    Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could
    Benefit from Better Use of Technology (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-346).

    The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by
    the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash
    assistance program in the United States.  For fiscal year 2002,
    SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more
    than six million financially needy individuals who are aged,
    blind, or disabled.  Since becoming operational in August 1996,
    the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by
    helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI
    benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to
    locate and and apprehend fugitive felons.  Nevertheless, several
    technological and other barriers are contributing to
    inefficiencies in the program's operations.  Certain information
    systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    use in processing matched data are not interoperable or
    compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant
    information.  Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one
    office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the
    overall performance of the fugitive felon program.  Consequently,
    no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and
    matching process.  Largely because of the SSA's and states'
    limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive
    felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been
    reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA.
    According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors
    that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were
    that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
    information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and
    manually transmitting the information created additional resource
    requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment
    of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive
    felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits
    and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing
    justice.  However, the additional matches of warrant records
    against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase
    the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's
    Information Technology Center.	SSA may be able to improve the
    fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by
    exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting
    other federal, state, and local programs.  SSA currently has
    direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and
    receives data supporting various other programs, including its
    program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-346
        ACCNO:   A04765
      TITLE:     Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program
    Could Benefit from Better Use of Technology
         DATE:   09/06/2002
      SUBJECT:   Federal social security programs
    	     Information technology
    	     Data bases
    	     Computer matching
    	     Criminals
    	     Social security benefits
    	     Supplemental Security Income Program
    	     Old Age Survivors and Disability
    	     Insurance Program

    	     Disability Insurance Program

    Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program Could
    Benefit from Better Use of Technology (06-SEP-02, GAO-02-346).

    The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by
    the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash
    assistance program in the United States.  For fiscal year 2002,
    SSA expects to pay SSI benefits totaling $31.5 billion to more
    than six million financially needy individuals who are aged,
    blind, or disabled.  Since becoming operational in August 1996,
    the fugitive felon program has provided a valuable service by
    helping SSA to identify and prevent payments to ineligible SSI
    benefits recipients and helping law enforcement agencies to
    locate and and apprehend fugitive felons.  Nevertheless, several
    technological and other barriers are contributing to
    inefficiencies in the program's operations.  Certain information
    systems that SSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    use in processing matched data are not interoperable or
    compatible, thus also hindering the efficient exchange of warrant
    information.  Contributing to these inefficiencies is that no one
    office within SSA has been designated to oversee and manage the
    overall performance of the fugitive felon program.  Consequently,
    no program officials could explain the overall data sharing and
    matching process.  Largely because of the SSA's and states'
    limited uses of information technology to support the fugitive
    felon program, many state law enforcement agencies have been
    reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with SSA.
    According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors
    that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were
    that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
    information and SSA's guidance for formatting, downloading, and
    manually transmitting the information created additional resource
    requirements that some states were unable to meet. The enactment
    of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive
    felons could increase SSA's recovery of improperly paid benefits
    and prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing
    justice.  However, the additional matches of warrant records
    against OASI and DI recipient files could substantially increase
    the data processing workloads of both SSA and the FBI's
    Information Technology Center.	SSA may be able to improve the
    fugitive felon program's operational efficiency and outcomes by
    exploring its existing telecommunications connectivity supporting
    other federal, state, and local programs.  SSA currently has
    direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits and
    receives data supporting various other programs, including its
    program to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-346
        ACCNO:   A04765
      TITLE:     Social Security Administration: Fugitive Felon Program
    Could Benefit from Better Use of Technology
         DATE:   09/06/2002
      SUBJECT:   Federal social security programs
    	     Information technology
    	     Data bases
    	     Computer matching
    	     Criminals
    	     Social security benefits
    	     Supplemental Security Income Program
    	     Old Age Survivors and Disability
    	     Insurance Program

    	     Disability Insurance Program

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    GAO-02-346

                                           A

    Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate

    September 2002 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Fugitive Felon Program Could
    Benefit from Better Use of Technology

    GAO- 02- 346

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 2 Background 5 Technological and Other Barriers
    Contribute to Inefficiencies in the

    Fugitive Felon Program 8 SSA*s Efforts to Obtain Data- Matching Agreements
    Have Not

    Resulted in Comprehensive Data 17 Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI
    Benefits for Fugitive Felons

    Could Have a Substantial Impact on the Program 21 Increased Reliance on
    Other Agencies* Databases Could Help

    Enhance Fugitive Felon Program Operations 23 Conclusions 25
    Recommendations for Executive Action 26 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    27

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 35

    Appendix II: Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching Process 38

    Appendix III: Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending
    Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments 41

    Appendix IV: Comments from the Social Security Administration 43

    Appendix V: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice 49 Figures
    Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA*s Fugitive

    Felon Program 7 Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program
    Process 10 Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated) 15 Figure
    4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements 19

    Abbreviations

    BOP Bureau of Prisons CMPPA Computer Matching Privacy and Protection Act
    EVS Enumeration Verification System FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
    GAO U. S. General Accounting Office ITC Information Technology Center NCC
    National Computer Center NCIC National Crime Information Center OASI/ DI
    Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance OIG Office of
    Inspector General PRWORA Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
    Reconciliation

    Act SSA Social Security Administration SSI Supplemental Security Income
    USMS U. S. Marshals Service

    Letter

    September 6, 2002 The Honorable Charles E. Grassley Ranking Minority
    Member Committee on Finance United States Senate

    Dear Senator Grassley: The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
    administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest
    cash assistance program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA
    expects to pay SSI

    benefits totaling approximately $31.5 billion to more than 6 million
    financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Under the
    Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 1
    any individuals fleeing to avoid prosecution or confinement after

    conviction for a crime that is a felony or who violate a condition of
    probation or parole imposed under federal or state law are ineligible to
    receive SSI benefits. SSA has the authority to suspend such benefits when
    these individuals are identified. Further, under certain conditions, the
    act allows SSA to disclose information on these individuals to law
    enforcement agencies to aid in their location and apprehension.

    In August 1996, SSA established the fugitive felon program to facilitate
    identifying individuals in violation of the act and help protect the
    integrity of the SSI program and ensure the public*s safety. SSA, state
    and local governments, and federal law enforcement agencies rely on
    numerous databases and information systems to carry out the fugitive felon
    program. Accordingly, you requested that we review the technological
    aspects of the program to (1) identify technological barriers restricting
    (a) data matching between SSA*s and the Federal Bureau of Investigation*s
    (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data- matching
    agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the
    technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors
    Insurance (OASI)

    and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation
    restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other
    databases, such as those maintained by the Department of Justice*s Bureau
    of Prisons 1 Pub. L. No. 104- 193, 202 Stat. 2105, 2186 (1996), commonly
    known as the Welfare Reform

    Act.

    and the U. S. Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the
    fugitive felon program.

    In performing this review, we analyzed key documentation maintained by
    SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and the U. S. Marshals Service. These
    included data- matching policies and standards, operational and security
    procedures, and technical infrastructure descriptions associated with the
    fugitive felon program. We also analyzed data- matching agreements and
    laws regulating data- matching activities with state and local law
    enforcement agencies. We conducted site visits and telephone conferences
    with 17 state and local law enforcement agencies to determine their
    involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological
    barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share
    data with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns
    affecting their efforts to negotiate data- matching agreements with SSA.
    In

    addition, we interviewed officials at SSA*s Headquarters, Office of
    Inspector General, and National Computer Center; at the FBI*s Criminal
    Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and
    its Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and at the
    Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service. Our review focused on the
    ways in which information technology is being used to achieve fugitive
    felon program efficiencies, but did not assess the program*s
    effectiveness. We plan to issue a report later this year that will in part
    address the

    program*s effectiveness. We performed our review from August 2001 through
    May 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. Additional details concerning the objectives, scope, and
    methodology of our review are contained in appendix I.

