Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could	 
Benefit from Better Use of Technology (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-346).	 
                                                                 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by  
the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash	 
assistance program in the United States.  For fiscal year 2002,  
SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more	 
than six million financially needy individuals who are aged,	 
blind, or disabled.  Since becoming operational in August 1996,  
the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by	 
helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI	 
benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to	 
locate and and apprehend fugitive felons.  Nevertheless, several 
technological and other barriers are contributing to		 
inefficiencies in the program's operations.  Certain information 
systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	 
use in processing matched data are not interoperable or 	 
compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant
information.  Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one
office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the  
overall performance of the fugitive felon program.  Consequently,
no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and  
matching process.  Largely because of the SSA's and states'	 
limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive	 
felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been	 
reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA.	 
According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors
that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were
that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and  
manually transmitting the information created additional resource
requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment 
of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive	 
felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits 
and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing	 
justice.  However, the additional matches of warrant records	 
against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase 
the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's 	 
Information Technology Center.	SSA may be able to improve the	 
fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by  
exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting
other federal, state, and local programs.  SSA currently has	 
direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and  
receives data supporting various other programs, including its	 
program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-346 					        
    ACCNO:   A04765						        
  TITLE:     Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program   
Could Benefit from Better Use of Technology			 
     DATE:   09/06/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Federal social security programs			 
	     Information technology				 
	     Data bases 					 
	     Computer matching					 
	     Criminals						 
	     Social security benefits				 
	     Supplemental Security Income Program		 
	     Old Age Survivors and Disability			 
	     Insurance Program					 
                                                                 
	     Disability Insurance Program			 

                                                                 
Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could	 
Benefit from Better Use of Technology (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-346).	 
                                                                 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by  
the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash	 
assistance program in the United States.  For fiscal year 2002,  
SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more	 
than six million financially needy individuals who are aged,	 
blind, or disabled.  Since becoming operational in August 1996,  
the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by	 
helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI	 
benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to	 
locate and and apprehend fugitive felons.  Nevertheless, several 
technological and other barriers are contributing to		 
inefficiencies in the program's operations.  Certain information 
systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	 
use in processing matched data are not interoperable or 	 
compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant
information.  Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one
office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the  
overall performance of the fugitive felon program.  Consequently,
no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and  
matching process.  Largely because of the SSA's and states'	 
limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive	 
felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been	 
reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA.	 
According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors
that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were
that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and  
manually transmitting the information created additional resource
requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment 
of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive	 
felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits 
and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing	 
justice.  However, the additional matches of warrant records	 
against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase 
the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's 	 
Information Technology Center.	SSA may be able to improve the	 
fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by  
exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting
other federal, state, and local programs.  SSA currently has	 
direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and  
receives data supporting various other programs, including its	 
program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-346 					        
    ACCNO:   A04765						        
  TITLE:     Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program   
Could Benefit from Better Use of Technology			 
     DATE:   09/06/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Federal social security programs			 
	     Information technology				 
	     Data bases 					 
	     Computer matching					 
	     Criminals						 
	     Social security benefits				 
	     Supplemental Security Income Program		 
	     Old Age Survivors and Disability			 
	     Insurance Program					 
                                                                 
	     Disability Insurance Program			 

******************************************************************
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GAO-02-346

                                       A

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate

September 2002 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Fugitive Felon Program Could
Benefit from Better Use of Technology

GAO- 02- 346

Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 Technological and Other Barriers
Contribute to Inefficiencies in the

Fugitive Felon Program 8 SSA*s Efforts to Obtain Data- Matching Agreements
Have Not

Resulted in Comprehensive Data 17 Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI
Benefits for Fugitive Felons

Could Have a Substantial Impact on the Program 21 Increased Reliance on
Other Agencies* Databases Could Help

Enhance Fugitive Felon Program Operations 23 Conclusions 25
Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
27

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

Appendix II: Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching Process 38

Appendix III: Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending
Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments 41

Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration 43

Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice 49 Figures
Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA*s Fugitive

Felon Program 7 Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program
Process 10 Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated) 15 Figure
4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements 19

Abbreviations

BOP Bureau of Prisons CMPPA Computer Matching Privacy and Protection Act
EVS Enumeration Verification System FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO U. S. General Accounting Office ITC Information Technology Center NCC
National Computer Center NCIC National Crime Information Center OASI/ DI
Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance OIG Office of
Inspector General PRWORA Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation

Act SSA Social Security Administration SSI Supplemental Security Income
USMS U. S. Marshals Service

Letter

September 6, 2002 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Finance United States Senate

Dear Senator Grassley: The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest
cash assistance program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA
expects to pay SSI

benefits totaling approximately $31.5 billion to more than 6 million
financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Under the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 1
any individuals fleeing to avoid prosecution or confinement after

conviction for a crime that is a felony or who violate a condition of
probation or parole imposed under federal or state law are ineligible to
receive SSI benefits. SSA has the authority to suspend such benefits when
these individuals are identified. Further, under certain conditions, the
act allows SSA to disclose information on these individuals to law
enforcement agencies to aid in their location and apprehension.

In August 1996, SSA established the fugitive felon program to facilitate
identifying individuals in violation of the act and help protect the
integrity of the SSI program and ensure the public*s safety. SSA, state
and local governments, and federal law enforcement agencies rely on
numerous databases and information systems to carry out the fugitive felon
program. Accordingly, you requested that we review the technological
aspects of the program to (1) identify technological barriers restricting
(a) data matching between SSA*s and the Federal Bureau of Investigation*s
(FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data- matching
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the
technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI)

and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation
restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other
databases, such as those maintained by the Department of Justice*s Bureau
of Prisons 1 Pub. L. No. 104- 193, 202 Stat. 2105, 2186 (1996), commonly
known as the Welfare Reform

Act.

and the U. S. Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the
fugitive felon program.

In performing this review, we analyzed key documentation maintained by
SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and the U. S. Marshals Service. These
included data- matching policies and standards, operational and security
procedures, and technical infrastructure descriptions associated with the
fugitive felon program. We also analyzed data- matching agreements and
laws regulating data- matching activities with state and local law
enforcement agencies. We conducted site visits and telephone conferences
with 17 state and local law enforcement agencies to determine their
involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological
barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share
data with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns
affecting their efforts to negotiate data- matching agreements with SSA.
In

addition, we interviewed officials at SSA*s Headquarters, Office of
Inspector General, and National Computer Center; at the FBI*s Criminal
Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and
its Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and at the
Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service. Our review focused on the
ways in which information technology is being used to achieve fugitive
felon program efficiencies, but did not assess the program*s
effectiveness. We plan to issue a report later this year that will in part
address the

program*s effectiveness. We performed our review from August 2001 through
May 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Additional details concerning the objectives, scope, and
methodology of our review are contained in appendix I.

