Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
Planning (16-MAY-02, GAO-02-426).
The worldwide trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material has
reportedly increased in recent years. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit
trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases
reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce
a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a
wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's
border through various means. Many nuclear smuggling cases have
been traced to nuclear material that originated in the former
Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of
Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program,
has helped them secure nuclear material at civilian and defense
facilities--the first line of defense against potential theft and
diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by
nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries
improve their border security--a second line of defense--but
these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. U.S. efforts
to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal
agencies--the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S.
Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the
U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001,
the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly
in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat
the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials. GAO found that U.S.
assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group,
chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S.
assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing
assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this
group. The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued
separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment
at other countries' border crossings; consequently, some
countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear
smuggling than others. U.S. assistance is generally helping
countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive
materials, but serious problems with installing, using, and
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S.
efforts. These and other problems have largely resulted from a
lack of agency oversight and follow-up.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-426
ACCNO: A03084
TITLE: Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination
and Planning
DATE: 05/16/2002
SUBJECT: Federal aid to foreign countries
Interagency relations
International relations
Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapons
Smuggling
Central Europe
Dept. of State Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance
Program
Dept. of State Georgia Border Security
and Law Enforcement Program
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
DOD International Counterproliferation
Program
DOE International Export Control Program
DOE Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting Program
DOE Second Line of Defense Program
Eastern Europe
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
Soviet Union
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-426
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
May 2002 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
U. S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning
GAO- 02- 426
Page i GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4 U. S. Government Has Spent about $86
Million to Help Countries
Combat Nuclear Smuggling 6 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Lacks a Coordinated
Approach 11 U. S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear
Smuggling,
but Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts 15 Conclusions 24
Recommendations 25 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 Scope and
Methodology 28
Appendix I Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents 31 Incidents
Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material 31 Luch Scientific Production
Association (Russia), 1992 34 Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993 34 Murmansk,
Russia, 1993 35 Murmansk, Russia, 1993 35 St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994 35
Tengen, Germany, 1994 36 Landshut, Germany, 1994 36 Munich, Germany, 1994
36 Prague, Czech Republic, 1994 37 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999 37 Kara- Balta,
Kyrgyzstan, 1999 38 Batumi, Georgia, 2000 38 Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 38
Germany, 2000 38 Greece, 2001 38 France, 2001 39
Appendix II U. S. Government Assistance Programs 40 Department of Energy
40 Department of State 43 Department of Defense 45 U. S. Customs Service
46 U. S. Coast Guard 48 Federal Bureau of Investigation 48 Contents
Page ii GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Appendix
III Comments from the Department of State 50
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 54
Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 56
Tables
Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2001 9 Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-
Usable
Material since 1992 33 Table 3: International Export Control Program
Expenditures
through Fiscal Year 2001 42 Table 4: Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance
Program Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001 45 Table 5: Cooperative Threat
Reduction Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2001 46 Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by
Funding Source,
through Fiscal Year 2001 48
Figures
Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors 16 Figure 2: Typical Handheld
Radiation Detector Used by Border
Guards 17 Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van 18 Figure 4: U. S.-
Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport
in Moscow 19
Page 1 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
May 16, 2002 The Honorable Pat Roberts Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
Dear Senator Roberts: Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and
other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased
in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 1
(IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of
illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See app. I for more
information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant number of the
cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a
nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with
radioactive material (* dirty bomb*) to spread radioactive contamination
over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country*s
border through a variety of means: it can be hidden in a car, train, or
ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport, or walked across an
unprotected border.
Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that
originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States,
through the Department of Energy*s Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting (MPC& A) program, 2 has helped these countries secure nuclear
material at civilian and defense facilities* this effort is considered the
first line of defense against potential theft and/ or diversion of nuclear
1 IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member states,
including the United States. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful
use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material under its
supervision or control is not used to further any military purpose. 2 This
review will only focus on U. S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling at
countries* borders. We recently reported on the Department of Energy*s
MPC& A program and found that the program is reducing the risk of theft of
nuclear material but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still
lack improved security systems and are vulnerable to theft. See Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Security of Russia*s Nuclear Material Improving; Further
Enhancements Needed (GAO- 01- 312, Feb. 28, 2001).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United
States is helping these countries improve their border security* a second
line of defense* but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. 3
For example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14
countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical
proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.
As agreed with your office, this report addresses U. S. efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U. S. federal programs tasked
with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and
the amount of U. S. funding spent on this effort; (2) determining how well
the U. S. assistance is coordinated among federal agencies; and (3)
assessing the effectiveness of the equipment and training provided by the
United States. We visited four countries to obtain a first hand look at U.
S. radiation detection equipment installed at different border crossings
and meet with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement,
and export controls.
U. S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six
federal agencies* the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S.
Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U. S.
Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six
agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of
smuggling of nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of
mass destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance,
including radiation detection equipment and training, technical exchanges
to promote the development and enforcement of laws and regulations
governing the export of nuclear- related equipment and technology, and
other equipment and training to generally improve countries* ability to
interdict nuclear smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two
programs to combat nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia.
Energy has installed radiation detection monitors at eight border
crossings, including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar
equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has
provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with
3 While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear smuggling, a
portion of the assistance is intended to improve countries* ability to
interdict any weapons smuggling* nuclear, chemical, biological, and
conventional. Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance to
about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of
Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided radiation detection
monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20 countries.
With funding provided by the Departments of State and Defense, the U. S.
Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U. S. Coast
Guard have provided a variety of training and equipment to customs, border
guard, and law enforcement officials in numerous countries.
U. S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by
the State Department, exists to coordinate U. S. assistance efforts, the
six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their
efforts through this group. As a result, the Departments of Energy, State,
and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
detection equipment at other countries* border crossings; consequently,
some countries* border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling
than others. Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing
equipment at border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is
installing equipment in another country that is better able to detect
weapons- usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed
less sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries.
Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the
Department of Energy*s Second Line of Defense program does not coordinate
its efforts with another office within the Department that also provides
radiation detection equipment because that office receives funding from
and installs equipment on behalf of the State Department. Officials of the
Departments of State, Energy, and Defense have acknowledged that U. S.
assistance efforts lack adequate planning and need better coordination
among all the agencies. In addition, these officials told us that the
roles and responsibilities of each agency in the overall U. S. assistance
effort should be better clarified. This report makes recommendations to
improve the planning and coordination of U. S. assistance to combat
nuclear smuggling.
While U. S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling
of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems with
installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have
undermined U. S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient countries told
us that U. S. assistance has provided needed radiation detection equipment
at border sites and training for border security guards and other law
enforcement personnel. Without U. S. assistance, some countries would not
have any radiation detection equipment at their borders or training in
Page 4 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and people and investigate nuclear
smuggling cases. In other countries, U. S. assistance has bolstered
existing nuclear smuggling detection programs. We observed at border sites
in countries we visited that U. S.- provided equipment was working and was
being used for the purposes intended. However, we also found serious
problems with some of the equipment provided to various countries. For
example, about one- half of the stationary radiation detection monitors
funded by the Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet
Union was never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could not
be accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the State
Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U. S. embassy
for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the department and the
recipient country about the need for a power supply line costing $12,600.
These and other problems are largely a result of the lack of oversight and
follow- up by the agencies providing the assistance. U. S. officials are
attempting to correct some of these problems by, among other things,
stationing advisors in countries receiving U. S. assistance. Another
problem affecting U. S. assistance efforts is that recipient countries do
not systematically report incidents of nuclear material detected at their
borders, which limits the ability of U. S. agencies to measure the
effectiveness of the equipment they are providing. This report makes
several recommendations designed to improve management of U. S.- provided
radiation detection equipment and to secure recipient country assurances
that information about detected nuclear materials is shared in a timely
basis.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the report and State
specifically said that it agreed with the report*s conclusions and
recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our recommendation to
specifically include it as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we did. DOE did not comment on the
conclusions and recommendations.
Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention to
the threat that unsecured weapons- usable nuclear material in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be stolen
and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking weapons of mass
destruction. Background
Page 5 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear
weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons- usable material when it
collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in
nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States responded to
the threat by providing assistance to increase security at numerous
nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia, in
order to prevent weapons- usable nuclear material from being stolen. In
addition, the United States has provided portal monitors (stationary
equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians
or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors at border crossings
in many countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe. The equipment, which is installed at car and truck crossings,
railroad crossings, seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes:
deterring smugglers from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting
cases of actual nuclear smuggling.
Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological
treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring radiation
such as fertilizer, and* of primary concern in terms of nonproliferation*
nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Nuclear material
includes radioactive source materials-- such as natural uranium, low
enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial nuclear power reactors, and
plutonium and highly enriched uranium-- that are key components of nuclear
weapons. The capability of the equipment to detect nuclear material
depends on a number of factors including the amount of material, the size
of the detection device, and whether the material is shielded from
detection. For example, a small amount of material shielded by a lead
container would likely escape detection while a large amount of material
with no shielding would be more likely to cause an alarm. Detecting actual
cases of illicit trafficking in weapons- usable nuclear material is
complicated because one of the materials that is of greatest concern in
terms of proliferation* highly enriched uranium* is among the most
difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of
radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,
which could be used in a radiological dispersion device or *dirty bomb,*
are highly radioactive and therefore easier to detect. Because of the
complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs officers or border
guards who are responsible for operating the equipment must also be
trained in how to use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source
of an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit
nuclear smuggling.
Page 6 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140
million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear smuggling
in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the former Soviet
Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The
Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four other agencies,
and some agencies have carried over millions of dollars in program funds
into fiscal year 2002 because they have received more funding than they
have been able to spend.
The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U. S. Coast Guard have
provided assistance to about 30 countries* customs, border, and law
enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear
smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of
assistance that the U. S. agencies are providing. Other equipment ranges
from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different
compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles for
conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands- on instruction
in using the equipment and conducting searches to high- level technical
exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory basis for preventing
illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods and materials that could
be used in a nuclear weapon. U. S. assistance began in the mid- 1990s
under DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and then expanded to
State, DOE, and other DOD programs.
While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their assistance
programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive their funding from
State and/ or DOD. DOE also receives part of its funding from State.
DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of Defense
Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to Russia. From
fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million, including $2.7
million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal monitors at
eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport. DOE has identified
close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to install portal monitors over
the next decade at a total cost of about $50 million and has begun work at
19 of these sites. In addition, DOE may expand the program beyond Russia
to include other countries of the former Soviet Union. DOE*s International
Export Control Program spent $22 million, including U. S. Government Has
Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling
U. S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in
Delivering U. S. Assistance
Page 7 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
$2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal year 1992 through 2001 to help
countries of the former Soviet Union control the export of goods and
technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.
Whereas the Second Line of Defense program focuses on the nuclear material
needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the other high-
technology components needed for a bomb such as equipment for enriching
uranium. The program provides assistance to prevent legitimate
enterprises, such as businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet
Union*s nuclear weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally
engaging in illicit trade in such goods and technologies. DOE also spent
$1.8 million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear
smuggling.
The State Department has received the largest amount of funding through
the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear smuggling in
about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe. State spent $11. 4 million primarily through two programs*
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program. Through the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1994
through 2001 to, among other things, install portal monitors in countries
other than Russia. In addition, State provided handheld radiation
detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels of radiation), and mobile vans
equipped with x- ray machines and radiation detectors that can be driven
among a number of border crossings. From fiscal year 1998 through 2001,
State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program
spent $2.7 million to, among other things, purchase three vans equipped
with radiation detectors for Russia and another van for Poland. State*s
Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (implemented by
Customs) also spent $0.2 million to provide radiation detection equipment
as part of its assistance to strengthen Georgia*s overall border
infrastructure and security against any type of crime, including nuclear
material smuggling. State also provided $58.8 million to DOE, Customs, and
the Coast Guard to fund their assistance activities.
DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two
programs* the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the International
Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to 2001, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to assist five
countries. The assistance included $1 million for radiation detection
equipment* 36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen people) and 100
handheld radiation detectors for one country and an additional 100
Page 8 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
handheld detectors for another country* and about $10 million for other
equipment to enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct
searches for smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. In
addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, in fiscal
year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory to install seven portal monitors at three border crossings in
another country. DOD has begun site surveys at about eight additional
border crossings in that country where it plans to install portal
monitors. As part of the International Counterproliferation program, DOD
spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs
and FBI training and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union
and Central and Eastern Europe.
The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on
assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided training and
equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close to 30 countries.
The equipment includes radiation pagers (small detectors that can be worn
on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels or used as a handheld
device to pinpoint the location of radioactive material detected by a
portal monitor) as well as a variety of other high- and low- tech tools to
conduct searches and detect sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber
optic scopes for examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes
assistance in operating the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors;
providing hands- on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear
smuggling; teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations;
tracking the movements of smugglers between ports of entry, including
through rough terrain; and providing *train- the- trainer* courses to
enable countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can
reach. In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22
incountry advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help
implement and coordinate the assistance.
From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part of
the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/ FBI effort
trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate and respond
to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. Training
included seminars for high- level officials and courses on conducting
investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure has taken place.
Equipment provided as part of the training included protective equipment,
such as HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized material safer; evidence
collection and sampling kits; and chemical detection equipment. In U. S.
Customs Service,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U. S. Coast Guard Implement
Assistance with Funding from the Departments of State and Defense
Page 9 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
addition, the FBI recently expanded the equipment list to include
radiation pagers.
From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard spent $1.6
million in funding received from the State Department Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has provided
assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of
the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one country includes two
boats with spare parts and stationing of an in- country Coast Guard
advisor.
Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal year
2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For additional
details about each of the six agencies* programs and expenditures, see
appendix II.
Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
Fiscal Year 2001
Dollars in millions
Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
source
DOE Second Line of Defense Install radiation detection portal monitors at
Russian border
crossings. $11.2 Includes $8.5 million in DOE funds and $2.7 million from
State DOE International Export Control Program
Provide nuclear- specific export control assistance to countries of the
former Soviet Union. 22.0 Includes $19.6 million in
DOE funds and $2.4 million from State DOE Install radiation detection
equipment in countries of the
former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central and Eastern Europe.
1.8 Includes $0.5 million from State and $1. 3 million from DOD State
Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund
Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe.
8.5 State Dept. Export Control & Related Border Security Assistance
Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe. (Took over Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation
detection assistance beginning in FY 2002.)
2.7 State Dept. Georgia Border Security & Law Enforcement
Provide wide range of assistance to Georgia border guards and customs
service to interdict nuclear smuggling, fight other crimes such as drug
smuggling, and develop border infrastructure.
0.2 DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Provide radiation detection equipment
and other assistance
for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5 countries, and install radiation
detection portal monitors in one country.
16.3 DOD International Counterproliferation program
Train and equip customs officers, border guards, and law enforcement
officials to detect, interdict, and respond to nuclear smuggling.
10.2
Page 10 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Dollars in millions
Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
source
U. S. Customs Service Train and equip customs officers and border guards
in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to detect and
interdict nuclear smuggling.
11.1 Includes $8.8 million from State and $2. 3 million from DOD Federal
Bureau of Investigation Train and equip law enforcement officials in the
former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe to investigate and respond to nuclear
smuggling incidents.
0.4 Includes $0.4 million from DOD
U. S. Coast Guard Provide assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear
smuggling. 1.6 Includes $1.6 million from
State
Total $86.1
Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U. S. Customs Service,
U. S. Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Funding for State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in fiscal year 1998
to $40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due to the rapid increase,
some agencies receiving funds from State have carried over millions of
dollars in program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have received
more funding than they have been able to spend. For example, Customs*
program expenditures have not kept pace with its growth in funding, and it
carried over $33.1 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002,
including $6.5 million in obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in
funds that had not been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed
the carryover to not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal
year and not obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which
the assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and
State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides the
funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3 year
period.
