Airport Infrastructure: Unresolved Issues Make It Difficult to	 
Determine the Cost to Serve New Large Aircraft (04-FEB-02,	 
GAO-02-251).							 
                                                                 
Airbus Industrie plans to introduce the New Large Aircraft (NLA) 
to U.S. airports in 2006. The Boeing 747 (B-747)is currently the 
largest commercial aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) sets standards that govern how an airport must be 	 
configured to safely serve aircraft with certain wingspans and	 
weight. A B-747 operates under Design Group V standards, while	 
FAA has determined that NLA will operate under Design Group VI	 
standards. Determining the cost to serve NLA is difficult because
several possible infrastructure changes at airports are 	 
unresolved. These include (1) whether and the extent to which FAA
revises the standards or grants modifications, (2) which airlines
buy NLA and the frequency of NLA service at U.S. airports, (3)	 
when NLA begin serving these airports, and (4) the extent to	 
which the cost estimates reported by the airports are attributed 
to NLA instead of changes to accommodate growth in air traffic.  
The 14 airports that expect to serve NLA by 2010 collectively	 
report that their cost estimate for infrastructure changes is	 
$2.1 billion; however, the ultimate cost will depend on how	 
issues that affect cost will be resolved. As these issues are	 
resolved, airports will have a clearer understanding of what	 
infrastructure changes must be made at their costs.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-251 					        
    ACCNO:   A02735						        
  TITLE:     Airport Infrastructure: Unresolved Issues Make It	      
Difficult to Determine the Cost to Serve New Large Aircraft	 
     DATE:   02/04/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft						 
	     Airports						 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Airbus 380 Aircraft				 
	     Boeing 747 Aircraft				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-251
     
United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2002

AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE

Unresolved Issues Make It Difficult to Determine the Cost to Serve New Large
Aircraft

GAO-02-251

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3
Background 4
The  Cost   for  Airports'   Infrastructure  Upgrades  to   Serve  NLA  Will

Be Affected by a Number of Unresolved Issues 5
Agency Comments 8

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Appendix II Airport Design Standards 12

Appendix III Cost Estimates Reported by 14 Airports to Serve
NLA through Revisions or Modifications to Design
Standards 14

Appendix  IV  Airports'  Cost  Estimates to  Upgrade  Four  Major  Types  of
Infrastructure

Appendix V Comments From Airbus Industrie

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 21

GAO Contacts 21
Staff Acknowledgments 21

Table

Table 1: Design Group Standards, JFK's Current Configuration, and
JFK's Plans to Accommodate NLA 13

Figures

Figure 1: Comparison of Aircraft Design Group V and VI Standards 5 Figure 2:
Cost Estimates for 14 Airports to Upgrade Four Major Types of Airport
Infrastructure 16

Abbreviations

A380 Airbus 380
B-747 Boeing 747
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GAO General Accounting Office
JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport
NLA New Large Aircraft

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

February 4, 2002

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation United States Senate

                    The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

                     Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate

Airbus Industrie (Airbus),1 the European manufacturer of large commercial
aircraft, plans to introduce New Large Aircraft (NLA) to U. S. airports in
2006.2 Airports, such as New York's John F. Kennedy International (JFK) and
Los Angeles International, which now provide service to the Boeing 747
(B-747), currently the largest commercial aircraft, as well as those that
serve as hubs for airlines that might purchase NLA, are likely candidates to
serve these new aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sets the
design standards that govern how an airport must be configured to safely
serve aircraft with certain wingspans and weight. A B-747 operates under
Design Group V standards, while FAA has determined that NLA will operate
under Design Group VI standards. Currently, FAA is reviewing the standards
for NLA, which were published in 1983, to determine whether they should be
revised.

Many large airports could serve NLA now by placing restrictions on NLA's
ground operations or those of other aircraft. However, because many of these
large airports have typically experienced congestion and delay problems,
such measures as restricting NLA to designated taxi routes, terminal gates,
and runways, and/or restricting the ground movements of other aircraft would
likely hinder the efficient movement of traffic. To

1Airbus is one of only two aircraft manufacturers (Boeing being the other)
in the market for large commercial airliners. Airbus designs, builds, sells,
and supports commercial aircraft with a capacity of 100 seats or more.

