Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in	 
Chemical and Biological Preparedness (17-OCT-01, GAO-02-162T).	 
								 
Since the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade  
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the threat of	 
terrorism rose to the top of the country's national security and 
law enforcement agendas. Because the current investigations into 
anthrax incidents, the threat remains at the top of those	 
agendas. The nature of terrorist threat appears to be more	 
uncertain since the September 11 attacks. Preparing for all	 
possible contingencies is not practical, so a risk management	 
approach should be used. This would include a threat assessment  
to determine which chemical or biological agents are of most	 
concern. The federal government has a variety of programs to	 
prepare for and respond to chemical and biological terrorism,	 
including response teams, support laboratories, training and	 
equipment programs, and research efforts. Evaluations of chemical
and biological preparedness have identified a number of problems 
and their solutions. Congress faces competing demands for	 
spending as it seeks to invest resources to better prepare our	 
nation for chemical and biological terrorism. Given the 	 
uncertainty of the chemical and biological threat, Congress may  
want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad	 
applicability over those that are only applicable under a	 
specific type of chemical or biological attack. 		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-162T					        
    ACCNO:   A02328						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing	      
Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness		 
     DATE:   10/17/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Biological warfare 				 
	     Budgeting						 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     CDC National Pharmaceutical Stockpile		 
	     Program						 
								 
	     FEMA Federal Response Plan 			 
	     Pentagon						 
	     United States Interagency Domestic 		 
	     Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan		 
								 
	     World Trade Center (NY)				 

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GAO-02-162T
     
Testimony Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m., Wednesday, October 17,
2001 COMBATING TERRORISM

Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and Biological
Preparedness

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Managing Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management

GAO- 02- 162T

Page 1 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee I appreciate the opportunity to be
here today to discuss GAO?s work on efforts to prepare for and respond to
chemical and biological terrorist attacks. With the coordinated terrorist
attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the top of the country?s national
security and law enforcement agendas. With the current investigations into
anthrax incidents, the threat remains at the top of those agendas. My
comments are based upon four of our recent reports. 1 The first report was
on the West Nile Virus outbreak in New York City and its implications for
public health preparedness. The second was on federal teams that could
respond to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks.
The third was on federal research and preparedness programs specific to
biological terrorism. And finally, the fourth report summarized our overall
work on combating terrorism over the last 5 years. In these reports, and the
earlier work that preceded them, we have taken a detailed look at programs
to prepare for and respond to terrorism, including chemical and biological
terrorism. 2

My statement, after providing some background, will first discuss the
growing uncertainties regarding the terrorist threat and the need for a risk
management approach. Next, I will discuss some of the specific federal
programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological agents or
weapons. Third, I will discuss some of the problems identified in
evaluations of chemical and biological preparedness. Finally, I will make
some suggestions for the Congress to consider for investing resources in
chemical and biological preparedness.

In summary, the nature of the terrorist threat appears to be more uncertain
since the September 11 attacks. Preparing for all possible contingencies is
not practical, so a risk management approach should be used. This would
include a threat assessment to determine which chemical or biological agents
are of most concern. The federal government has a

1 The four reports discussed are West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for
Public Health Preparedness (GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180, Sept. 11, 2000); Combating
Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities
Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO- 01- 14, Nov. 30, 2000); Bioterrorism:
Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO- 01- 915, Sept. 28, 2001);
and Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations
(GAO- 01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001).

2 A more complete list of GAO products related to terrorism appears at the
end of this statement.

Page 2 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

variety of programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological
terrorism, including response teams, support laboratories, training and
equipment programs, and research efforts. Evaluations of chemical and
biological preparedness have identified a number of problems and their
solutions. Some of these solutions to improve the response to chemical and
biological terrorism have broad applicability across a variety of
contingencies while other response requirements are applicable to only a
specific type of attack. For example, efforts to improve public health
surveillance would be useful in any disease outbreak, whereas efforts to
provide vaccines for smallpox would be useful only if terrorists used
smallpox in a biological attack. The Congress faces competing demands for
spending as it seeks to invest resources to better prepare our nation for
chemical and biological terrorism. Funding to combat terrorism, which was
originally budgeted to be less than $13 billion, may exceed $50 billion for
fiscal year 2002, including supplemental emergency contingency funding.
Given the uncertainty of the chemical and biological threat, the Congress
may want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad applicability
over those that are only applicable under a specific type of chemical or
biological attack. As threat information becomes more certain, it may be
more appropriate to invest in efforts only applicable to specific chemical
or biological agents.