After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental
appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that they
have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for assistance
(including detection equipment) to six countries. Some Agencies*
Expenditures Have Not Kept Pace with Growth in Funding
Page 11 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Because U. S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of
Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing
other countries* border crossings, with the result that some countries*
border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at
border sites in Russia and another country, the State Department has
installed less sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In
addition, no governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs
together, which exacerbates the coordination problems.
The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat
nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency group
chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes representatives
from all the U. S. programs that are providing assistance, meets about
once a month to discuss such issues as funding and financial management of
the agencies* various programs, upcoming assistance activities, and
results of program personnel*s recent trips to recipient countries. In
addition, program managers of the various agencies work together to
implement the programs. For example, DOD officials said that they
regularly meet with Customs and FBI program managers to implement
assistance and that they participate in the FBI and Customs training
courses that DOD funds.
A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since
State established a separate office in November 2000* the Office of Export
Control Cooperation and Sanctions* to manage and coordinate U. S.
assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs to
station 22 in- country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are
responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six agencies
within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the advisors play an
important role in implementing their programs. In addition, the new office
has assumed responsibility for much of the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear smuggling. For instance,
the office has taken over responsibility for providing and maintaining
radiation detection equipment to countries other than Russia.
Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the
overall U. S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling;
consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without always
coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For example, DOD
installed portal monitors at three sites in one country of the former
Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the interagency U. S.
Assistance to
Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated Approach
Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate
Page 12 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
group learned of the project. According to a DOD official, the project was
coordinated with other State Department officials. Similarly, although
State provides its radiation detection assistance through DOE, the DOE
office that works with State is completely separate from the Second Line
of Defense program, and a Second Line of Defense official said that his
program and the other office do not communicate with each other. According
to the official, a few years ago the two offices were discussing the
possibility of merging, but the discussions ended after a new director
took over the other office even though Second Line of Defense officials
still believe that the two offices should be merged. Even within the State
Department, different offices implement their programs without full
coordination. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
approved a project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing
that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take
over State*s radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at
State has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program even though one of the objectives of the program is to strengthen
Georgia*s ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally, even though it
funds much of the assistance provided by other agencies, State could not
provide accurate information on the other agencies* program expenditures
during the course of our review. For example, State*s records did not
match Customs* financial data on expenditures of funds provided to Customs
by State. State officials said that they have now developed a financial
database to track how the other agencies have spent State*s funds.
In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the
appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself as
the agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting policy, a
DOD official said that State does not have the necessary expertise or
resources to manage the overall U. S. effort. In contrast, DOE officials
said that State should have a lead role in coordination and diplomatic
support for the assistance programs and that DOE would depend on State to
establish the diplomatic basis that would allow the Second Line of Defense
program to expand into other countries. However, DOE officials questioned
whether State and DOD are the appropriate agencies for installing portal
monitors in countries other than Russia.
Page 13 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have
installed portal monitors that have different levels of capability to
detect weapons- usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings
more vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE and
DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border sites in
Russia and another country, State has installed less sophisticated portal
monitors in other countries. In addition, in the mid- 1990s, the DOD
Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided less sophisticated portal
monitors to another country in the former Soviet Union.
The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation*
gamma and neutron* whereas the portal monitors installed by State and the
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma radiation. The
ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a greater ability to
detect weapons- usable plutonium, one of the materials of greatest concern
in terms of nonproliferation. In addition, according to DOE officials, due
to their configuration and sensitivity the State Department portal
monitors are less likely to detect small quantities of highly enriched
uranium, the other material that is of greatest nonproliferation concern,
or material that is shielded, for example by a lead container or certain
parts of a vehicle. DOE*s office that installs the portal monitors on
behalf of State acknowledged that the less sophisticated portal monitors
have a limited capability to detect weapons- usable nuclear material and
said that the portal monitors serve mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In
addition, DOE and DOD have taken different approaches even though the two
agencies have installed the same Russian- manufactured portal monitors.
For example, DOE officials said that the Second Line of Defense program
has calibrated the monitors in Russia to detect a smaller quantity of
material than the monitors installed by DOD in another country. In
contrast, a DOD official said that DOE*s approach runs the risk of a high
rate of false alarms, which can lead to complacency among officials in
charge of responding to alarms.
State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of their
lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in maintaining
sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack even the basic
infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors, such as a source
of electricity. Because of the different circumstances existing in each
country, State officials said that radiation detection assistance should
be tailored to each country*s needs. The Director of State*s Office of
Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that State is reevaluating
its approach to providing radiation detection equipment, Ineffective
Coordination
Has Resulted in Some Border Crossings Being More Vulnerable to Nuclear
Smuggling Than Others
Page 14 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
including installing better equipment where appropriate. Second Line of
Defense officials expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal
monitors at border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to
countries seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense
officials said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE
would replace State*s portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment if
the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and
perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower- priority sites. Overall,
Second Line of Defense officials said that the U. S. government assistance
to provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and lacks a single,
coherent approach and that the portal monitors should meet a minimum
standard for detecting weapons- usable nuclear material.
The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing
handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and State,
the U. S. Customs Service has provided customs and border officials with
radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation pagers, and DOE
officials said that they view the pagers as personal safety devices that
are ineffective at detecting weapons- usable nuclear material. According
to State and Customs officials, pagers are a useful part of a radiation
detection system at border crossings. Customs officials also said that
pagers are just one part of a multi- layered radiation detection system
used by border personnel.
No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs together
through common goals and objectives, strategies and time frames for
providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating the
effectiveness of assistance. The in- country customs advisors have
developed country- specific plans, and DOD has developed a plan for its
International Counterproliferation program that includes threat
assessments and a prioritization of countries into three levels of weapons
of mass destruction proliferation risk in the context of border security
and customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has developed a list of close to
60 border crossings where it plans to install radiation detection
equipment as part of the Second Line of Defense program and estimated the
cost and timeframe for completing the program. On the other hand, the
State Department has no plan for providing radiation detection equipment
that details how many portal monitors it plans to install, in what
countries, and at which border crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies
have not developed a joint assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and
the best mix and location of radiation detection equipment to address the
threat. Need Exists for Plan to
Guide U. S. Assistance Efforts
Page 15 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
While DOE conducted an in- depth assessment of the smuggling threat to
prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal monitors,
State and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to prioritize the
countries or border crossings to which they are providing radiation
detection equipment. Numerous agency officials acknowledged that the U. S.
effort to improve countries* ability to combat nuclear smuggling lacks
adequate planning. For example, the director of State*s Office of Export
Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that ideally the U. S. government
would have a process for determining how much funding to allocate to each
country and what to spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official said
that the U. S. effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership and
a redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome
coordination issues.
U. S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous
countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U. S. efforts.
These problems are largely the result of the lack of oversight and follow-
up by some of the U. S. agencies providing the equipment. Another problem
is that many countries that have received radiation detection equipment
are not reporting information about nuclear materials detected by U. S.-
supplied equipment. Recently, the United States began stationing advisors
in many of the countries receiving the assistance to, among other things,
correct equipment problems.
Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U. S. assistance to combat
nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much needed
radiation detection equipment and training. According to officials from
several countries, U. S.- supplied portal monitors installed at border
crossings and handheld detection equipment represent the only assistance
of this type that their countries have received. In other countries the U.
S. assistance has supplemented equipment and training received from other
countries. For example, Latvia has received radiation detection equipment
from Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received
equipment from Finland and Germany.
In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw that a
U. S.- furnished portal monitor and U. S.- supplied handheld detectors and
radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and other materials. U.
S. Assistance Has
Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but Problems with Equipment
Undermine Efforts
Recipient Country Officials Cite Benefits of U. S. Assistance
Page 16 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
According to this country*s officials, the U. S.- supplied portal monitors
installed at several border crossings are well- maintained and serviced
regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U. S. equipment in that country.
Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors
Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors.
