Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates 
Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks (05-MAR-02, GAO-02-298).	 
                                                                 
The F-22 aircraft is designed to be less detectable, capable of  
flying at higher speeds for longer distances, and able to provide
the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the		 
surrounding situation than the F-15 it will replace. The Air	 
Force began the F-22 development program in 1991 and plans to	 
complete it by March 2004. In 1998, following repeated increases 
in the program's estimated development cost, Congress capped	 
developmental costs at $20.443 billion. The F-22 program did not 
meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to complete planned	 
development is likely to exceed the $21 billion reported to	 
Congress, and the program is not far enough along in		 
flight-testing to confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's  
performance. Despite progress in testing the aircraft's 	 
capabilities, problems and delays continue to plague the assembly
and delivery of development test aircraft, and the flight-test	 
program is less efficient than planned. Furthermore, flight-test 
delays make it unlikely that the planned development program can 
be completed within the current cost goal. On the basis of	 
initial testing, the Air Force projects that the F-22 will meet  
or exceed its performance goals by the end of development.	 
However, testing to demonstrate performance is not far enough	 
along to allow the Air Force to confirm its projections. The Air 
Force has implemented process and manufacturing changes to the	 
horizontal tail section and for cracking in the cockpit canopy	 
that GAO reported on last year. Although the results to date	 
appear adequate, the Air Force continues to monitor the results  
to ensure the corrective actions will be sufficient. In September
2001, the Air Force submitted to Congress a revised acquisition  
plan to increase the number of aircraft committed to low-rate	 
production before the completion of operational testing. Buying  
production articles before they are adequately tested can be	 
costly if further testing identifies problems that then require  
costly modifications. Moreover, an increase in production	 
commitments could occur without the F-22 program office knowing  
if the contractor's key manufacturing processes are adequate.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-298 					        
    ACCNO:   A02848						        
  TITLE:     Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial	      
Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks		 
     DATE:   03/05/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Cost analysis					 
	     Developmental testing				 
	     Fighter aircraft					 
	     Military cost control				 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Air Force F-22 Engineering and			 
	     Manufacturing Development Program			 
                                                                 
	     Eagle Aircraft					 
	     F-15 Aircraft					 
	     F-22 Aircraft					 

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GAO-02-298
     
United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Committees

March 2002

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce
Risks

GAO-02-298

Contents

Letter

Results in Brief
Background
F-22 Development Program Continues to Experience Delays and

Risks in Meeting Key Schedule Goals F-22 Development Costs Likely to
Increase More Testing Needed to Confirm F-22 Performance Estimates Status of
Aircraft Modifications Risks in the F-22 Proposed Acquisition Plan
Conclusions Recommendations for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation Scope and Methodology 1

2 4

6 16 18 21 22 25 26 26 28

Appendix  I Calendar  Year  2001 Test  Criteria  Required to  Continue  with
Low-Rate Initial Production

Appendix II Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV GAO Staff Acknowledgments 35 Acknowledgments 35

Related GAO Products

Tables

Table 1: Revised Schedule Dates Associated with the Test Program Realignment
8 Table 2: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours for Development Test
Aircraft 11 Table 3: Delays in First Flight Dates of F-22 Development Test
Aircraft 12 Table 4: Planned Aircraft Quantity Reductions 23

Figures

Figure 1: F-22 Test Program Schedule Before and After

Realignment 7
Figure 2: Increase in Estimated Hours to Assemble F-22
Development Test Aircraft at the Marietta, Georgia,
Facility (October 1995-July 2000) 10

Figure 3: Planned Verses Actual Usage of Development Test
Aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003 14
Figure 4: Lockheed Costs Over Budgets during Fiscal Years 2000
and 2001 17
Figure 5: Total Post-Development Funding As Planned Each Year
in Fiscal Years 2000, 2001, and 2002 18

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

March 5, 2002

Congressional Committees

The Air Force is developing the F-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15
aircraft. The F-22 is to be superior to the F-15 by being less detectable,
capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, and able to provide
the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding
situation. The Air Force began the F-22 development program in 1991 and
plans to complete it by March 2004. In 1998, following repeated increases in
the program's estimated development cost, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 19981 limited the cost of F-22 development to $20.443
billion.2 The act also required us to assess the Air Force's F-22
development program annually and determine whether key cost, schedule, and
performance goals are being met.3 This is our fifth report. In our last
report, issued in March 2001,4 we stated that the Air Force had not met its
schedule goals for 2000 and that flight-testing delays coupled with prior
years' delays made it unlikely that the development program could be
completed as scheduled within the $20.443 billion congressional cost
limitation.

On September 13, 2001, the secretary of defense notified the congressional
defense committees that the Department of Defense (DOD) had approved the
F-22 program for low-rate initial production and that the cost to complete
the program's development phase would be $557 million more than the cost
limit. This increased the cost estimate for development to $21 billion. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20025 has since
eliminated the cost limitation but still requires us to provide annual
assessments.

1P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.

2As adjusted under the act's provisions.

3The act also requires us to assess whether we had access to sufficient
information to make informed judgments on matters covered by our report.

4U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and
Testing Delays Indicate Need for Limit on Low-Rate Production, GAO-01-310
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2001).

5P.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001.

Results in Brief

This report addresses (1) the extent to which the development program is
meeting its schedule, cost, and performance goals, including whether the
program is likely to be completed within the current cost estimate; (2) the
status of F-22 modifications; and (3) the Air Force's plans for low-rate
initial production of F-22 aircraft and the risks associated with those
plans.

The F-22 program did not meet key schedule goals for 2001, the cost to
complete planned development is likely to exceed the $21 billion reported to
Congress, and the program is not far enough along in flight-testing to
confirm Air Force estimates of the aircraft's performance. First, while
progress was made in testing the aircraft's capabilities, problems and
delays continue with the assembly and delivery of development test aircraft
and the flight-test program continues to be less efficient than planned. The
delays and the less than planned efficiency have prevented the Air Force
from completing the flight-testing planned for 2001. In June 2001, the Air
Force extended the development test program 8 months and delayed the
beginning of operational testing. However, even with the extension, it is
unlikely that the development and operational tests programs can be
completed as scheduled for several reasons, including the fact that test
aircraft are taking longer to assemble and are being delivered late to the
flight-test program. DOD's director, operational test and evaluation, and an
Air Force independent test review team have characterized the new test plan
as very optimistic.6 Second, delays in the flight-test program make it
unlikely that the development program can be completed as planned within the
current $21 billion cost goal. Third, based on initial testing, the Air
Force projects that the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals by
the end of development. However, testing to demonstrate performance is not
far enough along to enable the Air Force to confirm its projections.

