Highlights of GAO's Conference on Options to Enhance Mail	 
Security and Postal Operations (20-DEC-01, GAO-02-315SP).	 
								 
With the recent anthrax attacks on Congress and the media, the	 
U.S. Postal Service faces a new and more immediate challenge of  
responding and developing a plan to safeguard the mail system	 
from future attacks. GAO held a conference, on December 10, 2001,
with  representatives from Congress, the Postal Service, and many
of the Service's key stakeholders to discuss possible options to 
enhance mail security and postal operations. The conference	 
participants agreed that there is no single or simple solution	 
for ensuring the safety of mail. Nevertheless, they agreed that  
the Service, the mailing industry, and other stakeholders should 
work closely together to assess current risks, develop a	 
framework for responding to potential threats, and take immediate
steps to secure the safety of the mail to restore public	 
confidence.Participants also agreed that detection technology is 
essential for securing the mail and they emphasized the need for 
enhanced efficiency of postal operations.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-315SP					        
    ACCNO:   A02611						        
  TITLE:     Highlights of GAO's Conference on Options to Enhance Mail
Security and Postal Operations					 
     DATE:   12/20/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Diseases						 
	     Facility security					 
	     Mail delivery problems				 
	     Postal service					 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Postal facilities					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Safety regulation					 

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GAO-02-315SP
     
GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations

December 20, 2001 The Honorable Dan Burton Chairman The Honorable Henry A.
Waxman Ranking Minority Member Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives

Subject: Highlights of GAO?s Conference on Options to Enhance Mail Security
and Postal Operations

As you know, the U. S. Postal Service faces a number of formidable
challenges as it seeks to carry out its mission of providing affordable,
universal service that binds the nation together. With the recent anthrax
attacks on Congress and the media, the Service now faces a new and more
immediate challenge of responding to those attacks and developing a plan to
safeguard the mail system from future attacks. To assist the Service and its
congressional oversight committees in addressing these anthrax- related
challenges, you asked that we convene a conference to identify options,
other than irradiation, to enhance mail security and postal operations.

On December 10, 2001, we held a conference of representatives from Congress,
the Service, and many of the Service?s key stakeholders (e. g., major
mailers, mailer associations, postal equipment manufacturers, postal unions,
management associations, and various federal agencies) to discuss possible
options to enhance mail security and postal operations. As agreed, we are
providing this letter and its enclosures to document the options identified
and the issues that participants raised at the conference for consideration
by Congress, the Service, and other stakeholders as they develop strategies
to deal with potential terrorist threats to the mail system and enhance
postal operations. Enclosure I highlights the options offered by the
conference participants, and enclosure II identifies the issues raised as
the options were discussed. Enclosure III identifies the conference
participants. The options and issues presented here are those of the
conference participants and do not necessarily represent our views.

In general, the conference participants agreed that there is no single or
simple solution for ensuring the safety of the mail. Nevertheless, they
agreed that the Service, the mailing industry, and other stakeholders should
work closely together to assess current risks, develop a framework for
responding to potential threats, and take immediate steps to secure the
safety of the mail to restore public confidence in the integrity of the
postal system. Many participants also agreed that detection

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 2 technology is essential
for securing the mail. They also emphasized the need to

enhance the efficiency of postal operations. Some of the options suggested
to enhance mail security and operations included (1) conducting risk- based
assessments of potential threats; (2) redesigning and reducing the number of
collection boxes to enhance employee and public safety; (3) encouraging the
mailing industry to take steps to enhance mail security, such as controlling
access to their facilities and participating in a security certification
process for bulk mailers; (4) reducing the anonymity of mailers through such
measures as requiring identification from mailers and using video- enabled
kiosks; (5) creating separate mail streams corresponding to the level of
risk associated with the source of the mail; (6) accelerating the Service?s
implementation of an ?information platform? to, among other things, track
and trace mail using enhanced bar codes and trackable postage; (7) changing
postage rate structures to establish incentives for mailers to promote
security, such as discounts and surcharges; (8) communicating a clear and
consistent message to employees and the public on security- related matters;
and (9) reexamining the postal infrastructure and delivery standards to
improve efficiency and security.