Results in Brief Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive
felon program has provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify
and prevent payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law
enforcement

agencies to locate and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several
technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the
program*s operations. As currently administered, the processing of
fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients is
complex and fragmented, involving numerous organizations performing
multiple steps to obtain and act on the information. In addition, while
matches of fugitive warrant records against SSI recipient files are
conducted using computers, most of the essential tasks of sharing and
verifying warrant information are performed manually. For example, SSA
currently lacks the capability to accept warrant information from law
enforcement agencies on line; thus,

the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service, and some participating state law
enforcement agencies must download this information from their databases
and information systems onto electronic media, such as cartridges and
tapes, and send it to SSA via the U. S. mail or FedEx. In addition,
certain information systems that SSA and the FBI use in processing matched
data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also

hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Collectively, the
manual activities in processing warrant information have resulted in an
inefficient and time- consuming operation that, based on our analysis of
the process used, can take up to 165 days to complete (from SSA*s receipt
of warrant information until SSI benefits are suspended). Contributing to
these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated
to oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon
program. Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data
sharing and matching process.

Largely because of SSA*s and states* limited uses of information
technology to support the fugitive felon program, many state law
enforcement agencies have been reluctant to enter into data- matching
agreements with SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among
the factors that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements
were that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
information and SSA*s guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually
transmitting the information created additional resource requirements that
some states were unable to meet. In addition, some states report warrant
information

on a voluntary basis, and some states that have signed agreements have not
yet submitted any data to SSA. SSA officials acknowledged that the
agency*s efforts to obtain comprehensive warrant information have not
yielded anticipated results.

The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive
felons could increase SSA*s recovery of improperly paid benefits and
prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice.
However, the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI
recipient

files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both
SSA and the FBI*s Information Technology Center. The center plays a major
role in verifying the accuracy of warrant records and supplies fugitives*
addresses to law enforcement agencies. SSA and FBI officials recognize the
need for additional information technology support to conduct computer
matches of warrant information against the OASI and DI recipient files.
However, at the conclusion of our review, neither SSA nor the FBI had yet

initiated evaluations to assess the anticipated technological impact on
their operations. SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program*s
operational

efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications
connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA
currently has direct, on- line connections with every state that transmits
and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program
to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners. In addition, while SSA
does not currently have telecommunications connectivity with the FBI*s
National Crime Information Center* a national database of warrant and
other criminal information* agency officials believed this database could
offer a more comprehensive and readily accessible means of obtaining
outstanding warrant information from the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service, and
state agencies. However, all states report warrant information to this
database voluntarily. Further, while SSA officials viewed the database as
a potential single source of comprehensive warrant information, they had
not assessed the feasibility of this alternative or other options for
using online connections with federal, state, and local agencies to more
efficiently obtain the information.

To ensure that the fugitive felon program is positioned to meet its
current and future obligations toward preventing payments of SSI benefits
to fugitive felons, we are making recommendations to the Commissioner of
Social Security that include (1) designating a program office and manager

to oversee and direct the program; (2) fully assessing the program*s
current operations and performance; and (3) examining and proposing
options for using technology to automate currently manual functions
involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information.

SSA and the Department of Justice provided written comments on a draft of
our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V. In its
comments, SSA expressed disappointment with our report and generally
disagreed with our recommendations. Among its specific comments, SSA
disagreed with the need for a program manager and additional monitoring
and analysis of the program*s operations. Given the complexities of the

fugitive felon processes, we continue to believe that SSA*s program could
benefit from more focused program management and additional monitoring and
analysis to identify process improvements and technological enhancements.
In addition, as part of continual monitoring and analysis, SSA needs to
identify aggregate tracking data to assess the

program*s overall cost and performance. The Department of Justice provided
technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals
who have limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These
benefits

are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial need. SSA has
estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits
payments totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million
individuals. Since 1997, we have designated SSI a high- risk program
because of its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and SSA*s
insufficient management oversight. 2 Long- standing concerns regarding
program abuses and mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and the
inability to recover outstanding SSI debt have led to congressional
criticism of SSA*s ability to effectively manage and ensure the program*s
integrity.

In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs* together
commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs funded
from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their wages. OASI
provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their dependents or, when
workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI program provides monthly
cash benefits to workers and their dependents when workers are disabled.
In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI programs collectively are expected to
pay approximately $447 billion in benefits to about 46 million eligible
workers, dependents, and survivors.

In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting SSI benefits.
Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible to receive SSI
payments during any month in which he or she is

 fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the laws
of the place from which the person flees, 3 2 U. S. General Accounting
Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration, GAO- 01- 261 (Washington, D. C.: January 2001).

3 A felony is a serious offense that is usually punishable by imprisonment
for more than 1 year.

 fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime
that is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees,
or

 violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or
state law. 4 PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI
payments to fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to
provide information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and
apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar authority
for OASI and DI benefits payments.

In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and
entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG).
SSA*s OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program
integrity and law enforcement functions and is the primary interface
between SSA and law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make
arrests for program fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement
agencies pursuing SSI recipients engaging in criminal activities.

Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the
program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA*s offices of operations,
disability and income security programs, and systems; its regional and
field offices; and the FBI*s Information Technology Center in Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to administer
the fugitive felon program. Rather, according to SSA officials, each
participating SSA office (for example, the office of operations and OIG)
and the FBI Information Technology Center use existing funding to support
the program.

4 Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment that allows parolees
to serve the remainder of their term outside the confines of a penal
institution if they satisfactorily comply with all terms and conditions
provided. Probation is a type of sentence imposed by a court for the
commission of a crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released
into the community under the supervision of a probation officer. Violation
of probation can result in probation being revoked and a sentence of
confinement imposed.

Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA*s Fugitive Felon
Program

a In commenting on our draft report, SSA stated that, as part of an Office
of Systems* reorganization, the Office of Systems Analysis and the Office
of Information Management have been replaced by the Office of Earnings,
Enumeration and Administrative Systems; the Office of Systems Design and
Development has been replaced by the Office of Disability and Supplemental
Security Income

Systems. Source: GAO analysis based on SSA*s data.

Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information from
available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI recipients
on its rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant information from
several sources, including (1) the FBI*s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC); (2) state and local law enforcement agencies; and (3) the U. S.
Marshals Service (USMS). SSA receives warrant information from the FBI and
USMS under memorandums of understanding and from certain state and local
law enforcement agencies under matching agreements that establish
conditions for SSA*s use of the warrant information in its matching
operations. According to SSA, in calendar year 2001, it received
approximately 27 million warrant records from these federal, state, and

local law enforcement agencies. Of these, about 2 million records were
eligible to be matched against SSI benefits files. 5 Appendix II provides
a detailed description of the fugitive felon data- matching process. OIG
reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching

operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000
fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of
these fugitives, approximately 5, 000 were subsequently apprehended.
Appendix III presents selected cases in which fugitives were apprehended
and SSI

benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive felon program.
Technological and

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several Other
Barriers

technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its
processing of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI
recipients. These Contribute to

barriers include a complex, multistep process to obtain and act on
fugitive Inefficiencies in the

warrant information and a heavily manual approach to accomplishing
Fugitive Felon critical program tasks, such as exchanging and verifying
warrant information. In addition, where information systems are used to
support

Program the program, many of them are not interoperable or capable of
exchanging data electronically. Consequently, key portions of the data-
matching

process are complicated and time- consuming. Contributing to this
situation is that SSA has not designated a single, central point of
management accountability to direct the fugitive felon program*s
operations. 5 According to SSA data, during an initial screening of these
records against information it

had on all holders and applicants of Social Security numbers, a majority
of the approximately 27 million warrant records that it actually received
could not be verified against a Social Security number or other vital
information, and therefore, were not included in its match against files
identifying SSI recipients.

Fugitive Felon DataMatching The steps in administering the fugitive felon
program* from the point that

Process Is SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the
suspension of

Complex and Highly SSI benefits* are complicated and include many back-
and- forth exchanges

Manual of warrant information among the participating entities. At the
time of our

review, each of the organizations participating in the program had
responsibility for distinct segments of the tasks involved in processing
fugitive warrant information received from federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. However, there was no single entity within SSA that
was able to provide a full explanation of the complete chain of activities
comprising the data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped
the process ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.

Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process

Source: GAO analysis.

As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a
monthly basis) from the FBI*s national repository* NCIC* and from USMS and
state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration
Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master
files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify
identity

information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social Security number
of the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of those records for
which identities can be verified, OIG screens the data to eliminate
misdemeanors. 6 Then, a second match is conducted against files maintained
in SSA*s supplemental security record to determine which of the fugitives
are receiving SSI benefits. The results of the second match (addresses of
the fugitive benefits recipients) are forwarded to OIG for

further processing. OIG and its field offices work with the FBI*s
Information Technology Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation,
or parole violation warrants are active and that the appropriate
individuals have been identified. Once verifications are made, ITC
provides address information about each SSI recipient (called *leads*) to
the appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement agency so that it
can locate and apprehend the

individual. After action by the law enforcement agency, OIG refers its
findings to the appropriate SSA field offices, which initiate suspension
of SSI benefits.

In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to
match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the master
files of Social Security number holders and applications and the
supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the
warrant information used in the matching process, are performed manually.
For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications capability that would
allow it to accept warrant information on line. As a result, the FBI,
USMS, and state and local law enforcement agencies must download warrant
information from their respective databases and information systems onto
various electronic media (such as cartridges, tapes, and CDROMS)

and send this information to SSA via the U. S. mail or FedEx. Depending on
the type of media used, two separate SSA offices* the Office of Central
Operations and the Office of Telecommunications and Systems

6 PRWORA does not specifically address, and SSA does not conduct data
matches of, misdemeanor charges, with the exception of high misdemeanors,
which are considered felonies under the laws of New Jersey.

Operations* receive, log, and upload the information onto SSA*s mainframe
computer to begin the matching process. Beyond manually sharing warrant
information, many of the steps in verifying and referring information
contained in the matched records also are performed manually. For example,
to accurately identify and locate fugitives, SSA*s field offices, OIG, and
the FBI*s ITC exchange numerous forms with law enforcement agencies. 7
However, none of these forms are automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to
manually prepare and fax or mail them to the appropriate entities.

In addition, both OIG*s and ITC*s program activities are supported by
distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further
preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG*s
allegation and case investigative system and ITC*s automated case support
system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation numbers to
matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched data.
However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched records on
which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download files
containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG*s system
uses Microsoft Word and ITC*s system uses Corel WordPerfect; thus, when
ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable format to be able
to process the warrant information.

Manual Processes Have The various manual interventions in processing
fugitive warrants all

Resulted in a TimeConsuming contribute to a time- consuming operation that
is less than optimally

Operation efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files
that federal and

state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are not formatted in
accordance with SSA*s specifications and must be returned to the agencies
for correction, delaying action on matching these files. In addition, the
electronic media containing warrant records are sometimes lost during the
mail delivery process or are misplaced before being entered

into SSA*s computers. As a result, this time- sensitive information may go
unaccounted for a number of days. SSA had not determined the extent to
which warrant records are being lost or mishandled and over what length of
time, but program officials acknowledged that the longer it takes to match
the warrant information, the greater the opportunity for fugitives to

7 These forms include the OI- 5B (Referral Form), OI- 5C (Law Enforcement
Certification Form), OI- 5D (Investigative Certification Form), and OI- 5E
(SSA Feedback Form).

remain unaccounted for and to continue to receive SSI benefits payments.
Further, the officials stated that the manual steps involved in verifying
fugitives* identities and obtaining address information for referring
leads to law enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of
locating and apprehending fugitives.

SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually required
to complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our analysis of
data that SSA provided on its existing procedures found that the steps
required to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such
as lost or mishandled files, or improperly formatted warrant information
received

from states reporting warrant information for the first time, could take
up to 165 days. 8 This approximate processing time could be increased up
to an additional 70 days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal
SSA*s decision to suspend benefits.

As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65 days
during which SSA and the FBI*s ITC conduct matches and initial
verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement
agencies. 9 The approximate time also includes a total of 90 days that is
devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly identified and that
their privacy and other rights are protected* 60 days that state and local
law enforcement agencies are allowed to locate and apprehend fugitives
before SSA serves notice that benefits will be suspended and 30 days
during which OIG field offices conduct additional verifications prior to
sending

summaries of actions taken on matched records to SSA field offices for
suspension of benefits. Program officials informed us that state and local
law enforcement agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and
apprehend fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased to
60 to provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions
taken on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with
data matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law
enforcement agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security
numbers or identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike prisoners,
fleeing felons are not incarcerated and may not have been convicted of a
crime.

8 The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of
information provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. To
confirm the validity of our timeline estimate, we shared the results of
our analysis with appropriate SSA officials.

9 The approximate 65 days includes certain unaccounted for activities,
such as uploading and initial processing, screening for misdemeanors, and
sorting duplicate warrant records.

Consequently, the time devoted to manually verifying the currency of
warrant information is vital for ensuring that the correct individuals are
identified and apprehended.

Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated)

Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant
information are necessary to help ensure the program*s integrity. However,
automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant information

from other agencies* databases on line, could help eliminate much of the
time devoted to initially processing and matching warrant information and

verifying and referring leads that results from the matched records (now
estimated to take about 65 days).

At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had
recently begun considering options to automate manual processes in the
field offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering
eliminating many of the field offices* benefits suspension activities,
such as

providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports and,
instead, performing these activities in one regional office with the use
of computers.