    Results in Brief Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive
    felon program has provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify
    and prevent payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law
    enforcement

    agencies to locate and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several
    technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the
    program*s operations. As currently administered, the processing of
    fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients is
    complex and fragmented, involving numerous organizations performing
    multiple steps to obtain and act on the information. In addition, while
    matches of fugitive warrant records against SSI recipient files are
    conducted using computers, most of the essential tasks of sharing and
    verifying warrant information are performed manually. For example, SSA
    currently lacks the capability to accept warrant information from law
    enforcement agencies on line; thus,

    the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service, and some participating state law
    enforcement agencies must download this information from their databases
    and information systems onto electronic media, such as cartridges and
    tapes, and send it to SSA via the U. S. mail or FedEx. In addition,
    certain information systems that SSA and the FBI use in processing matched
    data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also

    hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Collectively, the
    manual activities in processing warrant information have resulted in an
    inefficient and time- consuming operation that, based on our analysis of
    the process used, can take up to 165 days to complete (from SSA*s receipt
    of warrant information until SSI benefits are suspended). Contributing to
    these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated
    to oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon
    program. Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data
    sharing and matching process.

    Largely because of SSA*s and states* limited uses of information
    technology to support the fugitive felon program, many state law
    enforcement agencies have been reluctant to enter into data- matching
    agreements with SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among
    the factors that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements
    were that some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant
    information and SSA*s guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually
    transmitting the information created additional resource requirements that
    some states were unable to meet. In addition, some states report warrant
    information

    on a voluntary basis, and some states that have signed agreements have not
    yet submitted any data to SSA. SSA officials acknowledged that the
    agency*s efforts to obtain comprehensive warrant information have not
    yielded anticipated results.

    The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive
    felons could increase SSA*s recovery of improperly paid benefits and
    prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice.
    However, the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI
    recipient

    files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both
    SSA and the FBI*s Information Technology Center. The center plays a major
    role in verifying the accuracy of warrant records and supplies fugitives*
    addresses to law enforcement agencies. SSA and FBI officials recognize the
    need for additional information technology support to conduct computer
    matches of warrant information against the OASI and DI recipient files.
    However, at the conclusion of our review, neither SSA nor the FBI had yet

    initiated evaluations to assess the anticipated technological impact on
    their operations. SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program*s
    operational

    efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications
    connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA
    currently has direct, on- line connections with every state that transmits
    and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program
    to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners. In addition, while SSA
    does not currently have telecommunications connectivity with the FBI*s
    National Crime Information Center* a national database of warrant and
    other criminal information* agency officials believed this database could
    offer a more comprehensive and readily accessible means of obtaining
    outstanding warrant information from the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service, and
    state agencies. However, all states report warrant information to this
    database voluntarily. Further, while SSA officials viewed the database as
    a potential single source of comprehensive warrant information, they had
    not assessed the feasibility of this alternative or other options for
    using online connections with federal, state, and local agencies to more
    efficiently obtain the information.

    To ensure that the fugitive felon program is positioned to meet its
    current and future obligations toward preventing payments of SSI benefits
    to fugitive felons, we are making recommendations to the Commissioner of
    Social Security that include (1) designating a program office and manager

    to oversee and direct the program; (2) fully assessing the program*s
    current operations and performance; and (3) examining and proposing
    options for using technology to automate currently manual functions
    involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information.

    SSA and the Department of Justice provided written comments on a draft of
    our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V. In its
    comments, SSA expressed disappointment with our report and generally
    disagreed with our recommendations. Among its specific comments, SSA
    disagreed with the need for a program manager and additional monitoring
    and analysis of the program*s operations. Given the complexities of the

    fugitive felon processes, we continue to believe that SSA*s program could
    benefit from more focused program management and additional monitoring and
    analysis to identify process improvements and technological enhancements.
    In addition, as part of continual monitoring and analysis, SSA needs to
    identify aggregate tracking data to assess the

    program*s overall cost and performance. The Department of Justice provided
    technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

    Background Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals
    who have limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These
    benefits

    are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial need. SSA has
    estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits
    payments totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million
    individuals. Since 1997, we have designated SSI a high- risk program
    because of its susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and SSA*s
    insufficient management oversight. 2 Long- standing concerns regarding
    program abuses and mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and the
    inability to recover outstanding SSI debt have led to congressional
    criticism of SSA*s ability to effectively manage and ensure the program*s
    integrity.

    In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs* together
    commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs funded
    from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their wages. OASI
    provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their dependents or, when
    workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI program provides monthly
    cash benefits to workers and their dependents when workers are disabled.
    In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI programs collectively are expected to
    pay approximately $447 billion in benefits to about 46 million eligible
    workers, dependents, and survivors.

    In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
    Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting SSI benefits.
    Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible to receive SSI
    payments during any month in which he or she is

     fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the laws
    of the place from which the person flees, 3 2 U. S. General Accounting
    Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
    Administration, GAO- 01- 261 (Washington, D. C.: January 2001).

    3 A felony is a serious offense that is usually punishable by imprisonment
    for more than 1 year.

     fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime
    that is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees,
    or

     violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or
    state law. 4 PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI
    payments to fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to
    provide information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and
    apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar authority
    for OASI and DI benefits payments.

    In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and
    entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG).
    SSA*s OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program
    integrity and law enforcement functions and is the primary interface
    between SSA and law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make
    arrests for program fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement
    agencies pursuing SSI recipients engaging in criminal activities.

    Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the
    program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA*s offices of operations,
    disability and income security programs, and systems; its regional and
    field offices; and the FBI*s Information Technology Center in Fort
    Monmouth, New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to administer
    the fugitive felon program. Rather, according to SSA officials, each
    participating SSA office (for example, the office of operations and OIG)
    and the FBI Information Technology Center use existing funding to support
    the program.

    4 Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment that allows parolees
    to serve the remainder of their term outside the confines of a penal
    institution if they satisfactorily comply with all terms and conditions
    provided. Probation is a type of sentence imposed by a court for the
    commission of a crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released
    into the community under the supervision of a probation officer. Violation
    of probation can result in probation being revoked and a sentence of
    confinement imposed.

    Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA*s Fugitive Felon
    Program

    a In commenting on our draft report, SSA stated that, as part of an Office
    of Systems* reorganization, the Office of Systems Analysis and the Office
    of Information Management have been replaced by the Office of Earnings,
    Enumeration and Administrative Systems; the Office of Systems Design and
    Development has been replaced by the Office of Disability and Supplemental
    Security Income

    Systems. Source: GAO analysis based on SSA*s data.

    Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information from
    available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI recipients
    on its rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant information from
    several sources, including (1) the FBI*s National Crime Information Center
    (NCIC); (2) state and local law enforcement agencies; and (3) the U. S.
    Marshals Service (USMS). SSA receives warrant information from the FBI and
    USMS under memorandums of understanding and from certain state and local
    law enforcement agencies under matching agreements that establish
    conditions for SSA*s use of the warrant information in its matching
    operations. According to SSA, in calendar year 2001, it received
    approximately 27 million warrant records from these federal, state, and

    local law enforcement agencies. Of these, about 2 million records were
    eligible to be matched against SSI benefits files. 5 Appendix II provides
    a detailed description of the fugitive felon data- matching process. OIG
    reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching

    operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000
    fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of
    these fugitives, approximately 5, 000 were subsequently apprehended.
    Appendix III presents selected cases in which fugitives were apprehended
    and SSI

    benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive felon program.
    Technological and

    In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several Other
    Barriers

    technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its
    processing of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI
    recipients. These Contribute to

    barriers include a complex, multistep process to obtain and act on
    fugitive Inefficiencies in the

    warrant information and a heavily manual approach to accomplishing
    Fugitive Felon critical program tasks, such as exchanging and verifying
    warrant information. In addition, where information systems are used to
    support

    Program the program, many of them are not interoperable or capable of
    exchanging data electronically. Consequently, key portions of the data-
    matching

    process are complicated and time- consuming. Contributing to this
    situation is that SSA has not designated a single, central point of
    management accountability to direct the fugitive felon program*s
    operations. 5 According to SSA data, during an initial screening of these
    records against information it

    had on all holders and applicants of Social Security numbers, a majority
    of the approximately 27 million warrant records that it actually received
    could not be verified against a Social Security number or other vital
    information, and therefore, were not included in its match against files
    identifying SSI recipients.

    Fugitive Felon DataMatching The steps in administering the fugitive felon
    program* from the point that

    Process Is SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the
    suspension of

    Complex and Highly SSI benefits* are complicated and include many back-
    and- forth exchanges

    Manual of warrant information among the participating entities. At the
    time of our

    review, each of the organizations participating in the program had
    responsibility for distinct segments of the tasks involved in processing
    fugitive warrant information received from federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies. However, there was no single entity within SSA that
    was able to provide a full explanation of the complete chain of activities
    comprising the data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped
    the process ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.

    Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process

    Source: GAO analysis.

    As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a
    monthly basis) from the FBI*s national repository* NCIC* and from USMS and
    state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration
    Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master
    files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify
    identity

    information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social Security number
    of the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of those records for
    which identities can be verified, OIG screens the data to eliminate
    misdemeanors. 6 Then, a second match is conducted against files maintained
    in SSA*s supplemental security record to determine which of the fugitives
    are receiving SSI benefits. The results of the second match (addresses of
    the fugitive benefits recipients) are forwarded to OIG for

    further processing. OIG and its field offices work with the FBI*s
    Information Technology Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation,
    or parole violation warrants are active and that the appropriate
    individuals have been identified. Once verifications are made, ITC
    provides address information about each SSI recipient (called *leads*) to
    the appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement agency so that it
    can locate and apprehend the

    individual. After action by the law enforcement agency, OIG refers its
    findings to the appropriate SSA field offices, which initiate suspension
    of SSI benefits.

    In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to
    match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the master
    files of Social Security number holders and applications and the
    supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the
    warrant information used in the matching process, are performed manually.
    For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications capability that would
    allow it to accept warrant information on line. As a result, the FBI,
    USMS, and state and local law enforcement agencies must download warrant
    information from their respective databases and information systems onto
    various electronic media (such as cartridges, tapes, and CDROMS)

    and send this information to SSA via the U. S. mail or FedEx. Depending on
    the type of media used, two separate SSA offices* the Office of Central
    Operations and the Office of Telecommunications and Systems

    6 PRWORA does not specifically address, and SSA does not conduct data
    matches of, misdemeanor charges, with the exception of high misdemeanors,
    which are considered felonies under the laws of New Jersey.

    Operations* receive, log, and upload the information onto SSA*s mainframe
    computer to begin the matching process. Beyond manually sharing warrant
    information, many of the steps in verifying and referring information
    contained in the matched records also are performed manually. For example,
    to accurately identify and locate fugitives, SSA*s field offices, OIG, and
    the FBI*s ITC exchange numerous forms with law enforcement agencies. 7
    However, none of these forms are automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to
    manually prepare and fax or mail them to the appropriate entities.

    In addition, both OIG*s and ITC*s program activities are supported by
    distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further
    preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG*s
    allegation and case investigative system and ITC*s automated case support
    system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation numbers to
    matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched data.
    However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched records on
    which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download files
    containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG*s system
    uses Microsoft Word and ITC*s system uses Corel WordPerfect; thus, when
    ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable format to be able
    to process the warrant information.

    Manual Processes Have The various manual interventions in processing
    fugitive warrants all

    Resulted in a TimeConsuming contribute to a time- consuming operation that
    is less than optimally

    Operation efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files
    that federal and

    state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are not formatted in
    accordance with SSA*s specifications and must be returned to the agencies
    for correction, delaying action on matching these files. In addition, the
    electronic media containing warrant records are sometimes lost during the
    mail delivery process or are misplaced before being entered

    into SSA*s computers. As a result, this time- sensitive information may go
    unaccounted for a number of days. SSA had not determined the extent to
    which warrant records are being lost or mishandled and over what length of
    time, but program officials acknowledged that the longer it takes to match
    the warrant information, the greater the opportunity for fugitives to

    7 These forms include the OI- 5B (Referral Form), OI- 5C (Law Enforcement
    Certification Form), OI- 5D (Investigative Certification Form), and OI- 5E
    (SSA Feedback Form).

    remain unaccounted for and to continue to receive SSI benefits payments.
    Further, the officials stated that the manual steps involved in verifying
    fugitives* identities and obtaining address information for referring
    leads to law enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of
    locating and apprehending fugitives.

    SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually required
    to complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our analysis of
    data that SSA provided on its existing procedures found that the steps
    required to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such
    as lost or mishandled files, or improperly formatted warrant information
    received

    from states reporting warrant information for the first time, could take
    up to 165 days. 8 This approximate processing time could be increased up
    to an additional 70 days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal
    SSA*s decision to suspend benefits.

    As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65 days
    during which SSA and the FBI*s ITC conduct matches and initial
    verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement
    agencies. 9 The approximate time also includes a total of 90 days that is
    devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly identified and that
    their privacy and other rights are protected* 60 days that state and local
    law enforcement agencies are allowed to locate and apprehend fugitives
    before SSA serves notice that benefits will be suspended and 30 days
    during which OIG field offices conduct additional verifications prior to
    sending

    summaries of actions taken on matched records to SSA field offices for
    suspension of benefits. Program officials informed us that state and local
    law enforcement agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and
    apprehend fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased to
    60 to provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions
    taken on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with
    data matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law
    enforcement agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security
    numbers or identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike prisoners,
    fleeing felons are not incarcerated and may not have been convicted of a
    crime.

    8 The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of
    information provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. To
    confirm the validity of our timeline estimate, we shared the results of
    our analysis with appropriate SSA officials.

    9 The approximate 65 days includes certain unaccounted for activities,
    such as uploading and initial processing, screening for misdemeanors, and
    sorting duplicate warrant records.

    Consequently, the time devoted to manually verifying the currency of
    warrant information is vital for ensuring that the correct individuals are
    identified and apprehended.

    Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated)

    Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

    Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant
    information are necessary to help ensure the program*s integrity. However,
    automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant information

    from other agencies* databases on line, could help eliminate much of the
    time devoted to initially processing and matching warrant information and

    verifying and referring leads that results from the matched records (now
    estimated to take about 65 days).

