    Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries
    Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and
    Planning (16-MAY-02, GAO-02-426).

    The worldwide trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material has
    reportedly increased in recent years. The International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit
    trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases
    reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce
    a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a
    wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's
    border through various means. Many nuclear smuggling cases have
    been traced to nuclear material that originated in the former
    Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of
    Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program,
    has helped them secure nuclear material at civilian and defense
    facilities--the first line of defense against potential theft and
    diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by
    nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries
    improve their border security--a second line of defense--but
    these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. U.S. efforts
    to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal
    agencies--the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S.
    Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the
    U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001,
    the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly
    in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat
    the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials. GAO found that U.S.
    assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
    governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group,
    chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S.
    assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing
    assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this
    group. The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued
    separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment
    at other countries' border crossings; consequently, some
    countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear
    smuggling than others. U.S. assistance is generally helping
    countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive
    materials, but serious problems with installing, using, and
    maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S.
    efforts. These and other problems have largely resulted from a
    lack of agency oversight and follow-up.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-426
        ACCNO:   A03084
      TITLE:     Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other
    Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination
    and Planning
         DATE:   05/16/2002
      SUBJECT:   Federal aid to foreign countries
    	     Interagency relations
    	     International relations
    	     Nuclear proliferation
    	     Nuclear weapons
    	     Smuggling
    	     Central Europe
    	     Dept. of State Export Control and
    	     Related Border Security Assistance
    	     Program

    	     Dept. of State Georgia Border Security
    	     and Law Enforcement Program

    	     DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
    	     DOD International Counterproliferation
    	     Program

    	     DOE International Export Control Program
    	     DOE Material Protection, Control, and
    	     Accounting Program

    	     DOE Second Line of Defense Program
    	     Eastern Europe
    	     Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
    	     Soviet Union

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    GAO-02-426

       Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
       and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

       United States General Accounting Office

       GAO

       May 2002 NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

       U. S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
       Strengthened Coordination and Planning

       GAO- 02- 426

       Page i GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Letter 1

       Results in Brief 2 Background 4 U. S. Government Has Spent about $86
       Million to Help Countries

       Combat Nuclear Smuggling 6 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
       Lacks a Coordinated

       Approach 11 U. S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear
       Smuggling,

       but Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts 15 Conclusions 24
       Recommendations 25 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 Scope and
       Methodology 28

       Appendix I Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents 31 Incidents
       Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material 31 Luch Scientific Production
       Association (Russia), 1992 34 Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993 34 Murmansk,
       Russia, 1993 35 Murmansk, Russia, 1993 35 St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994 35
       Tengen, Germany, 1994 36 Landshut, Germany, 1994 36 Munich, Germany, 1994
       36 Prague, Czech Republic, 1994 37 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999 37 Kara- Balta,
       Kyrgyzstan, 1999 38 Batumi, Georgia, 2000 38 Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 38
       Germany, 2000 38 Greece, 2001 38 France, 2001 39

       Appendix II U. S. Government Assistance Programs 40 Department of Energy
       40 Department of State 43 Department of Defense 45 U. S. Customs Service
       46 U. S. Coast Guard 48 Federal Bureau of Investigation 48 Contents

       Page ii GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Appendix
       III Comments from the Department of State 50

       Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 54

       Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 56

       Tables

       Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
       Fiscal Year 2001 9 Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-
       Usable

       Material since 1992 33 Table 3: International Export Control Program
       Expenditures

       through Fiscal Year 2001 42 Table 4: Export Control and Related Border
       Security Assistance

       Program Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001 45 Table 5: Cooperative Threat
       Reduction Expenditures through

       Fiscal Year 2001 46 Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by
       Funding Source,

       through Fiscal Year 2001 48

       Figures

       Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors 16 Figure 2: Typical Handheld
       Radiation Detector Used by Border

       Guards 17 Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van 18 Figure 4: U. S.-
       Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport

       in Moscow 19

       Page 1 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       May 16, 2002 The Honorable Pat Roberts Ranking Minority Member,
       Subcommittee on Emerging Threats

       and Capabilities Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

       Dear Senator Roberts: Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and
       other radioactive materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased
       in recent years. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 1
       (IAEA), as of December 31, 2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of
       illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. (See app. I for more
       information about nuclear smuggling cases.) A significant number of the
       cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a
       nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with
       radioactive material (* dirty bomb*) to spread radioactive contamination
       over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country*s
       border through a variety of means: it can be hidden in a car, train, or
       ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport, or walked across an
       unprotected border.

       Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that
       originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States,
       through the Department of Energy*s Material Protection, Control, and
       Accounting (MPC& A) program, 2 has helped these countries secure nuclear
       material at civilian and defense facilities* this effort is considered the
       first line of defense against potential theft and/ or diversion of nuclear

       1 IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member states,
       including the United States. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful
       use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material under its
       supervision or control is not used to further any military purpose. 2 This
       review will only focus on U. S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling at
       countries* borders. We recently reported on the Department of Energy*s
       MPC& A program and found that the program is reducing the risk of theft of
       nuclear material but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still
       lack improved security systems and are vulnerable to theft. See Nuclear
       Nonproliferation: Security of Russia*s Nuclear Material Improving; Further
       Enhancements Needed (GAO- 01- 312, Feb. 28, 2001).

       United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

       Page 2 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United
       States is helping these countries improve their border security* a second
       line of defense* but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. 3
       For example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14
       countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical
       proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

       As agreed with your office, this report addresses U. S. efforts to combat
       nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U. S. federal programs tasked
       with combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and
       the amount of U. S. funding spent on this effort; (2) determining how well
       the U. S. assistance is coordinated among federal agencies; and (3)
       assessing the effectiveness of the equipment and training provided by the
       United States. We visited four countries to obtain a first hand look at U.
       S. radiation detection equipment installed at different border crossings
       and meet with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement,
       and export controls.

       U. S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six
       federal agencies* the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S.
       Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U. S.
       Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six
       agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the
       former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of
       smuggling of nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of
       mass destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance,
       including radiation detection equipment and training, technical exchanges
       to promote the development and enforcement of laws and regulations
       governing the export of nuclear- related equipment and technology, and
       other equipment and training to generally improve countries* ability to
       interdict nuclear smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two
       programs to combat nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia.
       Energy has installed radiation detection monitors at eight border
       crossings, including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar
       equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has
       provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with

       3 While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear smuggling, a
       portion of the assistance is intended to improve countries* ability to
       interdict any weapons smuggling* nuclear, chemical, biological, and
       conventional. Results in Brief

       Page 3 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance to
       about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of
       Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided radiation detection
       monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20 countries.
       With funding provided by the Departments of State and Defense, the U. S.
       Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U. S. Coast
       Guard have provided a variety of training and equipment to customs, border
       guard, and law enforcement officials in numerous countries.

       U. S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall
       governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by
       the State Department, exists to coordinate U. S. assistance efforts, the
       six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their
       efforts through this group. As a result, the Departments of Energy, State,
       and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
       detection equipment at other countries* border crossings; consequently,
       some countries* border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling
       than others. Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing
       equipment at border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is
       installing equipment in another country that is better able to detect
       weapons- usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed
       less sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries.
       Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the
       Department of Energy*s Second Line of Defense program does not coordinate
       its efforts with another office within the Department that also provides
       radiation detection equipment because that office receives funding from
       and installs equipment on behalf of the State Department. Officials of the
       Departments of State, Energy, and Defense have acknowledged that U. S.
       assistance efforts lack adequate planning and need better coordination
       among all the agencies. In addition, these officials told us that the
       roles and responsibilities of each agency in the overall U. S. assistance
       effort should be better clarified. This report makes recommendations to
       improve the planning and coordination of U. S. assistance to combat
       nuclear smuggling.

       While U. S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling
       of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems with
       installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have
       undermined U. S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient countries told
       us that U. S. assistance has provided needed radiation detection equipment
       at border sites and training for border security guards and other law
       enforcement personnel. Without U. S. assistance, some countries would not
       have any radiation detection equipment at their borders or training in

       Page 4 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and people and investigate nuclear
       smuggling cases. In other countries, U. S. assistance has bolstered
       existing nuclear smuggling detection programs. We observed at border sites
       in countries we visited that U. S.- provided equipment was working and was
       being used for the purposes intended. However, we also found serious
       problems with some of the equipment provided to various countries. For
       example, about one- half of the stationary radiation detection monitors
       funded by the Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet
       Union was never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could not
       be accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the State
       Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U. S. embassy
       for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the department and the
       recipient country about the need for a power supply line costing $12,600.
       These and other problems are largely a result of the lack of oversight and
       follow- up by the agencies providing the assistance. U. S. officials are
       attempting to correct some of these problems by, among other things,
       stationing advisors in countries receiving U. S. assistance. Another
       problem affecting U. S. assistance efforts is that recipient countries do
       not systematically report incidents of nuclear material detected at their
       borders, which limits the ability of U. S. agencies to measure the
       effectiveness of the equipment they are providing. This report makes
       several recommendations designed to improve management of U. S.- provided
       radiation detection equipment and to secure recipient country assurances
       that information about detected nuclear materials is shared in a timely
       basis.