Page 17 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards
In another country we visited, we saw a U. S. Customs Service- furnished
mobile x- ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to inspect
luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia A few hours
later, the van was driven to another crossing point along the border where
passengers and their possessions were screened at a train station.
Passengers* bags and other personal items were passed through an x- ray
machine that was part of the van*s screening apparatus. Occasionally, the
border guard who was operating the x- ray machine would examine the
contents of the items that had been x- rayed to determine their exact
content. Figure 3 shows the x- ray van.
Page 18 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van
Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
funded by DOE*s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
Russia*s plans to improve border security. According to these officials,
as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of
Russia*s 300 portal monitors. The U. S.- funded equipment is manufactured
in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing conducted by DOE
national laboratory personnel. This testing is designed to ensure that
portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize
detection capability) and that the equipment is being used as intended.
According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE on
ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment. Russian
customs officials also told us that DOE has done a very credible job of
making follow- up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it is
recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.
During our visit to Russia, we observed several U. S.- funded pedestrian
portal monitors that were installed at Moscow*s Sheremetyevo Airport (see
fig. 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment and a
Page 19 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to
the portal monitors. DOE*s detection equipment installed throughout Russia
is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian officials tested the
equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. They *planted** with our
knowledge* a radioactive source in an attache case that we carried past a
pedestrian portal monitor, which activated an alarm. A computer screen in
the control room displayed our movements past the portal monitor.
Figure 4: U. S.- Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in
Moscow
U. S. assistance includes training, which U. S. and recipient country
officials told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to
combat nuclear smuggling. This approach should include equipment,
training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training is
a critical component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example, border
personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques, laboratory
specialists need to be able to analyze and properly identify material that
is detected and law enforcement officials need to be able to conduct
investigations in order to prosecute, when appropriate, individuals
apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U. S. agencies have trained more
Page 20 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
than 3,500 border security and law enforcement personnel in a broad range
of weapons of mass destruction interdiction programs. The U. S. Customs
Service trained over 2, 970 customs and law enforcement officers from more
than 25 countries during 1996- 2001, and the FBI trained approximately 600
foreign country personnel during a similar period. DOE has funded the
development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300 customs officers to
help identify equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear weapon. In
addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs Academy, implemented a
mobile training program that provides training to customs agents in remote
locations.
U. S. agency officials provided several examples to show how U. S.-
provided equipment and training have strengthened countries* ability to
detect and deter nuclear smuggling.
In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country detected
radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across the border.
According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at the border
crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the incident occurred.
According to DOE officials, U. S. equipment in Russia has detected more
than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases include
contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive
materials that could pose a proliferation concern. In 1999, customs
officials in a country that had received DOD/ Customs
training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for smuggled nuclear
materials seized weapons- usable material that had been hidden inside the
trunk of a car. According to U. S. Customs officials, this case shows the
importance of providing training that combines general border inspection
techniques with specialized training in nuclear materials.
We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection
equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the U.
S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a DOE
office responsible for installing portal monitors in some countries, U. S.
assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked effective followup to
ensure that equipment delivered was properly maintained and used for the
purposes intended. Several officials told us that there has been
inadequate funding for maintenance and training on the use of the
equipment in many countries of the former Soviet Union. U. S. officials
frequently described this practice as *drop and run.* A State Department
official told us that it had always been the responsibility of the
recipient countries to alert the United States when equipment needed to be
Problems with Equipment
Undermine U. S. Assistance Efforts
Page 21 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
repaired. This official noted, however, that country officials did not
systematically report problems and, as a result, malfunctioning equipment
was sometimes left unrepaired for extended periods of time. He also noted
that until recently there was no consolidated list of all the equipment
that different agencies had provided. He compiled such a list but could
not be certain that all equipment provided under DOD*s Cooperative Threat
Reduction program was included.
At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information
about problems with U. S.- supplied equipment. He noted that audits found
that detection equipment in several countries had never been used and
remained in storage; expensive high- technology equipment was only used in
the presence of visiting U. S. delegations; and equipment was going unused
because it needed battery replacement, very minor repairs, or major
repairs that required out- of- country servicing. The DOD official noted
that recipient country officials offered numerous reasons why the
equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, including (1) the
equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was trained to use it; (3)
the equipment would be broken; (4) use of the equipment could cause
injuries; (5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no funds had been provided
for new batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge about where or how to send
the equipment for repairs.
During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with U. S.
radiation detection equipment provided to many countries, including the
following examples, which are based on, among other things, discussions
with U. S. program officials and representatives of countries receiving U.
S. assistance:
The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border
crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as
deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a November
2001 U. S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted that according to
a customs official from this recipient country, the portal monitors were
not being used because they emitted too much radiation and posed a health
and safety hazard. According to a U. S. official, the incident indicates
how little some recipient country officials know about the equipment,
because the portal monitors do not emit radiation. In addition, based on a
recent inventory, a U. S. official was unable to locate many radiation
pagers furnished to that country. In another country, the whereabouts of
several dozen handheld radiation detectors could not be determined.
Page 22 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country in
the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not operational.
Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
then they could use. In addition, the equipment had limited capability to
detect nuclear material. Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were
stored in the U. S. embassy
basement for about 2 years because the State Department and the Lithuanian
border organization disagreed about the need for a power supply that cost
$12,600 to operate the equipment. In February 2002, the monitors were
finally installed. Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation
protection suits and
pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/ FBI training
program because an agreement governing the release of such equipment had
not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an embassy garage for
about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia in December 2001. A
portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a couple
of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not expected to open
for another 1- 1/ 2 years. Plans are underway to relocate the equipment.
In November 2001, a U. S. official visited a border crossing in one
country
of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been disconnected.
Country officials told him that it had been shut off because it was
lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The monitor is
designed to be operated continuously.
We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation
detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have
limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold climates
or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some countries. For
example, customs officials from one country told us that the vans (which
had a total cost of about $900,000) they received within the last 2 years
had to be moved to a warmer part of the country. Nevertheless, they told
us that the vans could only be operated about 9 months each year and that
even when operational, they are very fuel inefficient. Officials from
another country told us the van they received about 1 year ago has rarely
been used because of the cold weather and the expense associated with its
operation. They said that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at
customs* headquarters.
In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many of
the countries receiving U. S. assistance to improve program effectiveness.
These advisors, generally retired U. S. Customs Service officials, are
responsible for, among other things, developing, coordinating, and Country
Advisors Trying to
Improve Delivery of U. S. Assistance
Page 23 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
updating recipient country border security requirements. In addition, they
seek to ensure that the appropriate foreign officials attend training
courses; track the assistance that countries receive from various programs
to avoid duplication of equipment; meet with government ministries in the
recipient countries; and inventory equipment and determine how it is being
used, including assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using
the advisors to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine
maintenance and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds
them, the advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD
officials said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing
their assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that
the advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and
resolving problems with equipment.
According to DOE, State, and other U. S. officials, in many cases
countries that have received U. S. radiation detection equipment are not
systematically providing information about nuclear materials detected by
U. S.- supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to determine the
overall impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While agencies are
receiving feedback on the performance level of equipment, such as whether
the equipment is properly calibrated or performing according to technical
specifications, limited information is provided about the impact of the
equipment* namely to what extent is it detecting weapons- usable and other
types of radioactive material. Two U. S. advisors told us that recipient
country officials have ignored their requests for this type of
information. An official from DOE*s office that installs portal monitors
in some countries told us that his program does not have the means to
verify the effectiveness of portal monitors due to the lack of incident
reporting by some countries. He noted that information about nuclear
smuggling cases varies from country to country and depends on good
relationships between the recipient country*s border security organization
and the U. S. embassy. Officials from DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
told us that they receive information about incidents from their Russian
counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not
consistent and they are not confident that there has been a complete
sharing of information about nuclear materials detected with U. S.- funded
equipment. DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of information as
part of an overall agreement with Russia on the Second Line of Defense
program.