    At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had
    recently begun considering options to automate manual processes in the
    field offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering
    eliminating many of the field offices* benefits suspension activities,
    such as

    providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports and,
    instead, performing these activities in one regional office with the use
    of computers.

    Although SSA*s consideration of options for improving the fugitive felon
    process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped its
    existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without doing
    so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes that are
    most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement goals, and
    ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for improving its manual
    operations. The Clinger- Cohen Act of 1996 requires agency heads to
    analyze, revise, and improve mission- related and administrative processes
    before making significant investments in supporting information
    technology. Further, an agency should have an overall business process
    improvement strategy that provides a means to coordinate and integrate the
    various reengineering and improvement projects, set priorities, and make
    appropriate budget decisions. By doing so, an agency can better

    position itself to maximize the potential of technology to improve
    performance, rather than simply automating inefficient processes.

    SSA Could Benefit from Although the fugitive felon program is achieving
    results, it could benefit

    Clear and Unified from increased management accountability. SSA relies on
    multiple

    Management Accountability agencies and offices to implement the fugitive
    felon program. However, to Direct the Fugitive Felon

    there is no unified source of management accountability to provide the
    consistent oversight and program continuity that is essential to
    sustaining Program

    program success. Consequently, staff assigned to administer the program
    offered conflicting accounts as to what program tasks were being performed
    and by whom. For example, program officials identified three different SSA
    offices* operations, program support, and OIG* as having responsibility
    for leading the program; yet no officials in these offices could explain
    the overall data- matching process or had decision- making and oversight
    responsibility for the other participating entities.

    In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the
    program*s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs
    and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For
    example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with
    certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive warrant
    records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had mapped the
    overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to
    comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA*s receipt of
    warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons were
    actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in place for 6
    years, program officials were unable to provide data on the total costs of
    the program.

    In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA
    officials acknowledged that the program lacked unified management
    accountability. An OIG official stated that, while the agency had
    initially decided that both headquarters offices and OIG would jointly
    administer the program, these offices had only recently begun considering
    ways to improve their

    management of the program. The agency was considering the development of a
    management board to oversee and address program issues and concerns.
    However, it had not developed any specific tasks or milestones for this
    improvement effort. Given the inherent complexity of the fugitive felon
    program and the many entities involved in its implementation, effective
    management of operations and data is essential for determining how best to
    achieve and sustain future program operations and reporting.

    SSA*s Efforts to Obtain Having complete and comprehensive warrant
    information from states is

    Data- Matching crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive
    felon program are

    achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant
    Agreements Have Not

    information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all outstanding
    Resulted in

    warrants are being included in the FBI*s NCIC database* a prime source of
    Comprehensive Data

    SSA*s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has been taking steps to
    obtain more comprehensive state and local information by pursuing
    datamatching agreements with states that do not report all of their
    warrant information to NCIC. However, a number of these states have been
    reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always
    abided by them, largely because of SSA*s and the states* concerns
    regarding the lack of information technology and adequate resources to
    support the program.

    SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC if
    they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation violators.
    States are considered to be partially reporting warrant information if,
    for example, they report felonies but not parole and probation violators.
    10 As of May 2002 (the latest month for which data were available), SSA
    had identified 21 states and the District of Columbia as fully reporting
    warrant information to NCIC and 29 states as partially reporting warrant
    information.

    In pursuing data- matching agreements to obtain all of the states* warrant
    information, 11 SSA reported as of May 2002 that it had signed agreements
    with 18 states 12 and was in various stages of negotiating agreements with
    5 other states. SSA had been unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3
    states, all of which had declined to enter into the agreements. It had not
    yet begun negotiating agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4
    reflects the status of SSA*s attempts to obtain data- matching agreements
    with the states as of May 2002.

    10 According to two states that SSA identified as fully reporting to NCIC
    (Florida and Kansas), most, but not all, felony warrants are reported to
    this database because the submission of felony warrants is at the
    discretion of local agencies within these states.

    11 At the time that SSA began pursuing data matching agreements, three
    states (Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania) did not maintain central
    repositories of state and local warrant information. Therefore, to obtain
    a majority of the states* warrant information, SSA negotiated agreements
    with their largest local law enforcement agencies.

    12 This number includes 3 states (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey)
    identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but
    from which SSA, for various reasons, negotiated agreements to also
    directly obtain data.

    Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements a The states that
    SSA is pursuing agreements with include 3 (Delaware, Indiana, and New
    Jersey) identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC,
    but from which SSA, for various reasons, negotiated agreements to also
    directly obtain data. b SSA does not pursue data- matching agreements with
    states that fully report to NCIC.

    Source: SSA.

    SSA and state officials cited various factors* often related to their uses
    of information technology* that had made negotiating data- matching
    agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to decline
    an agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not have the
    capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state officials
    would have to reformat, download to electronic media, and mail the warrant
    information to SSA Headquarters. The officials believed that doing so
    would not be cost- effective and, thus, elected to continue their practice
    of submitting paper printouts of warrant information to the SSA OIG field

    office in Des Moines. In Florida, officials explained that their state had
    not entered an agreement with SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant
    information to NCIC because of SSA*s specifications for formatting and
    downloading the warrant information onto electronic media. They expressed
    concern that additional resources would be required to perform these
    formatting tasks and manually provide the warrant information to SSA.
    Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data- matching

    agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or
    repositories of warrant information in some state and local law
    enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that
    because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to enter
    into a data- matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained that not
    all of the states* approximately 700 local law enforcement offices
    currently report all of their warrant information at the state level and
    to NCIC. Thus,

    to meet the intent of a data- matching agreement, each local agency would
    have to provide their warrant information directly to SSA. However, most
    local law enforcement agencies within the state do not have central
    repositories for reporting the information to SSA.

    Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central repository,
    they had chosen not to sign a data- matching agreement with SSA because of
    privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials expressed concerns
    with the privacy and security implications of submitting sensitive warrant
    information via the U. S. mail.

    Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully achieved
    its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information from the
    states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18 states with
    which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually submitting warrant

    information to the agency. According to SSA, the remaining 9 states that
    had signed agreements but had not yet sent warrant information provided

    similar reasons for not complying with the agreements. These included
    states* concerns about the privacy and security of the warrant information
    and difficulties complying with SSA*s record layout or formatting
    requirements. In addition, although having agreed to submit warrant

    information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado) later
    decided instead to report all warrant information to NCIC.

    At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the
    process for obtaining data- matching agreements was difficult and had not
    yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially provide
    warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements are intended
    primarily to protect states* data from unauthorized disclosure and use.
    Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the absence of a single and
    complete source of fugitive warrant records from all states, the
    datamatching agreements were necessary for ensuring that the agency could
    obtain comprehensive warrant information. We agree that comprehensive
    warrant information is vital to the success of the fugitive felon program.
    However, the data- matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will
    obtain the comprehensive warrant information that it seeks.

    Legislation Prohibiting Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are
    prohibited from receiving

    OASI and DI Benefits SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI
    benefits. Specifically, SSA maintains address information on fugitives
    receiving SSI, OASI, and DI

    for Fugitive Felons benefits, but can only share information with law
    enforcement agencies on Could Have a

    those fugitives receiving SSI. However, the increasing realization that
    OASI Substantial Impact on

    and DI benefits payments may also finance a potentially dangerous
    fugitive*s flight from justice has prompted the Congress to pursue

    the Program implementing provisions to prohibit payments to fugitives in
    these

    programs as well. 13 Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit
    SSA to share address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI
    benefits. In its own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that
    doing so could result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs.
    Specifically, in an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between August
    1996 and June

    13 In February 2002, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House
    Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security introduced
    legislation (H. R. 4070) to deny Title II (OASI and DI) benefits to
    fugitive felons and persons fleeing prosecution. In April 2002, a similar
    bill (S. 2387) was introduced before the Senate Finance Committee.

