Social Security Administration: Agency Must Position Itself Now  
to Meet Profound Challenges (02-MAY-02, GAO-02-289T).		 
                                                                 
The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided $450 billion in
benefits to 50 million recipients in fiscal year 2001 Three	 
programs--Old Age and Survivors Insurance, Disability Insurance, 
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)--touches the lives of	 
almost every American family. Since 1995, when SSA became an	 
independent agency, GAO has called for effective leadership and  
sustained management attention to a constant set of unresolved	 
management challenges. These include the need to redesign its	 
disability claims process, addressing management and oversight	 
problems with its SSI program, meeting future service delivery	 
demands, effectively implementing its information technology and 
research and policy development capacity. SSA has much more to do
and will need to take bolder action or make more fundamental	 
changes to existing programs.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-289T					        
    ACCNO:   A03220						        
  TITLE:     Social Security Administration: Agency Must Position     
Itself Now to Meet Profound Challenges				 
     DATE:   05/02/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Claims processing					 
	     Computer security					 
	     Financial management				 
	     General management reviews 			 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Information technology				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Disability Insurance Program			 
	     Old-Age Survivors Insurance Program		 
	     SSA Prototype Initiative				 
	     SSA Security Program				 
	     SSA Software Process Improvement Program		 
	     Supplemental Security Income Program		 


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GAO-02-289T
     
United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m.,

Thursday, May 2, 2002 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Agency Must Position Itself Now to Meet Profound Challenges

Statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income
Security Issues, and David L. McClure, Director, Information Technology
Management Issues

GAO-02-289T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the challenges facing the
Social Security Administration (SSA). SSA oversees three major programs that
in fiscal year 2001 provided more than $450 billion in benefits to more than
50 million recipients. One or more of the three programs-Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI)-touches the lives of almost every American family at
one time or another.

SSA has many strengths. The agency is considered to be a leader in federal
service delivery, and it has a long tradition of strategic planning. In
addition, SSA produces timely and accurate financial statements and is a
leader among government agencies for its accountability reporting.

However, since 1995, when SSA became an independent agency, we have called
for effective leadership and sustained management attention to a relatively
constant set of unresolved management challenges.1 These challenges include
the need to redesign its disability claims process and heighten the focus on
work for claimants, address management and oversight problems with its SSI
program, meet its growing future service delivery demands, effectively
implement its information technology initiatives, and strengthen its
research and policy development capacity. Solutions to these challenges are
difficult but necessary because they are linked to profound changes in our
nation. The baby boom generation is nearing retirement age, people are
living longer, technology and its applications are changing rapidly, and
public expectations for faster and better service from government are
growing. The implications of these changes create some management challenges
and make others more difficult to overcome.

1See U.S. General Accounting Office, SSA's Management Challenges: Strong
Leadership Needed to Turn Plans Into Timely, Meaningful Action,
GAO/T-HEHS-98-113 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 1998); Social Security
Administration: Information Technology Challenges Facing the Commissioner,
GAO/T-AIMD-98-109 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 1998); Social Security
Administration: Significant Challenges Await New Commissioner,
GAO/HEHS-97-53 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 1997); Social Security
Administration: Effective Leadership Needed to Meet Daunting Challenges,
GAO/HEHS-96-196 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 1996); and Social Security
Administration: Leadership Challenges Accompany Transition to an Independent
Agency, GAO/HEHS-95-59 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 1995).

Today, I will discuss SSA's progress in meeting these and other challenges.
The information I am providing is based on our previous and ongoing work,
much of it performed for these subcommittees. (See Related GAO Products at
the end of this statement.)

In summary, SSA has taken a number of varied steps to address its management
challenges; however, the challenges remain, and some are becoming ever more
pressing. In certain instances, SSA's actions show promise, but it is too
early to tell how effective they will be; in others, SSA's efforts have not
produced the desired results. In almost all cases, the agency has much more
to do and will likely need to take bolder action or make more fundamental
changes to existing programs or procedures.

* SSA has been working for years to improve its disability claims process;
yet, ensuring the quality and timeliness of its disability decisions remains
one of the agency's greatest challenges. The agency faces some difficult
decisions about its next steps in this area and may need to consider more
fundamental changes to the process. In addition, although SSA has taken some
positive steps to return people with disabilities to work, a more
fundamental change to the agency's process and underlying philosophy is
needed. Since 1996, we have called for SSA to integrate return-to-work
strategies into all phases of its disability determination process to help
disabled workers who can return to work to do so.

* In 1997, we designated the SSI program as high risk because of its
susceptibility to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Since that time,
SSA has taken or begun to take a number of concrete and appropriate steps to
improve the integrity of the program. However, some of these actions are
still in the early stages and have yet to yield significant results. We
believe more can be done, including moving forward on proposals to simplify
program requirements, which are often error prone and a major source of SSI
overpayments.

* The combination of three factors-the expected increase in demand for
services as the baby boomers reach retirement age, the imminent retirement
of a large part of the agencies workforce, and changing customer
expectations-has the potential to cripple SSA's future service delivery
system. Even though SSA has a number of human capital initiatives under way
to help it prepare for the future, it lacks a service delivery plan that
lays out a detailed blueprint for how service will be delivered in the
future. Without such a plan, the agency cannot ensure that its human capital
efforts fully will support its vision for service delivery and that it is
effectively marshalling its scarce resources.

* SSA is relying heavily on information technology initiatives to cope with
its growing workloads, and it plans to increasingly use Web-based
technologies to meet its service delivery goals. For fiscal year 2001, SSA
estimated spending about $741 million on information technology systems and
projects. Sound policies and procedures are fundamental to effectively
managing information technology initiatives, and in a prior review, we found
that SSA had not consistently implemented some key policies and procedures
to guide its major information technology functions, including information
security. Doing so is imperative, given that the agency has experienced
mixed success in carrying out prior information technology initiatives.

* Regarding the need to strengthen its ability to conduct research and
contribute to policy development, SSA is well positioned to contribute vital
information to policymakers on the overarching problem of ensuring the
long-term solvency of the Social Security Trust Funds. The agency also has a
responsibility to review and identify other areas where policy changes are
needed, such as in its disability programs. SSA has recently increased the
level of staff and resources available to support these activities; however,
many of the agency's efforts are in the early stages, and it is not yet
clear how the agency will use them and what their ultimate effect on SSA
program policy will be.

* Finally, in light of the terrorist events of September 11th, the nation
has a heightened awareness of the need to protect sensitive information. SSA
will need to continue to take steps to ensure that only individuals who are
eligible for social security numbers (SSN) receive them and to ensure that
its information on deceased SSN holders is accurate and timely. However,
once SSA has issued an SSN to an individual, the agency has little control
over how SSNs are used by other government agencies and the private sector.
As we complete our review of how federal, state, and local programs and
agencies use SSNs and how well they protect them, we look forward to
exploring with you additional options to better protect SSNs.

