Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries	 
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and	 
Planning (16-MAY-02, GAO-02-426).				 
                                                                 
The worldwide trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material has  
reportedly increased in recent years. The International Atomic	 
Energy Agency (IAEA) reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit	 
trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases	 
reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce 
a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a
wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's	 
border through various means. Many nuclear smuggling cases have  
been traced to nuclear material that originated in the former	 
Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of	 
Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program,	 
has helped them secure nuclear material at civilian and defense  
facilities--the first line of defense against potential theft and
diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by	 
nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries  
improve their border security--a second line of defense--but	 
these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. U.S. efforts  
to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal	 
agencies--the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S.
Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the	 
U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001,
the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly  
in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat
the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials. GAO found that U.S.
assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall	 
governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group,  
chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S.	 
assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing 	 
assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this	 
group. The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued
separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment  
at other countries' border crossings; consequently, some	 
countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear	 
smuggling than others. U.S. assistance is generally helping	 
countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive  
materials, but serious problems with installing, using, and	 
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S.	 
efforts. These and other problems have largely resulted from a	 
lack of agency oversight and follow-up. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-426 					        
    ACCNO:   A03084						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other     
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination
and Planning							 
     DATE:   05/16/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Central Europe					 
	     Dept. of State Export Control and			 
	     Related Border Security Assistance 		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Dept. of State Georgia Border Security		 
	     and Law Enforcement Program			 
                                                                 
	     DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program		 
	     DOD International Counterproliferation		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     DOE International Export Control Program		 
	     DOE Material Protection, Control, and		 
	     Accounting Program 				 
                                                                 
	     DOE Second Line of Defense Program 		 
	     Eastern Europe					 
	     Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund		 
	     Soviet Union					 

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GAO-02-426

   Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
   and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

   United States General Accounting Office

   GAO

   May 2002 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

   U. S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
   Strengthened Coordination and Planning

   GAO- 02- 426

   Page i GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Letter 1

   Results in Brief 2 Background 4 U. S. Government Has Spent about $86
   Million to Help Countries

   Combat Nuclear Smuggling 6 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
   Lacks a Coordinated

   Approach 11 U. S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear
   Smuggling,

   but Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts 15 Conclusions 24
   Recommendations 25 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 Scope and
   Methodology 28

   Appendix I Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents 31 Incidents
   Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material 31 Luch Scientific Production
   Association (Russia), 1992 34 Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993 34 Murmansk,
   Russia, 1993 35 Murmansk, Russia, 1993 35 St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994 35
   Tengen, Germany, 1994 36 Landshut, Germany, 1994 36 Munich, Germany, 1994
   36 Prague, Czech Republic, 1994 37 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999 37 Kara- Balta,
   Kyrgyzstan, 1999 38 Batumi, Georgia, 2000 38 Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 38
   Germany, 2000 38 Greece, 2001 38 France, 2001 39

   Appendix II U. S. Government Assistance Programs 40 Department of Energy
   40 Department of State 43 Department of Defense 45 U. S. Customs Service
   46 U. S. Coast Guard 48 Federal Bureau of Investigation 48 Contents

   Page ii GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Appendix
   III Comments from the Department of State 50

   Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 54

   Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 56

   Tables

   Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
   Fiscal Year 2001 9 Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-
   Usable

   Material since 1992 33 Table 3: International Export Control Program
   Expenditures

   through Fiscal Year 2001 42 Table 4: Export Control and Related Border
   Security Assistance

   Program Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001 45 Table 5: Cooperative Threat
   Reduction Expenditures through

   Fiscal Year 2001 46 Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by
   Funding Source,

   through Fiscal Year 2001 48

   Figures

   Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors 16 Figure 2: Typical Handheld
   Radiation Detector Used by Border

   Guards 17 Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van 18 Figure 4: U. S.-
   Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport

   in Moscow 19

   Page 1 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   May 16, 2002 The Honorable Pat Roberts Ranking Minority Member,
   Subcommittee on Emerging Threats

   and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

   Dear Senator Roberts: Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and
   other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased
   in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 1
   (IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of
   illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See app. I for more
   information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant number of the
   cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a
   nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with
   radioactive material (* dirty bomb*) to spread radioactive contamination
   over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country*s
   border through a variety of means: it can be hidden in a car, train, or
   ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport, or walked across an
   unprotected border.

   Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that
   originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States,
   through the Department of Energy*s Material Protection, Control, and
   Accounting (MPC& A) program, 2 has helped these countries secure nuclear
   material at civilian and defense facilities* this effort is considered the
   first line of defense against potential theft and/ or diversion of nuclear

   1 IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member states,
   including the United States. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful
   use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material under its
   supervision or control is not used to further any military purpose. 2 This
   review will only focus on U. S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling at
   countries* borders. We recently reported on the Department of Energy*s
   MPC& A program and found that the program is reducing the risk of theft of
   nuclear material but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still
   lack improved security systems and are vulnerable to theft. See Nuclear
   Nonproliferation: Security of Russia*s Nuclear Material Improving; Further
   Enhancements Needed (GAO- 01- 312, Feb. 28, 2001).

   United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

   Page 2 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United
   States is helping these countries improve their border security* a second
   line of defense* but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. 3
   For example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14
   countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical
   proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

   As agreed with your office, this report addresses U. S. efforts to combat
   nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U. S. federal programs tasked
   with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and
   the amount of U. S. funding spent on this effort; (2) determining how well
   the U. S. assistance is coordinated among federal agencies; and (3)
   assessing the effectiveness of the equipment and training provided by the
   United States. We visited four countries to obtain a first hand look at U.
   S. radiation detection equipment installed at different border crossings
   and meet with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement,
   and export controls.

   U. S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six
   federal agencies* the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S.
   Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U. S.
   Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six
   agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the
   former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of
   smuggling of nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of
   mass destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance,
   including radiation detection equipment and training, technical exchanges
   to promote the development and enforcement of laws and regulations
   governing the export of nuclear- related equipment and technology, and
   other equipment and training to generally improve countries* ability to
   interdict nuclear smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two
   programs to combat nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia.
   Energy has installed radiation detection monitors at eight border
   crossings, including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar
   equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has
   provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with

   3 While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear smuggling, a
   portion of the assistance is intended to improve countries* ability to
   interdict any weapons smuggling* nuclear, chemical, biological, and
   conventional. Results in Brief

   Page 3 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance to
   about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of
   Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided radiation detection
   monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20 countries.
   With funding provided by the Departments of State and Defense, the U. S.
   Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U. S. Coast
   Guard have provided a variety of training and equipment to customs, border
   guard, and law enforcement officials in numerous countries.

   U. S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
   governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by
   the State Department, exists to coordinate U. S. assistance efforts, the
   six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their
   efforts through this group. As a result, the Departments of Energy, State,
   and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
   detection equipment at other countries* border crossings; consequently,
   some countries* border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling
   than others. Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing
   equipment at border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is
   installing equipment in another country that is better able to detect
   weapons- usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed
   less sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries.
   Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the
   Department of Energy*s Second Line of Defense program does not coordinate
   its efforts with another office within the Department that also provides
   radiation detection equipment because that office receives funding from
   and installs equipment on behalf of the State Department. Officials of the
   Departments of State, Energy, and Defense have acknowledged that U. S.
   assistance efforts lack adequate planning and need better coordination
   among all the agencies. In addition, these officials told us that the
   roles and responsibilities of each agency in the overall U. S. assistance
   effort should be better clarified. This report makes recommendations to
   improve the planning and coordination of U. S. assistance to combat
   nuclear smuggling.

   While U. S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling
   of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems with
   installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have
   undermined U. S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient countries told
   us that U. S. assistance has provided needed radiation detection equipment
   at border sites and training for border security guards and other law
   enforcement personnel. Without U. S. assistance, some countries would not
   have any radiation detection equipment at their borders or training in

   Page 4 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and people and investigate nuclear
   smuggling cases. In other countries, U. S. assistance has bolstered
   existing nuclear smuggling detection programs. We observed at border sites
   in countries we visited that U. S.- provided equipment was working and was
   being used for the purposes intended. However, we also found serious
   problems with some of the equipment provided to various countries. For
   example, about one- half of the stationary radiation detection monitors
   funded by the Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet
   Union was never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could not
   be accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the State
   Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U. S. embassy
   for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the department and the
   recipient country about the need for a power supply line costing $12,600.
   These and other problems are largely a result of the lack of oversight and
   follow- up by the agencies providing the assistance. U. S. officials are
   attempting to correct some of these problems by, among other things,
   stationing advisors in countries receiving U. S. assistance. Another
   problem affecting U. S. assistance efforts is that recipient countries do
   not systematically report incidents of nuclear material detected at their
   borders, which limits the ability of U. S. agencies to measure the
   effectiveness of the equipment they are providing. This report makes
   several recommendations designed to improve management of U. S.- provided
   radiation detection equipment and to secure recipient country assurances
   that information about detected nuclear materials is shared in a timely
   basis.