Federal programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological
terrorist attacks operate under an umbrella of various policies and
contingency plans. Federal policies on combating terrorism are laid out in a
series of presidential directives and implementing guidance. 3 These
documents divide the federal response to terrorist attacks into two
categories- crisis management and consequence management. Crisis management
includes efforts to stop a terrorist attack, arrest terrorists, and gather
evidence for criminal prosecution. Crisis management is led by the
Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All
federal agencies and departments, as needed, would support the Department of
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on- scene commander.
Consequence management includes efforts to provide medical treatment and
emergency services, evacuate people from dangerous areas, and restore
government services. Consequence

3 For a compendium of relevant federal policy and planning documents for
combating terrorism, see app. I of GAO- 01- 822. In addition to documents
mentioned in that report, the President signed Executive Order 13228 on Oct.
8, 2001, which established a new Office of Homeland Security. Background on

Federal Policies, Plans, and Coordination Problems

Page 3 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

management activities of the federal government are led by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency in support of state and local authorities.
Unlike crisis management, the federal government does not have primary
responsibility for consequence management; state and local authorities do.
Crisis and consequence management activities may overlap and run
concurrently during the emergency response and are dependent upon the nature
of the incident.

In a chemical or biological terrorist incident, the federal government would
operate under one or more contingency plans. The U. S. Government
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan establishes
conceptual guidelines for assessing and monitoring a developing threat,
notifying appropriate agencies concerning the nature of the threat, and
deploying necessary advisory and technical resources to assist the lead
federal agency in facilitating interdepartmental coordination of crisis and
consequence management activities. In the event that the President declares
a national emergency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency also would
coordinate the federal response using a generic disaster contingency plan
called the Federal Response Plan. This plan- which has an annex specific for
terrorism- outlines the roles of federal agencies in consequence management
during terrorist attacks. More specifically, the plan outlines the planning
assumptions, policies, concept of operation, organizational structures, and
specific assignment of responsibilities to lead departments and agencies in
providing federal assistance. The plan categorizes the types of assistance
into specific ?emergency support functions.? Examples of emergency support
functions include mass care and health and medical services. In addition,
several individual agencies have their own contingency plans or guidance
specific to their activities. 4

Our September 20, 2001, report found significant coordination and
fragmentation problems across the various federal agencies that combat
terrorism. 5 In May 1998, the President established a National Coordinator
within the National Security Council to better lead and coordinate these
federal programs; however, the position?s functions were never detailed in

4 An example of agency- specific guidance would be the U. S. Coast Guard?s
Interim Guidance Regarding Coast Guard Response to Weapons of Mass
Destruction Incidents of June 2000. For a list of additional plans and
guidance by individual agencies, see app. II of GAO- 01- 822.

5 GAO- 01- 822, pp. 31- 43.

Page 4 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

either an executive order or legislation. Many of the overall leadership and
coordination functions that we had identified as critical were not given to
the National Coordinator. In fact, several agencies performed interagency
functions that we believed would have been performed more appropriately
above the level of individual agencies. The interagency roles of these
various agencies were not always clear and sometimes overlapped, which led
to a fragmented approach. For example, the Department of Justice, the
National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency all had been developing or planning to
develop potentially duplicative national strategies to combat terrorism. In
a more recent report and testimony, we provide additional examples of
coordination difficulties specific to biological terrorism. 6

To improve overall leadership and coordination of federal efforts to combat
terrorism, the President announced the creation of an Office of Homeland
Security on September 20, 2001, and specified its functions in Executive
Order 13228 on October 8, 2001. These actions represent potentially
significant steps toward improved coordination of federal activities and are
generally consistent with our recent recommendations. 7 Some questions that
remain to be addressed include how this new office will be structured, what
authority the Director will have, and how this effort can be
institutionalized and sustained over time.