                                 Background

SSA administers three major federal programs. OASI and DI, together commonly
known as Social Security, provide benefits to retired and disabled workers
and their dependents and survivors. In fiscal year 2001, SSA provided OASI
retirement benefits totaling more than $369 billion to over 38 million
individuals and DI benefits of more than $59 billion to 6.8 million
individuals. These benefits are paid from trust funds that are financed
through payroll taxes paid by workers and their employers and by the
self-employed. The third program, SSI, provides income for aged, blind, or
disabled individuals with limited income and resources. In fiscal

year 2001, 6.7 million individuals received almost $28 billion in SSI
benefits.2 SSI payments are financed from general tax revenues.

To administer these programs, SSA must perform certain essential tasks. It
must issue SSNs to individuals, maintain earnings records for individual
workers by collecting wage reports from employers, use these records and
other information to determine the amount of benefits an applicant may
receive, and process benefit claims for all three programs.

To meet its customer service responsibilities, SSA operates a vast network
of offices distributed throughout the country. These offices include
approximately 1,300 field offices, which, among other things, take
applications for benefits; 138 Offices of Hearings and Appeals; and 36
teleservice centers responsible for SSA's national 800 number operations.3
The agency's policy is to provide customers with a choice in how they
conduct business with SSA. Options include visiting or calling a field
office, calling SSA's toll-free number, or contacting SSA through the mail
or the Internet. To conduct its work, SSA employs almost 62,000 staff. In
addition, to make initial and ongoing disability determinations, SSA
contracts with 54 state disability determination service (DDS) agencies
under authority of the Social Security Act.4 Although federally funded and
guided by SSA in their decision making, these agencies hire their own staff
and retain a degree of independence in how they manage their offices and
conduct disability determinations.5 Overall, SSA relies extensively on
information technology to support its large volumes of programmatic and
administrative work.

The process for obtaining SSA disability benefits under either DI or SSI is
complex, and multiple organizations are involved in determining whether a
claimant is eligible for benefits. As shown in figure 1, the current process
consists of an initial decision and as many as three levels of
administrative appeals if the claimant is dissatisfied with SSA's decision.

2Some DI and OASI benefit recipients have incomes low enough to qualify them
for SSI, and they, therefore, receive benefits from both programs.

3Other SSA facilities include 10 regional offices, 7 processing centers, and
1 data operations center.

4These agencies exist in each state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

5The state DDS sites employ a total of more than 14,000 staff.

                 Figure 1: SSA's Disability Claims Process

Each level of appeal involves multistep procedures for evidence collection,
review, and decision making. Generally, a claimant applies for disability
benefits at one of SSA's 1,300 field offices across the country. If the
claimant meets certain nonmedical program eligibility criteria, the field
office staff forward the claim to the DDS. DDS staff then obtain medical
evidence about the claimant's impairment and determine whether the claimant
is disabled. Claimants who are initially denied benefits can appeal by
requesting the DDS to reconsider its initial denial. If the decision at the
reconsideration level remains unfavorable, the claimant can request a
hearing before a federal administrative law judge at an SSA hearings office
and, if still dissatisfied, a review by SSA's appeals council. After
exhausting these administrative remedies, the individual may file a
complaint in federal district court.

The agency's ability to continue providing Social Security benefits over the
long term is strained by profound demographic changes. The baby boom
generation is nearing retirement age. In addition, life expectancy has
increased continually since the 1930s, and further increases are expected.
This increase in life expectancy, combined with falling fertility rates,
mean that fewer workers will be contributing to Social Security for each
aged, disabled, dependent, or surviving beneficiary. Beginning in 2017,
Social Security's expenditures are expected to exceed its tax income. By
2041, without corrective action, experts expect the combined OASI and DI
trust funds to be depleted, leaving insufficient funds to pay the current
level of benefits. Unless actions are taken to reform the social security
system, the nation will face continuing difficulties in financing social
security benefits in the long term. Over the past few years, a wide array of
proposals has been put forth to restore Social Security's long-term
solvency, and in December 2001, a commission appointed by the president
presented three alternative proposals for reform.

This solvency problem is part of a larger and significant fiscal and
economic challenge facing our aging society. The expected growth in the
Social Security program (OASI and DI), combined with even faster expected
growth in Medicare and Medicaid, will become increasingly unsustainable over
time, compounding an ongoing decline in budget flexibility. Absent changes
in the structure of Social Security and Medicare, there would be virtually
no room for any other budget priorities in future decades. Ultimately,
restoring our long-term fiscal flexibility will involve reforming existing
federal entitlement programs and promoting

Additional Progress Is Needed to Improve SSA's Disability Determination
Process and to Return People to Work

the saving and investment necessary for robust long-term economic growth.6

The disability determination process is time-consuming, complex, and
expensive. Individuals who are initially denied benefits by SSA and appeal
their claim experience lengthy waits for a final decision on their
eligibility, and questions have been raised about the quality and
consistency of certain disability decisions. Since 1994, SSA has introduced
a wide range of initiatives intended to address long-standing problems with
its disability claims process. However, the agency's efforts, in general,
have not achieved the intended result, and the problems persist. Because
SSA's DI and SSI programs are expected to grow significantly over the next
decade, improving the disability determination process remains one of SSA's
most pressing and difficult challenges requiring immediate and sustained
attention from the new commissioner. Additionally, in redesigning its
disability decision-making process, SSA still needs to incorporate into its
eligibility assessment process an evaluation of what is needed for an
individual to return to work. We have recommended developing a comprehensive
return-to-work strategy that focuses on identifying and enhancing the work
capacities of applicants and beneficiaries.

Improvements to the Disability Determination Process Have Been Limited

SSA's complex disability claims process has been plagued by a number of
long-standing weaknesses that have resulted in lengthy waiting periods for
claimants seeking disability benefits. For example, claimants who wish to
appeal an initial denial of benefits frequently wait more than 1 year for a
final decision. We have reported that these long waits result, in part, from
complex and fragmented decision-making processes that are laden with many
layers of reviews and multiple handoffs from one person to another. The cost
of administering the DI and SSI programs reflects the demanding nature of
the process. Although SSI and DI program benefits account for less than 20
percent of the total benefit payments made by SSA, they consume nearly 55
percent of annual administrative resources.

In addition to its difficulties in processing claims, SSA has also had
difficulty ensuring that decisions about a claimant's eligibility for
disability benefits are accurate and consistent across all levels of the
decision-making process. For example, our work shows that in fiscal year
2000,

6For more information,  see U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security:
Issues in  Evaluating Reform Proposals,  GAO-02-288T (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
10, 2001).

about 40 percent of applicants whose cases were denied at the initial level
appealed this decision and about two-thirds were awarded benefits. This
happens in part because decision makers at the initial level use a different
approach to evaluate claims and make decisions than those at the appellate
level. The inconsistency of decisions at these two levels has raised
questions about the fairness, integrity, and cost of SSA's disability
programs.