   We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
   Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
   the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
   Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
   technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
   The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the report and State
   specifically said that it agreed with the report*s conclusions and
   recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our recommendation to
   specifically include it as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
   plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we did. DOE did not comment on the
   conclusions and recommendations.

   Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention to
   the threat that unsecured weapons- usable nuclear material in the
   countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be stolen
   and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking weapons of mass
   destruction. Background

   Page 5 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear
   weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons- usable material when it
   collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in
   nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
   1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States responded to
   the threat by providing assistance to increase security at numerous
   nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia, in
   order to prevent weapons- usable nuclear material from being stolen. In
   addition, the United States has provided portal monitors (stationary
   equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians
   or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors at border crossings
   in many countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
   Europe. The equipment, which is installed at car and truck crossings,
   railroad crossings, seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes:
   deterring smugglers from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting
   cases of actual nuclear smuggling.

   Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
   medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological
   treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring radiation
   such as fertilizer, and* of primary concern in terms of nonproliferation*
   nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Nuclear material
   includes radioactive source materials-- such as natural uranium, low
   enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial nuclear power reactors, and
   plutonium and highly enriched uranium-- that are key components of nuclear
   weapons. The capability of the equipment to detect nuclear material
   depends on a number of factors including the amount of material, the size
   of the detection device, and whether the material is shielded from
   detection. For example, a small amount of material shielded by a lead
   container would likely escape detection while a large amount of material
   with no shielding would be more likely to cause an alarm. Detecting actual
   cases of illicit trafficking in weapons- usable nuclear material is
   complicated because one of the materials that is of greatest concern in
   terms of proliferation* highly enriched uranium* is among the most
   difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of
   radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,
   which could be used in a radiological dispersion device or *dirty bomb,*
   are highly radioactive and therefore easier to detect. Because of the
   complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs officers or border
   guards who are responsible for operating the equipment must also be
   trained in how to use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source
   of an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit
   nuclear smuggling.

   Page 6 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140
   million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear smuggling
   in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the former Soviet
   Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The
   Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four other agencies,
   and some agencies have carried over millions of dollars in program funds
   into fiscal year 2002 because they have received more funding than they
   have been able to spend.

   The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service;
   the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U. S. Coast Guard have
   provided assistance to about 30 countries* customs, border, and law
   enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear
   smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of
   assistance that the U. S. agencies are providing. Other equipment ranges
   from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different
   compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles for
   conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands- on instruction
   in using the equipment and conducting searches to high- level technical
   exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory basis for preventing
   illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods and materials that could
   be used in a nuclear weapon. U. S. assistance began in the mid- 1990s
   under DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and then expanded to
   State, DOE, and other DOD programs.

   While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their assistance
   programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive their funding from
   State and/ or DOD. DOE also receives part of its funding from State.

   DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
   material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
   International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of Defense
   Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to Russia. From
   fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million, including $2.7
   million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal monitors at
   eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport. DOE has identified
   close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to install portal monitors over
   the next decade at a total cost of about $50 million and has begun work at
   19 of these sites. In addition, DOE may expand the program beyond Russia
   to include other countries of the former Soviet Union. DOE*s International
   Export Control Program spent $22 million, including U. S. Government Has

   Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   U. S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies

   Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in
   Delivering U. S. Assistance

   Page 7 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   $2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal year 1992 through 2001 to help
   countries of the former Soviet Union control the export of goods and
   technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.
   Whereas the Second Line of Defense program focuses on the nuclear material
   needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the other high-
   technology components needed for a bomb such as equipment for enriching
   uranium. The program provides assistance to prevent legitimate
   enterprises, such as businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet
   Union*s nuclear weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally
   engaging in illicit trade in such goods and technologies. DOE also spent
   $1.8 million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear
   smuggling.

   The State Department has received the largest amount of funding through
   the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear smuggling in
   about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and
   Eastern Europe. State spent $11. 4 million primarily through two programs*
   the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and
   Related Border Security Assistance program. Through the Nonproliferation
   and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1994
   through 2001 to, among other things, install portal monitors in countries
   other than Russia. In addition, State provided handheld radiation
   detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels of radiation), and mobile vans
   equipped with x- ray machines and radiation detectors that can be driven
   among a number of border crossings. From fiscal year 1998 through 2001,
   State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program
   spent $2.7 million to, among other things, purchase three vans equipped
   with radiation detectors for Russia and another van for Poland. State*s
   Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (implemented by
   Customs) also spent $0.2 million to provide radiation detection equipment
   as part of its assistance to strengthen Georgia*s overall border
   infrastructure and security against any type of crime, including nuclear
   material smuggling. State also provided $58.8 million to DOE, Customs, and
   the Coast Guard to fund their assistance activities.

   DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two
   programs* the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the International
   Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to 2001, the
   Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to assist five
   countries. The assistance included $1 million for radiation detection
   equipment* 36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen people) and 100
   handheld radiation detectors for one country and an additional 100

   Page 8 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   handheld detectors for another country* and about $10 million for other
   equipment to enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct
   searches for smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. In
   addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, in fiscal
   year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National
   Laboratory to install seven portal monitors at three border crossings in
   another country. DOD has begun site surveys at about eight additional
   border crossings in that country where it plans to install portal
   monitors. As part of the International Counterproliferation program, DOD
   spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs
   and FBI training and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union
   and Central and Eastern Europe.

   The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
   State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on
   assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided training and
   equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close to 30 countries.
   The equipment includes radiation pagers (small detectors that can be worn
   on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels or used as a handheld
   device to pinpoint the location of radioactive material detected by a
   portal monitor) as well as a variety of other high- and low- tech tools to
   conduct searches and detect sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber
   optic scopes for examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes
   assistance in operating the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors;
   providing hands- on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear
   smuggling; teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations;
   tracking the movements of smugglers between ports of entry, including
   through rough terrain; and providing *train- the- trainer* courses to
   enable countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can
   reach. In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22
   incountry advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help
   implement and coordinate the assistance.

   From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part of
   the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/ FBI effort
   trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate and respond
   to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. Training
   included seminars for high- level officials and courses on conducting
   investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure has taken place.
   Equipment provided as part of the training included protective equipment,
   such as HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized material safer; evidence
   collection and sampling kits; and chemical detection equipment. In U. S.
   Customs Service,

   Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U. S. Coast Guard Implement
   Assistance with Funding from the Departments of State and Defense

   Page 9 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   addition, the FBI recently expanded the equipment list to include
   radiation pagers.

   From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard spent $1.6
   million in funding received from the State Department Export Control and
   Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has provided
   assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of
   the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one country includes two
   boats with spare parts and stationing of an in- country Coast Guard
   advisor.

   Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal year
   2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For additional
   details about each of the six agencies* programs and expenditures, see
   appendix II.

   Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
   Fiscal Year 2001

   Dollars in millions

   Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
   source

   DOE Second Line of Defense Install radiation detection portal monitors at
   Russian border

   crossings. $11.2 Includes $8.5 million in DOE funds and $2.7 million from
   State DOE International Export Control Program

   Provide nuclear- specific export control assistance to countries of the
   former Soviet Union. 22.0 Includes $19.6 million in

   DOE funds and $2.4 million from State DOE Install radiation detection
   equipment in countries of the

   former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central and Eastern Europe.

   1.8 Includes $0.5 million from State and $1. 3 million from DOD State
   Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund

   Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
   interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
   Eastern Europe.

   8.5 State Dept. Export Control & Related Border Security Assistance

   Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
   interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
   Eastern Europe. (Took over Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation
   detection assistance beginning in FY 2002.)

   2.7 State Dept. Georgia Border Security & Law Enforcement

   Provide wide range of assistance to Georgia border guards and customs
   service to interdict nuclear smuggling, fight other crimes such as drug
   smuggling, and develop border infrastructure.

   0.2 DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Provide radiation detection equipment
   and other assistance

   for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5 countries, and install radiation
   detection portal monitors in one country.

   16.3 DOD International Counterproliferation program

   Train and equip customs officers, border guards, and law enforcement
   officials to detect, interdict, and respond to nuclear smuggling.

   10.2

   Page 10 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Dollars in millions

   Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
   source

   U. S. Customs Service Train and equip customs officers and border guards
   in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to detect and
   interdict nuclear smuggling.

