Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to
Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources (31-JAN-02,
GAO-02-259).
Dangerous accumulations of brush, small trees, and other
vegetation on federal lands, particularly in the western United
States, have helped fuel devastating wildfires in recent years.
Although a single focal point is critical for directing
firefighting efforts by federal, state, and local governments,
GAO found a lack of clearly defined leadership at the federal
level. Authority and responsibility remain fragmented among the
Department of the Interior, the Forest Service, and the states.
Implementation of a performance accountability network also
remains fragmented. As a result, GAO could not determine if the
$796 million earmarked for hazardous fuels reduction in 2001 and
2002 has been targeted to communities and areas at highest risk.
The five federal land management agencies--the National Park
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Forest
Service--have yet to begin the research needed to identify and
prioritize vulnerable communities near high-risk federal lands.
Moreover, the agencies are not collecting the data needed to
determine if changes are needed to expedite the project-planning
process. They also are not collecting data needed to measure the
effectiveness of efforts to dispose of the large amount of brush
and other vegetation on federal lands.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-259
ACCNO: A02719
TITLE: Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability
Needed to Reduce Risks to Communities and Resources
DATE: 01/31/2002
SUBJECT: Appropriated funds
Data collection
Emergency preparedness
Environmental monitoring
Funds management
Land management
Performance measures
Strategic planning
Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy
National Fire Plan
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GAO-02-259
United States General Accounting Office
GAO Report to Congressional Requesters
January 2002
SEVERE WILDLAND FIRES
Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce Risks to Communities and
Resources
GAO-02-259
Contents
Letter
Results In Brief
Background
The Federal Effort to Reduce Hazardous Fuels Lacks Clearly
Defined and Effective Leadership
Little Progress Made In Implementing a Sound Performance Accountability
Framework to Spend Funds Appropriated to Reduce Hazardous Fuels Effectively
Data Are Not Available to Make Informed Decisions and to
Measure Progress Conclusions Matters for Congressional Consideration
Recommendation for Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation Scope
and Methodology
1
3 5
6
11
21 24 25 25 26 28
Appendix I Comments From the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture
Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 41
GAO Contacts 41 Acknowledgments 41
Tables
Table 1: Funds Appropriated to Reduce Hazardous Fuels on Federal Lands,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002 6
Figures
Figure 1: Entities Established by Interior and Agriculture to Coordinate
Hazardous Fuels Reduction and Other Key Elements of the National Fire Plan 8
Figure 2: Proposed National Wildland Fire Policy Implementation
Council 10
Figure 3: Location of Major Wildland Fires During the 2000
Wildland Fire Season 16
Figure 4: Number of Communities by State Identified by Interior as
Being at Highest Risk from Wildland Fire 16
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
January 31, 2002
Congressional Requesters
Human activities-especially the federal government's decades-old,
well-intended policy of suppressing all wildland fires, including naturally
occurring ones-have resulted in dangerous accumulations of brush, small
trees, and other hazardous vegetation on federal lands, especially in the
dry, lower-elevation, fire-adapted regions of the interior western United
States. This vegetation has increasingly provided fuel for large, intense
(severe) wildland fires.
The 2000 wildland fire season was one of the worst in 50 years. The scale
and intensity of the fires capped a decade that was characterized by
dramatic increases not only in the number of severe wildland fires, but also
in the costs associated with suppressing them. These fires have also posed
increasing risks to communities in the wildland-urban interface- areas where
human development meets or intermingles with undeveloped wildland-as well as
to municipal watersheds and individual resources, such as threatened and
endangered species, clean water, and clean air.
To respond to the wildland fires in 2000, then-President Clinton requested,
and the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture submitted, a September
8, 2000, report on managing the impact of wildland fires on communities and
the environment.1 This report together with the accompanying budget request;
Congressional direction accompanying substantial new appropriations for
wildland fire management for fiscal year 2001; and resulting strategies,
plans, projects, and other activities have become known as the National Fire
Plan. In addition, the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy,2
updated in 2001,3 provides the philosophical and
1 Managing the Impact of Wildfires on Communities and the Environment, A
Report to the President In Response to the Wildfires of 2000, Secretaries of
the Interior and Agriculture (Sept. 8, 2000).
2 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review, Report to the
Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture by the Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy and Program Review Steering Group (Dec. 18, 1995).
3 Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy,
Report to the Secretaries of the Interior, of Agriculture, of Energy, of
Defense, and of Commerce; the Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency; and the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, by an
Interagency Federal Wildland Fire Policy Review Working Group (Jan. 2001).
policy foundation for hazardous fuels reduction as well as for other federal
interagency wildland fire management activities conducted under the National
Fire Plan.
The National Fire Plan advocates a new approach to wildland fires. This
approach shifts emphasis from reactive to proactive-from attempting to
suppress wildland fires to reducing the buildup of hazardous vegetation that
fuels severe fires. The Plan recognizes that, unless hazardous fuels are
reduced, the number of severe wildland fires and the costs associated with
suppressing them will continue to increase.
Reducing the buildup of hazardous vegetation that fuels severe fires
requires primarily vegetation management, including fires set by federal
land managers (prescribed fires), mechanical thinning, and timber
harvesting. On federal lands, these activities are conducted primarily by
five agencies-the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the
Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service within the Department of
Agriculture.
Prior to fiscal year 1998, the administration did not request, and the
Congress did not appropriate, funds specifically for hazardous fuels
reduction. For fiscal years 1998 through 2000, funds requested and
appropriated specifically for these activities totaled less than $93 million
a year. For fiscal year 2001, the Clinton administration requested a
substantial increase, and the Congress appropriated $401 million to reduce
hazardous fuels. For fiscal year 2002, the Congress appropriated another
$395 million for hazardous fuels reduction. Congressional committees have
also recognized the need to sustain increased funding for hazardous fuels
reduction in future fiscal years.
Because the Congress is prepared to fund an aggressive, multi-year campaign
to reduce hazardous fuels, it is imperative that the five federal land
management agencies receiving these funds act quickly to develop the
leadership and performance accountability framework to spend the funds in an
efficient, effective, and timely manner.4 In this report we discuss (1) the
need for clearly defined and effective leadership to reduce the buildup of
hazardous vegetation that fuels severe wildland fires, (2)
4 See Reducing Wildfire Threats: Funds Should Be Targeted to the Highest
Risk Areas (GAO/T-RCED-00-296, Sept. 13, 2000).
Results In Brief
the progress that the five federal land management agencies have made in
implementing a sound performance accountability framework to spend
effectively the funds appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction, and (3)
the availability of data on which to make informed decisions and to measure
progress.
Our work has shown that a single focal point is critical for efforts-such as
reducing severe wildland fires and the vegetation that fuels them-that
involve many federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the
private sector, and private individuals. However, over a year after the
Congress substantially increased funds to reduce hazardous fuels, the
federal effort still lacks clearly defined and effective leadership. Rather
than a single focal point, authority and responsibility remain fragmented
among Interior, the Forest Service, and the states. In a December 2001
report for the Department of the Interior,5 the National Academy of Public
Administration6 recommended that, to provide the required leadership, the
Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture should establish an
interagency national council to implement the Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy as well as hazardous fuels reduction and other key
elements of the National Fire Plan, such as fire suppression.
A sound framework to ensure that funds appropriated to reduce hazardous
fuels are spent in an efficient, effective, and timely manner is needed.