Operational issues raised included the following questions: (1) What risks
need to be addressed, such as biological, chemical, radiological, and/ or
explosive threats? (2) What role should the Service, the mailing industry,
and others play in protecting the mail? (3) What impact will efforts to
reduce the anonymity of mail have on mailers? convenience and privacy, mail
volume, and mail cost? (4) What is the availability of effective detection
equipment? (5) What changes can be made to the postal infrastructure to
promote both efficiency and security? (6) What security measures need to be
taken immediately? and (7) What tradeoffs between mail security and safety,
service, convenience, and cost are the public and the mailing industry
willing to accept for the nation?s mail system?

Public policy issues included (1) whether self- regulation and/ or federal
regulation is needed to provide oversight of the actions taken by the
mailing industry to ensure mail security and how such regulation would be
carried out; (2) whether third- party certification of detection and
sanitization equipment is needed and who would provide it; (3) whether the
Service or another federal entity should be responsible for sanitization of
the mail; (4) whether manufacturer liability is hindering the development of
detection and sanitization equipment; (5) whether universal postal service
should continue to include ?anonymous? mail and, if so, on what terms; and
(6) who should pay for enhanced mail security- taxpayers, current postal
ratepayers, future postal ratepayers, or a combination of these.

- - - - -

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 3 We are sending copies
of this letter and its enclosures to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on the Budget; the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations and its Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government; the
Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee on
Appropriations and its Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services; the Postmaster General and
Chief Executive Officer, U. S. Postal Service; and other conference
participants. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you have any questions about this letter or the enclosures, please
contact me on (202) 512- 8387 or at ungarb@ gao. gov.

Bernard L. Ungar Director, Physical Infrastructure

Issues Enclosures - 3

Enclosure I

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 4

Options Offered by Panel Members and Other Conference Participants for
Enhancing Mail Security and Postal Operations

Prevention Options

Conduct risk- based assessments of potential threats.

Assess what it takes to create the threat and to deliver, detect, and
counter it.

Ensure that countermeasures address the problem instead of deterring
something that might not be repeated.

Educate employees on safe mail handling and the proper use of protective
gear.

Educate secondary and tertiary vendors regarding the need for heightened
security.

Ensure that incident response plans are in place for facilities that receive
and process high volumes of inbound mail.

Require that mailpieces have bio liners that can kill bacteria.

Develop and implement a security certification process for bulk mailers.

Distribute posters alerting mail preparation personnel and the public of the
penalties for hoaxes in the mail, and prosecute perpetrators to the fullest
extent of the law.

Ensure that professional mailers have adequate procedures in place to

strictly control access to their plants and work sites, such as requiring
deliveries to be made to restricted areas;

secure transportation by taking such steps as sealing all inbound and
outbound shipments, using certified trucking companies; and recording and
checking the serial numbers of the seals on bills of lading;

provide for a secure workforce by performing background checks and
establishing an employee identification program; and

provide for adequate mailpiece design by such actions as using transparent,
tamper- resistant envelopes; a recognizable company logo on the outside of
mailpieces; and indicia or metered postage instead of live postage stamps.

Develop standards for safe and secure bulk mail.

Employ a mailer certification process.

Independently assess the security operations of bulk mailers.

Deny bulk mailers? access to the mail system if they do not provide secure
mail.

Options to Reduce the Volume of Anonymous Mail

Issue ?smart cards? encoded with ?official? postal identification
information (i. e., identity, postal address, and e- mail address).

Allow the use of postal smart cards at video- enabled kiosks located in
various retail sites.

Require presentation of a driver?s license and/ or credit card or debit card
when purchasing stamps or mailing packages. An alternative would be to allow
smart cards to provide identification.

Enclosure I

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 5

Expand retail presence in kiosks and mail service centers in food retail
stores to make services involving identification available.

Develop envelopes with windows for both the mailing address and return
address that could be used for remittance mail.

Detection Options

Equip collection boxes and mail slots with plastic bag liners that have one-
way throats and detection strips for a wide variety of bacteria.

Provide postal workers with contamination detectors, which would be worn on
their breast pockets like radiation badges.

Equip postal facers/ cancellers with scanners that will alarm if they come
in contact with a threshold level of a contaminant.

Use portable sampling devices to detect contaminants on the surface of
packages or in mail sacks and trays.

Deploy currently available detection and sanitization technology- do not
delay deployment while waiting for more advanced technology to be developed.

Develop detection strips for mailboxes and require that these strips be
installed in all mailboxes, including rural mailboxes and cluster boxes.

Use third parties to certify the capabilities of detection and sanitization
technologies before procuring and deploying.