There appears to be additional uncertainties about the terrorist threat in
general since the September 11 attacks. Before those attacks, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation had identified the largest domestic threat to be the

?lone wolf? terrorist- an individual who operated alone. U. S. intelligence
agencies had reported an increased possibility that terrorists would use
chemical or biological weapons in the next decade. However, terrorists would
have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to
successfully produce and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient
quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people

6 For example, fragmentation is evident in the different threat lists of
biological agents developed by federal departments and agencies (see GAO-
01- 915, p. 18). Our recent testimony, Bioterrorism: Public Health and
Medical Preparedness (GAO- 02- 141T, Oct. 9, 2001) also included a graphic
representation of the complicated coordination networks involved (see its
app. III, fig. 1).

7 Our recent summary report highlighted a number of important
characteristics and responsibilities necessary for a single focal point,
such as the Office of Homeland Security, to improve coordination and
accountability (see GAO- 01- 822, pp. 41- 42). New Uncertainties

Regarding the Terrorist Threat

Page 5 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. In most
cases, specialized knowledge is required in the manufacturing process and in
improvising an effective delivery device for most chemical and nearly all
biological agents that could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of
the required components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of
biological agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists may have to
overcome other obstacles to successfully launch an attack that would result
in mass casualties, such as unfavorable meteorological conditions and
personal safety risks.

On September 11, terrorists redefined the term ?weapon of mass destruction.?
Up to that point, that term generally referred to chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. As clearly shown on September
11, a terrorist attack would not have to fit that definition to result in
mass casualties, destruction of critical infrastructures, economic losses,
and disruption of daily life nationwide. The attack increased the
uncertainties regarding the threat, although terrorists would still face the
technical challenges described above in conducting chemical or biological
attacks. The uncertainty has increased because the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon were conducted by a large group of
conspirators rather than one individual. In addition, the terrorists were
executing a long- planned coordinated attack, showing a level of
sophistication that may not have been anticipated by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation- the agency responsible for monitoring national security
threats within the United States. Also, the terrorists were willing to
commit suicide in the attacks, showing no concern for their own personal
safety, which was considered one of the barriers to using chemical or
biological agents. And most recently, the threat of anthrax has gone from a
series of hoaxes to actual cases under investigation by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

Given the uncertainty about the threat, we continue to believe that a risk
management approach is necessary to enhance domestic preparedness against
terrorist threats. Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to
consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or
function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the
consequences of an attack. While the risk cannot be eliminated entirely,
enhancing protection from known or potential threats can reduce the risk.
This approach includes three key elements: a threat assessment, a
vulnerability assessment, and a criticality assessment (assessing the
importance or significance of a target). This approach would include a
threat assessment to determine which chemical or biological agents are of
most concern. Without the benefits that a risk

Page 6 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

management approach provides, many agencies have been relying on worst case
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear scenarios to generate
countermeasures or establish their programs. By using worst case scenarios,
the federal government is focusing on vulnerabilities (which are unlimited)
rather than credible threats (which are limited). As stated in our recent
testimony, a risk management approach could help the United States prepare
for the threats it faces and allow us to focus finite resources on areas of
greatest need. 8

A terrorist attack using chemical or biological weapons presents an array of
complex issues to state and local first responders. These responders would
include police, firefighters, emergency medical services, and hazardous
material technicians. They must identify the agent used so as to rapidly
decontaminate victims and apply appropriate medical treatments. If the
incident overwhelms state and local response capabilities, they may call on
federal agencies to provide assistance. To provide such assistance, the
federal government has a variety of programs to prepare for and respond to
chemical and biological terrorism, including response teams, support
laboratories, training and equipment programs, and research efforts, as
follows.

 Federal agencies have special teams that can respond to terrorist
incidents involving chemical or biological agents or weapons. These teams
perform a wide variety of functions, such as hands- on response; providing
technical advice to state, local, or federal authorities; or coordinating
the response efforts of other federal teams. Figure 1 shows selected federal
teams that could respond to a chemical or biological terrorist incident. 9

 Federal agencies also have laboratories that may support response teams by
performing tests to analyze and test samples of chemical and biological
agents. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform functions that
enable federal response teams to perform their role. For example, when a
diagnosis is confirmed at a laboratory, response teams can begin to treat
victims appropriately.