Such a framework is grounded in federal wildland fire management policies,
the National Fire Plan, and Congressional direction. This framework
includes, among other things, (1) consistent criteria to identify and
prioritize wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of
federal lands that are at high risk from severe wildland fires; (2) clearly
defined and outcome-oriented goals and objectives, as well as quantifiable
long-term and annual performance measures, to assess progress in reducing
the risks of severe wildland fires in wildland-urban interface areas as well
as in other areas; (3) a comprehensive long-term strategy that incorporates
the criteria, goals, objectives, and measures; and
5 Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal
Interagency Policy, A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration for the United States Department of the Interior (Dec. 2001).
6 The National Academy of Public Administration is an independent, nonprofit
organization chartered by the Congress in 1967 to improve governance at all
levels-local, regional, state, national, and international.
(4) yearly performance plans and reports. However, just as leadership for
reducing hazardous fuels is fragmented among Interior, the Forest Service,
and the states, so too is implementation of a performance accountability
framework. As a result, (1) high-risk communities have not been identified
and prioritized, (2) multiple strategies have been developed with different
goals and objectives, (3) quantifiable indicators of performance have not
been developed to measure progress in reducing risks, and (4) annual plans
and reports that have been developed do not describe what will be
accomplished with the appropriated funds. Therefore, it is not possible to
determine if the $796 million appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction in
fiscal years 2001 and 2002 is targeted to the communities and other areas at
highest risk of severe wildland fires.
Federal land management agencies do not have adequate data for making
informed decisions and measuring the agencies' progress in reducing
hazardous fuels. These processes require accurate, complete, and comparable
data. The infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars of new money for
hazardous fuels reduction activities for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and the
expectation of sustained similar funding for these activities in future
fiscal years accentuate the need for accurate, complete, and comparable
data. However, the five federal land management agencies have not initiated
the research needed to better identify and prioritize wildland-urban
interface communities within the vicinity of federal lands that are at high
risk from wildland fire. Moreover, the agencies are not collecting the data
required to determine if changes are needed to expedite the project-planning
process. They are also not collecting the data needed to measure the
effectiveness of efforts to dispose of the large amount of brush, small
trees, and other vegetation that must be removed to reduce the risk of
severe wildland fire.
We agree with the National Academy of Public Administration that an
interagency national council is needed to provide the strategic direction,
leadership, coordination, conflict resolution, and oversight and evaluation
necessary to ensure that funds appropriated to implement the hazardous fuels
reduction, as well as other elements of the National Fire Plan, are spent in
an efficient, effective, and timely manner. However, even though the
September 2000 National Fire Plan-prepared at the request of the President
of the United States-directed them to establish a similar Cabinet-level
coordinating team, the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture have
not done so. Therefore, we suggest that the Congress consider directing the
Secretaries to immediately establish the council. In addition, we suggest
that the Congress consider directing the Secretaries to consolidate under
the council the current fragmented implementation
Background
of a sound performance accountability framework. We also recommend that the
Secretaries of the of the Interior and Agriculture gather the data to make
more informed decisions and to measure the agencies' progress in reducing
hazardous fuels. The departments of Agriculture and the Interior generally
agreed with our recommendations. However, they were concerned that we had
not given them enough credit for several actions taken or underway related
to enhancing interagency leadership; establishing a framework to ensure that
funds appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels are spent in an efficient,
effective, and timely manner; and undertaking adequate research and data
collection efforts. Where appropriate, we have included reference to these
activities.
The federal government's share of the nation's total surface area, is now
about 29 percent. Today, four agencies-the National Park Service, the Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Management within the
Department of the Interior and the Forest Service within the Department of
Agriculture-manage about 655 million acres, or 96 percent of all federal
lands. In addition, Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs manages another 55
million acres. Most federal lands in the 48 contiguous United States are
located in 11 western states.
Primarily as a result of human activities, ecological conditions on 211
million acres-or almost one-third of all federal lands and about 10 percent
of the nation's total surface area-continue to deteriorate. According to a
2001 update of federal wildland fire management policy, these ecological
conditions have increased "the probability of large, intense fires beyond
any scale yet witnessed."7 A 1994 report on wildland fire disasters states
that these fires "will periodically and tragically overwhelm our best
efforts at fire prevention and suppression."8 Coupled with the explosive
growth of people and structures in the wildland-urban interface, these fires
have, in turn, increased the risks to communities, watersheds, ecosystems,
and species. They have also placed in jeopardy
7 See Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy,
Report to the Secretaries of the Interior, of Agriculture, of Energy, of
Defense, and of Commerce; the Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency; and the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, by an
Interagency Federal Wildland Fire Policy Review Working Group (Jan. 2001).
8 See Report of the National Commission on Wildfire Disasters (1994). The
National Commission on Wildfire Disasters was established on May 9, 1990, by
the Wildfire Disaster Recovery Act of 1989 (Pub. L. No. 101-286).
the lives of the public as well as the lives of the firefighters charged
with controlling or suppressing them.
For fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the administration has requested and the
Congress has appropriated funds to the five major federal land management
agencies specifically to reduce hazardous fuels on federal lands. (See table
1.) Each of the agencies then allocates the funds through their individual
organizational structures to their field units.
Table 1: Funds Appropriated to Reduce Hazardous Fuels on Federal Lands,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002
Dollars in millions
Total $70.1
$101.1 $107.9
$401.0 $395.2
The Federal
Effort to Reduce
Hazardous Fuels
Lacks Clearly
Defined and
Effective
Leadership
Source: GAO
analysis of data provided by the Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior.
Our work has shown that a single focal point is critical for efforts-such as
reducing severe wildland fires and the vegetation that fuels them-that
involve many federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the
private sector, and private individuals. 9 However, over a year after the
Congress substantially increased funds to reduce hazardous fuels, the
federal effort still lacks clearly defined and effective leadership. Rather
than a single focal point, authority and responsibility remain fragmented
among Interior, the Forest Service, and the states.
In a December 2001 report, a panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) concluded that an interagency national council is
needed to implement both the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy
9 For example, we have observed that the federal government's efforts to
combat terrorism have suffered because there is no single leader in charge
of the many functions conducted by different federal departments and
agencies.
and the National Fire Plan. Therefore, NAPA recommended that the Secretaries
of the Interior and Agriculture immediately form and empower such a council.
Rather Than a Single Focal Point, Leadership and Management Are Fragmented
To be accountable for reducing hazardous fuels and other key elements of the
National Fire Plan, the plan directed the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture to "establish a Cabinet-level coordinating team to ensure that
the actions recommended by the Departments receive the highest priority."
However, rather than establish one Cabinet-level coordinating entity, the
Secretaries established two separate entities.
In January 2001, the Secretary of the Interior established the Office of
Wildland Fire Coordinator to coordinate and integrate the fire management
programs of the Department's four land management agencies as well as the
related activities of two other Interior agencies- the U.S. Geological
Survey and the Bureau of Reclamation. That same month, the Secretary of
Agriculture established a National Fire Plan Implementation Team headed by a
National Fire Plan Coordinator. The coordinator and team are to work with
stakeholders to achieve the goals of the National Fire Plan by assisting
them in developing work plans, budgets, accomplishment reports, and
operating principles.
In September 2001, Interior's Office of Wildland Fire Coordinator organized
a Wildland Fire Steering Group consisting of representatives from Interior's
four land management agencies. A representative from the Forest Service's
National Fire Plan Implementation Team serves as an advisory member. The
group is to "provide leadership and oversight for the fuels management
program" and unite Interior's agencies and programs under the common purpose
of reducing risks to communities and improving land health.