Mail Collection Options

Conduct a comprehensive review of all collection boxes and mail slots and
determine if some of them could be eliminated because they are either served
by a local post office or infrequently used.

Use sampling teams to test detection systems, such as those employed on
collection boxes with detection strips.

Consider requiring cluster boxes for some existing housing.

Mail Preparation Options

Use current technology to sanitize mail.

Use available filtration systems to screen mail contaminants.

Require that windowed envelopes be closed with a protective film to help
prevent cross contamination.

Require that bulk mailers use tinted shrinkwrap for their mail, thus
identifying the mail as coming from a professional mailer and allowing for
easier detection of tampering.

Require that film processors use transparent plastic envelopes with ?safety?
seals.

Enclosure I

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 6

Mail Processing Options

Optimize the postal infrastructure to reduce redundancies.

Install high- efficiency filtration systems within postal mail- processing
facilities to minimize the spread of contaminants from the mail.

Develop and deploy filtration systems for mail- processing equipment to
identify and limit the spread of contaminants from the mail.

Create three separate mail streams corresponding to the level of risk
associated with the source of the mail. That is, high- risk anonymous mail
(e. g., mail from collection boxes on the street), medium- risk semi-
anonymous mail (e. g., packages and other mail handed to a window clerk),
and low- risk mail (e. g., bulk mail from a known shipper).

Do not merge collection mail with bulk mail until decontamination testing of
the collection mail has been completed to help prevent cross contamination.

Test sanitization equipment on actual anthrax spores. Do more testing of the
impact of sanitization on different types of mail.

Task a federal organization other than the Service with responsibility for
operating and financing the sanitization equipment.

Options for Tracking Parcels and Other Mail

Develop and deploy an information platform that will allow the Service to
track and trace mailpieces and provide customers with real- time information
on the status of their mailings.

Digitally watermark and/ or have indicia on all stamps and prestamped
envelopes to allow them to be tracked and traced by lot number and by the
post office that sold them.

Update the Service?s Point- of- Sale (POS) system with a transaction- based
database that will provide the capability to record stamp sales by type, lot
number, and purchaser?s name and address.

Market PC postage more widely- for example, through kiosks. PC postage
products create Information Based Indicia- a two- dimensional (2D) bar code
to convey security and mail- processing information about the mailpiece.

Issue ?official? USPS e- mail addresses.

Develop database cross- linking e- mail and postal addresses to enable
businesses to use hard- copy mail when customers do not respond to e- mail.

Options for Using Information Technology to Create ?Intelligent Mail?

Expand the use of two- dimensional bar code technology to provide additional
data for tracking the mailpiece and make this technology available to all
mailers.

Redesign the Domestic Mail Classification Schedule (DMCS) to provide mailers
with discounts to encourage maximum participation in programs that enhance
mail security and the Service?s cost efficiency.

Enclosure I

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 7

Infrastructure or Network Options

Reexamine the entire postal system to improve both mail security and safety
as well as postal operations.

Expand the Service?s retail presence through the use of kiosks and ?mail
service? centers located in food retail stores.

Rate Structure or Pricing Options

Change the postage rate structure to establish incentives for mailers to
promote mail security, such as surcharges, discounts, and/ or new mail
classes or subclasses.

Divide First- Class Mail into two new subclasses-( 1) single- piece mail
that requires additional security handling by the Service and (2) bulk mail
from presort houses that requires no additional handling.

Create a new class of mail, such as ?Second- Class Mail.? This mail would be
sealed against inspection and subject to slower delivery than First- Class
Mail. Second- Class Mail could include anonymous mail, such as greeting
cards, and would be irradiated.

Establish discounts for PC postage.

Options for Changing Delivery Standards to Enhance Mail Security

Provide for discounts or different delivery standards for mail based on the
level of security standard met.

Options for Financing Costs Relating to Mail Safety and Security

Increase postage rates.

Increase limits on the Service?s borrowing authority.

Impose a surcharge on anonymous mail that requires more safety or security
measures, such as sanitization.

Congress could appropriate funds to cover the additional security- related
costs since September 11, 2001. (Appropriations to the airline industry
would be a good model to follow.)

Congress could fund any requirements to irradiate mail and to provide
special handling and safety measures for government mail.

Congress could appropriate funds to enable the Service to complete the
information platform in a much shorter time frame than would otherwise be
the case.

Require mailers to initiate safety and security measures and bear the cost.