Although SSA*s consideration of options for improving the fugitive felon
process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped its
existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without doing
so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes that are
most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement goals, and
ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for improving its manual
operations. The Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996 requires agency heads to
analyze, revise, and improve mission- related and administrative processes
before making significant investments in supporting information
technology. Further, an agency should have an overall business process
improvement strategy that provides a means to coordinate and integrate the
various reengineering and improvement projects, set priorities, and make
appropriate budget decisions. By doing so, an agency can better

position itself to maximize the potential of technology to improve
performance, rather than simply automating inefficient processes.

SSA Could Benefit from Although the fugitive felon program is achieving
results, it could benefit

Clear and Unified from increased management accountability. SSA relies on
multiple

Management Accountability agencies and offices to implement the fugitive
felon program. However, to Direct the Fugitive Felon

there is no unified source of management accountability to provide the
consistent oversight and program continuity that is essential to
sustaining Program

program success. Consequently, staff assigned to administer the program
offered conflicting accounts as to what program tasks were being performed
and by whom. For example, program officials identified three different SSA
offices* operations, program support, and OIG* as having responsibility
for leading the program; yet no officials in these offices could explain
the overall data- matching process or had decision- making and oversight
responsibility for the other participating entities.

In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the
program*s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs
and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For
example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with
certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive warrant
records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had mapped the
overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to
comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA*s receipt of
warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons were
actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in place for 6
years, program officials were unable to provide data on the total costs of
the program.

In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA
officials acknowledged that the program lacked unified management
accountability. An OIG official stated that, while the agency had
initially decided that both headquarters offices and OIG would jointly
administer the program, these offices had only recently begun considering
ways to improve their

management of the program. The agency was considering the development of a
management board to oversee and address program issues and concerns.
However, it had not developed any specific tasks or milestones for this
improvement effort. Given the inherent complexity of the fugitive felon
program and the many entities involved in its implementation, effective
management of operations and data is essential for determining how best to
achieve and sustain future program operations and reporting.

SSA*s Efforts to Obtain Having complete and comprehensive warrant
information from states is

Data- Matching crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive
felon program are

achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant
Agreements Have Not

information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all outstanding
Resulted in

warrants are being included in the FBI*s NCIC database* a prime source of
Comprehensive Data

SSA*s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has been taking steps to
obtain more comprehensive state and local information by pursuing
datamatching agreements with states that do not report all of their
warrant information to NCIC. However, a number of these states have been
reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always
abided by them, largely because of SSA*s and the states* concerns
regarding the lack of information technology and adequate resources to
support the program.

SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC if
they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation violators.
States are considered to be partially reporting warrant information if,
for example, they report felonies but not parole and probation violators.
10 As of May 2002 (the latest month for which data were available), SSA
had identified 21 states and the District of Columbia as fully reporting
warrant information to NCIC and 29 states as partially reporting warrant
information.

In pursuing data- matching agreements to obtain all of the states* warrant
information, 11 SSA reported as of May 2002 that it had signed agreements
with 18 states 12 and was in various stages of negotiating agreements with
5 other states. SSA had been unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3
states, all of which had declined to enter into the agreements. It had not
yet begun negotiating agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4
reflects the status of SSA*s attempts to obtain data- matching agreements
with the states as of May 2002.

10 According to two states that SSA identified as fully reporting to NCIC
(Florida and Kansas), most, but not all, felony warrants are reported to
this database because the submission of felony warrants is at the
discretion of local agencies within these states.

11 At the time that SSA began pursuing data matching agreements, three
states (Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania) did not maintain central
repositories of state and local warrant information. Therefore, to obtain
a majority of the states* warrant information, SSA negotiated agreements
with their largest local law enforcement agencies.

12 This number includes 3 states (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey)
identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but
from which SSA, for various reasons, negotiated agreements to also
directly obtain data.

Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements a The states that
SSA is pursuing agreements with include 3 (Delaware, Indiana, and New
Jersey) identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC,
but from which SSA, for various reasons, negotiated agreements to also
directly obtain data. b SSA does not pursue data- matching agreements with
states that fully report to NCIC.

Source: SSA.

SSA and state officials cited various factors* often related to their uses
of information technology* that had made negotiating data- matching
agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to decline
an agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not have the
capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state officials
would have to reformat, download to electronic media, and mail the warrant
information to SSA Headquarters. The officials believed that doing so
would not be cost- effective and, thus, elected to continue their practice
of submitting paper printouts of warrant information to the SSA OIG field

office in Des Moines. In Florida, officials explained that their state had
not entered an agreement with SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant
information to NCIC because of SSA*s specifications for formatting and
downloading the warrant information onto electronic media. They expressed
concern that additional resources would be required to perform these
formatting tasks and manually provide the warrant information to SSA.
Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data- matching

agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or
repositories of warrant information in some state and local law
enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that
because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to enter
into a data- matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained that not
all of the states* approximately 700 local law enforcement offices
currently report all of their warrant information at the state level and
to NCIC. Thus,

to meet the intent of a data- matching agreement, each local agency would
have to provide their warrant information directly to SSA. However, most
local law enforcement agencies within the state do not have central
repositories for reporting the information to SSA.

Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central repository,
they had chosen not to sign a data- matching agreement with SSA because of
privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials expressed concerns
with the privacy and security implications of submitting sensitive warrant
information via the U. S. mail.

Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully achieved
its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information from the
states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18 states with
which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually submitting warrant

information to the agency. According to SSA, the remaining 9 states that
had signed agreements but had not yet sent warrant information provided

similar reasons for not complying with the agreements. These included
states* concerns about the privacy and security of the warrant information
and difficulties complying with SSA*s record layout or formatting
requirements. In addition, although having agreed to submit warrant

information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado) later
decided instead to report all warrant information to NCIC.

At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the
process for obtaining data- matching agreements was difficult and had not
yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially provide
warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements are intended
primarily to protect states* data from unauthorized disclosure and use.
Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the absence of a single and
complete source of fugitive warrant records from all states, the
datamatching agreements were necessary for ensuring that the agency could
obtain comprehensive warrant information. We agree that comprehensive
warrant information is vital to the success of the fugitive felon program.
However, the data- matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will
obtain the comprehensive warrant information that it seeks.

Legislation Prohibiting Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are
prohibited from receiving

OASI and DI Benefits SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI
benefits. Specifically, SSA maintains address information on fugitives
receiving SSI, OASI, and DI

for Fugitive Felons benefits, but can only share information with law
enforcement agencies on Could Have a

those fugitives receiving SSI. However, the increasing realization that
OASI Substantial Impact on

and DI benefits payments may also finance a potentially dangerous
fugitive*s flight from justice has prompted the Congress to pursue

the Program implementing provisions to prohibit payments to fugitives in
these

programs as well. 13 Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit
SSA to share address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI
benefits. In its own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that
doing so could result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs.
Specifically, in an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between August
1996 and June

13 In February 2002, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House
Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security introduced
legislation (H. R. 4070) to deny Title II (OASI and DI) benefits to
fugitive felons and persons fleeing prosecution. In April 2002, a similar
bill (S. 2387) was introduced before the Senate Finance Committee.

