Inspectors General: Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement Authority 
Is Granted (22-MAY-02, GAO-02-437).				 
                                                                 
At federal offices of inspectors general (IG), criminal 	 
investigators can make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute	 
search warrants, and carry firearms. Because IGs lack permanent  
statutory law enforcement authority, most presidentially	 
appointed IGs have to request temporary deputation from the	 
Department of Justice (DOJ). However, presidentially appointed	 
IGs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense,
and Department of the Treasury possess permanent statutory law	 
enforcement authority and do not need to obtain DOJ's approval.  
IG criminal investigators who are deputized do not differ in	 
terms of their scope of law enforcement authority, supervision,  
and training from their counterparts who have statutory law	 
enforcement authority. Deputized IGs receive additional oversight
over their law enforcement authority. Fifteen of the 23 deputized
IGs report that statutory authority would improve their criminal 
investigative practices and enhance their recognition as fully	 
authorized officers in the law enforcement community. DOJ is now 
considering its position on ways to provide law enforcement	 
authority to deputized IGs.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-437 					        
    ACCNO:   A02904						        
  TITLE:     Inspectors General: Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement   
Authority Is Granted						 
     DATE:   05/22/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Criminal procedure 				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Inspectors general 				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Investigations into federal agencies		 
	     Comparative analysis				 

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GAO-02-437
     
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2002 INSPECTORS GENERAL

Comparison of Ways Law Enforcement Authority Is Granted

GAO- 02- 437

Page i GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Scope and Methodology 6 Statutory and
Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Authority is

Similar, but Differences Exist in Oversight Requirements 7 Views of
Deputized IGs and Other Federal Officials on Both

Methods 9 No Significant Cost or Savings Would Result from Switching

Deputized IGs to Statutory Authority 10 Conclusions 11 Agency Comments 11

Appendix I IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and Received
Law Enforcement Authority 15

Departments 15 Agencies 15

Appendix II Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed Deputized
IG Offices 16

Appendix III Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency 23

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice 26

Table

Table 1: Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Results Reported to DOJ from 1998
through 2000 8 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General Abbreviations

CBO Congressional Budget Office DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of
Justice FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation GSA General Services
Administration HHS Department of Health and Human Services IG Inspectors
General MOU memorandum of understanding OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPM Office of Personnel Management PCIE President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration USDA U.
S. Department of Agriculture USMS U. S. Marshals Service

Page 1 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

May 22, 2002 The Honorable Dan Burton Chairman, Committee on Government
Reform House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: As a part of their responsibilities federal inspectors
general (IGs) offices conduct criminal investigations of fraud, waste, and
abuse in federal departments and programs. IG criminal investigators
exercise law enforcement authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and
execute warrants, and carry firearms. Because IGs generally do not possess
permanent statutory law enforcement authority, most presidentially appointed
IGs have to request temporary deputation from the Department of Justice
(DOJ). 1 However, three presidentially appointed IGs 2 -U. S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Department of Defense (DOD), and Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)- possess permanent statutory law
enforcement authority and do not need to obtain DOJ?s approval.

This report responds to your request that we identify the similarities and
differences between providing statutory authority and deputation to
presidentially appointed IGs. Specifically, you asked us to

 compare the statutory authority and deputation in terms of the scope of
law enforcement authority granted to the IG criminal investigators, amount
of supervision and training of criminal investigators, and the extent of
oversight required;

1 Deputation is the process through which some criminal investigators derive
their law enforcement authority. DOJ?s U. S. Marshals Service is authorized
to deputize selected persons to perform the functions of a deputy U. S.
Marshal whenever considered appropriate.

2 These three presidentially appointed IGs have what has been referred to as
full statutory law enforcement authority, giving their investigators the
ability to, in general, make certain arrests, carry firearms, and execute
search warrants. For this report, references to ?statutory authority? are
used to refer to certain common characteristics of these three
presidentially appointed IGs identified to us as having statutory law
enforcement authority comparable to the law enforcement authority granted to
the deputized IGs.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

 obtain the views of (1) IGs using deputation (deputized IGs) regarding
whether statutory authority would improve their investigative practices or
impact their current jurisdictions; and (2) other federal officials,
including DOJ and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), regarding
statutory authority and deputation;

 estimate the cost implications if legislation were enacted to grant
statutory authority to those IGs who do not possess such law enforcement
authority.