Enclosure I

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 8

Options for Responding to Incidents

Have call centers for employees, customers, and postal operations.

Communicate a clear and consistent message on the incident and what is being
done.

Other Options

Build public confidence in the integrity of the mail system by communicating
steps being taken to provide for a secure and safe mail system.

Create a greater deterrent by communicating the ability to identify the
perpetrators of threats and hoaxes as well as the consequences of these
crimes.

Rely on the mailing industry to communicate the importance of mail and the
mailing industry to Congress and the public.

Review privacy statements on whether the Service will pass along customer
information.

Clearly mark all bulk mail shipments.

Update or create business continuity plans for critical postal functions.

Include mailing industry representatives on the Communicating and Messaging
Working Group of the Postal Service?s Mail Security Task Force.

Enclosure II

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 9

Issues Raised by Panel Members and Other Conference Participants Regarding
Mail Security and Postal Operations

Issues Raised

What tradeoffs between mail security and safety, service, convenience, and
cost are the public and the mailing industry willing to accept for its mail
system?

To what extent should the mail system be accessible and enable customers to
send ?anonymous mail?? Should such mail be surcharged?

Are sufficient financial resources available to implement improvements? What
level of cost is appropriate- is there some limit on what is worth doing,
considering the risk? What will be the impact of costly measures? Are
decisions being overly influenced by the associated cost?

What risks need to be addressed, including biological, chemical,
radiological, and explosive risks?

What is the objective (e. g., to detect and deter risks or to restore public
confidence)? To what extent do different objectives call for different
approaches?

What level of detection or sanitization will be required to maximize public
confidence in the safety of the mail?

To what extent should the Service provide a universal system with measures
to help ensure mail security and safety? Should measures taken by the
mailing industry be considered sufficient for its mail to bypass some or all
of the Service?s measures (e. g., drop- shipped mail that could avoid
sanitization and/ or detection)?

Should irradiation be the Service?s primary method of securing the mail or
should it be placing more emphasis on such efforts as early detection of
contaminated mail, developing an information platform, tracking and tracing,
and smart stamps? Is cost- effective detection technology available that can
be fully deployed for all mail, including mail drop- shipped to post
offices?

What is the appropriate balance between the public?s right to privacy versus
the Service?s need to know the identity of mailers in order to increase mail
security?

What can be done to reduce anonymous or unknown mailers?

How can the Service and the government best assess the risks associated with
using the mail system for terrorist purposes and develop an appropriate
framework to respond to threats?

Who should bear the additional cost associated with securing the mailstream-
taxpayers, current postal ratepayers (through rate increases), future postal
ratepayers (through borrowing), or a combination of these? If current
ratepayers are to bear the additional cost, how should that cost be
allocated?

What role should mailers play in protecting the mails? What role should
their suppliers play (e. g., envelope suppliers and paper mills)? Should
there be a different standard for the Service and others (e. g., in the
filtration and detection equipment used)?

Are there lessons to be learned from foreign postal administrations that
could improve postal operations and better protect the mail?

Enclosure II

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 10

Should the Service purchase currently available technology to detect
contaminants and sanitize the mail, or should it delay those purchases until
better technology is available?

Who should be liable in the event of terrorist acts involving the mail?
Should liability be capped? Is third- party product liability hindering
efforts to develop and implement new technology to detect contaminants and
sanitize the mail?

Does the Service?s current infrastructure promote maximum effectiveness and
efficiency?

How should the Service process mail that is known to be sensitive to current
sanitization technology, such as photographic film and pharmaceutical
products?

What legislative changes, if any, might be needed to improve postal
operations and protect the mail from terrorists?

Who decides whether measures taken by mailers are adequate to protect mail
security and safety? Is self- regulation adequate to ensure mail safety and
security and public confidence, or is federal regulation and oversight
needed to ensure that the mailing industry has taken adequate measures?

If federal regulation is needed, would there be standards against which to
regulate? Who would have responsibility for regulation: the Service, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Postal Rate Commission,
and/ or other federal agencies? What enforcement mechanism is appropriate?

Should sanitization and detection equipment receive third- party
certification? Would this be a federal responsibility? If so, how can this
be done with the current limited testing capacity?

How quickly does progress need to be made? Do different time frames apply to
different measures?

How should the Service be held accountable for making progress on such steps
as the information platform?

Whose job is it to convince the public that the mail is safe: the Service,
the mailing industry, or Congress?

Who is going to follow- up on the options and questions raised at the
conference?