    1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at least $108 million in OASI
    and DI benefits. In August 2001, the office revised its estimates,
    projecting that OASI and DI benefits amounting to approximately $40
    million would be paid to fugitives through October 2001, and in each
    additional year that legislation was not enacted to prohibit such benefits
    payments* for a 5- year total payout of approximately $198 million.

    Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon program*s
    workload could increase substantially. SSA officials acknowledged that the
    additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program*s
    datamatching activities. According to an analysis that the OIG performed,
    the enactment of the legislative proposal would result in three times the
    current work level of SSI matches.

    The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying
    effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal Justice
    Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database, stated
    that implementing the provision would have no technological impact on that
    organization*s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant information.

    They anticipated that the database would continue to supply SSA with
    warrant records received daily from state and local law enforcement
    agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that the additional
    matched records for OASI and DI recipients could substantially increase

    ITC*s workload associated with verifying the accuracy of the matched
    records and supplying fugitives* addresses to law enforcement agencies.
    Further, based on its study, OIG officials, and those of the FBI, believed
    that ITC*s workforce would have to increase substantially* from the
    current staff of 7 to about 60* to accommodate the additional workload
    associated with handling all the leads generated through the matching
    process.

    With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon program,
    SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information systems
    support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant information
    against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither SSA nor the FBI
    had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the anticipated technological
    impact on their operations. Such an assessment is critical to helping SSA
    make an informed decision regarding its ability to ensure that
    comprehensive and efficient data- matching operations would continue under
    expanded operations. As discussed in our investment guide, good

    decisions require good data. 14 Consequently, having solid data on a
    program*s operations is essential for making informed decisions concerning
    workload management and the technological solutions needed to sustain
    efficient and effective performance.

    Increased Reliance on As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon
    program, having

    Other Agencies* efficient and effectively run operations will be essential
    to achieving

    sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged inefficiencies
    Databases Could Help

    in the existing fugitive felon processes and have indicated that they
    expect Enhance Fugitive

    to rely more heavily on information technology to help improve the Felon
    Program

    program*s operations and outcomes. Information systems and databases
    maintained by some of the federal, state, and local law enforcement

    Operations agencies that currently participate in the fugitive felon
    program could offer

    SSA opportunities for more efficiently obtaining warrant information to
    enhance the program.

    Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the
    fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local agencies
    participating in other programs. According to SSA systems officials, SSA
    currently has a direct, dedicated on- line connection with every state*s
    department of social services. 15 States use these lines to submit
    information to SSA covering various programs, such as child support
    enforcement. Similarly, as part of the prisoner program, some state and
    local prison facilities send federal prisoner data to SSA on line to aid
    in suspending SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to incarcerated inmates. 16 In
    discussing the exchange of states* fugitive warrant information, SSA

    officials told us that they had not evaluated how on- line connections
    with state and local agencies could be used to receive information
    supporting the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing an
    on- line

    14 U. S General Accounting Office, Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide
    for Evaluating Federal Agencies* IT Investment Decision- making, GAO/
    AIMD- 10. 1.13 (Washington, D. C.: February 1997). 15 SSA*s receipt of
    state and local agencies* data via dedicated on- line connections
    primarily involve batch, rather than real- time, transfers of data. 16 In
    response to PRWORA, SSA also instituted the prisoner program. Under this
    program, SSA has agreements with state and local correctional facilities
    to obtain information that is used to suspend SSI and OASI and DI benefits
    to prisoners.

    connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each state law
    enforcement agency would require each state to have access to a secure
    (encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They believed

    that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to be
    addressed. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA official
    told us that the agency had reached agreement with one state* Connecticut*
    to exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file transfer. According to
    the

    official, Connecticut is preparing to submit data via a Connect: Direct
    electronic file transfer method, in which data will be encrypted and sent
    from one mainframe computer to another over dedicated lines.

    An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance on
    the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily
    accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI,
    USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC*s technical
    infrastructure includes high- level security controls and validation and
    confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the
    database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on- line, real-
    time capacity with other information systems and databases, including
    those of USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant data
    to NCIC

    via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the FBI Criminal
    Justice Information Services* network. 17 As discussed earlier, all states
    transmit all or some portion of their warrant information on line to the
    NCIC database each month.

    Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on- line connections to
    transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and local
    law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant
    information that it sends to SSA via U. S. mail. On the other hand, SSA
    officials stated that the Bureau of Prison*s database of incarcerated
    inmates, which supports SSA*s prisoner program, could not be used to
    effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database does

    not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons. Both SSA and
    its OIG officials believed that having a single source of warrant
    information would help make the data- matching process less laborious and
    eliminate processing inefficiencies. Accordingly, in

    17 These systems, called control terminal agencies, provide statewide
    services such as overseeing the transmission of all warrant information
    within a state, controlling security, and providing information security
    program training.

    November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national warrant
    database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told
    us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a potential single source of
    warrant information to support the fugitive felon program. The officials
    believed that receiving USMS*s and state and local law enforcement
    agencies* warrant information on line via NCIC could potentially eliminate
    much of the duplicate warrant information that now contributes to the

    program*s inefficiencies. For example, according to federal, state, and
    local law enforcement officials, USMS and all states currently transmit
    all or some of their warrant information to the FBI*s NCIC. Thus, when the
    FBI

    downloads warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the
    information duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials
    reported that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60, 000
    duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per

    month) as a result of these dual exchanges. SSA officials noted, however,
    that achieving a single source of fugitive warrant information would
    require that SSA have the capability to accept data from NCIC on line. At
    the conclusion of our review, SSA officials stated that the agency had not
    explored using an on- line connection to NCIC to enhance the sharing of
    fugitive warrant information. In addition, they stated that, for NCIC to
    be effective as a single source of comprehensive warrant information,
    state agencies would have to be willing to report that portion of warrant
    information to NCIC that SSA currently must obtain from them under data-
    matching agreements. However, according to FBI officials, there is no
    statute or regulation requiring the states to fully report warrant
    information to NCIC; rather, states report information to this database
    voluntarily. Conclusions In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA
    faces significant

    technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient and
    effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome its
    high- risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits
    payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes have
    resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the program*s
    longterm

    success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data- matching agreements
    with the states have hindered SSA*s efforts to obtain comprehensive
    warrant information needed to fulfill program objectives. In the absence
    of essential management accountability, SSA lacks critical data needed to
    make informed decisions about the program*s processes and activities, as

    well as existing and future plans for technology supporting the program.
    Overcoming these inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to
    ensuring that the fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to
    achieve the greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively
    positioned to fulfill its potentially broader role in preventing OASI and
    DI benefits payments to fugitives.

    SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes
    could result from more substantial uses of information technology to
    perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline
    datamatching operations. Further, given the potential increase in SSA*s
    workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI nonpayment
    provision, having the necessary information technology to support its
    operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a proven capability
    to share data on line with federal, state, and local agencies in support
    of other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps toward examining its
    current data- matching operations and approaches to obtaining warrant
    information or exploring how best to use technology to enhance the overall
    fugitive felon process.