       We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
       Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
       the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
       Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
       technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
       The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the report and State
       specifically said that it agreed with the report*s conclusions and
       recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our recommendation to
       specifically include it as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
       plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we did. DOE did not comment on the
       conclusions and recommendations.

       Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention to
       the threat that unsecured weapons- usable nuclear material in the
       countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be stolen
       and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking weapons of mass
       destruction. Background

       Page 5 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear
       weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons- usable material when it
       collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in
       nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
       1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States responded to
       the threat by providing assistance to increase security at numerous
       nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia, in
       order to prevent weapons- usable nuclear material from being stolen. In
       addition, the United States has provided portal monitors (stationary
       equipment designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians
       or vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors at border crossings
       in many countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
       Europe. The equipment, which is installed at car and truck crossings,
       railroad crossings, seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes:
       deterring smugglers from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting
       cases of actual nuclear smuggling.

       Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in
       medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological
       treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring radiation
       such as fertilizer, and* of primary concern in terms of nonproliferation*
       nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Nuclear material
       includes radioactive source materials-- such as natural uranium, low
       enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial nuclear power reactors, and
       plutonium and highly enriched uranium-- that are key components of nuclear
       weapons. The capability of the equipment to detect nuclear material
       depends on a number of factors including the amount of material, the size
       of the detection device, and whether the material is shielded from
       detection. For example, a small amount of material shielded by a lead
       container would likely escape detection while a large amount of material
       with no shielding would be more likely to cause an alarm. Detecting actual
       cases of illicit trafficking in weapons- usable nuclear material is
       complicated because one of the materials that is of greatest concern in
       terms of proliferation* highly enriched uranium* is among the most
       difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of
       radioactivity. In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources,
       which could be used in a radiological dispersion device or *dirty bomb,*
       are highly radioactive and therefore easier to detect. Because of the
       complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs officers or border
       guards who are responsible for operating the equipment must also be
       trained in how to use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source
       of an alarm, identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit
       nuclear smuggling.

       Page 6 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140
       million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear smuggling
       in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the former Soviet
       Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The
       Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four other agencies,
       and some agencies have carried over millions of dollars in program funds
       into fiscal year 2002 because they have received more funding than they
       have been able to spend.

       The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service;
       the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U. S. Coast Guard have
       provided assistance to about 30 countries* customs, border, and law
       enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear
       smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of
       assistance that the U. S. agencies are providing. Other equipment ranges
       from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different
       compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles for
       conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands- on instruction
       in using the equipment and conducting searches to high- level technical
       exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory basis for preventing
       illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods and materials that could
       be used in a nuclear weapon. U. S. assistance began in the mid- 1990s
       under DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and then expanded to
       State, DOE, and other DOD programs.

       While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their assistance
       programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive their funding from
       State and/ or DOD. DOE also receives part of its funding from State.

       DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
       material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
       International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of Defense
       Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to Russia. From
       fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million, including $2.7
       million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal monitors at
       eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport. DOE has identified
       close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to install portal monitors over
       the next decade at a total cost of about $50 million and has begun work at
       19 of these sites. In addition, DOE may expand the program beyond Russia
       to include other countries of the former Soviet Union. DOE*s International
       Export Control Program spent $22 million, including U. S. Government Has

       Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       U. S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies

       Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in
       Delivering U. S. Assistance

       Page 7 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       $2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal year 1992 through 2001 to help
       countries of the former Soviet Union control the export of goods and
       technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.
       Whereas the Second Line of Defense program focuses on the nuclear material
       needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the other high-
       technology components needed for a bomb such as equipment for enriching
       uranium. The program provides assistance to prevent legitimate
       enterprises, such as businesses that were affiliated with the Soviet
       Union*s nuclear weapons complex, from intentionally or unintentionally
       engaging in illicit trade in such goods and technologies. DOE also spent
       $1.8 million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear
       smuggling.

       The State Department has received the largest amount of funding through
       the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear smuggling in
       about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and
       Eastern Europe. State spent $11. 4 million primarily through two programs*
       the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and
       Related Border Security Assistance program. Through the Nonproliferation
       and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1994
       through 2001 to, among other things, install portal monitors in countries
       other than Russia. In addition, State provided handheld radiation
       detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels of radiation), and mobile vans
       equipped with x- ray machines and radiation detectors that can be driven
       among a number of border crossings. From fiscal year 1998 through 2001,
       State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program
       spent $2.7 million to, among other things, purchase three vans equipped
       with radiation detectors for Russia and another van for Poland. State*s
       Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (implemented by
       Customs) also spent $0.2 million to provide radiation detection equipment
       as part of its assistance to strengthen Georgia*s overall border
       infrastructure and security against any type of crime, including nuclear
       material smuggling. State also provided $58.8 million to DOE, Customs, and
       the Coast Guard to fund their assistance activities.

       DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two
       programs* the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the International
       Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to 2001, the
       Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to assist five
       countries. The assistance included $1 million for radiation detection
       equipment* 36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen people) and 100
       handheld radiation detectors for one country and an additional 100

       Page 8 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       handheld detectors for another country* and about $10 million for other
       equipment to enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct
       searches for smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. In
       addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, in fiscal
       year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National
       Laboratory to install seven portal monitors at three border crossings in
       another country. DOD has begun site surveys at about eight additional
       border crossings in that country where it plans to install portal
       monitors. As part of the International Counterproliferation program, DOD
       spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs
       and FBI training and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union
       and Central and Eastern Europe.

       The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
       State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on
       assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided training and
       equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close to 30 countries.
       The equipment includes radiation pagers (small detectors that can be worn
       on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels or used as a handheld
       device to pinpoint the location of radioactive material detected by a
       portal monitor) as well as a variety of other high- and low- tech tools to
       conduct searches and detect sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber
       optic scopes for examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes
       assistance in operating the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors;
       providing hands- on instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear
       smuggling; teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations;
       tracking the movements of smugglers between ports of entry, including
       through rough terrain; and providing *train- the- trainer* courses to
       enable countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can
       reach. In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22
       incountry advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help
       implement and coordinate the assistance.

       From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part of
       the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/ FBI effort
       trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate and respond
       to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. Training
       included seminars for high- level officials and courses on conducting
       investigations and managing a crime scene where a seizure has taken place.
       Equipment provided as part of the training included protective equipment,
       such as HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized material safer; evidence
       collection and sampling kits; and chemical detection equipment. In U. S.
       Customs Service,

       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U. S. Coast Guard Implement
       Assistance with Funding from the Departments of State and Defense

       Page 9 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       addition, the FBI recently expanded the equipment list to include
       radiation pagers.

       From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard spent $1.6
       million in funding received from the State Department Export Control and
       Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has provided
       assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of
       the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one country includes two
       boats with spare parts and stationing of an in- country Coast Guard
       advisor.

       Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal year
       2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For additional
       details about each of the six agencies* programs and expenditures, see
       appendix II.

       Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through
       Fiscal Year 2001

       Dollars in millions

       Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
       source

       DOE Second Line of Defense Install radiation detection portal monitors at
       Russian border

       crossings. $11.2 Includes $8.5 million in DOE funds and $2.7 million from
       State DOE International Export Control Program

       Provide nuclear- specific export control assistance to countries of the
       former Soviet Union. 22.0 Includes $19.6 million in

       DOE funds and $2.4 million from State DOE Install radiation detection
       equipment in countries of the

       former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central and Eastern Europe.

       1.8 Includes $0.5 million from State and $1. 3 million from DOD State
       Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund

       Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
       interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
       Eastern Europe.

       8.5 State Dept. Export Control & Related Border Security Assistance

       Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance for
       interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and
       Eastern Europe. (Took over Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund radiation
       detection assistance beginning in FY 2002.)

       2.7 State Dept. Georgia Border Security & Law Enforcement

       Provide wide range of assistance to Georgia border guards and customs
       service to interdict nuclear smuggling, fight other crimes such as drug
       smuggling, and develop border infrastructure.

       0.2 DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Provide radiation detection equipment
       and other assistance

       for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5 countries, and install radiation
       detection portal monitors in one country.

       16.3 DOD International Counterproliferation program

       Train and equip customs officers, border guards, and law enforcement
       officials to detect, interdict, and respond to nuclear smuggling.

       10.2

       Page 10 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Dollars in millions

       Programs/ activities Program/ activity description Expenditures Funding
       source

       U. S. Customs Service Train and equip customs officers and border guards
       in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to detect and
       interdict nuclear smuggling.

       11.1 Includes $8.8 million from State and $2. 3 million from DOD Federal
       Bureau of Investigation Train and equip law enforcement officials in the
       former Soviet

       Union and Central and Eastern Europe to investigate and respond to nuclear
       smuggling incidents.