What impact will efforts to reduce the anonymity of mail have on mailers?
convenience, mail volume, mail cost, and mailer privacy?

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 11

Panelists and Other Participants of the GAO Conference on Options to Enhance
Mail Security and Postal Operations

Introductions

The Honorable David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States U. S.
General Accounting Office

Bernard L. Ungar Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues U. S. General
Accounting Office

Jack Potter Postmaster General, CEO U. S. Postal Service

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member, Committee on

Government Reform House of Representatives

The Honorable Ernest J. Istook Chairman, Subcommittee on Treasury,

Postal Service, and General Government Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

Panel 1: Options for the Postal Service to Enhance Mail Security and Postal
Operations

Mary Elcano - Moderator Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP

Allan Algazi Symbol Technologies

Maynard Benjamin Envelope Manufacturers Association

John Campo Pitney Bowes, Inc.

Richard Fairfax Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 12 Michael Schmidt

Deutsche Post World Net Ken Weaver U. S. Postal Service

Panel 2: Options for Mailers to Enhance Mail Security and Postal Operations-
Mail Preparation and Information Technology Strategies

Gene A. Del Polito - Moderator Association for Postal Commerce

John Campanelli R. R. Donnelley Logistics Services

Eric Casey Mailing & Fulfillment Service Association

Judy Marks Lockheed Martin Distribution Technologies

V. Joseph Renna Pharmaceutical Care Management Association

Seth Weisberg Stamps. com

Summary of Conference

David Treworgy PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Other Participants

Alison Bean Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Brooke Brewer Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Peter Dees Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Nanci Langley Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 13 Susan Propper

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Robert Westbrooks Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs

Tammy Hughes House Appropriations Committee

Ed Puccerella House Budget Committee

Kate Anderson House Committee on Government Reform

Phil Barnett House Committee on Government Reform

Andrei Greenawalt House Committee on Government Reform

Michael Layman House Committee on Government Reform

Denise Wilson House Committee on Government Reform

Nick Manetto House of Representatives

William Heniff Congressional Research Service

Frank Brennan U. S. Postal Service

Tom Day U. S. Postal Service

Sheila Meyers U. S. Postal Service

John Rapp U. S. Postal Service

Jim Roman U. S. Postal Service

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 14 Wayne Wilkerson

U. S. Postal Service Dave Willard U. S. Postal Service

Len Read Office of the Inspector General U. S. Postal Service

Robert Cohen Postal Rate Commission

Daniel LaPlaca Office of Management and Budget

Dr. Lawrence D. Kerr Office of Science and Techology Policy

Dr. Jeffrey S. Kieft Office of Science and Techology Policy

Clint Chamberlain Office of Public Health Preparedness

Brian Little Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Dr. Kevin D. Crowley National Academy of Sciences

Hans Martin Federal Bureau of Investigation

Melissa Willig Federal Bureau of Investigation

Henry Maury General Services Administration

Neil A. Boyer Department of State

Linda Elliot D. C. Circuit Court

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 15 Michael Reid

American Postal Workers Union Al Ferranto National Association of Letter
Carriers

Dick Collins National Postal Mail Handlers Union

Dale Holton National Rural Letter Carriers Association

Ted Keating National Association of Postal Supervisors

Bob Levi National Association of Postmasters of the United States

Joe Cinadr National League of Postmasters of the United States

Tony Gallo Association for Postal Commerce

Peter Jacobsen Association for Postal Commerce

Robert Laybourn Association of Priority Mail Users, Inc.

Edward Hudgins Cato Institute

Ari Schwartz Center for Democracy & Technology

Edward Gleiman Direct Marketing Association

Russ Snyder Greeting Card Association

Robert E. McLean Mailers Council

Cecilia Daly Magazine Publishers of America

Enclosure III

GAO- 02- 315SP Mail Security and Postal Operations 16 David Todd

Mail Order Association of America Jack Estes Main Street Coalition

Robert J. Brinkman Newspaper Association of America

Joel Thomas National Association of Presort Mailers

Senny Boone National Newspaper Association

Mike Cavanagh National Postal Policy Council

James Pierce Myers Parcel Shippers Association

Brett Martin Pharmaceutical Care Management Association

Wolfgang Pordzik Deutsche Post World Net USA, Inc.

David Nassef Pitney Bowes, Inc.

David Zaharchuk PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Robert Grabowski Symbol Technologies

(543015)
*** End of document. ***