 Federal agencies also have programs to train and equip state and local
authorities to respond to chemical and biological terrorism. The programs

8 Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach (GAO- 02-
150T, Oct. 12, 2001). 9 For a more detailed description of these federal
teams, including their mission, authority, personnel, and response times,
see GAO- 01- 14, app. I. Federal Programs to

Respond to Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Page 7 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

have improved domestic preparedness by training and equipping over 273,000
first responders. The programs also have included exercises to allow first
responders to interact with themselves and federal responders.

 Finally, federal agencies have a number of research and development
projects underway to combat terrorism. Examples of recently developed and
fielded technologies include products to detect and identify chemical and
biological weapons. Additional research and/ or development projects include
chemical monitoring devices and new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and
antivirals.

Figure 1: Federal Response Teams for Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Note: This figure includes federal teams for both crisis and consequence
management in a terrorist incident involving chemical or biological agents.
Federal agencies have additional teams not shown that might be used in
conventional, radiological, or nuclear incidents.

Source: GAO analysis.

Page 8 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

There are a variety of chemical agents potentially used by terrorists. These
chemical agents could be dispersed as a gas, vapor, liquid, or aerosol. A
chemical agent could be disseminated by explosive or mechanical delivery.
Some chemicals disperse rapidly and others remain toxic for days or weeks
and require decontamination and clean up. Rapid exposure to a highly
concentrated agent would increase the number of casualties. Federal, state,
and local officials generally agree that a chemical terrorist incident would
look like a major hazardous material emergency. According to the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, over 600 local and state hazardous
material teams will be the first to respond to a chemical incident. If local
responders are unable to manage the situation or are overwhelmed, the
incident commander has access to state and federal assets. A variety of
federal teams could be deployed to provide assistance. 10

Terrorists also can potentially use a variety of biological agents.
Biological agents must be disseminated by some means that infects enough
individuals to initiate a disease epidemic. According to a wide range of
experts in science, health, intelligence, and biological warfare and a
technical report, the most effective way to disseminate a biological agent
is by aerosol. This method allows the simultaneous respiratory infection of
a large number of people. A few biological agents (e. g., plague and
smallpox) are communicable and can be spread beyond those directly affected
by the weapon or dissemination device. The release of a biological agent or
weapon may not be known for several days until victims present themselves to
medical personnel in doctors? offices, clinics, and emergency rooms where
the symptoms might easily be confused with influenza or other less virulent
illnesses. Accordingly, the critical detection of the biological agent
begins with the public health infrastructure that detects outbreaks of
illness, identifies the sources and modes of transmission, and performs
rapid agent laboratory identification. Once diagnosis of a biological agent
is confirmed, treating victims may require the use of federal consequence
management teams and the items from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.
Again, a variety of federal teams could be deployed to provide assistance.
11

10 For a detailed discussion of what teams would perform what functions in a
chemical terrorist incident, see GAO- 01- 14, app. III. 11 For a detailed
discussion of what teams would perform what functions in a biological
terrorist incident, see GAO- 01- 14, app. IV. Characteristics of

Chemical Terrorism Characteristics of Biological Terrorism

Page 9 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

We have identified a number of problems that require solutions in order to
improve preparedness for chemical and biological terrorism. Some of these
are included in our recent reports and testimony. For example, our report on
the West Nile Virus outbreak identified specific weaknesses in the public
health system that need to be addressed to improve preparedness for
biological terrorism. 12 Our recent report on biological terrorism examined
evaluations of the effectiveness of federal programs to prepare state and
local authorities. 13 For this statement, we also conducted an analysis of
federal exercise evaluations to identify problems associated with chemical
and biological terrorism that needed to be solved. In doing this, we
examined 50 evaluations representing 40 separate exercises with chemical or
biological scenarios.

Based upon our review, the problems and their solutions fell into two
categories. These categories were (1) generic problems and solutions that
are generally applicable to any type of terrorist incident, major accident,
or natural disaster, and (2) problems and solutions that are applicable to
both chemical and biological terrorist events. Specific examples of each
category follow.

The first category of problems and their solutions are generally applicable
to any type of terrorist incident. These would apply not only to chemical
and biological terrorism but also to all hazards including emergencies
unrelated to terrorism, such as major accidents or natural disasters.

 Command and control. The roles, responsibilities, and the legal authority
to plan and carry out a response to a weapon of mass destruction terrorist
incident are not always clear, which could result in a delayed and
inadequate response.