   11.1 Includes $8.8 million from State and $2. 3 million from DOD Federal
   Bureau of Investigation Train and equip law enforcement officials in the
   former Soviet

   Union and Central and Eastern Europe to investigate and respond to nuclear
   smuggling incidents.

   0.4 Includes $0.4 million from DOD

   U. S. Coast Guard Provide assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear
   smuggling. 1.6 Includes $1.6 million from

   State

   Total $86.1

   Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U. S. Customs Service,
   U. S. Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

   Funding for State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
   program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in fiscal year 1998
   to $40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due to the rapid increase,
   some agencies receiving funds from State have carried over millions of
   dollars in program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have received
   more funding than they have been able to spend. For example, Customs*
   program expenditures have not kept pace with its growth in funding, and it
   carried over $33.1 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002,
   including $6.5 million in obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in
   funds that had not been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed
   the carryover to not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal
   year and not obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which
   the assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and
   State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides the
   funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3 year
   period.

   After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental
   appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that they
   have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for assistance
   (including detection equipment) to six countries. Some Agencies*

   Expenditures Have Not Kept Pace with Growth in Funding

   Page 11 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Because U. S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of
   Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing
   other countries* border crossings, with the result that some countries*
   border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
   While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at
   border sites in Russia and another country, the State Department has
   installed less sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In
   addition, no governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs
   together, which exacerbates the coordination problems.

   The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat
   nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency group
   chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes representatives
   from all the U. S. programs that are providing assistance, meets about
   once a month to discuss such issues as funding and financial management of
   the agencies* various programs, upcoming assistance activities, and
   results of program personnel*s recent trips to recipient countries. In
   addition, program managers of the various agencies work together to
   implement the programs. For example, DOD officials said that they
   regularly meet with Customs and FBI program managers to implement
   assistance and that they participate in the FBI and Customs training
   courses that DOD funds.

   A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since
   State established a separate office in November 2000* the Office of Export
   Control Cooperation and Sanctions* to manage and coordinate U. S.
   assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs to
   station 22 in- country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are
   responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six agencies
   within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the advisors play an
   important role in implementing their programs. In addition, the new office
   has assumed responsibility for much of the Nonproliferation and
   Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear smuggling. For instance,
   the office has taken over responsibility for providing and maintaining
   radiation detection equipment to countries other than Russia.

   Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the
   overall U. S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling;
   consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without always
   coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For example, DOD
   installed portal monitors at three sites in one country of the former
   Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the interagency U. S.
   Assistance to

   Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated Approach

   Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate

   Page 12 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   group learned of the project. According to a DOD official, the project was
   coordinated with other State Department officials. Similarly, although
   State provides its radiation detection assistance through DOE, the DOE
   office that works with State is completely separate from the Second Line
   of Defense program, and a Second Line of Defense official said that his
   program and the other office do not communicate with each other. According
   to the official, a few years ago the two offices were discussing the
   possibility of merging, but the discussions ended after a new director
   took over the other office even though Second Line of Defense officials
   still believe that the two offices should be merged. Even within the State
   Department, different offices implement their programs without full
   coordination. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
   approved a project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing
   that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take
   over State*s radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at
   State has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
   program even though one of the objectives of the program is to strengthen
   Georgia*s ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally, even though it
   funds much of the assistance provided by other agencies, State could not
   provide accurate information on the other agencies* program expenditures
   during the course of our review. For example, State*s records did not
   match Customs* financial data on expenditures of funds provided to Customs
   by State. State officials said that they have now developed a financial
   database to track how the other agencies have spent State*s funds.

   In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the
   appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself as
   the agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting policy, a
   DOD official said that State does not have the necessary expertise or
   resources to manage the overall U. S. effort. In contrast, DOE officials
   said that State should have a lead role in coordination and diplomatic
   support for the assistance programs and that DOE would depend on State to
   establish the diplomatic basis that would allow the Second Line of Defense
   program to expand into other countries. However, DOE officials questioned
   whether State and DOD are the appropriate agencies for installing portal
   monitors in countries other than Russia.

   Page 13 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have
   installed portal monitors that have different levels of capability to
   detect weapons- usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings
   more vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE and
   DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border sites in
   Russia and another country, State has installed less sophisticated portal
   monitors in other countries. In addition, in the mid- 1990s, the DOD
   Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided less sophisticated portal
   monitors to another country in the former Soviet Union.

   The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation*
   gamma and neutron* whereas the portal monitors installed by State and the
   DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma radiation. The
   ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a greater ability to
   detect weapons- usable plutonium, one of the materials of greatest concern
   in terms of nonproliferation. In addition, according to DOE officials, due
   to their configuration and sensitivity the State Department portal
   monitors are less likely to detect small quantities of highly enriched
   uranium, the other material that is of greatest nonproliferation concern,
   or material that is shielded, for example by a lead container or certain
   parts of a vehicle. DOE*s office that installs the portal monitors on
   behalf of State acknowledged that the less sophisticated portal monitors
   have a limited capability to detect weapons- usable nuclear material and
   said that the portal monitors serve mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In
   addition, DOE and DOD have taken different approaches even though the two
   agencies have installed the same Russian- manufactured portal monitors.
   For example, DOE officials said that the Second Line of Defense program
   has calibrated the monitors in Russia to detect a smaller quantity of
   material than the monitors installed by DOD in another country. In
   contrast, a DOD official said that DOE*s approach runs the risk of a high
   rate of false alarms, which can lead to complacency among officials in
   charge of responding to alarms.

   State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
   said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of their
   lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in maintaining
   sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack even the basic
   infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors, such as a source
   of electricity. Because of the different circumstances existing in each
   country, State officials said that radiation detection assistance should
   be tailored to each country*s needs. The Director of State*s Office of
   Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that State is reevaluating
   its approach to providing radiation detection equipment, Ineffective
   Coordination

   Has Resulted in Some Border Crossings Being More Vulnerable to Nuclear
   Smuggling Than Others

   Page 14 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   including installing better equipment where appropriate. Second Line of
   Defense officials expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal
   monitors at border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to
   countries seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense
   officials said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE
   would replace State*s portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment if
   the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and
   perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower- priority sites. Overall,
   Second Line of Defense officials said that the U. S. government assistance
   to provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and lacks a single,
   coherent approach and that the portal monitors should meet a minimum
   standard for detecting weapons- usable nuclear material.

   The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing
   handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and State,
   the U. S. Customs Service has provided customs and border officials with
   radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
   provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation pagers, and DOE
   officials said that they view the pagers as personal safety devices that
   are ineffective at detecting weapons- usable nuclear material. According
   to State and Customs officials, pagers are a useful part of a radiation
   detection system at border crossings. Customs officials also said that
   pagers are just one part of a multi- layered radiation detection system
   used by border personnel.

   No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs together
   through common goals and objectives, strategies and time frames for
   providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating the
   effectiveness of assistance. The in- country customs advisors have
   developed country- specific plans, and DOD has developed a plan for its
   International Counterproliferation program that includes threat
   assessments and a prioritization of countries into three levels of weapons
   of mass destruction proliferation risk in the context of border security
   and customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has developed a list of close to
   60 border crossings where it plans to install radiation detection
   equipment as part of the Second Line of Defense program and estimated the
   cost and timeframe for completing the program. On the other hand, the
   State Department has no plan for providing radiation detection equipment
   that details how many portal monitors it plans to install, in what
   countries, and at which border crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies
   have not developed a joint assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and
   the best mix and location of radiation detection equipment to address the
   threat. Need Exists for Plan to

   Guide U. S. Assistance Efforts

   Page 15 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   While DOE conducted an in- depth assessment of the smuggling threat to
   prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal monitors,
   State and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to prioritize the
   countries or border crossings to which they are providing radiation
   detection equipment. Numerous agency officials acknowledged that the U. S.
   effort to improve countries* ability to combat nuclear smuggling lacks
   adequate planning. For example, the director of State*s Office of Export
   Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that ideally the U. S. government
   would have a process for determining how much funding to allocate to each
   country and what to spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official said
   that the U. S. effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership and
   a redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome
   coordination issues.

   U. S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous
   countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
   Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
   However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and
   maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U. S. efforts.
   These problems are largely the result of the lack of oversight and follow-
   up by some of the U. S. agencies providing the equipment. Another problem
   is that many countries that have received radiation detection equipment
   are not reporting information about nuclear materials detected by U. S.-
   supplied equipment. Recently, the United States began stationing advisors
   in many of the countries receiving the assistance to, among other things,
   correct equipment problems.

   Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U. S. assistance to combat
   nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much needed
   radiation detection equipment and training. According to officials from
   several countries, U. S.- supplied portal monitors installed at border
   crossings and handheld detection equipment represent the only assistance
   of this type that their countries have received. In other countries the U.
   S. assistance has supplemented equipment and training received from other
   countries. For example, Latvia has received radiation detection equipment
   from Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received
   equipment from Finland and Germany.

   In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw that a
   U. S.- furnished portal monitor and U. S.- supplied handheld detectors and
   radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and other materials. U.
   S. Assistance Has

   Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but Problems with Equipment
   Undermine Efforts

   Recipient Country Officials Cite Benefits of U. S. Assistance

   Page 16 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   According to this country*s officials, the U. S.- supplied portal monitors
   installed at several border crossings are well- maintained and serviced
   regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U. S. equipment in that country.

   Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors

   Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors.

   Page 17 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards

   In another country we visited, we saw a U. S. Customs Service- furnished
   mobile x- ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to inspect
   luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia A few hours
   later, the van was driven to another crossing point along the border where
   passengers and their possessions were screened at a train station.
   Passengers* bags and other personal items were passed through an x- ray
   machine that was part of the van*s screening apparatus. Occasionally, the
   border guard who was operating the x- ray machine would examine the
   contents of the items that had been x- rayed to determine their exact
   content. Figure 3 shows the x- ray van.

   Page 18 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van

   Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
   funded by DOE*s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
   Russia*s plans to improve border security. According to these officials,
   as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of
   Russia*s 300 portal monitors. The U. S.- funded equipment is manufactured
   in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing conducted by DOE
   national laboratory personnel. This testing is designed to ensure that
   portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize
   detection capability) and that the equipment is being used as intended.
   According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE on
   ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment. Russian
   customs officials also told us that DOE has done a very credible job of
   making follow- up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it is
   recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.

   During our visit to Russia, we observed several U. S.- funded pedestrian
   portal monitors that were installed at Moscow*s Sheremetyevo Airport (see
   fig. 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment and a

   Page 19 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to
   the portal monitors. DOE*s detection equipment installed throughout Russia
   is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian officials tested the
   equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. They *planted** with our
   knowledge* a radioactive source in an attache case that we carried past a
   pedestrian portal monitor, which activated an alarm. A computer screen in
   the control room displayed our movements past the portal monitor.

   Figure 4: U. S.- Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in
   Moscow

   U. S. assistance includes training, which U. S. and recipient country
   officials told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to
   combat nuclear smuggling. This approach should include equipment,
   training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training is
   a critical component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example, border
   personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques, laboratory
   specialists need to be able to analyze and properly identify material that
   is detected and law enforcement officials need to be able to conduct
   investigations in order to prosecute, when appropriate, individuals
   apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U. S. agencies have trained more

   Page 20 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   than 3,500 border security and law enforcement personnel in a broad range
   of weapons of mass destruction interdiction programs. The U. S. Customs
   Service trained over 2, 970 customs and law enforcement officers from more
   than 25 countries during 1996- 2001, and the FBI trained approximately 600
   foreign country personnel during a similar period. DOE has funded the
   development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300 customs officers to
   help identify equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear weapon. In
   addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs Academy, implemented a
   mobile training program that provides training to customs agents in remote
   locations.

   U. S. agency officials provided several examples to show how U. S.-
   provided equipment and training have strengthened countries* ability to
   detect and deter nuclear smuggling.

    In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country detected
   radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across the border.
   According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at the border
   crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the incident occurred.
    According to DOE officials, U. S. equipment in Russia has detected more

   than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases include
   contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive
   materials that could pose a proliferation concern.  In 1999, customs
   officials in a country that had received DOD/ Customs

   training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for smuggled nuclear
   materials seized weapons- usable material that had been hidden inside the
   trunk of a car. According to U. S. Customs officials, this case shows the
   importance of providing training that combines general border inspection
   techniques with specialized training in nuclear materials.

   We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection
   equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the U.
   S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a DOE
   office responsible for installing portal monitors in some countries, U. S.
   assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked effective followup to
   ensure that equipment delivered was properly maintained and used for the
   purposes intended. Several officials told us that there has been
   inadequate funding for maintenance and training on the use of the
   equipment in many countries of the former Soviet Union. U. S. officials
   frequently described this practice as *drop and run.* A State Department
   official told us that it had always been the responsibility of the
   recipient countries to alert the United States when equipment needed to be
   Problems with Equipment

   Undermine U. S. Assistance Efforts

   Page 21 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   repaired. This official noted, however, that country officials did not
   systematically report problems and, as a result, malfunctioning equipment
   was sometimes left unrepaired for extended periods of time. He also noted
   that until recently there was no consolidated list of all the equipment
   that different agencies had provided. He compiled such a list but could
   not be certain that all equipment provided under DOD*s Cooperative Threat
   Reduction program was included.

   At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information
   about problems with U. S.- supplied equipment. He noted that audits found
   that detection equipment in several countries had never been used and
   remained in storage; expensive high- technology equipment was only used in
   the presence of visiting U. S. delegations; and equipment was going unused
   because it needed battery replacement, very minor repairs, or major
   repairs that required out- of- country servicing. The DOD official noted
   that recipient country officials offered numerous reasons why the
   equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, including (1) the
   equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was trained to use it; (3)
   the equipment would be broken; (4) use of the equipment could cause
   injuries; (5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no funds had been provided
   for new batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge about where or how to send
   the equipment for repairs.

   During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with U. S.
   radiation detection equipment provided to many countries, including the
   following examples, which are based on, among other things, discussions
   with U. S. program officials and representatives of countries receiving U.
   S. assistance:

    The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border
   crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as
   deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a November
   2001 U. S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted that according to
   a customs official from this recipient country, the portal monitors were
   not being used because they emitted too much radiation and posed a health
   and safety hazard. According to a U. S. official, the incident indicates
   how little some recipient country officials know about the equipment,
   because the portal monitors do not emit radiation. In addition, based on a
   recent inventory, a U. S. official was unable to locate many radiation
   pagers furnished to that country. In another country, the whereabouts of
   several dozen handheld radiation detectors could not be determined.

   Page 22 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

    About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country in
   the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not operational.
   Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
   then they could use. In addition, the equipment had limited capability to
   detect nuclear material.  Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were
   stored in the U. S. embassy

   basement for about 2 years because the State Department and the Lithuanian
   border organization disagreed about the need for a power supply that cost
   $12,600 to operate the equipment. In February 2002, the monitors were
   finally installed.  Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation
   protection suits and

   pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/ FBI training
   program because an agreement governing the release of such equipment had
   not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an embassy garage for
   about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia in December 2001.  A
   portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a couple

   of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not expected to open
   for another 1- 1/ 2 years. Plans are underway to relocate the equipment. 
   In November 2001, a U. S. official visited a border crossing in one
   country

   of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been disconnected.
   Country officials told him that it had been shut off because it was
   lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The monitor is
   designed to be operated continuously.

   We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation
   detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have
   limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold climates
   or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some countries. For
   example, customs officials from one country told us that the vans (which
   had a total cost of about $900,000) they received within the last 2 years
   had to be moved to a warmer part of the country. Nevertheless, they told
   us that the vans could only be operated about 9 months each year and that
   even when operational, they are very fuel inefficient. Officials from
   another country told us the van they received about 1 year ago has rarely
   been used because of the cold weather and the expense associated with its
   operation. They said that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at
   customs* headquarters.

   In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many of
   the countries receiving U. S. assistance to improve program effectiveness.
   These advisors, generally retired U. S. Customs Service officials, are
   responsible for, among other things, developing, coordinating, and Country
   Advisors Trying to

   Improve Delivery of U. S. Assistance

   Page 23 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   updating recipient country border security requirements. In addition, they
   seek to ensure that the appropriate foreign officials attend training
   courses; track the assistance that countries receive from various programs
   to avoid duplication of equipment; meet with government ministries in the
   recipient countries; and inventory equipment and determine how it is being
   used, including assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using
   the advisors to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine
   maintenance and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds
   them, the advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD
   officials said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing
   their assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that
   the advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and
   resolving problems with equipment.

   According to DOE, State, and other U. S. officials, in many cases
   countries that have received U. S. radiation detection equipment are not
   systematically providing information about nuclear materials detected by
   U. S.- supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to determine the
   overall impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While agencies are
   receiving feedback on the performance level of equipment, such as whether
   the equipment is properly calibrated or performing according to technical
   specifications, limited information is provided about the impact of the
   equipment* namely to what extent is it detecting weapons- usable and other
   types of radioactive material. Two U. S. advisors told us that recipient
   country officials have ignored their requests for this type of
   information. An official from DOE*s office that installs portal monitors
   in some countries told us that his program does not have the means to
   verify the effectiveness of portal monitors due to the lack of incident
   reporting by some countries. He noted that information about nuclear
   smuggling cases varies from country to country and depends on good
   relationships between the recipient country*s border security organization
   and the U. S. embassy. Officials from DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
   told us that they receive information about incidents from their Russian
   counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not
   consistent and they are not confident that there has been a complete
   sharing of information about nuclear materials detected with U. S.- funded
   equipment. DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of information as
   part of an overall agreement with Russia on the Second Line of Defense
   program.

