Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for	 
Combating Proliferation (07-NOV-01, GAO-02-226T).		 
								 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, and recent anthrax exposures  
have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the		 
international community have initiated a number of successive	 
efforts over the years to secure these weapons and prevent their 
spread. There is renewed need to maintain strong international	 
controls over such weapons and related technologies, as well as  
the need to reevaluate the effectiveness of the controls. The	 
United States has used four key policy instruments to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) international  
treaties, (2) multilateral export control arrangements, (3) U.S. 
export controls, and (4) security assistance to other countries. 
Each instrument is important to the collective framework for	 
preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and	 
associated technologies to terrorists or rogue states, but each  
also has limitations. International treaties obligate members to 
restrict transfers of weapons of mass destruction technologies,  
but their effectiveness depends on whether treaties can be	 
verified and enforced and whether all countries of concern are	 
members. Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, 
nonbinding agreements under which countries that produce the	 
technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction agree to
restrict the transfer of these technologies. U.S. export controls
set the legal and regulatory conditions under which goods and	 
technologies can be exported. Security assistance to other	 
countries helps control or eliminate nuclear, chemical, and	 
biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of	 
weapons of mass destruction.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-226T					        
    ACCNO:   A02436						        
  TITLE:     Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools 
for Combating Proliferation					 
     DATE:   11/07/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Biological warfare 				 
	     Export regulation					 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Nuclear proliferation				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Weapons of Mass Destruction			 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-02-226T
     
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Assessing U. S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation Statement of Joseph
A Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Security,

Proliferation, and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.
S. Senate

For Release on Delivery 2: 30 p. m., November 7, 2001

GAO- 02- 226T

1 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the efforts of the United States
and the international community to stem the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their related technologies.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and recent anthrax exposures have
heightened longstanding concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The United States and the international community have
initiated a number of successive efforts over the years to secure these
weapons and prevent their spread. There is renewed need to maintain strong
international controls over such weapons and related technologies, as well
as the need to reevaluate the effectiveness of the controls. I will describe
and provide observations based on work we have conducted over the past
several years on each of the mechanisms the United States has historically
used to reduce proliferation risks.

Summary

The United States has used four key policy instruments to combat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) international treaties,
(2) multilateral export control arrangements, (3) U. S. export controls, and
(4) security assistance to other countries. Each instrument is important to
the collective framework for preventing the transfer of weapons of mass
destruction and associated technologies to terrorists or rogue states, but
each also has limitations.

International treaties obligate members to restrict transfers of WMD
technologies, but their effectiveness depends on whether treaties can be
verified and enforced and whether all countries of concern are members.
These treaties also depend on the integrity and honesty of the countries
party to the treaty.

2 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, nonbinding
agreements under which countries that produce the technologies used to
develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of these
technologies. Such arrangements depend on the national discretion of member
governments, which are free to implement these arrangements as they see fit.
Member countries do not always agree on which countries and technologies are
of greatest concern. We are currently examining how the extent to which
members abide by their commitments, establish laws and regulations to
restrict transfers, and coordinate their actions with other members limit
these arrangements.

U. S. export controls set the legal and regulatory conditions under which
goods and technologies can be exported. While the goal of export controls is
to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies, a number of factors
hinder their implementation. These include a failure to assess the security
risk associated with the transfer of sensitive goods and technologies, and
difficulties in screening out end- users and monitoring the use of items
after export.

Security assistance to other countries helps control or eliminate nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. U. S. efforts have helped make large quantities
of WMD- related materials more secure and have supplemented the incomes of
several thousand former Soviet scientists in hopes they will not sell their
knowledge to terrorists or countries of concern. However, the cost of U. S.
efforts to reduce the proliferation risks of former Soviet WMD has been and
will continue to be substantial, and it will take much longer than was once
thought to secure sensitive materials and weapons. In addition, the United
States' ability to demonstrate that these efforts have had a positive impact
is limited primarily because of Russian restrictions on U. S. access to
relevant sites and materials and inherent difficulties in assessing the
effect of U. S. aid on the motivations of former Soviet scientists.