Regarding the status of modifications, the Air Force has implemented and
continues to implement process and manufacturing changes to solve problems
with the horizontal tail section and cracking in the cockpit canopy that we
reported on last year. While the results to date appear

6The team is comprised mainly of former Air Force and Office of the
Secretary of Defense officials with extensive aircraft testing experience
and was formed by the principal deputy assistant secretary of the air force
for acquisition.

adequate, the Air Force continues to monitor the results to ensure the
corrective actions will be sufficient.

In September 2001, the Air Force submitted to Congress a revised acquisition
plan. Because of the recent slip in the projected start of operational
testing, the revised plan will increase the number of aircraft committed to
low-rate production before the completion of operational testing. In
previous reports, we have said that buying production articles before they
are adequately tested can be costly, if further testing identifies problems
that then require costly modifications. Further, the increase in production
commitments could occur without the F-22 program office knowing the extent
that the contractor's key manufacturing processes are in control.7 Program
officials state that they no longer track this information. Our prior
reviews have found that proceeding into production without manufacturing
processes in control can increase both cost and schedule risks.

We are recommending that the Air Force reassess the cost to complete the
F-22 development program and report the results to Congress. We are also
recommending that DOD limit the low-rate production of F-22 aircraft until
operational testing is completed and manufacturing processes are in control.
We are further recommending that the Air Force monitor the status of the
contractor's key manufacturing processes.

In commenting on our report, DOD said that it continuously tracks the cost
to complete the F-22 development phase of the program and that if the budget
for that phase of the program were to increase, it would report this
increase to Congress. However, it said that a report was unnecessary at this
time. As discussed in this report, there are strong indications the F-22
development program is unlikely to be completed within the current cost
estimate of $21 billion. We believe that Congress should be notified as soon
as possible of projected cost increases in the development program. In
response to our second recommendation, DOD said that it does not believe
there is sufficient justification to limit the F-22 production rate. We
believe this report provides ample justification for limiting low-rate
production quantities. DOD agreed that it is important to ensure that
manufacturing processes are maturing as production progresses and that these
processes are in control. It said that an assessment of key F-22

7A manufacturing process is considered to be in control when it can
consistently be done in a high-quality manner.

Background

manufacturing processes would be included in an upcoming report on
production readiness. We support DOD's plan to conduct the assessment and
believe that the F-22 program office should continue to accumulate
statistics on the percentage of key manufacturing processes in control as
the program proceed towards full-rate production.

The F-22 is an air superiority aircraft with advanced features to make it
less detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high
speeds for long ranges.8 It has integrated avionics to greatly improve
pilots' awareness of the situation surrounding them. The objectives of the
F-22 development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9
F-22 development test aircraft, 2 non-flying structural test aircraft, 6
production representative test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines;
(2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3)
design, develop, and test the support and training systems. The F-22 is
being developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation (for the
aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine).

Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the development
phase of the F-22 program, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 established a cost limitation of $18.688 billion for F-22
development and a limitation of $43.4 billion for production.9 The act
instructed the secretary of the air force to adjust the cost limitation for
the amounts of increases or decreases in costs attributable to economic
inflation after September 30, 1997, and for compliance with changes in
federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997.
Congressional direction in fiscal year 2000 legislation added six production
representative test aircraft to the development program, which helped
increase the cost limitation to $20.443 billion.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 required that
before the secretary of the air force awards a contract for F-22 low-rate
initial production,10 the secretary of defense had to certify that the (1)
test plan in the program's development phase is adequate for determining the

8Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of
operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by
the enemy.

9P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.

10P.L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999.

operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22 aircraft and (2)
development phase and the production phase for the F-22 program could be
executed within the congressionally mandated cost limitations.11 If the
Secretary of Defense was unable to make either of these certifications, he
would be required to submit to the congressional defense committees a report
that includes (1) the reasons the certifications could not be made, (2) a
revised acquisition plan if the decision to proceed with low-rate initial
production is made, and (3) revised cost estimates for the remainder of the
development phase and the production phase if the decision is made to
proceed with low-rate initial production.

On September 13, 2001, the under secretary of defense for acquisition,
technology, and logistics notified the congressional defense committees that
DOD had approved the F-22 program for low-rate initial production. The under
secretary certified that the development test plan is adequate to determine
the operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22 aircraft. The
under secretary said DOD could not certify that the F-22 development phase
or the production phase could be completed within the existing congressional
cost limitations. In his letter, he stated that both the Air Force and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of the cost to complete the
development phase exceeded the cost limitation. He indicated that the
development phase would cost an additional $557 million. However, instead of
requesting an increase in the cost limitation amount, he asked that the
development cost limitation be removed. The under secretary also developed a
revised acquisition plan and requested that Congress remove the production
cost limitation, estimating that the production phase could cost $5.4
billion more than the $37.6 billion production cost limitation.

In December 2001, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002 eliminated the development cost limitation.12 The production cost
limitation remains in effect.

11 The limitation  on production cost  does not  specify a quantity  of F-22
aircraft. 12P.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001.

F-22 Development Program Continues to Experience Delays and Risks in Meeting
Key Schedule Goals

The F-22 program met DOD's test criteria to continue with low-rate initial
production, but it did not meet key schedule goals for developmental
flight-testing. The Air Force reduced and extended the development
flight-test program due to delays in flight-testing. The development
flight-test program now overlaps with operational testing. However, the
extended flight-test schedule is also experiencing delays. These delays will
likely require the Air Force to extend the development flight-test schedule
again to complete current testing objectives. DOD's director, operational
test and evaluation, and an Air Force chartered independent test review team
have characterized the new test plan as very optimistic.