Figure 1 depicts the entities established by Interior and Agriculture to
coordinate hazardous fuels reduction and other key elements of the National
Fire Plan.
Figure 1: Entities Established by Interior and Agriculture to Coordinate
Hazardous Fuels Reduction and Other Key Elements of the National Fire Plan
Source: Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal
Interagency Policy, A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration for the United States Department of the Interior (Dec. 2001).
In addition to the three coordination entities established within Interior
or Agriculture, the Western Governors' Association in September 2000
established a fourth coordination entity.10 This entity-composed of
stakeholders from all levels of government, tribal interests, conservation
and commodity groups, and community-based restoration groups-has
10 The Western Governors' Association is an independent non-partisan
organization of governors from 18 western states as well as two territories
and a commonwealth in the Pacific. Its mission is to identify and address
key policy and governance issues in the West, advance the role of Western
states in the federal system, and strengthen the social and economic fabric
of the region.
assumed roles and responsibilities similar to those of the other three
coordination entities. For example, the coordination entity established by
the Western Governors' Association has developed a 10-year strategy for
reducing wildland fire risks to communities and the environment11 and is
developing a plan to implement its strategy. However, the Secretaries of the
Interior and of Agriculture have not delegated clear authority to any of the
four groups to implement the National Fire Plan, including hazardous fuels
reduction, or to unite the agencies' programs to reduce risks to communities
and improve land health.
The National Academy of Public Administration Has Proposed Establishing a
Single Focal Point
NAPA's December 200l report for the Department of the Interior observed that
(1) the current approach to coordinate the implementation of the Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy and the National Fire Plan is not working
and (2) a coordinated interagency, intergovernmental, and interdisciplinary
approach is needed to implement the policy and the plan. The report
evaluated a wide variety of options for establishing and locating an
effective interagency coordination entity. These options ranged from
establishing a typical interagency coordination committee to creating a
wildland fire czar or combining the five federal land management agencies
into a new Department of Natural Resources. NAPA concluded that a National
Wildland Fire Policy Implementation Council was needed to implement both the
policy and the plan. Therefore, NAPA recommended that the Secretaries of the
Interior and Agriculture immediately form and empower such a council. (See
figure 2.)
11 A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities
and the Environment: 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, (Aug. 2001).
Figure 2: Proposed National Wildland Fire Policy Implementation Council
Source: Managing Wildland Fire: Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal
Interagency Policy, A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration for the United States Department of the Interior (Dec. 2001).
According to NAPA, this council should (1) consist of the heads of the five
federal land management agencies and the respective deputy secretary in both
Interior and Agriculture; (2) have adequate, permanent, interdisciplinary
staff in both departments to support the work of the council as well as
implementation of the policy and the plan; (3) be advised by a committee
composed of states and other nonfederal parties; and (4) seek advice and
active participation in implementing the policy and plan from other federal
agencies. However, according to NAPA, if the council cannot ensure effective
implementation of the policy and plan within 3 years, "it would be
advantageous to find ways to make the Council a more unified operation."
Little Progress Made In Implementing a Sound Performance Accountability
Framework to Spend Funds Appropriated to Reduce Hazardous Fuels Effectively
A sound framework to ensure that funds appropriated to reduce hazardous
fuels are spent in an efficient, effective, and timely manner is needed.
Such a framework is grounded in federal wildland fire management policies,
the National Fire Plan, and Congressional direction.12 This framework
includes, among other things, (1) consistent criteria to identify and
prioritize wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of
federal lands that are at high risk from severe wildland fires; (2) clearly
defined and outcome-oriented goals and objectives, as well as quantifiable
long-term and annual performance measures, to assess progress in reducing
the risks of severe wildland fires in wildland-urban interface areas as well
as in other areas; (3) a comprehensive long-term strategy that incorporates
the criteria, goals, objectives, and measures; and (4) yearly performance
plans and reports.
However, just as leadership for reducing hazardous fuels is fragmented among
Interior, the Forest Service, and the states, so too is implementation of a
performance accountability framework. As a result, (1) high-risk communities
have not been identified and prioritized, (2) multiple strategies have been
developed with different goals and objectives, (3) quantifiable indicators
of performance have not been developed to measure progress in reducing
risks, and (4) annual plans and reports that have been developed do not
describe what will be accomplished with the funds appropriated for hazardous
fuels reduction. Therefore, it is not possible to determine if the $796
million appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction in fiscal years 2001 and
2002 is targeted to the communities and other areas at highest risk of
severe wildland fires.
A Sound Performance The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy provides the
philosophical
Accountability Framework and policy foundation for hazardous fuels reduction
as well as for other federal interagency wildland fire management activities
conducted under the National Fire Plan. In addition, the acts making
appropriations to Interior and the Forest Service for fiscal years 2001 and
2002 and their legislative histories provide clear direction to the five
federal land
12 See Western National Forests: Catastrophic Wildfires Threaten Resources
and Communities (GAO/T-RCED-98-273, Sept. 28, 1998), Western National
Forests: Nearby Communities Are Increasingly Threatened by Catastrophic
Wildfires (GAO/T-RCED-99-79, Feb. 9, 1999), Western National Forests: A
Cohesive Strategy is Needed to Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats
(GAO/RCED-99-65, Apr. 2, 1999), and Western National Forests: Status of
Forest Service's Efforts to Reduce Catastrophic Wildfire Threats
(GAO/T-RCED-99-241, June 29, 1999).
Wildland Fire-Specific Policy and Congressional Direction
management agencies concerning funding priorities related to reducing
hazardous fuels. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the
Results Act) provides a framework that can be used to implement the Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy, the National Fire Plan, and the
Congressional direction.
Severe wildland fires and the vegetation that fuels them do not recognize
the administrative boundaries of the individual federal land management
agencies or the boundaries between federal and nonfederal lands. To address
this challenge, the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy calls for
federal agencies to develop a uniform, national federal wildland fire
management process to enhance efficient and effective management across
administrative boundaries on a landscape scale.13
Toward this end, the policy urges coordination, consistency, and agreement
not only among the five federal land management agencies but also between
these agencies and other federal agencies as well as state, tribal, and
private stakeholders. It stresses the need for these parties to jointly (1)
develop clearly defined fire management goals and objectives, (2) establish
consistent criteria for evaluating ecosystem conditions in order to
prioritize areas for treatment, (3) monitor results, and (4) conduct a fire
research program to improve the understanding of fire behavior and its role
in ecosystems.
The acts making appropriations to Interior and the Forest Service for fiscal
years 2001 and 2002 and their legislative histories complement the Federal
Wildland Fire Management Policy. For example, the policy identifies the need
for a consistent national process to assess wildland-urban interface
hazards, risks, values, and losses in order to prescribe mitigation
measures, including hazardous fuels reduction. The fiscal year 2001
appropriations act required the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture, after consultation with state and local firefighting agencies,
to publish jointly in the Federal Register a list of all wildland-urban
interface communities, as defined by the Secretaries, within the vicinity of
federal lands that are at high risk from wildfire, as defined by the
Secretaries. The list was to be published by December 10, 2000.
13 A landscape is an area composed of interacting and interconnected
patterns of habitats (ecosystems) that are repeated because of the geology,
landform, soils, climate, biota, and human influences throughout the area. A
landscape is composed of watersheds and smaller ecosystems. It is the
building block of biotic provinces and regions.