       0.4 Includes $0.4 million from DOD

       U. S. Coast Guard Provide assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear
       smuggling. 1.6 Includes $1.6 million from

       State

       Total $86.1

       Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U. S. Customs Service,
       U. S. Coast Guard, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

       Funding for State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
       program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in fiscal year 1998
       to $40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due to the rapid increase,
       some agencies receiving funds from State have carried over millions of
       dollars in program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have received
       more funding than they have been able to spend. For example, Customs*
       program expenditures have not kept pace with its growth in funding, and it
       carried over $33.1 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002,
       including $6.5 million in obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in
       funds that had not been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed
       the carryover to not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal
       year and not obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which
       the assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and
       State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides the
       funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3 year
       period.

       After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental
       appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that they
       have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for assistance
       (including detection equipment) to six countries. Some Agencies*

       Expenditures Have Not Kept Pace with Growth in Funding

       Page 11 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Because U. S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of
       Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing
       other countries* border crossings, with the result that some countries*
       border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
       While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at
       border sites in Russia and another country, the State Department has
       installed less sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In
       addition, no governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs
       together, which exacerbates the coordination problems.

       The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat
       nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency group
       chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes representatives
       from all the U. S. programs that are providing assistance, meets about
       once a month to discuss such issues as funding and financial management of
       the agencies* various programs, upcoming assistance activities, and
       results of program personnel*s recent trips to recipient countries. In
       addition, program managers of the various agencies work together to
       implement the programs. For example, DOD officials said that they
       regularly meet with Customs and FBI program managers to implement
       assistance and that they participate in the FBI and Customs training
       courses that DOD funds.

       A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since
       State established a separate office in November 2000* the Office of Export
       Control Cooperation and Sanctions* to manage and coordinate U. S.
       assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs to
       station 22 in- country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are
       responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six agencies
       within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the advisors play an
       important role in implementing their programs. In addition, the new office
       has assumed responsibility for much of the Nonproliferation and
       Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear smuggling. For instance,
       the office has taken over responsibility for providing and maintaining
       radiation detection equipment to countries other than Russia.

       Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the
       overall U. S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling;
       consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without always
       coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For example, DOD
       installed portal monitors at three sites in one country of the former
       Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the interagency U. S.
       Assistance to

       Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated Approach

       Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate

       Page 12 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       group learned of the project. According to a DOD official, the project was
       coordinated with other State Department officials. Similarly, although
       State provides its radiation detection assistance through DOE, the DOE
       office that works with State is completely separate from the Second Line
       of Defense program, and a Second Line of Defense official said that his
       program and the other office do not communicate with each other. According
       to the official, a few years ago the two offices were discussing the
       possibility of merging, but the discussions ended after a new director
       took over the other office even though Second Line of Defense officials
       still believe that the two offices should be merged. Even within the State
       Department, different offices implement their programs without full
       coordination. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
       approved a project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing
       that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take
       over State*s radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at
       State has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
       program even though one of the objectives of the program is to strengthen
       Georgia*s ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally, even though it
       funds much of the assistance provided by other agencies, State could not
       provide accurate information on the other agencies* program expenditures
       during the course of our review. For example, State*s records did not
       match Customs* financial data on expenditures of funds provided to Customs
       by State. State officials said that they have now developed a financial
       database to track how the other agencies have spent State*s funds.

       In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the
       appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself as
       the agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting policy, a
       DOD official said that State does not have the necessary expertise or
       resources to manage the overall U. S. effort. In contrast, DOE officials
       said that State should have a lead role in coordination and diplomatic
       support for the assistance programs and that DOE would depend on State to
       establish the diplomatic basis that would allow the Second Line of Defense
       program to expand into other countries. However, DOE officials questioned
       whether State and DOD are the appropriate agencies for installing portal
       monitors in countries other than Russia.

       Page 13 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have
       installed portal monitors that have different levels of capability to
       detect weapons- usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings
       more vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE and
       DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border sites in
       Russia and another country, State has installed less sophisticated portal
       monitors in other countries. In addition, in the mid- 1990s, the DOD
       Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided less sophisticated portal
       monitors to another country in the former Soviet Union.

       The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation*
       gamma and neutron* whereas the portal monitors installed by State and the
       DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma radiation. The
       ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a greater ability to
       detect weapons- usable plutonium, one of the materials of greatest concern
       in terms of nonproliferation. In addition, according to DOE officials, due
       to their configuration and sensitivity the State Department portal
       monitors are less likely to detect small quantities of highly enriched
       uranium, the other material that is of greatest nonproliferation concern,
       or material that is shielded, for example by a lead container or certain
       parts of a vehicle. DOE*s office that installs the portal monitors on
       behalf of State acknowledged that the less sophisticated portal monitors
       have a limited capability to detect weapons- usable nuclear material and
       said that the portal monitors serve mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In
       addition, DOE and DOD have taken different approaches even though the two
       agencies have installed the same Russian- manufactured portal monitors.
       For example, DOE officials said that the Second Line of Defense program
       has calibrated the monitors in Russia to detect a smaller quantity of
       material than the monitors installed by DOD in another country. In
       contrast, a DOD official said that DOE*s approach runs the risk of a high
       rate of false alarms, which can lead to complacency among officials in
       charge of responding to alarms.

       State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
       said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of their
       lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in maintaining
       sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack even the basic
       infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors, such as a source
       of electricity. Because of the different circumstances existing in each
       country, State officials said that radiation detection assistance should
       be tailored to each country*s needs. The Director of State*s Office of
       Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that State is reevaluating
       its approach to providing radiation detection equipment, Ineffective
       Coordination

       Has Resulted in Some Border Crossings Being More Vulnerable to Nuclear
       Smuggling Than Others

       Page 14 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       including installing better equipment where appropriate. Second Line of
       Defense officials expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal
       monitors at border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to
       countries seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense
       officials said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE
       would replace State*s portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment if
       the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and
       perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower- priority sites. Overall,
       Second Line of Defense officials said that the U. S. government assistance
       to provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and lacks a single,
       coherent approach and that the portal monitors should meet a minimum
       standard for detecting weapons- usable nuclear material.

       The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing
       handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and State,
       the U. S. Customs Service has provided customs and border officials with
       radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
       provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation pagers, and DOE
       officials said that they view the pagers as personal safety devices that
       are ineffective at detecting weapons- usable nuclear material. According
       to State and Customs officials, pagers are a useful part of a radiation
       detection system at border crossings. Customs officials also said that
       pagers are just one part of a multi- layered radiation detection system
       used by border personnel.

       No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies* programs together
       through common goals and objectives, strategies and time frames for
       providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating the
       effectiveness of assistance. The in- country customs advisors have
       developed country- specific plans, and DOD has developed a plan for its
       International Counterproliferation program that includes threat
       assessments and a prioritization of countries into three levels of weapons
       of mass destruction proliferation risk in the context of border security
       and customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has developed a list of close to
       60 border crossings where it plans to install radiation detection
       equipment as part of the Second Line of Defense program and estimated the
       cost and timeframe for completing the program. On the other hand, the
       State Department has no plan for providing radiation detection equipment
       that details how many portal monitors it plans to install, in what
       countries, and at which border crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies
       have not developed a joint assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and
       the best mix and location of radiation detection equipment to address the
       threat. Need Exists for Plan to

       Guide U. S. Assistance Efforts

       Page 15 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       While DOE conducted an in- depth assessment of the smuggling threat to
       prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal monitors,
       State and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to prioritize the
       countries or border crossings to which they are providing radiation
       detection equipment. Numerous agency officials acknowledged that the U. S.
       effort to improve countries* ability to combat nuclear smuggling lacks
       adequate planning. For example, the director of State*s Office of Export
       Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that ideally the U. S. government
       would have a process for determining how much funding to allocate to each
       country and what to spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official said
       that the U. S. effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership and
       a redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome
       coordination issues.

       U. S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous
       countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
       Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
       However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and
       maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U. S. efforts.
       These problems are largely the result of the lack of oversight and follow-
       up by some of the U. S. agencies providing the equipment. Another problem
       is that many countries that have received radiation detection equipment
       are not reporting information about nuclear materials detected by U. S.-
       supplied equipment. Recently, the United States began stationing advisors
       in many of the countries receiving the assistance to, among other things,
       correct equipment problems.

       Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U. S. assistance to combat
       nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much needed
       radiation detection equipment and training. According to officials from
       several countries, U. S.- supplied portal monitors installed at border
       crossings and handheld detection equipment represent the only assistance
       of this type that their countries have received. In other countries the U.
       S. assistance has supplemented equipment and training received from other
       countries. For example, Latvia has received radiation detection equipment
       from Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received
       equipment from Finland and Germany.