F-22 Program Meets DOD's According to the Air Force, the F-22 program had
fulfilled all test criteria Test Criteria to Continue considered
prerequisites for awarding the fiscal year 2002 low-rate with Low-Rate
Production production contract. The under secretary of defense for
acquisition,

technology, and logistics established the criteria. The test criteria
included completing specific testing of the avionics for guided missile
launch, engine, and radar. DOD required the criteria to be met prior to the
planned December 2001 contract award date for 13 low-rate production
aircraft. (See appendix I for a listing of the criteria.)

Delays Result in Flight-Test Program Being Reduced and Extended

In March 2001, we reported that the F-22 development flight-test program was
significantly behind schedule due to (1) problems and delays with the
assembly and delivery of development test aircraft, (2) delivered
development test aircraft not being ready for testing, and (3) lower than
planned efficiency in the flight-test program.13 We concluded that the Air
Force would have to either extend the developmental test program past its
planned completion date of August 2002, or start operational testing,
scheduled to begin in August 2002, without completing all development
flight-tests.

In June 2001, the Air Force realigned the test program. The realignment
extended the completion of the development flight-test program, delayed the
beginning of operational testing, and reduced the content of the test
program. Development flight-testing determined by the Air Force as necessary
to begin operational testing was extended 8 months and the beginning of
operational testing was delayed 8 months. Some additional development
flight-testing is now planned to be concurrent with

13See GAO-01-310, Mar. 15, 2001.

operational testing. Figure 1 shows the program schedule before and after
the realignment and shows a 9-month overlap between development
flight-testing and operational testing that did not exist prior to the
realignment.

Figure 1: F-22 Test Program Schedule Before and After Realignment

Source: Air Force.

Office of the Secretary of Defense officials involved in operational testing
were included in the testing realignment process and did not take exception
to some development flight-testing being planned concurrent with operational
testing. However, according to these officials, there is an increased risk
involved in the concurrency, and there is still a high risk of not
completing an adequate amount of development flight-testing before
operational testing is scheduled to begin. The start of operational testing
could be delayed if the required development flight-testing is not completed
as scheduled.

During the program realignment, the Air Force established new schedule dates
for the remaining major schedule events. Table 1 shows the prior and current
schedule dates and the slip in schedule between the prior and current dates.

Table 1: Revised Schedule Dates Associated with the Test Program Realignment
                       Estimate prior to realignment

Current estimate

                                            Slip in schedule events (months)

                              Schedule events

Completion of development flight-testing necessary prior to operational
testing

August 2002 April 2003

Start of operational testing August 2002 April 2003

Completion of operational testing February 2003 December 2003

High-rate production decision July 2003 March 2004

Source: Air Force.

In addition to extending the flight-test program schedule, the Air Force
reduced the content of the F-22 development flight-test program.
Specifically, the Air Force eliminated and consolidated some test points
(specific test objectives conducted during flight-testing) and deferred
other test points that it did not have to complete before the start of
operational testing. As a result, the combined total flight-test points
(airframe and avionics) remaining have been reduced by approximately 4,708
points, or 31 percent.

Extended Test Schedule Likely to Slip

The realigned test schedule established by the Air Force in June 2001 is
likely to slip for a number of reasons. First, development test aircraft are
taking longer to assemble and, as a result, are being delivered late to the
flight-test program. Second, the schedule for completing airframe
flight-testing is high risk because (1) the available test aircraft are not
achieving the number of test objectives per flight hour specified in the
test plan and (2) the completion of the schedule is heavily dependent on one
test aircraft in lieu of three as originally planned. Third, the avionics
portion of the flight test program is being delayed by the late delivery of
test aircraft.

The director, operational test and evaluation, and the Air Force's
independent test review team have expressed concerns that the revised test
schedule still does not provide enough time for adequate testing and is very
optimistic. The director, operational test and evaluation, has reported that
extending the portion of development flight-testing necessary to begin
operational testing by 8 months, to April 2003, still does not provide
enough time to sufficiently complete that testing. The director estimates
that the F-22 program will probably not be ready to begin operational
testing until at least August 2003, not April 2003 as currently planned.

Delays in Aircraft Assembly Delay Flight-Test Program

The contractor is taking considerably more time than originally estimated to
assemble development test aircraft. For example, a few months after the
critical design review in February 1995,14 the contractor estimated that it
would take 665,111 hours to assemble nine development test aircraft at the
Marietta, Georgia, facility.15 According to the latest data provided to us
and as shown in figure 2, that estimate continued to grow through July 2000.
As the figure shows, the contractor estimated in July 2000 that it would
take 1,025,290 hours, or around 360,000 more hours to assemble the nine
development test aircraft.

14A review conducted to determine that the detailed design satisfies the
performance and engineering requirements of the aircraft.

15This figure was an estimate based on actual assembly hours of historical
fighter aircraft.

Figure 2: Increase in Estimated Hours to Assemble F-22 Development Test
Aircraft at the Marietta, Georgia, Facility (October 1995-July 2000)

Assembly hours in thousands

1,050

1,000

950

900

850

800

750

700

650

600

Oct Mar Aug Jul Oct Mar Sep Mar Apr Jul

1995 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000

Source: Lockheed.

The three aircraft completed during 2001 took more hours to complete than
planned. Also, the two aircraft that are still being assembled are requiring
more assembly time than planned. Table 2 shows the planned versus actual
assembly hours for these five aircraft.

Table 2: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours for Development Test Aircraft

Aircraft

Planned assembly hoursa

Actual assembly hoursa Difference

aPlanned and actual
hours at the
Marietta, Georgia;
Ft. Worth, Texas;
and Seattle,
Washington,
facilities.

bCompleted aircraft.

cAs of November 2001. These aircraft are not yet completed.

Source: Air Force.

According to Air Force officials the development test aircraft are taking
longer to assemble than planned because of necessary design changes and
modifications to the aircraft, parts shortages, and problems integrating
hardware and software subsystems. For example, an engineering redesign that
affected all aircraft was required because of problems with the separation
of materials in the aircraft's horizontal tail section. In addition,
manufacturing problems associated with some of the avionics components-the
communication, navigation, and identification and the electronic warfare
systems-resulted in lower than expected software productivity and the late
release of engineering drawings. Moreover, the contractor experienced higher
levels of scrap and rework, and increased labor hours for inspection of
nonconforming parts.

