Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-Critical Targets (30-NOV-01,	 
GAO-02-204R).							 
								 
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to attack 
time-critical targets. DOD has developed guidance to help the	 
military services achieve system interoperability as well as	 
oversight controls, directives, and policies and to achieve	 
interoperability. DOD has also worked to develop joint		 
capabilities through exercises and advance concept technology	 
demonstrations. Further, the individual services have undertaken 
a variety of efforts to improve their own capability to attack	 
time-critical targets. Although these efforts are helping DOD to 
make improvements in the sensor-to-shooter process, considerably 
more needs to be done to significantly reduce the time it takes  
to strike time-critical targets. First, DOD needs to overcome	 
cultural impediments to joint warfighting. Further, some of DOD's
current oversight and control mechanisms are simply not working. 
Also, DOD still lacks a joint service concept of operations to	 
defeat time-critical targets and, as a result, each military	 
service plans and acquires systems to meet requirements under its
own concept of operations. DOD has recently developed plans and  
initiatives to address these and other problems. GAO found that  
it is too early to determine whether these steps will enable DOD 
to overcome the challenges associated with achieving more common,
integrated systems.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-204R					        
    ACCNO:   A02533						        
  TITLE:     Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-Critical Targets       
     DATE:   11/30/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Military operations				 
	     Military systems analysis				 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Systems compatibility				 
	     Tactical air forces				 
	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review			 
	     Scud Missile					 

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GAO-02-204R
     
GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time Critical Targets

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

November 30, 2001 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman, Subcommittee on
Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives

Subject: Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time- Critical Targets Dear Mr.
Chairman: This letter responds to your request that we review the Department
of Defense?s (DOD) efforts to enhance its ability to attack time- critical
targets. 1 While DOD has developed and fielded considerable capability to
detect, assess, and attack most fixed enemy targets, experiences in the
Persian Gulf and more recently in Kosovo revealed that DOD has limited
ability to rapidly identify and strike time- critical targets, such as
mobile Scud 2 and surface- to- air missile sites. Such targets proved to be
elusive when our adversaries were able to move critical assets to safety in
a shorter time frame than it takes us to implement the sensor- to- shooter
process. In fact, the time needed to effectively attack mobile targets is
much shorter than DOD?s established 30 to 72 hour targeting cycle for
attacking most fixed targets.

DOD studies have pointed to a variety of reasons for why it takes too long
to be in a position to strike time- critical targets. Chiefly, the systems
involved in the sensor- toshooter process do not operate effectively
together. There are over 100 command, control, communications, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that are needed to identify and
strike targets. But these are separately owned and operated by each of the
military services as well as other DOD and intelligence agencies. These
separate systems have limited ability to interoperate, both technically
(such as incompatible data formats) and operationally. As a result, they
cannot easily and quickly exchange data; communication systems must be
patched together to make this happen. Compounding this problem is the fact
that each service has its own command, control, and communications structure
that may present barriers to interoperability. In fact, in a battle
situation, the Joint Forces Commander is faced with integrating, in an ad
hoc manner, more than 400 different mission and software applications.

1 These include targets that are of high value, require immediate response,
or have a limited window of vulnerability such as mobile theater missiles,
surface- to- air missile launchers, and cruise missile batteries.

2 Scud missiles are mobile, short- range surface- to- surface missiles.

GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical Targets Page 2 DOD has undertaken
numerous efforts to address these fundamental problems.

Primarily, DOD has developed guidance to help the military services achieve
system interoperability 3 as well as oversight controls, directives, and
policies to ensure that this guidance was being followed and that
interoperability is being achieved. DOD has also worked to develop joint
capabilities through exercises and advance concept technology
demonstrations. The demonstrations focus on assessing emerging technologies,
such as those that would put targeting information into the hands of
commanders faster as well as new manned and unmanned sensors and weapons
platforms. Additionally, the individual services have undertaken a variety
of efforts to improve their own capability to attack time- critical targets.
For example, the Air Force is developing a new family of systems designed to
attack time- critical targets much more quickly. The Navy has an effort to
network its sensors, command centers, and long- range weapons. And the Army
is working to improve the flow of battlefield information.

While these efforts are helping DOD to make improvements in the sensor- to-
shooter process, considerably more needs to be done to significantly reduce
the time it takes to strike time- critical targets. First, DOD needs to
overcome cultural impediments to joint warfighting. Each of the military
services still plans, acquires, and operates systems to effectively meet its
own operational concepts, but not necessarily the requirements of joint
operations. To facilitate the services? different capabilities and concepts
of operation requires segmenting the battlefield with each military
component responsible for a specified area of the battlefield. And there is
little incentive to design common, integrated 4 systems. Naturally, this
continues to result in disparate systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported
that there are over 100 different operational architecture efforts. DOD?s
Director for Interoperability also estimates that there are $36 billion
worth of systems the services plan to buy that cannot operate effectively
together.