   In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other factors
   that impact U. S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including
   corruption in countries* border organizations and the amount of territory,
   including Lack of Consistent

   Reporting Hampers U. S. Efforts to Measure Impact of Radiation Detection
   Equipment

   Other Challenges to Border Security

   Page 24 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   borders that are not clearly marked, that requires protection. According
   to officials from several recipient countries, corruption is a pervasive
   problem within the ranks of border security organizations. For example,
   approximately 1,500 Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for
   corruption. Russian customs officials noted that efforts are underway to
   root corruption out but that this is a slow process. An official from one
   country told us that border security personnel turned off radiation
   detection equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of
   alcohol. In fiscal year 2002, the U. S. Customs Service started providing
   a new anti- corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by
   the expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us
   that it is impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country has
   green borders* expanses of territory that are not patrolled or regulated
   by border security personnel. These areas are very attractive to smugglers
   in general. In addition, borders are not always clearly marked or well
   established following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. A high-
   level official from one country*s border guard told us that the biggest
   problem he faces is the lack of agreement with Russia over boundaries.
   Furthermore, a border security official from another country told us that
   a dedicated nuclear smuggler has a 90- percent chance of successfully
   defeating his country*s border controls. A customs official from Russia
   told us that equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained
   border personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering
   operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating
   nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at
   civilian and military facilities.

   The current multiple- agency approach to providing U. S. assistance to
   combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way to
   deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U. S. agencies
   participating in these programs and activities have not been well
   coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort to
   effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess recipient
   country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within agencies
   providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are two offices
   within the Department of Energy that are providing radiation detection
   equipment and two offices within the Department of State that have funded
   similar types of equipment for various countries. To ensure the efficient
   and effective delivery of assistance and the timely and effective
   expenditure of program funds, we believe that the development of a
   governmentwide plan is needed. Such a plan could identify a unified set of
   program goals and priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities;
   Conclusions

   Page 25 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   determine program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively
   spending program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the
   operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country
   receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
   equipment maintenance to the countries.

   We are also concerned about how U. S. equipment is being used by the
   recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U. S.- provided
   equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive material, some
   equipment has not been well maintained, adequately accounted for, or
   installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue surrounding nuclear
   smuggling is the sharing of information about incidents that occur in each
   country. Currently, the agencies that are providing the equipment have
   limited access to this type of information. There is currently no
   systematic effort to obtain this data, and the United States depends on
   the willingness of the countries to voluntary provide information. It is
   difficult to assess the impact and effectiveness of the U. S.- supplied
   equipment unless data are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that
   U. S. agency personnel must continue to make the case to each country that
   sharing such data is of critical importance to the success of the U. S.
   program and countries* efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

   We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating the
   development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries develop an
   integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan should be
   developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy
   (working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
   Administration), and the Commissioner of the U. S. Customs Service, as
   well as the heads of other federal agencies participating in this effort.
   The plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified set of program goals
   and priorities, including defining participating agencies* roles and
   responsibilities; (2) overall program cost estimates; (3) time frames for
   effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; (5)
   strategies to maintain and sustain the operation of the equipment,
   including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country
   receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
   equipment maintenance to the host country.

   In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are other
   steps that could be taken immediately to improve U. S. efforts. We think
   that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative or
   overlapping Recommendations

   Page 26 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a single agency
   program office. To that end, we recommend that the

    Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
   National Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation detection
   equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within the Second Line
   of Defense program and  Secretary of State consolidate all border
   security and nuclear smuggling

   efforts under one program office. In addition, we recommend that the
   Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
   National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Secretaries of State and
   Defense

    strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that is
   in each country, including the handheld radiation detection equipment; 
   ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is adequately

   maintained; and  seek recipient country assurances that information about
   nuclear

   materials detected by U. S.- supplied equipment is shared with U. S.
   agencies on a timely basis.

   We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
   Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
   the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
   Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
   technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
   State*s, DOE*s, and Customs Service*s written comments are presented in
   appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies agreed with the
   facts presented in the report and State specifically said that it agreed
   with the report*s conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that
   we reword our recommendation to specifically include it as one of the
   agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE
   did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.

   In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that
   interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling
   can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per our
   recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the development of a
   governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment and maintenance
   support. State also commented, however, that the report gave insufficient
   weight to the progress that has been made in the past 1- 1/2 years to
   improve Agency Comments

   and Our Evaluation

   Page 27 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   coordination and planning. Specifically, State cited its establishment of
   the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is
   responsible for, among other things, managing and coordinating U. S.
   government export control and related border security programs. In
   addition, the Office chairs an interagency working group that evaluates,
   prioritizes, and approves projects that U. S. agencies undertake to
   improve countries* export control and related border security
   capabilities. The Department also stated that it has taken steps to
   improve internal coordination as well as accountability for equipment
   previously provided to other countries and noted that the country advisors
   play a prominent role in these matters. Regarding these points, we
   recognized in the draft report that State had improved coordination
   through an interagency group that it chairs. Further, we noted that
   recipient country officials told us that the advisors play a valuable role
   in implementing their assistance programs. In addition, we recognized in
   the draft report that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and
   Sanctions has improved coordination. However, we continue to believe that
   interagency coordination has been inadequate and needs to be improved.
   State acknowledged this point in its comments and said that a more
   coherent, better coordinated approach to providing radiation detection
   equipment is needed. The Department concurred with all of our
   recommendations and said that it will work with other agencies to
   implement them.

   In its comments, the Department of Energy*s National Nuclear Security
   Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and
   effectiveness of U. S.- supplied equipment unless data from the recipient
   countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes that sharing
   data is critical to the success of the U. S. program and countries*
   efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the need for a more
   uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries* borders. The
   Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs that operate in
   this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has historically
   focused on Russia; the International Export Control program that deals
   with equipment that has both civilian and military applications, material
   and technology; and a program that uses Department of State funding to
   maintain and install equipment outside of Russia. DOE also pointed out
   that radiation detection monitors installed by other U. S. agencies are
   not as sensitive to special nuclear materials (plutonium and highly
   enriched uranium) as the monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no
   ability to detect shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE*s point about its
   different programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three
   separate programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted
   the Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE*s primary

   Page 28 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE*s comment about the
   limitations of equipment installed by other U. S. programs, we recognized
   in the draft report that DOE has installed more sophisticated portal
   monitors in Russia and that the State Department has installed less
   sophisticated equipment in other countries.

   The U. S. Customs Service noted that the U. S. government*s
   nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but instead
   cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including
   chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that although our
   report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear or radioactive
   materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained border inspection
   personnel should not be underestimated. Finally, because Customs has been
   the largest recipient of funds appropriated for nuclear smuggling
   assistance, it suggested that our recommendation be reworded to include
   Customs specifically as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
   plan to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling. While we agree with
   Customs* assertion that U. S. nonproliferation activities are aimed at a
   broad range of threats, our review focused only on the nuclear material
   smuggling component of this effort. We agree with Customs* point about
   highly skilled and trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft
   report that training is a critical component and should be part of an
   integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded
   our recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies
   that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries combat
   nuclear smuggling.

   To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and
   expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies
   participating in the program* the Departments of Energy, State, and
   Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and the Federal
   Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each agency
   collects and reports its financial data differently. We attempted to
   standardize the reporting format for each agency and verify the accuracy
   of the data by crosschecking financial records maintained by each agency.
   When we found discrepancies, we brought them to the attention of the
   agencies. The agencies* data did not allow us to aggregate cost on a
   country- by- country basis because data was generally reported on a
   project, not country, basis. Our task was further complicated because the
   Department of State, which is responsible for tracking funds it has
   received for border security assistance, did not have an adequate
   financial management system in place to report program expenditures.
   Department Scope and

   Methodology

   Page 29 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   of State officials responsible for monitoring program expenditures are
   aware of this deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current
   financial management system.

   To assess how well U. S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program
   officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed
   pertinent documents, including individual agency*s assistance plans, as
   available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group headed
   by the Department of State and met with the lead official of that effort-
   the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions-- and members of
   his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with U. S. advisors
   stationed in countries receiving U. S. assistance including Azerbaijan,
   Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
   Several of these advisors were responsible for tracking assistance efforts
   in more than one country. For example, the advisor stationed in Latvia was
   also responsible for Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.