To address these areas, we interviewed officials from various federal
departments and agencies, including USDA, DOD, and DOJ, the FBI, and the U.
S. Marshals Service (USMS), TIGTA, and Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS); Congressional Budget Office (CBO), General Services
Administration (GSA), OMB, and Office of Personnel Management (OPM). We
compared and analyzed information to determine similarities and differences
associated with statutory authority and deputation. To obtain the views
about specific aspects of law enforcement authority, we surveyed and
received responses from all 23 deputized IGs. We reviewed CBO?s cost
analysis to determine the costs involved in switching from deputation to
statutory authority.

We found that IG criminal investigators who are deputized do not
significantly differ in terms of their scope of law enforcement authority,
supervision, and training from their counterparts who have statutory law
enforcement authority. We also found that deputized IGs receive additional
oversight over their law enforcement authority. For example, deputized IGs
must renew their law enforcement authority every 3 years and involve the FBI
when initiating certain criminal investigations and other sensitive
investigations. 3

In responding to our questionnaire, 15 of the 23 deputized IGs reported that
having statutory authority would improve their criminal investigative
practices to at least some extent and 9 of these reported that statutory
authority would improve their investigative practices to a great or very
great extent. Three deputized IGs said it would enhance their recognition as
fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. DOJ said it is
currently considering its position on ways to provide law enforcement

3 As of January 2001, deputized IGs renewed their law enforcement authority
for a 3- year period, rather than annually. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

authority to deputized IGs. OMB deferred the matter for DOJ?s consideration.

Deputized IGs and other federal agencies including the CBO stated that
granting statutory law enforcement authority to IGs who are currently
deputized would have no significant effect on federal costs since it would
involve replacing one system of review and oversight with another.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the President?s Council
on Integrity & Efficiency 4 (PCIE) and DOJ. The PCIE disagreed with our
report message. The PCIE generally disagreed with the methodology we used
for our work and with some of the conclusions they believe the report was
making in regard to the impacts of using one form of law enforcement
authority over another.

The PCIE questioned our methodology, which compared temporary deputation
with permanent statutory law enforcement authority. They stated that we
should have compared deputized IGs to the provisions in the legislation (S.
3144) proposed in the last Congress rather than provisions that authorize
the three IGs who have statutory law enforcement authority-- DOD, USDA, and
TIGTA. The PCIE stated that the bill (S. 3144) was the only bona fide
standard to compare against because it reflected the actual statutory
authority that the deputized IGs were seeking. We compared deputation with
the provisions of statutes that grant law enforcement authority to IGs in
DOD, USDA, and TIGTA because these are the ways that IGs currently receive
law enforcement authority. Importantly, the bill that the IGs referred to
did not pass, and because provisions in any future legislation are subject
to change, we did not believe it was appropriate to use provisions of S.
3144 in the comparison.

The PCIE stated that they disagree with the draft report?s conclusion that
unless significant cost savings can be associated with permanent statutory
law enforcement authority, the current temporary deputation system should be
retained. Our report does not state or imply such a conclusion. It
accurately summarizes the information the IGs and other federal agencies,
such as CBO, told us would be the cost impact of switching from

4 The council is an interagency council comprised principally of
presidentially appointed and Senate- confirmed IGs, which currently operates
under Executive Order No. 12805 to coordinate and enhance the work of the
IGs.

Page 4 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

deputation to statutory law enforcement authority. The PCIE also stated that
the report incorrectly concluded that the deputation process offers greater
oversight and better professional standards than permanent statutory law
enforcement authority. The report reaches no such conclusion. The report
states that the current deputation process involved increased oversight,
such as requiring deputized IGs to renew their law enforcement authority
every 3 years with DOJ. The report does not conclude that one process is
better than the other. The PCIE also stated that the deputation renewal
process caused an administrative burden for USMS. Our work did not support
such a conclusion. The USMS told us that the deputation process has improved
and that renewing deputized IG?s law enforcement authority was the easiest
task of their deputation workload.