In 1994, SSA laid out a plan to address these problems, yet that plan and
three subsequent revisions in 1997, 1999, and 2001 have yielded only limited
success. The agency's initial plan entailed a massive effort to redesign the
way it made disability decisions. Among other things, SSA planned to develop
a streamlined decision-making and appeal process, more consistent guidance
and training for decision makers at all levels of the process, and an
improved process for reviewing the quality of eligibility decisions. In our
reviews of SSA's efforts after 2 years, 4 years, and again in 2001, we found
that the agency had accomplished little.7 In some cases, the plans were too
large and too complex to keep on track, and the results of many of the
initiatives that were tested fell far short of expectations. Moreover, the
agency was not able to garner consistent stakeholder support and cooperation
for its proposed changes.

Despite the overall disappointing progress, the agency did experience some
successes. For example, it conducted a large training effort to improve the
consistency of decisions, which agency officials believe resulted in 90,000
eligible individuals' receiving benefits 500 days sooner than otherwise
might have been the case over a 3-year period. In addition, the agency
issued formal guidance in a number of areas intended to improve the
consistency of decisions between the initial and appellate levels.

Overall, however, significant problems persist and difficult decisions
remain. For example, SSA is currently collecting final data on the results
from an initiative known as the Prototype, which was implemented in 10
states in October 1999. Although interim data indicated that the Prototype

7U.S. General Accounting Office, SSA Disability Redesign: Focus Needed on
Initiatives Most Crucial to Reducing Costs and Time, GAO/HEHS-97-20
(Washington, D.C.: Dec.20, 1996); SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to
Enhance Future Progress, GAO/HEHS-99-25 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 1999);
and Social Security Disability: Disappointing Results From SSA's Efforts to
Improve the Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention,
GAO-02-322 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

resulted in more awards at the initial decision level without compromising
accuracy, it also indicated that the number of appeals would increase. This,
in turn, would result in both higher administrative and benefit costs and
lengthen the wait for final decisions on claims. As a result, SSA decided
that the Prototype would not continue in its current form. Recently, SSA
announced its "short-term" decision to revise some features of the Prototype
to improve disability claims processing time while it continues to develop
longer-term improvements. It remains to be seen whether these revisions will
retain the positive results from the Prototype while also controlling
administrative and benefit costs.

Even more pressing in the near term is the management and workload crisis
that SSA faces in its hearings offices. The agency's 1999 plan included an
initiative to overhaul operations at its hearing offices to increase
efficiency and significantly reduce processing times at that level; however,
this nationwide effort not only has failed to achieve its goals but, in some
cases, has made things worse. The initiative has suffered, in part, from
problems associated with implementing large-scale changes too quickly
without resolving known problems. As a result, the average case-processing
time slowed and backlogs of cases waiting to be processed approached crisis
levels. We have recommended that the new commissioner act quickly to
implement short-term strategies to reduce the backlog and develop a
long-range strategy for a more permanent solution to the backlog and
efficiency problems at the Office of Hearings and Appeals.8 According to SSA
officials, they have recently made some decisions on short-term initiatives
to reduce the backlogs and streamline the process, and they are preparing to
negotiate with union officials regarding some of these planned changes.

Finally, SSA's 1994 plan to redesign the claims process called for the
agency to revamp its existing quality assurance system. However, because of
disagreement among stakeholders on how to accomplish this difficult
objective, progress in this area has been limited. In March 2001, a
contractor issued a report assessing SSA's existing quality assurance
practices and recommended a significant overhaul to encompass a more
comprehensive view of quality management. We agreed with this assessment and
recommended that SSA develop an action plan for implementing a more
comprehensive and sophisticated quality assurance

8GAO-02-322.

program.9 Since then, the commissioner has signaled the high priority she
attaches to this effort by appointing to her staff a senior manager for
quality who reports directly to her. The senior manager is responsible for
developing a proposal to establish a quality-oriented approach to all SSA
business processes. The manager is currently assembling a team to carry out
this challenging undertaking.

The disappointing results of some of these initiatives can be linked, in
part, to slow progress in achieving technological improvements. As
originally envisioned, SSA's plan to redesign its disability determination
process was heavily dependent upon these improvements. The agency spent a
number of years designing and developing a new computer software application
to automate the disability claims process. However, SSA decided to
discontinue the initiative in July 1999, after about 7 years, citing
software performance problems and delays in developing the

10

software.

In August 2000, SSA issued a new management plan for the development of the
agency's electronic disability system. SSA expects this effort to move the
agency toward a totally paperless disability claims process. The strategy
consists of several key components, including (1) an electronic claims
intake process for the field offices, (2) enhanced state DDS claims
processing systems, and (3) technology to support the Office of Hearing and
Appeals' business processes. The components are to be linked to one another
through the use of an electronic folder that is being designed to transmit
data from one processing location to another and to serve as a data
repository, storing documents that are keyed in, scanned, or faxed. SSA
began piloting certain components of its electronic disability system in one
state in May 2000 and has expanded this pilot test to one more state since
then. According to agency officials, SSA has taken various steps to increase
the functionality of the system; however, the agency still has a number of
remaining issues to address. For example, SSA's system must comply with
privacy and data protection standards required under the Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act, and the agency will need to effectively
integrate its existing legacy information systems with new technologies,
including interactive Web-based applications.

9GAO-02-322.

10U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Administration: Update on
Year 2000 and Other Key Information Technology Initiatives,
GAO/T-AIMD-99-259 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 1999).

SSA is optimistic that it will meet its scheduled date for achieving a
paperless disability claims process-anticipated for the end of 2005-and has
taken several actions to ensure that its efforts support the agency's
mission. For example, to better ensure that its business processes drive its
information technology strategy, SSA has transferred management of the
electronic disability strategy from the Office of Systems to the Office of
Disability and Income Security Programs. In addition, SSA hired a contractor
to independently evaluate the electronic disability strategy and recommend
options for ensuring that the effort addresses all of the business and
technical issues required to meet the agency's mission. According to an
agency official, SSA is currently implementing the contractor's
recommendations. As SSA proceeds with this new system, however, it is
imperative that the agency effectively identify, track, and manage the
costs, benefits, schedule, and risks associated with the system's full
development and implementation. Moreover, SSA must ensure that it has the
right mix of skills and capabilities to support this initiative and that
desired end results are achieved.

Overall, SSA is at a crossroads in its efforts to redesign and improve its
disability claims process. It has devoted significant time, energy, and
resources to its redesign initiatives over the last 7 years, yet progress
has been limited and often disappointing. SSA is not the only government
agency to experience difficulty in overhauling or reengineering its
operations. According to reengineering experts, many federal, state, and
local agencies have failed in similar efforts. Frequent leadership turnover,
constraints on flexibility posed by laws and regulations, and the fact that
government agencies often must serve multiple stakeholders with competing
interests all constrain progress. Yet, it is vital that SSA address its
claims process problems now, before the agency experiences another surge in
workload as the baby boomers reach their disability-prone years. To date,
the focus on changing the steps and procedures of the process or changing
the duties of its decision makers has not been successful. Given this
experience, it may be appropriate for the agency to undertake a new and
comprehensive analysis of the fundamental issues impeding progress. Such an
analysis might include reassessing the root causes contributing to its
problems and would encompass concerns raised by the Social Security Advisory
Board, such as the fragmentation and structural problems in the agency's
overall disability service delivery system. The outcome of this analysis
may, in some cases, require legislative changes.