The delays in assembling development test aircraft continue to delay the
flight-test program. Table 3 shows the delay in the development test
aircraft's first flights.

Table 3: Delays in First Flight Dates of F-22 Development Test Aircraft

Test Planned first flight
aircraft dates dates flight dates (months)

Actual first flight Total delay to first 
Total delay

Schedule for
Completing
Airframe
Flight-Testing Is
High Risk

aProjected as of
February 2002.

Source: Air Force.

In early 2001, the Air Force anticipated that the five development test
aircraft that remained to be assembled at that time (aircraft 4005-4009)
would be available for flight-testing by the end of 2001 and planned to use
these aircraft for flight-testing under the flight-test program realignment.
However, only aircraft 4005-4007 became available. Although aircraft 4007
took its first flight, other delays prevented it from being fully
incorporated into the flight-test program during 2001. Aircraft 4008 was
delayed until February 2002 and aircraft 4009 is projected to be delayed
until March 2002.

The Air Force's plan to complete developmental airframe flight-testing
necessary for the start of operational testing in April 2003 and all
airframe flight-testing by February 2004 is high risk because (1) the
planned number of test objectives per flight-hour are not being achieved and
(2) most of the planned flight-test program is essentially being performed
by only one test aircraft rather than the three originally planned. Airframe
testing demonstrates the aircraft's flight capabilities.

The Air Force is not accomplishing the planned number of airframe test
objectives per flight-hour. Aircraft flight capabilities are demonstrated by
performing specific test objectives or flight-test points. A gauge of
flight-testing efficiency is the number of flight-test points achieved in
each flight-test hour. In our March 2001 report, we noted that the Air Force
had planned to accomplish an average of 10.4 test points per flight-test
hour through December 2000 but were only accomplishing an average of 6.9
points per hour, or 30 percent less than planned. We found a similar

situation in 2001. Specifically, the Air Force's plan continues to have a
test point goal of around 10 points per hour, but is only accomplishing a
program average of 7 test points per hour, or 30 percent less than planned.

It is unlikely that the planned flight-test hours will be achieved, much
less increased, because flight-test plans were based on the availability of
three test aircraft, and only one is available for most of such testing. The
original 1997 test program contained a plan for using development test
aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003 for the airframe flight-test program. The plan
was for aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003 to concurrently accomplish
approximately 80 percent of the testing required to expand the F-22 flight
parameters and then aircraft 4003 would continue to the 100 percent level.
However, program officials determined that aircraft 4001 and 4002 would not
be capable of accomplishing more than 40 percent of flight parameters and
that the structures of all subsequent development test aircraft would need
to be strengthened. This structural strengthening began with aircraft 4003.
Aircraft 4003 remains the only development test aircraft that is
structurally strong enough and adequately equipped with test instrumentation
to accomplish the other 60 percent of flight parameters and to complete the
planned airframe portion of flight-testing. Therefore, the completion of
future airframe test points and flight hours relies heavily on this one
aircraft. Figure 3 below compares the planned and actual usage of aircraft
4001, 4002, and 4003.

Figure 3: Planned Verses Actual Usage of Development Test Aircraft 4001,
4002, and 4003

Aircraft usage

                                                     Original planned usage

Actual usage

Flight parameters in percents

Aircraft 4001

Source: Air Force.

An assessment by the director, operational test and evaluation, indicated
that the availability of only one development test aircraft to complete
essentially all the remaining airframe flight-testing including structural,
performance, propulsion, and flying qualities, creates a significant risk.
The director concluded that without augmentation of aircraft 4003 with
another aircraft, the completion of the required developmental
flight-testing necessary to begin operational testing in April 2003 is high
risk. Our computations show that the development flight-testing necessary
for the start of operational testing might not be completed until March
2004, or 11 months later than planned. Air Force officials told us they
understand that completing the tests as scheduled with only one development
test aircraft is high risk.

Based on Air Force F-22 flight-test accomplishment data and current flight
plans, we project that airframe flight-testing will have to continue until
February 2008 to accomplish all the remaining 8,199 test points with one
aircraft. Our computations are based on an average completion rate of 7 test
points per flight-test hour at an average of 15.2 flight-test hours per
aircraft completed per month. Thus, unless the test plan changes, it will
take almost 4 years beyond the February 2004 scheduled completion date to
complete all airframe flight-testing. An F-22 program office testing

Avionics Flight-Test Schedule Is at Risk

official agreed with our projection. Officials in the program office also
told us that in November 2001 the Air Force reviewed the flight-testing
delays, but the conclusions reached during this review are still unofficial.

The original 1997 program and realigned flight-test program planned to use
development test aircraft 4004-4009 for avionics flight-testing.16 However,
the late delivery of these aircraft is increasing the risk of not completing
the avionics portion of the realigned flight-test program by the planned
September 2003 date. Aircraft 4007, 4008, and 4009 will be delivered later
than the planned dates under the flight-test program realignment, which
could result in additional delays in completing flight-test points. As of
January 2002, the three aircraft had been delayed a total of 8 months since
the realignment, and aircraft 4008 and 4009 were not scheduled to be
delivered until sometime in calendar year 2002.

In addition to late deliveries of aircraft 4007-4009, aircraft 4004-4006 are
accomplishing less than one avionics test point per flying hour. Based on
F-22 flight-test data provided by the Air Force, we project it would take
until August 2004 to complete the remaining 1,271 avionics flight-test
points. This would require an extension of about 11 months in avionics
flight-testing beyond the September 2003 scheduled end of testing.

Air Force officials also told us they understand that completing avionics
flight-testing as scheduled will be a program challenge, but they still
expect to meet the planned completion date and consider the completion of
airframe flight-testing an even higher risk. These officials also explained
that once test aircraft 4007, 4008, and 4009 are fully incorporated into the
flight-test program, the test program will have six test aircraft designated
for avionics flight-testing instead of just the three current aircraft and
the program will be able to accomplish the projected 70 avionics flight-test
hours per month. However, our projection assumes that aircraft 4007, 4008,
and 4009 will be incorporated into the flight-test program as scheduled and
still shows that avionics flight-testing could be delayed if the program
accomplishes only 54 avionics flight-test hours per month, which is the
projected accomplishment rate based on the historical average for the
program.