2The term New Large Aircraft is generally used to describe the new aircraft
being developed by Airbus Industrie that have wingspans and lengths
substantially greater than today's Boeing 747 aircraft, weigh up to 1.2
million pounds, and have a seating capacity ranging from 555 to 880
passengers. Airbus calls its NLA the A380.

safely serve significant numbers of NLA while efficiently moving air
traffic, U.S. airports might need to upgrade such infrastructure as runways
and taxiways. In 1997, 20 airports that were likely candidates to receive
NLA reported to FAA that costs to meet Design Group VI standards would total
$6.6 billion (in 1997 dollars).3 At that time, FAA noted that the costs
reported by some airports included estimates associated with planned
projects that were not a direct consequence of the NLA. Since then, some
airports have decided not to serve NLA and others have revised their
estimates. In response to your request, this report provides the airports'
estimates of the costs needed for infrastructure changes to accommodate NLA.

While the number of NLA that individual airports would serve is uncertain at
this time, Airbus expects the market for its A380 to be robust. Because of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it is unclear whether any
long-term reduced demand for flying might result in fewer than expected NLA
sales and lower use at U.S. airports. It is also unclear how the increased
emphasis on airport security might affect the cost of infrastructure changes
airports plan to make to serve NLA. As agreed with your office, we plan, at
a later date, to examine the costs and other issues associated with safety
and security as well as the operational, capacity, and environmental
challenges that U.S. airports might face in serving NLA.

In July 2001, we mailed a survey to officials at the 23 airports that we
identified as likely candidates to serve NLA and asked them if they were
planning to accommodate NLA at their airport and to estimate the costs for
those infrastructure changes that they would likely make if FAA revises the
standards and/or grants modifications to their individual airport.4 We
received responses from 22 airports. We asked airports to derive their cost
estimates from those that were used to support planning documents, such as
an airport's master plan and capital budget. We did

3See The Operational and Economic Effects of Large Airplanes on United
States Airports, FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, Mar. 1998. FAA
noted in the report that the costs reported by airports include some
estimates associated with planned projects that are not a direct consequence
of NLA. To solicit estimated costs, FAA, in cooperation with the Airports
Council International-North America and the Air Transport Association,
jointly prepared a survey that was sent to 22 airports. They received
responses from 20 of them.

4FAA defines "modifications to standards" as any change to its standards
applicable to an airport's design, construction, or equipment procurement
project that results in lower costs, greater efficiency, or is necessary to
accommodate an unusual local condition, when adopted on a case-by-case
basis.

not verify the airports'  estimates for accuracy. (See app. I for additional
information on our scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief

At this time, determining the cost to serve NLA is difficult because a
number of important issues that affect the infrastructure changes that
airports might be making are unresolved. These issues include (1) whether
and the extent to which FAA revises the standards or grants modifications,
(2) which airlines buy NLA and the frequency of NLA service at U.S.
airports, (3) when NLA begin serving these airports, and (4) the extent to
which the cost estimates reported by the airports are attributable to NLA
instead of changes to accommodate growth in air traffic. The 14 airports
that expect to serve NLA by 2010 collectively reported that their cost
estimate for infrastructure changes is $2.1 billion; however, the ultimate
cost will depend on how issues that affect cost will be resolved. As these
issues are resolved, airports will have a clearer understanding of what
infrastructure changes must be made and their costs.

We provided the Department of Transportation, the Airports Council
International-North America, and Airbus with a draft of this report for
review and comment. Officials from the Department of Transportation and
Airports Council International-North America provided oral comments and
generally agreed with the information presented in the report. They provided
clarifying and technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate.