       In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw that a
       U. S.- furnished portal monitor and U. S.- supplied handheld detectors and
       radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and other materials. U.
       S. Assistance Has

       Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, but Problems with Equipment
       Undermine Efforts

       Recipient Country Officials Cite Benefits of U. S. Assistance

       Page 16 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       According to this country*s officials, the U. S.- supplied portal monitors
       installed at several border crossings are well- maintained and serviced
       regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U. S. equipment in that country.

       Figure 1: U. S.- Installed Portal Monitors

       Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors.

       Page 17 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards

       In another country we visited, we saw a U. S. Customs Service- furnished
       mobile x- ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to inspect
       luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia A few hours
       later, the van was driven to another crossing point along the border where
       passengers and their possessions were screened at a train station.
       Passengers* bags and other personal items were passed through an x- ray
       machine that was part of the van*s screening apparatus. Occasionally, the
       border guard who was operating the x- ray machine would examine the
       contents of the items that had been x- rayed to determine their exact
       content. Figure 3 shows the x- ray van.

       Page 18 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Figure 3: U. S.- Supplied Mobile X- Ray Van

       Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
       funded by DOE*s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
       Russia*s plans to improve border security. According to these officials,
       as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of
       Russia*s 300 portal monitors. The U. S.- funded equipment is manufactured
       in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing conducted by DOE
       national laboratory personnel. This testing is designed to ensure that
       portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize
       detection capability) and that the equipment is being used as intended.
       According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE on
       ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment. Russian
       customs officials also told us that DOE has done a very credible job of
       making follow- up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it is
       recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.

       During our visit to Russia, we observed several U. S.- funded pedestrian
       portal monitors that were installed at Moscow*s Sheremetyevo Airport (see
       fig. 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment and a

       Page 19 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to
       the portal monitors. DOE*s detection equipment installed throughout Russia
       is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian officials tested the
       equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. They *planted** with our
       knowledge* a radioactive source in an attache case that we carried past a
       pedestrian portal monitor, which activated an alarm. A computer screen in
       the control room displayed our movements past the portal monitor.

       Figure 4: U. S.- Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in
       Moscow

       U. S. assistance includes training, which U. S. and recipient country
       officials told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to
       combat nuclear smuggling. This approach should include equipment,
       training, and intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training is
       a critical component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example, border
       personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques, laboratory
       specialists need to be able to analyze and properly identify material that
       is detected and law enforcement officials need to be able to conduct
       investigations in order to prosecute, when appropriate, individuals
       apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U. S. agencies have trained more

       Page 20 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       than 3,500 border security and law enforcement personnel in a broad range
       of weapons of mass destruction interdiction programs. The U. S. Customs
       Service trained over 2, 970 customs and law enforcement officers from more
       than 25 countries during 1996- 2001, and the FBI trained approximately 600
       foreign country personnel during a similar period. DOE has funded the
       development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300 customs officers to
       help identify equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear weapon. In
       addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs Academy, implemented a
       mobile training program that provides training to customs agents in remote
       locations.

       U. S. agency officials provided several examples to show how U. S.-
       provided equipment and training have strengthened countries* ability to
       detect and deter nuclear smuggling.

        In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country detected
       radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across the border.
       According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at the border
       crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the incident occurred.
        According to DOE officials, U. S. equipment in Russia has detected more

       than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases include
       contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive
       materials that could pose a proliferation concern.  In 1999, customs
       officials in a country that had received DOD/ Customs

       training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for smuggled nuclear
       materials seized weapons- usable material that had been hidden inside the
       trunk of a car. According to U. S. Customs officials, this case shows the
       importance of providing training that combines general border inspection
       techniques with specialized training in nuclear materials.

       We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection
       equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the U.
       S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a DOE
       office responsible for installing portal monitors in some countries, U. S.
       assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked effective followup to
       ensure that equipment delivered was properly maintained and used for the
       purposes intended. Several officials told us that there has been
       inadequate funding for maintenance and training on the use of the
       equipment in many countries of the former Soviet Union. U. S. officials
       frequently described this practice as *drop and run.* A State Department
       official told us that it had always been the responsibility of the
       recipient countries to alert the United States when equipment needed to be
       Problems with Equipment

       Undermine U. S. Assistance Efforts

       Page 21 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       repaired. This official noted, however, that country officials did not
       systematically report problems and, as a result, malfunctioning equipment
       was sometimes left unrepaired for extended periods of time. He also noted
       that until recently there was no consolidated list of all the equipment
       that different agencies had provided. He compiled such a list but could
       not be certain that all equipment provided under DOD*s Cooperative Threat
       Reduction program was included.

       At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information
       about problems with U. S.- supplied equipment. He noted that audits found
       that detection equipment in several countries had never been used and
       remained in storage; expensive high- technology equipment was only used in
       the presence of visiting U. S. delegations; and equipment was going unused
       because it needed battery replacement, very minor repairs, or major
       repairs that required out- of- country servicing. The DOD official noted
       that recipient country officials offered numerous reasons why the
       equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, including (1) the
       equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was trained to use it; (3)
       the equipment would be broken; (4) use of the equipment could cause
       injuries; (5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no funds had been provided
       for new batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge about where or how to send
       the equipment for repairs.

       During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with U. S.
       radiation detection equipment provided to many countries, including the
       following examples, which are based on, among other things, discussions
       with U. S. program officials and representatives of countries receiving U.
       S. assistance:

        The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border
       crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as
       deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a November
       2001 U. S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted that according to
       a customs official from this recipient country, the portal monitors were
       not being used because they emitted too much radiation and posed a health
       and safety hazard. According to a U. S. official, the incident indicates
       how little some recipient country officials know about the equipment,
       because the portal monitors do not emit radiation. In addition, based on a
       recent inventory, a U. S. official was unable to locate many radiation
       pagers furnished to that country. In another country, the whereabouts of
       several dozen handheld radiation detectors could not be determined.

       Page 22 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

        About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country in
       the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not operational.
       Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
       then they could use. In addition, the equipment had limited capability to
       detect nuclear material.  Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were
       stored in the U. S. embassy

       basement for about 2 years because the State Department and the Lithuanian
       border organization disagreed about the need for a power supply that cost
       $12,600 to operate the equipment. In February 2002, the monitors were
       finally installed.  Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation
       protection suits and

       pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/ FBI training
       program because an agreement governing the release of such equipment had
       not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an embassy garage for
       about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia in December 2001.  A
       portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a couple

       of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not expected to open
       for another 1- 1/ 2 years. Plans are underway to relocate the equipment.
       In November 2001, a U. S. official visited a border crossing in one
       country

       of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been disconnected.
       Country officials told him that it had been shut off because it was
       lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The monitor is
       designed to be operated continuously.

       We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation
       detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have
       limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold climates
       or are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some countries. For
       example, customs officials from one country told us that the vans (which
       had a total cost of about $900,000) they received within the last 2 years
       had to be moved to a warmer part of the country. Nevertheless, they told
       us that the vans could only be operated about 9 months each year and that
       even when operational, they are very fuel inefficient. Officials from
       another country told us the van they received about 1 year ago has rarely
       been used because of the cold weather and the expense associated with its
       operation. They said that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at
       customs* headquarters.

       In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many of
       the countries receiving U. S. assistance to improve program effectiveness.
       These advisors, generally retired U. S. Customs Service officials, are
       responsible for, among other things, developing, coordinating, and Country
       Advisors Trying to

       Improve Delivery of U. S. Assistance

       Page 23 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       updating recipient country border security requirements. In addition, they
       seek to ensure that the appropriate foreign officials attend training
       courses; track the assistance that countries receive from various programs
       to avoid duplication of equipment; meet with government ministries in the
       recipient countries; and inventory equipment and determine how it is being
       used, including assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using
       the advisors to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine
       maintenance and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds
       them, the advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD
       officials said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing
       their assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that
       the advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and
       resolving problems with equipment.

       According to DOE, State, and other U. S. officials, in many cases
       countries that have received U. S. radiation detection equipment are not
       systematically providing information about nuclear materials detected by
       U. S.- supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to determine the
       overall impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While agencies are
       receiving feedback on the performance level of equipment, such as whether
       the equipment is properly calibrated or performing according to technical
       specifications, limited information is provided about the impact of the
       equipment* namely to what extent is it detecting weapons- usable and other
       types of radioactive material. Two U. S. advisors told us that recipient
       country officials have ignored their requests for this type of
       information. An official from DOE*s office that installs portal monitors
       in some countries told us that his program does not have the means to
       verify the effectiveness of portal monitors due to the lack of incident
       reporting by some countries. He noted that information about nuclear
       smuggling cases varies from country to country and depends on good
       relationships between the recipient country*s border security organization
       and the U. S. embassy. Officials from DOE*s Second Line of Defense program
       told us that they receive information about incidents from their Russian
       counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not
       consistent and they are not confident that there has been a complete
       sharing of information about nuclear materials detected with U. S.- funded
       equipment. DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of information as
       part of an overall agreement with Russia on the Second Line of Defense
       program.