The Results Act Provides a Framework to Implement the Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy and Congressional Direction
In addition, the conference committee report accompanying the fiscal year
2001 appropriations act directed the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture to "engage governors in a collaborative structure to
cooperatively develop a coordinated National 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy
with the states as full partners in the planning, decision making, and
implementation of the [National Fire] plan." According to the report, "key
decisions should be made at the local levels." Moreover, in an effort to
ensure accountability for the appropriated funds, the report directed the
Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture to develop an action plan and
a companion financial plan to provide operational and financial details.
The Results Act seeks to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and
accountability of federal programs by establishing a system for agencies to
set goals for their programs' performance and to measure results. In an
October 1999 report, we set forth a framework for using the Act to improve
performance accountability within the Forest Service.14 The same framework
can be used to effectively implement the Federal Wildland Fire Management
Policy, the National Fire Plan, and Congressional direction. Specifically,
to improve their efforts, the five federal land management agencies would
need to:
* establish consistent criteria to identify and prioritize wildland-urban
interface communities within the vicinity of federal lands that are at high
risk from severe wildland fires.
* develop clearly defined and outcome-oriented goals and objectives, as well
as quantifiable long-term and annual performance measures, to assess
progress in reducing the risks of severe wildland fires in wildland-urban
interface areas as well as in other areas.
* incorporate the criteria, goals, objectives, and measures into a
comprehensive 10-year strategy.
* use the strategy to develop yearly action plans and as a basis for
reporting accomplishments in future fiscal years' budget requests.
14 See Forest Service: A Framework for Improving Accountability
(GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-2, Oct. 13, 1999).
High-Risk Communities Have Not Been Identified and Prioritized
The fiscal year 2001 appropriations act required the Secretaries of
Agriculture and of the Interior to jointly publish in the Federal Register
by January 2001 a list of all "urban-wildland interface communities," as
defined by the Secretaries, "within the vicinity of federal lands that are
at high risk from wildfire," as defined by the Secretaries. However, as a
result of inconsistencies in the processes that Interior and the Forest
Service used to identify and prioritize communities for funding, it is not
known whether the communities being funded are the ones at highest risk of
wildland fire.
Interior and the Forest Service did not establish well-defined criteria to
identify wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of federal
lands that are at high risk from severe wildland fire. Instead, each state
and tribe was allowed to use different data and criteria for identifying
communities at risk. For example, California considered communities within
1.5 miles of federal lands to be at high risk from wildland fire. Idaho, on
the other hand, considered communities within 20 miles of federal lands to
be at high risk. The individual state lists were then published in the
Federal Register in January 2001.
The January 2001 Federal Register notice provided the federal government's
initial definition of wildland-urban interface communities. The notice
defined wildland-urban interface community to mean those communities "where
humans and their development meet or intermix with wildland fuel." The
notice identified three types of wildland-urban interface communities: (1)
"interface community," where structures directly abut wildland fuels; (2)
"intermix community," where structures are scattered throughout a wildland
area; and (3) "occluded community," where structures abut an island of
wildland fuels such as a park.
In addition, the January 2001 Federal Register notice provided preliminary
criteria that were to be used by the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture to rank and prioritize communities for treatment. These criteria
included (1) three "risk factors" for evaluating the risk to wildland-urban
interface communities (fire behavior potential; values at risk; and
infrastructure) and (2) two or three "situations" that contribute to risk
for each of the three factors. For example, the two situations for values at
risk divided communities into those in an "urban interface setting" and
those in an "intermix or occluded setting."
However, rather than the Secretaries ranking and prioritizing communities
for treatment, they deferred this responsibility to the states in February
2001 guidance. The definition of wildland-urban interface communities as
well as the risk factors and situations in the January 2001 Federal Register
notice were very general and were subject to broad interpretation by the
states. Moreover, the guidance (1) did not specifically identify federal
lands that are at high risk from wildland fire and (2) did not define what
is meant by "within the vicinity of" federal lands.
Without knowing which federal lands are at high risk from wildland fire or
what is meant by "within the vicinity of" federal lands and with the risk
factors and situations subject to broad interpretation, each state used
criteria that it believed to be appropriate for identifying communities at
risk. For example, some states identified communities within the vicinity of
(1) small units of federal land, such as lighthouses and cemeteries, which
are not at high risk from wildland fire and (2) lands managed by federal
agencies other than the five agencies receiving the funds to reduce
hazardous fuels. In addition, two states-California and Idaho refused to
rank their communities published in the January 2001 Federal Register notice
on the basis of the definition of wildland-urban interface communities as
well as the risk factors and situations in the notice.
By May 2001, the states had identified over 22,000 communities that they
believed to be at high risk from wildland fire. By August 2001, Interior and
the Forest Service had reduced this number by about half by excluding
communities that (1) are near lands managed by other federal agencies or (2)
they believed are not within the vicinity of lands that they manage that are
at high risk from wildland fire. In August 2001, Interior and the Forest
Service published the remaining 11,376 communities in the Federal Register.
Interior and the Forest Service then used different approaches to prioritize
these communities for funding.
To help prioritize the 11,376 communities for funding, Interior assigned
numeric values to each of the "situations" in the January 2001 Federal
Register notice. However, this approach, coupled with the refusal of
California and Idaho to rank their communities published in the January 2001
Federal Register notice-resulted in over half of the "highest-risk"
communities (278 of 545) being in three southeastern states-Georgia, North
Carolina, and Tennessee-that are not prone to severe wildland fires. (See
figures 3 and 4.)
Figure 3: Location of Major Wildland Fires During the 2000 Wildland Fire
Season
Note: Occurrences in Alaska and Hawaii are not included. Source: Adapted by
GAO from U.S. Department of the Interior data.
Figure 4: Number of Communities by State Identified by Interior as Being at
Highest Risk from Wildland Fire
Source: Adapted by GAO from U.S. Department of the Interior data.
Interior next convened state teams consisting of state, state forestry,
and/or local officials to select projects on federal lands within the
wildland-urban interface that are either near the 545 communities or near
other communities that the states proposed, including communities in Idaho
and California. The state-by-state lists were then forwarded to Interior's
headquarters for approval. According to Interior, for fiscal year 2002, it
is funding projects near these communities. Thus, the projects being funded
by Interior are not based on a consistent national prioritization of
communities at high risk from wildfire.
The Forest Service, on the other hand, left the prioritization of
communities and projects primarily to the discretion of its field unit
managers. The agency's headquarters did, however, instruct its field unit
managers to use the August 2001 list of 11,376 communities as guidance in
identifying projects for funding. The lists developed by the field unit
managers were then forwarded to the Forest Service's headquarters for
approval. Thus, the projects being funded by the Forest Service are also not
based on a consistent national prioritization of communities at high risk
from wildfire.
Multiple Strategies For Reducing Hazardous Fuels Have Been Developed With
Different Goals and Objectives
The conference committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2001
appropriations act directed the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture to "engage governors in a collaborative structure to
cooperatively develop a coordinated National 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy
with the states as full partners in the planning, decision making, and
implementation of the plan." However, rather than one comprehensive
strategy, Interior, the Forest Service, and the states have developed
multiple strategies with different goals and objectives.