    Recommendations for To improve the fugitive felon program*s operational
    efficiency and ensure Executive Action

    sustained, long- term success in identifying fugitive SSI beneficiaries,
    we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security designate a program
    management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the
    program*s activities and progress. In addition, we recommend that the
    commissioner direct the program management office and manager to  conduct
    a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program*s current

    operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the
    organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to
    administer the program, a full accounting of the program*s costs,
    estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload

    requirements;  identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those
    fugitive felon

    processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving
    technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient
    operation;

     continue to examine and propose options for using technology to automate
    the currently manual functions involved in exchanging

    fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law
    enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of
    this information, including assessing alternatives to using data- matching
    agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining whether
    on- line connections with state and local law enforcement agencies and/ or
    direct telecommunications connections with the FBI*s NCIC database could
    offer viable and more efficient means of sharing warrant information; and

     assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations
    from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits
    payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information
    systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads
    resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these
    benefits recipients* files.

    Agency Comments and We received written comments on a draft of this report
    from the

    Our Evaluation Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the
    Director, Audit

    Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice (see
    app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed disappointment with
    our report and generally disagreed with our recommendations. The

    Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we have
    incorporated, as appropriate.

    Regarding the commissioner*s statement expressing disappointment in our
    report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the efficiency
    of the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in which
    improvements can be made that can benefit SSA*s future efforts at
    streamlining the program*s inefficient processes, improving performance
    and operations, and applying technology, where appropriate. In SSA*s
    comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied

    that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon program
    and did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program without
    startup funding or additional resources. We recognize the valuable role
    that SSA plays in implementing the fugitive felon program to prevent
    benefits payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing out
    technological and other barriers to the program*s operations, our intent
    was not to imply that

    SSA and other participating components lack a vision for the program.
    Rather, given the program*s complexity and multiple entities involved in
    its administration, we believe it is important to highlight critical
    conditions

    and operational inefficiencies necessitating SSA*s continual attention in
    order to ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize
    that funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as
    a steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it
    consistently carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data- matching
    operations in an efficient manner. Regarding our recommendation to
    designate a program management office

    and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program*s
    activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency- wide program
    manager was necessary. SSA stated that managers within its office of

    operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all involved
    offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
    responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act does
    not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in administrative
    decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition, regarding our
    statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing
    and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials
    are able to explain the process in its entirety. SSA also stated that, to
    ensure all

    involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
    responsibilities, it had released a detailed process description and
    provided a copy to us. Further, SSA added that because its officials had
    chosen not to answer questions pertaining to other components* work during
    our review, we had mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could
    explain the overall process.

    We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that
    there are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the
    participating components involved in administering the program. Our
    recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight
    capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently exist.
    It is not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that
    management oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding
    possible limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector General
    Act, the Act

    does not prohibit coordination of joint action between the OIG and the
    head of the establishment involved to ensure efficiency of operation and
    to avoid duplication of effort, nor do we believe that such coordination
    would affect OIG*s personal and professional independence. In this
    respect, as we

    noted in our report, an OIG official has commented on the need for
    improved coordination and management of the fugitive felon program. That
    official also noted that OIG had already begun to work with SSA*s Office
    of Operations to improve management of the program.

    Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in
    each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they were
    responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any

    officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of
    overall program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff
    within the SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the
    fugitive felon data- matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA
    revised its policy instructions in April 2002, outlining involved offices*
    roles and responsibilities, these instructions do not address SSA*s
    overall fugitive felon processes. In addition, we were unable to identify
    any aggregate tracking data to assess the program*s overall cost and
    performance. Given the multiple agencies and offices involved in
    administering this complex program, we continue to believe that having a
    unified source of accountability and authority for the program is
    essential to effectively and consistently oversee its progress and ensure
    that informed decisions are being made about its implementation. In
    discussing our findings on May 10, 2002, SSA and OIG officials agreed that
    the program lacked uniform management accountability and stated that they
    had just recently begun considering the development of a management board
    to oversee and

    address program management issues and concerns. SSA also disagreed with
    our recommendation that called for it to conduct a detailed assessment of
    the fugitive felon program*s current operations and performance, including
    a full accounting of the program*s costs and benefits and workload
    requirements. SSA stated that its analysis of the program*s operations is
    an ongoing process and that enhancements are made when deemed necessary.
    SSA further stated that it had completed many of the tasks cited in our
    recommendation prior to starting the matching process in calendar year
    1999, and that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the program.
    We agree that ongoing monitoring and analysis of the program*s operations
    is essential for ensuring that management is informed of the program*s
    cost and progress and to assess risks to overall performance. However,
    during our review, SSA could not demonstrate that it had made an aggregate
    assessment of the program*s current operations and performance, including
    an awareness of the processes, information flows, and time involved in
    administering the program, as well as a full accounting of its costs and
    requirements. Such information is vital for making informed decisions
    about the program*s progress and for determining where process
    improvements are needed and how best to achieve them. The fugitive felon
    program has been in place since 1996 (with computerized matching since
    1999), giving SSA sufficient opportunities to perform these necessary and
    critical assessments. Further,

    while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the
    fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA conduct its own program
    assessment that includes all participating components, which ensures that
    the program can be consistently and comprehensively controlled and
    managed.

    Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed a
    cost- benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001. Our
    review of the two- page summary found that it lacked substantial
    information about the program*s overall costs and benefits. An operations
    official who provided the document told us that the summary had
    constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate reflection, of
    the program*s costs and benefits, and that it had been developed only for
    the purpose of renewing SSA*s computer- matching program. The official
    added that the development of actual cost and benefits data for the
    fugitive felon program would require significantly more time than had been
    invested in preparing the current summary. SSA believed that our
    recommendation to identify and prioritize those

    fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for
    resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their
    efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for these
    actions during normal operations. The agency added that it has a number of
    efforts under way to automate some of the fugitive felon processes.
    However, SSA stated that there are some manual processes in the program
    that contribute to minor interruptions to the fugitive felon process.
    While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some fugitive

    felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving the
    technological and administrative barriers affecting the program*s
    operations. As our report notes, an overall business process improvement
    strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and integrate its various
    reengineering and improvement projects and, thus, maximize the potential
    of technology to improve the program*s performance. Further, at the
    conclusion of our review, SSA provided us with documentation outlining
    discussions to automate field office functions. However, the information
    provided did not include enough detail on the initiative that it said was
    being undertaken; therefore, we could not comment on these developments.
    We recognize that there are many steps within the fugitive felon process
    that must be completed manually. While we agree that some

    of these manual processes are necessary, our report notes that technology
    may enhance the program. Given our assessment of the length of the

    process (approximately 165 days), we continue to believe that SSA needs to
    perform a complete analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify
    areas for improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to
    support more efficient operations.

    SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and
    propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual
    functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with
    federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining the
    most efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our
    recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication
    connections with the FBI*s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA
    believed that the creation of a single national warrant database would be
    a better solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA stated
    that its OIG had testified before the Congress on the benefits that would
    be derived if such a database were established. SSA added that NCIC would
    be effective as a single source of comprehensive warrant information only
    if entry of states* warrant information became mandatory.