       In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other factors
       that impact U. S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including
       corruption in countries* border organizations and the amount of territory,
       including Lack of Consistent

       Reporting Hampers U. S. Efforts to Measure Impact of Radiation Detection
       Equipment

       Other Challenges to Border Security

       Page 24 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       borders that are not clearly marked, that requires protection. According
       to officials from several recipient countries, corruption is a pervasive
       problem within the ranks of border security organizations. For example,
       approximately 1,500 Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for
       corruption. Russian customs officials noted that efforts are underway to
       root corruption out but that this is a slow process. An official from one
       country told us that border security personnel turned off radiation
       detection equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of
       alcohol. In fiscal year 2002, the U. S. Customs Service started providing
       a new anti- corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by
       the expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us
       that it is impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country has
       green borders* expanses of territory that are not patrolled or regulated
       by border security personnel. These areas are very attractive to smugglers
       in general. In addition, borders are not always clearly marked or well
       established following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. A high-
       level official from one country*s border guard told us that the biggest
       problem he faces is the lack of agreement with Russia over boundaries.
       Furthermore, a border security official from another country told us that
       a dedicated nuclear smuggler has a 90- percent chance of successfully
       defeating his country*s border controls. A customs official from Russia
       told us that equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained
       border personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering
       operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating
       nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at
       civilian and military facilities.

       The current multiple- agency approach to providing U. S. assistance to
       combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way to
       deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U. S. agencies
       participating in these programs and activities have not been well
       coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort to
       effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess recipient
       country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within agencies
       providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are two offices
       within the Department of Energy that are providing radiation detection
       equipment and two offices within the Department of State that have funded
       similar types of equipment for various countries. To ensure the efficient
       and effective delivery of assistance and the timely and effective
       expenditure of program funds, we believe that the development of a
       governmentwide plan is needed. Such a plan could identify a unified set of
       program goals and priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities;
       Conclusions

       Page 25 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       determine program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively
       spending program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the
       operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country
       receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
       equipment maintenance to the countries.

       We are also concerned about how U. S. equipment is being used by the
       recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U. S.- provided
       equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive material, some
       equipment has not been well maintained, adequately accounted for, or
       installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue surrounding nuclear
       smuggling is the sharing of information about incidents that occur in each
       country. Currently, the agencies that are providing the equipment have
       limited access to this type of information. There is currently no
       systematic effort to obtain this data, and the United States depends on
       the willingness of the countries to voluntary provide information. It is
       difficult to assess the impact and effectiveness of the U. S.- supplied
       equipment unless data are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that
       U. S. agency personnel must continue to make the case to each country that
       sharing such data is of critical importance to the success of the U. S.
       program and countries* efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

       We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating the
       development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries develop an
       integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan should be
       developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy
       (working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
       Administration), and the Commissioner of the U. S. Customs Service, as
       well as the heads of other federal agencies participating in this effort.
       The plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified set of program goals
       and priorities, including defining participating agencies* roles and
       responsibilities; (2) overall program cost estimates; (3) time frames for
       effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures; (5)
       strategies to maintain and sustain the operation of the equipment,
       including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country
       receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for
       equipment maintenance to the host country.

       In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are other
       steps that could be taken immediately to improve U. S. efforts. We think
       that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative or
       overlapping Recommendations

       Page 26 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a single agency
       program office. To that end, we recommend that the

        Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
       National Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation detection
       equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within the Second Line
       of Defense program and  Secretary of State consolidate all border
       security and nuclear smuggling

       efforts under one program office. In addition, we recommend that the
       Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the
       National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Secretaries of State and
       Defense

        strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that is
       in each country, including the handheld radiation detection equipment;
       ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is adequately

       maintained; and  seek recipient country assurances that information about
       nuclear

       materials detected by U. S.- supplied equipment is shared with U. S.
       agencies on a timely basis.

       We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,
       Energy, and Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and
       the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The
       Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided
       technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.
       State*s, DOE*s, and Customs Service*s written comments are presented in
       appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies agreed with the
       facts presented in the report and State specifically said that it agreed
       with the report*s conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that
       we reword our recommendation to specifically include it as one of the
       agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE
       did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.

       In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that
       interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling
       can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per our
       recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the development of a
       governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment and maintenance
       support. State also commented, however, that the report gave insufficient
       weight to the progress that has been made in the past 1- 1/2 years to
       improve Agency Comments

       and Our Evaluation

       Page 27 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       coordination and planning. Specifically, State cited its establishment of
       the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is
       responsible for, among other things, managing and coordinating U. S.
       government export control and related border security programs. In
       addition, the Office chairs an interagency working group that evaluates,
       prioritizes, and approves projects that U. S. agencies undertake to
       improve countries* export control and related border security
       capabilities. The Department also stated that it has taken steps to
       improve internal coordination as well as accountability for equipment
       previously provided to other countries and noted that the country advisors
       play a prominent role in these matters. Regarding these points, we
       recognized in the draft report that State had improved coordination
       through an interagency group that it chairs. Further, we noted that
       recipient country officials told us that the advisors play a valuable role
       in implementing their assistance programs. In addition, we recognized in
       the draft report that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and
       Sanctions has improved coordination. However, we continue to believe that
       interagency coordination has been inadequate and needs to be improved.
       State acknowledged this point in its comments and said that a more
       coherent, better coordinated approach to providing radiation detection
       equipment is needed. The Department concurred with all of our
       recommendations and said that it will work with other agencies to
       implement them.

       In its comments, the Department of Energy*s National Nuclear Security
       Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and
       effectiveness of U. S.- supplied equipment unless data from the recipient
       countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes that sharing
       data is critical to the success of the U. S. program and countries*
       efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the need for a more
       uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries* borders. The
       Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs that operate in
       this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has historically
       focused on Russia; the International Export Control program that deals
       with equipment that has both civilian and military applications, material
       and technology; and a program that uses Department of State funding to
       maintain and install equipment outside of Russia. DOE also pointed out
       that radiation detection monitors installed by other U. S. agencies are
       not as sensitive to special nuclear materials (plutonium and highly
       enriched uranium) as the monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no
       ability to detect shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE*s point about its
       different programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three
       separate programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted
       the Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE*s primary

       Page 28 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE*s comment about the
       limitations of equipment installed by other U. S. programs, we recognized
       in the draft report that DOE has installed more sophisticated portal
       monitors in Russia and that the State Department has installed less
       sophisticated equipment in other countries.

       The U. S. Customs Service noted that the U. S. government*s
       nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but instead
       cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including
       chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that although our
       report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear or radioactive
       materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained border inspection
       personnel should not be underestimated. Finally, because Customs has been
       the largest recipient of funds appropriated for nuclear smuggling
       assistance, it suggested that our recommendation be reworded to include
       Customs specifically as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide
       plan to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling. While we agree with
       Customs* assertion that U. S. nonproliferation activities are aimed at a
       broad range of threats, our review focused only on the nuclear material
       smuggling component of this effort. We agree with Customs* point about
       highly skilled and trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft
       report that training is a critical component and should be part of an
       integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded
       our recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies
       that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries combat
       nuclear smuggling.

       To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and
       expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies
       participating in the program* the Departments of Energy, State, and
       Defense; the U. S. Customs Service; the U. S. Coast Guard; and the Federal
       Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each agency
       collects and reports its financial data differently. We attempted to
       standardize the reporting format for each agency and verify the accuracy
       of the data by crosschecking financial records maintained by each agency.
       When we found discrepancies, we brought them to the attention of the
       agencies. The agencies* data did not allow us to aggregate cost on a
       country- by- country basis because data was generally reported on a
       project, not country, basis. Our task was further complicated because the
       Department of State, which is responsible for tracking funds it has
       received for border security assistance, did not have an adequate
       financial management system in place to report program expenditures.
       Department Scope and

       Methodology

       Page 29 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       of State officials responsible for monitoring program expenditures are
       aware of this deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current
       financial management system.

       To assess how well U. S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program
       officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed
       pertinent documents, including individual agency*s assistance plans, as
       available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group headed
       by the Department of State and met with the lead official of that effort-
       the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions-- and members of
       his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with U. S. advisors
       stationed in countries receiving U. S. assistance including Azerbaijan,
       Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
       Several of these advisors were responsible for tracking assistance efforts
       in more than one country. For example, the advisor stationed in Latvia was
       also responsible for Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.

       We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the
       effectiveness of the U. S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
       and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U. S. radiation detection
       equipment installed at different border crossings and meet with officials
       responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls. We
       also attended a technical conference on radiation detection equipment
       sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we met with officials from 13
       additional countries that had received U. S. assistance: Azerbaijan,
       Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of
       Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. We
       also met with representatives from the IAEA, the U. S. Mission to
       International Organizations in Vienna, and the U. S. embassies in Latvia,
       Estonia, Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained
       technical information on radiation detection equipment from DOE; Lawrence
       Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National Laboratory; the
       Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer, TSA Systems Ltd.