Second, some of DOD?s current oversight and control mechanisms are simply
not working. For example, DOD?s Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)
is the primary certifier for ensuring that the military services? command,
control, communications, and intelligence systems are interoperable and are
able to exchange information effectively during a joint mission. But DOD
organizations have not always complied with the interoperability testing and
certification process. Furthermore, according to a Defense Science Board
study, the Joint Interoperability Test Command does not have the facilities
needed to test the interactions between the services' weapon systems and
information systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has also recognized that its
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)- which is responsible for
approving the services? operational requirements for high- valued systems-
has not been focused on evaluating systems from a joint warfighting
perspective.

3 Interoperability is essentially the ability of independent systems to
provide and accept information from other systems. 4 Integrated systems
extend beyond interoperability to form a network of interdependent systems.
Such integrated systems are expected to provide increased capabilities over
disparate independent systems that are capable of exchanging information.

GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical Targets Page 3 Third, DOD still lacks
a joint service concept of operations to defeat time- critical

targets and, as a result, each military service plans and acquires systems
to meet requirements under its own concept of operations. A joint
operational concept would provide the necessary foundation for developing
joint requirements for common integrated systems. Once a joint operational
concept is developed, a joint operational architecture needs to be
constructed to focus on how the services will work together to carry out
joint warfighting missions and help ensure that their operations are in
synchronization. Ultimately, this should lead to an enterprise architecture
that would include joint operational concepts and operational architectures,
along with comprehensive systems architectures. A comprehensive systems
architecture would provide the underlying blueprint for more detailed design
and implementation decisions about component systems. With a complete
architecture, DOD would be able to ensure that duplicative as well as
disparate systems are not allowed to go forward.

During our review, we discussed these and other problems with senior
officials in the military services and in DOD and found general agreement as
to the causes of the problems and additional steps needed. These steps are
captured in a number of recent DOD plans and initiatives. Importantly,

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review reinforces previous guidance by stating
that DOD must integrate combat forces and they must be highly networked with
joint command and control. The Review calls for developing a standing joint
task force that will develop an operational concept to address the critical
operational challenge-- to continuously locate and track and attack time-
critical targets. The headquarters for these new forces would provide
uniform standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical
system requirements. The standing joint task force would undertake
experimental exercises as new technologies become available.

In a July 2001 report, Network Centric Warfare, DOD proposed establishing an
Office of Transformation to ensure adequate focus on improving joint
networkcentric warfighting capabilities and to help overcome impediments to
progress such as cultural, organizational, and other barriers. It stated
that network- centric warfare and operations should be the cornerstone of
DOD?s strategic plan for transformation of the forces. The 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review reported plans to appoint a Director for Force Transformation
to foster innovation and experimentation, who will report to the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence recently issued a strategic plan for integrating intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is developing joint operational concepts and
architectures that are needed to achieve joint integrated warfighting
capabilities. The U. S. Joint Forces Command is also developing joint
operational concepts, including time- critical targeting, as well as
conducting joint experiments and testing of its new warfighting concepts in
collaboration with the services.

GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical Targets Page 4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is strengthening reviews conducted by its Joint
Requirements Oversight Council to ensure that individual systems establish
interoperability as a key performance parameter (requirement). The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council also plans to change its approach to its
review of major systems? operational requirements by ensuring that they have
a more ?joint? focus that addresses the warfighters? needs rather than a
?service? focus.

These and other new efforts are further described in enclosure I. It is too
early to determine whether these steps will enable DOD to overcome the
challenges associated with achieving more common, integrated systems
necessary for effectively attacking time- critical targets. As such, we will
continue to monitor these initiatives. In particular, we plan to monitor
whether and how well DOD is overcoming impediments such as cultural
barriers. Undoubtedly, this will be the most critical challenge for DOD.
Past efforts to focus on system development from a DOD- wide perspective
versus a service- perspective have failed because the services were
unwilling to forego their unique requirements in favor of requirements that
would benefit the department as a whole. At the same time, DOD did not have
a sustained commitment from its top leaders or did not successfully
implement management policies and funding controls needed to overcome
service resistance.