 Planning and operations. State and local emergency operations plans do not
always conform to federal plans. The operational procedures for requesting
federal assistance are not always compatible with state and local
procedures.

 Resource management and logistics. State and local governments can be
overwhelmed with the resource management and logistical requirements of
managing a large incident, particularly after the arrival of additional
state and federal assets. For example, state and local officials could have

12 See GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180. 13 See GAO- 01- 915. Problems Identified in

Preparing for Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Page 10 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

difficulty providing support to numerous military units that might be
needed.

 Communication. Interoperability difficulties exist at the interagency and
intergovernmental levels. Also, the public health community lacks robust
communication systems, protocols, equipment, and facilities.

 Exercises. Many exercises focus primarily on crisis management, which
often ends in a successful tactical resolution of the incident and do not
include more likely scenarios where terrorist attacks are successful,
requiring a consequence management exercise component.

 Mass casualties. Overall planning and integration among agencies are
needed for mass casualty management, including conventional terrorist
incidents. Also, medical surge capacity for any type of weapon of mass
destruction event may be limited. Disposition of bodies would also be an
issue.

The second category of problems and their solutions are applicable to
chemical or biological incidents. They would not be relevant in a
conventional, radiological, or nuclear terrorist incident; however, they
would be relevant in other chemical or biological events not related to
terrorism, such as an accidental release of chemicals or a natural outbreak
of a disease. They vary in their level of applicability, with some only
being applicable to specific chemical or biological agents.

 Public health surveillance. Basic capacity for public health surveillance
is lacking. Improved public health- coordinated surveillance for biological
terrorism and emerging infectious diseases is an urgent preparedness
requirement at the local level.

 Detection and risk assessment. The capability of first responders and
specialized response teams to rapidly and accurately detect, recognize, and
identify chemical or biological agents and assess the associated health
risks can be slow. Also, following the release of a chemical or biological
agent, emergency hazardous material teams do not always conduct a downwind
analysis of the toxic cloud, which could delay a decision to evacuate
potentially affected populations.

 Protective equipment and training. First responders often lack special
personal protective equipment (level- A protective clothing and masks) to
safeguard them from chemical or biological agents and could become
contaminated themselves. Training curricula deal with the technical level of
response, such as treatment protocols, but do not describe operational
guidelines and strategies for responding to large- scale public health
emergencies. Physicians sometimes lack adequate training to recognize
chemical and biological agents.

Page 11 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

 Chemical and biological- specific planning. Emergency operations plans and
?all- hazard? plans do not adequately address the response to a largescale
chemical or biological terrorism event. Plans often do not address chemical
or biological incidents.

 Hospital notification and decontamination. Delays could occur in the
notification of local hospitals that a biological incident has occurred. By
the time the hospitals are notified, they could become contaminated by self-
referred patients, have to close, and not treat other victims. First
responders could become victims themselves and contaminate emergency rooms.

 Distribution of pharmaceuticals. State and local health officials have
found it difficult to break down and distribute tons of medical supplies
contained in push- packages from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.

 Vaccines and pharmaceuticals. Some pharmaceuticals, such as antibiotics,
are generic and can be used to treat several different biological agents,
whereas others, such as vaccines, are agent- specific. An example would be
the smallpox vaccine, which would only be useful if terrorists used smallpox
in an attack.

 Laboratories. Even a small outbreak of an emerging disease would strain
resources. There is a need for broadening laboratory capabilities, ensuring
adequate staffing and expertise, and improving the ability to deal with
surges in testing needs.

 Medical and veterinary coordination. Problems exist in communication
between public health officials and veterinary officials. The local and
state veterinary disaster response plan may not adequately address the
impact of a biological incident on the animal population, which could have
dramatic health, economic, and public relations implications.

 Quarantine. Quarantine would be resource- intensive and would require a
well- planned strategy to implement and sustain. Questions that have to be
addressed include implementation authority, enforcement, logistics,
financial support, and the psychological ramifications of quarantine.