DOJ neither agreed nor disagreed with our draft report. DOJ requested that
our report state that DOJ has not yet taken a position on providing law
enforcement authority through either statute or deputation and that the
issue is under review within the Administration. Officials from PCIE and DOJ
also provided technical comments that we incorporated into the report as
appropriate.

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, among other things,
identified specific federal departments and agencies that are required to
have IGs appointed by the president, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 5 The act also requires each such IG to appoint an assistant
inspector general for investigations to supervise the performance of
investigative activities, including criminal investigations, relating to
their agencies? programs and operations.

Although presidentially appointed IGs have the authority to conduct criminal
investigations, the IGs have not been granted across- the- board statutory
law enforcement authority. 6 However, as the role of the presidentially
appointed IGs in active investigations of criminal activity expanded, so too
did their requests for deputation seeking the authority to make warrantless
arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and carry firearms

5 Inspector General Act of 1978 (Public Law 95- 452), as amended, (codified
at 5 U. S. C. App. 3 ). 6 IGs do, however, have the across- the- board power
to, for example, issue subpoenas for the production of information and
documents, among other things, in the performance of their investigations.
Background

Page 5 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

to reduce requests for assistance from other law enforcement personnel in
dangerous situations. Subsequently, 23 presidentially appointed IGs?
criminal investigators received law enforcement authority through caseby-
case deputation granted by the USMS. Under this process, the presidentially
appointed IGs applied for deputation for each criminal investigator in each
case where the need was anticipated. Upon completion of the case, the
deputation and its accompanying law enforcement authority expired, and the
process would start over again.

In 1995, in an effort to reduce paperwork and excessive delays, certain
presidentially appointed IGs began receiving 1- year deputation law
enforcement authority for criminal investigators. 7 Appendix I provides a
list of the 23 deputized IGs who requested and received annual deputation.
As of January 2001, these deputized IGs renew their law enforcement
authority for a 3- year period, rather than annually. This process includes
(1) requesting temporary law enforcement authority and obtaining approval
from DOJ, (2) submitting a formal deputation application to DOJ, and (3)
taking an oath. Deputized IGs? criminal investigators must also adhere to
the terms and conditions disclosed in a DOJ memorandum of understanding
(MOU). The MOU is designed to provide DOJ guidance and oversight of IG
criminal investigator training and conduct of criminal investigations.

Although not passed, proposed legislation (S. 3144) was introduced during
the 106th Congress, which would have, among other things, provided criminal
investigators in specified IG offices (see appendix I) with certain
statutory law enforcement authorities. Under this bill, deputized IGs would
(1) no longer be required to renew their law enforcement authority through
the USMS; and (2) obtain a statutory basis for carrying firearms, making
certain types of warrantless arrests, and executing warrants.

In addition, the bill contained provisions for oversight over the IGs. The
bill, for example, provided for ?peer reviews? of IGs by other IGs. 8 (The
results of such reviews would have been forwarded to the applicable IG

7 The departments of Labor, Housing and Urban Development, State, and
Transportation; Veterans Affairs, Social Security Administration, and the
Small Business Administration were originally selected for the deputation
pilot program.

8 Although the bill was not enacted into law, the PCIE Investigations
Committee prepared a draft Guide for Conducting Qualitative Assessment
Reviews for the Investigative Operations of the IGs and is conducting a
nine- month pilot field- test to finalize the guide. The pilot test is
scheduled to end on April 30, 2002.

Page 6 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

and the Attorney General) and required DOJ?s continued oversight of IGs?
activities, such as involving the FBI when initiating certain criminal
investigations. In addition, the Attorney General would have the authority,
under certain conditions, to rescind or suspend such law enforcement
authority of these IGs.