Airbus provided written comments through its Deputy Vice President of Safety
and Technical Affairs (see app. V). Airbus officials agreed with the list of
14 airports that reported that they expect to serve NLA by 2010 but said
that airport officials overestimated the costs to serve NLA. The company
estimated the cost for these 14 airports to accommodate NLA at $520 million
as opposed to the $2.1 billion the airports estimated. Airbus offered two
major reasons why it believed airport officials overstated the cost
estimates reported to us. First, Airbus stated that, in the majority of
cases, there is no safety need to bring existing airport infrastructure to
Group VI standards to accommodate the A380. Although we revised the report
to acknowledge that many airports could safely serve NLA by placing
restrictions on NLA's operations or the operations of other aircraft, we do
not view this as a long-term solution to serving NLA because many of these
airports have typically experienced delay and congestion problems that could
be made worse by additional restrictions. Second, Airbus said that most of
the estimated costs airports reported are attributable to the growth of air
traffic and not directly related to serving NLA. We revised the report to
acknowledge that cost estimates would

change if it is determined that some portion of the overall costs airports
reported might be attributable to overall growth rather than specifically to
serving NLA. Airport officials have told us that it is very difficult to
separate these costs, especially when an airport expects to serve NLA as a
part of its growth.

Background To develop and maintain a national system of safe airports, FAA
promulgates federal standards and recommendations for the design of airport
infrastructure. FAA's airport design standards regulate how an airport must
be configured to safely serve aircraft with certain characteristics, such as
wingspan and weight. Design Group V standards serve the B-747, while Design
Group VI standards will serve NLA (see fig. 1).5 FAA has established a
process to grant modifications to airport design standards according to an
airport's unique local conditions. Under a recently established policy, FAA
headquarters officials have the sole authority to approve modifications to
the standards for accommodating NLA. Generally, an airport's request must
show that an acceptable level of safety, economy, durability, and
workmanship will continue despite any modification. (See app. II for more
detailed information on airport design standards and the process for
requesting and granting modifications.)

5To help introduce NLA at U.S. airports, FAA has an NLA Facilitation Group
made up of FAA, Boeing, Airbus, and other aviation officials, including
representatives of airports, airlines, and pilots.

Figure 1: Comparison of Aircraft Design Group V and VI Standards

Source: FAA's Airport Design Advisory Circular 150/5300-13.

With the arrival of NLA closer and the availability of more up-to-date
information to airport officials about whether airlines plan to offer NLA
service at their airports, 14 airports reported that they expect to serve
NLA by 2010.6 Determining the cost to serve NLA is difficult because a
number of issues are unresolved including

The Cost for Airports'

Infrastructure Upgrades to Serve NLA Will Be Affected by a Number of
Unresolved Issues

* whether and the extent to which FAA revises NLA's design standards or
grants modifications;

* which airlines actually buy NLA and the frequency of NLA service at U.S.
airports;

* whether NLA will begin service in the United States as early as 2006, as
planned; and

6Of the eight other airports responding to our survey, six reported that
they probably or definitely would not serve NLA by 2010. These airports are
Bradley International, Honolulu International, Minneapolis-St. Paul
International, Phoenix Sky Harbor International, Seattle-Tacoma
International, and Detroit Metropolitan. Two others, Philadelphia
International and Logan International (Boston), told us that they are as
likely as not to serve NLA.

* the extent to which the cost estimates reported by the airports are
attributable to NLA instead of changes to accommodate growth in air traffic.

The 14 airports that expect to serve NLA by 2010 collectively reported that
their cost estimate for infrastructure changes is $2.1 billion. However,
even with these changes, officials from most of these airports told us that
they do not expect their airports to fully meet current Design Group VI
standards. (See app. III for a list of these cost estimates by airport. See
app. IV for the cost estimates from these 14 airports to upgrade their four
major types of infrastructure.)

Regarding the unresolved issues, most airport officials told us that they
plan to apply to FAA for modifications to the standards or to serve NLA by
restricting its operations.7 FAA has three studies underway to evaluate
certain Design Group VI standards to determine which ones should be revised.
One study uses actual data from taxiing B-747 aircraft to determine how much
pilots deviate from a taxiway's centerline. The amount of deviation is
important to help determine a taxiway's required width to operate NLA
safely. According to FAA, it has continuously kept airport and industry
officials informed of preliminary results of its on-going studies. However,
FAA will not know until 2003, when the final results are expected, whether
to revise the current Design Group VI standards and/or grant modifications
or what the nature of any changes might be. There are certain Design Group
VI standards for which modifications cannot be granted. For example, runway
and taxiway bridges designed to safely support a B-747 with a maximum
taxiing weight of 875,000 pounds cannot support an A380 with a maximum
taxiing weight of 1.4 million pounds.