We also plan to monitor whether and how well DOD develops, implements, and
enforces a joint concept of operations and a joint operational architecture.
Our previous reviews have shown that while the absence of a complete
architecture does not guarantee the failure of system modernization efforts,
it does greatly increase the risk that agencies will spend more time and
money than necessary to ensure that systems are compatible and in line with
mission needs. Again, however, developing a joint concept of operations and
a joint operational architecture, and ultimately an enterprise architecture,
will be extremely challenging because it will require DOD to obtain
consensus from the services and others on high- level issues such as
creating a joint command and control structure- something that has not yet
been achieved on such a large scale.

Lastly, we plan to monitor whether DOD is putting in the right tools to
guide its efforts to success. These include a central clearinghouse to
review and coordinate the implementation of the many different service and
DOD initiatives to reduce the risk of overlap and duplication and increase
opportunities for knowledge sharing. These also include specific guidance on
where DOD specifically wants to go in terms of systems interoperability so
that oversight and control entities have a solid foundation for deciding
whether individual efforts will complement each other and link to DOD?s
overall goals.

Agency Comments

DOD provided oral comments on a draft of this report. DOD noted that our
report makes several pertinent observations and that it would consider our
comments when addressing solutions. It further stated that the recent
Defense Planning Guidance has placed emphasis on attack of time- critical
targets. DOD also provided technical corrections that we incorporated where
appropriate.

GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical Targets Page 5

Scope and Methodology

During our review we analyzed an extensive array of DOD policy, planning,
and guidance documents, official publications, statements, reports and other
assessments, and open literature addressing attacking time- critical
targets, interoperability, and joint warfighting capabilities to develop a
better understanding of the key issues affecting progress. We also met with
a broad spectrum of key defense officials in various offices and commands to
discuss the problems facing the military in attacking time- critical
targets, the need for integrating the capabilities necessary for detecting,
tracking, communicating, deciding, and attacking timecritical targets; and
the need for developing a joint concept of operations which would provide
the framework for determining the joint warfighting requirements that would
be critical in developing new or modified systems needed to attack
timecritical targets. DOD offices visited included the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence; and Operational Test and
Evaluation); the Joint Staff; the U. S. Joint Forces Command; the Air
Force?s Air Combat Command and Aerospace Command and Control, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center; the Navy Warfare Development
Command; service representatives; and others.

We conducted our review from February 2000 to October 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 5 days from its issue date. At that time,
we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff. We will make copies available to others on request and through the
GAO home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

We plan to keep you informed on the results of our monitoring efforts that
relate to DOD?s efforts to improve interoperability and shorten the time
needed to strike timecritical targets. In the interim, if you have questions
about the initiatives described in this letter or the challenges DOD now
faces, please call me at (202) 512- 4841. Other major contributors to this
work include William Gillies and Mary Quinlan.

Sincerely yours, James F. Wiggins Director Acquisition and Sourcing
Management

Enclosure

Enclosure I Enclosure I Page 6 GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical
Targets

Description of Recent Initiatives to Address Interoperability Problems

Quadrennial Defense Review

Summary: This review was intended to develop a new strategy for the defense
of the United States. Decisions taken on strategy, forces, capabilities, and
risks resulted from months of deliberation and consultation among senior
Department of Defense (DOD) leadership.

The review calls for developing new joint forces that come under joint
command and control and that are highly networked. The forces would be
lighter, more lethal and maneuverable, survivable, and more readily deployed
and employed in an integrated fashion.

To enable a common relevant operational picture of the battlespace, the
review calls for enhancing communications networks and systems to provide
shared situational awareness and integration of joint fires, maneuver, and
intelligence.

The review calls for establishing a standing joint task force headquarters,
which would provide uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics,
techniques, and technical system requirements, with the ability to move
expertise among commands. The headquarters is to have a standardized
operational architecture.

The review states that DOD will examine the option of establishing a
standing joint task force to address the critical operational challenge of
locating, tracking, and attacking mobile targets at any range with
precision.

The review also calls for undertaking experimental exercises, as new
technologies become available. Status: Report issued September 2001.

Report on Network- Centric Warfare

Summary: This report to the Congress was directed by section 934 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P. L. 106- 398).

Network- centric warfare is described as a set of warfighting concepts and
associated military capabilities that allow warfighters to take advantage of
all available information and bring all available assets to bear in a rapid
and flexible manner.

Network- centric warfare is not a fully developed and deployable warfighting
capability. In fact, applications of network- centric warfare theory have
been limited, but early experimentation has shown justification for its
impact on future combat forces.

DOD?s strategy for implementing network- centric warfare is to (1) set
priorities in developing and implementing network- centric concepts and
capabilities, such as the capability to self- synchronize its operations,
and achieve secure and seamless connectivity, (2) measure success, and (3)
overcome obstacles that are cultural, organizational, technical and
administrative. To ensure adequate focus in implementing this strategy, an
Office of Transformation, reporting to the Secretary of Defense, will be
established.