16Flight-testing of the aircraft electronics.

F-22 Development The F-22 development program is not likely to be completed
within the

current cost estimate of $21 billion. Costs will likely increase further
Costs Likely to because (1) delays in the flight-test program may require an
extension of Increase the development program, and (2) Lockheed's
development costs continue

to increase. In addition to development costs, the estimated cost of post-

development activities continues to increase.

Flight-Test Delays Would Increase Costs

The delays that increase the number of months to complete development will
result in increased costs for the F-22 program. As noted earlier in this
report, it is unlikely that the Air Force will be able to complete the
development program as scheduled. Continued delays in the assembly and
delivery of development test aircraft and a flight-test program that is less
efficient than planned will likely result in delays in the completion of
development flight-testing and the beginning of operational testing after
April 2003. If this happens, the development program will cost more than
currently estimated. For example, the recent test program realignment that
extended the majority of development testing and the start of operational
testing 8 months resulted in a cost increase of $557 million.

Increases in  Lockheed's  Lockheed's development costs  continue to increase
and,  because of  the  Cost  Will Likely  Increase  cost  reimbursement type
contract  Lockheed  has  with  DOD,  those  costs   Development  Costs   are
liabilities to the government. Over the last two fiscal years, Lockheed's

costs have exceeded budgets by a total of $218 million. Figure 4 shows the

costs over budgets for fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

Figure 4: Lockheed Costs Over Budgets during Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001

Dollars in millions

                                                  140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

127

2000 2001 Fiscal year

Source: Lockheed.

At the beginning of fiscal year 2001, F-22 program officials told us that
Lockheed's costs for the fiscal year should be closer to their budget than
that experienced in 2000 because the development program was closer to
completion and there was more certainty concerning the cost of the remaining
development activities. However, Lockheed's costs over budget in fiscal year
2001 exceeded the fiscal year 2000 amount. If cost increases continue in
fiscal year 2002 and these are not offset by cost savings initiatives, the
development program will cost more than currently estimated.

Planned Post-Development Funding Continues to Increase

The Air Force has defined another phase of the program separate from
development and production that will require additional funds. The Air Force
budget includes additional planned funding of almost $1.4 billion through
fiscal year 2007 for activities the Air Force has defined as
post-development, or separate from the activities associated with the $21
billion development estimate. These activities include avionics software
upgrades, partial funding for a ground collision avoidance system, an
improved short-range missile, instrumentation for testing, and a classified
project. Air Force officials told us they consider these funds and the
activities associated with these funds outside the scope of the F-22

development and production programs. We are reporting on these planned
activities and potential costs because they have increased significantly
since fiscal year 2000. Figure 5 shows that planned funding has increased
each year from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2002.

Figure  5: Total  Post-Development Funding  As Planned  Each Year  in Fiscal
Years 2000, 2001, and 2002

                         Dollars in millions 1,600

                                   1,400

                                  1,366.2

                                   1,200

                                 1,000 800

                                    600

                                    400

                                   200 0

2000 2001 2002 Fiscal year

                             Source: Air Force.

In November 2001, the Air Force estimated that by the time the development
program ends, the program will have met and, in some instances, exceeded the
major F-22 performance goals. However, the Air Force's estimates are based
on limited flight-test data, computer models, ground tests, and analyses.
Flight-test progress has been slower than expected, thus delaying the
confirmation that the F-22 will deliver the required performance. Moreover,
the F-22's performance may be affected by other factors such as increasing
aircraft weight, maintenance needs, and a potential problem with the
aircraft's vertical tail.

More Testing Needed to Confirm F-22 Performance Estimates

Significant Testing Even though F-22 development began in 1991 and
flight-testing began in Remains to Confirm 1997, a significant amount of
testing remains before the planned Performance Estimates completion of
development flight-testing in February 2004. F-22

performance goals are described in 10 key performance parameters, about

which the Air Force reports regularly to the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Through November
2001, the Air Force reported that ground and flight-test experience,
engineering analyses, and computer models indicate F-22 performance will
meet or exceed all required parameters. However, most ground and
flight-tests will have to be completed before the estimates are confirmed. A
recent review by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
concluded there was insufficient testing completed to assess 9 of the 10 key
performance parameters.

Appendix II shows the goal for each parameter and the estimated performance
the Air Force believes is consistent with models, ground tests, analyses,
and flight-tests for each parameter as of November 2001. The appendix also
shows the Air Force's latest estimates of expected performance for each
parameter by the end of the development program.

While avionics testing with development test aircraft has been limited,17
the program has been able to accomplish airborne avionics testing in a
flying avionics laboratory, a commercial aircraft reconfigured as flying
laboratory. This has helped provide information to testers and has helped to
identify many problems with the hardware and software. However, while
avionics testing in a flying laboratory is effective testing, it is not the
equivalent of avionics testing in an actual F-22 test aircraft for two main
reasons. First, because the flying laboratory is a large Boeing 757
passenger aircraft and not a more agile F-22, the Air Force cannot test the
F-22's avionics performance in a dynamic flight environment where the
aircraft is maneuvering at speeds and angles more characteristic of a
smaller, fighter aircraft. A DOD testing official advised us that avionics
performance can change when operated under the more demanding conditions of
a fighter aircraft. Second, the flying laboratory does not contain the full
complement of avionics sensors that are planned to be on an F-22, and in
some cases, the position of sensors on the laboratory are not representative
of how they are to be positioned on an F-22.

17 Only  288 of  about  1,324  planned avionics  flight-test  points, or  22
percent, have been accomplished.

Performance May Be Affected by Additional Factors

The F-22's performance may be affected by (1) increased aircraft weight, (2)
maintenance needs that exceed established objectives, and (3) a potential
problem with the aircraft's vertical tails. Aircraft weight, which impacts
several of the key performance parameters such as supercruise,18
maneuverability, acceleration, and combat radius has increased since 1995.
During 2001, the aircraft's weight increased 285 pounds because the airframe
had to be strengthened with additional materials. Even though the aircraft
weight continues to increase, the Air Force continues to estimate that by
the end of the development program, the F-22 will meet or exceed its
supercruise, maneuverability, acceleration, and combat radius key
parameters.