SSA Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Return People with Disabilities to
Work

The number of working-age beneficiaries of the DI and SSI programs has
increased by 61 percent over the past 10 years. We have reported that as the
beneficiary population has grown, numerous technological and medical
advances, combined with changes in society and the nature of work, have
increased the potential for some people with disabilities to return to, or
remain in, the labor force. Also, legislative changes have focused on
returning disabled beneficiaries to work. The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 supports the premise that people with disabilities can work and
have the right to work, and the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act of 1999 increased beneficiaries' access to vocational
services. Indeed, many beneficiaries with disabilities indicate that they
want to work, and many may be able work in today's labor market if they
receive needed support. In 1996, we recommended that SSA place a greater
priority on helping disabled beneficiaries work, and the agency has taken a
number of actions to improve its return-to-work practices. But even with
these actions, SSA has achieved poor results in this arena, where fewer than
1 in 500 DI beneficiaries and few SSI beneficiaries leave the disability
rolls to work.

Even in light of the Ticket to Work Act, SSA will continue to face
difficulties in returning beneficiaries to work, in part owing to
weaknesses, both statutory and policy, in the design of the DI program. As
we have reported in the past, these weaknesses include an either/or
disability decision-making process that characterizes individuals as either
unable to work or having the capacity to work. This either/or process
produces a strong incentive for applicants to establish their inability to
work to qualify for benefits.

Moreover, return-to-work services are offered only after a lengthy
determination process. Because applicants are either unemployed or only
marginally connected to the labor force at the time of application and
remain so during the eligibility determination process, it is likely that
their skills, work habits, and motivation to work deteriorate during this
wait. Thus, individuals who have successfully established their disability
may have little reason or desire to attempt rehabilitation and work. Unlike
some private sector disability insurers and foreign social insurance
systems, SSA does not incorporate into its initial or continuing eligibility
assessment process an evaluation of what is needed for an individual to
return to work. Instead of receiving assistance to stay in the workforce or
return to work-and thus to stay off the long-term disability rolls-an
individual can obtain assistance through DI or SSI only by proving his or
her inability to work. And even in its efforts to redesign the decision-

making process, SSA has yet to incorporate into these initiatives an
evaluation of what an individual may need to return to work.

Moreover, SSA has made limited strides in developing baseline data to
measure progress in the return-to-work area. In June 2000, we reported that
many of SSA's fiscal year 2001 performance measures were not sufficiently
results oriented, making it difficult to track progress. SSA's fiscal year
2002 performance plan shows that SSA has begun to incorporate more
outcome-oriented performance indicators that could support their efforts in
this area. Two new indicators, in particular, could help SSA gauge progress:
the percentage increase in the number of DI beneficiaries whose benefits are
suspended or terminated owing to employment and the percentage increase in
the number of disabled SSI beneficiaries no longer receiving cash benefits.
However, SSA has not yet set specific performance targets for these
measures.

Nevertheless, SSA has recently stepped up its return-to-work efforts. For
example, it has (1) established an Office of Employment Support Programs to
promote employment of disabled beneficiaries; (2) recruited 184 public or
private entities to provide vocational rehabilitation, employment, and other
support services to beneficiaries under the Ticket to Work Program; (3)
raised the limit on the amount a DI beneficiary can earn from work and still
receive benefits to encourage people with disabilities to work; (4) funded
12 state partnership agreements that are intended to help the states develop
services to increase beneficiary employment; and (5) completed a pilot study
on the deployment of work incentive specialists to SSA field offices and is
currently determining how to best implement the position nationally.

While these efforts represent positive steps in trying to return people with
disabilities to work, much remains to be done. As we have recommended
previously, SSA still needs to move forward in developing a comprehensive
return-to-work strategy that integrates, as appropriate, earlier
intervention, including earlier and more effective identification of work
capacities, and the expansion of such capacities by providing essential
return-to-work assistance for applicants and beneficiaries. Adopting such a
strategy is likely to require improvements to staff skill levels and areas
of expertise, as well as changes to the disability determination process. It
will also require fundamental changes to the underlying philosophy and
direction of the DI and SSI programs, as well as legislative changes in some
cases. Policymakers will need to carefully weigh the implications of such
changes. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that the absence of such a
strategy and accompanying

Longstanding High-Risk SSI Issues Require Sustained Management and Oversight

performance plan goals may hinder SSA's efforts to make significant strides
in the return-to-work area. An improved return-to-work strategy could
benefit both the beneficiaries who want to work and the American taxpayer.

The SSI program is the nation's largest cash assistance program for the
poor. In fiscal year 2000, the program paid 6.6 million low-income aged,
blind, and disabled recipients $31 billion in benefits. During that year,
newly detected overpayments and outstanding SSI debt totaled more than $3.9
billion. In 1997, after several years of reporting on specific instances of
abuse and mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and poor recovery of
outstanding SSI debt, we designated SSI a high-risk program. The SSI program
poses a special challenge for SSA because, unlike OASI and DI, it is a
means-tested program; thus, SSA must collect and verify information on
income, resources, and recipient living arrangements to determine initial
and continuing eligibility for the program. Our prior work, however, shows
that SSA has often placed a greater priority on quickly processing and
paying SSI claims with insufficient attention to verifying recipient
self-reported information, controlling program expenditures, and pursuing
overpayment recoveries once they occur.

In response to our high-risk designation, SSA has made progress in
coordination with Congress to improve the financial integrity and management
of SSI, including developing a major SSI legislative proposal with numerous
overpayment deterrence and recovery provisions. Many of these provisions
were incorporated into the Foster Care Independence Act, which was signed
into law in December 1999. The act directly addresses a number of our prior
recommendations and provides SSA with additional tools to obtain applicant
income and resource information from financial institutions; imposes a
period of ineligibility for applicants who transfer assets to qualify for
SSI benefits; and authorizes the use of credit bureaus, private collection
agencies, interest levies, and other means to recover delinquent debt. SSA
also obtained separate legislative authority in 1998 to recover overpayments
from former SSI recipients currently receiving OASI or DI benefits. The
agency was previously excluded from using this cross-program recovery tool
to recover SSI overpayments without first obtaining debtor consent. As a
result of this new authority, SSA has recently begun the process of
recovering overpayments from Social Security benefits of individuals no
longer on the SSI rolls. The agency has also issued regulations on the use
of credit bureaus and drafted regulations for wage garnishments. We have
been told that the draft regulations are currently under review by the new
commissioner and by the Office of Management and Budget.