To compare the similarities and differences between providing statutory
authority and deputation, we examined MOUs, federal statutes, operating
manuals, and other pertinent documents between the two groups of IGs. We
also interviewed officials involved with the deputation program and/ or
related efforts to obtain statutory authority for the deputized IGs. This
included officials in Washington, D. C., from the USMS, FBI, DOJ?s Criminal
Division, OMB, and selected presidentially appointed IGs with deputation-
HHS, GSA, DOJ IG, OPM, and the PCIE. In addition, we identified and
interviewed three presidentially appointed IGs- USDA, DOD, TIGTA 9 -having
statutory authority comparable to the law enforcement authority granted to
deputized IGs. We obtained perspectives and relevant documents related to
their use of law enforcement authority. We compared the scope of law
enforcement authority, supervision, and training of IG criminal
investigators for both methods.

To obtain views of deputized IGs on whether statutory authority would
improve their investigative practices or impact their current jurisdictions,
we surveyed and received responses from all 23 deputized IGs (see app. II
for the questionnaire). 10

To identify the cost and any savings that might result by switching from
deputation to statutory authority, we reviewed congressional hearing
documents and the CBO cost analysis associated with a recent legislative
proposal. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOJ, OMB, CBO, and
selected IGs to obtain applicable cost and savings information.

9 Statutory law enforcement authority is exercised by these IGs either
through specific statutory grants to the IGs or delegations by the agency
head. To illustrate, USDA IG was granted statutory law enforcement authority
in 1981 (P. L. 97- 98) and TIGTA IG was granted statutory law enforcement
authority in 1998 (P. L. 105- 206). DOD IG was granted certain statutory law
enforcement authorities in 1997 (P. L. 105- 85) but has the authority to
carry firearms under delegation from the Secretary of Defense (10 U. S. C.
1585).

10 Prior to distributing the survey questionnaire, we pretested it with the
deputized IGs from HHS and GSA and made revisions accordingly. Scope and

Methodology

Page 7 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

We performed our work from May 2001 through May 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Regardless of the origin of law enforcement authority- either through
statutory authority or deputation, IGs? scope of law enforcement authority,
supervision, and training are similar. However, differences exist in the
level of DOJ?s oversight given to the deputized IGs by DOJ.

Whether under statute or deputation, IGs? law enforcement authority is
similar. Our comparative analysis revealed that IGs have comparable duties,
practices, and standards regarding their (1) scope of law enforcement
authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and
carry firearms; (2) supervision of criminal investigators, which generally
provides for day- to- day oversight by an agency official such as a special
agent- in- charge; and (3) training standards. For example, IG criminal
investigators with statutory authority and IG criminal investigators with
deputation train together at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
located in Glynco, Georgia. The facility provides both groups the same basic
training curriculum in matters such as firearms, search and seizure, and
arrest procedures as well as criminal investigator- specialized training.

We found differences in the level of DOJ oversight for IGs who are deputized
by DOJ. Deputized IGs must renew their law enforcement authority every 3
years, while IGs with statutory authority do not have this requirement. DOJ
established a process for granting and renewing deputation that allows its
deputy attorney general, Criminal Division, FBI, and the USMS to review
certain aspects of deputized IGs activities. The purpose of this process is
to determine whether deputized IGs continue to meet standards for (1)
keeping firearms skills current, (2) providing adequate training, and (3)
coordinating with federal prosecutors and other federal law enforcement
agencies. Statutory and

Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Authority is Similar, but Differences Exist
in Oversight Requirements

Similarities Differences

Page 8 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

As part of DOJ?s deputation process, deputized IGs are required to report to
DOJ annually on the results they achieved, as a condition for renewing their
deputation. Table 1 summarizes the results achieved with deputation from
1998 through 2000 that we identified from deputized IG responses to our
survey. 11

Table 1: Deputized IGs? Law Enforcement Results Reported to DOJ from 1998
through 2000

Types of activity a Total

Arrests 4,762 Searches 1,298 Protection of witness 576 Dangerous
surveillance of investigative subjects 11,445 Temporary custody of federal
prisoners (outside controlled environment) 1,086 Dangerous interviews 16,389
Support for undercover operations 4,561 Restraining orders 73 Dangerous
subpoena service 3, 791 Assisting in electronic surveillance 8, 502 a The
results exclude two deputized IGs, because the data were not provided by
types of activity.

Both DOJ and FBI officials told us that the reporting requirement is being
re- evaluated, and DOJ said that it is outdated and no longer used as a
condition for renewing deputized IGs? law enforcement authority.
Furthermore, DOJ said that no deputized IG has been denied its deputation
renewal request.