In addition to weight increases, the F-22's performance may also be affected
by maintenance needs that exceed established objectives. The Air Force has
estimated that the F-22 should at this point in development be able to
complete 1.55 flying hours between maintenance actions. The Air Force also
estimates the F-22 will be able to complete 1.95 flying hours between
maintenance actions by the end of development and 3 flying hours between
maintenance actions when the F-22 reaches maturity in 2008.19 (The figure of
3 flying hours between maintenance actions is a key performance parameter.)
However, the development test aircraft have been completing only .60 flying
hours between maintenance actions, which means significantly more
maintenance actions than are currently expected at this point in development
and significantly more than are expected at system maturity.

Further, extensive maintenance has been associated with compounds that are
used to fill gaps or seams on the aircraft's surface to help maintain the
aircraft's low observable or stealthy nature.20 As a result, when
maintenance actions related to low observable features are included, the
flying hours between maintenance figure decreases to only .44 flying hours
between maintenance actions. In March 2001, we reported that program
officials had earlier determined that the compound planned for this use on
the F-22 was not meeting expectations; under certain conditions, it would
swell or crack after application. Since then, a new compound has been

18Supercruise is the aircraft's ability to travel at high speeds for long
ranges.

19System maturity is defined as 100,000 flying hours.

20Because the presence of any seams around maintenance access panels can
potentially allow the aircraft to more easily be detected by enemy radar, a
compound is applied to these seams in an effort to eliminate them and make
the aircraft's surface smooth.

Status of Aircraft Modifications

formulated and is being tested, but the cracking problem continues under
certain conditions. This issue is a concern because in early 2002 the test
program is about to enter a phase where the Air Force expects aircraft 4007,
4008, and 4009 to maintain 100 percent of their planned low observable
configuration throughout their use in the test program. Moreover, the
maintenance of low observable features has historically been more difficult
and time consuming than expected.

The Air Force is also investigating a problem with the aircraft's vertical
tails that could impact performance. The problem involves a "buffet," or
excess movement back and forth, of the aircraft's two vertical tails when
the aircraft is operating at certain speeds and angles. Additional test
instrumentation has been added to development test aircraft 4003 to better
define the problem and determine the possible final solutions.

Air Force and Lockheed officials said they have implemented and are
continuing to implement needed changes to solve problems discovered with
separation between some of the materials within the horizontal tail and
cracking around the cockpit canopy holes. These are problems we reported on
last year. The Air Force continues to monitor these problems closely to
ensure the corrective actions will be sufficient.

The current problem they are working on with the horizontal tail section
involves separations between some of the materials and the shaft that allows
the horizontal tail to pivot. Because the separations reduce the strength of
the tails, the Air Force restricted the flight-testing of aircraft 4002 and
4003, the two development test aircraft that had this problem. To remove the
test restriction, Lockheed repaired the horizontal tails of these two
aircraft. The Air Force and Lockheed officials believe that improvements to
the aircraft's manufacturing process will solve this problem, and experience
to date appears to confirm their position. According to Air Force officials,
these improvements are to be used in the manufacture of the horizontal tail
for aircraft 4012, scheduled for delivery in June 2002.

The problem with the cockpit canopy involves cracks emanating from the
mounting holes in the clear section of the canopy. In our March 2001 report,
we stated that the contractor and the supplier had identified over 100
potential causes for the cracks and were developing plans to address each
cause. Manufacturing changes have been made to reduce exposure of the canopy
to harmful solvents and excess stress placed on the clear section of the
canopy during assembly into its frame. Additional changes

are also being evaluated. According to Air Force officials, while the
potential for cracking still exists, it is being continually reduced as
manufacturing improvements are made.

Risks in the F-22 Proposed Acquisition Plan

The F-22 revised acquisition plan, submitted to Congress in September 2001,
has risks. First, the plan increases the total number of aircraft committed
to production before the completion of operational testing. We have
previously reported that buying production articles before they are
adequately tested can be costly when testing identifies problems requiring
costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance. Second, the
increase in production commitments could increase cost and schedule risks if
the contractor's key manufacturing processes are not in control. The F-22
program office no longer tracks the percentage of the contractor's key
manufacturing processes that are in control. Third, the plan would increase
annual production quantities even though tests of the F-22's structural
integrity are not complete.

Increasing Production Prior to Completion of Operational Testing Increases
Risks

In September 2001, DOD informed Congress that the F-22 production program
would exceed the congressional cost limit by $5.4 billion and the Air Force
would purchase a minimum of 303 aircraft, a reduction of 36 aircraft.21 The
Air Force proposed an acquisition plan that extends initial low-rate
production two additional years and begins high-rate production in fiscal
year 2006 rather than 2004. The proposed plan is designed to provide funds
for cost reduction initiatives by funding fewer aircraft in the early
production years of the proposed plan. Table 5 shows the planned aircraft
purchases under the prior and the proposed acquisition plans and the
quantity reductions through 2005.

21The Air Force still intends to try to procure these 36 aircraft if cost
savings are realized through ongoing cost savings projects.

         Table 4: Planned Aircraft Quantity Reductions Fiscal year

aHigh-rate
production

Source: Office of
the Secretary of
Defense.

The fiscal year 2002 Defense Appropriations Act provided funds to increase
initial low-rate production to 13 F-22 aircraft.22 The act also provided
advance procurement funds for F-22s in fiscal year 2003. The Air Force
proposes to continue low-rate initial production through 2005 and begin
high-rate production of 40 aircraft in fiscal year 2006.

In several reports over the last 7 years, we concluded that DOD should
minimize commitments to F-22 production until completion of operational
testing. In our March 2001 report, we concluded that limiting production to
no more than 10 aircraft a year (the fiscal year 2001 quantity) was a
prudent way to mitigate risks until the Air Force completes operational
testing.

The Air Force's current plan would reduce the annual buy of low-rate
production aircraft, but it would increase the total commitment of
production aircraft before the projected completion of operational testing
in December 2003. Specifically, the Air Force had planned to buy 47 aircraft
at about $9.8 billion prior to the completion of operational testing in
February 2003. However, under the current acquisition plan, it plans to buy
71 aircraft at about $14.9 billion prior to the completion of operational
testing, now scheduled for December 2003. Moreover, should the schedule for
operational testing slip further, as indicated earlier in this report, the
Air Force's commitment to a greater number of aircraft before the end of
operational testing could increase significantly. Buying production articles
before they can be adequately tested can result in buying systems that
require significant, and sometimes costly, modifications to achieve
satisfactory performance; accepting less capable systems than planned; and
deploying substandard systems to combat forces. Conversely, lower

22P.L. 107-117, Jan.10, 2002.

production rates  could increase  average procurement cost over  the life of
the program.