Which airlines actually buy NLA, how they use these aircraft in their route
structure, and the total number of NLA that are put into service will
influence which airports eventually receive NLA and the cost for
infrastructure changes. For example, Honolulu International Airport is a
likely destination for NLA if Japan Airlines or All Nippon Airways, two of

7Only three airports, Dallas/Fort Worth International, Orlando
International, and Washington-Dulles International, expect to fully meet
current Design Group VI standards. Although Denver International is very
close to meeting Design Group VI standards, it reported that it would need
at least one modification to the standard or for FAA to revise this standard
to accommodate NLA, even after this airport's currently planned upgrades are
completed.

the key airlines that serve this airport, buy them. If not, Honolulu
International Airport would not likely receive NLA on a regular basis and
could possibly accommodate them through modifications to standards, thereby
avoiding more costly infrastructure changes.8 The total number of NLA in
service and which airlines purchase them will be influenced by market
demand, which is even more uncertain than when the estimates were made
because of the September 11th terrorist attacks. Before and after these
attacks, Airbus has estimated that 1,500 NLA would be flying worldwide by
2019. In contrast, in July 2001, Airbus' competitor, Boeing, said that it
estimated that 500 NLA would be flying by then-a threefold difference.9 Each
company's future vision of air travel accounts for the large difference
between their estimates.10 Officials at many of the airports we surveyed
believe that if they serve only a few NLA, they might be able to accommodate
these aircraft with operational restrictions, thus making full compliance
with Design Group VI standards unnecessary. For example, to help ensure
safety, an airport could restrict NLA's ground movement to designated taxi
routes, terminal gates, and runways, and/or could restrict the ground
movement of other aircraft.

The total estimated cost to accommodate NLA could also change because the
timing of its arrival is uncertain. The A380 has not been completely built
and the first flight (certification trial) is not expected until 2004.11 The
A380 is not expected to arrive in the United States until 2006.12 Meanwhile,
many factors, including commercial decisions and unforeseen technical
problems in certifying the aircraft for service, could delay this schedule.
This uncertainty has led some airports to decide that they will not upgrade

8Since the A380 has not yet been built and neither of these airlines has
committed to purchasing NLA, Honolulu International Airport officials
reported that they are not expecting the arrival of NLA.

9At the time we completed our audit work in December 2001, Airbus maintained
that its estimate was still valid while Boeing did not respond to our
inquiry about whether it had revised its estimate.

10At the time of its estimate, Boeing anticipated more point-to-point travel
("fragmentation" of the market), making large aircraft like the A380 less
necessary. Therefore, the company has decided to pursue developing a faster
aircraft instead of a larger one. Airbus, while believing that fragmentation
will certainly occur, expects more hub travel ("consolidation" of the
market), making the A380, which carries many passengers to one place, more
useful.

11FAA conducts certification flight trials to demonstrate that new aircraft
comply with its standards and requirements.

12The first version expected to arrive is the passenger aircraft, with the
cargo aircraft expected to begin service in the United States in 2008.

their infrastructure unless they are reasonably certain that some of the
airlines they serve will be using NLA there.

Lastly, distinguishing, where possible, between the costs for growth and
those specific to serving NLA would affect the estimated costs of
infrastructure changes. Costs that airports would incur for growth,
regardless of whether they serve NLA, should be separated from those that an
airport is incurring only because it is serving NLA. Airbus officials stated
that most of the estimated costs airports reported for infrastructure
upgrades are attributable to growth rather than accommodating NLA. However,
airport officials have told us that, in some cases, costs attributable to
growth and serving NLA are so interrelated that it is very difficult to
separate them.

Within the next 2 years, we expect some of these issues will be resolved.
For example, FAA expects to have final results from its tests on certain
airport design standards in 2003 and will then be able to decide whether to
revise the standards. With these issues resolved, airports will have a
clearer understanding of the infrastructure changes that must be made and
their costs.