3 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Background

U. S. policy states that weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems pose a direct and serious threat to the national security of the
United States, and its friends, forces, and allies. President Bush has said
that the United States must have a comprehensive strategy to counter this
complex and dangerous challenge. Terrorists or rogue states can acquire
weapons of mass destruction by buying materials and equipment from countries
that produce and export them or by stealing them from inadequately protected
stockpiles in states of the former Soviet Union. Elements of U. S. current
nonproliferation strategy are to (1) strengthen existing international
nonproliferation treaties, promote new ones that meet U. S. interests, and
upgrade the means of verifying them; (2) persuade or induce proliferating
governments to change course; (3) deny proliferators the supply of
equipment, material, or technology from abroad; and (4) use U. S. threat
reduction programs to secure or eliminate weapons of mass destruction and
missile capabilities left over from the Cold War.

With the increasing globalization of the world economy, dual- use items and
technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction cannot be
effectively controlled without cooperation among exporting and transit
countries. Thus, foreign purchasers denied a critical item by one country
may be able to obtain the same item from another country that does not
control its exports as stringently. The U. S. government has made it a
priority to strengthen and deepen multilateral cooperation on export
controls.

The goal of the U. S. export control system is to manage risk. Exports to
some countries involve less risk than to other countries, and some exported
items involve less risk than others. In controlling the export of sensitive
dual- use technology, U. S. policy seeks to balance the U. S. economic
interest in promoting economic exports with the need to maintain national
security by preventing the proliferation of technologies used to develop
weapons of mass destruction.

Effectiveness of International Treaties Relies on Enforcement Mechanisms

4 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction The international community has
established treaties to eliminate chemical and

biological weapons and prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons. These
treaties reflect the international community's will to reduce the threat
posed by these weapons. Three key treaties have been established to stem the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, (2) the Chemical Weapons Convention, and (3) the
Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention. Although the treaties' mechanisms
for verifying and enforcing treaty compliance vary, these treaties are
legally binding and share similar objectives. In addition, a majority of the
world's nations adhere to them.

The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, signed in 1968, was prompted by
widespread concerns that there might be dozens of countries with nuclear
weapons in a few decades. The treaty obliges the five nuclear- weapon states
1 recognized by the treaty to refrain from the transfer of nuclear weapons,
other nuclear explosive devices, or related technology to any country that
does not have nuclear weapons. Countries that do not have nuclear weapons
agree to refrain from acquiring or producing such items in return for the
peaceful use of nuclear technology. There are 187 countries party to the
treaty.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in 1997, prohibits the production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, retention, and use of chemical weapons.
Outbreaks in the use of chemical weapons prompted the world community to
reach an agreement banning their use. The Convention obligates countries to
destroy any chemical weapons and related production facilities they possess
by 2007. 2 It also has the administrative structure and procedures to
inspect declared and undeclared sites on short notice. There are currently
143 countries party to the treaty.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention obliges parties not to develop,
produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins that are not used
for peaceful purposes, as well as related weapons and means of delivery. The
Convention entered into force in

1 The treaty designated the five nuclear weapon states as China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

5 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction 1975 but did not have an
enforcement protocol. In September 1986, the parties agreed to

share data on permitted biological activities to enhance confidence and
promote cooperation. In July 2001, the United States rejected a draft
protocol designed to strengthen the inspection and enforcement mechanisms of
the treaty. Currently, 144 countries are party to the treaty.

The effectiveness of these treaties depends on the mechanisms in place for
verifying and enforcing compliance. For example, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty relies on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to monitor members' nuclear facilities. IAEA monitoring techniques, also
known as safeguards, were enhanced after it was learned that Iraq had
circumvented IAEA inspection procedures. Although the Chemical Weapons
Convention contains intrusive inspection provisions, its most important tool
challenge inspections has yet to be used. The organization tasked with
oversight of the Convention the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons is confronting a serious financial crisis that may force a cutback
in verification activities. In contrast, the 1975 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention has no mechanisms for conducting inspections. One party
to the Convention, the former Soviet Union, was able to conduct a massive
covert biological weapons program during the 1970s and 1980s.