Key Manufacturing Processes Need to Be in Control to Reduce Production Risks

Our reviews of world class organizations during the last four years found
that these organizations minimize risk when they manufacture products by
relying on existing manufacturing processes and controlling key
manufacturing processes before production begins.23 In fact, most of the
firms we visited during these reviews told us that all of their key
manufacturing processes are in control before production begins. In November
2000, when the F-22 program office ceased collecting information on the
percentage of key processes in control, the contractor had only 44 percent
of its manufacturing processes in control. Less than a year later, in
September 2001, a contract for 10 aircraft was awarded to begin F-22
production.

During our current review, F-22 program officials told us that neither they
nor the prime contractors track the status of manufacturing processes in
control because of the cost involved in tracking these processes. They rely
on the subcontractors to manage their own manufacturing processes. Hence,
the program office may be committing to increased production quantities
without knowing the percentage of key manufacturing processes that are in
control. Continuing to increase the F-22 aircraft production quantities in
low-rate production before 100 percent of the key manufacturing processes
are in control increases the risk that manufacturing and assembly problems
evident with the development test aircraft will carry over to the production
program. The cost involved in correcting manufacturing and assembly problems
would most likely exceed the cost of tracking manufacturing processes.

Need to Complete Fatigue The F-22 test plan requires two major tests (static
and fatigue) of the

Testing to Reduce Risks structural integrity of the F-22's airframe. These
tests are important to reduce the risk of structural problems emerging
during the production of aircraft or during aircraft operations. Static
testing is undertaken to ensure

23U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Successful Application to
Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD's Environment, GAO/NSIAD-98-56
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 1998).

Conclusions

the aircraft will withstand stresses that are expected to be encountered
throughout the aircraft's flight regime. The aircraft structure is tested to
determine if it can withstand stresses up to 150 percent of its design
limits. After a 14-month delay, static testing was essentially completed in
December 2000.

In 1997, the Air Force estimated that fatigue testing, which measures the
aircraft's durability over its expected life, would be completed in December
1999. After several subsequent delays, fatigue testing was started on
December 21, 2000, and is expected to be completed by April 2002, more than
2 years later than planned. Delays in the completion of fatigue testing
affect when structural changes can be identified and incorporated into F-22
production. DOD's director, operational test and evaluation, has expressed
concern over the delays in the completion of fatigue testing for these
reasons.

In June 2001, the Air Force extended the F-22 development test program. This
schedule may have to be extended further because problems and delays
continue with the assembly and delivery of flight-test aircraft, the
flight-test program continues to be less efficient than planned, and there
are limited development test aircraft to accomplish required test
objectives. If the schedule slips again, the cost of the development program
will increase beyond the $21 billion reported to Congress in September 2001.

The current acquisition plan would increase the total number of aircraft
committed to production before the completion of operational testing
compared with the previous plan. The number of aircraft committed to
production could be even higher than that in the current plan if the test
schedule slips again. Buying production aircraft before they are adequately
tested can result in problems, such as the need for costly modifications to
achieve satisfactory performance.

The F-22 program office does not know the percentage of the contractor's key
manufacturing processes that are in control because they no longer collect
these statistics. As of November 2000, the contractor had only 44 percent of
its key manufacturing processes in control. Increasing F-22 production
quantities before key manufacturing processes are in control increases the
risk that manufacturing and assembly problems with development test aircraft
will transition to the production program.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Because of Congress's past and continuing interest in the cost of the F-22
program, it is important that it be kept apprised of the current cost to
complete the F-22 development program. Therefore, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Air Force reassess the cost to complete the F-22
development program and, as a supplement to the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, provide information on any funds that would be necessary above the
$21 billion previously reported to Congress.

To help minimize the risks of producing large quantities of aircraft that
may require costly modifications, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
limit aircraft production to no more than 13 aircraft a year until
operational testing is completed and key manufacturing processes are in
control.

To help ensure that manufacturing and assembly problems with the development
test aircraft do not carry over to the production program, we recommend that
the Secretary of the Air Force direct the F-22 program office to monitor the
status of key manufacturing processes by accumulating statistics on the
percentage of key manufacturing processes in control as the program
continues to proceed toward high-rate production.

                               Agency Comments
                             and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with
our first recommendation. In responding, DOD said that it continuously
tracks the cost to complete the engineering and manufacturing development
phase of the F-22 program and reports the results to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics at quarterly reviews. DOD
also said that if the budget for that phase of the program were to increase,
it would report this increase to Congress. DOD did not believe that it was
necessary to provide Congress with a supplement to the fiscal year 2003
budget request.

We support DOD's tracking of the F-22's development costs and its intent to
report cost increases to Congress. As discussed in this report, there are
strong indications the F-22 development program is unlikely to be completed
within the current cost estimate of $21 billion because delays in the
flight-test program may require an extension of the development program and
delays result in increased costs. Moreover, Lockheed's development costs
continue to increase and, because of the cost reimbursement type contract
Lockheed has with DOD, these costs are liabilities to the government. We
believe that Congress should be notified

as soon as possible of projected cost increases in the development program.

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation. It stated it does not
believe there is sufficient justification to limit the production rate for
the F-22 until operational testing is completed. DOD said that while
flight-testing has progressed at a slower than predicted rate, the F-22
continues to make progress in development. DOD believes this progress
confirms the F-22's potential to meet air superiority mission needs. DOD
also said that limiting the number of aircraft acquired during low-rate
production would make it difficult for the contractor to persuade its
suppliers to make improvements leading to full-rate production readiness.