       We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance with
       generally accepted government auditing standards.

       As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
       earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
       after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this
       report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear
       Security

       Page 30 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the
       Commissioner, U. S. Customs Service; the Director, Federal Bureau of
       Investigation; the Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard; the Director, Office of
       Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will
       make copies available to others upon request.

       If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at
       (202) 512- 3841. Major contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,
       Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis.

       Sincerely yours, (Ms.) Gary L. Jones Director, Natural Resources

       and Environment

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 31 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling
       incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents
       involving weapons- usable nuclear material. The information was obtained
       from, among other sources, data provided by the International Atomic
       Energy Agency (IAEA) 1 and the Department of Energy.

       Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit
       trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to
       IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural
       uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, 2 plutonium, and uranium enriched in
       the isotopes U- 233 or U- 235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 3 *
       known as weapons usable material* are considered to pose the greatest
       proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In
       1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit
       trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty- nine countries, or about one-
       half of IAEA*s member states, currently participate in the database. As of
       December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the
       illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons- usable
       material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the
       information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact
       from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking
       incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly enriched uranium or
       plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons- usable
       material occurred during 1993- 95. The remaining cases occurred during
       1999- 2001.

       IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. officials provided us with information about 20
       cases involving the smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992.
       Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases involving
       weapons- usable material is probably larger than what is currently being
       reported because countries are not always willing to share sensitive

       1 IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United Nations.
       Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to
       verify that nuclear material under its supervision or control is not used
       to further any military purpose.

       2 Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of
       products and processes. Handling and disposing of thorium is a challenge
       because it is radioactive and produces radon gas when it decays.

       3 Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in
       the isotope U- 235. Uranium enriched in U- 235 above the level found in
       nature (. 071 percent) but less than 20 percent is called low enriched
       uranium. Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

       Smuggling Incidents Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 32 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the premature public
       disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing criminal
       investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another factor that
       affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of the
       information. DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us that a
       significant amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular incident
       before it can be deemed credible, and many of the reported incidents turn
       out to be unsubstantiated. For example, several reported cases over the
       years have been scams whereby a *smuggler* has been apprehended trying to
       sell material that is purported to be weapons- usable but is not.
       Regardless of the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials
       stated that the threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not
       be underestimated. The head of IAEA*s Office of Physical Protection and
       Material Security told us that every reported case should be taken
       seriously. Further, she noted that countries need to more systematically
       report smuggling incidents so that better assessments can be performed.

       Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U. S. agencies provided several
       observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons- usable nuclear
       material.

        Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the
       former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.  From the early 1990s through
       about 1998, the nuclear material was seized

       primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past few years,
       there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in nuclear material
       through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and
       Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain whether the increase represents
       more trafficking in this material or better detection and reporting of
       activities that may have been going on in earlier years.  Most of the
       smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities of

       weapons- usable material that were insufficient to construct a nuclear
       bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved may
       indicate that that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer with
       a *sample size* quantity of material. In other cases, it appears doubtful
       that the traffickers had or claimed access to larger quantities of nuclear
       material.  The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized
       criminal or terrorist

       activity or organization.  In most of the incidents, the weapons- usable
       material was seized as a

       result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by
       equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable
       exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 33 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of a
       few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or
       protected to avoid detection.

       Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the
       smuggling of weapons- usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of
       some of the significant incidents follows the table.

       Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons- Usable Material
       since 1992 Date Source of material Country where

       material seized Material/ quantity How material was found

       May 1992 Russia (Luch Scientific Production Association)

       Russia 1. 5 kilograms (90 percent highly enriched uranium) Discovered by
       police

       investigation May 1993 Russia Lithuania 0. 1 kilogram (50 percent highly

       enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1993 Russia
       Russia 1. 8 kilograms (36 percent highly

       enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation November 1993 Russia
       Russia 4. 5 kilograms (20 percent highly

       enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation March 1994 Russia
       Russia 3. 05 kilograms (90 percent

       highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1994
       Unspecified Germany 0.006 kilograms plutonium- 239 Discovered by police

       investigation June 1994 Russia Germany 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent

       highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation July 1994
       Russia Germany 0.00024 kilograms plutonium Discovered by police

       investigation August 1994 Russia Germany 0.4 kilograms of plutonium
       Discovered by police

       investigation December 1994 Russia Czech Republic 2.7 kilograms (87.7
       percent

       highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
       Russia Czech Republic 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent

       highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
       Russia Czech Republic 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent

       highly enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation June 1995
       Russia Russia 1. 7 kilograms (21 percent highly

       enriched uranium) Discovered by police investigation May 1999 Russia
       Bulgaria 0. 004 kilograms of highly

       enriched uranium Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs. October 1999
       Unspecified Kyrgyzstan 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police

       investigation April 2000 Unspecified but

       Russia suspected Georgia 0. 9 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (30
       percent) Possible combination of

       radiation detection equipment at border and police investigation September
       2000 Possibly Russia

       and/ or Ukraine Georgia 0. 0004 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by
       police investigation

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 34 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Date Source of material Country where material seized Material/ quantity
       How material was found

       December 2000 Germany Germany Less than 1 milligram of plutonium
       Radioactive contamination

       disclosed in a test. January 2001 Unspecified Greece Approximately 0.003
       kilograms

       of plutonium Discovered by police investigation July 2001 Unspecified
       France About 0.005 kilograms of highly

       enriched uranium (approximately 80 percent enriched)

       Discovered by police investigation

       Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U- 235 is considered
       weapons- usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand
       grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the
       weight of a paperclip.

       Source: Various U. S. agencies and international organizations.

       This incident involved a chemical engineer and long- time employee of the
       State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as
       Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow. 4 Beginning in May 1992, over
       a 5- month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small
       quantities of highly enriched uranium totaling 1. 5 kilograms. In October
       1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing
       equipment from the Luch facility. Once in custody, the police discovered
       the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a
       specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market
       for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and
       received 3 years* probation.

       In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in a
       smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the
       production of, among other things, x- ray tubes, lasers, computers,
       aircraft parts, nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian
       authorities seized the material, they discovered that some of the
       beryllium (141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kilogram
       of highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the individuals
       involved were aware that the beryllium contained the enriched uranium.
       Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated at the Institute of
       Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This institute is involved in the

       4 This institute is involved in developing space and mobile reactors,
       including the TOPAZ reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch has several
       tons of weapons- usable material on site. Luch Scientific

       Production Association (Russia), 1992

       Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 35 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       research and development of nuclear power reactors and employs about 5,000
       people and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material.

       In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel
       rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were for
       Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained 36-
       percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent or greater is
       considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of material totaled
       about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Russian security officers
       discovered the missing material and apprehended the individuals before the
       material left the Murmansk area. One of the individuals arrested was a
       guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the material
       was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught implicated two
       Russian naval officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing trial only the
       two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 4
       and 5 years.

       In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20- percent enriched
       uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen
       from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk,
       Russia. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft,
       including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage
       for several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The
       three individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3- 1/ 2- year
       sentences while the third person was acquitted.

       In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for
       trying to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90
       percent. The material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal
       Production Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The
       facility produces low- enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power
       reactors and also has the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium for
       nuclear powered icebreakers and submarines. The material was smuggled out
       of the facility and approximately 500 grams of the material were found
       inside a glass jar in a refrigerator in one of individual*s homes.
       Murmansk, Russia,

       1993 Murmansk, Russia, 1993

       St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 36 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 0.006
       kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium- 239 in the home of a German
       citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of many
       components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, broken glass,
       and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The presence of mercury in
       the mixture suggests that the material may have been used as part of a red
       mercury scam. 5 In November 1995, the German national was sentenced to 2-
       1/ 2 years in prison for violating arms control laws. The sentence was
       added onto a 3- year term he was already serving time for counterfeiting.

       In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was
       recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, along
       with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a result of a
       police undercover operation. The material was seized in an undercover
       police operation. Three individuals apprehended were citizens of the
       Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A German court
       sentenced several of the individuals to probationary terms but one of the
       group*s leaders was sentenced to 2 years in prison.

       In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers intercepted
       approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich Airport. It is
       believed that the material originated in Russia*s Institute of Physics and
       Power Engineering. The institute, which is operated by Russia*s Ministry
       of Atomic Energy, is involved in the research and development of nuclear
       power reactors and possesses several tons of weapons- usable material. The
       material was in a suitcase that had arrived on a flight from Moscow. The
       individuals involved in the smuggling case were from Colombia and Spain. A
       German court sentenced the Colombian national to almost 5 years in prison
       and the Spanish nationals received prison sentences of between 3 and 4
       years. All of the individuals were expelled from Germany after serving
       half of their sentences. By February 1996, Russian authorities had
       arrested several Russian accomplices, including a key figure involved in
       the theft of the material from the institute.