For example, in August 2001, the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture endorsed a 10-year strategy for reducing wildland fire risks to
communities and the environment.15 The strategy included four goals, one of
which is to reduce hazardous fuels. Moreover, during fiscal year 2001, three
of the five federal land management agencies-the National Park Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs-developed
agency-specific implementation strategies.
15 A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities
and the Environment: 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, (Aug. 2001).
In September 2001, Interior and Forest Service officials informed the
Congress that they were working together to develop a cohesive strategy to
reduce hazardous fuels. According to these officials, the cohesive strategy
will combine a long-term strategy finalized by the Forest Service in October
200016 and a draft strategy developed by Interior in June 2001.17 Like the
10-year strategy, the cohesive strategy being developed by Interior and the
Forest Service is intended to provide a framework for reducing the risk and
consequences of unwanted wildland fire. It is also intended to provide
direction to, and coordinate the activities of, the five federal land
management agencies.
However, Interior and the Forest Service are developing their cohesive
strategy to reduce hazardous fuels independent of, and apart from, the
10-year strategy prepared pursuant to the conference committee report.
Moreover, the agency-specific implementation strategies developed by the
National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs are not linked to each other or to the 10-year strategy, the
cohesive strategy being developed, or the Forest Service's final and
Interior's draft long-term strategies to reduce hazardous fuels. In
addition, the 10-year strategy has different goals and objectives than the
Forest Service's final and Interior's draft long-term strategies on which
the cohesive strategy is based. For instance, two priorities under the
long-term strategies of both the Forest Service and Interior-conserving
accessible municipal watersheds and protecting threatened and endangered
species-do not appear as priorities under the 10-year strategy.
According to Interior and Forest Service headquarters officials, they have
developed, or are developing, numerous strategies that are not linked and
that have different goals and objectives primarily because they have planned
and managed their lands on an agency-by-agency basis for decades. Moreover,
they observed that since Interior, the Forest Service, and the states have
not been able to agree on one strategy or on similar goals and objectives,
they have gone their separate ways. However, according to Interior and
Forest Service headquarters officials, they will
16 Protecting People and Sustaining Resources in Fire-Adapted Ecosystems: A
Cohesive Strategy, The Forest Service Management Response to the General
Accounting Office Report GAO/RCED-99-65 (Oct 13, 2000).
17 Integrating Fire and Natural Resource Management - A Cohesive Strategy
For Protecting People by Restoring Land Health, The Department of the
Interior (June 2001).
continue to work with the states in an effort to reach agreement on one
strategy and on similar goals and objectives.
Clearly Defined, Outcome-Oriented Objectives and Quantifiable Performance
Indicators Have Not Been Developed to Measure Progress in Reducing Risks
To assess progress in reducing the risks of severe wildland fires in
wildland-urban interface areas as well as in other areas requires clearly
defined and outcome-oriented goals and objectives as well as quantifiable
long-term and annual performance measures. However, none of the strategies
developed to date contain clearly defined, outcome-oriented objectives or
quantifiable performance indicators.
For example, although one of the four broad goals under the 10-year strategy
is to "reduce hazardous fuels," the strategy lacks clearly defined,
outcome-oriented objectives between this broad goal and long-term and the
annual performance measures intended to gauge the agencies' progress in
achieving the goal. For instance, one objective of the strategy is to
"reduce the total number of acres at risk to severe wildland fire." However,
this objective does not distinguish between those landscapes where science
indicates that frequent fire use to predominate and now does not and those
landscapes that normally burn less frequently and where efforts to reduce
fire intensity would disrupt and damage forest health.
Another objective of the 10-year strategy is to "ensure communities most at
risk in the wildland-urban interface receive priority for hazardous fuels
treatment." However, the strategy does not include any clearly defined,
outcome-oriented objectives that can be used to assess the agencies'
progress in achieving this goal.
In addition, the strategies developed by the Forest Service, Interior, the
National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs do not contain consistent national performance measures and
reporting procedures. For instance, the Forest Service proposes to measure
and report on (1) the percent of wildland-urban interface areas with
completed fuels treatments and (2) the percent of all acres with fuel levels
meeting "condition class 1;" that is, where human activities have not
significantly altered historical fire regimes or where management activities
have successfully maintained or restored ecological integrity.18 Conversely
18 Managing the Impacts on Communities and the Environment Performance
Accountability, Forest Service (May 2001).
Interior plans to use only the number of acres treated to measure and report
to the Congress its progress in reducing hazardous fuels. However, Interior
cannot identify how many of these acres are within areas at high risk from
wildland fire.
The 10-year strategy developed by the Western Governors' Association in
collaboration with the Departments of the Interior and of Agriculture
recognizes the need to develop consistent national performance measures and
reporting procedures to aid in monitoring results. The strategy proposes to
include these measures and reporting procedures in a detailed implementation
plan to be developed by May 1, 2002. In the interim, Interior and the Forest
Service have initiated a study to develop "consistent performance measures
that capture the intent and new strategic direction of the National Fire
Plan and the policies, guidelines and actions of the 2001 Federal Wildland
Fire Management Policy." However, as of December 2001, the agencies had not
established a clear sequence or schedule to deliver the performance measures
and this effort had not been integrated with the effort by the Western
Governors' Association to develop a 10-year strategy. Thus, at a minimum,
funds appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction for fiscal years 2001 and
2002 have been, or will be, allocated to the five agencies' field units and
the President's budget for fiscal year 2003 will be submitted to the
Congress before clearly defined, outcome-oriented objectives and
quantifiable performance indicators are developed.
Action and Financial Plans Will Describe How Federal Funds Will Be Spent,
Not What Will Be Accomplished With the Money
In an effort to ensure accountability for the appropriated funds, the
conference committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2001 appropriations
act directed the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture to (1)
develop an action plan and a companion financial plan to provide operational
and financial details and (2) report on accomplishments in future fiscal
years' budget requests. However, rather than developing one action plan and
one financial plan, in January 2001, the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture signed similar, but separate action plans and financial plans
for their respective departments.
Moreover, while Interior's and the Forest Service's action and financial
plans describe the work they plan to accomplish and how they plan to
allocate and spend the funds, they do not describe how the work and the
expenditure of funds will reduce the risk of severe wildland fires to
communities or to other areas at risk on either a local or national basis.
For example, both the Forest Service's and Interior's plans consist largely
of lists of projects, including their location, cost, and acreage. They do
not, however, describe how the projects will reduce the risk of severe
wildland
fires to communities, watersheds, ecosystems, or species on either a local
or national basis. As a result, while the five federal land management
agencies will be able to provide the Congress with assurance that they spent
the funds appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction for fiscal years 2001
and 2002, they will not be able to report to the Congress on what they
accomplished with the money.
According to Interior and Forest Service headquarters officials, they have
developed separate action plans and financial plans because they have
planned and managed their lands on an agency-by-agency basis for decades.
Moreover, they observed that, since Interior and the Forest Service prepare
separate budget requests and the Congress provides separate appropriations
each fiscal year, it seemed reasonable to develop separate action plans and
financial plans. Future fiscal years' action plans and financial plans
should better describe how their work and their expenditure of funds would
reduce the risk of severe wildland fires to communities or to other areas at
risk, according to the Interior and Forest Service officials.