In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other factors
that impact U. S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including
corruption in countries* border organizations and the amount of territory,
including Lack of Consistent
Reporting Hampers U. S. Efforts to Measure Impact of Radiation Detection
Equipment
Other Challenges to Border Security
Page 24 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
borders that are not clearly marked, that requires protection. According
to officials from several recipient countries, corruption is a pervasive
problem within the ranks of border security organizations. For example,
approximately 1,500 Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for
corruption. Russian customs officials noted that efforts are underway to
root corruption out but that this is a slow process. An official from one
country told us that border security personnel turned off radiation
detection equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of
alcohol. In fiscal year 2002, the U. S. Customs Service started providing
a new anti- corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by
the expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us
that it is impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country has
green borders* expanses of territory that are not patrolled or regulated
by border security personnel. These areas are very attractive to smugglers
in general. In addition, borders are not always clearly marked or well
established following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. A high-
level official from one country*s border guard told us that the biggest
problem he faces is the lack of agreement with Russia over boundaries.
Furthermore, a border security official from another country told us that
a dedicated nuclear smuggler has a 90- percent chance of successfully
defeating his country*s border controls. A customs official from Russia
told us that equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained
border personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering
operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating
nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at
civilian and military facilities.
The current multiple- agency approach to providing U. S. assistance to
combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way to
deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U. S. agencies
participating in these programs and activities have not been well
coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort to
effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess recipient
country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within agencies
providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are two offices
within the Department of Energy that are providing radiation detection
equipment and two offices within the Department of State that have funded
similar types of equipment for various countries. To ensure the efficient
and effective delivery of assistance and the timely and effective
expenditure of program funds, we believe that the development of a
governmentwide plan is needed. Such a plan could identify a unified set of
program goals and priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities;
Conclusions
Page 25 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
determine program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively
spending program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the
operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country
receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
equipment maintenance to the countries.
We are also concerned about how U. S. equipment is being used by the
recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U. S.- provided
equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive material, some
equipment has not been well maintained, adequately accounted for, or
installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue surrounding nuclear
smuggling is the sharing of information about incidents that occur in each
country. Currently, the agencies that are providing the equipment have
limited access to this type of information. There is currently no
systematic effort to obtain this data, and the United States depends on
the willingness of the countries to voluntary provide information. It is
difficult to assess the impact and effectiveness of the U. S.- supplied
equipment unless data are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that
U. S. agency personnel must continue to make the case to each country that
sharing such data is of critical importance to the success of the U. S.
program and countries* efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating the
development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries develop an
integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan should be
developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy
(working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration), and the Commissioner of the U. S. Customs Service, as
well as the heads of other federal agencies participating in this effort.
The plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified set of program goals
and priorities, including defining participating agencies* roles and
responsibilities; (2) overall program cost estimates; (3) time frames for
effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; (5)
strategies to maintain and sustain the operation of the equipment,
including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country
receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
equipment maintenance to the host country.
In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are other
steps that could be taken immediately to improve U. S. efforts. We think
that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative or
overlapping Recommendations
Page 26 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a single agency
program office. To that end, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation detection
equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within the Second Line
of Defense program and Secretary of State consolidate all border
security and nuclear smuggling
efforts under one program office. In addition, we recommend that the
Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Secretaries of State and
Defense
strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that is
in each country, including the handheld radiation detection equipment;
ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is adequately
maintained; and seek recipient country assurances that information about
nuclear
materials detected by U. S.- supplied equipment is shared with U. S.
agencies on a timely basis.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
State*s, DOE*s, and Customs Service*s written comments are presented in
appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies agreed with the
facts presented in the report and State specifically said that it agreed
with the report*s conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that
we reword our recommendation to specifically include it as one of the
agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE
did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.
In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that
interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling
can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per our
recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the development of a
governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment and maintenance
support. State also commented, however, that the report gave insufficient
weight to the progress that has been made in the past 1- 1/2 years to
improve Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 27 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
coordination and planning. Specifically, State cited its establishment of
the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is
responsible for, among other things, managing and coordinating U. S.
government export control and related border security programs. In
addition, the Office chairs an interagency working group that evaluates,
prioritizes, and approves projects that U. S. agencies undertake to
improve countries* export control and related border security
capabilities. The Department also stated that it has taken steps to
improve internal coordination as well as accountability for equipment
previously provided to other countries and noted that the country advisors
play a prominent role in these matters. Regarding these points, we
recognized in the draft report that State had improved coordination
through an interagency group that it chairs. Further, we noted that
recipient country officials told us that the advisors play a valuable role
in implementing their assistance programs. In addition, we recognized in
the draft report that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and
Sanctions has improved coordination. However, we continue to believe that
interagency coordination has been inadequate and needs to be improved.
State acknowledged this point in its comments and said that a more
coherent, better coordinated approach to providing radiation detection
equipment is needed. The Department concurred with all of our
recommendations and said that it will work with other agencies to
implement them.
In its comments, the Department of Energy*s National Nuclear Security
Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and
effectiveness of U. S.- supplied equipment unless data from the recipient
countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes that sharing
data is critical to the success of the U. S. program and countries*
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the need for a more
uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries* borders. The
Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs that operate in
this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has historically
focused on Russia; the International Export Control program that deals
with equipment that has both civilian and military applications, material
and technology; and a program that uses Department of State funding to
maintain and install equipment outside of Russia. DOE also pointed out
that radiation detection monitors installed by other U. S. agencies are
not as sensitive to special nuclear materials (plutonium and highly
enriched uranium) as the monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no
ability to detect shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE*s point about its
different programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three
separate programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted
the Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE*s primary
Page 28 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE*s comment about the
limitations of equipment installed by other U. S. programs, we recognized
in the draft report that DOE has installed more sophisticated portal
monitors in Russia and that the State Department has installed less
sophisticated equipment in other countries.
The U. S. Customs Service noted that the U. S. government*s
nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but instead
cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including
chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that although our
report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear or radioactive
materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained border inspection
personnel should not be underestimated. Finally, because Customs has been
the largest recipient of funds appropriated for nuclear smuggling
assistance, it suggested that our recommendation be reworded to include
Customs specifically as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
plan to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling. While we agree with
Customs* assertion that U. S. nonproliferation activities are aimed at a
broad range of threats, our review focused only on the nuclear material
smuggling component of this effort. We agree with Customs* point about
highly skilled and trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft
report that training is a critical component and should be part of an
integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded
our recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies
that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries combat
nuclear smuggling.
To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and
expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies
participating in the program* the Departments of Energy, State, and
Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each agency
collects and reports its financial data differently. We attempted to
standardize the reporting format for each agency and verify the accuracy
of the data by crosschecking financial records maintained by each agency.
When we found discrepancies, we brought them to the attention of the
agencies. The agencies* data did not allow us to aggregate cost on a
country- by- country basis because data was generally reported on a
project, not country, basis. Our task was further complicated because the
Department of State, which is responsible for tracking funds it has
received for border security assistance, did not have an adequate
financial management system in place to report program expenditures.
Department Scope and
Methodology
Page 29 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
of State officials responsible for monitoring program expenditures are
aware of this deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current
financial management system.
To assess how well U. S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program
officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed
pertinent documents, including individual agency*s assistance plans, as
available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group headed
by the Department of State and met with the lead official of that effort-
the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions-- and members of
his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with U. S. advisors
stationed in countries receiving U. S. assistance including Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
Several of these advisors were responsible for tracking assistance efforts
in more than one country. For example, the advisor stationed in Latvia was
also responsible for Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.
We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the
effectiveness of the U. S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U. S. radiation detection
equipment installed at different border crossings and meet with officials
responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls. We
also attended a technical conference on radiation detection equipment
sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we met with officials from 13
additional countries that had received U. S. assistance: Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of
Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. We
also met with representatives from the IAEA, the U. S. Mission to
International Organizations in Vienna, and the U. S. embassies in Latvia,
Estonia, Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained
technical information on radiation detection equipment from DOE; Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; the
Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer, TSA Systems Ltd.