1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at least $108 million in OASI
and DI benefits. In August 2001, the office revised its estimates,
projecting that OASI and DI benefits amounting to approximately $40
million would be paid to fugitives through October 2001, and in each
additional year that legislation was not enacted to prohibit such benefits
payments* for a 5- year total payout of approximately $198 million.

Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon program*s
workload could increase substantially. SSA officials acknowledged that the
additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program*s
datamatching activities. According to an analysis that the OIG performed,
the enactment of the legislative proposal would result in three times the
current work level of SSI matches.

The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying
effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database, stated
that implementing the provision would have no technological impact on that
organization*s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant information.

They anticipated that the database would continue to supply SSA with
warrant records received daily from state and local law enforcement
agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that the additional
matched records for OASI and DI recipients could substantially increase

ITC*s workload associated with verifying the accuracy of the matched
records and supplying fugitives* addresses to law enforcement agencies.
Further, based on its study, OIG officials, and those of the FBI, believed
that ITC*s workforce would have to increase substantially* from the
current staff of 7 to about 60* to accommodate the additional workload
associated with handling all the leads generated through the matching
process.

With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon program,
SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information systems
support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant information
against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither SSA nor the FBI
had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the anticipated technological
impact on their operations. Such an assessment is critical to helping SSA
make an informed decision regarding its ability to ensure that
comprehensive and efficient data- matching operations would continue under
expanded operations. As discussed in our investment guide, good

decisions require good data. 14 Consequently, having solid data on a
program*s operations is essential for making informed decisions concerning
workload management and the technological solutions needed to sustain
efficient and effective performance.

Increased Reliance on As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon
program, having

Other Agencies* efficient and effectively run operations will be essential
to achieving

sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged inefficiencies
Databases Could Help

in the existing fugitive felon processes and have indicated that they
expect Enhance Fugitive

to rely more heavily on information technology to help improve the Felon
Program

program*s operations and outcomes. Information systems and databases
maintained by some of the federal, state, and local law enforcement

Operations agencies that currently participate in the fugitive felon
program could offer

SSA opportunities for more efficiently obtaining warrant information to
enhance the program.

Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the
fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local agencies
participating in other programs. According to SSA systems officials, SSA
currently has a direct, dedicated on- line connection with every state*s
department of social services. 15 States use these lines to submit
information to SSA covering various programs, such as child support
enforcement. Similarly, as part of the prisoner program, some state and
local prison facilities send federal prisoner data to SSA on line to aid
in suspending SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to incarcerated inmates. 16 In
discussing the exchange of states* fugitive warrant information, SSA

officials told us that they had not evaluated how on- line connections
with state and local agencies could be used to receive information
supporting the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing an
on- line

14 U. S General Accounting Office, Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide
for Evaluating Federal Agencies* IT Investment Decision- making, GAO/
AIMD- 10. 1.13 (Washington, D. C.: February 1997). 15 SSA*s receipt of
state and local agencies* data via dedicated on- line connections
primarily involve batch, rather than real- time, transfers of data. 16 In
response to PRWORA, SSA also instituted the prisoner program. Under this
program, SSA has agreements with state and local correctional facilities
to obtain information that is used to suspend SSI and OASI and DI benefits
to prisoners.

connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each state law
enforcement agency would require each state to have access to a secure
(encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They believed

that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to be
addressed. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA official
told us that the agency had reached agreement with one state* Connecticut*
to exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file transfer. According to
the

official, Connecticut is preparing to submit data via a Connect: Direct
electronic file transfer method, in which data will be encrypted and sent
from one mainframe computer to another over dedicated lines.

An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance on
the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily
accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI,
USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC*s technical
infrastructure includes high- level security controls and validation and
confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the
database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on- line, real-
time capacity with other information systems and databases, including
those of USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant data
to NCIC

via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the FBI Criminal
Justice Information Services* network. 17 As discussed earlier, all states
transmit all or some portion of their warrant information on line to the
NCIC database each month.

Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on- line connections to
transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and local
law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant
information that it sends to SSA via U. S. mail. On the other hand, SSA
officials stated that the Bureau of Prison*s database of incarcerated
inmates, which supports SSA*s prisoner program, could not be used to
effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database does

not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons. Both SSA and
its OIG officials believed that having a single source of warrant
information would help make the data- matching process less laborious and
eliminate processing inefficiencies. Accordingly, in

17 These systems, called control terminal agencies, provide statewide
services such as overseeing the transmission of all warrant information
within a state, controlling security, and providing information security
program training.

November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national warrant
database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told
us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a potential single source of
warrant information to support the fugitive felon program. The officials
believed that receiving USMS*s and state and local law enforcement
agencies* warrant information on line via NCIC could potentially eliminate
much of the duplicate warrant information that now contributes to the

program*s inefficiencies. For example, according to federal, state, and
local law enforcement officials, USMS and all states currently transmit
all or some of their warrant information to the FBI*s NCIC. Thus, when the
FBI

downloads warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the
information duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials
reported that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60, 000
duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per

month) as a result of these dual exchanges. SSA officials noted, however,
that achieving a single source of fugitive warrant information would
require that SSA have the capability to accept data from NCIC on line. At
the conclusion of our review, SSA officials stated that the agency had not
explored using an on- line connection to NCIC to enhance the sharing of
fugitive warrant information. In addition, they stated that, for NCIC to
be effective as a single source of comprehensive warrant information,
state agencies would have to be willing to report that portion of warrant
information to NCIC that SSA currently must obtain from them under data-
matching agreements. However, according to FBI officials, there is no
statute or regulation requiring the states to fully report warrant
information to NCIC; rather, states report information to this database
voluntarily. Conclusions In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA
faces significant

technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient and
effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome its
high- risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits
payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes have
resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the program*s
longterm

success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data- matching agreements
with the states have hindered SSA*s efforts to obtain comprehensive
warrant information needed to fulfill program objectives. In the absence
of essential management accountability, SSA lacks critical data needed to
make informed decisions about the program*s processes and activities, as

well as existing and future plans for technology supporting the program.
Overcoming these inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to
ensuring that the fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to
achieve the greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively
positioned to fulfill its potentially broader role in preventing OASI and
DI benefits payments to fugitives.

SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes
could result from more substantial uses of information technology to
perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline
datamatching operations. Further, given the potential increase in SSA*s
workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI nonpayment
provision, having the necessary information technology to support its
operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a proven capability
to share data on line with federal, state, and local agencies in support
of other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps toward examining its
current data- matching operations and approaches to obtaining warrant
information or exploring how best to use technology to enhance the overall
fugitive felon process.