A second factor constraining the effectiveness of these treaties is the
scope of their membership. Although the overwhelming majority of the world's
countries are party to these treaties, significant countries of concern
remain outside their scope. For example, Israel, India, and Pakistan are not
party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and Iraq, Syria, Libya, and
North Korea have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Finally,
treaties rely on the integrity and accuracy of declarations made by the
member countries. U. S. government officials have raised questions regarding
the integrity of Russian, Iranian, and Chinese declarations concerning the
Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as North Korean commitments to the
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation
Treaty.

2 According to the Convention, a 5- year extension may be granted.

6 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Constraints on Consensus and Cooperation Within Multilateral Export Control
Arrangements

Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, nonbinding
agreements under which countries that produce the technologies used to
develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of these
technologies. These arrangements include lists of sensitive materials and
technologies that are to be controlled through each member's national laws.

There are four important multilateral export control arrangements, each with
between 32 to 38 members.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group, established in 1974, seeks to ensure that
nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation
of nuclear weapons or explosive devices.

The Australia Group, which aims to control chemical and biological weapons,
was established in 1984. This arrangement seeks to ensure that the
industries of participating countries do not assist either on purpose or by
accident other countries seeking to obtain the technology to build chemical
and biological weapons.

The Missile Technology Control Regime, established in 1987, addresses
missiles and technologies useful for developing missile systems capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction that is nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons.

The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1996 in part to address
technologies not covered by the other arrangements. This arrangement aims to
prevent the destabilizing buildup of conventional arms, as well as goods and
technologies that have both civilian and military applications. Rather than
establishing prohibitions on transfer, this arrangement encourages
transparency and national restraint.

7 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction Both the executive and
legislative branches have affirmed support for strengthening the

effectiveness of multilateral export control arrangements as a critical
aspect of U. S. nonproliferation policy. However, the effectiveness of
multilateral controls has been increasingly questioned in recent years. As
part of our ongoing work in this area, we are examining

how the effectiveness of these voluntary arrangements may be limited by the
degree of consensus among members and by controls implemented at the
national discretion of member governments;

whether member countries abide by their commitments to not export items that
other members have denied;

the extent to which member countries share relevant information about their
export decisions;

the sufficiency of coordination among the arrangements in sharing
information about rogue states and terrorists; and

whether countries that are not members of an export control arrangement can
undermine the arrangement's ability to prevent the transfer of controlled
technology.

Implementation Issues Hamper U. S. Export Control Policy

Members of multilateral export control arrangements implement multilateral
controls through each country?s domestic laws and regulations. Under U. S.
law, the President has the authority to control and require licenses for the
export of items such as nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile
technologies that may pose a national security risk or foreign policy
concern. The President also has the authority to revise or remove those
controls as U. S. concerns and interests change. The U. S. export control
system is administered by two agencies. The Commerce Department licenses
sensitive dual- use

8 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction items under the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P. L. 96- 72), 3 while the

State Department licenses munitions items under the Arms Export Control Act
(P. L. 90- 629).

In our past work, we have identified weaknesses in implementation of
selected U. S. export controls. These weaknesses also raise questions about
how well the United States implements controls on transfers of technology
that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Assessing proliferation risks. The executive branch has not assessed
national security risks of items such as high- performance computers and
semiconductor manufacturing technologies to determine whether such items at
specified performance levels need to be controlled. As a result, the
executive branch has not adequately justified changes in some export
controls, even when the law required specific justifications for raising
computer control levels. We have recommended that the executive branch
conduct these assessments, in part to determine how the uses of certain
items would threaten U. S. national security interests, but it has not done
so. 4

Screening recipients of exported items. Limitations of both government and
private industry screening of proposed recipients of sensitive American
exports has long been an issue. For example, the Commerce Department does
not have complete intelligence information on license applicants that may
serve as fronts for proliferators or terrorists engaged in illicit
activities. Also, the U. S. government increasingly relies on industry to
determine whether an export needs to be licensed,

3 The Export Administration Act ended Aug. 20, 1994. Under Executive Order
12924, issued on Aug. 19, 1994 (59 Fed. Reg. 43437), the President, to the
extent permitted by law, extended the application of the act. In addition,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses exports of nuclear reactors. The
Department of Commerce, in consultation with a number of other agencies,
licenses dual- use nuclear exports.