Data Are Not Available to Make Informed Decisions and to Measure Progress
Making informed decisions and measuring the agencies' progress in reducing
hazardous fuels require accurate, complete, and comparable data. The
infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars of new money for hazardous fuels
reduction activities for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and the expectation of
sustained similar funding for these activities in future fiscal years
accentuate this need. Despite ongoing research efforts to study the
effectiveness of fuels treatments, however, the five federal land management
agencies have not initiated the research needed to better identify and
prioritize wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of
federal lands that are at high risk from wildland fire. Moreover, although
directed to do so in the fiscal year 2001 appropriations act, the agencies
are not collecting the data required to determine the effectiveness of
changes in the project-planning process. They are also not collecting the
data needed to measure the effectiveness of efforts to dispose of the large
amount of brush, small trees, and other vegetation that must be removed to
reduce the risk of severe wildland fire.
Data Are Not Available to Through the National Fire Plan, 24 research
projects in support of Better Prioritize hazardous fuels reduction were
funded at a total cost of about $10.2 Communities and Projects million in
fiscal year 2001. These projects continue to be funded in fiscal
year 2002. The intent of the projects is to study and collect data on,
amongfor Funding other things, optimizing fuel reduction, wildfire risk,
impacts of fuels
reduction on fire behavior, and effects of fuel reduction on resources such
as water, soil, and species.
Although available data can help focus attention on areas at high risk from
severe wildland fire, they are currently not adequate for prioritizing
communities and projects for funding, according to many Interior and Forest
Service officials to whom we spoke. According to these officials, the
agencies need better data on (1) hazard (an area's accumulation of hazardous
fuel and its combustibility); (2) risk (the probability of ignition); and
(3) value (physical, social, and economic costs of potential damage).
Although limited research efforts are underway to study these issues,
neither Interior nor the Forest Service has funded a research program to
gather these data on a systematic and comprehensive basis.
For instance, the Forest Service proposed a project--referred to as
LANDFIRE-that within 12 to 18 months could have provided better data on the
current condition of the lands and communities at risk in the interior
western United States. Within 4 years, LANDFIRE also could have provided
these and other data nationwide. However, the project, which was estimated
to cost at least $45 million, has not been funded. As a result, much of the
data needed to prioritize communities and projects for funding might never
be available.
Data Are Not Available to Determine if Changes Are Needed to Expedite the
Project-Planning Process
Before the five federal land management agencies can implement a hazardous
fuels reduction project, they must ensure that the project complies with the
requirements of numerous environmental statutes addressing individual
resources, such as endangered and threatened species, clean water, and clean
air. They must also ensure that the project complies with the requirements
of various planning laws, whose purpose is to ensure that important effects
on the environment are not overlooked or understated. Securing this
assurance and completing the required environmental analyses can take a year
or more. The fiscal year 2001 appropriations act directed the Secretaries of
the Interior, of Agriculture, and of Commerce as well as the Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality to evaluate the need for revised or
expedited environmental compliance procedures for hazardous fuels reduction
projects occurring within the vicinity of wildland-urban interface
communities in fiscal year 2001.
To respond to Congressional directive, the Secretaries of the Interior and
of Agriculture identified a number of efforts that they were taking to
reduce the time and improve the efficiency of environmental compliance.
Specifically, they cited efforts to (1) assign experienced and trained
personnel to conduct the analyses, (2) provide consistent direction, (3)
develop swift dispute resolution procedures, and (4) share information.
During the course of our review, agency officials also reported that (1)
some field units were sharing experienced and trained personnel, (2) both
departments contributed funding to hire additional biologists for
determining compliance with the Endangered Species Act, and (3) the Forest
Service's Region 3 had streamlined consultation with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service on 283 wildland-urban interface projects involving
approximately 1.9 million acres. Also, the Forest Service reported that it
increased training and coaching as a means of sharing best practices and
lessons learned among its field units. While these efforts are clearly a
step in the right direction, neither Interior nor the Forest Service is
gathering and analyzing the data necessary to show the extent to which they
are reducing the time and improving the efficiency of environmental
compliance.
Data Are Not Available to Measure the Effectiveness of Efforts to Dispose of
the Large Amounts of Material that Must Be Removed
An aggressive, 10-year effort to reduce hazardous fuels on federal lands
will require the five federal land management agencies to dispose of large
amounts of brush, small trees, and other vegetation that must be
mechanically removed before fire can be safely reintroduced. To this end,
the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service have prepared a
preliminary estimate of the amount of biomass that could be utilized through
hazardous fuels treatments, and the Forest Service together with the
Department of Energy have studied the economics of biomass utilization.
Various efforts are underway to identify viable disposal options, including
some that could generate revenue to partially offset the costs of reducing
hazardous fuels.
For instance, the Forest Service is studying the application of
small-diameter trees for wood composites and other wood products, the
production of ethanol and electricity from the material, and the use of
biomass to produce heat and hot water for office buildings and apartment
buildings. The Bureau of Land Management is selling wood from mechanical
thinning for personal use, such as home heating, in northern New Mexico.
The successes encountered to date in biomass utilization, however, have been
localized. For example, while BLM has been successful in disposing of
biomass through the sale of firewood in New Mexico, the Forest Service has
been largely unsuccessful with similar efforts in the Front Range west of
Denver due largely to differences in lifestyles and burning restrictions.
Similar to their efforts to reduce the time and improve the efficiency of
environmental compliance, neither Interior nor the Forest Service has
gathered and analyzed the data necessary to show on a national scale (1)
Conclusions
the extent to which these efforts are accomplishing their goal of disposing
of large amounts of material, (2) how these efforts might be increased, or
(3) what would be required to do so.
Without clearly defined and effective leadership, the five federal land
management agencies have made little progress in implementing a sound
performance accountability framework. Without a sound performance
accountability framework, it is not possible to determine if the hundreds of
millions of dollars being appropriated each fiscal year for hazardous fuels
reduction are being targeted to the communities and other areas at highest
risk of severe wildland fires. By not targeting these communities and areas,
the risks to human lives and development as well as to municipal watersheds
and individual resources-such as threatened and endangered species, clean
water, and clean air-are increased.
Over a year after the Congress substantially increased funds to reduce
hazardous fuels, the federal effort still lacks clearly defined and
effective leadership. Rather than a single focal point, authority and
responsibility remain fragmented among Interior, the Forest Service, and the
states. Therefore, we agree with NAPA that an interagency national council
is needed to provide the strategic direction, leadership, coordination,
conflict resolution, and oversight and evaluation necessary to ensure that
funds appropriated to implement the hazardous fuels reduction, as well as
other elements of the National Fire Plan, are spent in an efficient,
effective, and timely manner. However, even though the September 2000
National Fire Planprepared at the request of the President of the United
States-directed them to establish a similar Cabinet-level coordinating team,
the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture have not done so.
Implementation of a sound performance accountability framework to spend
funds appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels effectively as well as funds
appropriated for other elements of the National Fire Plan is also fragmented
among Interior, the Forest Service, and the states. As a result, it is not
possible to determine if the $796 million appropriated for hazardous fuels
reduction in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 is targeted to the communities and
other areas at highest risk of severe wildland fires. Our findings indicate
that there is a need for the agencies' current fragmented performance
accountability framework to be consolidated.