    We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information
    into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to
    achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless, achieving
    an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA examining the

    strengths and limitations of all of the potential alternatives to sharing
    warrant information, including NCIC. Accordingly, this recommendation
    remains in our report. However, we have also incorporated language
    reflecting SSA*s views regarding a national warrant database. Also in its
    response to this recommendation and in additional comments, SSA noted
    several instances where it believed we had made incorrect assumptions
    regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with our assertion
    that it cannot determine the amount of time that is actually required to
    complete the processing of fugitive warrants and stated that it was able
    to track the number of days it takes for each individual subject
    (fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated that our analysis of
    the fugitive felon processing timeline had incorrectly considered start-
    up/ test file processing times that can be associated with states* first
    submissions of warrant files, thus accounting for our approximation of 165
    days. We acknowledge that SSA has been able to track fugitive warrant
    information

    on a subject- by- subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA
    had performed any aggregate tracking of the time required to process
    fugitive warrants* data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the

    program*s performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited
    to case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or
    improperly formatted data. However, we have amended our report to
    specifically reflect that we also did not include trial and error times
    for states reporting

    warrant information for the first time. In addition, SSA interpreted our
    discussion of states* perspectives regarding fugitive felon data
    formatting and transmission requirements as an implication that the
    requirements were unduly restrictive. However, we recognize the importance
    of prescribed standards for ensuring consistent reporting of warrant
    information and other computerized data. In this

    regard, our report aims only to highlight some of the circumstances that
    currently prevent SSA from receiving comprehensive warrant information
    from state and local law enforcement agencies.

    Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information
    about the agency*s on- line connections with states* departments of social
    service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of Prisons.
    SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to each state
    and that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and that real- time

    transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report. Based on
    documentation that SSA*s Office of Systems provided, we determined that
    SSA has direct, dedicated on- line connections with every state*s
    department of social services. However, we do not imply in our report that
    on- line connections mean real- time connections. We have added language
    to clarify that SSA*s existing on- line connections with state and local
    agencies primarily involve batch, rather than real- time, transfers of
    data.

    Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated
    technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation
    of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, SSA

    stated that it and the OIG have already completed this task. In
    particular, SSA stated that a joint SSA/ OIG analysis of state and federal
    warrant files had been started in January 2001 to determine what impact
    OASI and DI legislation would have on the program. According to SSA, this
    analysis had determined that the legislation would affect staff resources,
    but would not

    affect its need for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information
    had been shared with us during our review. While conducting our review,
    OIG officials did inform us that they had

    performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI legislation
    on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the conclusion of our

    review, the officials had not met our request for documentation supporting
    this analysis. OIG officials subsequently provided the analysis to us
    while reviewing and commenting on our draft report. We agreed to review
    the analysis and make revisions to our report, as necessary. Our review of
    the analysis found that OIG*s main objective had been to determine the

    increase in the current fugitive felon program workload. However, the
    analysis did not include any discussion of the technological implications
    resulting from the OASI and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that,
    in June 2001, its Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI

    to the fugitive felon program would require about 8 work years, but that
    the agency did not envision any major new or unique information technology
    expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our
    review, SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems* projection or of
    documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have modified our
    report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that assessed the

    workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI legislation, we continue to
    believe that additional assessment is necessary to determine whether and
    what information systems support would be required to meet the broader
    mission.

    Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which listed
    the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon program and
    to the definition of *high misdemeanors* discussed in footnote 6 to the
    report.

    As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
    this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
    Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of Management
    and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
    addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    http:// www. gao. gov.

    Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report,
    please contact me at (202) 512- 6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant
    Director, at (202) 512- 6304. We can also be reached by E- mail at
    willemssenj@ gao. gov and

    melvinv@ gao. gov, respectively. Individuals making key contributions to
    this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison,
    David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and Eric
    Trout. Sincerely yours,

    Joel C. Willemssen Managing Director, Information Technology Issues

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to examine the
    technological aspects of the fugitive felon program in order to (1)
    identify technological barriers restricting (a) data matching between the
    Social Security Administration*s (SSA) and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation*s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain
    data- matching agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies;
    (2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and
    Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be
    included in legislation restricting payments to fugitive felons; and (3)
    determine whether other databases, such as those

    maintained by the Department of Justice*s Bureau of Prisons and the U. S.
    Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon
    program. To understand the fugitive felon data- matching process, we
    obtained and

    analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of
    Prisons and the U. S. Marshals Service. These documents described data
    sharing and matching policies, operational and security procedures, and
    the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive felon program. We
    complemented our understanding of the data- matching process by

    arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an industry leader
    with expertise in data- matching software, to understand how datamatching
    software works in a database environment. At the time of our review, SSA
    did not have documentation showing the

    flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data- matching
    process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish this,
    we relied on the results of our document analyses and used business
    process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of the
    fugitive felon program*s process flow. We provided copies of the completed
    business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and its Office of
    Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our process depiction
    and incorporated changes based on their review and comments. In addition,
    to further confirm the process, we interviewed agency officials in all of
    the offices involved in administering the fugitive felon program. These
    included SSA*s OIG and office of operations, SSA and OIG field

    offices, and the FBI Information Technology Center (ITC) in Fort Monmouth,
    New Jersey.

    Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many days
    it took to process warrant information, we determined the approximate
    number of days involved in the process from the receipt of warrant
    information from federal, state, and local law enforcement

    agencies until the suspension of fugitives* SSI benefits. We derived the
    number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation obtained
    from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed samples of
    incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of Central
    Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems Operations to
    calculate the approximate number of days it took these offices to process
    the warrant data from its receipt until they forwarded it to OIG. We also
    interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters, its OIG, and the FBI ITC
    regarding the number of days involved in processing fugitive warrants. We
    shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA

    officials to confirm the validity of our processing timeline estimate. To
    identify technological barriers restricting data matching between SSA*s
    and the FBI*s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of SSA*s
    fugitive felon process and assessed information describing its supporting
    technical infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation describing the
    FBI*s repository of fugitives and other criminals* the National Crime
    Information Center (NCIC)* along with the agency*s approach to providing
    warrant information to SSA. To support our analysis, we applied various

    guidance, including Office of Management and Budget Circular A- 130,
    Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records about
    Individuals and Appendix II, Security of Federal Automated

    Information Resources; and National Institute of Standards and Technology
    computer security guidance. Regarding SSA*s ongoing efforts to obtain
    data- matching agreements with

    state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer Matching
    Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100- 503), amending the
    Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data- matching agreements fall under the
    provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized disclosures of
    computerized data through data matching. In addition, we applied the
    Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93- 579), which stipulates provisions for
    protecting individuals from unauthorized disclosure of non- computerized
    information. We also applied knowledge gained through our detailed
    analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA*s model data-
    matching agreements, reports documenting the status of negotiations
    between SSA and state and local law enforcement agencies, and other policy
    and procedural documentation. We conducted site visits and telephone
    conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law enforcement
    agencies* Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
    Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,
    Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania* to determine

    their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any
    technological barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and
    efficiently share data with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess
    issues and concerns affecting their efforts to negotiate data- matching
    agreements with SSA.

    To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should legislation
    be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI benefits
    payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal Responsibility and
    Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L. 104- 193), amending
    Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as OASI and DI legislation
    proposed by the House of Representatives and U. S. Senate. We also
    assessed SSA OIG reports and testimony that highlighted the Inspector
    General*s position regarding proposed legislation prohibiting OASI and DI
    benefits payments to fugitive felons and determined SSA*s decisions and
    actions regarding the potential impact of such proposed legislation. In
    addition, as part of our analysis, we considered our recent correspondence
    to the House Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has
    the authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide
    law enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security
    numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons. 18 Finally,
    to

    determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the
    Department of Justice*s Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service could
    provide additional support to the fugitive felon program, we obtained and
    analyzed documentation describing the agreements between SSA*s OIG and
    these agencies. In addition, we analyzed systems documentation pertaining
    to the Bureau of Prisons and U. S. Marshals Service*s databases, as well
    as the FBI*s NCIC and state and local law enforcement agencies* databases.
    This documentation included data standards, reporting requirements
    (memoranda of understanding and data- matching agreements), policies, and
    procedures. We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of SSA*s
    Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice Information
    Services Division; the U. S. Marshals Service; and the Bureau of Prisons
    to gain an understanding of how their databases could be used to support
    the fugitive felon program.