       5 According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since 1979.
       Red mercury is a material that would- be smugglers have tried to sell
       claiming that the material can be used to produce a nuclear weapon.
       Tengen, Germany,

       1994 Landshut, Germany, 1994

       Munich, Germany, 1994

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 37 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized approximately
       2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material is believed to have
       been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics and Power Engineering.
       The individuals involved included a Tajikistan national, a former Russian
       nuclear institute worker, and at least one Czech national. The material
       was brought into the Czech Republic on a train and then hidden for about 6
       months while the individuals involved tried to sell it. They were arrested
       after Czech authorities received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave
       several members of the group prison sentences ranging from about 18 months
       to 8 years.

       Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the seizure
       of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to available
       information, the composition of the material and its location were linked
       to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In both instances, the small
       quantities of material involved indicated that it was a sample that could
       be used to attract a potential buyer.

       In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border checkpoint
       seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
       on the Bulgarian/ Romanian border. Rousse is a city that serves as
       Bulgaria*s principal river port and is a transportation hub for road and
       rail traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded (lead) container
       inside the trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish citizen. The driver
       attempted to sell the material first in Turkey and then traveled through
       Bulgaria on his way to Romania, where he planned to find a buyer. A
       Bulgarian customs agent, using standard profiling techniques, suspected
       that the driver was a smuggler. A search of the driver*s papers revealed a
       document describing uranium. When the driver attempted to bribe the
       customs officer, his car was thoroughly inspected and the officer
       eventually discovered the vial containing the weapons- usable nuclear
       material. Bulgarian scientists concluded that the material was highly
       enriched uranium. Although the source of the material is not certain, it
       is probable that it came from the Mayak Production Association in Russia.
       This large complex produces special isotopes used for industrial,
       agricultural, and medical purposes and also reprocesses naval and civil
       nuclear power reactor fuel for plutonium and uranium recovery. Prague,
       Czech

       Republic, 1994 Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 38 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small
       metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item was
       analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two
       individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.

       In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia,
       for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly enriched uranium
       fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the Black Sea located along
       the Georgia- Turkey border. According to one press report, the material
       may have been smuggled from Russia. The pellets mass and shape, together
       with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced
       for use in a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another
       report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the
       Russian border into Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment
       and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended.
       It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material
       into Turkey.

       In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for
       attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about
       0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched
       uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. According
       to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security
       said that two individuals arrested were Georgian citizens, and the third
       was from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the uranium and
       plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell it.

       In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant
       removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, deliberately
       evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated items, described as
       rags and a test tube filled with aging waste material, contained a very
       minute amount of plutonium.

       In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates buried
       in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was determined
       to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as americium. According to
       one report, the material had been smuggled into Greece either from one of
       the countries of the former Soviet Union or Bulgaria. Each plate contained
       a small quantity of plutonium but the total amount was about Kara- Balta,

       Kyrgyzstan, 1999 Batumi, Georgia, 2000

       Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 Germany, 2000 Greece, 2001

       Appendix I: Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents

       Page 39 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       0.003 kilograms. An official from Greece*s atomic energy commission said
       that the quantity of nuclear material found was insufficient to build a
       nuclear weapon but the material posed a health hazard. A law enforcement
       officer speculated that the individuals who buried the metal plates were
       probably waiting for a potential buyer.

       In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium and
       arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary
       reports, the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of
       laboratory analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the
       suspects had recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, and
       the other two reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to one press
       account, French police found the material encased in a glass bulb that was
       stored in a lead cylinder. France, 2001

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 40 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       This appendix provides additional information about each of the six
       agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.

       DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear
       material smuggling* the Second Line of Defense program and the
       International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through 2001,
       DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program, including
       $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal
       monitors at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20 handheld
       radiation detectors. The eight border crossings include an airport in
       Moscow, six seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight border crossings
       are the first of close to 60 sites that DOE has included in the Second
       Line of Defense program based on a study in which DOE evaluated the need
       for radiation detection equipment at over 300 border crossings in Russia.
       DOE prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase
       the risk that potential smugglers would use those border crossings to
       smuggle nuclear material out of Russia. For example, the study placed a
       higher priority on border crossings that are close to Russian facilities
       that store weapons- usable nuclear material or to potential markets for
       smuggled nuclear material. DOE began work at two additional border
       crossings in Russia in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings
       in fiscal year 2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in
       fiscal year 2002.

       DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure that
       radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that Russia
       is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE uses equipment
       manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order to facilitate
       equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the Russian contractor
       installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at the border crossings to
       ensure that the portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration and
       calibrated correctly and that they are installed as agreed. For example,
       DOE conducted testing in October 2000 and found that some portal monitors
       were not configured optimally or calibrated correctly and that some
       pedestrian and vehicle crossings did not have radiation detection
       equipment. DOE officials said that they withheld final payment for
       installation until the contractor submitted evidence showing that any
       problems had been resolved.

       According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly committed
       to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE with good
       access to the border crossings where equipment is being installed. For
       example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE to participate in
       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance

       Programs Department of Energy

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 41 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of the portal monitors
       provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the truck was transporting
       fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In addition, DOE estimated
       that Russia spent $300,000 to install 14 pedestrian portal monitors at
       another terminal of the airport in Moscow.

       DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and spent
       $8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program received
       $12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations. 1 The State Department
       provided a total of $7.5 million to support the Second Line of Defense
       program*$ 5.1 million to pay the Russian enterprise that manufactures and
       installs the portal monitors and $2.4 million that it provided to DOE. Of
       the $5.1 million for the Russian contractor, State spent $2.6 million
       through fiscal year 2001. 2 Of the $2.4 million that it received from
       State (through the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
       program), DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over
       $2.3 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

       DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including $2.4
       million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of the
       former Soviet Union* primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan* to improve
       their ability to control the export of goods that could be used in the
       development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided under this program
       falls into three general categories: export licensing, industry awareness
       and compliance, and border enforcement. The export licensing assistance
       helps establish the regulations and procedures for issuing licenses to
       enterprises that allow them to export their goods and technologies. For
       example, DOE is providing Ukraine and Kazakhstan with computerized export
       control licensing systems that are specific to nuclear goods. Industry
       awareness and compliance consists primarily of workshops for enterprises
       that need training in understanding the export control system and
       complying with export control laws and regulations. DOE officials estimate
       that about 1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of

       1 DOE carried over $0. 9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002
       and transferred $0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the
       International Export Control Program in fiscal year 2001 when DOE made the
       Second Line of Defense program part of the Material Protection, Control,
       and Accounting program.

       2 The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation and
       Disarmament Fund and $2.1 million from the Export Control and Related
       Border Security Assistance program. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament
       Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and manages the entire $5.
       1 million in funding.

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 42 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       which are spin- offs of the nuclear weapons complex, need such training.
       Border enforcement assistance consists of equipment and training to help
       customs officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear- related
       good and technologies that require an export license before they can be
       exported from the country.

       Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program
       expenditures by country and source of funding. State*s Export Control and
       Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of $4.9
       million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which DOE
       spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5 million
       in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

       Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through Fiscal
       Year 2001

       Dollars in millions

       Country DOE funds State funds Total

       Russia $4.6 $0.5 $5.1

       Ukraine 2. 1 0.4 2.4

       Kazakhstan 1.3 0. 6 1.9

       Baltic states < 0.1 0. 2 0.2

       Regional/ other 11.7 0. 8 12.5 Total $19.6 $2.4 $22.0

       Note: Regional/ other expenditures includes $9. 3 million spent from
       fiscal years 1992 through 1997 that DOE was not able to break down by
       country.

       Source: DOE.

       In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the International
       Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the Special Technologies
       Program to install portal monitors in countries other than Russia with
       funding from the State Department Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.
       State*s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program also
       provided $0.5 million to this office to repair and maintain portal
       monitors already installed, but DOE had not spent any of this funding as
       of the end of fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million in DOD funds
       to support DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, DOE*s
       Los Alamos National Laboratory helped to install portal monitors in one
       country in the former Soviet Union.

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 43 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling
       primarily through two programs* the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
       and the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. In
       addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program has a
       small radiation detection component. State established the
       Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to provide funding for
       unexpected needs or opportunities in U. S. nonproliferation efforts. Of
       the $115 million the fund received from fiscal year 1994 through 2001,
       State spent $8.5 million on assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. State
       provided radiation detection equipment and other assistance to 22
       countries including vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with x-
       ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation
       detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers. 3 The projects also provided
       customs officials and border guards with other equipment such as fiber
       optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to detect chemicals
       and metals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction, night vision
       equipment, and radios.

       Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included assessments
       of countries* ability to interdict nuclear smuggling, multinational
       conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling and techniques for
       analyzing seized nuclear material, and course development for hands- on
       training in interdicting nuclear smuggling offered at Pacific Northwest
       National Laboratory. Although State has begun to consolidate assistance
       for combating nuclear smuggling under the Export Control and Related
       Border Security Assistance program, it continues to provide some
       assistance through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. In
       particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a $1.3 million
       Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install vehicle portal
       monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to
       assist another country upgrade their domestically produced portal monitors
       to better detect weapons- usable nuclear material. State also provided
       $4.3 million from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to DOE and the
       U. S. Customs Service to implement part of the assistance* $3 million to
       DOE*s Second Line of Defense Program in Russia, $0.5 million to DOE*s
       Special Technologies Program to install the portal

       3 The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
       Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
       Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey,
       Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Department of State

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 44 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to the U. S. Customs Service
       to help State provide equipment and training to the recipient countries.

       From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated $86.6
       million for the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
       program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and provided $40.2
       million to the U. S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U. S. Coast
       Guard, $4.9 million to DOE*s International Export Control Program, $4.5
       million to DOE*s Second Line of Defense program, and $0.5 million to DOE*s
       Special Technologies Program, which installs and maintains portal monitors
       in countries other than Russia on behalf of State. 4 After September 11,
       State received an emergency supplemental appropriation of $24.7 million
       for the program. State*s own $2.7 million in expenditures included $0.9
       million for three vans equipped with radiation detectors and x- ray
       machines for Russia, $0.2 million for a van for another country, and $0.4
       million to support a multinational conference on export controls and
       travel expenses of program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to
       hire outside firms to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other
       agencies and evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that
       State considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict
       nuclear smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of
       countries receiving U. S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State*s
       Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the
       program, developed a list of export control system standards by which to
       evaluate export control systems in host countries. The standards include
       criteria for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict smuggling
       using radiation detection equipment at border crossings.

       State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border
       Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act, which
       is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union,
       and from the Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related
       Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for export
       control and related border security assistance from fiscal year 1998
       through 2001.

       4 State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9 million to
       Department of Commerce assistance to improve countries* export control
       systems and $0.8 million to DOD to update an export control computer
       system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program provided to one
       country.

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 45 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program
       Funding, Fiscal Year 1998- 2001

       Dollars in millions

       1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

       Nonproliferation, Anti- Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs $3.0 $5.0
       $14.5 $19.1 $41.6

       FREEDOM Support Act 0 0 15.0 21.0 36.0

       Other 0 4. 0 5.0 0 9.0

       Emergency supplemental appropriation 0 0 0 24.7 24.7 Total $3.0 $9.0 $34.5
       $64.8 $111.3

       Source: State Department.

       In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export
       Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State*s Georgia
       Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some radiation
       detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling. The Georgia
       program focuses more broadly on developing the country*s border
       infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border including its
       seacoast, and strengthening border security against any type of crime such
       as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the program is also to
       strengthen the country*s border security against nuclear smuggling.
       Customs, which manages the program for State, received a total of $71.1
       million from State and spent $38.3 million through fiscal year 2001, of
       which $0.2 million was for radiation detection equipment including two
       portal monitors and 44 handheld radiation detectors.

       From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction
       program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries. In addition,
       DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the U. S. Customs
       Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16 million, DOD spent
       $1 million on radiation detection equipment including $0.9 million for 36
       pedestrian portal monitors and 100 handheld radiation detectors for one
       country in the former Soviet Union and $0.1 million for 100 handheld
       radiation detectors for another country. The $10.2 million worth of other
       equipment that DOD provided consisted a range of items to enable the
       countries to better patrol their borders, conduct searches for smuggled
       contraband, and equip their border posts. For example, DOD provided vans
       equipped with x- ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to search cargo
       to two countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling their
       coasts, and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with tools
       such as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for a
       Department of

       Defense

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 46 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       breakdown of expenditures by country and category of assistance to combat
       nuclear smuggling.

       Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year
       2001

       Dollars in millions

       Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus Georgia Total

       Radiation detection equipment 0 0 $0.1 $0.9 0 $1.0

       Other equipment 0 $2.3 4. 2 2.6 $1.0 10.2

       Program management <0 .1 2.1 0. 4 2.2 0. 1 4.8 Total $< 0.1 $4.4 $4.7 $5.7
       $1.1 $16.0

       Source: DOD.

       DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the
       International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and
       equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in 17
       countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes a
       program in cooperation with the U. S. Customs Service, which received $2.1
       million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in cooperation
       with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/ Customs program provides
       instruction on the detection, identification, and investigation of nuclear
       smuggling. The training comes with equipment packages that include
       radiation pagers and tools for searching persons and vehicles. The DOD/
       FBI program provides training and equipment with an emphasis on
       investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling incidents.

       Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent $0.3
       million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one
       country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in
       cooperation with DOE*s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which has
       begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings. Although
       DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country that DOE is
       providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense program, DOD has also
       worked with that country to develop an indigenous capability to
       manufacture and maintain portal monitors.

       The U. S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by
       State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies and
       spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on assistance to
       combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically: U. S. Customs Service

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 47 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

        Customs received $40.2 million from State*s Export Control and Related
       Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from fiscal year
       1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to 30 countries.
       Assistance under this program includes stationing advisors in many of the
       countries to help coordinate and implement assistance from all of the
       programs to combat nuclear smuggling.  Customs received $0.8 million from
       State*s Nonproliferation and

       Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal year
       1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training to the
       Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.
       Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta with funding from the
       Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.  Customs received $2.1 million
       from DOD*s International

       Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year 1997
       through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia,
       Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,
       Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  Customs
       received $1.1 million from DOD*s Cooperative Threat Reduction

       program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through 1999 for
       assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Customs returned
       $0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD.

       Customs* assistance included radiation pagers that border officials wear
       on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to pinpoint
       the location of radioactive material that caused a portal monitor alarm.
       Customs provided a variety of other high- and low- tech tools ranging from
       very basic items such as flashlights and tools for opening containers
       where smuggled goods may be hidden to more sophisticated equipment such as
       fiber optic scopes for searching fuel tanks. Training includes operation
       of the x- ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; hands- on
       instruction in using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling; techniques for
       investigating smuggling operations; tracking the movements of smugglers
       who avoid legal border crossings by going through rugged and remote areas
       between ports of entry; and *train- the- trainer* courses to enable
       countries to train more personnel than the U. S. assistance can reach.
       Hands- on training includes a 2- week course at DOE*s Pacific Northwest
       National Laboratory on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass
       destruction, including nuclear materials. Officials from several countries
       that have received U. S. assistance told us that the training improved
       their border security interdiction and investigation skills and promoted
       better understanding of how to operate radiation detection equipment. For
       example, one country*s border security and customs personnel told us that
       the U. S. Customs Service- sponsored training at Pacific Northwest
       National Laboratory was

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 48 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       particularly beneficial because it provided for *hands- on* training to
       detect nuclear materials hidden in vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of
       U. S. Customs Expenditures.

       Table 6: U. S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through
       Fiscal Year 2001

       Funding Expenditures Obligations Balance

       State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance $40.2 $8.1
       $6.3 $25.8 State Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 0.8 0. 6 <0 .1 0.1
       DOD International Counterproliferation program 2.1 1. 6 0.2 0. 3 DOD
       Cooperative Threat Reduction 1.1 0. 7 0 0. 3

       Total $44.2 $11.1 $6.5 $26.5

       Source: U. S. Customs Service.

       Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U. S. Coast Guard received $4.4
       million from the State Department Export Control and Related Border
       Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide assistance
       for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of the former
       Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that amount in one
       country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a Coast Guard
       advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the Coast Guard
       provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted funds for
       assistance to four other countries.

       The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet Union
       and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International
       Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the FBI
       travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI*s only
       expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the training
       courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received approximately $1
       million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal year 2001, FBI
       assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for high- level
       government officials on weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation at
       the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. In fiscal
       year 2001, the FBI began providing additional courses with more detailed
       training geared toward the law enforcement officers who investigate and
       respond to smuggling incidents. One of the new courses, U. S. Coast Guard

       Federal Bureau of Investigation

       Appendix II: U. S. Government Assistance Programs

       Page 49 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       which the DOD/ FBI effort had provided only to one country as of the end
       of fiscal year 2001, trains law enforcement and emergency management
       personnel through practical exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or
       other smuggled material. As part of the course, the DOD/ FBI effort
       provides equipment packages worth $240, 000 to outfit three 30- man
       response teams with a variety of equipment including HAZMAT suits to
       facilitate the safe handling of seized material, evidence collection and
       sampling kits, chemical detection equipment, and also radiation pagers.
       (The FBI originally planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000,
       but it increased the amount of equipment because it received additional
       funding from DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year
       2001 include crime scene management and crisis management, which trains
       different government agencies to work together to respond to a smuggling
       incident.

       Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

       Page 50 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

       Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

       Page 51 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

       Page 52 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State

       Page 53 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

       Page 54 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

       Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Energy

       Page 55 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

       Page 56 GAO- 02- 426 U. S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

       Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Customs Service

       (360093)

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