Recommendations for To improve the fugitive felon program*s operational
efficiency and ensure Executive Action

sustained, long- term success in identifying fugitive SSI beneficiaries,
we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security designate a program
management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the
program*s activities and progress. In addition, we recommend that the
commissioner direct the program management office and manager to  conduct
a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program*s current

operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the
organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to
administer the program, a full accounting of the program*s costs,
estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload

requirements;  identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those
fugitive felon

processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving
technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient
operation;

 continue to examine and propose options for using technology to automate
the currently manual functions involved in exchanging

fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of
this information, including assessing alternatives to using data- matching
agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining whether
on- line connections with state and local law enforcement agencies and/ or
direct telecommunications connections with the FBI*s NCIC database could
offer viable and more efficient means of sharing warrant information; and

 assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations
from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits
payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information
systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads
resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these
benefits recipients* files.

Agency Comments and We received written comments on a draft of this report
from the

Our Evaluation Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the
Director, Audit

Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice (see
app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed disappointment with
our report and generally disagreed with our recommendations. The

Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated, as appropriate.

Regarding the commissioner*s statement expressing disappointment in our
report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the efficiency
of the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in which
improvements can be made that can benefit SSA*s future efforts at
streamlining the program*s inefficient processes, improving performance
and operations, and applying technology, where appropriate. In SSA*s
comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied

that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon program
and did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program without
startup funding or additional resources. We recognize the valuable role
that SSA plays in implementing the fugitive felon program to prevent
benefits payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing out
technological and other barriers to the program*s operations, our intent
was not to imply that

SSA and other participating components lack a vision for the program.
Rather, given the program*s complexity and multiple entities involved in
its administration, we believe it is important to highlight critical
conditions

and operational inefficiencies necessitating SSA*s continual attention in
order to ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize
that funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as
a steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it
consistently carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data- matching
operations in an efficient manner. Regarding our recommendation to
designate a program management office

and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program*s
activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency- wide program
manager was necessary. SSA stated that managers within its office of

operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all involved
offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act does
not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in administrative
decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition, regarding our
statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing
and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials
are able to explain the process in its entirety. SSA also stated that, to
ensure all

involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
responsibilities, it had released a detailed process description and
provided a copy to us. Further, SSA added that because its officials had
chosen not to answer questions pertaining to other components* work during
our review, we had mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could
explain the overall process.

We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that
there are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the
participating components involved in administering the program. Our
recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight
capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently exist.
It is not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that
management oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding
possible limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector General
Act, the Act

does not prohibit coordination of joint action between the OIG and the
head of the establishment involved to ensure efficiency of operation and
to avoid duplication of effort, nor do we believe that such coordination
would affect OIG*s personal and professional independence. In this
respect, as we

noted in our report, an OIG official has commented on the need for
improved coordination and management of the fugitive felon program. That
official also noted that OIG had already begun to work with SSA*s Office
of Operations to improve management of the program.

Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in
each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they were
responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any

officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of
overall program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff
within the SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the
fugitive felon data- matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA
revised its policy instructions in April 2002, outlining involved offices*
roles and responsibilities, these instructions do not address SSA*s
overall fugitive felon processes. In addition, we were unable to identify
any aggregate tracking data to assess the program*s overall cost and
performance. Given the multiple agencies and offices involved in
administering this complex program, we continue to believe that having a
unified source of accountability and authority for the program is
essential to effectively and consistently oversee its progress and ensure
that informed decisions are being made about its implementation. In
discussing our findings on May 10, 2002, SSA and OIG officials agreed that
the program lacked uniform management accountability and stated that they
had just recently begun considering the development of a management board
to oversee and

address program management issues and concerns. SSA also disagreed with
our recommendation that called for it to conduct a detailed assessment of
the fugitive felon program*s current operations and performance, including
a full accounting of the program*s costs and benefits and workload
requirements. SSA stated that its analysis of the program*s operations is
an ongoing process and that enhancements are made when deemed necessary.
SSA further stated that it had completed many of the tasks cited in our
recommendation prior to starting the matching process in calendar year
1999, and that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the program.
We agree that ongoing monitoring and analysis of the program*s operations
is essential for ensuring that management is informed of the program*s
cost and progress and to assess risks to overall performance. However,
during our review, SSA could not demonstrate that it had made an aggregate
assessment of the program*s current operations and performance, including
an awareness of the processes, information flows, and time involved in
administering the program, as well as a full accounting of its costs and
requirements. Such information is vital for making informed decisions
about the program*s progress and for determining where process
improvements are needed and how best to achieve them. The fugitive felon
program has been in place since 1996 (with computerized matching since
1999), giving SSA sufficient opportunities to perform these necessary and
critical assessments. Further,

while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the
fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA conduct its own program
assessment that includes all participating components, which ensures that
the program can be consistently and comprehensively controlled and
managed.

Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed a
cost- benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001. Our
review of the two- page summary found that it lacked substantial
information about the program*s overall costs and benefits. An operations
official who provided the document told us that the summary had
constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate reflection, of
the program*s costs and benefits, and that it had been developed only for
the purpose of renewing SSA*s computer- matching program. The official
added that the development of actual cost and benefits data for the
fugitive felon program would require significantly more time than had been
invested in preparing the current summary. SSA believed that our
recommendation to identify and prioritize those

fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for
resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their
efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for these
actions during normal operations. The agency added that it has a number of
efforts under way to automate some of the fugitive felon processes.
However, SSA stated that there are some manual processes in the program
that contribute to minor interruptions to the fugitive felon process.
While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some fugitive

felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving the
technological and administrative barriers affecting the program*s
operations. As our report notes, an overall business process improvement
strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and integrate its various
reengineering and improvement projects and, thus, maximize the potential
of technology to improve the program*s performance. Further, at the
conclusion of our review, SSA provided us with documentation outlining
discussions to automate field office functions. However, the information
provided did not include enough detail on the initiative that it said was
being undertaken; therefore, we could not comment on these developments.
We recognize that there are many steps within the fugitive felon process
that must be completed manually. While we agree that some

of these manual processes are necessary, our report notes that technology
may enhance the program. Given our assessment of the length of the

process (approximately 165 days), we continue to believe that SSA needs to
perform a complete analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify
areas for improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to
support more efficient operations.

SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and
propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual
functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining the
most efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our
recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication
connections with the FBI*s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA
believed that the creation of a single national warrant database would be
a better solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA stated
that its OIG had testified before the Congress on the benefits that would
be derived if such a database were established. SSA added that NCIC would
be effective as a single source of comprehensive warrant information only
if entry of states* warrant information became mandatory.