We believe that there is sufficient justification to limit F-22 low-rate
production until operational testing is completed because the Air Force's
estimates of performance are based on limited flight-test data, computer
models, ground tests, and analyses. Our previous work has shown that buying
production articles before they can be adequately tested can result in
buying systems that require significant and sometimes costly modifications
to achieve satisfactory performance, accepting less capable systems than
planned, and deploying substandard systems to combat forces. Deferring a
substantial increase in production rates would reduce the amount of
production funds committed until the operational effectiveness and
suitability of the F-22 has been successfully demonstrated during
operational testing. Although DOD said that lower production rates may cause
the contractor to have difficulty persuading its suppliers to make
improvements in their manufacturing process needed for full-rate production
readiness, we believe this possibility would be an acceptable risk to the
alternative of producing larger quantities of aircraft before the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22 has been demonstrated.

In regard to the third recommendation, DOD partially concurred. It agreed
that it is important to ensure that manufacturing processes are maturing as
production progresses and that these processes are in control. DOD further
said that an assessment of the status of key F-22 manufacturing processes
would be included in an upcoming report assessing production readiness. This
report is scheduled for completion prior to the lot 3 low-rate production
contract award planned for December 2002. We support DOD's plan to conduct
an assessment of the status of key F-22 manufacturing processes prior to the
next planned low-rate production contract and believe that the F-22 program
office should continue to

Scope and Methodology

accumulate statistics on the percentage of key manufacturing processes in
control as the program continues to proceed towards full-rate production.

DOD's comments are reproduced in appendix III. DOD also provided updated
information and suggested additional technical changes, which we
incorporated in the report where appropriate.

To determine whether the program is expected to meet schedule goals, we
reviewed program and avionics schedules and discussed potential changes to
these schedules with F-22 program officials. We also compared current
schedules with those developed in 1997 as a result of a study by a cost
estimating team. We tracked progress in the flight-test program and
evaluated schedule variances in the contractors' performance management
system and compared planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual
dates. We tracked technical problems in manufacturing and assembling the
development test aircraft.

To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost goal, we
examined (1) the extent to which the development program is likely to be
completed within the current cost estimate, (2) the Air Force's plans to
fund the program for fiscal year 2002, and (3) the program funding plan
compared to the current cost estimate. We compared the estimated cost at
completion of the prime contracts with planned amounts, evaluated cost
variances identified in the contractors' cost reporting systems, and
reviewed the status of initiatives designed to avoid cost growth.

To determine whether the development program is likely to meet performance
goals, we analyzed information on the key performance parameters and those
sub-parameters that are measured. We compared performance goals established
by the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics
with the Air Force's current estimates of performance in November 2001 and
at completion of development.

To identify the status of F-22 modifications, we collected updated
information on the status of existing aircraft structural problems that have
required aircraft modifications.

To assess the Air Force's plans for low-rate initial production and the
risks associated with those plans, we determined the amount of overlap
between the development program and the production plans, particularly in
reference to the completion of initial operational testing and evaluation.

In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we
required access to current information about test results, performance
estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being incurred,
aircraft modifications, and the program's plans for continued development
and initial production. The Air Force and contractors gave us access to
sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in
this report.

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.; the F-22
System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Defense
Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautical
Systems, Marietta, Georgia; and the F-22 Combined Test Force, Edwards Air
Force Base, California. We performed our work from July 2001 through
February 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense; the
secretary of the air force; and the director, Office of Management and
Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Robert Pelletier at (202) 512-4032 if you or
your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix IV.

James F. Wiggins
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Calendar Year 2001 Test Criteria Required to Continue with
Low-Rate Initial Production

Criteria Completion date

Establish the flight envelope for Block 2 aircraft structures May 2001

Conduct sufficient engine initial service release testing to determine
engine hot section life June 2001

Complete F-22 radar detection range measurement April 2001

Complete first segment of radar cross-section stability over time testing
June 2001

Complete F-22 first Block 3.0 avionics AIM-120 missile guided launch
September 2001

Conduct full scale airframe fatigue testing sufficient to define life limits
and initial airframe September 2001 inspection requirements

Appendix II: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters

Key performance parameter 
Goal (acquisition program baseline) Air Force assessment of estimated
performance through November 2001 Estimated performance at completion of
development

      Supercruise            100 percent         114 percent           115 percent
 Acceleration (< 100% is
      favorable)a            100 percent          89 percent           87 percent
    Maneuverability          100 percent         101 percent           102 percent
 Airlift support (C-141
      equivalents)                8                  6.6                   6.6
 Sortie generation rate      100 percent         100 percent           100 percent
   Radar cross section                          Favorable (data      Favorable (data
  (front sector only)        100 percent         classified)           classified)
   Average flight-test                                            1.95 (at end of
     hours between               3.0                 0.44         development)

      maintenance                                                         3.0 (by system
                                                                       maturity in year
                                                                          2008)
   Payload (missiles)     four medium-range, six medium-range,    six medium-range, two
                                 two         two short-           short-
                             short-range            range                 range
     Combat radius           100 percent         112 percent           115 percent
 Radar detection range       100 percent         105 percent           105 percent

aThe acceleration parameter is a measure of the time it takes the aircraft
to increase speed to a certain level. If the aircraft is able to increase
speed to a certain level in less time than expected, this is considered
favorable. Therefore, a measure of less than 100 percent is favorable.

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Arthur Cobb, Travis
Masters, Gary Middleton, Robert D. Murphy, Don M. Springman, and John Van
Schaik made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs
Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.:
July 16, 2001.

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need
for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 2001.

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded
Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.:
August 15, 2000.

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22
Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.:
June 15, 2000.

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2001. GAO/OCG-00-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000.

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are
Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000.

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999.

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD's Procurement and RDT&E Programs.
GAO/NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999.

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal
Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, DC: April 16, 1999.

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering
and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113.
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999.

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-55. Washington, D.C.:
March 15, 1999.

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 1998.

Related GAO Products

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Goals. GAO/NSIAD-98-67. Washington, D.C.:
March 10, 1998.

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program.

GAO/NSIAD-97-156. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 1997.

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic
Budget Projections. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 1997.

F-22 Restructuring. GAO/NSIAD-97-100R. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 1997.

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22
Aircraft Should Be Reduced. GAO/NSIAD-95-59. Washington, D.C.:
April 19, 1995.

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176. Washington,
D.C.: May 5, 1994.

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned.

GAO/NSIAD-94-118. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1994.

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