The report acknowledges that each service is actively acquiring service-
centric time- critical targeting capabilities without an integrating effort
to address a joint architecture.

Status: Report issued July 2001.

Enclosure I Enclosure I Page 7 GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical
Targets

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integrated Capstone Strategic
Plan

Summary: The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence, issued this plan to provide a structure
and methodology for guiding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
toward an integrated capability to maintain information superiority. DOD
envisions a system that brings together a joint and combined force of
national, theater, and tactical sensors, commanders and shooters to strike
targets rapidly at extended ranges. DOD also envisions a new operational
concept to attack time- critical targets that integrates command and control
authorities; command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems; and, shooters.

Status: Plan issued November 2000.

Joint Chiefs of Staff/ U. S. Joint Forces Command

Summary: Revised Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Instruction designated
interoperability as a (mandatory) key performance parameter for systems that
exchange information. Interoperability requirements must be addressed in the
operational requirements document approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council and evaluated by the U. S. Joint Forces Command based on a
warfighter?s perspective. Interoperability key performance parameters will
be tested and certified by the Joint Interoperability Test Command.

The JROC plans to change its approach to its review of major systems?
operational requirements by ensuring that they have a more ?joint? focus
that addresses the warfighter?s need rather than a service focus.

JCS is planning to develop, using its Joint Warfighting Capabilities
Assessments, joint operational concepts for its critical warfighting
functions, including precision engagement and dominant maneuver. These
operational concepts will guide future sensor to shooter system
acquisitions. They will also serve as a foundation for joint operational
architectures that will provide the framework for developing a systemof-
systems solution to time- critical targeting.

The U. S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for developing new operational
concepts, including attacking time- critical targets, and executing joint
experimentation as it develops new joint warfighting concepts.

Status: The JCS?s instruction ?Interoperability and Supportability of
National Security Systems, and Information Technology Systems? (CJCSI
6212.01B) was issued May 2000.

Global Information Grid (GIG)

Summary: The Global Information Grid provides a very broad high- level
concept to integrate information capabilities and is expected to meet the
needs of the individual services as they develop solutions to address the
limitations in attacking time- critical targets. The advancement of the
global information grid would benefit from incorporating joint operational
concepts as it forms architectures needed in developing joint warfighting
capabilities.

Status: Ongoing.

Enclosure I Enclosure I Page 8 GAO- 02- 204R Attacking Time- Critical
Targets

The Family of Interoperable Pictures (FIOP)

Summary The Family of Interoperable Pictures (FIOP) is a methodology for
addressing the lack of a coherent view of the battlefield. The Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense/ Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Interoperability is the lead proponent for the FIOP and the JROC has
directed implementation of a strategy, to be led by the Air Force, to
develop a joint concept of operation needed to provide an allsource picture
of the battlefield. This initiative requires that a joint concept of
operations be developed before developing requirements.

Status Ongoing.

Air Force Efforts

Summary The Air Force is developing a new family of systems to attack time-
critical targets that are expected to reduce attack times. For example, the
time- critical targeting cell initiative will provide the air component
commander?s air operations center an ability to detect and direct forces to
attack targets quickly. The theater battle management core system is
expected to merge several legacy systems such as its air tasking order
system, which controls employment of fixed wing aircraft in the battle area
with new capabilities, to reduce the timelines to attack time- critical
targets.

Status Ongoing.

Navy Efforts

Summary The Navy is developing a new series of systems for its time-
critical strike future naval capability program, such as the real time
execution decision support (REDS) initiative.

The Navy is also working on a network- centric warfare concept that will
network Navy sensors, command centers, and its long- range weapons to attack
a broader range of targets (including those in the deep battle area) more
effectively. This concept includes a vast array of procurement and research
and development weapon systems, ships, aircraft, and command and control,
communications, intelligence and reconnaissance programs.

The Navy is considering the need for new command and control ships to
provide the Navy with the capability to control deployed joint forces while
stationed off shore.

Status Ongoing.

Army Efforts

Summary The Army is continuing to fund its Battlefield Digitization
initiative, which is designed to improve the flow of battlefield information
within the Army?s fighting organizational structure.

The Army is also developing a transformation strategy, which is designed to
ensure that the Army could respond to a broad range of operations. The
strategy centers on developing a combat force that is expected to be
lighter, but just as powerful and survivable as today?s heavy force. This
new force will be planned around Future Combat systems. These systems will
provide the capability to attack critical targets much deeper in the battle
area before they become a direct threat.

Status Ongoing.

(120028)
*** End of document. ***