   We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the
   effectiveness of the U. S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
   and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U. S. radiation detection
   equipment installed at different border crossings and meet with officials
   responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls. We
   also attended a technical conference on radiation detection equipment
   sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we met with officials from 13
   additional countries that had received U. S. assistance: Azerbaijan,
   Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of
   Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. We
   also met with representatives from the IAEA, the U. S. Mission to
   International Organizations in Vienna, and the U. S. embassies in Latvia,
   Estonia, Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained
   technical information on radiation detection equipment from DOE; Lawrence
   Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; the
   Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer, TSA Systems Ltd.

   We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance with
   generally accepted government auditing standards.

   As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
   earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
   after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
   report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear
   Security

   Page 30 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the
   Commissioner, U. S. Customs Service; the Director, Federal Bureau of
   Investigation; the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard; the Director, Office of
   Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will
   make copies available to others upon request.

   If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at
   (202) 512- 3841. Major contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,
   Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis.

   Sincerely yours, (Ms.) Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources

   and Environment

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 31 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling
   incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents
   involving weapons- usable nuclear material. The information was obtained
   from, among other sources, data provided by the International Atomic
   Energy Agency (IAEA) 1 and the Department of Energy.

   Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
   trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to
   IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural
   uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, 2 plutonium, and uranium enriched in
   the isotopes U- 233 or U- 235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 3 *
   known as weapons usable material* are considered to pose the greatest
   proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In
   1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit
   trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty- nine countries, or about one-
   half of IAEA*s member states, currently participate in the database. As of
   December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the
   illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons- usable
   material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the
   information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact
   from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking
   incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly enriched uranium or
   plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons- usable
   material occurred during 1993- 95. The remaining cases occurred during
   1999- 2001.

   IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. officials provided us with information about 20
   cases involving the smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992.
   Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases involving
   weapons- usable material is probably larger than what is currently being
   reported because countries are not always willing to share sensitive

   1 IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United Nations.
   Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to
   verify that nuclear material under its supervision or control is not used
   to further any military purpose.

   2 Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of
   products and processes. Handling and disposing of thorium is a challenge
   because it is radioactive and produces radon gas when it decays.

   3 Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in
   the isotope U- 235. Uranium enriched in U- 235 above the level found in
   nature (. 071 percent) but less than 20 percent is called low enriched
   uranium. Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

   Smuggling Incidents Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 32 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the premature public
   disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing criminal
   investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another factor that
   affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of the
   information. DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us that a
   significant amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular incident
   before it can be deemed credible, and many of the reported incidents turn
   out to be unsubstantiated. For example, several reported cases over the
   years have been scams whereby a *smuggler* has been apprehended trying to
   sell material that is purported to be weapons- usable but is not.
   Regardless of the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials
   stated that the threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not
   be underestimated. The head of IAEA*s Office of Physical Protection and
   Material Security told us that every reported case should be taken
   seriously. Further, she noted that countries need to more systematically
   report smuggling incidents so that better assessments can be performed.

   Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. agencies provided several
   observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons- usable nuclear
   material.

    Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the
   former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.  From the early 1990s through
   about 1998, the nuclear material was seized

   primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past few years,
   there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in nuclear material
   through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and
   Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain whether the increase represents
   more trafficking in this material or better detection and reporting of
   activities that may have been going on in earlier years.  Most of the
   smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities of

   weapons- usable material that were insufficient to construct a nuclear
   bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved may
   indicate that that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer with
   a *sample size* quantity of material. In other cases, it appears doubtful
   that the traffickers had or claimed access to larger quantities of nuclear
   material.  The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized
   criminal or terrorist

   activity or organization.  In most of the incidents, the weapons- usable
   material was seized as a

   result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by
   equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable
   exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 33 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of a
   few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or
   protected to avoid detection.

   Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the
   smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of
   some of the significant incidents follows the table.

   Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons- Usable Material
   since 1992 Date Source of material Country where

   material seized Material/ quantity How material was found

   May 1992 Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association)

   Russia 1. 5 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium) Discovered by
   police

   investigation May 1993 Russia Lithuania 0. 1 kilogram (50 percent highly

   enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1993 Russia
   Russia 1. 8 kilograms (36 percent highly

   enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation November 1993 Russia
   Russia 4. 5 kilograms (20 percent highly

   enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation March 1994 Russia
   Russia 3. 05 kilograms (90 percent

   highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1994
   Unspecified Germany 0.006 kilograms plutonium- 239 Discovered by police

   investigation June 1994 Russia Germany 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent

   highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1994
   Russia Germany 0.00024 kilograms plutonium Discovered by police

   investigation August 1994 Russia Germany 0.4 kilograms of plutonium
   Discovered by police

   investigation December 1994 Russia Czech Republic 2.7 kilograms (87.7
   percent

   highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
   Russia Czech Republic 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent

   highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
   Russia Czech Republic 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent

   highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
   Russia Russia 1. 7 kilograms (21 percent highly

   enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1999 Russia
   Bulgaria 0. 004 kilograms of highly

   enriched uranium Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs. October 1999
   Unspecified Kyrgyzstan 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police

   investigation April 2000 Unspecified but

   Russia suspected Georgia 0. 9 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (30
   percent) Possible combination of

   radiation detection equipment at border and police investigation September
   2000 Possibly Russia

   and/ or Ukraine Georgia 0. 0004 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by
   police investigation

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 34 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Date Source of material Country where material seized Material/ quantity
   How material was found

   December 2000 Germany Germany Less than 1 milligram of plutonium
   Radioactive contamination

   disclosed in a test. January 2001 Unspecified Greece Approximately 0.003
   kilograms

   of plutonium Discovered by police investigation July 2001 Unspecified
   France About 0.005 kilograms of highly

   enriched uranium (approximately 80 percent enriched)

   Discovered by police investigation

   Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U- 235 is considered
   weapons- usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand
   grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the
   weight of a paperclip.

   Source: Various U. S. agencies and international organizations.

   This incident involved a chemical engineer and long- time employee of the
   State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as
   Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow. 4 Beginning in May 1992, over
   a 5- month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small
   quantities of highly enriched uranium totaling 1. 5 kilograms. In October
   1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing
   equipment from the Luch facility. Once in custody, the police discovered
   the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a
   specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market
   for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and
   received 3 years* probation.

   In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in a
   smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the
   production of, among other things, x- ray tubes, lasers, computers,
   aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian
   authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the
   beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kilogram
   of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the individuals
   involved were aware that the beryllium contained the enriched uranium.
   Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated at the Institute of
   Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This institute is involved in the

   4 This institute is involved in developing space and mobile reactors,
   including the TOPAZ reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch has several
   tons of weapons- usable material on site. Luch Scientific

   Production Association (Russia), 1992

   Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 35 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   research and development of nuclear power reactors and employs about 5,000
   people and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material.

   In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel
   rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were for
   Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained 36-
   percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent or greater is
   considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of material totaled
   about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Russian security officers
   discovered the missing material and apprehended the individuals before the
   material left the Murmansk area. One of the individuals arrested was a
   guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the material
   was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two
   Russian naval officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the
   two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4
   and 5 years.

   In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20- percent enriched
   uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen
   from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk,
   Russia. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft,
   including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage
   for several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The
   three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3- 1/ 2- year
   sentences while the third person was acquitted.

   In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for
   trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90
   percent. The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal
   Production Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The
   facility produces low- enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power
   reactors and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium for
   nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was smuggled out
   of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the material were found
   inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of individual*s homes.
   Murmansk, Russia,

   1993 Murmansk, Russia, 1993

   St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 36 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 0.006
   kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium- 239 in the home of a German
   citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of many
   components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, broken glass,
   and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The presence of mercury in
   the mixture suggests that the material may have been used as part of a red
   mercury scam. 5 In November 1995, the German national was sentenced to 2-
   1/ 2 years in prison for violating arms control laws. The sentence was
   added onto a 3- year term he was already serving time for counterfeiting.

   In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was
   recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, along
   with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a result of a
   police undercover operation. The material was seized in an undercover
   police operation. Three individuals apprehended were citizens of the
   Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A German court
   sentenced several of the individuals to probationary terms but one of the
   group*s leaders was sentenced to 2 years in prison.

   In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers intercepted
   approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich Airport. It is
   believed that the material originated in Russia*s Institute of Physics and
   Power Engineering. The institute, which is operated by Russia*s Ministry
   of Atomic Energy, is involved in the research and development of nuclear
   power reactors and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material. The
   material was in a suitcase that had arrived on a flight from Moscow. The
   individuals involved in the smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A
   German court sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison
   and the Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4
   years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving
   half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had
   arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved in
   the theft of the material from the institute.