We sent a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation, the
Airports Council International-North America, and Airbus for their review
and comment. We met with Transportation officials, including the Director,
Office of Airport Safety and Standards, FAA. These officials suggested that
we explain why some airports indicated large differences between the costs
for meeting Design Group VI standards reported to FAA in 1997 and those we
received in 2001. We believe that the costs for making infrastructure
changes to fully meet Design Group VI do not provide a realistic estimate of
the changes that airports expect to make to serve NLA. Therefore, we revised
the report to focus on the airports that expect to serve NLA and the costs
of those infrastructure changes they expect to make. FAA officials also
provided a number of clarifying comments, which we have incorporated.

The Senior Vice-President, Technical and Environmental Affairs, Airport
Council International-North America, provided oral comments. He suggested
that we clarify the relationship between Design Group VI standards for new
construction at airports and NLA's operational requirements. He said that
the draft report made reference to airports' inability to meet Design Group
VI standards without noting that airports

Agency Comments

can accommodate NLA with operating restrictions. We revised the report to
clarify this point.

The Deputy Vice President of Safety and Technical Affairs for Airbus
provided written comments (see app. V for the full text of Airbus'
comments). Airbus agreed with the list of 14 airports that reported that
they expect to serve NLA by 2010. However, the company said that the
estimates from these airports overstated the costs to accommodate NLA. The
company's collective estimate for the 14 airports that expect to serve NLA
is $520 million, as opposed to the $2.1 billion collectively estimated by
the airports. The company provided two major reasons for this difference.
First, Airbus said that, in the majority of cases, there is no safety need
to bring existing airport infrastructure to Group VI standards to
accommodate the A380. Second, Airbus said that the cost estimates reported
by the airports are "rough" and do not reflect detailed analysis. Airbus
said that most of the cost estimates airports reported could be attributed
to the growth of air traffic and are not directly related to accommodating
NLA.

With respect to whether airports can safely accommodate NLA now, the report
was revised to acknowledge that many airports could accommodate NLA by
placing ground restrictions on its movement or the movement of other
aircraft and that these measures might obviate the need for immediate
infrastructure changes. However, if Airbus' expectation of a robust demand
for its NLA becomes reality, these measures are not likely to provide an
efficient long-term solution, especially at those large airports that have
experienced delay and congestion problems in the past. As for the rigor of
the estimates, we asked the airports to derive their cost estimates from
those used to support such planning documents as their master plan and
capital budget. We revised the report to clarify the basis for their
estimates. While the draft report acknowledged that the estimates were based
on assumptions about several factors, we revised it to state that
distinguishing between the costs attributable to growth versus the costs
specific to serving NLA would affect an airport's cost estimate. Airport
officials have told us that it is very difficult to separate these costs,
especially when an airport expects to serve NLA as a part of its growth.

Airbus also disagreed with including any costs for the five airports that
are not likely to receive NLA by 2010. However, if these costs are included,
the company estimated the costs for 19 airports to fully meet Design Group
VI standards at $1.7 billion, as opposed to the $4.6 billion reported to us.
We agree with Airbus that including the costs for five airports to fully
meet standards when they do not expect to accommodate NLA does not provide

a useful estimate. Moreover, some airports told us that they do not expect
to make some of the changes that they reported would be necessary to meet
these standards because of space limitations or other factors. Therefore, we
revised the report to focus on the airports that expect to accommodate NLA
and their cost estimates for the infrastructure changes they plan to make.

We performed our work from June to December 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the
date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Ranking Minority Members, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and its Aviation Subcommittee; interested Members of
Congress; the Secretary of Transportation; and the Administrator, FAA.
This report is also available on GAO's home page at http://www.gao.gov. If
you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please call me
at (202) 512-3650 or call Belva Martin, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-
4285. We can also be reached by e-mail at [email protected] and
[email protected], respectively. See appendix VI for a list of key
contributors to this report.

Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

                      Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We mailed a survey to officials at 23 airports and asked them to update the
cost estimates to upgrade their airport infrastructure that they had
reported to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1997. We sent
surveys to the same 22 airports that FAA had surveyed because those airports
provided nearly all of the B-747 service or serve as hubs for airlines that
might purchase New Large Aircraft (NLA) and therefore are likely to also
serve NLA. We also included Indianapolis because it is a cargo hub for
Federal Express, which has already placed an order with Airbus for 10 NLA.