4 Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance
Computing is Ineffective (GAO01- 10, Dec. 18, 2000); Export Controls:
Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer Controls Demonstrates
Need for Comprehensive Study (GAO- 01- 534T, Mar. 15, 2001).

9 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction even though industry has raised
questions about its capability and willingness to

make this assessment without government support.

Monitoring illicit use of exports. The U. S. government has difficulties
confirming the appropriate use of exported technologies. For example,
certain countries of concern, such as China, restrict U. S. officials?
visits to recipients? facilities. In addition, the U. S. government makes
limited efforts to monitor exporters? and end users? compliance with
conditions set forth in export licenses for computers.

Controlling the Spread of Former Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction Will Be
Costly and Time- Consuming

The states of the former Soviet Union possess an enormous quantity of assets
that could help terrorists or rogue states acquire weapons of mass
destruction. By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had, at the time of
its collapse in 1991, about 30,000 nuclear weapons, 650 metric tons of
weapons- usable materials, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, an
extensive biological weapons infrastructure, and thousands of systems
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet collapse also
left 30,000 to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
scientists and thousands of less experienced junior scientists without full-
time employment.

Since 1991, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State have helped Russia
and other newly independent states eliminate weapons of mass destruction,
secure WMD materials, and control the spread of WMD knowledge. Their efforts
have focused on

destroying the vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and securing former
Soviet nuclear weapons and their components,

securing and protecting weapons- usable nuclear materials such as highly
enriched uranium 5 and plutonium that may be subject to theft and diverted
to terrorists and countries of concern,

5 The United States has also arranged for the purchase of highly enriched
uranium from Russia for conversion to reactor fuel.

10 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

securing weapons of mass destruction from theft, and

engaging scientists formerly engaged in weapons development in peaceful
projects in the hope that they will not be tempted to sell their skills to
terrorists or countries of concern.

Reducing the formidable proliferation risks posed by former Soviet WMD
assets is clearly in the U. S. national interest. U. S. efforts have helped
make large quantities of WMD- related materials more secure and have
supplemented the incomes of several thousand former Soviet scientists.
However, the cost of such efforts has been substantial and will continue to
grow, and the timeframes for completing them have been extended
considerably. Since 1991, the Congress has authorized about $5.5 billion for
U. S. programs to reduce former Soviet WMD threats and is now doing so at a
rate of several hundreds of millions of dollars annually. U. S. agencies
plan to spend billions of dollars to continue to address these threats over
the next two decades. For example, the Department of Energy now estimates
that it will spend more than $2.2 billion by 2020 to help Russia secure
certain nuclear materials that could be used for weapons. The Department of
Defense also is seeking to build a $890 million facility that would destroy
Russian chemical weapons at one of Russia?s several chemical weapons storage
sites.

While these efforts are potentially valuable, the reliability of such cost
estimates is uncertain, at best, due to Russia?s apparent inability to
shoulder a substantial portion of the burden and to changing Russian
requirements. For example, the United States estimated in 1996 that the
Department of Defense would pay no more than $275 million to help Russia
design and build a facility intended to store plutonium extracted from
dismantled weapons. However, in 1998, Russia?s apparent inability to
contribute its share of funding to the project led the United States to
agree to pay more than $412 million for a substantially downsized version of
the facility. It is worth noting that the Department of Defense?s recent
estimate that it will pay $890 million to design and build a Russian
chemical weapons elimination facility rests on the assumption that Russia
will pay more than $750 million in related infrastructure and operations
costs. In addition, the Department of Energy?s hopes of controlling the cost
of securing Russian nuclear