In addition, deputized IGs are required to notify the FBI when initiating
certain criminal investigations as well as work jointly with the FBI on
certain other sensitive investigations. 12 The three presidentially
appointed IGs with statutory authority do not have a specific statutory
requirement to coordinate their investigations with the FBI. DOJ requires
deputized IGs

11 The 3- year period (1998 through 2000) for which we requested information
might not have been applicable to each deputized IG based on the MOU date
they entered USMS?s deputation program. Also, DOJ?s IG did not provide us
with reporting results, citing that it submits the agency?s annual reports
directly to the deputy attorney general rather than to the Criminal
Division.

12 Deputized IGs must further consult with federal prosecutors before
proceeding with an investigation to ensure that an allegation, if proven,
would be prosecuted.

Page 9 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

and the FBI to provide each other written notification involving areas of
concurrent jurisdiction. The FBI has jurisdiction in all matters involving
fraud against the federal government and jointly shares this jurisdiction
with the deputized IGs in matters of fraud against each IG?s agency. DOJ
also requires the FBI or another federal law enforcement agency to assist
the deputized IGs when conducting specific types of sensitive
investigations, such as court- ordered electronic surveillance. 13

According to the FBI, the purpose of these requirements is to provide
oversight in order to (1) place limits on the authority of the deputized
IGs? criminal investigators, and (2) help ensure compliance with applicable
DOJ guidelines, and (3) address law enforcement coordination procedures for
deputized IGs when conducting their criminal investigations.

As requested, we obtained views of deputized IGs and other federal officials
on certain matters related to statutory authority and deputation. We found
that deputized IGs prefer statutory authority to deputation and most
believed statutory authority would improve their investigative practices at
least to some extent. Most deputized IGs also reported that statutory
authority would have little impact on their current statutory jurisdictions.
Other federal officials generally believed that the current deputation
process has improved. DOJ has not yet settled on its position on providing
law enforcement authority to deputized IGs under either method. OMB deferred
the matter for DOJ?s consideration.

Fifteen of the 23 deputized IGs reported that having statutory authority
would improve their criminal investigative practices to at least some extent
and 9 of these reported that statutory authority would improve their
investigative practices to a great or very great extent. Three of these
believed that practices would be improved because statutory authority would
enhance their investigators status as fully authorized officers in the law
enforcement community. Further, 20 of the 23 deputized IGs reported that
granting statutory authority would change their current jurisdiction of
authority to little or no extent.

13 DOJ defines this category of cases to be any case involving the
interception of communications pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 2510 et seq.,
electronic surveillance using closed circuit television in situations where
a warrant is required, or any other courtordered electronic surveillance.
Views of Deputized

IGs and Other Federal Officials on Both Methods

Deputized IGs? Views on Certain Matters Related to Statutory Authority

Page 10 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

In July 2000, DOJ and OMB testified at congressional hearings in favor of a
legislative proposal that would have granted statutory authority to
specified IG offices. However, the issue is currently under review within
the Administration, and DOJ has not yet settled on its position as of May
2002. FBI officials we interviewed said that the deputation process is a
much better system of conferring law enforcement authority to the IGs
because it provides greater flexibility for DOJ and appropriately places
oversight responsibilities at the Attorney General level. The Attorney
General has the authority to delegate these responsibilities to Justice
entities including DOJ?s Criminal Division, FBI and USMS. The Attorney
General has delegated this authority to USMS. Although the FBI reported no
significant problems of abuse or misconduct from the deputized IGs, they
continue to believe that deputation enables DOJ to ensure coordination in
matters of concurrent jurisdiction. In responding to our questionnaire, OMB
indicated that the issue of whether deputized IGs should be switched from
deputation to statutory authority was a matter that DOJ would have to
consider.

Officials with DOJ?s Criminal Division, FBI, and USMS generally agree that
recent improvements, including extending the deputation renewal cycle from 1
to 3 years, will ease the processing burden.