The Congress may want to consider several factors before investing resources
in the rapidly growing budget for combating terrorism. Even before September
11, funding to combat terrorism had increased 78 percent from the fiscal
year 1998 level of about $7.2 billion to the proposed fiscal year 2002
budget of about $12.8 billion. After September 11, the Congress approved the
President?s request for $20 billion in emergency assistance and provided an
additional $20 billion to supplement existing contingency funds. Thus,
terrorism- related funding in fiscal year 2002 may exceed $50 billion.
Further, a number of additional funding proposals have been introduced in
the Congress that could further raise that amount. Suggestions to

Consider for Investing Resources

Page 12 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

The challenge facing the Congress and the nation is to invest new resources
where they will make the most difference in protecting people and responding
to terrorist attacks, including those involving chemical and biological
agents or weapons. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have profoundly
changed the management agendas of the Congress, the White House, federal
agencies, and state and local governments. However, as we respond to the
urgent priorities and the enduring requirements of combating terrorism, our
nation still must address the short- term and longterm fiscal challenges
that were present before September 11 and that remain today. It is important
to remember that the long- term pressures on the budget from competing
programs have not lessened. In fact, long- term pressures have increased due
to the slowing economy and the spending levels expected for fiscal year
2002. As a result, the ultimate task of addressing today?s urgent needs
without unduly exacerbating our longrange fiscal challenges has become more
difficult.

As discussed above, the nature of the threat appears to have become more
uncertain since the September 11 attacks. Despite this uncertainty,
preparing for all possible contingencies is not practical because
vulnerabilities are unlimited, so a risk management approach is needed to
help focus resource investments. Efforts to better prepare for chemical and
biological attacks include solutions that have broad applicability across a
variety of contingencies and solutions that are applicable to only a
specific type of attack. For example, efforts to improve public health
surveillance would be useful in any disease outbreak, whereas efforts to
provide vaccines for smallpox would be useful only if terrorists used
smallpox in a biological attack. Given the uncertainty of the chemical and
biological terrorist threat and continued fiscal concerns, the Congress may
want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad applicability
rather than those that are only applicable under a specific type of chemical
or biological attack. As threat information becomes more certain, it may be
more appropriate to invest in efforts only applicable to specific chemical
or biological agents. This approach would focus finite resources on areas of
greatest need using a risk management approach.

As stated initially, this testimony is based largely upon recent GAO
reports. In addition, we sought to determine what types of problems might
arise in responding to chemical and biological terrorist attacks. To do so,
we analyzed after- action reports and other evaluations from federal
exercises that simulated chemical and biological terrorist attacks. The
scope of this analysis was governmentwide. Our methodology initially
identified and catalogued after- action reports and evaluations from federal
Scope and

Methodology

Page 13 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

exercises over the last 6 fiscal years (fiscal years 1996 to 2001). The
analysis was limited to those 50 after- action reports (representing 40
different exercises) that had a chemical and/ or biological terrorism
component. The analysis did not include exercises involving radiological
and/ or nuclear agents, and it does not represent all federal after- action
reports for combating terrorism exercises during that period. We then
identified specific problems and issues associated with chemical and
biological terrorism exercises. We compared those specific problems and
solutions to determine which ones were specific to chemical and to
biological incidents.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee may have.

Contact and Acknowledgments

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)
512- 4300. For information specifically on biological terrorism please
contact Janet Heinrich at (202) 512- 7250. Stephen L. Caldwell, Mark A.
Pross, James C. Lawson, Harry L. Purdy, Jason G. Venner, and M. Jane Hunt
made key contributions to this statement.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach

(GAO- 02- 150T, Oct. 12, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs

(GAO- 02- 149T, Oct. 10, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness (GAO- 02- 141T, Oct. 9,
2001).

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness (GAO- 02- 129T, Oct. 5, 2001).

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities

(GAO- 01- 915, Sept. 28, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations (GAO-
01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H. R. 525 to Create a President?s Council
on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness (GAO- 01- 555T, May 9, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement (GAO- 01- 666T, May 1, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response
(GAO- 01- 660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement (GAO- 01- 463, Mar. 30, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy (GAO- 01- 556T, Mar. 27, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response (GAO- 01- 15, Mar. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO- 01- 14, Nov. 30, 2000).

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness

(GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180, Sept. 11, 2000). Related GAO Products

Page 15 GAO- 02- 162T Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R& D Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 130, Mar. 22, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly
Managed (GAO/ T- HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 59, Mar. 8, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly
Managed (GAO/ HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate
Contamination (GAO/ RCED- 00- 3, Oct. 27, 1999).

(350130)
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