In addition to establishing the new legislative authorities, SSA has
initiated a number of internal administrative actions to further strengthen
SSI program integrity. These include using tax refund offsets for delinquent
SSI debtors, an action that SSA said resulted in $61 million in additional
overpayment recoveries last year. SSA also uses more frequent (monthly)
automated matches to identify ineligible SSI recipients living in nursing
homes and other institutions. As of January 2001, SSA's field offices were
also provided on-line access to wage, new-hire, and unemployment insurance
data maintained by the Office of Child Support Enforcement. These data are
key to field staff's ability to more quickly verify employment and income
information essential to determining SSI eligibility and benefit levels. SSA
also increased the number of SSI financial redeterminations that it
conducted, from about 1.8 million in fiscal year 1997 to about 2.2 million
in fiscal year 2000. These reviews focus on income and resource factors
affecting eligibility and payment amounts. SSA estimates that by conducting
more redeterminations and refining its methodology for targeting cases most
likely to have payment errors, it prevented nearly $600 million in
additional overpayments in fiscal year 1999.

SSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has also increased the level of
resources and staff devoted to investigating SSI fraud and abuse; key among
the OIG's efforts is the formation of Cooperative Disability Investigation
teams in 13 field locations. These teams are designed to identify fraud and
abuse before SSI benefits are approved and paid. Finally, in response to our
prior recommendation, SSA has revised its field office work credit and
measurement system to better reward staff for time spent thoroughly
verifying applicant eligibility information and developing fraud referrals.
If properly implemented, such measures should provide field staff with
much-needed incentives for preventing fraud and abuse and controlling
overpayments.

SSA's current initiatives demonstrate a stronger management commitment to
SSI integrity issues and have the potential to significantly improve program
management; however, our work shows that SSA overpayments and outstanding
debt owed to the program remain at high levels. A number of the agency's
initiatives-especially those associated with the Foster Care Independence
Act-are still in the early planning or implementation stages and have yet to
yield results. In addition, at this stage, it is not clear how great an
effect the impact of SSA's enhanced matching efforts, online access tools,
and other internal initiatives has had on the agency's ability to recover
and avoid overpayments. The same is true for the agency's efforts to improve
the accuracy of SSI eligibility decisions.

SSA also has not yet addressed a key program vulnerability-program
complexity-that is associated with increased SSI overpayments. In prior
work, we have reported that SSI living arrangement and in-kind support and
maintenance policies used by SSA to calculate eligibility and benefit
amounts were complex, prone to error, and a major source of overpayments. We
also recommended that SSA develop options for simplifying the program. Last
year, SSA's policy office issued a study that discussed various options for
simplifying complex SSI policies. Although SSA is considering various
options, it has not moved forward in recommending specific cost neutral
proposals for change.

We believe that sustained management attention is necessary to improve SSI
program integrity. Thus, it is important that SSA move forward in fully
implementing the overpayment deterrence and recovery tools currently
available to it and seek out additional ways to improve program management.
Accordingly, we have a review under way that is aimed at documenting the
range of SSI activities currently in place; their effects on program
management and operations; and additional legislative or administrative
actions, or both, necessary to further improve SSA's ability to control and
recover overpayments. A particular focus of this review will be to assess
remaining weaknesses in SSA's initial and ongoing eligibility verification
procedures, application of penalties for individuals who fail to report
essential eligibility information, and overpayment recovery policies.

Among federal agencies, SSA has long been considered one of the leaders in
service delivery. Indeed, for fiscal year 2001, SSA reported that 81 percent
of its customers rated the agency's services as "excellent," "very good," or
"good." SSA considers service delivery one of its top priorities, and its
current performance plan includes specific goals and strategies to provide
accurate, timely, and useful service to the public. However, the agency
faces significant challenges that could hamper its ability to provide
high-quality service over the next decade and beyond. Demand for services
will grow rapidly as the baby boom generation ages and enters the
disability-prone years. By 2010, SSA expects worker applications for DI to
increase by as much as 32 percent over 2000 levels. Determining eligibility
for disability benefits is a complex process that spans a number of offices
and can take over a year to complete. As we have observed earlier in this
statement, SSA already has trouble managing its disability determination
workload; adding additional cases without rectifying serious case processing
issues will only make things worse. Furthermore, by 2010, SSA projects that
applications for retirement benefits will also increase dramatically-by 31
percent over the 2000 levels.

SSA Lacks a Plan to Help It Cope with Future Service Delivery Challenges

SSA's ability to provide high-quality service delivery is also potentially
weakened by challenges regarding its workforce. First, SSA's workforce is
aging, and SSA is predicting a retirement wave that will peak in the years
2007 through 2010, when it expects about 2,500 employees to retire each
year. By 2010, SSA projects that about 37 percent of its almost 62,000
employees will retire. The percentage is higher for employees in SSA's
supervisory or managerial ranks. In particular, more than 70 percent of
SSA's upper-level managers and executives (GS-14, GS-15, and SES level) are
expected to retire by 2010. Second, SSA will need to increase staff skills
to deal with changing customer expectations and needs. SSA's staff will need
to obtain and continually update the skills needed to use the most current
technology available to serve the public in a more convenient, cost
effective, and secure manner. At the same time, some aspects of SSA's
customer service workload will likely become more time consuming and labor
intensive, owing primarily to the growing proportion of SSA's non-English
speaking customers and the rising number of disability cases involving
mental impairments. Both situations result in more complex cases that
require diverse staff skills.

SSA has a number of workforce initiatives under way to help it prepare for
the future. For example, as we recommended in 1993, and as required by law,
SSA developed a workforce transition plan to lay out actions to help ensure
that its workforce will be able to handle future service delivery
challenges. In addition, recognizing that it will shortly be facing the
prospect of increasing retirements, SSA conducted a study that predicts
staff retirements and attrition each year, from 1999 to 2020, by major job
position and agency component. SSA also began to take steps to fill its
expected leadership gap. We have long stressed the importance of succession
planning and formal programs to develop and train managers at all levels of
SSA. As early as 1993, we recommended that SSA make succession planning a
permanent aspect of its human resource planning and evaluate the adequacy of
its investments in management training and development. SSA created three
new leadership development programs to help prepare selected staff to assume
mid- and top-level leadership positions at the agency. Overall, many of the
efforts being made today are consistent with principles of human capital
management, and good human capital management is fundamental to the federal
government's ability to serve the American people. For this reason, we have
designated strategic

human capital management a high-risk area across the federal government.11

However, SSA is taking these human capital measures in the absence of a
concrete service delivery plan to help guide its investments. We recommended
as long ago as 1993 that SSA complete such a plan to ensure that its human
capital and other key investments are put to the best use.12 In 1998, the
agency took a first step by beginning a multiyear project to monitor and
measure the needs, expectations, priorities, and satisfaction of customer
groups, major stakeholders, and its workforce. In 2000, SSA completed a
document that articulates how it envisions the agency functioning in the
future.13 For example, SSA anticipates offering services in person, over the
telephone, and via the Internet; its telephonic and electronic access
services will be equipped with sophisticated voice recognition and language
translation features, and work will be accomplished through a paperless
process. In this service vision document, SSA also states that it will rely
heavily on a workforce with diverse and updated skills to accomplish its
mission. Although this new vision represents a positive step for the agency
toward acknowledging and preparing for future service delivery challenges,
it is too broad and general to be useful in making specific information
technology and workforce decisions. We have stressed that this document
should be followed by a more detailed service delivery plan that spells out
who will provide what type of services in the future, where these services
will be made available, and the steps and timetables for accomplishing
needed changes. SSA officials told us that they are working on such a
blueprint. Without this plan, SSA cannot ensure that its investments in its
workforce and technology are consistent with and fully support its future
approach to service delivery.