Most deputized IGs believed no significant cost or savings would derive from
conferring statutory authority to them. Eighteen of the 23 deputized IGs
reported that no significant cost would be associated with switching them
from deputation to statutory authority. The remaining 5 deputized IGs
reported that some savings would be likely by eliminating administrative
responsibilities associated with preparing, processing, and reviewing
deputation requests and annual reports. USMS officials told us that about
2,000 of the approximately 7,500 deputations they authorize each year are
for IG criminal investigators. This number will be cut by onethird in 2004
when renewals will be done every 3 years. However, USMS currently invests
less than 4 staff years in its deputation responsibilities, so the overall
impact on USMS?s deputation process would be minimal. USMS would be able to
reduce its workload (reviewing deputation requests) by about 27 percent
annually. However, beginning in January 2004, USMS will begin renewing IGs?
deputation on a 3- year cycle.

Officials at DOJ concurred that the cost and any savings associated with
switching from deputation to statutory authority would be minimal. Other
Federal Officials?

Views on Statutory and Deputation Law Enforcement Authority

No Significant Cost or Savings Would Result from Switching Deputized IGs to
Statutory Authority

Page 11 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

In addition, the CBO provided a cost estimate for a proposed bill (S. 3144)
during the 106th Congress that would have granted statutory authority to
specified IG offices. Because the bill would have codified powers already
exercised by deputized IGs, and replaced one system of review and oversight
with another, CBO estimated that implementing it would have no significant
effect on federal costs. CBO told us that any costs would be less than
$500,000. However, CBO told us they did not consider the potential cost
related to peer review. The vice chair of the President?s Council on
Integrity and Efficiency 14 said at hearings that a legislative proposal to
grant permanent statutory law enforcement authority to deputized IGs would
have carried with it no additional costs, in part because the deputized IGs?
criminal investigators already (1) exercised law enforcement authority
through deputation, (2) trained as criminal investigators, and (3)
participated in the federal law enforcement retirement system. Officials at
OMB and CBO agreed with this cost assessment.

With the exception of DOJ?s imposed oversight requirements, we could not
identify any other significant differences relating to law enforcement
authority between the three IGs with statutory authority and the 23
deputized IGs. To some extent, DOJ has eased its requirements by extending
the deputation renewal cycle from 1 to 3 years. In addition, DOJ concedes
that its requirement for annual reports from deputized IGs has become
outdated, and DOJ is reassessing the need for the requirement. Some
deputized IGs believe that their status would be enhanced if they were
statutorily authorized.

We received comments on a draft of this report from the PCIE (which presents
the views of the IG community), and DOJ. The PCIE?s March 18, 2002, comments
and DOJ?s March 25, 2002, comments are in appendixes III and IV,
respectively. The PCIE disagreed with our report message. DOJ neither agreed
nor disagreed with our report. Officials from these organizations also
provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the report as
appropriate.

14 The vice- chair of the council, accompanied by the chairpersons of the
council?s Legislation Committee and the Investigation Committee, testified
regarding legislative proposals and issues relevant to the operations of the
inspectors general, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
106th Congress, (2000). Conclusions

Agency Comments

Page 12 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

The PCIE felt that GAO should have focused on determining which means of
providing law enforcement authority to IGs would foster the most effective
investigative process. We were not requested to address this issue and
therefore it was not within the scope of our work. We did however survey all
23 IGs and obtained their views on providing law enforcement authority (see
our survey results on p. 8).

The PCIE disagreed with our methodology comparing presidentially appointed
IGs? deputation with statutory law enforcement authority. They stated that
we should have compared deputized IGs? law enforcement authority to S. 3144
rather than the statutes that granted law enforcement authority to IGs at
DOD, USDA, and TIGTA. The PCIE stated that S. 3144?s provisions included,
among other things, the statutory law enforcement authority that they are
seeking. Because legislative proposals, including proposals from a previous
session of Congress, are subject to change, we do not believe it is
appropriate to use S. 3144 as the basis of comparison. Moreover, based on
our analysis, law enforcement authority- the authority to carry firearms,
make certain arrests, and execute warrants- proposed under S. 3144 is
essentially the same as granted by statute to IGs at DOD, USDA, and TIGTA.
In addition, the PCIE claimed that the deputation renewal process caused an
administrative burden on USMS. Our work did not support such a conclusion.
The USMS told us that the deputation process has improved and that renewing
deputized IGs? law enforcement authority was the easiest task of their
deputation workload.