Because 4 years have elapsed, we expected that airport officials would have
more recent information to estimate the following:

* the cost to accommodate NLA, if FAA revises the Design Group VI standards
or grants modifications to them and

* the cost to fully meet Design Group VI standards.

The officials were asked to specify their airport's total estimated costs to
upgrade the following four major types of infrastructure for NLA: runways;
taxiways; bridges, culverts, and tunnels; and terminals, concourses, and
aprons. (See app. IV for estimates of these costs by category.) We also
asked additional questions about their plans for serving NLA, such as the
number of aircraft they expect to serve and the time frame for service. When
answers were unclear or incomplete, we conducted follow-up telephone calls
for clarification. We asked airports to derive their cost estimates from
those that were used to support planning documents, such as an airport's
master plan and capital budget. We did not verify the airports' estimates
for accuracy.

We received responses from 22 of the 23 airports, including 19 of the 20
that responded in 1997 and 3 additional airports. Only Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport did not respond. In 1997, FAA received responses from
20 of the 22 airports it surveyed; Honolulu International and Orlando
International did not respond.

                    Appendix II: Airport Design Standards

The FAA establishes airport design standards to configure an airport's
infrastructure to safely serve aircraft with certain characteristics, such
as wingspan and weight. Design Group V standards serve the Boeing 747, while
Design Group VI standards will serve NLA. FAA defines Design Group V
aircraft as those having a wingspan of at least 171 feet but less than 214
feet. Design Group VI aircraft are those having a wingspan of at least 214
feet but less than 262 feet. The standards for Design Group VI were
published in 1983 and are currently under review by FAA. The agency has
established an NLA Facilitation Group to help introduce NLA at airports.
This group is made up of FAA, Boeing, Airbus, and other aviation officials,
including representatives of airports, airlines, and pilots.

Unique local conditions might require modifications to airport design
standards on a case-by-case basis. FAA's approval is required for modifying
airport design standards that are related to new construction,
reconstruction, expansion, or an upgrade at an airport that receives federal
or federally approved funding. FAA has established a process to approve
modifications to standards.13 An airport's request for a modification must
be submitted to the appropriate FAA regional or district office for
evaluation to determine whether the modification is appropriate, and, if it
is, the proper level of approval. Under a recently established policy, FAA
headquarters officials have sole authority to approve modifications to
standards related to serving NLA.14

Some of the Design Group VI standards that pose the most difficult
challenges for airports are runway and taxiway widths, separation distances
(e.g., for a runway and parallel taxiway and for parallel taxiways), and
infrastructure strength (e.g., for bridges and culverts). Clearances on
aprons, ramps, gate areas, and terminals at many airports might also need to
be upgraded to meet these standards. For example, John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) does not fully meet all of the current Design
Group V standards because the airport is severely limited by a lack of
airfield space. Airport management is developing plans to get the airport to
Design Group V and hopes that with FAA's granting a modification to the
airport or revising certain Design Group VI standards, the airport would be
able to safely serve NLA. (See table 1 for a

13FAA Order 5300.1F, Modifications to Agency Airport Design, Construction,
and Equipment Standards, establishes the process to approve modifications to
standards.

14FAA anticipates publishing guidance to eventually allow consistent
nationwide approval of these modifications by regional offices.

Appendix II: Airport Design Standards

comparison  of  current design  group  requirements  for key  infrastructure
features of airports and specific features at JFK.)

Table  1: Design  Group  Standards, JFK's  Current Configuration,  and JFK's
Plans to Accommodate NLA

                           Airport infrastructure

Design Group V Design Group VI

                        JFK's Current Configuration

JFK's Plans for NLA

Taxiway  to  fixed
or   movable   160
feet 193  feet 130
feet 167 feet
object

Source:  JFK   officials  and   FAA's   Airport   Design  Advisory  Circular
150/5300-13.

