore, we continue to believe
that the Army needs to expedite developing such a program and implement it
as a part of each IBCT?s training program. In responding to our
recommendation regarding IBCT reassignments, the

Department said that the Army is carefully managing IBCT personnel
reassignments pointing to the IBCT personnel stabilization policy that the
Army instituted. Although this policy is intended to limit personnel
turnover in the IBCT, the fact remains that IBCT soldiers are re- enlisting
to leave the IBCT at a higher rate than other units in I Corps. We believe
that collecting information on the reasons why IBCT soldiers are leaving at
this higher rate would help Army officials identify actions that they might
take to encourage re- enlistments in the IBCT. We also believe that this

recommendation is especially important in that continuity is critical to
achieving training objectives. In responding to our recommendation
concerning facility requirements at

subsequent IBCT locations, the Department stated that the Army routinely
conducts estimates as part of the annual budgetary process. The Department
said that the Army now has a draft transformation template for Army
installations that will provide facility requirements to support IBCT
stationing, training, and sustainment. The draft template is designed to
provide installation planners a starting point to determine their
installation peculiar requirements to support an IBCT.

With regard to establishing a BCC- like organization at future IBCT sites,
the Department stated that the Army has identified certain functions,
processes, and support capabilities required to transform a unit into an
IBCT. The Department noted that each IBCT location will have different

levels of internal staff capability to execute transformation and that the
Army will tailor, on a case- by- case basis, the resources required to fill
the shortfalls at each location. We did not intend to dictate the size nor
organizational structure for the BCC- like organization we recommended. We
agree that as the Army learns about fielding IBCTs, requirements will differ
from location to location and the Army should tailor whatever organization
it sets up to fit the situational needs.

In response to our recommendation regarding establishing a central
collection point for IBCT lessons learned, the Department acknowledged that
some lessons learned have not been disseminated throughout the

Army nor sent to the Army?s Center for Lessons Learned. It said that the
Army is planning to establish a central repository and procedures to inform
the Army about past and future lessons learned from the Army?s
transformation as we recommended. Appendix II contains the full text of the
Department?s comments.

Scope and To identify and gain an understanding of the anticipated
capabilities of the

Methodology IBCT, we discussed planned IBCT capabilities with Army officials
at Fort

Lewis, Washington; I Corps; the Brigade Coordination Cell; 3rd Brigade/ 2nd
Infantry Division; and officials at the Armor and Infantry Schools and the
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We also obtained and
reviewed various briefing documents, the IBCT Organizational and

Operational Concept, the Center for Lesson Learned newsletter, test and

evaluation reports, and the IBCT?s modified table of organization and
equipment.

To determine whether the CINCs believe the IBCTs? planned combat
capabilities will meet their requirements, we received briefings and
discussed IBCT capabilities with commanders and staff at the U. S. Pacific
Command and U. S. Army, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; U. S. Forces Korea and 8
th U. S. Army, Seoul, Korea; U. S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; and
U. S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany; and U. S. Central Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, Florida. We reviewed documents that the Army

developed concerning its respective areas of responsibility and planning. To
identify challenges in forming the IBCTs, we concentrated our efforts on the
first brigade being formed at Fort Lewis since the second brigade is in its
early stages of formation. We attended weekly transformation update meetings
at Fort Lewis from April 2001 through January 2002 to gain a sense of the
challenges being faced. We interviewed the Commanding General and Deputy
Commanding General for I Corps and Fort Lewis, the Deputy Commanding General
for Training and Readiness, the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation
(TRADOC) at Fort Lewis, their staffs, representatives from the Brigade
Coordination Cell, the IBCT Commander and his battalion commanders, and the
Army Materiel Command?s Director of Transformation Support on the extent of
issues and challenges that had arisen in forming the first IBCT. In
addition, to gain the perspective of the Army?s schools for training the
IBCTs, we interviewed Army representatives from the U. S. Army Infantry
Center, Fort Benning, Georgia; the U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox,
Kentucky; and the

Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We obtained and reviewed
IBCT training doctrine and manuals and discussed the IBCTs with senior Army
officials and their staff to understand IBCT training issues. Based on the
results from the Army?s weekly IBCT meetings and our interviews and analysis
of documentation, we were able to discuss issues regarding potential
challenges in the core areas of manning, equipping, training, supporting,
and deploying the initial IBCT.

To determine if the Army had an effective means for capturing lessons
learned that may be applied to subsequent brigade formations, we interviewed
I Corps and Fort Lewis representatives and the BCC historian;

received briefings and interviewed representatives from the Center for Army
Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and attended the Information
Exchange Conference held at Fort Lewis. We obtained reports published by the
Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Army?s Test and

Evaluation Command with regards to fielding the IBCTs at Fort Lewis. In
addition, we acquired the current history files from the I Corps and Fort
Lewis historian as well as the regulations for recording the Army?s history
and lessons learned. As a result, we identified the Army?s process to
capture lessons learned that may be applied to subsequent IBCT formations.

Our review was performed from April 2001 to March 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government audit standards. We are sending copies of this
report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We will also make copies available to appropriate congressional
committees and to other interested parties on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no cost on the

GAO Web site at http:// www. gao. gov. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512- 5140.

Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Beverly G.
Burke; Timothy A. Burke; Kevin Handley, M. Jane Hunt; Tim R. Schindler; Pat
L. Seaton; and Leo B. Sullivan.

Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

Appendi xes Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106- 398 Concerning
Limitations on Army

Appendi x I Transformation Actions

Appendi x II Comments from the Department of Defense

(350064)

GAO?s Mission The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve

the performance and accountability of the federal government for the
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal
programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other
assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO?s commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO
documents at no cost is

through the Internet. GAO?s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts and
fulltext GAO Reports and

files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older
Testimony

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents
using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their
entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ?Today?s Reports,? on its Web
site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files. To
have GAO e- mail this

list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov and select ?Subscribe to
daily E- mail alert for newly released products? under the GAO Reports
heading.

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to
the Superintendent of Documents. GAO

also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a
single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D. C.
20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202)
512- 6061

To Report Fraud, Contact:

Waste, and Abuse in Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm

E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov Federal Programs

Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202) 512- 7470 Public
Affairs Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512-
4800

U. S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.
C. 20548

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Page i GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Contents

Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 1 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation United States General Accounting
Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

A

Page 2 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 3 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 4 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 5 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 6 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 7 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 8 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 9 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 10 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 11 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 12 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 13 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 14 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 15 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 16 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 17 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 18 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 19 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 20 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 21 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 22 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 23 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 24 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 25 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 26 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 27 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 28 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 29 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 30 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 31 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 32 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 33 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 34 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 35 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 36 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 37 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 38 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 39 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 40 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix I

Appendix I Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 41 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix I Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 42 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix I Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 43 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix I Sections from Public Laws 107- 107 and 106398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions

Page 44 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Page 45 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix II

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 46 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 47 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 48 GAO- 02- 442 Military Transformation

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested Presorted Standard

Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***