We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear
Security
Page 30 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the
Commissioner, U. S. Customs Service; the Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will
make copies available to others upon request.
If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at
(202) 512- 3841. Major contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,
Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis.
Sincerely yours, (Ms.) Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources
and Environment
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 31 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling
incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents
involving weapons- usable nuclear material. The information was obtained
from, among other sources, data provided by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) 1 and the Department of Energy.
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to
IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural
uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, 2 plutonium, and uranium enriched in
the isotopes U- 233 or U- 235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 3 *
known as weapons usable material* are considered to pose the greatest
proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In
1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty- nine countries, or about one-
half of IAEA*s member states, currently participate in the database. As of
December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the
illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons- usable
material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the
information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact
from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking
incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly enriched uranium or
plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons- usable
material occurred during 1993- 95. The remaining cases occurred during
1999- 2001.
IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. officials provided us with information about 20
cases involving the smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992.
Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases involving
weapons- usable material is probably larger than what is currently being
reported because countries are not always willing to share sensitive
1 IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United Nations.
Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to
verify that nuclear material under its supervision or control is not used
to further any military purpose.
2 Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of
products and processes. Handling and disposing of thorium is a challenge
because it is radioactive and produces radon gas when it decays.
3 Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in
the isotope U- 235. Uranium enriched in U- 235 above the level found in
nature (. 071 percent) but less than 20 percent is called low enriched
uranium. Appendix I: Information on Nuclear
Smuggling Incidents Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 32 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the premature public
disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing criminal
investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another factor that
affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of the
information. DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us that a
significant amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular incident
before it can be deemed credible, and many of the reported incidents turn
out to be unsubstantiated. For example, several reported cases over the
years have been scams whereby a *smuggler* has been apprehended trying to
sell material that is purported to be weapons- usable but is not.
Regardless of the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials
stated that the threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not
be underestimated. The head of IAEA*s Office of Physical Protection and
Material Security told us that every reported case should be taken
seriously. Further, she noted that countries need to more systematically
report smuggling incidents so that better assessments can be performed.
Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. agencies provided several
observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons- usable nuclear
material.
Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the
former Soviet Union, primarily Russia. From the early 1990s through
about 1998, the nuclear material was seized
primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past few years,
there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in nuclear material
through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and
Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain whether the increase represents
more trafficking in this material or better detection and reporting of
activities that may have been going on in earlier years. Most of the
smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities of
weapons- usable material that were insufficient to construct a nuclear
bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved may
indicate that that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer with
a *sample size* quantity of material. In other cases, it appears doubtful
that the traffickers had or claimed access to larger quantities of nuclear
material. The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized
criminal or terrorist
activity or organization. In most of the incidents, the weapons- usable
material was seized as a
result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by
equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable
exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 33 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of a
few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or
protected to avoid detection.
Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the
smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of
some of the significant incidents follows the table.
Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons- Usable Material
since 1992 Date Source of material Country where
material seized Material/ quantity How material was found
May 1992 Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association)
Russia 1. 5 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium) Discovered by
police
investigation May 1993 Russia Lithuania 0. 1 kilogram (50 percent highly
enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1993 Russia
Russia 1. 8 kilograms (36 percent highly
enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation November 1993 Russia
Russia 4. 5 kilograms (20 percent highly
enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation March 1994 Russia
Russia 3. 05 kilograms (90 percent
highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1994
Unspecified Germany 0.006 kilograms plutonium- 239 Discovered by police
investigation June 1994 Russia Germany 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent
highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1994
Russia Germany 0.00024 kilograms plutonium Discovered by police
investigation August 1994 Russia Germany 0.4 kilograms of plutonium
Discovered by police
investigation December 1994 Russia Czech Republic 2.7 kilograms (87.7
percent
highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
Russia Czech Republic 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent
highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
Russia Czech Republic 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent
highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
Russia Russia 1. 7 kilograms (21 percent highly
enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1999 Russia
Bulgaria 0. 004 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs. October 1999
Unspecified Kyrgyzstan 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police
investigation April 2000 Unspecified but
Russia suspected Georgia 0. 9 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (30
percent) Possible combination of
radiation detection equipment at border and police investigation September
2000 Possibly Russia
and/ or Ukraine Georgia 0. 0004 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by
police investigation
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 34 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Date Source of material Country where material seized Material/ quantity
How material was found
December 2000 Germany Germany Less than 1 milligram of plutonium
Radioactive contamination
disclosed in a test. January 2001 Unspecified Greece Approximately 0.003
kilograms
of plutonium Discovered by police investigation July 2001 Unspecified
France About 0.005 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium (approximately 80 percent enriched)
Discovered by police investigation
Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U- 235 is considered
weapons- usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand
grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the
weight of a paperclip.
Source: Various U. S. agencies and international organizations.
This incident involved a chemical engineer and long- time employee of the
State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as
Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow. 4 Beginning in May 1992, over
a 5- month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small
quantities of highly enriched uranium totaling 1. 5 kilograms. In October
1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing
equipment from the Luch facility. Once in custody, the police discovered
the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a
specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market
for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and
received 3 years* probation.
In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in a
smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the
production of, among other things, x- ray tubes, lasers, computers,
aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian
authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the
beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kilogram
of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the individuals
involved were aware that the beryllium contained the enriched uranium.
Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated at the Institute of
Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This institute is involved in the
4 This institute is involved in developing space and mobile reactors,
including the TOPAZ reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch has several
tons of weapons- usable material on site. Luch Scientific
Production Association (Russia), 1992
Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 35 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
research and development of nuclear power reactors and employs about 5,000
people and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material.
In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel
rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were for
Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained 36-
percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent or greater is
considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of material totaled
about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Russian security officers
discovered the missing material and apprehended the individuals before the
material left the Murmansk area. One of the individuals arrested was a
guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the material
was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two
Russian naval officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the
two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4
and 5 years.
In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20- percent enriched
uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen
from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk,
Russia. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft,
including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage
for several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The
three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3- 1/ 2- year
sentences while the third person was acquitted.
In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for
trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90
percent. The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal
Production Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The
facility produces low- enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power
reactors and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium for
nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was smuggled out
of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the material were found
inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of individual*s homes.
Murmansk, Russia,
1993 Murmansk, Russia, 1993
St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 36 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 0.006
kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium- 239 in the home of a German
citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of many
components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, broken glass,
and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The presence of mercury in
the mixture suggests that the material may have been used as part of a red
mercury scam. 5 In November 1995, the German national was sentenced to 2-
1/ 2 years in prison for violating arms control laws. The sentence was
added onto a 3- year term he was already serving time for counterfeiting.
In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was
recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, along
with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a result of a
police undercover operation. The material was seized in an undercover
police operation. Three individuals apprehended were citizens of the
Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A German court
sentenced several of the individuals to probationary terms but one of the
group*s leaders was sentenced to 2 years in prison.
In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers intercepted
approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich Airport. It is
believed that the material originated in Russia*s Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering. The institute, which is operated by Russia*s Ministry
of Atomic Energy, is involved in the research and development of nuclear
power reactors and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material. The
material was in a suitcase that had arrived on a flight from Moscow. The
individuals involved in the smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A
German court sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison
and the Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4
years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving
half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had
arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved in
the theft of the material from the institute.
5 According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since 1979.
Red mercury is a material that would- be smugglers have tried to sell
claiming that the material can be used to produce a nuclear weapon.
Tengen, Germany,
1994 Landshut, Germany, 1994
Munich, Germany, 1994
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 37 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized approximately
2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material is believed to have
been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics and Power Engineering.
The individuals involved included a Tajikistan national, a former Russian
nuclear institute worker, and at least one Czech national. The material
was brought into the Czech Republic on a train and then hidden for about 6
months while the individuals involved tried to sell it. They were arrested
after Czech authorities received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave
several members of the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months
to 8 years.
Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the seizure
of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to available
information, the composition of the material and its location were linked
to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In both instances, the small
quantities of material involved indicated that it was a sample that could
be used to attract a potential buyer.
In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border checkpoint
seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
on the Bulgarian/ Romanian border. Rousse is a city that serves as
Bulgaria*s principal river port and is a transportation hub for road and
rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded (lead) container
inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish citizen. The driver
attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and then traveled through
Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned to find a buyer. A
Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling techniques, suspected
that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the driver*s papers revealed a
document describing uranium. When the driver attempted to bribe the
customs officer, his car was thoroughly inspected and the officer
eventually discovered the vial containing the weapons- usable nuclear
material. Bulgarian scientists concluded that the material was highly
enriched uranium. Although the source of the material is not certain, it
is probable that it came from the Mayak Production Association in Russia.
This large complex produces special isotopes used for industrial,
agricultural, and medical purposes and also reprocesses naval and civil
nuclear power reactor fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery. Prague,
Czech
Republic, 1994 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 38 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small
metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item was
analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two
individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.
In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia,
for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly enriched uranium
fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the Black Sea located along
the Georgia- Turkey border. According to one press report, the material
may have been smuggled from Russia. The pellets mass and shape, together
with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced
for use in a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another
report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the
Russian border into Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment
and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended.
It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material
into Turkey.
In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for
attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about
0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched
uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. According
to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security
said that two individuals arrested were Georgian citizens, and the third
was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the uranium and
plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell it.
In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant
removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, deliberately
evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated items, described as
rags and a test tube filled with aging waste material, contained a very
minute amount of plutonium.
In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates buried
in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was determined
to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as americium. According to
one report, the material had been smuggled into Greece either from one of
the countries of the former Soviet Union or Bulgaria. Each plate contained
a small quantity of plutonium but the total amount was about Kara- Balta,
Kyrgyzstan, 1999 Batumi, Georgia, 2000
Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 Germany, 2000 Greece, 2001
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Page 39 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
0.003 kilograms. An official from Greece*s atomic energy commission said
that the quantity of nuclear material found was insufficient to build a
nuclear weapon but the material posed a health hazard. A law enforcement
officer speculated that the individuals who buried the metal plates were
probably waiting for a potential buyer.
In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium and
arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary
reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of
laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the
suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, and
the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to one press
account, French police found the material encased in a glass bulb that was
stored in a lead cylinder. France, 2001
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 40 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
This appendix provides additional information about each of the six
agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.
DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through 2001,
DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program, including
$2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal
monitors at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20 handheld
radiation detectors. The eight border crossings include an airport in
Moscow, six seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight border crossings
are the first of close to 60 sites that DOE has included in the Second
Line of Defense program based on a study in which DOE evaluated the need
for radiation detection equipment at over 300 border crossings in Russia.
DOE prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase
the risk that potential smugglers would use those border crossings to
smuggle nuclear material out of Russia. For example, the study placed a
higher priority on border crossings that are close to Russian facilities
that store weapons- usable nuclear material or to potential markets for
smuggled nuclear material. DOE began work at two additional border
crossings in Russia in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings
in fiscal year 2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in
fiscal year 2002.
DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure that
radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that Russia
is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE uses equipment
manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order to facilitate
equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the Russian contractor
installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at the border crossings to
ensure that the portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration and
calibrated correctly and that they are installed as agreed. For example,
DOE conducted testing in October 2000 and found that some portal monitors
were not configured optimally or calibrated correctly and that some
pedestrian and vehicle crossings did not have radiation detection
equipment. DOE officials said that they withheld final payment for
installation until the contractor submitted evidence showing that any
problems had been resolved.
According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly committed
to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE with good
access to the border crossings where equipment is being installed. For
example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE to participate in
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance
Programs Department of Energy
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 41 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of the portal monitors
provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the truck was transporting
fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In addition, DOE estimated
that Russia spent $300,000 to install 14 pedestrian portal monitors at
another terminal of the airport in Moscow.
DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and spent
$8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program received
$12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations. 1 The State Department
provided a total of $7.5 million to support the Second Line of Defense
program*$ 5.1 million to pay the Russian enterprise that manufactures and
installs the portal monitors and $2.4 million that it provided to DOE. Of
the $5.1 million for the Russian contractor, State spent $2.6 million
through fiscal year 2001. 2 Of the $2.4 million that it received from
State (through the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
program), DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over
$2.3 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.
DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including $2.4
million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of the
former Soviet Union* primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan* to improve
their ability to control the export of goods that could be used in the
development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided under this program
falls into three general categories: export licensing, industry awareness
and compliance, and border enforcement. The export licensing assistance
helps establish the regulations and procedures for issuing licenses to
enterprises that allow them to export their goods and technologies. For
example, DOE is providing Ukraine and Kazakhstan with computerized export
control licensing systems that are specific to nuclear goods. Industry
awareness and compliance consists primarily of workshops for enterprises
that need training in understanding the export control system and
complying with export control laws and regulations. DOE officials estimate
that about 1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of
1 DOE carried over $0. 9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002
and transferred $0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the
International Export Control Program in fiscal year 2001 when DOE made the
Second Line of Defense program part of the Material Protection, Control,
and Accounting program.
2 The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund and $2.1 million from the Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance program. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and manages the entire $5.
1 million in funding.
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 42 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
which are spin- offs of the nuclear weapons complex, need such training.
Border enforcement assistance consists of equipment and training to help
customs officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear- related
good and technologies that require an export license before they can be
exported from the country.
Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program
expenditures by country and source of funding. State*s Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of $4.9
million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which DOE
spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5 million
in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.
Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through Fiscal
Year 2001
Dollars in millions
Country DOE funds State funds Total
Russia $4.6 $0.5 $5.1
Ukraine 2. 1 0.4 2.4
Kazakhstan 1.3 0. 6 1.9
Baltic states < 0.1 0. 2 0.2
Regional/ other 11.7 0. 8 12.5 Total $19.6 $2.4 $22.0
Note: Regional/ other expenditures includes $9. 3 million spent from
fiscal years 1992 through 1997 that DOE was not able to break down by
country.
Source: DOE.
In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the International
Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the Special Technologies
Program to install portal monitors in countries other than Russia with
funding from the State Department Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program also
provided $0.5 million to this office to repair and maintain portal
monitors already installed, but DOE had not spent any of this funding as
of the end of fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million in DOD funds
to support DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, DOE*s
Los Alamos National Laboratory helped to install portal monitors in one
country in the former Soviet Union.
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 43 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling
primarily through two programs* the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
and the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. In
addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program has a
small radiation detection component. State established the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to provide funding for
unexpected needs or opportunities in U. S. nonproliferation efforts. Of
the $115 million the fund received from fiscal year 1994 through 2001,
State spent $8.5 million on assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. State
provided radiation detection equipment and other assistance to 22
countries including vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with x-
ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation
detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. 3 The projects also provided
customs officials and border guards with other equipment such as fiber
optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to detect chemicals
and metals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction, night vision
equipment, and radios.
Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included assessments
of countries* ability to interdict nuclear smuggling, multinational
conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling and techniques for
analyzing seized nuclear material, and course development for hands- on
training in interdicting nuclear smuggling offered at Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory. Although State has begun to consolidate assistance
for combating nuclear smuggling under the Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance program, it continues to provide some
assistance through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. In
particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a $1.3 million
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install vehicle portal
monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to
assist another country upgrade their domestically produced portal monitors
to better detect weapons- usable nuclear material. State also provided
$4.3 million from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to DOE and the
U. S. Customs Service to implement part of the assistance* $3 million to
DOE*s Second Line of Defense Program in Russia, $0.5 million to DOE*s
Special Technologies Program to install the portal
3 The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Department of State
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 44 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to the U. S. Customs Service
to help State provide equipment and training to the recipient countries.