11U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
2001).

12U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security: Sustained Effort Needed
to Improve Management and Prepare for the Future, GAO/HRD-94-22 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 27, 1993). Also, see GAO/T-HEHS-98-113 and GAO/HEHS-96-196.

13This document was originally called "2010 Vision" but subsequently was
renamed "SSA's Service Vision."

SSA's Future Success Is Linked to Effectively Managing Information
Technology Initiatives

SSA also plans to rely heavily on information technology to cope with
growing workloads and to enhance its processing capabilities. To this end,
the agency has devoted considerable time and effort to identifying
strategies to meet its goal of providing world-class service. For example,
SSA has begun expanding its electronic service delivery capability- offering
retirees the option of applying for benefits on-line as well as pursuing
other on-line or Internet options to facilitate customer access to the
agency's information and services. Yet, SSA's overall success in meeting its
service delivery challenge will depend on how effectively it manages its
information technology initiatives. As SSA transitions to electronic
processes, it will be challenged to think strategically about its
information technology investments and to effectively link these investments
to the agency's service delivery goals and performance. Furthermore, its
actions and decisions must effectively address dual modes of service
delivery-its traditional services via telephone, face-to-face, and mail
contacts that are supported primarily by its mainframe computer operations,
as well as a more interactive, on-line, Web-based environment aimed at
delivering more readily accessible services in response to increased
customer demands.

SSA has experienced mixed success in carrying out prior information
technology initiatives. For example, the agency has made substantial
progress in modernizing workstations and local area networks to support its
work processes, and it has clearly defined its business needs and linked
information technology projects to its strategic objectives. Moreover, our
evaluation of its information technology policies, procedures, and practices
in five key areas-investment management, enterprise architecture, software
development and acquisition, human capital, and information security-found
that SSA had many important information technology management policies and
procedures in place. 14 For instance, SSA had sound policies and procedures
for software development that were consistent with best practices.

However, SSA had not implemented its policies and procedures uniformly and
had not established several key policies and procedures essential to
ensuring that its information technology investments and human capital were
effectively managed. We noted weaknesses in each of the five key

14U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology Management: Social
Security Administration Practices Can Be Improved,GAO-01-961 (Washington,
D.C.: August 21, 2001).

areas and recommended actions to improve SSA's information technology
management practices in each area. In total, our report included 20 specific
recommendations for more effectively managing the agency's information
technology. In responding to our report, SSA agreed with all of the
recommendations.

Let me illustrate some of the weaknesses that formed the basis for our
recommendations. In making decisions on technology projects, SSA lacked key
criteria and regular oversight for ensuring consistent investment management
and decision-making practices. It also did not always consider costs,
benefits, schedules, and risks when making project selections and as part of
its ongoing management controls. Without such information, SSA cannot be
assured that its investment proposals will provide the most cost-effective
solutions and achieve measurable and specific program-related benefits
(e.g., high-quality service delivered on time, within cost, and to the
customer's satisfaction). Furthermore, given competing priorities and
funding needs, SSA will need such information to make essential tradeoffs
among its information technology investment proposals and set priorities
that can maximize the potential for both short-and longer-term improvements
to services provided to the public.

As SSA pursues Internet and Web-based applications to better serve its
customers, it must ensure that these efforts are aligned with the agency's
information technology environment. A key element for achieving this
transition is the successful implementation of SSA's enterprise
architecture. An enterprise architecture serves as a blueprint for
systematically and completely defining an organization's current (baseline)
and desired (target) environment and is essential for evolving information
systems, developing new systems, and inserting emerging technologies that
optimize their mission value. It also provides a tool for assessing
benefits, impacts, and capital investment measurements and supporting
analyses of alternatives, risks, and trade-offs. Nonetheless, we found that
SSA had not completed key elements of its enterprise architecture, including
(1) finalizing its enterprise architecture framework, (2) updating and
organizing its architectures and architecture definitions under the
framework, and (3) reflecting its future service delivery vision and
e-business goals. In addition, it had not ensured that enterprise
architecture change management and legacy system integration policies,
procedures, and processes were effectively implemented across the agency.

As SSA moves forward in implementing electronic services and other
technologies, its architecture will be critical to defining, managing, and

enforcing adherence to the framework required to support its current and
future information processing needs. Moreover, without effective enterprise
architecture change management and legacy system integration processes, SSA
will lack assurance that (1) it can successfully manage and document changes
to its architecture as business functions evolve and new technologies are
acquired and (2) new software and hardware technologies will interoperate
with existing systems in a cost-effective manner. In surveying 116 agencies
across the federal government, we found the use of enterprise architectures
to be a work in progress, with much left to be accomplished.15 We assessed
SSA at a relatively low level of maturity in enterprise architecture
management.

SSA plans to rely extensively on software-intensive systems to help achieve
processing efficiencies and improved customer service. Because SSA is an
agency in which software development continues to be predominantly an
in-house effort, in 1997, its Office of Systems established the Software
Process Improvement program, in which new policies and procedures were
created to enhance the quality of the agency's software development.
However, our evaluation of these policies and procedures found that SSA was
not consistently applying them to its software development projects. In
particular, SSA had not applied sound management and technical practices in
its development of the electronic disability system. This poses a
significant risk given SSA's history of problems in developing and
delivering the critical software needed to support its redesigned work
processes.16 The use of sound, disciplined software development processes is
critical to ensuring that SSA delivers quality software on schedule and
within established cost estimates. Until SSA consistently and effectively
implements its software development policies and procedures, it will lack
assurance that it can meet its goal of developing a technological
infrastructure to support its service delivery vision.

As SSA places increased emphasis on using information technology to support
new ways of delivering service, it must ensure that it effectively manages
its human capital to anticipate, plan for, and support its information
technology requirements. However, SSA had not taken all of

15U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-6
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2002).