Appendix III: Cost Estimates Reported by 14 Airports to Serve NLA through
Revisions or Modifications to Design Standards

                                  Airport

Cost estimate to service NLA through revisions or modifications

                            Dollars in thousands

                    Los Angeles International $1,215,000

                   O'Hare International (Chicago) 232,750

                   John F. Kennedy International 109,000

                Ted Stevens Anchorage International 106,000

                     San Francisco International 76,000

                   Dallas/Fort Worth International 73,055

                     Indianapolis International 66,030

                   Washington Dulles International 64,050

                        Memphis International 36,600

                  Hartsfield Atlanta International 26,359

               George Bush Intercontinental (Houston) 23,600

                        Orlando International 18,838

                         Miami International 18,300

                        Denver International 16,250

                              Total $2,082,000

                         Source: GAO's 2001 survey.

Appendix IV: Airports' Cost Estimates to Upgrade Four Major Types of
Infrastructure

Our survey asked airports to provide cost estimates for four major types of
airport infrastructure: runways; taxiways; bridges, culverts, and tunnels;
and terminals, concourses, and aprons. According to a 1997 survey, these
areas represent those that are most likely to require upgrades to
accommodate NLA.

Figure 3 shows the percentage of the $2.1 billion total estimated cost to
upgrade each major type of airport infrastructure at the 14 airports that
expect to accommodate NLA through revisions or modifications to FAA's
airport design standards. The $663 million reported for upgrading runways
accounts for the largest percentage of cost (32 percent). NLA. Moreover, Los
Angeles International Airport's estimate to upgrade its runways accounts for
$398 million of the total reported by 14 airports. Upgrading bridges,
tunnels, and culverts accounts for 28 percent of the total cost ($593
million). The vast majority of the bridge and tunnel costs are attributable
to a $508-million project at Los Angeles where the freeway runs under the
airfield. Upgrading the cost for taxiways accounts for 24 percent ($509
million) of the total cost, and upgrading terminals, concourses, and aprons
accounts for 15 percent of the total cost ($317 million). At some airports,
airlines are responsible for these areas, so upgrading them does not show up
as a cost to airports. Additionally, since two airports, Indianapolis
International and Memphis International, are primarily going to receive the
cargo version of the A380, terminal upgrades would not be needed.

Appendix IV: Airports' Cost Estimates to Upgrade Four Major Types of
Infrastructure

Figure  2: Cost  Estimates for 14  Airports to  Upgrade Four Major  Types of
Airport Infrastructure

Note: The percentages do  not total 100 percent because of rounding. Source:
GAO's 2001 survey.

                 Page 17 GAO-02-251 Airport Infrastructure

                 Page 18 GAO-02-251 Airport Infrastructure

                 Page 19 GAO-02-251 Airport Infrastructure

                 Page 20 GAO-02-251 Airport Infrastructure

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts Gerald Dillingham (202) 512-3650 Belva Martin (202) 512-4285

Staff  Key contributors to  this assignment were Carolyn  Boyce, Jean Brady,
Stephen    Brown,   James    Fields,    David   Hooper,    Michael   Horton,

Acknowledgments  Mitchell Karpman, Kieran McCarthy,  Richard Scott, and Kate
Wulff.

              (540002) Page 21 GAO-02-251 Airport Infrastruct

GAO's Mission

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to
support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help
improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal
programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other
assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents is through the
Internet. GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full-text
files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older
products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents
using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their
entirety, including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its Web
site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have
GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select
"Subscribe to daily e-mail alert for newly released products" under the GAO
Reports heading.

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free.
Additional copies are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to
the Superintendent of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard.
Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25
percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, D.C. 20013

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202)
512-6061

Visit GAO's Document GAO Building

Distribution  Center  Room 1100,  700 4th  Street, NW  (corner of 4th  and G
Streets, NW) Washington, D.C. 20013

To Report Fraud, Contact: Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm,

Waste, and Abuse in E-mail: [email protected], or

Federal Programs 1-800-424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 (automated answering
system).

Jeff   Nelligan,  Managing   Director,   [email protected]   (202)  512-4800

Public Affairs U.S.  General Accounting Office, 441 G. Street NW, Room 7149,
Washington, D.C. 20548
*** End of document. ***