   5 According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since 1979.
   Red mercury is a material that would- be smugglers have tried to sell
   claiming that the material can be used to produce a nuclear weapon.
   Tengen, Germany,

   1994 Landshut, Germany, 1994

   Munich, Germany, 1994

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 37 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized approximately
   2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material is believed to have
   been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics and Power Engineering.
   The individuals involved included a Tajikistan national, a former Russian
   nuclear institute worker, and at least one Czech national. The material
   was brought into the Czech Republic on a train and then hidden for about 6
   months while the individuals involved tried to sell it. They were arrested
   after Czech authorities received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave
   several members of the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months
   to 8 years.

   Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the seizure
   of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to available
   information, the composition of the material and its location were linked
   to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In both instances, the small
   quantities of material involved indicated that it was a sample that could
   be used to attract a potential buyer.

   In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border checkpoint
   seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
   on the Bulgarian/ Romanian border. Rousse is a city that serves as
   Bulgaria*s principal river port and is a transportation hub for road and
   rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded (lead) container
   inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish citizen. The driver
   attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and then traveled through
   Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned to find a buyer. A
   Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling techniques, suspected
   that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the driver*s papers revealed a
   document describing uranium. When the driver attempted to bribe the
   customs officer, his car was thoroughly inspected and the officer
   eventually discovered the vial containing the weapons- usable nuclear
   material. Bulgarian scientists concluded that the material was highly
   enriched uranium. Although the source of the material is not certain, it
   is probable that it came from the Mayak Production Association in Russia.
   This large complex produces special isotopes used for industrial,
   agricultural, and medical purposes and also reprocesses naval and civil
   nuclear power reactor fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery. Prague,
   Czech

   Republic, 1994 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 38 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small
   metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item was
   analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two
   individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.

   In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia,
   for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly enriched uranium
   fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the Black Sea located along
   the Georgia- Turkey border. According to one press report, the material
   may have been smuggled from Russia. The pellets mass and shape, together
   with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced
   for use in a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another
   report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the
   Russian border into Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment
   and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended.
   It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material
   into Turkey.

   In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for
   attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about
   0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched
   uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. According
   to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security
   said that two individuals arrested were Georgian citizens, and the third
   was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the uranium and
   plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell it.

   In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant
   removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, deliberately
   evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated items, described as
   rags and a test tube filled with aging waste material, contained a very
   minute amount of plutonium.

   In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates buried
   in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was determined
   to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as americium. According to
   one report, the material had been smuggled into Greece either from one of
   the countries of the former Soviet Union or Bulgaria. Each plate contained
   a small quantity of plutonium but the total amount was about Kara- Balta,

   Kyrgyzstan, 1999 Batumi, Georgia, 2000

   Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 Germany, 2000 Greece, 2001

   Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

   Page 39 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   0.003 kilograms. An official from Greece*s atomic energy commission said
   that the quantity of nuclear material found was insufficient to build a
   nuclear weapon but the material posed a health hazard. A law enforcement
   officer speculated that the individuals who buried the metal plates were
   probably waiting for a potential buyer.

   In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium and
   arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary
   reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of
   laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the
   suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, and
   the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to one press
   account, French police found the material encased in a glass bulb that was
   stored in a lead cylinder. France, 2001

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 40 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   This appendix provides additional information about each of the six
   agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.

   DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
   material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
   International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through 2001,
   DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program, including
   $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal
   monitors at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20 handheld
   radiation detectors. The eight border crossings include an airport in
   Moscow, six seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight border crossings
   are the first of close to 60 sites that DOE has included in the Second
   Line of Defense program based on a study in which DOE evaluated the need
   for radiation detection equipment at over 300 border crossings in Russia.
   DOE prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase
   the risk that potential smugglers would use those border crossings to
   smuggle nuclear material out of Russia. For example, the study placed a
   higher priority on border crossings that are close to Russian facilities
   that store weapons- usable nuclear material or to potential markets for
   smuggled nuclear material. DOE began work at two additional border
   crossings in Russia in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings
   in fiscal year 2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in
   fiscal year 2002.

   DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure that
   radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that Russia
   is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE uses equipment
   manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order to facilitate
   equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the Russian contractor
   installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at the border crossings to
   ensure that the portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration and
   calibrated correctly and that they are installed as agreed. For example,
   DOE conducted testing in October 2000 and found that some portal monitors
   were not configured optimally or calibrated correctly and that some
   pedestrian and vehicle crossings did not have radiation detection
   equipment. DOE officials said that they withheld final payment for
   installation until the contractor submitted evidence showing that any
   problems had been resolved.

   According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly committed
   to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE with good
   access to the border crossings where equipment is being installed. For
   example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE to participate in
   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance

   Programs Department of Energy

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 41 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of the portal monitors
   provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the truck was transporting
   fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In addition, DOE estimated
   that Russia spent $300,000 to install 14 pedestrian portal monitors at
   another terminal of the airport in Moscow.

   DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and spent
   $8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program received
   $12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations. 1 The State Department
   provided a total of $7.5 million to support the Second Line of Defense
   program*$ 5.1 million to pay the Russian enterprise that manufactures and
   installs the portal monitors and $2.4 million that it provided to DOE. Of
   the $5.1 million for the Russian contractor, State spent $2.6 million
   through fiscal year 2001. 2 Of the $2.4 million that it received from
   State (through the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
   program), DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over
   $2.3 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

   DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including $2.4
   million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of the
   former Soviet Union* primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan* to improve
   their ability to control the export of goods that could be used in the
   development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided under this program
   falls into three general categories: export licensing, industry awareness
   and compliance, and border enforcement. The export licensing assistance
   helps establish the regulations and procedures for issuing licenses to
   enterprises that allow them to export their goods and technologies. For
   example, DOE is providing Ukraine and Kazakhstan with computerized export
   control licensing systems that are specific to nuclear goods. Industry
   awareness and compliance consists primarily of workshops for enterprises
   that need training in understanding the export control system and
   complying with export control laws and regulations. DOE officials estimate
   that about 1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of

   1 DOE carried over $0. 9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002
   and transferred $0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the
   International Export Control Program in fiscal year 2001 when DOE made the
   Second Line of Defense program part of the Material Protection, Control,
   and Accounting program.

   2 The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation and
   Disarmament Fund and $2.1 million from the Export Control and Related
   Border Security Assistance program. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament
   Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and manages the entire $5.
   1 million in funding.

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 42 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   which are spin- offs of the nuclear weapons complex, need such training.
   Border enforcement assistance consists of equipment and training to help
   customs officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear- related
   good and technologies that require an export license before they can be
   exported from the country.

   Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program
   expenditures by country and source of funding. State*s Export Control and
   Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of $4.9
   million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which DOE
   spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5 million
   in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

   Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through Fiscal
   Year 2001

   Dollars in millions

   Country DOE funds State funds Total

   Russia $4.6 $0.5 $5.1

   Ukraine 2. 1 0.4 2.4

   Kazakhstan 1.3 0. 6 1.9

   Baltic states < 0.1 0. 2 0.2

   Regional/ other 11.7 0. 8 12.5 Total $19.6 $2.4 $22.0

   Note: Regional/ other expenditures includes $9. 3 million spent from
   fiscal years 1992 through 1997 that DOE was not able to break down by
   country.

   Source: DOE.

   In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the International
   Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the Special Technologies
   Program to install portal monitors in countries other than Russia with
   funding from the State Department Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
   State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program also
   provided $0.5 million to this office to repair and maintain portal
   monitors already installed, but DOE had not spent any of this funding as
   of the end of fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million in DOD funds
   to support DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, DOE*s
   Los Alamos National Laboratory helped to install portal monitors in one
   country in the former Soviet Union.

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 43 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling
   primarily through two programs* the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
   and the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. In
   addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program has a
   small radiation detection component. State established the
   Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to provide funding for
   unexpected needs or opportunities in U. S. nonproliferation efforts. Of
   the $115 million the fund received from fiscal year 1994 through 2001,
   State spent $8.5 million on assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. State
   provided radiation detection equipment and other assistance to 22
   countries including vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with x-
   ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation
   detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. 3 The projects also provided
   customs officials and border guards with other equipment such as fiber
   optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to detect chemicals
   and metals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction, night vision
   equipment, and radios.

   Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included assessments
   of countries* ability to interdict nuclear smuggling, multinational
   conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling and techniques for
   analyzing seized nuclear material, and course development for hands- on
   training in interdicting nuclear smuggling offered at Pacific Northwest
   National Laboratory. Although State has begun to consolidate assistance
   for combating nuclear smuggling under the Export Control and Related
   Border Security Assistance program, it continues to provide some
   assistance through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. In
   particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a $1.3 million
   Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install vehicle portal
   monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to
   assist another country upgrade their domestically produced portal monitors
   to better detect weapons- usable nuclear material. State also provided
   $4.3 million from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to DOE and the
   U. S. Customs Service to implement part of the assistance* $3 million to
   DOE*s Second Line of Defense Program in Russia, $0.5 million to DOE*s
   Special Technologies Program to install the portal

   3 The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
   Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
   Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey,
   Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Department of State

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 44 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to the U. S. Customs Service
   to help State provide equipment and training to the recipient countries.

   From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated $86.6
   million for the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
   program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and provided $40.2
   million to the U. S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U. S. Coast
   Guard, $4.9 million to DOE*s International Export Control Program, $4.5
   million to DOE*s Second Line of Defense program, and $0.5 million to DOE*s
   Special Technologies Program, which installs and maintains portal monitors
   in countries other than Russia on behalf of State. 4 After September 11,
   State received an emergency supplemental appropriation of $24.7 million
   for the program. State*s own $2.7 million in expenditures included $0.9
   million for three vans equipped with radiation detectors and x- ray
   machines for Russia, $0.2 million for a van for another country, and $0.4
   million to support a multinational conference on export controls and
   travel expenses of program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to
   hire outside firms to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other
   agencies and evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that
   State considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict
   nuclear smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of
   countries receiving U. S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State*s
   Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the
   program, developed a list of export control system standards by which to
   evaluate export control systems in host countries. The standards include
   criteria for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict smuggling
   using radiation detection equipment at border crossings.

   State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border
   Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act, which
   is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union,
   and from the Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related
   Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for export
   control and related border security assistance from fiscal year 1998
   through 2001.

   4 State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9 million to
   Department of Commerce assistance to improve countries* export control
   systems and $0.8 million to DOD to update an export control computer
   system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided to one
   country.

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 45 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
   Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001

   Dollars in millions

   1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

   Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs $3.0 $5.0
   $14.5 $19.1 $41.6

   FREEDOM Support Act 0 0 15.0 21.0 36.0

   Other 0 4. 0 5.0 0 9.0

   Emergency supplemental appropriation 0 0 0 24.7 24.7 Total $3.0 $9.0 $34.5
   $64.8 $111.3

   Source: State Department.

   In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export
   Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State*s Georgia
   Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some radiation
   detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling. The Georgia
   program focuses more broadly on developing the country*s border
   infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border including its
   seacoast, and strengthening border security against any type of crime such
   as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the program is also to
   strengthen the country*s border security against nuclear smuggling.
   Customs, which manages the program for State, received a total of $71.1
   million from State and spent $38.3 million through fiscal year 2001, of
   which $0.2 million was for radiation detection equipment including two
   portal monitors and 44 handheld radiation detectors.

   From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction
   program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries. In addition,
   DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the U. S. Customs
   Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16 million, DOD spent
   $1 million on radiation detection equipment including $0.9 million for 36
   pedestrian portal monitors and 100 handheld radiation detectors for one
   country in the former Soviet Union and $0.1 million for 100 handheld
   radiation detectors for another country. The $10.2 million worth of other
   equipment that DOD provided consisted a range of items to enable the
   countries to better patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled
   contraband, and equip their border posts. For example, DOD provided vans
   equipped with x- ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to search cargo
   to two countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling their
   coasts, and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with tools
   such as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for a
   Department of

   Defense

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 46 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   breakdown of expenditures by country and category of assistance to combat
   nuclear smuggling.

   Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year
   2001

   Dollars in millions

   Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus Georgia Total

   Radiation detection equipment 0 0 $0.1 $0.9 0 $1.0

   Other equipment 0 $2.3 4. 2 2.6 $1.0 10.2

   Program management <0 .1 2.1 0. 4 2.2 0. 1 4.8 Total $< 0.1 $4.4 $4.7 $5.7
   $1.1 $16.0

   Source: DOD.

   DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the
   International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and
   equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in 17
   countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes a
   program in cooperation with the U. S. Customs Service, which received $2.1
   million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in cooperation
   with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/ Customs program provides
   instruction on the detection, identification, and investigation of nuclear
   smuggling. The training comes with equipment packages that include
   radiation pagers and tools for searching persons and vehicles. The DOD/
   FBI program provides training and equipment with an emphasis on
   investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling incidents.

   Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent $0.3
   million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one
   country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in
   cooperation with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which has
   begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings. Although
   DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country that DOE is
   providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense program, DOD has also
   worked with that country to develop an indigenous capability to
   manufacture and maintain portal monitors.

   The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
   State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies and
   spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on assistance to
   combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically: U. S. Customs Service

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 47 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

    Customs received $40.2 million from State*s Export Control and Related
   Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from fiscal year
   1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to 30 countries.
   Assistance under this program includes stationing advisors in many of the
   countries to help coordinate and implement assistance from all of the
   programs to combat nuclear smuggling.  Customs received $0.8 million from
   State*s Nonproliferation and

   Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal year
   1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training to the
   Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.
   Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta with funding from the
   Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.  Customs received $2.1 million
   from DOD*s International

   Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year 1997
   through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia,
   Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
   Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  Customs
   received $1.1 million from DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction

   program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through 1999 for
   assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Customs returned
   $0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD.

   Customs* assistance included radiation pagers that border officials wear
   on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to pinpoint
   the location of radioactive material that caused a portal monitor alarm.
   Customs provided a variety of other high- and low- tech tools ranging from
   very basic items such as flashlights and tools for opening containers
   where smuggled goods may be hidden to more sophisticated equipment such as
   fiber optic scopes for searching fuel tanks. Training includes operation
   of the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; hands- on
   instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling; techniques for
   investigating smuggling operations; tracking the movements of smugglers
   who avoid legal border crossings by going through rugged and remote areas
   between ports of entry; and *train- the- trainer* courses to enable
   countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can reach.
   Hands- on training includes a 2- week course at DOE*s Pacific Northwest
   National Laboratory on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass
   destruction, including nuclear materials. Officials from several countries
   that have received U. S. assistance told us that the training improved
   their border security interdiction and investigation skills and promoted
   better understanding of how to operate radiation detection equipment. For
   example, one country*s border security and customs personnel told us that
   the U. S. Customs Service- sponsored training at Pacific Northwest
   National Laboratory was

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 48 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   particularly beneficial because it provided for *hands- on* training to
   detect nuclear materials hidden in vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of
   U. S. Customs Expenditures.

   Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through
   Fiscal Year 2001

   Funding Expenditures Obligations Balance

   State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance $40.2 $8.1
   $6.3 $25.8 State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 0.8 0. 6 <0 .1 0.1
   DOD International Counterproliferation program 2.1 1. 6 0.2 0. 3 DOD
   Cooperative Threat Reduction 1.1 0. 7 0 0. 3

   Total $44.2 $11.1 $6.5 $26.5

   Source: U. S. Customs Service.

   Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard received $4.4
   million from the State Department Export Control and Related Border
   Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide assistance
   for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of the former
   Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that amount in one
   country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a Coast Guard
   advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the Coast Guard
   provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted funds for
   assistance to four other countries.

   The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet Union
   and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International
   Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the FBI
   travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI*s only
   expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the training
   courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received approximately $1
   million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal year 2001, FBI
   assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for high- level
   government officials on weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation at
   the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. In fiscal
   year 2001, the FBI began providing additional courses with more detailed
   training geared toward the law enforcement officers who investigate and
   respond to smuggling incidents. One of the new courses, U. S. Coast Guard

   Federal Bureau of Investigation

   Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

   Page 49 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   which the DOD/ FBI effort had provided only to one country as of the end
   of fiscal year 2001, trains law enforcement and emergency management
   personnel through practical exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or
   other smuggled material. As part of the course, the DOD/ FBI effort
   provides equipment packages worth $240, 000 to outfit three 30- man
   response teams with a variety of equipment including HAZMAT suits to
   facilitate the safe handling of seized material, evidence collection and
   sampling kits, chemical detection equipment, and also radiation pagers.
   (The FBI originally planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000,
   but it increased the amount of equipment because it received additional
   funding from DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year
   2001 include crime scene management and crisis management, which trains
   different government agencies to work together to respond to a smuggling
   incident.

   Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

   Page 50 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

   Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

   Page 51 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

   Page 52 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

   Page 53 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

   Page 54 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

   Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

   Page 55 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

   Page 56 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

   Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

   (360093)

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