16GAO/T-AIMD-99-259.

the necessary steps to ensure the adequacy of its future information
technology workforce. For instance, we found that although SSA had begun
evaluating its short-and longer-term information technology needs, these
efforts were not complete. Specifically, SSA had not linked its information
technology staff needs to the competencies it would require to meet mission
goals. Doing so is necessary, however, to ensure that SSA's plans project
workforce needs far enough in advance to allow adequate time for staff
recruitment and hiring, skills refreshment and training, or outsourcing
considerations. Furthermore, SSA lacked an inventory identifying the
knowledge and skills of current information technology staff, which is
essential for uncovering gaps between current staff and future requirements.
Without such an inventory, SSA has no assurance that its plans for hiring,
training, and professionally developing information technology staff will
effectively target short- and long-term skills needed to sustain its current
and future operations. These shortcomings in SSA's information technology
human capital management could have serious ramifications as the agency
moves toward making larger investments in new electronic service delivery
options, such as Internet applications. Developing Internet applications
represents a new era for SSA-one in which the agency must ensure that is has
enough of the right people and skills to bring its electronic service
delivery plan to fruition.

As SSA proceeds with the development and implementation of Internet and
Web-based initiatives, the need for a strong program to address threats to
the security and integrity of its operations will grow. Without proper
safeguards, these initiatives pose enormous risks that make it easier for
individuals and groups with malicious intentions to intrude into
inadequately protected systems and use such access to obtain sensitive
information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against
other organizations' sites.

SSA has made progress in addressing the information protection issues raised
in prior years. Specifically, during fiscal year 2001, the agency

* conducted a risk assessment to identify critical assets and
vulnerabilities as part of the Critical Infrastructure Protection project;

* issued a final security policy for the state Disability Determination
Service sites in accordance with the information security requirements
included in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Publication 800-18;

* established and published technical security configuration standards for
operating systems and servers;

* completed updates for accreditation and certification of key systems; and

* further strengthened physical access controls over the National Computer
Center.

Nonetheless, weaknesses in SSA's information security program continue to
threaten its ability to effectively mitigate the risk of unauthorized access
to, and disclosure of, sensitive information. For example, although the
agency has made improvements to its entity-wide security program and
standards, control weaknesses continue to expose key elements of its
distributed systems and networks to unauthorized access to sensitive data.
The general areas where exposures occurred included implementation,
enforcement, and ongoing monitoring of compliance with technical security
configuration standards and rules governing the operation of firewalls;
monitoring controls over security violations and periodic reviews of user
access; and physical access controls at nonheadquarters locations. These
exposures exist primarily because SSA has not completed implementation of
its enterprise-wide security program.

Until a complete security framework is implemented and maintained, SSA's
ability to effectively mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to, and
modification or disclosure of, sensitive SSA data will be impaired.
Unauthorized access to sensitive data can result in the loss of data as well
as trust fund assets, and compromised privacy of information associated with
SSA's enumeration, earnings, benefit payment processes, and programs. The
need for a strong security framework to address threats to the security and
integrity of SSA operations will grow as the agency continues to implement
Internet and Web-based applications to serve the American public.

Program Challenges Require SSA to Play an Active Role in Research,
Evaluation, and Policy Development

In the past, we have reported that SSA has not undertaken the range of
research, evaluation, and policy analysis necessary (1) to identify areas
where legislative or other changes are needed to address program weaknesses
and (2) to assist policymakers in exploring and developing options for
change.

The long-term solvency of the Social Security system is a critical issue
facing the nation and SSA. As the debate on Social Security reform proceeds,
policymakers and the general public need thoughtful, detailed, and timely
analyses of the likely effect of different proposals on workers,
beneficiaries, and the economy. SSA is well positioned to assess the
programmatic impacts of economic and demographic trends and to identify
areas where policy changes are needed to ensure that recipients' needs are
met efficiently and cost effectively.

At the same time, SSA needs to prepare for the implementation of whatever
programmatic changes are eventually made. Many of the reform proposals
currently under debate will likely affect not only SSA but other government
agencies as well. As part of their debate, policymakers need to understand
the administrative aspects of each proposal, including the amount of time
and money necessary to implement the proposed changes. SSA has information
that could be central to the implementation and administration of proposed
Social Security reforms and should be providing this information in a timely
and accurate manner.

SSA also faces a wide range of pressing challenges with its disability
programs, including how best to 1) ensure the quality and timeliness of its
decisions, 2) integrate return-to-work strategies into all phases of its
disability determination process, and 3) address program complexity problems
that have contributed to vulnerability in the SSI program. To address these
challenges, SSA will need to target its research and conduct analyses that
will allow the agency to play a key role in proposing and analyzing major
policy changes. However, in the past, we have noted SSA's reluctance to take
the actions needed to fulfill its policy development and planning role in
advance of major program crises, particularly when they require long-term
solutions, legislative change, or both.

In recent years, SSA has taken action to strengthen its research and policy
development role in these and other areas. It has initiated several
reorganizations of its policy component to strengthen its capacity. The
agency has also significantly increased the level of staff and resources
available to support research activities and has several analyses planned

The Need to Protect Personal Information Has Gained New Urgency

or under way to address key policy issues. Specific to the long-term
solvency issue, SSA's Office of the Actuary has long provided key
information on the financial outlook of Social Security and projections of
the effects of different reform proposals on trust fund finances. In
addition, SSA has expanded its ability to use modeling techniques to predict
the effects of proposed program changes, and it has established a research
consortium to conduct and advise on relevant research and policy activities.
With respect to its disability programs, SSA has established a separate
disability research institute and has submitted to the Congress its first
major SSI legislative proposal aimed at improving program integrity.
However, many of the agency's actions and studies are in the early stages,
and it is not yet clear how the agency will use them and what their ultimate
effect on SSA program policy will be.

The Social Security Administration is responsible for issuing SSNs to most
Americans.17 The agency relies on the SSN to record wage data, maintain
earnings records, and efficiently administer its benefit programs. In
addition, the SSN is used by other government agencies as well as the
private sector. This widespread use offers many benefits; however, combined
with an increase in reports of identify theft, it has raised public concern
over how this and other personal information is being used and protected.
Moreover, the growth of the Internet, which can make personal information
contained in electronic records more readily accessible to the general
public, has heightened this concern. Finally, the terrorist attacks of
September 11th and the indication that some of the terrorists fraudulently
obtained SSNs have added new urgency to the need to assess how SSNs are used
and protected.

We have recently testified on work we are completing at the request of
Chairman Shaw and others to review the many uses of SSNs at all levels of
government and to assess how these government entities safeguard the SSNs.18
We found that SSNs are widely used across multiple agencies and departments
at all levels of government. They are used by agencies that deliver benefits
and services to the public as a convenient and efficient

17Since 1982, SSA has provided SSNs only to U.S. citizens, noncitizens
authorized to work in the United States, and noncitizens with an approved
nonwork reason for needing a number.