The PCIE stated that the draft report seems to assume that, unless
significant cost savings can be associated with permanent statutory law
enforcement authority, temporary deputation should be retained. The PCIE
said that it is a misperception that a decision on permanent statutory law
enforcement authority for all IGs should be driven by cost considerations.
We did not conclude or imply that significant cost savings should be a
determining factor in deciding whether to switch deputized IGs to permanent
statutory law enforcement authority. Rather, deputized IGs and other federal
agencies including the CBO said that minimal costs or savings would result
from switching from deputation to statutory authority. We were specifically
asked by Congress to answer this question.

The PCIE also said that as part of its oversight mechanisms, the proposed
bill (S. 3144) would have established a peer review process among deputized
IGs. The PCIE said there are no known administrative burdens associated with
this approach and its implementation would not increase federal
expenditures. While the operational procedures of the peer review are not
known, undoubtedly any review system would have some level of PCIE

Page 13 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

administrative burden and costs. For example, the PCIE?s draft peer review
guidelines-? Guide for Conducting Qualitative Assessment Reviews of the
Investigative Operations of Offices of Inspector General,?

among other things, recommends reviewing samples of IG criminal
investigators? training and basic qualification records as well as closed
investigative files to ensure adherence to professional law enforcement
standards. According to the PCIE, depending on the size of the IG agency or
level of detail of the review, a peer review cycle could take up to 120
days. The staff resources and activities related to scheduling, conducting,
and reporting results of 23 IGs? ?peer reviews? would incur time and costs.

On May 3, 2002 the PCIE provided further comments on our draft report. The
PCIE continued to disagree with our draft report for the basic reasons
stated in their earlier comments. Also, the PCIE requested that we defer
issuance of the final report until we obtain and incorporate DOJ?s current
views. The PCIE said it had become aware that DOJ was close to making a
decision and was optimistic that this decision will support a grant of
statutory law enforcement authority to the deputized IGs. On May 7, 2002,
DOJ told us that the matter is still under review within the administration
with no estimated date of completion. As a result, we do not feel that it is
appropriate to delay the report issuance. The PCIE also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate.

DOJ neither agreed nor disagreed with our draft report. DOJ requested that
our report state that DOJ has not settled on a position on providing law
enforcement authority through either statute or deputation and that the
issue is under review within the Administration. We incorporated DOJ?s
suggestion into the report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from
its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
acting assistant attorney general for administration; director, Office of
Management and Budget; director, Congressional Budget Office; and the vice
chairman, President?s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. This report will also be available
on GAO?s home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me or
Weldon McPhail at (202) 512- 8777. Other key contributors to this report DOJ

Page 14 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

were Clarence Tull, Veronica Mayhand, Lou V. B. Smith, David Alexander, and
Geoffrey Hamilton.

Sincerely yours, Paul L. Jones Director, Justice Issues

Appendix I: IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and
Received Law Enforcement Authority

Page 15 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

This appendix lists the 23 presidentially appointed inspectors general (IGs)
who have been granted deputation through calendar year 2000 for their
respective criminal investigators by the Department of Justice.

Department of Commerce Department of Education Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services Department of Housing and Urban
Development Department of Interior Department of Justice Department of Labor
Department of State Department of Transportation Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs

Agency for International Development Environmental Protection Agency Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Federal Emergency Management Agency General
Services Administration National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Personnel Management Railroad
Retirement Board Small Business Administration Social Security
Administration Appendix I: IG Offices That Have Made

Annual Deputation Requests and Received Law Enforcement Authority

Departments Agencies

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 16 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 17 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 18 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 19 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 20 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 21 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix II: Data Collection Instrument of Presidentially Appointed
Deputized IG Offices

Page 22 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency

Page 23 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency

Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency

Page 24 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix III: Comments from the President?s Council on Integrity and
Efficiency

Page 25 GAO- 02- 437 Inspectors General

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice Page 26 GAO- 02- 437
Inspectors General

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice

(440051)

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