We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information
into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to
achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless, achieving
an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA examining the

strengths and limitations of all of the potential alternatives to sharing
warrant information, including NCIC. Accordingly, this recommendation
remains in our report. However, we have also incorporated language
reflecting SSA*s views regarding a national warrant database. Also in its
response to this recommendation and in additional comments, SSA noted
several instances where it believed we had made incorrect assumptions
regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with our assertion
that it cannot determine the amount of time that is actually required to
complete the processing of fugitive warrants and stated that it was able
to track the number of days it takes for each individual subject
(fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated that our analysis of
the fugitive felon processing timeline had incorrectly considered start-
up/ test file processing times that can be associated with states* first
submissions of warrant files, thus accounting for our approximation of 165
days. We acknowledge that SSA has been able to track fugitive warrant
information

on a subject- by- subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA
had performed any aggregate tracking of the time required to process
fugitive warrants* data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the

program*s performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited
to case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or
improperly formatted data. However, we have amended our report to
specifically reflect that we also did not include trial and error times
for states reporting

warrant information for the first time. In addition, SSA interpreted our
discussion of states* perspectives regarding fugitive felon data
formatting and transmission requirements as an implication that the
requirements were unduly restrictive. However, we recognize the importance
of prescribed standards for ensuring consistent reporting of warrant
information and other computerized data. In this

regard, our report aims only to highlight some of the circumstances that
currently prevent SSA from receiving comprehensive warrant information
from state and local law enforcement agencies.

Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information
about the agency*s on- line connections with states* departments of social
service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of Prisons.
SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to each state
and that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and that real- time

transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report. Based on
documentation that SSA*s Office of Systems provided, we determined that
SSA has direct, dedicated on- line connections with every state*s
department of social services. However, we do not imply in our report that
on- line connections mean real- time connections. We have added language
to clarify that SSA*s existing on- line connections with state and local
agencies primarily involve batch, rather than real- time, transfers of
data.

Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated
technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation
of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, SSA

stated that it and the OIG have already completed this task. In
particular, SSA stated that a joint SSA/ OIG analysis of state and federal
warrant files had been started in January 2001 to determine what impact
OASI and DI legislation would have on the program. According to SSA, this
analysis had determined that the legislation would affect staff resources,
but would not

affect its need for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information
had been shared with us during our review. While conducting our review,
OIG officials did inform us that they had

performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI legislation
on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the conclusion of our

review, the officials had not met our request for documentation supporting
this analysis. OIG officials subsequently provided the analysis to us
while reviewing and commenting on our draft report. We agreed to review
the analysis and make revisions to our report, as necessary. Our review of
the analysis found that OIG*s main objective had been to determine the

increase in the current fugitive felon program workload. However, the
analysis did not include any discussion of the technological implications
resulting from the OASI and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that,
in June 2001, its Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI

to the fugitive felon program would require about 8 work years, but that
the agency did not envision any major new or unique information technology
expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our
review, SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems* projection or of
documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have modified our
report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that assessed the

workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI legislation, we continue to
believe that additional assessment is necessary to determine whether and
what information systems support would be required to meet the broader
mission.

Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which listed
the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon program and
to the definition of *high misdemeanors* discussed in footnote 6 to the
report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512- 6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant
Director, at (202) 512- 6304. We can also be reached by E- mail at
willemssenj@ gao. gov and

melvinv@ gao. gov, respectively. Individuals making key contributions to
this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison,
David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and Eric
Trout. Sincerely yours,

Joel C. Willemssen Managing Director, Information Technology Issues

Appendi Appendi xes x I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine the
technological aspects of the fugitive felon program in order to (1)
identify technological barriers restricting (a) data matching between the
Social Security Administration*s (SSA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation*s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain
data- matching agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies;
(2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be
included in legislation restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3)
determine whether other databases, such as those

maintained by the Department of Justice*s Bureau of Prisons and the U. S.
Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon
program. To understand the fugitive felon data- matching process, we
obtained and

analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of
Prisons and the U. S. Marshals Service. These documents described data
sharing and matching policies, operational and security procedures, and
the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive felon program. We
complemented our understanding of the data- matching process by

arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an industry leader
with expertise in data- matching software, to understand how datamatching
software works in a database environment. At the time of our review, SSA
did not have documentation showing the

flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data- matching
process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish this,
we relied on the results of our document analyses and used business
process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of the
fugitive felon program*s process flow. We provided copies of the completed
business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and its Office of
Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our process depiction
and incorporated changes based on their review and comments. In addition,
to further confirm the process, we interviewed agency officials in all of
the offices involved in administering the fugitive felon program. These
included SSA*s OIG and office of operations, SSA and OIG field

offices, and the FBI Information Technology Center (ITC) in Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey.

Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many days
it took to process warrant information, we determined the approximate
number of days involved in the process from the receipt of warrant
information from federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies until the suspension of fugitives* SSI benefits. We derived the
number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation obtained
from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed samples of
incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of Central
Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems Operations to
calculate the approximate number of days it took these offices to process
the warrant data from its receipt until they forwarded it to OIG. We also
interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters, its OIG, and the FBI ITC
regarding the number of days involved in processing fugitive warrants. We
shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA

officials to confirm the validity of our processing timeline estimate. To
identify technological barriers restricting data matching between SSA*s
and the FBI*s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of SSA*s
fugitive felon process and assessed information describing its supporting
technical infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation describing the
FBI*s repository of fugitives and other criminals* the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC)* along with the agency*s approach to providing
warrant information to SSA. To support our analysis, we applied various

guidance, including Office of Management and Budget Circular A- 130,
Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records about
Individuals and Appendix II, Security of Federal Automated

Information Resources; and National Institute of Standards and Technology
computer security guidance. Regarding SSA*s ongoing efforts to obtain
data- matching agreements with

state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer Matching
Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100- 503), amending the
Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data- matching agreements fall under the
provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized disclosures of
computerized data through data matching. In addition, we applied the
Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93- 579), which stipulates provisions for
protecting individuals from unauthorized disclosure of non- computerized
information. We also applied knowledge gained through our detailed
analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA*s model data-
matching agreements, reports documenting the status of negotiations
between SSA and state and local law enforcement agencies, and other policy
and procedural documentation. We conducted site visits and telephone
conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law enforcement
agencies* Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania* to determine

their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any
technological barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and
efficiently share data with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess
issues and concerns affecting their efforts to negotiate data- matching
agreements with SSA.