    We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    18 U. S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Programs: The Scope of
    SSA*s Authority to Deny Benefits to Fugitive Felons and to Release
    Information about OASI and DI Beneficiaries Who Are Fugitive Felons, GAO-
    02- 459R (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

    Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching

    Appendi x II

    Process Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U. S. Marshals Service
    (USMS), and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant
    information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such as
    cartridges, diskettes, and CD- ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U. S. mail
    or FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and CD- ROMs
    is sent to SSA*s Office of Central Operations (any warrant information
    received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant information
    contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent to SSA*s
    Office of Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon receipt, staff
    in these two offices upload the warrant information onto SSA*s mainframe
    computer, located at its National Computer Center (NCC), to begin the
    data- matching process.

    As part of the data- matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup
    copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight
    batches, using SSA*s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify
    fugitives* names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The NCC
    staff then notifies SSA*s OIG that the data files are in production. The
    OIG is responsible for ensuring that the data files include only
    individuals charged with felony and parole or probation violations; it
    deletes any files naming individuals charged with misdemeanors.

    Following OIG*s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the
    supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI benefits
    payments. The records of fugitives identified* called matched records* are
    then returned to the OIG for further processing.

    OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation
    and case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case
    numbers are assigned based on whether the records represent *exact*
    matches or *good* matches. 19 OIG then sends the records containing exact
    matches (on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI*s ITC in Fort Monmouth,
    New Jersey and to USMS for additional processing. OIG also notifies its
    field offices via E- mail that exact and good matches have been entered
    into its allegation and case investigative system.

    19 Exact matches are those having only one person with a particular name,
    Social Security number, date of birth, and sex. Good matches are those
    having one or two of the data elements, such as name and date of birth,
    but not a Social Security number. Good matches require the OIG field
    offices to perform additional identification and verification.

    Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address and
    status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records to
    determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal computer

    to access and query fugitives* records that are maintained in the NCIC
    database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether states*
    matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes and mails
    the records to the applicable states for their verification. ITC staff
    also obtains

    from the NCIC database address information on the law enforcement agencies
    that originally issued the arrest warrants on the individuals named in the
    warrants and manually type each originating law enforcement agency*s
    address onto a cover letter. The staff then uses the address information
    to mail the *leads,* together with the cover letter, law enforcement
    referral form (OI- 5B), and the law enforcement certification form (OI-
    5C) to the originating law enforcement agencies for their use in locating
    and apprehending the fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally requires
    approximately 30 days to process the matched records.

    State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in the
    *leads* to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification forms
    to ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant. Before acting
    to suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the originating law
    enforcement agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive based on the leads
    provided. By allowing this *sunset* phase, SSA avoids letting fugitives
    know that their status and whereabouts have been revealed before law
    enforcement authorities can arrest them.

    When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement
    agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms to
    the appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the time
    that the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case consists of
    50 subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications, enter the
    information from these forms into the allegation and case investigative
    system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms, and mail the

    forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do not return
    certification forms indicating the status of the arrest warrant to ITC
    within 60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law enforcement agencies
    either by letter or telephone to determine whether the warrant is still
    active. OIG

    agents also perform additional identification activities for good matches
    and send these matches to SSA field offices, where staff query the
    supplemental security record for verification. If records cannot be
    verified using the supplemental security record, OIG contacts the law
    enforcement agencies for verification. If, after contacting law
    enforcement agencies,

    warrants still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed
    back to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to
    records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.

    Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still active,
    OIG agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices, where action
    is taken to suspend the fugitive*s SSI benefits, calculate the amount of
    overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told us that the
    process

    to suspend SSI benefits payments takes approximately 10 days. Based on our
    analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we determined that
    from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data from the law
    enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who receive SSI
    benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends SSI

    benefits, the process can take up to 165 days. 20 This approximate
    processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems, operations, and OIG
    staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to verify and batch process
    warrants, 60 days for state and local law enforcements agencies to locate
    and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice of benefits suspension,
    30 days for OIG field offices to act on information received from the law

    enforcement agencies, and 10 days for processing the suspension of
    benefits.

    Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given
    due process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact SSA
    for a continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension. If the
    fugitive

    loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and again update the
    supplemental security record. SSA*s NCC runs master tapes once a month and
    submits them to the Department of the Treasury, informing it of any
    updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing checks to the
    identified fugitive felons.

    20 The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of
    information provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. Our
    analysis considered the steps required to fully process a case that did
    not involve circumstances such as lost, mishandled, or improperly
    formatted warrant information. To confirm the validity of our timeline
    estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA and
    FBI officials.

    Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives and
    Preventing Them

    Appendi x III

    from Receiving SSI Payments SSA reports that, since its inception in
    August 1996, the fugitive felon program has been instrumental in helping
    identify approximately 45, 000 fugitives who improperly collected at least
    $82 million in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition,
    SSA reports that, as a result of sharing fugitive warrant information,
    officer and public safety throughout the United States has increased.
    According to SSA*s OIG, among those fugitives who have been identified as
    receiving SSI benefits, more than 5, 000 have been apprehended since the
    fugitive felon program began.

    The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon program
    has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and preventing
    improper payments of SSI benefits:

     On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result of
    computer matching between SSA*s OIG and the FBI*s NCIC. Agents from OIG*s
    New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and deputies from
    the Essex County, New York sheriff*s office, arrested one fugitive wanted
    on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of producing and
    distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both fugitives were
    remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and

    these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives* SSI benefits.
    In New York, the field division of SSA*s OIG used leads from matched

    fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union
    County, New Jersey sheriff*s office on a burglary charge. This fugitive,
    arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent, had 13 prior
    arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for homicide. This case
    resulted in SSI benefits suspension.

     Under the direction of the U. S. Attorney*s Office for the Eastern
    District of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated in
    an operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and juvenile
    chronic violent offenders. The 3- day operation resulted in the arrest of

    82 individuals* 67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The apprehended
    individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from criminal sexual conduct
    to armed robbery and assault with intent to do bodily harm.

     In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task Force,
    (composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization
    Service, and California state parole), assisted by California*s Department
    of Health Services and Department of Motor

    Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole violation.
    The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years by assuming
    the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for and received SSI
    benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31, 2001, a grand jury
    indicted him on two counts of false statements for SSI benefits, two
    counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number, and three counts

    of identity theft.

    Comments from the Social Security

    Appendi x IV Administration

    Now on p. 7. Now on p. 12.

    Comments from the U. S. Department of

    Appendi x V

    Justice (310420)

    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching Process

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    Appendix II Fugitive Felon Program Data- Matching Process

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    Appendix III

    Appendix III Fugitive Felon Program*s Assistance in Apprehending Fugitives
    and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI Payments

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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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    Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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    Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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    Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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    Appendix IV Comments from the Social Security Administration

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    Appendix V

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