Finally, the infusion of hundreds of millions of dollars of new money for
hazardous fuels reduction activities for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 and the
expectation of sustained similar funding for these activities in future
fiscal
Matters for Congressional Consideration
Recommendation for Executive Action
years accentuate the need for accurate, complete, and comparable data on
which to make informed decisions and measure the agencies' progress in
reducing hazardous fuels. However, the five federal land management agencies
have not initiated the research needed to better identify and prioritize
wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of federal lands
that are at high risk from wildland fire. Moreover, the agencies are not
collecting the data required to determine if changes are needed to expedite
the project-planning process. They are also not collecting the data needed
to measure the effectiveness of efforts to dispose of the large amount of
brush, small trees, and other vegetation that must be removed to reduce the
risk of severe wildland fire.
To provide the clearly defined and effective leadership required to ensure
that funds appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels as well as to implement
other key elements of the National Fire Plan, such as fire suppression, are
spent in an efficient, effective, and timely manner, we believe that the
Congress should consider directing the Secretaries of the Interior and of
Agriculture to establish the interagency national council recommended by
National Academy of Public Administration.
Moreover, to better ensure that funds appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels
as well as funds appropriated for other elements of the National Fire Plan
are spent effectively, we believe that the Congress should consider
directing the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture to consolidate
under the council the current fragmented implementation of a sound
performance accountability framework. Such a framework should include, among
other things, (1) consistent criteria to identify and prioritize
wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of federal lands
that are at high risk from severe wildland fires; (2) clearly defined and
outcome-oriented goals and objectives, as well as quantifiable long-term and
annual performance measures, to assess progress in reducing the risks of
severe wildland fires in wildland-urban interface areas as well as in other
areas; (3) a comprehensive long-term strategy that incorporates the
criteria, goals, objectives, and measures; and (4) yearly performance plans
and reports.
To make more informed decisions about, and to better measure progress in,
reducing hazardous fuels, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Interior
and of Agriculture jointly direct the heads of the National Park Service,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and the Forest Service to collect the accurate,
Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
complete, and comparable data needed to (1) better identify and prioritize
wildland-urban interface communities within the vicinity of federal lands
that are at high risk from wildland fire, (2) determine if changes are
needed to expedite the project-planning process, and (3) measure the
effectiveness of efforts to dispose of the large amount of brush, small
trees, and other vegetation that must be removed to reduce the risk of
severe wildland fire.
We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Agriculture and the
Interior for review and comment. The departments provided a consolidated
response to our report. They generally agreed with our recommendations.
However, the departments expressed concerns that we had not given them
enough credit for several actions taken or underway related to (1) enhancing
interagency leadership; (2) establishing a framework to ensure that funds
appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels are spent in an efficient, effective,
and timely manner; and (3) undertaking adequate research and data collection
efforts.
First, with respect to enhancing interagency leadership, the departments
felt that we should consider the efforts of its officials to work together
and what has been accomplished in the short period of time since adoption of
the National Fire Plan. For example, they noted a close working relationship
between the National Fire Plan Coordinators and cited various efforts to
collaborate among the federal agencies. During the course of our review we
noted this close working relationship and efforts to collaborate. However,
our report notes that the federal government's efforts to reduce hazardous
fuels lack clearly defined and effective leadership because this leadership
is fragmented among the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service, the
Department of the Interior, and the states. Thus, our discussions in the
report pertain to the leadership structure for fuels reduction efforts, not
to the relationships or efforts at collaboration among individual agency
officials. More than these relationships and collaboration are necessary to
develop and implement a framework to effectively spend funds appropriated to
reduce hazardous fuels. Our work over the years has shown that the effective
coordination and implementation of interagency programs requires effective
leadership from a single focal point empowered with the authority and
responsibility for interagency actions. For example, we have observed that
the federal government's efforts to combat terrorism have suffered because
there is no single leader in charge of the many functions conducted by
different federal departments and agencies. We continue to believe that a
single focal point is crucial to resolve discrepancies and to finalize
decisions on
fuel reduction issues for which stakeholders may have differing viewpoints
and that the Congress should consider establishing the interagency national
council recommended by the National Academy of Public Administration.
Second, with regard to establishing a framework to ensure funds appropriated
to reduce hazardous fuels are spent in an efficient, effective, and timely
manner, the departments state that all agencies have such frameworks and
they are making efforts to improve them, sometimes on a joint basis. For
example, they note that they plan to incorporate wildland fire performance
measures in the implementation plan for the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy.
However, on the basis of our review of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy we
believe it contains a series of actions that are largely unclear, not
specific, and output-oriented rather than results-oriented and the actions
contained in the strategy appear difficult to measure, thus making it
difficult for the agencies and states to develop corresponding performance
indicators. Moreover, our report notes that performance measures are only
one part of the needed framework. The framework that we refer to in our
report includes several components that are contemplated by the National
Wildland Fire Management Policy, the National Fire Plan, the Government
Performance and Results Act, and the fiscal year 2001 appropriations act for
the Department of the Interior. These components are: (1) consistent
criteria to identify and prioritize wildland-urban interface communities
within the vicinity of federal lands that are at high risk from severe
wildland fire; (2) clearly defined and outcome-oriented goals and
objectives; (3) quantifiable and long-term performance measures to assess
progress in meeting these strategic objectives; (4) a comprehensive
long-term strategy that incorporates the criteria, goals, objectives, and
performance measures; and (5) yearly performance plans and measures.
Additionally, the agencies need to use the same such framework, not
separately defined ones. Because the Forest Service and the Department of
the Interior have not collectively and adequately developed these
components, they have not developed the framework to ensure that funds
appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels are spent in an efficient, effective,
and timely manner. Moreover, the agencies' current efforts at developing
such a framework are divided into two separate strategic documents-the
10-Year Comprehensive Strategy developed with the states and a second,
interagency cohesive strategy currently being drafted. During our review,
officials from both departments told us that they were unclear as to which
strategy will be controlling.
Finally, the departments noted that some research has been initiated and
some data collection is underway. They mentioned several specific
research and data collection efforts that they felt we should have
mentioned, and we have now included several. For example, we have
revised our report to include research and data collection efforts on
environmental compliance, biomass utilization, and fuels reduction
effectiveness. However, our discussion in the report centers on the fact
that the Forest Service and Interior are collecting data that, for the most
part, are not national in scope. For example, the Forest Service and
Interior have been reluctant to collect the necessary data to better
prioritize communities and projects nationwide for hazardous fuels
treatment. On the basis of our review, LANDFIRE is the only proposed
research project so far that appears capable of producing consistent
national inventory data for improving the prioritization of fuel projects
and
communities. We first learned of the LANDFIRE project in 1998 during
our initial work on catastrophic wildfires in western national forests.19 At
that time, the Forest Service was testing a prototype to determine the
feasibility of LANDFIRE. During this review, which is about 3 years after
our initial review in 1998, the Forest Service showed us this same
prototype. Also, during our current review, we observed that the
enthusiasm for moving forward with LANDFIRE waned due to disputes
over content and funding considerations. As a result, we believe
LANDFIRE or some similar project for producing consistent national
inventory data for improving the prioritization of fuels projects and
communities is no closer to being funded today than it was in 1998. Thus,
agency promises with regard to research and data collection efforts--as
with enhancing interagency leadership and ensuring funds are spent in an
efficient, effective, and timely manner--are not new. The departments
have been pledging to jointly undertake improvements in all of these areas
since at least the adoption of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management
Policy.
Where appropriate, we have included additional references to the activities
mentioned in the department's comments. The departments' comments appear in
appendix I.
In reviewing the efforts of the Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior to reduce hazardous fuels, we considered available literature,
reviewed pertinent legislation and policies, examined agency documents
Scope and
Methodology
19 Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. (GAO/RCED-99-65, Apr. 2, 1999).
and budget data, conducted interviews, and visited agency field units.