To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should legislation
be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI benefits
payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L. 104- 193), amending
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as OASI and DI legislation
proposed by the House of Representatives and U. S. Senate. We also
assessed SSA OIG reports and testimony that highlighted the Inspector
General*s position regarding proposed legislation prohibiting OASI and DI
benefits payments to fugitive felons and determined SSA*s decisions and
actions regarding the potential impact of such proposed legislation. In
addition, as part of our analysis, we considered our recent correspondence
to the House Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has
the authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide
law enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security
numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons. 18 Finally,
to

determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the
Department of Justice*s Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service could
provide additional support to the fugitive felon program, we obtained and
analyzed documentation describing the agreements between SSA*s OIG and
these agencies. In addition, we analyzed systems documentation pertaining
to the Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service*s databases, as well
as the FBI*s NCIC and state and local law enforcement agencies* databases.
This documentation included data standards, reporting requirements
(memoranda of understanding and data- matching agreements), policies, and
procedures. We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of SSA*s
Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice Information
Services Division; the U. S. Marshals Service; and the Bureau of Prisons
to gain an understanding of how their databases could be used to support
the fugitive felon program.

We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Programs: The Scope of
SSA*s Authority to Deny Benefits to Fugitive Felons and to Release
Information about OASI and DI Beneficiaries Who Are Fugitive Felons, GAO-
02- 459R (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching

Appendi x II

Process Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service
(USMS), and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant
information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such as
cartridges, diskettes, and CD- ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U. S. mail
or FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and CD- ROMs
is sent to SSA*s Office of Central Operations (any warrant information
received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant information
contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent to SSA*s
Office of Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon receipt, staff
in these two offices upload the warrant information onto SSA*s mainframe
computer, located at its National Computer Center (NCC), to begin the
data- matching process.

As part of the data- matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup
copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight
batches, using SSA*s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify
fugitives* names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The NCC
staff then notifies SSA*s OIG that the data files are in production. The
OIG is responsible for ensuring that the data files include only
individuals charged with felony and parole or probation violations; it
deletes any files naming individuals charged with misdemeanors.

Following OIG*s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the
supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI benefits
payments. The records of fugitives identified* called matched records* are
then returned to the OIG for further processing.

OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation
and case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case
numbers are assigned based on whether the records represent *exact*
matches or *good* matches. 19 OIG then sends the records containing exact
matches (on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI*s ITC in Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey and to USMS for additional processing. OIG also notifies its
field offices via E- mail that exact and good matches have been entered
into its allegation and case investigative system.

19 Exact matches are those having only one person with a particular name,
Social Security number, date of birth, and sex. Good matches are those
having one or two of the data elements, such as name and date of birth,
but not a Social Security number. Good matches require the OIG field
offices to perform additional identification and verification.

Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address and
status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records to
determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal computer

to access and query fugitives* records that are maintained in the NCIC
database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether states*
matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes and mails
the records to the applicable states for their verification. ITC staff
also obtains

from the NCIC database address information on the law enforcement agencies
that originally issued the arrest warrants on the individuals named in the
warrants and manually type each originating law enforcement agency*s
address onto a cover letter. The staff then uses the address information
to mail the *leads,* together with the cover letter, law enforcement
referral form (OI- 5B), and the law enforcement certification form (OI-
5C) to the originating law enforcement agencies for their use in locating
and apprehending the fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally requires
approximately 30 days to process the matched records.

State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in the
*leads* to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification forms
to ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant. Before acting
to suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the originating law
enforcement agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive based on the leads
provided. By allowing this *sunset* phase, SSA avoids letting fugitives
know that their status and whereabouts have been revealed before law
enforcement authorities can arrest them.

When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement
agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms to
the appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the time
that the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case consists of
50 subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications, enter the
information from these forms into the allegation and case investigative
system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms, and mail the

forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do not return
certification forms indicating the status of the arrest warrant to ITC
within 60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law enforcement agencies
either by letter or telephone to determine whether the warrant is still
active. OIG

agents also perform additional identification activities for good matches
and send these matches to SSA field offices, where staff query the
supplemental security record for verification. If records cannot be
verified using the supplemental security record, OIG contacts the law
enforcement agencies for verification. If, after contacting law
enforcement agencies,

warrants still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed
back to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to
records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.

Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still active,
OIG agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices, where action
is taken to suspend the fugitive*s SSI benefits, calculate the amount of
overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told us that the
process

to suspend SSI benefits payments takes approximately 10 days. Based on our
analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we determined that
from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data from the law
enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who receive SSI
benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends SSI

benefits, the process can take up to 165 days. 20 This approximate
processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems, operations, and OIG
staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to verify and batch process
warrants, 60 days for state and local law enforcements agencies to locate
and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice of benefits suspension,
30 days for OIG field offices to act on information received from the law

enforcement agencies, and 10 days for processing the suspension of
benefits.

Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given
due process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact SSA
for a continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension. If the
fugitive

loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and again update the
supplemental security record. SSA*s NCC runs master tapes once a month and
submits them to the Department of the Treasury, informing it of any
updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing checks to the
identified fugitive felons.

20 The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of
information provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. Our
analysis considered the steps required to fully process a case that did
not involve circumstances such as lost, mishandled, or improperly
formatted warrant information. To confirm the validity of our timeline
estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA and
FBI officials.

Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives and
Preventing Them

Appendi x III

from Receiving SSI Payments SSA reports that, since its inception in
August 1996, the fugitive felon program has been instrumental in helping
identify approximately 45, 000 fugitives who improperly collected at least
$82 million in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition,
SSA reports that, as a result of sharing fugitive warrant information,
officer and public safety throughout the United States has increased.
According to SSA*s OIG, among those fugitives who have been identified as
receiving SSI benefits, more than 5, 000 have been apprehended since the
fugitive felon program began.

The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon program
has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and preventing
improper payments of SSI benefits:

 On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result of
computer matching between SSA*s OIG and the FBI*s NCIC. Agents from OIG*s
New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and deputies from
the Essex County, New York sheriff*s office, arrested one fugitive wanted
on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of producing and
distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both fugitives were
remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and

these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives* SSI benefits. 
In New York, the field division of SSA*s OIG used leads from matched

fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union
County, New Jersey sheriff*s office on a burglary charge. This fugitive,
arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent, had 13 prior
arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for homicide. This case
resulted in SSI benefits suspension.

 Under the direction of the U. S. Attorney*s Office for the Eastern
District of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated in
an operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and juvenile
chronic violent offenders. The 3- day operation resulted in the arrest of

82 individuals* 67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The apprehended
individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from criminal sexual conduct
to armed robbery and assault with intent to do bodily harm.

 In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task Force,
(composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and California state parole), assisted by California*s Department
of Health Services and Department of Motor

Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole violation.
The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years by assuming
the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for and received SSI
benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31, 2001, a grand jury
indicted him on two counts of false statements for SSI benefits, two
counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number, and three counts

of identity theft.

Comments from the Social Security

Appendi x IV Administration

Now on p. 7. Now on p. 12.

Comments from the U. S. Department of

Appendi x V

Justice (310420)

a

GAO United States General Accounting Office

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Appendix I

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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Appendix II

Appendix II Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching Process

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Appendix III

Appendix III Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives
and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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Appendix V

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