18U.S. General Accounting Office, SSNs Are Widely Used by Government and
Could Be Better Protected, GAO-02-619T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2002).

means of managing records. More importantly, these agencies rely on SSNs
when they share data with one another, for example, to make sure that only
eligible individuals receive benefits and to collect outstanding debt
individuals owe the government. Although these agencies are taking steps to
safeguard the SSNs from improper disclosure, our work identified potential
weaknesses in the security of information systems at all levels of
government. In addition, SSNs are widely found in documents that are
routinely made available to the public, that is, in public records. Although
some government agencies and courts are trying innovative approaches to
prevent the SSN from appearing on public records, not all agencies
maintaining public records have adopted these approaches. Moreover,
increasing numbers of departments are considering placing or planning to
place documents that may contain SSNs on the Internet, which would make
these numbers much more readily available to others, raising the risk of
their misuse.

We also found that SSNs are one of three personal identifiers most often
sought by identity thieves and that SSNs are often used to generate
additional false documents, which can be used to set up false identities.
What is harder to determine is a clear answer on where identify thieves
obtain the SSNs they misuse. Ultimately, in light of the recent terrorist
events, the nation must grapple with the need to find the proper balance
between the widespread and legitimate uses of personal information such as
SSNs, by both government and the private sector, and the need to protect
individual privacy.

There are no easy answers to these questions, but SSA has an important role
to play in protecting the integrity of the SSN. Given the widespread use of
SSNs, the agency needs to take steps to ensure that it is taking all
necessary precautions to prevent individuals who are not entitled to SSNs
from obtaining them. Currently, the agency is reexamining its process of
assigning SSNs to individuals. This may require the agency to find a new
balance between two competing goals: the need to take time to verify
documents submitted during the application process and the desire to serve
the applicant as quickly as possible. In addition, the agency is studying
ways to make sure it provides accurate and timely information to financial
institutions on deceased SSN holders. However, once SSA has issued an SSN,
it has little control over how the number is used by other government
agencies and the private sector. In this light, we look forward to exploring
additional options to better protect SSNs with you as we complete our
ongoing work in this area.

Concluding Observations

We have outlined a number of difficult challenges, most of them
long-standing, that the SSA Commissioner faces. These are, in general, the
same challenges we have been highlighting since SSA became an independent
agency. In some cases, SSA has begun to take positive steps to address its
challenges. Specifically, SSA's efforts to strengthen its research,
evaluation, and policy development activities show promise. Likewise, SSA
has made considerable progress in addressing weaknesses in the integrity of
the SSI program. However, more can be done in these areas. As new pressures
inevitably arise that will also demand attention from the commissioner and
her team, it will be important for the commissioner to sustain and expand on
the agency's actions to date.

We are particularly concerned, however, about other challenges where SSA's
efforts to date have fallen short and where the agency faces increasing
pressures in the near future. The commissioner faces crucial decisions on
how to proceed on several of these challenges. SSA has made disappointing
progress on (1) its efforts to improve its disability claims process, (2)
the need to better integrate return-to-work strategies into all phases of
the disability process, and (3) the need to better plan for future service
delivery pressures and changes. These challenges will be exacerbated by
growing workload pressures as the baby boom generation ages. After almost a
year without a long-term leadership structure in place, the commissioner and
a SSA team have an opportunity to take a fresh look at these longstanding
challenges and the fundamental issues impeding faster progress in these
areas. Again, focused and sustained attention to these challenges is vital,
as the agency is running out of time to make needed changes before the
expected increases in workload overwhelm its operations.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to
any questions that you or other member of the subcommittees may have.

Contacts and For further information regarding this testimony, please
contact Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, or Kay E. Brown, Assistant Director,
Education,

Acknowledgments Workforce, and Income Security at (202) 512-7215.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Michael
Alexander, Yvette Banks, Daniel Bertoni, Alicia Puente Cackley, Ellen
Habenicht, Carol Langelier, Valerie Melvin, Angela Miles, Carol Dawn
Petersen, and William Thompson.

Related GAO Products

                           Social Security Reform

Social  Security:  Issues  in  Evaluating Reform  Proposals .  GAO-02-288T.
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2001.

Social  Security:  Program ' s Role  in  Helping  Ensure  Income  Adequacy.
GAO-02-62. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2001.

Social  Security:   Evaluating  Reform  Proposals .    GAO/AIMD/HEHS-00-29.
Washington, D.C.: November 4, 1999.

SSA' s Management  Challenges: Strong Leadership  Needed to Turn  Plans Into
Timely, Meaningful  Action.  GAO/T-HEHS-98-113. Washington, D.C.:  March 12,
1998.

Social Security Disability Programs

Social Security Disability: Disappointing Results From SSA's Efforts to
Improve the Disability Claims Process Warrant Immediate Attention.

GAO-02-322. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

SSA Disability: SGA Levels Appear to Affect the Work Behavior of Relatively
Few Beneficiaries, but More Data Needed. GAO-02-224. Washington, D.C.:
January 16, 2002.

SSA Disability: Other Programs May Provide Lessons for Improving
Return-to-Work Efforts. GAO-01-153. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2001.

Social Security Disability: SSA Has Had Mixed Success in Efforts to Improve
Caseload Management. GAO/T-HEHS-00-22. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 1999.

SSA Disability Redesign: Actions Needed to Enhance Future Progress.
GAO/HEHS/99-25. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 1999.

SSA Disability: SSA Return-to-Work Strategies From Other Systems May Improve
Federal Programs. GAO-HEHS-96-133. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 1996.

Supplemental Security High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-273. Washington,
D.C.: January Income Program 2001.

Supplemental Security Income: Additional Actions Needed to Reduce Program
Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse. GAO/HEHS-99-151. Washington, D.C.:
September 15, 1999.

Supplemental Security Income: Long-Standing Issues Require More Active
Management and Program Oversight. GAO/T-HEHS-99-51. Washington, D.C.:
February 3, 1999.

Supplemental Security Income: Action Needed on Long-Standing Problems
Affecting Program Integrity. GAO/HEHS-98-158. Washington, D.C.: September
14, 1998.

Service Delivery  to the  SSA Customer Service: Broad  Service Delivery Plan
Needed to Address

Public Future Challenges . GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-75. Washington, D.C.: February
10, 2000.

                           Information Technology

Information Security: Additional Actions Needed to Fully Implement Reform
Legislation. GAO-02-470T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.

Information Technology: Enterprise Architecture Use Across the Federal
Government Can Be Improved. GAO-02-6. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2002.

Information Technology Management: Social Security Administration Practices
Can Be Improved. GAO-01-961. Washington, D.C.: August 21, 2001.

Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal
Agencies. GAO/AIMD-00-295. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2000.

SSA Customer Service: Broad Service Delivery Plan Needed to Address Future
Challenges. GAO/T-HEHS/AIMD-00-75. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2000.

Social Security Administration: Update on Year 2000 and Other Key
Information Technology Initiatives. GAO/T-AIMD-99-259. Washington, D.C.:
July 29, 1999.

Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations
and Assets at Risk. GAO/AIMD-98-92. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1998.

SSNs and Personal Social Security: Government and Commercial Use of the
Social Security

Information Number Is Widespread. GAO/HEHS-99-28. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 1999.
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