From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated $86.6
million for the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and provided $40.2
million to the U. S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U. S. Coast
Guard, $4.9 million to DOE*s International Export Control Program, $4.5
million to DOE*s Second Line of Defense program, and $0.5 million to DOE*s
Special Technologies Program, which installs and maintains portal monitors
in countries other than Russia on behalf of State. 4 After September 11,
State received an emergency supplemental appropriation of $24.7 million
for the program. State*s own $2.7 million in expenditures included $0.9
million for three vans equipped with radiation detectors and x- ray
machines for Russia, $0.2 million for a van for another country, and $0.4
million to support a multinational conference on export controls and
travel expenses of program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to
hire outside firms to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other
agencies and evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that
State considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict
nuclear smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of
countries receiving U. S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State*s
Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the
program, developed a list of export control system standards by which to
evaluate export control systems in host countries. The standards include
criteria for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict smuggling
using radiation detection equipment at border crossings.
State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act, which
is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union,
and from the Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related
Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for export
control and related border security assistance from fiscal year 1998
through 2001.
4 State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9 million to
Department of Commerce assistance to improve countries* export control
systems and $0.8 million to DOD to update an export control computer
system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided to one
country.
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 45 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001
Dollars in millions
1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs $3.0 $5.0
$14.5 $19.1 $41.6
FREEDOM Support Act 0 0 15.0 21.0 36.0
Other 0 4. 0 5.0 0 9.0
Emergency supplemental appropriation 0 0 0 24.7 24.7 Total $3.0 $9.0 $34.5
$64.8 $111.3
Source: State Department.
In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export
Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State*s Georgia
Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some radiation
detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling. The Georgia
program focuses more broadly on developing the country*s border
infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border including its
seacoast, and strengthening border security against any type of crime such
as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the program is also to
strengthen the country*s border security against nuclear smuggling.
Customs, which manages the program for State, received a total of $71.1
million from State and spent $38.3 million through fiscal year 2001, of
which $0.2 million was for radiation detection equipment including two
portal monitors and 44 handheld radiation detectors.
From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction
program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries. In addition,
DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the U. S. Customs
Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16 million, DOD spent
$1 million on radiation detection equipment including $0.9 million for 36
pedestrian portal monitors and 100 handheld radiation detectors for one
country in the former Soviet Union and $0.1 million for 100 handheld
radiation detectors for another country. The $10.2 million worth of other
equipment that DOD provided consisted a range of items to enable the
countries to better patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled
contraband, and equip their border posts. For example, DOD provided vans
equipped with x- ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to search cargo
to two countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling their
coasts, and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with tools
such as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for a
Department of
Defense
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 46 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
breakdown of expenditures by country and category of assistance to combat
nuclear smuggling.
Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year
2001
Dollars in millions
Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus Georgia Total
Radiation detection equipment 0 0 $0.1 $0.9 0 $1.0
Other equipment 0 $2.3 4. 2 2.6 $1.0 10.2
Program management <0 .1 2.1 0. 4 2.2 0. 1 4.8 Total $< 0.1 $4.4 $4.7 $5.7
$1.1 $16.0
Source: DOD.
DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the
International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and
equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in 17
countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes a
program in cooperation with the U. S. Customs Service, which received $2.1
million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in cooperation
with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/ Customs program provides
instruction on the detection, identification, and investigation of nuclear
smuggling. The training comes with equipment packages that include
radiation pagers and tools for searching persons and vehicles. The DOD/
FBI program provides training and equipment with an emphasis on
investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling incidents.
Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent $0.3
million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one
country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in
cooperation with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which has
begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings. Although
DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country that DOE is
providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense program, DOD has also
worked with that country to develop an indigenous capability to
manufacture and maintain portal monitors.
The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies and
spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on assistance to
combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically: U. S. Customs Service
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 47 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Customs received $40.2 million from State*s Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from fiscal year
1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to 30 countries.
Assistance under this program includes stationing advisors in many of the
countries to help coordinate and implement assistance from all of the
programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs received $0.8 million from
State*s Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal year
1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training to the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.
Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta with funding from the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. Customs received $2.1 million
from DOD*s International
Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year 1997
through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Customs
received $1.1 million from DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction
program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through 1999 for
assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Customs returned
$0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD.
Customs* assistance included radiation pagers that border officials wear
on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to pinpoint
the location of radioactive material that caused a portal monitor alarm.
Customs provided a variety of other high- and low- tech tools ranging from
very basic items such as flashlights and tools for opening containers
where smuggled goods may be hidden to more sophisticated equipment such as
fiber optic scopes for searching fuel tanks. Training includes operation
of the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; hands- on
instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling; techniques for
investigating smuggling operations; tracking the movements of smugglers
who avoid legal border crossings by going through rugged and remote areas
between ports of entry; and *train- the- trainer* courses to enable
countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can reach.
Hands- on training includes a 2- week course at DOE*s Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear materials. Officials from several countries
that have received U. S. assistance told us that the training improved
their border security interdiction and investigation skills and promoted
better understanding of how to operate radiation detection equipment. For
example, one country*s border security and customs personnel told us that
the U. S. Customs Service- sponsored training at Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory was
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 48 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
particularly beneficial because it provided for *hands- on* training to
detect nuclear materials hidden in vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of
U. S. Customs Expenditures.
Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through
Fiscal Year 2001
Funding Expenditures Obligations Balance
State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance $40.2 $8.1
$6.3 $25.8 State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 0.8 0. 6 <0 .1 0.1
DOD International Counterproliferation program 2.1 1. 6 0.2 0. 3 DOD
Cooperative Threat Reduction 1.1 0. 7 0 0. 3
Total $44.2 $11.1 $6.5 $26.5
Source: U. S. Customs Service.
Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard received $4.4
million from the State Department Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide assistance
for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of the former
Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that amount in one
country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a Coast Guard
advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the Coast Guard
provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted funds for
assistance to four other countries.
The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet Union
and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International
Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the FBI
travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI*s only
expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the training
courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received approximately $1
million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal year 2001, FBI
assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for high- level
government officials on weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation at
the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. In fiscal
year 2001, the FBI began providing additional courses with more detailed
training geared toward the law enforcement officers who investigate and
respond to smuggling incidents. One of the new courses, U. S. Coast Guard
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs
Page 49 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
which the DOD/ FBI effort had provided only to one country as of the end
of fiscal year 2001, trains law enforcement and emergency management
personnel through practical exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or
other smuggled material. As part of the course, the DOD/ FBI effort
provides equipment packages worth $240, 000 to outfit three 30- man
response teams with a variety of equipment including HAZMAT suits to
facilitate the safe handling of seized material, evidence collection and
sampling kits, chemical detection equipment, and also radiation pagers.
(The FBI originally planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000,
but it increased the amount of equipment because it received additional
funding from DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year
2001 include crime scene management and crisis management, which trains
different government agencies to work together to respond to a smuggling
incident.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Page 50 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Page 51 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Page 52 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State
Page 53 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 54 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy
Page 55 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service
Page 56 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service
(360093)
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists
to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to
help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government
for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and
other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and
funding decisions. GAO*s commitment to good government is reflected in its
core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost
is through the Internet. GAO*s Web site (www. gao. gov) contains abstracts
and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding
archive of older products. The Web site features a search engine to help
you locate documents using key words and phrases. You can print these
documents in their entirety, including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as *Today*s Reports,* on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full- text document files.
To have GAO e- mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www. gao. gov
and select *Subscribe to daily E- mail alert for newly released products*
under the GAO Reports heading.
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more
copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should
be sent to:
U. S. General Accounting Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM Washington, D. C.
20548
To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512- 6000 TDD: (202) 512- 2537 Fax: (202)
512- 6061
Contact: Web site: www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail:
fraudnet@ gao. gov Automated answering system: (800) 424- 5454 or (202)
512- 7470
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@ gao. gov (202) 512- 4800 U.
S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D. C.
20548 GAO*s Mission
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony
Order by Mail or Phone To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal
Programs
Public Affairs
*** End of document. ***