11 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction materials by consolidating
storage sites rests on Russia?s willingness to reduce its

requirements by closing certain sites and consolidating nuclear material.
The ability of the United States to conclusively demonstrate that its
efforts are having a positive impact is limited at best. In many cases, it
may never be proved that these programs have substantially achieved their
intended purpose. We can be fairly confident that DOD aid has helped two
former Soviet states meet their arms control obligations by destroying
launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, we may never
know if our aid to underemployed former Soviet weapons scientists has
reduced the desire of any one of them to sell his or her skills to
terrorists or countries of concern. Also, because U. S. assistance generally
employs these scientists part- time, they often continue to work at former
Soviet WMD research institutes. Under certain circumstances, aiding such
scientists without careful screening and monitoring could create new risks
for U. S. national security. Our ability to assess the impact of our aid is
also made difficult, in some cases, by Russia?s reluctance to provide U. S.
officials with full access to relevant sites and materials.

Conclusion

The tragic events of the last few months provide the impetus for reexamining
the U. S. policy instruments used to restrict the spread of weapons of mass
destruction to terrorists and rogue states. Ten years ago, the international
community made major changes in its controls over nuclear technology after
revelations about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We may be at a similar
juncture today. We need to reassess the adequacy of our current policy tools
to address our new vulnerabilities and changed perceptions of the threats we
face.

- - - - Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

12 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Joseph Christoff
at (202) 512- 8979. F. James Shafer, Stephen M. Lord, Eugene Aloise, Lynn
Cothern, Diana Glod, Jeffrey D. Phillips, Nanette J. Ryen, and Pierre R.
Toureille made key contributions to this testimony.

13 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix I

MEMBERSHIPS OF MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS

Countries Australia Group MTCR a NSG Wassenaar Arrangement Argentina

Australia

Austria

Belarus

Belgium

Brazil

Bulgaria

Canada

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Latvia

Luxembourg

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russia

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Africa

South Korea

Spain

Sweden

14 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Countries Australia Group MTCR a NSG Wassenaar Arrangement Argentina

Switzerland

Turkey

Ukraine

United Kingdom

United States

a Countries pledging to abide by MTCR guidelines include the People's
Republic of China, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia. Source: Center for
International Trade and Security, Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global
Evaluation, 2001.

15 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix II

SELECTED GAO REPORTS ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

EXPORT CONTROLS

Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times Are
Similar, GAO- 01- 528, June 1, 2001

Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile Technology
Licensing Requirements, GAO- 01- 530, May 31, 2001

Export Controls: Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer
Controls Demonstrates Need for Comprehensive Study, GAO- 01- 534T, March 15,
2001

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance
Computing Is Ineffective, GAO- 01- 10, December 18, 2000

Department of Energy: National Security Controls Over Contractors Traveling
to Foreign Countries Need Strengthening, RCED- 00- 140, June 26, 2000

Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on Computer Exports,
TNSIAD- 00- 187, May 26, 2000

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on
Computer Systems, T- NSIAD- 00- 139, March 23, 2000

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions To Controls on
Computers,

T- NSIAD- 00- 104, February 28, 2000

Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not Fully
Addressed, NSIAD- 00- 45, November 5, 1999

Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers, NSIAD-
00- 14 November 3, 1999

Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for High
Performance Computers, T- NSIAD- 00- 53, October 28, 1999

Export Controls: 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance Computers,

NSIAD- 99- 208, September 24, 1999

Defense Trade: Department of Defense Savings From Export Sales Are Difficult
to Capture, NSIAD- 99- 191, September 17, 1999

Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite
Exports,

NSIAD- 99- 182, September 17, 1999

Department of Energy: DOE Needs To Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors To
Its Weapons Laboratories, T- RCED- 99- 28, October 14, 1998

Export Controls: Change in Licensing Jurisdiction for Commercial
Communications Satellites, T- NSIAD- 98- 222, September 17, 1998

Export Controls: Changes in Controls Applied to the Export of High
Performance Computers, T- NSIAD- 98- 250, September 16, 1998

Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance
Computer Controls, NSIAD- 98- 196, September 16, 1998

16 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for High
Performance Computer Exports, NSIAD- 98- 200, September 16, 1998.

Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites,
TNSIAD- 98- 211, June 17, 1998

Export Controls: Issues Related to Commercial Communications Satellites,
TNSIAD- 98- 208 June 10, 1998

Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to
Weapons Laboratories, RCED- 97- 229, September 25, 1997.

Export Controls: Sales of High Performance Computers to Russia's Nuclear
Weapons Laboratories, T- NSIAD- 97- 128, April 15, 1997.

Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive
DualUse Items, NSIAD- 97- 24, January 14, 1997

Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China, NSIAD- 97- 4
November 19, 1996

Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China, NSIAD- 97-
5, November 13, 1996.

Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Request for the Export of U. S. Computers for
Stockpile Maintenance, T- NSIAD- 96- 245, September 30, 1996

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Information on Nuclear Exports Controlled by U. S.
EURATOM Agreement, RCED- 95- 168, June 16, 1995

Export Controls: Issues Concerning Sensitive Stealth- Related Items and
Technologies, T- NSIAD- 95- 158, May 11, 1995

Export Controls: Concerns Over Stealth- Related Exports, NSIAD- 95- 140, May
10, 1995

Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile- Related Technology Exports to
China Are Weak, NSIAD- 95- 82, April 17, 1995

FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, But
Procedural Limitations Remain, GAO- 01- 694, June 19, 2001

Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers
Program, GAO- 01- 582, May 10, 2001

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE?s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
Russia?s Nuclear Cities Faces Challenges, GAO- 01- 429, May 3, 2001

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia?s Nuclear Material Improving;
Further Enhancements Needed, GAO- 01- 312, February 28, 2001

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits,
Poses New Risks, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 138, April 28, 2000

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD?s 1997- 98 Reports on Accounting for
Assistance Were Late and Incomplete, GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 40, March 15, 2000

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U. S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from the Former
Soviet Union, GAO/ T- NSIAD/ RCED- 00- 119, March 6, 2000

17 GAO- 02- 226T Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material
Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, RCED/ NSIAD- 00- 82,
March 6, 2000

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U. S. Purchase
of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, RCED- 99- 194, September 22, 1999

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned, NSIAD- 99- 76, April 13, 1999

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE?s Efforts to Reduce the Risks
Posed by Russia?s Unemployed Weapons Scientists, RCED- 99- 54, February 19,
1999

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation
of U. S.- Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts, RCED- 98- 46, January 14,
1998

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Review of DOD?s June 1997 Report on Assistance
Provided, NSIAD- 97- 218, September 5, 1997

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the
Former Soviet Union, NSIAD- 97- 101, April 11, 1997

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction
Assistance Has Improved, NSIAD- 97- 84, February 27, 1997

Nuclear Safety: Status of U. S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of Soviet-
Designed Reactors, RCED- 97- 5, October 29, 1996

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program,

NSIAD- 96- 222, September 27, 1996

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U. S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States
Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls, T- NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 118, March 13,
1996

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U. S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Materials Controls in Newly Independent States, NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 89, March
8, 1996

Nuclear Safety: Concerns with Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of
Radiation in the Former Soviet Union, RCED- 96- 4, November 7, 1995

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction
Assistance Can Be Improved, NSIAD- 95- 191, September 29, 1995

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union- An Update, NSIAD- 95- 165, June 17, 1995

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet
Union,

NSIAD- 95- 7, October 6, 1994

Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet- Designed
Reactors Safer, RCED- 94- 234, September 29, 1994

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U. S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics Secure
and Destroy Weapons, NSIAD- T- 93- 5, March 9, 1993

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U. S.
Dismantlement Assistance, NSIAD- 93- 154, March 8, 1993

Russian Nuclear Weapons: U. S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991, NSIAD- T- 92- 47, July 27, 1992
*** End of document. ***