Specifically, we reviewed prior GAO reports, the report by the National
Academy of Public Administration, reports by conservation groups and trade
organizations, the agencies' cohesive strategies for fuels reduction, the
10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, and other agency documentation. We also
analyzed requirements germane to hazardous fuels in the Government
Performance and Results Act, the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management
Policy, and the acts making appropriations to the Department of the Interior
and the Forest Service for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. We interviewed Forest
Service, Department of Interior, and state officials on efforts to reduce
hazardous fuels, issues that transcend the administrative boundaries of the
lands they manage, their organizational structures, efforts to prioritize
communities and projects for treatment, research activities, information
systems, environmental compliance, and disposal of biomass. In addition, we
toured federal lands that agency personnel treated for hazardous fuels in
Colorado, New Mexico, and California
We conducted our work from November 2000 through December 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. For a more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology, see appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Public
Lands and Forests, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; the
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Resources; the Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, House Committee on
Resources; the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Interior and Related
Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations; the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry,
House Committee on Agriculture; and interested congressional committees. We
are also sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Interior
and of Agriculture; the Chief, Forest Service; the Director, Bureau of Land
Management; and the Director, National Park Service. The report is also
available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please call Chester F. Janik or
me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix
III.
Barry T. Hill Director, Natural Resources and Environment
List of Requesters
The Honorable Larry Craig
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate
The Honorable James Hansen
Chairman, Committee on Resources
House of Representatives
The Honorable Scott McInnis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health
Committee on Resources
House of Representatives
The Honorable Joe Skeen
Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte
Chairman, Subcommittee on Department Operations,
Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee on Agriculture
House of Representatives
The Honorable Mark Udall
House of Representatives
The Honorable Don Young
House of Representatives
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Page 37 GAO-02-259 Severe Wildland Fires
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we discuss (1) the need for clearly defined and effective
leadership to reduce the buildup of hazardous vegetation that fuels severe
wildland fires, (2) the progress that the five federal land management
agencies have made in implementing a sound framework to spend effectively
the funds appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction, and (3) the
availability of data on which to make informed decisions and to measure
progress.
To identify the need for clearly defined and effective leadership, we
reviewed prior GAO and other reports and studies addressing issues that
transcend the administrative boundaries of the individual federal agencies
and/or the boundaries between federal and nonfederal lands. We then
identified efforts to date by Interior, Agriculture, and the states to
establish such an entity that could address interagency issues.
To identify the progress that the five federal land management agencies have
made in implementing a sound framework to spend effectively the funds
appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction, we reviewed the requirements of
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) and an
October 1999 GAO report that portrayed the process of implementing the Act
within the Forest Service as a number of interrelated steps.1 As noted in
the report, a discussion of what the agency has done to implement each step
provides a benchmark for measuring its future progress. We also reviewed the
1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy,2 updated in 2001,3 which
provides the philosophical and policy foundation for hazardous fuels
reduction as well as for other federal interagency wildland fire management
activities conducted under the National Fire Plan. In addition, we reviewed
the acts making appropriations to Interior and the Forest Service for fiscal
years 2001 and 2002 as well as their legislative histories. We then reviewed
the 10-year strategy for reducing wildland fire risks to communities and the
environment, signed by the Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture in
August 2001.4 We also reviewed
1 See Forest Service: A Framework for Improving Accountability
(GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-2, Oct. 13, 1999).
2 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and Program Review, Report to the
Secretaries of the Interior and of Agriculture by an Interagency Federal
Wildland Fire Policy Review Working Group (Dec. 18, 1995).
3 Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy,
Report to the Secretaries of the Interior, of Agriculture, of Energy, of
Defense, and of Commerce; the Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency; and the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, by an
Interagency Federal Wildland Fire Policy Review Working Group (Jan. 2001).
4 A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities
and the Environment: 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, (Aug. 2001).
Page 38 GAO-02-259 Severe Wildland Fires
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
the long-term strategy to reduce hazardous fuels finalized by the Forest
Service in October 20005 and a similar draft strategy developed by Interior
in June 2001.6 In addition, we reviewed the agency-specific implementation
strategies developed during fiscal year 2001 by the National Park Service,
the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. We also
reviewed the February 2001 guidance issued by Interior and the Forest
Service to the states that defined wildland-urban interface, identified
three criteria for evaluating the risk to wildland-urban interface
communities, and fire behavior potential that provided some general
information on identifying fire risk. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed
the various lists of communities that Interior and the Forest Service
believed are at high risk from severe wildland fire. We also reviewed the
action plans and financial plans signed by the Secretaries of the Interior
and of Agriculture in January 2001. These plans were intended to provide the
operational and financial details necessary to ensure accountability for
appropriated funds.
To identify the availability of data on which to make informed decisions and
to measure progress, we reviewed reports and studies on, and interviewed
Interior and Forest Service officials about, data available and needed to
address challenges that could significantly affect their ability to spend
funds appropriated to reduce hazardous fuels in and efficient, effective,
and timely manner.
During the course of our review, we interviewed and gathered documentation
from Interior and Forest Service officials in their Washington, D.C.
headquarters as well as in various field units. These field units included
the Forest Service's regional offices in Denver, Colorado (Region 2);
Albuquerque, New Mexico (Region 3); and Vallejo, California (Region 5) as
well as the Arapaho-Roosevelt and Pike-San Isabel National Forests in
Colorado, the El Dorado National Forest in California, and the Santa Fe
National Forest in New Mexico. We also visited the Bureau of Land
Management's state offices in Colorado and Idaho and field offices in
Colorado and New Mexico; the regional offices of the National Park Service
and the Fish and Wildlife Service in Denver, Colorado; and Yosemite National
Park in California. In addition, we interviewed and gathered documentation
from the State Foresters of California, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico as
well as from representatives of the Western Governor's Association, the
Society of American Foresters, the National Interagency Fire Center, the
Wilderness Society, and the Pinchot Institute. We also reviewed
5 Protecting People and Sustaining Resources in Fire-Adapted Ecosystems: A
Cohesive Strategy, The Forest Service Management Response to the General
Accounting Office Report GAO/RCED-99-65 (Oct 13, 2000).
6 Integrating Fire and Natural Resource Management - A Cohesive Strategy For
Protecting People by Restoring Land Health, The Department of the Interior
(June 2001).
Page 39 GAO-02-259 Severe Wildland Fires
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
reports by the Congressional Research Service, the National Fire Protection
Association, the Forest Trust, the Southwest Forest Alliance, the Defenders
of Wildlife, and the Taxpayers for Common Sense. In addition, we attended
conferences on wildland fire and hazardous fuels reduction in Boise, Idaho
and Conifer, Colorado. Finally, we briefed and were briefed by the panel
within the National Academy of Public Administration that prepared the
October 2001 draft report on implementation of the Federal Wildland Fire
Management Policy and the National Fire Plan.
Page 40 GAO-02-259 Severe Wildland Fires
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts Barry T. Hill (202) 512-3841 Chester F. Janik (202) 512-6508
Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Ronald Belak; Charles
Cotton, Alan Dominicci; Richard Johnson; James Jones, Jr.; Chester Joy; and
Maria Vargas made key contributions to this report.
(360127) Page 41 GAO-02-259 Severe Wildland Fires
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